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Contention 1 is impacts its a new aff
Heg is good alternative is nuclear war
Kagan 12 (Robert Kagan, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, B.A., Yale University, M.P.P.,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Ph.D., American University, January 17,
2012, Not Fade Away: Against the Myth of American Decline, Brookings Institute,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/01/17-us-power-kagan)
The challenges today are great, and the rise of China is the most obvious of them. But they are not greater than the challenges the
United States faced during the Cold War. Only in retrospect can the Cold War seem easy. Americans at the end of World War II faced a major
strategic crisis. The Soviet Union, if only by virtue of its size and location, seemed to threaten vital strategic centers in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. In all these

To meet this challenge, the United States had to project its

own power, which was great but limited, into each of those regions. It had to form alliances with local powers, some of them former enemies, and
provide them with economic, political, and military assistance to help them stand on their own feet and resist Soviet pressure. In
regions, it confronted nations devastated and prostrate from the war.

the Cold War, the Soviets wielded influence and put pressure on American interests merely by standing still, while the United States had to scramble. It is worth recalling that
this strategy of containment, now hallowed by its apparent success, struck some influential observers at the time as entirely unworkable. Walter Lippmann attacked it as
misconceived, based on hope, conceding the strategic initiative to the Soviets while the United States exhausted its resources trying to establish satellite states, puppet

. Although China is and will be much richer, and

will wield greater economic influence in the world than the Soviet Union ever did, its geostrategic position is more difficult . World War II left
China in a comparatively weak position from which it has been working hard to recover ever since. Several of its neighbors are strong nations
with close ties to the United States. It will have a hard time becoming a regional hegemon so long as Taiwan
remains independent and strategically tied to the United States, and so long as strong regional powers such as Japan, Korea, and Australia continue
to host American troops and bases. China would need at least a few allies to have any chance of pushing the United States
out of its strongholds in the western Pacific, but right now it is the United States that has the allies. It is the United
States that has its troops deployed in forward bases. It is the United States that currently enjoys naval
predominance in the key waters and waterways through which China must trade. Altogether, Chinas task
as a rising great power, which is to push the United States out of its present position, is much harder than Americas task, which is
governments that were weak, ineffective, and unreliable. Today, in the case of China, the situation is reversed

only to hold on to what it has. Can the United States do that? In their pessimistic mood today, some Americans doubt that it can. Indeed, they doubt whether the United States
can afford to continue playing in any part of the world the predominant role that it has played in the past. Some argue that while Paul Kennedys warning of imperial

The fiscal crisis, the deadlocked political

system, the various maladies of American society (including wage stagnation and income inequality), the weaknesses of the
educational system, the deteriorating infrastructureall of these are cited these days as reasons why the United
States needs to retrench internationally, to pull back from some overseas commitments, to focus on nation building at home rather than try to keep shaping
the world as it has in the past. Again, these common assumptions require some examination. For one thing, how overstretched is the
overstretch may not have been correct in 1987, it accurately describes Americas current predicament.

United States? The answer, in historical terms, is not nearly as much as people imagine. Consider the straightforward matter of the number of troops that the United States
deploys overseas. To listen to the debate today, one might imagine there were more American troops committed abroad than ever before. But that is not remotely the case. In
1953, the United States had almost one million troops deployed overseas325,000 in combat in Korea and more than 600,000 stationed in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. In
1968, it had over one million troops on foreign soil537,000 in Vietnam and another half million stationed elsewhere. By contrast, in the summer of 2011, at the height of
Americas deployments in its two wars, there were about 200,000 troops deployed in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan combined, and another roughly 160,000 troops
stationed in Europe and East Asia. Altogether, and including other forces stationed around the world, there were about 500,000 troops deployed overseas. This was lower even
than the peacetime deployments of the Cold War. In 1957, for instance, there were over 750,000 troops deployed overseas. Only in the decade between the breakup of the
Soviet empire and the attacks of September 11 was the number of deployed forces overseas lower than it is today. The comparison is even more striking if one takes into
account the growth of the American population. When the United States had one million troops deployed overseas in 1953, the total American population was only 160 million.

. The country is twice as large, with half as

many troops deployed as fifty years ago. What about the financial expense? Many seem to believe that the cost of
these deployments, and of the armed forces generally, is a major contributor to the soaring fiscal deficits that threaten the
solvency of the national economy. But this is not the case, either. As the former budget czar Alice Rivlin has observed, the scary projections of future
deficits are not caused by rising defense spending, much less by spending on foreign assistance. The
runaway deficits projected for the coming years are mostly the result of ballooning entitlement spending. Even the most draconian
Today, when there are half a million troops deployed overseas, the American population is 313 million

cuts in the defense budget would produce annual savings of only $50 billion to $100 billion, a small fractionbetween 4 and 8 percentof the $1.5 trillion in annual deficits
the United States is facing. In 2002, when Paul Kennedy was marveling at Americas ability to remain the worlds single superpower on the cheap, the United States was
spending about 3.4 percent of GDP on defense. Today it is spending a little under 4 percent, and in years to come, that is likely to head lower againstill cheap by historical

. The cost of remaining the worlds predominant power is not prohibitive. If we are serious
about this exercise in accounting, moreover, the costs of maintaining this position cannot be measured
without considering the costs of losing it. Some of the costs of reducing the American role in the world are, of course, unquantifiable. What is
it worth to Americans to live in a world dominated by democracies rather than by autocracies? But some of
the potential costs could be measured, if anyone cared to try. If the decline of American military power produced an unraveling
standards

of the international economic order that American power has helped sustain; if trade routes and
waterways ceased to be as secure, because the U.S. Navy was no longer able to defend them; if
regional wars broke out among great powers because they were no longer constrained by the
American superpower; if American allies were attacked because the United States appeared unable to
come to their defense; if the generally free and open nature of the international system became less
soif all this came to pass, there would be measurable costs. And it is not too far-fetched to imagine that these costs would be far
greater than the savings gained by cutting the defense and foreign aid budgets by $100 billion a year. You can save money by buying a used car without a warranty and without

American military strength reduces the risk of accidents by

deterring conflict, and lowers the price of the accidents that occur by reducing the chance of
losing. These savings need to be part of the calculation, too. As a simple matter of dollars and cents, it may be a lot cheaper to preserve the
current level of American involvement in the world than to reduce it. Perhaps the greatest concern underlying the declinist
certain safety features, but what happens when you get into an accident?

mood at large in the country today is not really whether the United States can afford to continue playing its role in the world. It is whether the Americans are capable of solving
any of their most pressing economic and social problems. As many statesmen and commentators have asked, can Americans do what needs to be done to compete effectively in
the twenty-first-century world? The only honest answer is, who knows? If American history is any guide, however, there is at least some reason to be

Americans have experienced this unease before,

hopeful.
and many previous generations have also felt this sense of lost vigor and lost
virtue: as long ago as 1788, Patrick Henry lamented the nations fall from past glory, when the American spirit was in its youth. There have been many times over the past
two centuries when the political system was dysfunctional, hopelessly gridlocked, and seemingly unable to find solutions to crushing national problemsfrom slavery and then
Reconstruction, to the dislocations of industrialization at the end of the nineteenth century and the crisis of social welfare during the Great Depression, to the confusions and
paranoia of the early Cold War years. Anyone who honestly recalls the 1970s, with Watergate, Vietnam, stagflation, and the energy crisis, cannot really believe that our present

the American
system, for all its often stultifying qualities, has also shown a greater capacity to adapt and recover
from difficulties than many other nations, including its geopolitical competitors. This undoubtedly has
something to do with the relative freedom of American society, which rewards innovators, often
outside the existing power structure, for producing new ways of doing things; and with the relatively
open political system of America, which allows movements to gain steam and to influence the
behavior of the political establishment. The American system is slow and clunky in part because the Founders designed it that way, with a federal
difficulties are unrivaled. Success in the past does not guarantee success in the future. But one thing does seem clear from the historical evidence:

structure, checks and balances, and a written Constitution and Bill of Rightsbut the system also possesses a remarkable ability to undertake changes just when the steam
kettle looks about to blow its lid. There are occasional critical elections that allow transformations to occur, providing new political solutions to old and apparently insoluble
problems. Of course, there are no guarantees: the political system could not resolve the problem of slavery without war. But on many big issues throughout their history,
Americans have found a way of achieving and implementing a national consensus. When Paul Kennedy was marveling at the continuing success of the American superpower
back in 2002, he noted that one of the main reasons had been the ability of Americans to overcome what had appeared to him in 1987 as an insoluble long-term economic
crisis. American businessmen and politicians reacted strongly to the debate about decline by taking action: cutting costs, making companies leaner and meaner, investing in
newer technologies, promoting a communications revolution, trimming government deficits, all of which helped to produce significant year-on-year advances in

. It is possible to imagine that Americans may rise to this latest economic challenge as well . It is
also reasonable to expect that other nations will, as in the past, run into difficulties of their own. None of the nations
currently enjoying economic miracles is without problems. Brazil, India, Turkey, and Russia all have bumpy histories that suggest the
productivity

route ahead will not be one of simple and smooth ascent. There is a real question whether the autocratic model of China, which can be so effective in making some strategic
decisions about the economy in the short term, can over the long run be flexible enough to permit adaptation to a changing international economic, political, and strategic

it may be more than good fortune that has allowed the United States in the past to come
through crises and emerge stronger and healthier than other nations while its various competitors
have faltered. And it may be more than just wishful thinking to believe that it may do so again. But there is a danger. It is that in the meantime, while
the nation continues to struggle, Americans may convince themselves that decline is indeed
inevitable, or that the United States can take a time-out from its global responsibilities while it gets its own house in order. To many
environment. In sum:

Americans, accepting decline may provide a welcome escape from the moral and material burdens that have weighed on them since World War II. Many may unconsciously

The underlying assumption

of such a course is that the present world order will more or less persist without American power, or at
least with much less of it; or that others can pick up the slack; or simply that the benefits of the world order are permanent and require no special
exertion by anyone. Unfortunately, the present world orderwith its widespread freedoms, its general prosperity,
and its absence of great power conflictis as fragile as it is unique. Preserving it has been a struggle in
every decade, and will remain a struggle in the decades to come. Preserving the present world order
requires constant American leadership and constant American commitment. In the end, the decision is in the hands of
Americans. Decline, as Charles Krauthammer has observed, is a choice. It is not an inevitable fateat least not yet. Empires and great powers
yearn to return to the way things were in 1900, when the United States was rich, powerful, and not responsible for world order.

rise and fall, and the only question is when. But the when does matter. Whether the United States begins to decline over the next two decades or not for another two centuries
will matter a great deal, both to Americans and to the nature of the world they live in.

There is no alternative hegemonic transitions cause nuclear war

Brzezinski 12Professor of Foreign Policy @ Johns Hopkins Zbigniew, After America,
Foreign Policy, Jan/Dec 2012,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/after_america?page=0,0

For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not
even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright
chaos would be far more likely outcomes. While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for
instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global
political and economic disorder, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or
endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global
successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of
the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative
world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both
global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international
uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams
of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of
authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue. The leaders of the world's second-rank
powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the
potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an
assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders
in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America
falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude)
about America's uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of
the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions:
Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central
Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance
within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may
move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman
Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have
the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider
inheriting America's leading role. China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor,
has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of
which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China
thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing
hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but
on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is
not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have
repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China
will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not
only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and
national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global
leadership. At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage
China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a
powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might
even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional
scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's
neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could
then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, the
security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also
depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be
made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed
position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel,
and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered
species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a

waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A
faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's
economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such
sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A
decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the
U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more
defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to
sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a
declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous
phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of
territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents. Another consequence of
American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global
commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose
protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic
geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S.
role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the
superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict.
None of this will necessarily come to pass. Nor is the concern that America's decline would generate
global insecurity, endanger some vulnerable states, and produce a more troubled North American
neighborhood an argument for U.S. global supremacy. In fact, the strategic complexities of the world
in the 21st century make such supremacy unattainable. But those dreaming today of America's
collapse would probably come to regret it. And as the world after America would be increasingly
complicated and chaotic, it is imperative that the United States pursue a new, timely strategic vision
for its foreign policy -- or start bracing itself for a dangerous slide into global turmoil.
Biodiversity collapse causes extinction
Coyne and Hoekstra 7 *Professor in the Department of Ecology and Evolution at the University of Chicago AND ** Associate Professor
in the Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology at Harvard University (*Jerry and *Hopi, The Greatest Dying, The New Republic,
September 24th 2007, June 26th 2010, http://www.truthout.org/article/jerry-coyne-and-hopi-e-hoekstra-the-greatestdying)

Every year, up to 30,000 species disappear due to human activity alone. At this rate, we could lose
half of Earth's species in this century. And, unlike with previous extinctions, there's no hope that
biodiversity will ever recover, since the cause of the decimation - us - is here to stay. To scientists,
this is an unparalleled calamity, far more severe than global warming, which is, after all, only
one of many threats to biodiversity. Yet global warming gets far more press. Why? One reason is
that, while the increase in temperature is easy to document, the decrease of species is not.
Biologists don't know, for example, exactly how many species exist on Earth. Estimates range
widely, from three million to more than 50 million, and that doesn't count microbes, critical (albeit
invisible) components of ecosystems. We're not certain about the rate of extinction, either; how
could we be, since the vast majority of species have yet to be described? We're even less sure how
the loss of some species will affect the ecosystems in which they're embedded, since the intricate
connection between organisms means that the loss of a single species can ramify unpredictably.
But we do know some things. Tropical rainforests are disappearing at a rate of 2 percent per year.
Populations of most large fish are down to only 10 percent of what they were in 1950. Many
primates and all the great apes - our closest relatives - are nearly gone from the wild. And we know
that extinction and global warming act synergistically. Extinction exacerbates global warming: By
burning rainforests, we're not only polluting the atmosphere with carbon dioxide (a major
greenhouse gas) but destroying the very plants that can remove this gas from the air. Conversely,
global warming increases extinction, both directly (killing corals) and indirectly (destroying the
habitats of Arctic and Antarctic animals). As extinction increases, then, so does global warming,
which in turn causes more extinction - and so on, into a downward spiral of destruction. Why,
exactly, should we care? Let's start with the most celebrated case: the rainforests. Their loss will

worsen global warming - raising temperatures, melting icecaps, and flooding coastal cities. And, as
the forest habitat shrinks, so begins the inevitable contact between organisms that have not evolved
together, a scenario played out many times, and one that is never good. Dreadful diseases have
successfully jumped species boundaries, with humans as prime recipients. We have gotten aids
from apes, sars from civets, and Ebola from fruit bats. Additional worldwide plagues from
unknown microbes are a very real possibility. But it isn't just the destruction of the rainforests that
should trouble us.Healthy ecosystems the world over provide hidden services like waste disposal,
nutrient cycling, soil formation, water purification, and oxygen production. Such services are best
rendered by ecosystems that are diverse. Yet, through both intention and accident, humans have
introduced exotic species that turn biodiversity into monoculture. Fast-growing zebra mussels, for
example, have outcompeted more than 15 species of native mussels in North America's Great Lakes
and have damaged harbors and water-treatment plants. Native prairies are becoming dominated
by single species (often genetically homogenous) of corn or wheat. Thanks to these developments,
soils will erode and become unproductive - which, along with temperature change, will diminish
agricultural yields. Meanwhile, with increased pollution and runoff, as well as reduced forest cover,
ecosystems will no longer be able to purify water; and a shortage of clean water spells disaster. In
many ways, oceans are the most vulnerable areas of all. As overfishing eliminates major predators,
while polluted and warming waters kill off phytoplankton, the intricate aquatic food web could
collapse from both sides. Fish, on which so many humans depend, will be a fond memory. As
phytoplankton vanish, so does the ability of the oceans to absorb carbon dioxide and produce
oxygen. (Half of the oxygen we breathe is made by phytoplankton, with the rest coming from land
plants.) Species extinction is also imperiling coral reefs - a major problem since these reefs have far
more than recreational value: They provide tremendous amounts of food for human populations
and buffer coastlines against erosion. In fact, the global value of "hidden" services provided by
ecosystems - those services, like waste disposal, that aren't bought and sold in the marketplace has been estimated to be as much as $50 trillion per year, roughly equal to the gross domestic
product of all countries combined. And that doesn't include tangible goods like fish and timber.
Life as we know it would be impossible if ecosystems collapsed. Yet that is where we're
heading if species extinction continues at its current pace.Extinction also has a huge impact on
medicine. Who really cares if, say, a worm in the remote swamps of French Guiana goes extinct?
Well, those who suffer from cardiovascular disease. The recent discovery of a rare South American
leech has led to the isolation of a powerful enzyme that, unlike other anticoagulants, not only
prevents blood from clotting but also dissolves existing clots. And it's not just this one species of
worm: Its wriggly relatives have evolved other biomedically valuable proteins, including antistatin
(a potential anticancer agent), decorsin and ornatin (platelet aggregation inhibitors), and hirudin
(another anticoagulant). Plants, too, are pharmaceutical gold mines. The bark of trees, for example,
has given us quinine (the first cure for malaria), taxol (a drug highly effective against ovarian and
breast cancer), and aspirin. More than a quarter of the medicines on our pharmacy shelves were
originally derived from plants. The sap of the Madagascar periwinkle contains more than 70 useful
alkaloids, including vincristine, a powerful anticancer drug that saved the life of one of our friends.
Of the roughly 250,000 plant species on Earth, fewer than 5 percent have been screened for
pharmaceutical properties. Who knows what life-saving drugs remain to be discovered? Given
current extinction rates, it's estimated that we're losing one valuable drug every two years. Our
arguments so far have tacitly assumed that species are worth saving only in proportion to their
economic value and their effects on our quality of life, an attitude that is strongly ingrained,
especially in Americans. That is why conservationists always base their case on an economic
calculus. But we biologists know in our hearts that there are deeper and equally compelling reasons
to worry about the loss of biodiversity: namely, simple morality and intellectual values that
transcend pecuniary interests. What, for example, gives us the right to destroy other creatures?
And what could be more thrilling than looking around us, seeing that we are surrounded by our
evolutionary cousins, and realizing that we all got here by the same simple process of natural

selection? To biologists, and potentially everyone else, apprehending the genetic kinship and
common origin of all species is a spiritual experience - not necessarily religious, but spiritual
nonetheless, for it stirs the soul. But, whether or not one is moved by such concerns, it is certain
that our future is bleak if we do nothing to stem this sixth extinction. We are creating a world in
which exotic diseases flourish but natural medicinal cures are lost; a world in which carbon waste
accumulates while food sources dwindle; a world of sweltering heat, failing crops, and impure
water. In the end, we must accept the possibility that we ourselves are not immune to
extinction. Or, if we survive, perhaps only a few of us will remain, scratching out a grubby
existence on a devastated planet. Global warming will seem like a secondary problem when
humanity finally faces the consequences of what we have done to nature: not just another Great
Dying, but perhaps the greatest dying of them all.
Oxygen collapse causes extinction
Tatchell 8 (human rights activist, internally quotes ecologists, Peter, 8/13, The oxygen crisis,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/13/carbonemissions.climatechange)

Compared to prehistoric times, the level of oxygen in the earth's atmosphere has declined by over a
third and in polluted cities the decline may be more than 50%. This change in the makeup of the air
we breathe has potentially serious implications for our health. Indeed, it could ultimately threaten the
survival of human life on earth, according to Roddy Newman, who is drafting a new book, The Oxygen
Crisis. I am not a scientist, but this seems a reasonable concern. It is a possibility that we should
examine and assess. So, what's the evidence? Around 10,000 years ago, the planet's forest cover was
at least twice what it is today, which means that forests are now emitting only half the amount of
oxygen. Desertification and deforestation are rapidly accelerating this long-term loss of oxygen
sources. The story at sea is much the same. NASA reports that in the north Pacific ocean oxygenproducing phytoplankton concentrations are 30% lower today, compared to the 1980s. This is a huge
drop in just three decades. Moreover, the UN environment programme confirmed in 2004 that there
were nearly 150 "dead zones" in the world's oceans where discharged sewage and industrial waste,
farm fertiliser run-off and other pollutants have reduced oxygen levels to such an extent that most or
all sea creatures can no longer live there. This oxygen starvation is reducing regional fish stocks and
diminishing the food supplies of populations that are dependent on fishing. It also causes genetic
mutations and hormonal changes that can affect the reproductive capacity of sea life, which could
further diminish global fish supplies. Professor Robert Berner of Yale University has researched
oxygen levels in prehistoric times by chemically analysing air bubbles trapped in fossilised tree amber.
He suggests that humans breathed a much more oxygen-rich air 10,000 years ago. Further back, the
oxygen levels were even greater. Robert Sloan has listed the percentage of oxygen in samples of
dinosaur-era amber as: 28% (130m years ago), 29% (115m years ago), 35% (95m years ago), 33%
(88m years ago), 35% (75m years ago), 35% (70m years ago), 35% (68m years ago), 31% (65.2m years
ago), and 29% (65m years ago). Professor Ian Plimer of Adelaide University and Professor Jon
Harrison of the University of Arizona concur. Like most other scientists they accept that oxygen levels
in the atmosphere in prehistoric times averaged around 30% to 35%, compared to only 21% today
and that the levels are even less in densely populated, polluted city centres and industrial complexes,
perhaps only 15 % or lower. Much of this recent, accelerated change is down to human activity,
notably the industrial revolution and the burning of fossil fuels. The Professor of Geological Sciences
at Notre Dame University in Indiana, J Keith Rigby, was quoted in 1993-1994 as saying: In the 20th
century, humanity has pumped increasing amounts of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere by burning
the carbon stored in coal, petroleum and natural gas. In the process, we've also been consuming
oxygen and destroying plant life cutting down forests at an alarming rate and thereby shortcircuiting the cycle's natural rebound. We're artificially slowing down one process and speeding up
another, forcing a change in the atmosphere. Very interesting. But does this decline in oxygen matter?
Are there any practical consequences that we ought to be concerned about? What is the effect of lower
oxygen levels on the human body? Does it disrupt and impair our immune systems and therefore

make us more prone to cancer and degenerative diseases? Surprisingly, no significant research has
been done, perhaps on the following presumption: the decline in oxygen levels has taken place over
millions of years of our planet's existence. The changes during the shorter period of human life have
also been slow and incremental until the last two centuries of rapid urbanisation and
industrialisation. Surely, this mostly gradual decline has allowed the human body to evolve and adapt
to lower concentrations of oxygen? Maybe, maybe not. The pace of oxygen loss is likely to have
speeded up massively in the last three decades, with the industrialisation of China, India, South Korea
and other countries, and as a consequence of the massive worldwide increase in the burning of fossil
fuels. In the view of Professor Ervin Laszlo, the drop in atmospheric oxygen has potentially serious
consequences. A UN advisor who has been a professor of philosophy and systems sciences, Laszlo
writes: Evidence from prehistoric times indicates that the oxygen content of pristine nature was above
the 21% of total volume that it is today. It has decreased in recent times due mainly to the burning of
coal in the middle of the last century. Currently the oxygen content of the Earth's atmosphere dips to
19% over impacted areas, and it is down to 12 to 17% over the major cities. At these levels it is difficult
for people to get sufficient oxygen to maintain bodily health: it takes a proper intake of oxygen to keep
body cells and organs, and the entire immune system, functioning at full efficiency. At the levels we
have reached today cancers and other degenerative diseases are likely to develop. And at 6 to 7% life
can no longer be sustained.
Action now is critical to protect forestsall life depends upon their ability to sustain
oxygen and the environment and stabilize climate change the impact is extinction
NRDC 7
(largest US environmental action group of over a million members, Good Wood: How
Forest Certification Helps the Environment, http://www.nrdc.org/land/forests/qcert.asp)
Forests are more than a symbolic ideal of wilderness, more than quiet places to enjoy nature. Forest
ecosystems -- trees, soil, undergrowth, all living things in a forest -- are critical to maintaining life on
earth. Forests help us breathe by creating oxygen and filtering pollutants from the air, and help
stabilize the global climate by absorbing carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas. They soak up
rainfall like giant sponges, preventing floods and purifying water that we drink. They provide habitat
for 90 percent of the plant and animal species that live on land, as well as homelands for many of the
earth's last remaining indigenous cultures. Forests are commercially important, too; they yield
valuable resources like wood, rubber and medicinal plants, including plants used to create cancer
drugs. Harvesting these resources provides employment for local communities. Healthy forests are a
critical part of the web of life. Yet more than half of the earth's original forest cover has been
destroyed due to human activity such as agriculture, development and logging. Much of the loss has
occurred within the past three decades. Protecting the earth's remaining forest cover is now an urgent
task.

2
Contention 2 is I <3 Heg
Status quo reliance on land-and-sea based airpower transportation infrastructure
make U.S. air superiority vulnerable enables force denial by China, Iran, and North
Korea
Kramlinger 05 Col George D. Kramlinger, Summer 2005. USAFA; MAAS, School of Advanced
Airpower Studies; MA, Naval War College, is the commander, 612th Air Operations Group,
Headquarters Twelfth Air Force, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. Narrowing the Global-Strike Gap
with an Airborne Aircraft Carrier, Air & Space Power Journal KL
US Air Force bombers played key roles in Operations Allied Force, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi
Freedom. Throughout Allied Force, B-2s flying 30-hour round-trip missions from the continental
United States (CONUS) struck high-value Yugoslav targets at night through airspace considered too
hostile for nonstealthy aircraft. Fortunately, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) airfields in
nearby Italy enabled the proven tactic of packaging short-range defense suppression, fighter, and
jamming aircraft to improve bomber survivability.1 Two B-2 sorties originating from the CONUS
during each of the first two nights of Enduring Freedom quickly created a permissive environment
above Afghanistan by eliminating the Talibans meager strategic air defenses.2 As a result, B-1 and B52 bombers conveniently based at the British-owned atoll of Diego Garcia cycled freely over all of
Afghanistan, pounding al-Qaeda positions around-the-clock.3 During the 10 months preceding Iraqi
Freedom, multirole fighters patrolling the southern and northern no-fly zones systematically
dismantled much of the Iraqi Integrated Air Defense System (IADS).4 Consequently, the operation
began with B-1s and B-52s based in Diego Garcia enjoying the freedom of action to loiter over most of
Iraq with large payloads to rapidly engage emerging battlefield targets.5 However, a permissive
environment for nonstealthy bombers or -favorable basing options for bombers and short-range
support assets may not exist in the next conflict. Nations that prohibit overflight or that deny basing
rights, as well as adversaries who hold key airfields at risk or coerce allies with missiles armed with
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), can prohibit access to regionally deployed land-based airpower.
Naval attack fighters operating from the sea and conventional long-range bombers cannot survive
penetration of a sophisticated IADS that denies access to all but the stealthiest platforms. Standoff
air- and sea-launched cruise missiles are becoming increasingly vulnerable to advanced air defenses
and have only limited capability against mobile, hardened, and deeply buried targets (HDBT) that
create access denial. Long range, survivability, and penetrating weapons make the B-2 stealth bomber
a highly capable global-strike platform.6 Unfortunately, the 16 combat-coded B-2s in our inventory
are insufficient to conduct an unescorted enabling oper sation in places where access denial precludes
the use of regionally based airpower.7 F/A-22 and F-117 stealth fighters should protect and augment
the limited B-2 fleet by engaging mobile and hardened high-value targets, but they lack global range
because of the single pilots limited endurance. In the very near future, Iran, North Korea, and China
will likely possess the combination of weapons, missiles, and air defenses to negate access to theaterbased airpower. Consequently, the Air Force may have to use CONUS-to-CONUS missions to gain
access to denied airspace. Hampered by a limited B-2 inventory and an inability to operate stealth
fighters over global range, the United States will face a global-strike gap if it confronts a vast and welldefended adversary in an access-challenged theater halfway around the world.
Lack of infrastructure investment for airfields is the critical flaw in current U.S. policy
Flynn 02 John E. Flynn, Captain Naval Reserve, Joint and Allied Logistics Opportunities and
Tools Supporting 21st Century War Fighter Rapid Decisive Operations, 2002,
Logistics needs to focus on those key items that enable U.S. forces to establish and sustain presence.
Presence may depend upon the timely and intact seizure of key facilities and equipment. This

occurred during the Marine assault on Guadalcanal. Using captured weapons and ammunition, the
Marines strengthened their defenses with the enemys undamaged engineering equipment and
rushed to complete the airfield (Henderson field) as quickly as possible. [MacDonald, 1986, p. 74]
Although U.S. Forces may occasionally operate in areas where infrastructure is superb, such as that
offered by Saudi facilities during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, U.S. forces must be able
to operate and be supported for sustained periods in complex environments that will often possess
little indigenous infrastructure. Operation Enduring Freedom is an excellent example of this.
Logistics will also need to focus on key consumables that sustain U.S. forces. Among these
consumables, as validated during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, are water, fuel, food, and
ammunition. Water and fuel are likely to be the largest commodities required as measured by bulk
and consequently, impact on the U.S. military transportation infrastructure. In the context of those
RDO that may require the use of expeditionary Army ground forces, with a strong requirement for
airlift, the necessary additional logistics burden of sustainment or tail comes at the expense of
rapidly deploying teeth. The United States Marine Corps has over two hundred years of experience of
participating in naval operations. The Marine Corps treats the oceans as highways that allow them to
engage the enemy when and where they choose. The oceans are the Marines floating airfields and
afloat logistics bases. The oceans are the source of air and naval artillery fire power and are the key
enabler and sustainer that are central to concepts such as Ship to Objective Maneuver, Operational
Maneuver from the Sea, and Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. Although the Army has emulated the
Marine Corps and embraced the value of Afloat Pre-positioning Ships, the Army has not fully
exploited the capabilities resident in FDNF.
Upgrading strategic transportation systems boosts rapid response time and air
mobility thats critical to crisis de-escalation
CBO 05 September, Congressional Budget Office, Options for Strategic Military Transportation
Systems, http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6661/09-27strategicmobility.pdf
Since the end of World War II, the United States has maintained the ability to project combat power
rapidly around the globe. That ability has been achieved through a dual approach: forward basing
units overseas in regions of particular importance and fielding longrange (strategic) transportation
systems that can move forces around the world quickly, either to reinforce the forward-based units or
to respond to needs that arise elsewhere. Following the Cold War, emphasis has shifted away from
forward basing and toward increasing the mobility of forces based in the United States. In the past 15
years, the U.S. military has cut the number of forward-based troops by about half and has improved
its strategic transportation capability by fielding such systems as C-17 airlift aircraft and large,
medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships (LMSRs) for sealift. In addition, the Army is largely focusing its
current transformation efforts on changing equipment and organization to create units that can be
deployed more quickly and easily. Nevertheless, officials in the Department of Defense (DoD) seek to
increase the speed of military deployments to an even greater degree, because the ability to deliver
forces to a distant theater in the first few days or weeks of a crisis is seen as critical to ensuring a
favorable outcome. Several general approaches exist for speeding up the U.S. militarys response to
crises, such as: B Better matching the locations of forward bases to locations where conflicts are likely
to arise, B Redesigning ground combat and support units and their equipment to make them easier to
transport, and B Improving strategic transportation forces.
Air mobility is the vital internal link to overall air power
Hazdra 01 Richard J., Major, USAF, Fairchild Paper, Air University Press August
http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/fairchild_papers/Hazdra/Hazdra.pdf
Since airlift was first used as a tool of national security during the Berlin airlift, it has grown to deliver
passengers, cargo, and fuel to operations worldwide in support of national security. However, Air
Mobility Command (AMC) is the single organization that performs for air mobility for the United

States (US). Currently, the US Air Force (USAF) has structured AMC for war; yet this command
performs operations during times when the United States is at peace. AMC performs missions to
support US military operations in hostile environments as well as humanitarian operations in
nonhostile environments. The number of operations requiring mobility air forces has been on the rise
since the Cold War ended. These steady-state operations seem to overtask mobility air forces. This
study centers on the question: Can AMCs force structure, organized for two major theater wars, fulfill
that requirement and perform the steady-state operations in todays strategic environment? This
study finds that AMCs force structure cannot meet its requirements for two major theater wars and
that the current force structure is inefficient in meeting the requirements for steady-state operations.
First, this study presents a primer to acclimate the reader to the complex environment and
multifaceted requirements of mobility air forces. Second, it examines AMCs current force structure as
determined by Department of Defense (DOD) requirements for war. Third, this study describes the
various types of missions that AMC performs on a steady-state basis and evaluates the importance of
these operations in fulfilling US national security strategy. Fourth, this study recommends action that
the USAF and the DOD should investigate in order to improve their air mobility capabilities in
support of the national security strategy. Chapter 1 Introduction If we do not build a transportation
system that can meet the needs of tomorrow, then it doesnt matter much what kind of force we have
because it wont be able to get there. Gen John M. Shalikashvili, US Army Air mobility is the key to
unlocking the strength of United States (US) airpower because it performs rapid global mobility. US
military forces have relied on this capability since World War II, and it has always been there.
Combatant commanders increasingly rely on air mobility to transport forces quickly into their
theaters to head off potential crises, and Air Mobility Command (AMC) always responds
enthusiastically with the necessary assets. When the National Command Authorities (NCA) task the
Department of Defense (DOD) to achieve any objective, it relies on AMC to achieve rapid global
mobility requirements. Consequently, mobility air forces have a remarkable reputation for getting the
job done for DOD and combatant commanders. Since AMC has always achieved its objectives, neither
the US Air Force (USAF) nor DOD has conducted a thorough examination to determine if air mobility
capabilities will suffice in the future. However, the time has come to review the force structure of AMC
to determine if it can realistically continue to meet national security requirements.
Air power is the critical lynchpin of US hegemony
Lewis 02 Major William K, senior pilot in the T-37, T-38, AT-38 and F-15 Eagle, Distinguished
Graduate of the Squadron Officer School and the Air Command and Staff College, and graduate of the
School of Advanced Airpower Studies, June, UCAV THE NEXT GENERATION AIRSUPERIORITY FIGHTER?, school of advanced airpower studies @ Maxwell Air Force Base,
Alabama.
Air superiority has been an enduring prerequisite to military victory during conflicts in the twentyfirst century. The first aerial engagements in World War I were crude attempts by surface
commanders to deny their adversary aerial artillery spotting and reconnaissance operations, while
allowing and enhancing their own. These early missions mark the beginning of an unending quest by
air forces to control and exploit the aerospace medium. Control of this environment became an
important first step in military operations; it provided freedom to attack as well as freedom from
attack.28 As General Momyer and Colonel Warden put it, air superiority is the prelude to military
victorywithout it no conventional operations can be sustained. This is not an attempt to say that air
superiority alone wins wars; on the contrary, it is rarely an end in itself. Control of the skies protects
forces and permits decisive subsequent and follow-on operations by all air and surface arms.
Attaining air superiority alone cannot promise victory, but it can enable the full complement of
military might to become engaged. Air Superiority will continue to be a vital prerequisite for military
operations in the next century. Technology will advance and the nature of the enemy will inevitably
change. But, as one recent study emphasized: The ability to use the skies with impunity, while denying
the same capability to an enemy, is a perquisite for every other warfighting element of any future

campaign. Without it we lose the advantages gained by the inherent speed, range, and flexibility of
airpower. We also risk putting ourselves on the defensive while ceding the same advantages to our
adversaries. As the precision and lethality of our weapons increases, air superiority must be gained to
allow us to observe the enemy, track his activity, and react in a prompt and decisive manner, whether
or not he uses (or can use) airpower in support of his own objectives, or even whether or not we
choose to use (or can use) airpower in support of our objectives.29 As long as aircraft are more
flexible and versatile than ground forces and have the speed, range and persistence to permit
concentration on any point on the surface, they will continue to have a profound impact on the nature
and outcome of war. Air superiority will continue to be an essential military mission for the
foreseeable future.
AND - the plan would lock in U.S. surveillance and intelligence capacity for ISR and
drone capabilities
Kramlinger 05 Col George D., Summer. USAFA; MAAS, School of Advanced Airpower Studies; MA, Naval War
College, is the commander, 612th Air Operations Group, Headquarters Twelfth Air Force, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona.
Narrowing the Global-Strike Gap with an Airborne Aircraft Carrier, Air & Space Power Journal,
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/sum05/kramlinger.html#kramlinger.

Finding mobile targets in an access-denial environment requires persistent, close-in, and stealthy
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). During the Persian Gulf War of 1991, Iraq used
camouflage, concealment, and deception along with mobility to effectively hide Scud-missile
launchers in its western deserts despite a huge commitment of strike aircraft and standoff ISR
platforms.31 During Allied Force, the Serbs constantly moved their mobile SAM systems, preventing
ISR platforms from providing actionable targeting information. As a result, large sections of Serbian
airspace remained unsafe for nonstealthy aircraft.32 During Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom,
the RQ-1A Predator and high-flying RQ-4A Global Hawk UAVs demonstrated the enormous value of
persistent, close-in ISR at finding, fixing, and tracking emerging and fleeting targets. However,
neither of these UAVs is stealthy, and we have lost many of the low-flying Predators over hostile
territory.33 Double-digit SAM threats will push large, conventional ISR platforms such as the RC-135
Rivet Joint (signals intelligence) and the E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System to less
effective ranges. Medium and low Earth orbit satellites lack the dwell time over a particular area for
persistent ISR. Furthermore, space-based radars may not have sufficient fidelity to track mobile
targets.34 One of the X-45C program objectives calls for producing two hours of loiter time with a
4,500-pound payload 1,000 miles from the launch base.35 Fuel saved by launching from an AAC near
enemy territory will increase endurance and enable the stealthy X-45C UCAV to conduct persistent
ISR in a high-threat environment. However, we currently have no practical method of employing
fighter-sized UCAVs over global range.
ISR is key to wildfire control.
Sovada 8 (Jennifer P. Major, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Support to
Humanitarian Relief Operations within the United States: Where Everyone is in Charge)
Unity of effort is critical during ISR support to humanitarian relief operations within the Untied
States because as JP 2-0 states: unity of effort optimizes intelligence operations by reducing
unnecessary redundancy and duplication in intelligence collection and production.61 Hurricane
Katrina taught the United States the value of early and unified engagement62 while Hurricane
Katrina and the California wildfires proved to homeland defense officials that the nation has a need
to accurately and rapidly assess damage following a catastrophic event. 63 To accomplish these goals
and improve ISR operational effectiveness, organizations that provide ISR need to apply the following
lessons learned. First, an integrated, pre-established, on-the-shelf ISR plan needs to exist. As
evidenced by Hurricane Katrina, the lack of an on-the-shelf ISR plan hampered ISR operations.
Without a plan, no one understood the command relationships, information flow, timelines, content
of what they should provide, formats for imagery, or support priorities. Once NORTHCOM and its

subordinate units developed their plans, ISR support for the California wildfires improved
exponentially. An ISR plan is the backbone of any ISR operation. The second lesson learned from
Hurricane Katrina and the California wildfires is that the lead ISR organization needs to have
established command relationships in place. During Hurricane Katrina, operators lacked an
understanding of the command structure. Prior to the next disaster, NORTHCOM established
AFNORTH as the organization that would lead all airborne ISR collection efforts. This command
relationship made ISR operations more efficient and defined the chain of command. This ISR
operational design allows the J2 to decentralize much of its operational control to allow for a more
streamlined process. 64
Its the last remaining barrier to effective responses.
Sovada 8 (Jennifer P. Major, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Support to
Humanitarian Relief Operations within the United States: Where Everyone is in Charge)
Two years following Hurricane Katrina, a state once again called for DoD help. This time the state of
California requested ISR support for the wildfires that were jeopardizing lives and property in
southern California in October 2007. The state, DoD, and NGB, all played roles in this humanitarian
relief effort. ISR support included the Air Force RQ-4 GLOBAL HAWK and U-2, the Air National
Guard RC-26 and OH-58, the Air Force Auxiliary (Civil Air Patrol) using various platforms, and the
Navy P-3.40 This time these assets photographed over 22,000 images and recorded hundreds of
hours of full motion video.41 However, the question NORTHCOM asked was whether during the
California wildfires was there any improvement in unity of command and unity of effort?
Overall, ISR operations effectiveness improved from Hurricane Katrina to the California wildfires
through application of the principle of unity of effort. However, NORTHCOM, due to the plethora of
disparate organizations that participated in these operations, was unable to achieve unity of command
and realistically can expect never to achieve unity of command in these situations.42 As Secretary
McHale stated in his Senate testimony after Hurricane Katrina, we start any domestic mission with a
breach in that principle of unity of command, [but we should] achieve unity of effort.43
Forest fires decimate biological diversity
Nasi et al, Center for International Forestry Research, 2002
(Forest fire and biological diversity http://www.fao.org/docrep/004/y3582e/y3582e08.htm)
ECOSYSTEM EFFECTS OF FIRE
Forest fires have many implications for biological diversity. At the global scale, they are a significant
source of emitted carbon, contributing to global warming which could lead to biodiversity changes. At
the regional and local level, they lead to change in biomass stocks, alter the hydrological cycle with
subsequent effects for marine systems such as coral reefs, and impact plant and animal species'
functioning. Smoke from fires can significantly reduce photosynthetic activity (Davies and Unam,
1999) and can be detrimental to health of humans and animals.
One of the most important ecological effects of burning is the increased probability of further burning
in subsequent years, as dead trees topple to the ground, opening up the forest to drying by sunlight,
and building up the fuel load with an increase in fire-prone species, such as pyrophytic grasses. The
consequence of repeated burns is detrimental because it is a key factor in the impoverishment of
biodiversity in rain forest ecosystems. Fires can be followed by insect colonization and infestation
which disturb the ecological balance.

3
Contention 3 is MORE HEG
Anti-hegemony rhetoric is dangerouscauses a policy movement towards isolationism
Kagan 98 PhD, graduate of Harvards Kennedy School of Government, adjunct history professor at
Georgetown, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Robert, Foreign
Policy, The benevolent empire)
Those contributing to the growing chorus of antihegemony and multipolarity may know they are
playing a dangerous game, one that needs to be conducted with the utmost care, as French leaders did
during the Cold War, lest the entire international system come crashing down around them. What
they may not have adequately calculated, however, is the possibility that Americans will not respond
as wisely as they generally did during the Cold War. Americans and their leaders should not take all
this sophisticated whining about U.S. hegemony too seriously. They certainly should not take it more
seriously than the whiners themselves do. But, of course, Americans are taking it seriously. In the
United States these days, even conservatives echo the lugubrious guilt trip of post-Vietnam liberalism,
with William Buckley, Samuel Huntington, and James Schlesinger all decrying American hubris,
arrogance, and imperialism. Clinton administration officials, in between speeches exalting
America as the indispensable nation, increasingly behave as if what is truly indispensable is the
prior approval of China, France, and Russia for every military action. Moreover, at another level, there
is a stirring of neo-isolationism in America today, a mood that nicely complements the view among
many Europeans that America is meddling too much in everyone elses business and taking too little
time to mind its own. The existence of the Soviet Union disciplined Americans and made them see
that their enlightened self-interest lay in are relatively generous foreign policy. Today, that disciple is
no longer present. In other words, foreign grumbling about American hegemony would be merely
amusing, were it not for the very real possibility that too many Americans will forget -- even most of
the rest of the world does not -- just how important continued American dominance is to the
preservation of a reasonable level of international security and prosperity. World leaders may want to
keep this in mind when they pop the champagne corks in celebration of the next American humbling
Hegemony is key to being good intellectuals. We must celebrate and teach Western
values in this debate round for Western civilization to survive
Kors, 01 Prof history @ U Penn (Summer 2001, Alan, American Foreign Relations, America and
the West: Triumph Without Self Belief, pg. 354-355)
The fruits of that civilization have been an unprecedented ability to modify the remediable causes of
human suffering, to give great agency to utility and charity alike; to give to each individual a degree of
choice and freedom unparalleled in ail of human history; to offer a means of overcoming the station in
life to which one was born by the effort of one's labor, mind, and will. A failure to understand and to
teach that accomplishment would be its very betrayal. To the extent that Western civilization survives,
then, the hope of the world survives to eradicate unnecessary suffering; to speak a language of human
dignity, responsibility, and rights linked to a common reality: to minimize the depredations of the
irrational, the unexamined, the merely prejudicial in our lives: to understand the world in which we
find ourselves, and. moved by interest and charity, to apply that knowledge for good.
Threats are inevitable. Retreat from primacy magnifies every international problem
and makes your impax inevitable
Thayer 06 Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State
University [Bradley, In Defense of Primacy, The National Interest, December (lexis)]
A grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the United States stays the world's
number one power--the diplomatic, economic and military leader. Those arguing against primacy
claim that the United States should retrench, either because the United States lacks the power to

maintain its primacy and should withdraw from its global commitments, or because the maintenance
of primacy will lead the United States into the trap of "imperial overstretch." In the previous issue of
The National Interest, Christopher Layne warned of these dangers of primacy and called for
retrenchment.1 Those arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment are a diverse lot. They include
isolationists, who want no foreign military commitments; selective engagers, who want U.S. military
commitments to centers of economic might; and offshore balancers, who want a modified form of
selective engagement that would have the United States abandon its landpower presence abroad in
favor of relying on airpower and seapower to defend its interests. But retrenchment, in any of its
guises, must be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it would be a profound strategic
mistake that would lead to far greater instability and war in the world, imperil American security and
deny the United States and its allies the benefits of primacy. There are two critical issues in any
discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state? Should it strive to do
this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power
capabilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has
overwhelming military capabilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential
alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case for the foreseeable
future. With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment acknowledge this. So the debate
revolves around the desirability of maintaining American primacy. Proponents of retrenchment focus
a great deal on the costs of U.S. action--but they fail to realize what is good about American primacy.
The price and risks of primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it
are not. A GRAND strategy of ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of
the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical
resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that
Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the
United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO
in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor. In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will
not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will
make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats
will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot
call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising
powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is
"going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its
interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a
declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal
kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the
anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront
the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what
protects the country from such threats. And when enemies must be confronted, a strategy based on
primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the
Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in
other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a physical,
on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing. Indeed, as Barry Posen has
noted, U.S. primacy is secured because America, at present, commands the "global commons"--the
oceans, the world's airspace and outer space--allowing the United States to project its power far from
its borders, while denying those common avenues to its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power
projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the robustness of the United States'
conventional and strategic deterrent capabilities is increased.2 This is not an advantage that should be
relinquished lightly. A remarkable fact about international politics today--in a world where American
primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display--is that countries want to align themselves with the
United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so
allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes--their own protection, or to

gain greater influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America--their security is tied to the
United States through treaties and other informal arrangements--and they include almost all of the
major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change
from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus
the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies. U.S.
primacy--and the bandwagoning effect--has also given us extensive influence in international politics,
allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such
influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded
states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI ). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside
of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq
stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military
campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's
WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the
typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. You can count with one hand countries
opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and
Venezuela. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by
the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of
Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions of the United States. China is
clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is
intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims
that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including
asymmetric strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the
United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely
to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power
benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates. The other states are far
weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba--it is an anti-U.S.
regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed,
a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations. THROUGHOUT
HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power-Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic
effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we
consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for
human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents
seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power
behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant
lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's
collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order
created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang:
"You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those
good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American
primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the
world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced
friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany.
Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece
and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia.
This debate round is a signal of commitment to imperial resolve. We need to actively
support hegemony because our academic discourse matters
Mearsheimer 95 Professor of Political Science and the co-director of the Program on International
Security Policy at the University of Chicago. West Point graduate, retired Air Force officer (John,

Professor Political Science at the University of Chicago, International Security, Summer, p. 93)
The discussion of institutions up to now has a distinct academic flavor. However, the debate over
whether institutions cause peace is not just a dispute about international relations theory; it also has
significant real-world consequences. For example, the Clinton administration and many European
policymakers publicly maintain that states should not worry about the balance of power that is old
thinking, they say but should instead rely on institutions to protect them. This perspective makes
sense only if there is evidence that institutions can get the job done. But so far, the evidence indicates
that institutions do not provide a sound basis for building a stable post-Cold War world. Institutions
failed to prevent or shut down the recent wars in Bosnia and Transcaucasia, and failed to stop the
carnage in Rwanda; there is little reason to think that those same institutions would do better in the
next trouble spot. The bottom line on institutions seems clear: despite all the rhetoric about their
virtues, there is little evidence that they can alter state behavior and cause peace. States temporarily
led astray by the false promise of institutional rhetoric eventually come to their senses and start
worrying about the balance of power. Surely Bosnian policymakers now recognize their mistake in
trusting institutions like the UN and the EC to pull their chestnuts out of the fir. In the meantime,
however, a state that ignores the balance of power can suffer enormous damage. Thus, it would seem
to make sense, from both a moral and a strategic perspective, for institutionalists to tone down their
claims about the peace-causing effects of institutions until they have solid evidence to support their
positions

Plan
The United States federal government should substantially increase investment in
airborne aircraft carriers.