Civil Law: Legal Briefs

ANNULMENT;ROOT CAUSE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
EXTRA-JUDICIAL PARTITION ALLOWED WHEN NO CREDITORS AFFECTED
Without creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an
agreement for distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by the
rules from which, in the first place, nothing can be inferred that a writing or other formality is essential
for the partition to be valid
MEETING OF THE MINDS IN A CONTRACT OF SALE
The meeting of the minds in a contract speaks of the intent of the parties in entering into the contract
respecting the subject matter and the consideration thereof, and if the words of the contract appear to
be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former.
PROPERTY; ACCRETION; REQUISITES
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code, requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land
where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river
ADOPTION; STATUTES; PURPOSE
The main purpose of adoption statutes is the promotion of the welfare of children. The law must also
be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to
provide home, love, care and education for less fortunate children.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AGENT AND BROKER
An agent receives a commission upon the successful conclusion of a sale. A broker earns his pay
merely by bringing the buyer and the seller together, even if no sale is eventually made. The fact that a
person invested his own money to put service centers and showrooms does not necessarily prove that
he is not an agent of a car manufacturer.
MORTGAGE; SPECIAL POWERS OF ATTORNEY;EFFECT AGAINST THIRD PERSONS
WITH NO KNOWLEDGE.
Absent a valid revocation duly furnished to the mortgagee, Special Powers of Attorney continue to
have force and effect as against third persons who had no knowledge of such lack of authority.
AGENCY; SCOPE OF AUTHORITY.
As far as third persons are concerned, an act is deemed to have been performed within the scope of the
agent's authority if such is within the the terms of the power of attorney as written even if the agent has
in fact exceeded the limits of his authority according to the understanding between the principal and
the agent.
ALTERATION PLANS;MAJORITY OF HOMEOWNERS CONSENT NEEDED.
In alteration plans, written approval of the National Housing Authority alone is not sufficient. It must
be coupled with the written conformity or consent of the duly organized homeowners association or the
majority of the lot buyers.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CAUSE AND MOTIVE.
Cause is the essential reason for the contract, while motive is the particular reason of a contracting
party which does not affect the other party and which does not preclude the existence of a different
consideration. Article 1351 of the Civil Code provides that "the particular motives of the parties in
entering into a contract are different from the cause thereof."

CONSIGNATION; INAPPLICABLE TO LEASE WITH OPTION TO BUY

In Vda. de Quirino v. Palarca, it was ruled that consignation referred to in Article 1256 of the Civil
Code is inapplicable to a lease with option to buy because said provision refers to consignation as one
of the means for the payment or discharge of a "debt," whereas the lessee was not indebted to the lessor
for the price of the leased premises. The lessee merely exercised a right of option and had no obligation
to pay said price until execution of the deed of sale in his favor, which the lessor refused to do.
PROPERTY;LIS PENDENS; DEFINED.
Lis pendens is a Latin term which literally means a pending suit or a pending litigation while a notice
of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation,
serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over the said property does so at his own risk, or
that he gambles on the result of the litigation over the said property. It is but a signal to the intending
buyer or mortgagee to take care or beware and to investigate the prospect or non-prospect of the
litigation succeeding before he forks down his money.
CONTRACTS; EXTRAORDINARY INFLATION
It is only when an extraordinary inflation supervenes that the law affords the parties a relief in
contractual obligations.Art. 1250 of the Civil Code provides that "in case an extraordinary inflation or
deflation of the currency stipulated should supervene, the value of the currency at the time of the
establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of the payment, unless there is an agreement to the
contrary." In Filipino Pipe and Foundry Corporation v. NAWASA, the Court explained extraordinary
inflation thus: "Extraordinary inflation exists when 'there is a decrease or increase in the purchasing
power of the Philippine currency which is unusual or beyond the common fluctuation in the value of
said currency, and such decrease or increase could not have been reasonably foreseen or was
manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time of the establishment of the obligation.
(Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. IV, p. 284.)
LAND TITLES; UNRECORDED TITLE OF A HOUSE OF A PRIOR DATE PREFERRED
OVER RECORDED MORTGAGE OF SAME HOUSE
It should not be amiss to state by reference a case wherein the Supreme Court held that between an
unrecorded title of a house of a prior date and a recorded mortgage of the same house of later date, the
former is preferred for the reason that, if the original owner had parted with his ownership of the thing
sold, then he no longer had the ownership and free disposal of that thing so as to be able to mortgage it.
CONTRACTS; INTENTION OF PARTIES ASCERTAINED BY WORDS USED.
The important task in contract interpretation is always the ascertainment of the intention of the
contracting parties and that task is of course to be discharged by looking to the words they used to
project that intention in their contract, all the words not just a particular word or two, and words in
context not words standing alone.
CONTRACTS; LEASE; PERIOD OF LEASE DEEMED TO BENEFIT BOTH PARTIES.
It is also important to bear in mind that in a reciprocal contract like a lease, the period of the lease must
be deemed to have been agreed upon for the benefit of both parties, absent language showing that the
term was deliberately set for the benefit of the lessee or lessor alone. We are not aware of any
presumption in law that the term of a lease is designated for the benefit of the lessee alone.
DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE 33 OF CIVIL CODE; ONLY PREPONDERANCE OF
EVIDENCE REQUIRED.
To hold a person liable for damages under Article 33 of the Civil Code, only a preponderance of
evidence is required. An acquittal in a criminal case is not a bar to the filing of an action for civil
damages, for one may not be criminally liable and still be civilly liable. Thus, the outcome or result of
the criminal case, whether an acquittal or conviction, is really inconsequential and will be of no
moment in the civil action.
ARTICLE 33 OF THE CIVIL CODE; REASON FOR BURDEN OF PROOF
To subordinate the civil action contemplated in Arts. 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code to the result of the
criminal prosecution would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action when, on
the contrary, the law provides that such civil action "may proceed independently of the criminal
proceeding and regardless of the result of the latter." Art. 33 of the Civil Code contemplates a civil

action for recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case. This
is the reason why only a preponderance of evidence and not proof beyond reasonable doubt is deemed
sufficient in such civil action.
CONTRACTS; INTERPRETATION OF STIPULATIONS IN LEASE CONTRACT.
The new rule, therefore, is that a stipulation in the lease contract which provides for the extension of
the period of lease, the terms and conditions of which are subject to the mutual agreement of the lessor
and the lessee, should be interpreted to mean that the lease may be extended only upon mutual
agreement of the parties and not at the option alone of the lessee or even the lessor for that matter.
PROPERTY; IMPROVEMENTS ON PROPERTY; PROOF NEEDED TO DETERMINE
REIMBURSEMENT.
The Civil Code says that improvements, "whether for utility or adornment, made on the separate
property of the spouses through advancements from the partnership or through the industry of either
the husband or the wife, belong to the conjugal partnership," and buildings "constructed, at the expense
of the partnership, during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to the
partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same." Proof,
therefore, is needful of the time of the making or construction of the improvements and the source of
the funds used therefor, in order to determine the character of the improvements as belonging to the
conjugal partnership or to one spouse separately.
ARTICLE 1080 OF THE CIVIL CODE; TWO OPTIONS FOR MAKING A PARTITION OF
ESTATE.
Article 1080 of the New Civil Code allows a person to make a partition of his estate either by an act
inter vivos or by will and such partition shall be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime
of the compulsory heirs. While the law prohibits contracts upon future inheritance, the partition by the
parent, as provided in Art. 1080, is a case expressly authorized by law. Art. 1080 of the Civil Code
clearly gives a person two options in making a partition of his estate; either by an act inter vivos or by
will. When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must be executed in
accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person makes the partition of his
estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a
will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs.
PAROL PARTITIONS; MAY BE SUSTAINED ON GROUND OF ESTOPPEL; MAY BE
RECOGNIZED BY COURT FOR CONCLUDING RIGHTS OF PARTIES.
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained on the ground of
estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol
partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were
exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for
the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in
severalty. A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced
in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect
thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.
CONSIGNATION; INAPPLICABLE TO A LEASE WITH OPTION TO BUY.
In Vda. de Quirino v. Palarca, it was ruled that consignation referred to in Article 1256 of the Civil
Code is inapplicable to a lease with option to buy because said provision refers to consignation as one
of the means for the payment or discharge of a "debt," whereas the lessee was not indebted to the lessor
for the price of the leased premises. The lessee merely exercised a right of option and had no obligation
to pay said price until execution of the deed of sale in his favor, which the lessor refused to do.
ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES; MUST BE PROVED WITH REASONABLE
DEGREE OF CERTAINTY.
Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved, and proved with
reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the
fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have suffered and on
evidence of the actual amount thereof.

VALID TENDER OF PAYMENT; ENOUGH TO EXERCISE RIGHT OF REPURCHASE.

Since the case at bar involves the exercise of the right to repurchase, a showing that petitioner made a
valid tender of payment is sufficient. It is enough that a sincere or genuine tender of payment and not a
mock or deceptive one was made. The fact that he deposited the amount of repurchase money with the
Clerk of Court was simply an additional security for the petitioner. It was not an essential act that had
to be performed after tender of payment was refused by the private respondent although it may serve to
indicate the veracity of desire to comply with the obligation.
OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; TENDER OF PAYMENT OF A JUDGMENT NOT SAME
AS TENDER OF PAYMENT OF CONTRACTUAL DEBT.
Moreover, as previously shown, the rights and obligations of the parties arose from a judgment, not
from contract and therefore the Civil Code requirements as to consignation are not applicable. Thus, in
case of refusal of a tender of the amount due on a judgment, the court may direct the money to be paid
in court and when this is done, order satisfaction of the judgment to be entered. The tender of payment
of a judgment is not the same as tender of payment of a contractual debt and consignation of the
money due from a debtor to a creditor. The requisites of consignation under Art. 1256 et seq. do not
apply to the former.
DAMAGES; MERE FILING OF A COMPLAINT IS NOT PER SE EVIDENCE OF ILL WILL
ON WHICH A CLAIM FOR DAMGES MAY BE BASED.
It has not been sufficiently established that the complaint they filed was intended merely to harass and
place petitioner in disrepute as they apparently were pursuing a cause of action they sincerely believed
was meritorious. The fact that they have failed does not necessarily mean that they were acting in bad
faith. The mere filing of a complaint against a person, while it may cause him some anxiety, is not per
se evidence of ill will on which a claim for damages may be based. A contrary role would discourage
peaceful recourse to the courts of justice and induce resort to methods less than legal, and perhaps even
violent.
CONTRACTS; INTERPRETATION; LITERAL MEANING SHALL CONTROL.
It is a basic and fundamental rule in the interpretation of contract that if the terms thereof are clear and
leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning shall control. In order
to judge the intention of the parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally
considered.
WILLS AND SUCCESSION; PROBATE OF A WILL; DOES NOT LOOK INTO ITS
INTRINSIC VALIDITY.
Normally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity. The authentication of a will
decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with
those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of the wills. It does not
determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions of the will, thus
may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The question relating to
these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated.
POSSESSION; MUST BE ADVERSE TO CONSITUTE THE FOUNDATION OF A
PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT.
Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be
possession under claim of title (en concepto de dueno), or to use the common law equivalent of the
term, it must be adverse. Acts of possessory character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance
of the owner are clearly not en concepto de dueno, and such possessory acts, no matter how long so
continued, do not start the running of the period of prescription.
POSSESSION;ACTION FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER;PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN
OF PROOF.
In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the main issue is one of priority of possession. The legal
right thereto is not essential to the possessor's cause of action, for no one may take law into his own
hands and forcibly eject another or deprive him of his possession by stealth, even if his title thereto
were questionable or actually disputed in another case. If the plaintiff can prove prior physical

possession in himself, he may recover such possession even from the owner, but on the other hand, if
he cannot prove such prior physical possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer
even if he should be the owner of the property.
DONATIONS; REQUIREMENTS FOR DONATION OF AN IMMOVABLE; REGISTRATION
OF DONATION.
Article 749 of the Civil Code provides inter alia that "in order that the donation of an immovable may
be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value
of the charges which the donee must satisfy." Corollarily, Article 709 of the same Code explicitly
states that "the titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are not duly
inscribed or annotated in the Registry of property shall not prejudice third persons." From the
foregoing provisions, it may be inferred that as between the parties to a donation of an immovable
property, all that is required is for said donation to be contained in a public document. Registration is
not necessary for it to be considered valid and effective. However, in order to bind third persons, the
donation must be registered in the Registry of Property (now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds).
Although the non-registration of a deed of donation shall not affect its validity, the necessity of
registration comes into play when the rights of third persons are affected.
POSSESSION; PURCHASER AT AUCTION SALE NOT OBLIGED TO BRING SUIT FOR
POSSESSION AFTER LASE OF ONE YEAR REDEMPTION PERIOD.
There is no law in this jurisdiction whereby the purchaser at a sheriff's sale of real property is obliged
to bring a separate and independent suit for possession after the one-year period for redemption has
expired and after he has obtained the sheriff's final certificate of sale. There is neither legal ground nor
reason of public policy precluding the court from ordering the sheriff in this case to yield possession of
the property purchased at public auction where it appears that the judgment debtor is the one in
possession thereof and no rights of third persons are involved.
MORTGAGE; SUBORDINATE LIEN HOLDER; A PROPER PARTY TO A FORECLOSURE
PROCEEDING.
A subordinate lien holder is a proper, even a necessary, but not an indispensable, party to a foreclosure
proceeding. Appropriate relief could be granted by the court to the mortgagee in the foreclosure
proceeding, without affecting the rights of the subordinate lien holders. The effect of the failure on the
part of the mortgagee to make the subordinate lien holder a defendant is that the decree entered in the
foreclosure proceeding would not deprive the subordinate lien holder of his right of redemption. A
decree of foreclosure in a suit to which the holders of a second lien are not parties leaves the equity of
redemption in favor of such lien holders unforeclosed and unaffected.
SALE OF LAND IS VALID REGARDLESS OF FORM; REQUISITE UNDER ARTICLE 1458
OF THE CIVIL CODE FOR CONVENIENCE ONLY.
A sale of land is valid regardless of the form it may have been entered into. The requisite form under
Article 1458 of the Civil Code is merely for greater efficacy or convenience and the failure to comply
therewith does not affect the validity and binding effect of the act between the parties. If the law
requires a document or other special form, as in the sale of real property, the contracting parties may
compel each other to observe that form, once the contract has been perfected. Their right may be
exercised simultaneously with action upon the contract.
OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION; DISTINGUISHED.
It must be stressed that possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership exists when
a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law
and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is
the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding
of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a
thing with or without right.
WILLS; PROBATE DOES NOT LOOK INTO INTRINSIC VALIDITY.
Normally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity. The authentication of a will
decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with

those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of the wills. It does not
determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions of the will, thus
may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The question relating to
these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated.
FORECLOSURE SALE; RIGHTS OF BUYER THEREOF; BOND REQUIREMENT.
It is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if
it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled
to the possession of the said property and can demand it at any time following the consolidation of
ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title. The buyer can in
fact demand possession of the land even during the redemption period except that he has to post a bond
in accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3133 as amended. No such bond is required after the
redemption period if the property is not redeemed. Possession of the land then becomes an absolute
right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon proper application and proof of title, the issuance of
the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
MORAL DAMAGES; PURPOSE THEREOF.
The purpose of moral damages is essentially indemnity or reparation, both punishment or correction.
Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant;
they are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will
serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. In
other words, the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the possible, of
the spiritual status quo ante and, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
CONTRACTS; STIPULATION POUR AUTRUI; DEFINITION AND REQUISITES.
A stipulation pour autrui is one in favor of a third person who may demand its fulfillment, provided he
communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. An incidental benefit or interest,
which another person gains, is not sufficient. The contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately
conferred a favor upon a third person. The requisites for such contract are: (1) the stipulation in favor
of a third person must be a part of the contract, and not the contract itself; (2) the favorable stipulation
should not be conditioned or compensated by any kind of obligation; and (3) neither of the contracting
parties bears the legal representation or authorization of the third party.
CONTRACTS; PERFECTION; QUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE.
Contracts that are consensual in nature, like a contract of sale, are perfected upon mere meeting of the
minds. Once there is concurrence between the offer and the acceptance upon the subject matter,
consideration, and terms of payment, a contract is produced. The offer must be certain. To convert the
offer into a contract, the acceptance must be absolute and must not qualify the terms of the offer; it
must be plain, unequivocal, unconditional, and without variance of any sort from the proposal. A
qualified acceptance, or one that involves a new proposal, constitutes a counter-offer and is a rejection
of the original offer. Consequently, when something is desired which is not exactly what is proposed
in the offer, such acceptance is not sufficient to generate consent because any modification or variation
from the terms of the offer annuls the offer.
REGISTRATION; NOT EQUIVALENT TO TITLE; TORRENS SYSTEM.
Registration is not the equivalent of title. Under the Torrens system, registration only gives validity to
the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. It was not established as a means of acquiring title to
private land because it merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership.