Preserving the slender thread in Pakistan

Published on openDemocracy (http://www.opendemocracy.net)

Preserving the slender thread in Pakistan

Author:Kaustav Chakrabarti
Summary:Coercive public diplomacy with Pakistan has outlived its utility. Repeated public
admonishment by the United States is counter-productive and will only serve to snap the slender
thread of consensus against terrorism among the people and the soldiers of Pakistan; and undo the
most decisive driver behind successes in Swat and South Waziristan a Pakistani ownership of its
war against extremism. Given the growing ties between different militant groups, Pakistan seems
ready to expand its counter-terrorism strategy. But such a break from the past needs time, and a
sense of ownership. Patience, therefore, will yield greater long-term returns.
The arrest of Pakistani-American Faisal Shahzad, the alleged Times Square Bomber, resulted in a
flurry of public warnings from senior US officials. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton warmed Pakistan
of severe consequences should another terror act be traced back to Pakistans tribal areas, while
urging Pakistan to target militants in North Waziristan. Broadening the aperture of counterinsurgency
is a legitimate expectation of the west and Pakistans neighbours. However, issuing public warnings
and accusations (Clinton also made a veiled reference to Pakistan not sharing full information about
Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar) is counterproductive and will only serve to snap the slender
thread of consensus forged against terrorism among the people and the soldiers of Pakistan.
Repeated orders from Washington runs the serious risk of undoing arguably the most decisive
driver behind successes in Swat and South Waziristan Pakistani ownership of its war against
extremism.

The Slender thread - Pakistani ownership of its struggle

Last years much-celebrated offensives in Swat Valley and South Waziristan, the nerve centre of the
Pakistan Taliban, were not a result of pressures from United States. In fact, they were the outcome of
internal dynamics. Operation Rah-e-Rast in Swat began after the local Taliban refused to abide by a
peace deal, even after their popular demand of Shariah was met. It was Taliban excursions into
abutting districts, and not a sophisticated information campaign, that cost them local support; a
death blow to any insurgent. On the other hand, Operation Rah-e-Nijat in South Waziristan
commenced after militants linked with the Taliban attacked the armys headquarters in Rawalpindi.
Since then, officers and soldiers killed fighting the Taliban have been afforded the status of shaheed
(martyr), an honour that till recently, was exclusively reserved only for those who died fighting rival
India. Large number of people gathered to pay homage to the Brigadier who laid down his life
defending GHQ, and the young officers who were executed by militants in Swat. When the Taliban
attacked a military mosque in Rawalpindi, the entire nation shared the grief of soldiers who lost
family members. Surveys [1] prove that more Pakistanis approve of fighting terrorism; what they
cant quantify is the trauma that theyve gone through before collectively agreeing for the need to
slay demons of the past. The silver lining, if there ever is a silver lining to suicide bombing, is this
very internalised consensus a home-grown response to a home-grown problem.

Change in public opinion

Things were not always like this. Just a few years ago, the armys assault on Lal Masjid in Islamabad,
after the mosque had become a haven for militants, hardly generated the public approval that has
become the norm since 2009. Deaths of students, most of who belonged to the tribal areas, angered
large sections of the Pashtun community and brought them even closer to the Taliban. Not
surprisingly, the aftermath of the raid witnessed an unprecedented hike in suicide bombings across
Pakistan. The fact that major operations in those years took place at the same time as General
Pervez Musharraf happened to be visiting Washington did not help matters either. To put things in
perspective, compare 2007 Pakistan with the American experience in Vietnam or, the Indian
experience in Sri Lanka a nation that refused to agree with the war its army was fighting.

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Preserving the slender thread in Pakistan

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Why exercising patience is a wise option

Exercising restraint in the face of Times Square-like incidents might seem counterintuitive. However,
the United States should remain patient, especially in such trying times.
The US can achieve greater success with Pakistan by simply lowering its visibility, or rather its noise
level. No country likes to take orders from outsiders, least of all the proverbial epicentre of
terrorism that does not take favorably to American foreign policy in a post-invasion of Iraq world.
Coercive public diplomacy with Pakistan has outlived its utility. Rather, by consciously negating the
perception that the government of Asif Ali Zardari is a surrogate of the United States - and
accentuating Pakistans sovereignty over matters internal to it - the coming convergence of militant
groups in Pakistan will by itself cause Pakistan to expand its counter insurgency aperture.
Greater numbers of militants have begun to identify the United States as their main enemy. While
earlier, Jaish-e-Mohammad confined its attention to Kashmir, and Lashkar-e-Janghvi exclusively
targeted the Shiite community, significant elements within these groups have now coalesced to
target the Pakistani State, who they all agree is run by remote control from Washington. The
attack on the Marriott [2] in September 2008 was neither against those suggesting a political,
non-Jihadist solution to Kashmir nor was it against Shiite traders; it was a challenge to the very state
of Pakistan. The growing collaboration of the previously independent militant groups in Pakistan has
no doubt increased their collective lethality. However, a game-changing byproduct of increased
networking between Pashtun, Punjabi, sectarian, pro-Taliban and pro-Kashmir groups, all aided by
al-Qaeda, is that it will compel Pakistan to expand its counter terrorism/insurgency strategy, and that
too under the weight of its own security imperatives. By extrapolating these trends, it is not hard to
imagine a greater congruence of the counter-terrorism objectives of Pakistan, its neighbours and its
western allies in the near future.

Unintended consequences of browbeating Pakistan

By issuing public threats to Pakistan, the United States will inadvertently endanger Pakistans brittle
consensus, already under attack by elements that continue to blame the United States for all of
Pakistans problems and insist on halting military operations. Clintons remarks will only serve the
purpose of those who continue to seek distinctions between good and bad armed Jihadis.
Tactical reasons too call for prudence. Armies the world over have little trouble in smashing rebel
camps, tasks that are not dissimilar to conventional warfare. The real challenge lies in what follows
giving a sense of security to the population, preventing a resurgence of militancy, and carrying out
fast-track development; tasks that are all manpower intensive. Insurgents, therefore, take it as
matter of doctrine to wait till the counter-insurgent shifts his attention to other terrorist hotbeds,
and strike when supply lines thin. There is plenty to learn from Mao extend guerrilla warfare,
make a front out of the enemy's rear, and force him to fight ceaselessly throughout the territory he
occupies. Antagonizing more militants will require Pakistan to deploy more troops to control the
liberated population, who will subsequently demand the army to provide it with security and
logistics and, very likely, shift its allegiance if those demands are not met.
The extra troops can come from only one place Pakistans border with India, where tensions have
flared since the Mumbai attacks. Here, the best the United States could do is to maintain a safe
distance. Lacking legitimacy as an interlocutor in both New Delhi and Islamabad, even
well-intentioned efforts by Washington will be viewed as taking sides, complicating matters further.
Confidence building measures between India and Pakistan have a high gestation period. Accepting
this fact and showing perseverance will yield better results and reduce trust deficits between the
three countries.
Country:Pakistan
United States
Source URL:

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Preserving the slender thread in Pakistan

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http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/kaustav-chakrabarti/preserving-slender-thread-in-paki
stan
Created 06/28/2010 - 16:12
Links:
[1] http://pewglobal.org/2009/08/13/pakistani-public-opinion/
[2] http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/lahore-to-peshawar-the-trophy-target-war

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