Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 123997 January 20, 1999

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and BRIG. GEN. PEDRO R. BALBANERO, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
This case emphasizes with great force the awesome responsibility of counsel to
represent a client's cause with due diligence and zeal which necessarily excludes
improvident and unreasonable requests for postponement of hearings that only serve to
impede the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice.
The Republic of the Philippines, in this special civil action for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition, assails the Order of the Sandiganbayan, First Division, dated 19 October
1995, in "Republic of the Philippines v. Brig. Gen Balbanero," Civil Case No. 0053,
denying petitioner's oral motion for postponement of the 19 and 20 October 1995
hearings and requiring it instead to submit a written offer of evidence, as well as the
Resolution of 3 January 1996 denying reconsideration thereof. Petitioner therefore
prays that it be allowed to present documentary and testimonial evidence in a formal
trial and that public respondent be prevented from conducting further proceedings
pursuant to its questioned Orders.
Civil Case No. 0053 is an action for forfeiture under RA No. 1379 1 instituted on 14
October 1988 by the Republic of the Philippines against retired Brig. Gen. Pedro R.
Balbanero alleging that the latter acquired funds, real properties and other assets
amounting to P10.5 million manifestly out of proportion to his total salary and
emoluments as an Army Officer and as income from business and other legitimately
acquired properties.
On 22 March 1989 private respondent filed his answer with counterclaim to which the
Republic filed a reply with motion to dismiss counterclaim. After the submission by
private respondent of documentary evidence and in view of the manifestation of Solicitor
Felipe Magat, Colonel Ernesto Punzalan and Captain Samuel Padilla of the AFP AntiGraft Board representing the Government that P8.4 million of the alleged over P10
million unexplained wealth had been clarified, the Sandiganbayan in its Order dated 19

February 1990 required private respondent to prove the legal source of the remaining
"P1.3 million." The parties were required to meet to resolve the matter before trial. On
the basis of a "Complete Report" dated 2 August 1990 submitted by Capt. Padilla, the
amount of respondent's wealth deemed to be still unexplained dwindled to P165,043.00.
Thus the OSG in behalf of petitioner asked that a decision be rendered forfeiting the
amount in its favor.
To prove the legal source of the remaining P165,043.00, private respondent submitted a
document titled "Real Estate Mortgage Loan" purporting to show that the amount was
the purchase price he received for real estate sold to Ms. Iluminada S. Salvador et al.
when he failed to pay his mortgage indebtedness. In his Manifestation and Motion dated
7 December 1990 private respondent moved that the complaint against him be
dismissed on the ground that he had explained to the government's satisfaction the
legal source of all his alleged unexplained wealth.
In its answer to the foregoing Manifestation and Motion the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) denied that private respondent had satisfactorily explained
the legitimate source of his wealth and added that the "Complete Report" submitted by
the AFP Anti-Graft Board was without its approval, hence, did not bind the Republic.
On 28 June 1991, without resolving private respondent's Manifestation and Motion of 7
December 1990, public respondent Sandiganbayan allowed the Republic to present oral
and documentary evidence to support its complaint for forfeiture.
On 7 June 1994 private respondent moved that petitioner be bound by the Solicitor
General's previous admission that only P165,043.00 had not been satisfactorily
explained, hence, the remaining issue to be resolved by the Sandiganbayan should be
limited to the amount. But Sandiganbayan denied the motion. Hence, on 3 May 1995
private respondent elevated the matter to this Court by way of a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus in "Pedro R. Balbanero v. the Hon. Sandiganbayan and the
Republic of the Philippines," docketed as G.R. No. 119633.
In view of the pendency of his petition, private respondent moved that the hearings on
18, 19 and 20 October 1995 be canceled and that no further schedule be set. Public
respondent denied the cancellation unless a restraining order was issued by this Court
in G.R. No. 119633, citing petitioner's readiness to present on the scheduled hearings
Major Samuel Padilla (earlier referred to as Captain Padilla) who purportedly conducted
the audit examination of the accounts of private respondent.
Upon urgent motion dated 5 October 1995 the Sandiganbayan granted private
respondent's request for cancellation of the 18 October 1995 hearing on the allegation
that his counsel was scheduled to attend an election case before the RTC of Gapan,
Nueva Ecija, but stressing that the cancellation was without prejudice to the settings on
19 and 20 October 1995. 2

On 19 October 1995 Associate Solicitor Rodolfo Tagapan, Jr., and Assistant Solicitor
General Cesario del Rosario manifested during the hearing that they had been relieved
from the case and that ASG Romeo C. de la Cruz and Solicitor Karl B. Miranda had
been designated in their stead. However, since the latter two were in the United Arab
Emirates attending to the case of convicted Filipina overseas contract worker Sarah
Balabagan, Associate Solicitor Tagapan asked that the hearing be reset, to which the
Sandiganbayan reacted adversely with its now assailed Order of 19 October 1995
which we quote hereunder for a better appreciation of the factual milieu
When this case was called for hearing . . . respondent appeared . . . while the petitioner
Republic appeared through Associate Solicitor Rodolfo Tagapan together with Atty.
Cresencio Jaso of the PCGG. Associate Solicitor Tagapan informed the Court that he had
been relieved . . . from this case and in his stead Solicitor Karl B. Miranda had been
designated . . . but that Solicitor Miranda was . . . in Abu Dhabi on official mission, while
Atty. Jaso . . . informed this Court that this was his first appearance . . . and was,
therefore, not ready to be of assistance. Additionally, no witness had appeared allegedly
upon advice of Associate Solicitor Tagapan precisely, because of this (sic) reassignments relying on the postponement to be granted by this Court.
. . . Solicitor Rodolfo Reodica had been appearing until suddenly at the hearing on May
10, 1995 Associate Solicitor Tagapan appeared and had expressed his unreadiness to
proceed at that time. The petition for postponement was granted . . . over the objection of
the respondent, notwithstanding the pendency of a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus already filed by the respondent to dispute a prior denial of his motion to
dismiss by reason of . . . the petitioner's earlier repeated failure to proceed . . . said
petition . . . now docketed as G.R. No. 119633. On September 22, 1995 . . . Associate
Solicitor. Tagapan informed the Court that he would be ready to present Major Samuel
Padilla on October 18, 19 and 20, 1995. Today, the Court is faced with the situation as
above stated.
This case had been pending not only for a very long time but despite many false starts
from the petitioner. While indeed the Court has reacted negatively to the difficult
situations created by the assignment of young Solicitors such as Solicitor Reodica now
Solicitor Tagapan on short notice, the Court can not accept a rotation of young and
inexperienced Solicitors who are uninformed of the details of this case by reason of their
assignment on short notice as reasons for postponing this case on top of their informal
complaints of lack of cooperation from or coordination with the PCGG much less can the
Court accept the last minute substitutions of Solicitors with others who are not in this
country.
In view hereof, the petitioner is given ten (10) days from today within which to formally
offer whatever evidence exist (sic) on record with the respondent being given a like
period to comment thereon and to state his disposition on this matter with respect to the
presentation of his own evidence.
The setting for tomorrow is necessarily cancelled under the circumstances.

Petitioner moved that this Order be reconsidered and that it be allowed to present
evidence in a formal trial. The motion was denied by public respondent in its assailed
Resolution of 3 January 1996 thus

The "MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION" dated 7 December 1995 of the Plaintiff is

Denied.
It is true that this Court expressed its impatience and disapproval over the practice of the
Office of the Solicitor General of passing on, actually "dumping" of certain cases such as
these to a succession of young inexperienced lawyers on short notice. This, however, is
not cured by transferring a long standing case to probably experienced lawyers who are
not available and on short notice.
The point of this Court's impatience on the transferring of cases to inexperienced lawyers
on short notice is that cases are unduly delayed and, perhaps, prejudiced by the
inexperienced; in fact, more than anything, the practice has demonstrated an apparent
low regard of Solicitors and Assistant Solicitors General for many "PCGG cases."
Assigning this case, which has suffered long and innumerable postponements
attributable to plaintiff, to lawyers of the Office of the Solicitor General who are not even
in the country at the time of the setting neither responds to the problem nor demonstrates
appropriate concern for the case.
The petitioner is given fifteen (15) days to submit its written offer of evidence after which
the case of the plaintiff will be deemed submitted, with or without the offer.

Hence, this special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
The QSG contends that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it
deprived the Republic of its right to present evidence in a full-blown hearing amounting
to a violation of its right to due process. Counsel contends that the reasons given for the
requested resettings of the 19 and 20 October 1995 hearings were meritorious grounds
which were not intended to delay the case nor violate private respondent's right to a
speedy trial. The OSG further contends that public respondent should not have taken
against the Republic the fact that Major Samuel Padilla was indisposed on the day of
the hearing as it was a circumstance beyond its control while the re-assignment of the
case to Solicitor Miranda and Atty. Jaso was effected only in response to public
respondent's plaintive about the assignment of the case to young and untrained
solicitors.
On 17 April 1996 we required respondents to file their respective comments on the
petition without granting the TRO sought by petitioner. Private respondent's Comment
and petitioner's Reply thereto were noted on 8 July 1996 and 4 February 1998,
respectively. On 6 July 1998 we considered this case submitted for decision without
public respondent's comment when it failed to file the required pleading for more than
two (2) years from the time it was first required to do so and despite our Resolution of 4
February 1998 reiterating our Resolution of 17 April 1996.
Plainly stated, the issue before us is whether public respondent Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the Republic's oral motion for
postponement of the 19 and 20 October 1995 hearings and in requiring it to just formally
offer its evidence within fifteen (15) days from notice.

It is well-settled that motions for continuance or deferment of hearings are granted only
upon meritorious grounds 3 and that the grant or denial thereof is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court 4 the exercise of which will not be disturbed except on a
showing of a patent and grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioner failed to show such patent and grave abuse of discretion on the part of public
respondent in denying its oral motion for postponement. Records show that the 18, 19
and 20 October hearings were scheduled some five (5) months earlier, or on 10 May
1995, for several reasons among which was to give Associate Solicitor Tagapan of the
OSG, who appeared for the first time vice Solicitor Reodica, an opportunity to study the
case. 5 In addition, on 13 October 1995 when public respondent Sandiganbayan
canceled the 18 October hearing, it cautioned the parties that such cancellation was
without prejudice to the settings on 19 and 20 October 1995. 6
However, on 19 October 1995, Solicitor Tagapan appeared only to manifest that he had
just been relieved from the case and that other solicitors were assigned to take over but
unfortunately they were not then available. The OSG explains that the re-assignment
was effected in response to public respondent's complaint about the assignment of
many PCGG cases to young and inexperienced solicitors. But a careful reading of the
questioned Order of 19 October 1995 shows that public respondent objected not so
much on the assignment of the case to young and inexperienced solicitors but that such
re-assignment was done on short notice and very close to the date of scheduled
hearings. The excuse given by the OSG completely failed to justify why the reassignment had to be done so near to the scheduled hearing of 19 October 1995 and,
worse, to solicitors who were not even present.
Furthermore, it has not been shown that some other urgent circumstance prompted the
re-assignment to justify the OSG's non-compliance with the requisites of motions in
general set out in Rule 15 7 of the Rules of Court 8 Sec. 2 of which provides that "[a]ll
motions shall be in writing except motions for continuance made in the presence of the
adverse party, or those made in the course of a hearing or trial." A motion for
postponement should not be filed at the last hour 9 and that judges are cautioned against
granting improvident postponements. 10 Thus when the reason adduced in support of a
motion for postponement was not unavoidable or could have been foreseen but was
presented only on the day of the trial although there was no apparent reason why it
could not have been presented earlier, thus avoiding inconvenience to the adverse
party, it is proper for the court to deny postponement. 11
What exacerbates the case for the OSG is the fact that it appeared in the 19 October
1995 hearing without its promised witness, apparently expecting that public respondent
would just benevolently grant its precipitate oral motion for postponement. While the
OSG now claims that Major Padilla was "indisposed" for which reason he was not
presented, public respondent's factual conclusion to which this Court is bound in a
certiorari proceeding is that no witness appeared allegedly upon advice of Associate
Solicitor Tagapan relying on the postponement to be granted by public respondent
precisely because of the reassignment of solicitors. 12

The rule that a party asking for postponement has absolutely no right to assume that its
motion would be granted, especially on less than three (3) days' notice, and must be in
court prepared on the day of the hearing 13 applies with greater force in this case where
the OSG had in fact more reason not to presume a grant of its motion for postponement
considering that Major (formerly Captain) Samuel Padilla had already been previously
warned by public respondent
thus
Capt. Samuel Padilla is given five (5) days from receipt hereof to show why he should not
be held disciplinarily accountable for his failure to appear . . . when he knew as a matter
of fact that this case wherein he appears to be the principal government witness has
been pending since 1988 and that his testimony was suspended as far back as February
15, 1990, precisely by reason of the unorganized state of evidence of the petitioner at the
time so that all of the proceedings thereafter had been precisely to clarify and organize
whatever evidence the parties might have thereon. It is a cause of great wonder to the
Court what urgent meeting could have befallen Capt. Padilla resulting to his failure to
appear in Court
today. 14

Under the circumstances, it cannot rightly be said that the OSG was not guilty of
inexcusable carelessness, presumptiousness, indifference to and neglect of duty in
assuming that public respondent would grant its oral motion for postponement, coming
to court unprepared and without a witness. Hence public respondent was well within its
authority to deny the Republic's oral motion for postponement of the hearings set on 19
and 20 October 1995 and require it, instead, to just formally offer its evidence within
fifteen (15) days from notice. Petitioner is not guilty of abuse of discretion, much less
grave, nor can it be charged by petitioner with denial of due process. 15
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is DENIED.
The questioned Order of public respondent Sandiganbayan dated 19 October 1995
denying the oral motion of petitioner Republic of the Philippines for the postponement of
the 19 and 20 October 1995 hearings as well as the Resolution dated 3 January 1996
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.1wphi1.nt
Footnotes
1 An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State Any Property Found to have been
Unlawfully Acquired by any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings
therefor.
2 Petition, p. 19; Rollo, p. 20.
3 Padua v. Ericta, No. L-38570, 24 May 1988, 161 SCRA 458, 459.

4 People v. Remorosa, G.R. No. 81768, 7 August 1991, 200 SCRA 350, 356; Belstar
Transportation, Inc. v. Board of Transportation, No. L-47663, 22 January 1990, 181 SCRA
209, 213.
5 See Order dated 10 May 1995; Rollo, p. 59.
6 See Note 2.
7 As now amended by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
8 Agravante v. Patriarca, No. L-48324, 14 March 1990, 183 SCRA 113.
9 Caete v. Judge, Court of First Instance of Zamboanga de Sur, No. L-21743, 4 May
1968, 23 SCRA 543.
10 Hernandez v. De Guzman, A.M. No. RTJ-93-1064, 22 January 1996, 252 SCRA 64.
11 Hap Hong Hardware Co., Inc. v. Philippine Milling Co., No. L-16778, 23 May 1961, 2
SCRA 68.
12 Order dated 19 October 1995, p. 1; Rollo, p. 37.
13 Republic v. Gumayan, No. L-16780, 31 May 1961, 2 SCRA 580.
14 Order dated 19 May 1994, G.R. No. 119633; Rollo, p. 257.
15 See Auyong Hian v. Court of Tax Appeals, No. L-28782, 12 September 1974, 59
SCRA 110, 119, citing Sarreal v. Hon. Tan, 92 Phil. 689, 692.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 90478 November 21, 1991
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT), petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR. and DOMINADOR R.
SANTIAGO, respondents.

Dominador R. Santiago for and in his own behalf and as counsel for respondent
Tantoco, Jr.

NARVASA, J.:p
Private respondents Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago together
with Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria R.
Tantoco, and Maria Lourdes Tantoco-Pineda-are defendants in Civil Case No. 0008 of
the Sandiganbayan. The case was commenced on July 21, 1987 by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
The complaint which initiated the action was denominated one "for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages," and was avowedly filed pursuant to
Executive Order No. 14 of President Corazon C. Aquino.
After having been served with summons, Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, instead of filing
their answer, jointly filed a "MOTION TO STRIKE OUT SOME PORTIONS OF THE
COMPLAINT AND FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS OF OTHER PORTIONS" dated Nov.
3, 1987. 1 The PCGG filed an opposition thereto, 2 and the movants, a reply to the
opposition. 3 By order dated January 29, 1988, the Sandiganbayan, in order to expedite
proceedings and accommodate the defendants, gave the PCGG forty-five (45) days to
expand its complaint to make more specific certain allegations. 4
Tantoco and Santiago then presented a "motion for leave to file interrogatories under
Rule 25 of the Rules of Court" dated February 1, 1988, and "Interrogatories under Rule
25." 5 Basically, they sought an answer to the question: "Who were the Commissioners
of the PCGG (aside from its Chairman, Hon. Ramon Diaz, who verified the complaint)
who approved or authorized the inclusion of Messrs. Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and
Dominador R. Santiago as defendants in the . . case?" 6 The PCGG responded by filing
a motion dated February 9, 1988 to strike out said motion and interrogatories as being
impertinent, "queer," "weird," or "procedurally bizarre as the purpose thereof lacks merit
as it is improper, impertinent and irrelevant under any
guise." 7
On March 18, 1988, in compliance with the Order of January 29, 1988, the PCGG filed
an Expanded Complaint. 8 As this expanded complaint, Tantoco and Santiago reiterated
their motion for bill of particulars, through a Manifestation dated April 11, 1988. 9
Afterwards, by Resolution dated July 4, 1988, 10 the Sandiganbayan denied the motion
to strike out, for bill of particulars, and for leave to file interrogatories, holding them to be
without legal and factual basis. Also denied was the PCGG's motion to strike out
impertinent pleading dated February 9, 1988. The Sandiganbayan declared inter alia
the complaint to be "sufficiently definite and clear enough," there are adequate
allegations . . which clearly portray the supposed involvement and/or alleged
participation of defendants-movants in the transactions described in detail in said

Complaint," and "the other matters sought for particularization are evidentiary in nature
which should be ventilated in the pre-trial or trial proper . ." It also opined that "(s)ervice
of interrogatories before joinder of issue and without leave of court is premature . .
(absent) any special or extraordinary circumstances . . which would justify . . (the
same)."
Tantoco and Santiago then filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim under date of
July 18, 1988. 11 In response, the PCGG presented a "Reply to Answer with Motion to
Dismiss Compulsory Counterclaim " 12
The case was set for pre-trial on July 31, 1989. 13 On July 25, 1989, the PCGG
submitted its PRE-TRIAL. 14 The pre-trial was however reset to September 11, 1989,
and all other parties were required to submit pre-trial briefs on or before that date. 15
On July 27, 1989 Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading
denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff," 16 and on August 2, 1989, an "Amended
Interrogatories to Plaintiff"' 17 as well as a Motion for Production and Inspection of
Documents. 18
The amended interrogatories chiefly sought factual details relative to specific averments
of PCGG's amended complaint, through such questions, for instance, as
1. In connection with the allegations . . in paragraph 1 . ., what specific property or
properties does the plaintiff claim it has the right to recover from defendants Tantoco, Jr.
and Santiago for being ill-gotten?
3. In connection with the allegations . . in paragraph 10 (a) . . what specific act or acts . .
were committed by defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago in "concert with" defendant
Ferdinand Marcos and in furtherance or pursuit, of the alleged systematic plan of said
defendant Marcos to accumulate ill-gotten wealth?"
5. In connection with . . paragraph 13 . ., what specific act or acts of the defendants
Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago . . were committed by said defendants as part, or in
furtherance, of the alleged plan to conceal assets of defendants Ferdinand and Imelda
Marcos?
7. In connection with . . paragraph 15(c) . . is it plaintiff's position or theory of the case
that Tourist Duty Free Shops, Inc., including all the assets of said corporation, are
beneficially owned by either or both defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and that
the defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, as well as, the other stockholders of record of
the same corporation are mere "dummies" of said defendants Ferdinand and /or Imelda
R. Marcos?

On the other hand, the motion for production and inspection of documents prayed for
examination and copying of
1) the "official records and other evidence" on the basis of which the verification of the
Amended Complaint asserted that the allegations thereof are "true and correct;"

2) the documents listed in PCGG's Pre-Trial Brief as those "intended to be presented and
. . marked as exhibits for the plaintiff;" and
3) "the minutes of the meeting of the PCGG which chronicles the discussion (if any) and
the decision (of the Chairman and members) to file the complaint" in the case at bar.

By Resolutions dated August 21, 1989 and August 25, 1989, the Sandiganbayan
admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted the motion for production and
inspection of documents (production being scheduled on September 14 and 15, 1989),
respectively.
On September 1, 1989, the PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
of August 25, 1989 (allowing production and inspection of documents). It argued that
1) since the documents subject thereof would be marked as exhibits during the pre-trial
on September 11, 1989 anyway, the order for "their production and inspection on
September 14 and 15, are purposeless and unnecessary;"
2) movants already know of the existence and contents of the document which "are
clearly described . . (in) plaintiff's Pre-Trial Brief;"
3) the documents are "privileged in character" since they are intended to be used
against the PCGG and/or its Commissioners in violation of Section 4, Executive Order
No. 1, viz.:
(a) No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof for anything
done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order.
(b) No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial, legislative, or administrative proceeding concerning matters
within its official cognizance.

It also filed on September 4, 1989 an opposition to the Amended Interrogatories, 19

which the Sandiganbayan treated as a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of
August 21, 1989 (admitting the Amended Interrogatories). The opposition alleged that

1) the interrogatories "are not specific and do not name the person to whom they are
propounded . .," or "who in the PCGG, in particular, . . (should) answer the
interrogatories;"
2) the interrogatories delve into "factual matters which had already been decreed . . as
part of the proof of the Complaint upon trial . .;"
3) the interrogatories "are frivolous" since they inquire about "matters of fact . . which
defendants . . sought to . . (extract) through their aborted Motion for Bill of Particulars;"

4) the interrogatories "are really in the nature of a deposition, which is prematurely filed
and irregularly utilized . . (since) the order of trial calls for plaintiff to first present its
evidence."
Tantoco and Santiago filed a reply and opposition on September 18, 1989.
After hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2) Resolutions on September 29,
1989, the first, denying reconsideration (of the Resolution allowing production of
documents), and the second, reiterating by implication the permission to serve the
amended interrogatories on the plaintiff (PCGG). 20
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
The PCGG contends that said orders, both dated September 29, 1989, should be
nullified because rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction. More particularly, it claims
a) as regards the order allowing the amended interrogatories to the plaintiff PCGG:
1) that said interrogatories are not specific and do not name the particular
individuals to whom they are propounded, being addressed only to the
PCGG;
2) that the interrogatories deal with factual matters which the
Sandiganbayan (in denying the movants' motion for bill of particulars) had
already declared to be part of the PCGG's proof upon trial; and
3) that the interrogatories would make PCGG Commissioners and officers
witnesses, in contravention of Executive Order No. 14 and related
issuances; and
b) as regards the order granting the motion for production of documents:
1) that movants had not shown any good cause therefor;
2) that some documents sought to be produced and inspected had already
been presented in Court and marked preliminarily as PCGG's exhibits,
and the movants had viewed, scrutinized and even offered objections
thereto and made comments thereon; and
3) that the other documents sought to be produced are either
(a) privileged in character or confidential in
nature and their use is proscribed by the
immunity provisions of Executive Order No. 1,
or

(b) non-existent, or mere products of the

movants' suspicion and fear.
This Court issued a temporary restraining order on October 27, 1989, directing the
Sandiganbayan to desist from enforcing its questioned resolutions of September 29,
1989 in Civil Case No. 0008. 21
After the issues were delineated and argued at no little length by the parties, the
Solicitor General withdrew "as counsel for plaintiff . . with the reservation, however,
conformably with Presidential Decree No. 478, the provisions of Executive Order No.
292, as well as the decisional law of 'Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, et al.,' (G.R.
No. 92561, September 12, 1990) 22 to submit his comment/observation on
incidents/matters pending with this . . Court if called for by circumstances in the interest
of the Government or if he is so required by the Court." 23 This, the Court allowed by
Resolution dated January 21, 1991. 24
Subsequently, PCGG Commissioner Maximo A. Maceren advised the Court that the
cases from which the Solicitor General had withdrawn would henceforth be under his
(Maceren's) charge "and/or any of the following private attorneys: Eliseo B. Alampay, Jr.,
Mario E. Ongkiko, Mario Jalandoni and such other attorneys as it may later authorize."
25

The facts not being in dispute, and it appearing that the parties have fully ventilated their
respective positions, the Court now proceeds to decide the case.
Involved in the present proceedings are two of the modes of discovery provided in the
Rules of Court: interrogatories to parties , 26 and production and inspection of
documents and things. 27 Now, it appears to the Court that among far too many lawyers
(and not a few judges), there is, if not a regrettable unfamiliarity and even outright
ignorance about the nature, purposes and operation of the modes of discovery, at least
a strong yet unreasoned and unreasonable disinclination to resort to them which is a
great pity for the intelligent and adequate use of the deposition-discovery mechanism,
coupled with pre-trial procedure, could, as the experience of other jurisdictions
convincingly demonstrates, effectively shorten the period of litigation and speed up
adjudication. 28 Hence, a few words about these remedies is not at all inappropriate.
The resolution of controversies is, as everyone knows, the raison d'etre of courts. This
essential function is accomplished by first, the ascertainment of all the material and
relevant facts from the pleadings and from the evidence adduced by the parties, and
second, after that determination of the facts has been completed, by the application of
the law thereto to the end that the controversy may be settled authoritatively, definitely
and finally.
It is for this reason that a substantial part of the adjective law in this jurisdiction is
occupied with assuring that all the facts are indeed presented to the Court; for
obviously, to the extent that adjudication is made on the basis of incomplete facts, to
that extent there is faultiness in the approximation of objective justice. It is thus the

obligation of lawyers no less than of judges to see that this objective is attained; that is
to say, that there no suppression, obscuration, misrepresentation or distortion of the
facts; and that no party be unaware of any fact material a relevant to the action, or
surprised by any factual detail suddenly brought to his attention during the trial. 29
Seventy-one years ago, in Alonso v. Villamor, 30 this Court described the nature and
object of litigation and in the process laid down the standards by which judicial contests
are to be conducted in this jurisdiction. It said:
A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled
in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather a
contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in
issue and then brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form
and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done on the merits. Lawsuits, unlike
duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office
as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
consideration from courts. There should be no vested right in technicalities. . . .

The message is plain. It is the duty of each contending party to lay before the court the
facts in issue-fully and fairly; i.e., to present to the court all the material and relevant
facts known to him, suppressing or concealing nothing, nor preventing another party, by
clever and adroit manipulation of the technical rules of pleading and evidence, from also
presenting all the facts within his knowledge.
Initially, that undertaking of laying the facts before the court is accomplished by the
pleadings filed by the parties; but that, only in a very general way. Only "ultimate facts"
are set forth in the pleadings; hence, only the barest outline of the facfual basis of a
party's claims or defenses is limned in his pleadings. The law says that every pleading
"shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of
the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case
may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts." 31
Parenthetically, if this requirement is not observed, i.e., the ultimate facts are alleged too
generally or "not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable . . (an
adverse party) properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial," a bill
of particulars seeking a "more definite statement" may be ordered by the court on
motion of a party. The office of a bill of particulars is, however, limited to making more
particular or definite the ultimate facts in a pleading It is not its office to supply
evidentiary matters. And the common perception is that said evidentiary details are
made known to the parties and the court only during the trial, when proof is adduced on
the issues of fact arising from the pleadings.
The truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and learned by the parties
before the trial. Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties before
the trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial should discover or inform themselves
of all the facts relevant to the action, not only those known to them individually, but also
those known to adversaries; in other words, the desideratum is that civil trials should not
be carried on in the dark; and the Rules of Court make this ideal possible through the

deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29. The experience in other

jurisdictions has been that ample discovery before trial, under proper regulation,
accomplished one of the most necessary of modern procedure: it not only eliminates
unessential issue from trials thereby shortening them considerably, but also requires
parties to play the game with the cards on the table so that the possibility of fair
settlement before trial is measurably increased. . ." 32
As just intimated, the deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy the
conceded inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-giving,
issue-formulation and fact revelation theretofore performed primarily by the pleadings.
The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device,
along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues
between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those
issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable parties, consistent with recognized
privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trials
and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark. 33
To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is
as broad as when the interrogated party is called as a witness to testify orally at trial.
The inquiry extends to all facts which are relevant, whether they be ultimate or
evidentiary, excepting only those matters which are privileged. The objective is as much
to give every party the fullest possible information of all the relevant facts before the trial
as to obtain evidence for use upon said trial. The principle is reflected in Section 2, Rule
24 (governing depositions) 34 which generally allows the examination of a deponent
1) "regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject of
the pending action, whether relating to the claim or defense of any other
party;"
2) as well as:
(a) "the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of
any books, documents, or other tangible things" and
(b) "the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant
facts."
What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which may be
useful in the preparation for trial, such as the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of relevant facts; those relevant facts themselves; and the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other
tangible things. Hence, "the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and
liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to
preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case. Mutual
knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper

litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he
has in his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage
at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it,
thus reducing the possibility, of surprise, . . . 35
In line with this principle of according liberal treatment to the deposition-discovery
mechanism, such modes of discovery as (a) depositions (whether by oral examination
or written interrogatories) under Rule 24, (b) interrogatories to parties under Rule 25,
and (c) requests for admissions under Rule 26, may be availed of without leave of court,
and generally, without court intervention. The Rules of Court explicitly provide that leave
of court is not necessary to avail of said modes of discovery after an answer to the
complaint has been served. 36 It is only when an answer has not yet been filed (but after
jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant or property subject of the action) that
prior leave of court is needed to avail of these modes of discovery, the reason being that
at that time the issues are not yet joined and the disputed facts are not clear. 37
On the other hand, leave of court is required as regards discovery by (a) production or
inspection of documents or things in accordance with Rule 27, or (b) physical and
mental examination of persons under Rule 28, which may be granted upon due
application and a showing of due cause.
To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and
efficacious, the law imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to make
discovery, such as dismissing the action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering
judgment by default against the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the
party or agent of the party; payment of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in
obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking the matters inquired into as
established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow
the disobedient party support or oppose designated claims or defenses; striking out
pleadings or parts thereof; staying further proceedings. 38
Of course, there are limitations to discovery, even when permitted to be undertaken
without leave and without judicial intervention. "As indicated by (the) Rules . . .,
limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that the examination is being
conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy, embarass, or oppress the
person subject to the inquiry. 39 And . . . further limitations come into existence when the
inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of
privilege." 40
In fine, the liberty of a party to make discovery is well nigh unrestricted if the matters
inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good
faith and within the bounds of the law.
It is in light of these broad principles underlying the deposition-discovery mechanism, in
relation of course to the particular rules directly involved, that the issues in this case will
now be resolved.

The petitioner's objections to the interrogatories served on it in accordance with Rule 25

of the Rules of Court cannot be sustained.
It should initially be pointed out as regards the private respondents "Motion for Leave
to File Interrogatories" dated February 1, 1988 41 that it was correct for them to seek
leave to serve interrogatories, because discovery was being availed of before an
answer had been served. In such a situation, i.e., "after jurisdiction has been obtained
over any defendant or over property subject of the action" but before answer, Section 1
of Rule 24 (treating of depositions), in relation to Section 1 of Rule 25 (dealing with
interrogatories to parties) explicitly requires "leave of court." 42 But there was no need
for the private respondents to seek such leave to serve their "Amended Interrogatories
to Plaintiff" (dated August 2, 1989 43) after they had filed their answer to the PCGG's
complaint, just as there was no need for the Sandiganbayan to act thereon.
1. The petitioner's first contention that the interrogatories in question are defective
because they (a) do not name the particular individuals to whom they are propounded,
being addressed only to the PCGG, and (b) are "fundamentally the same matters . .
(private respondents) sought to be clarified through their aborted Motion . . for Bill of
Particulars" are untenable and quickly disposed of.
The first part of petitioner's submission is adequately confuted by Section 1, Rule 25
which states that if the party served with interrogatories is a juridical entity such as "a
public or private corporation or a partnership or association," the same shall be
"answered . . by any officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf." There is absolutely
no reason why this proposition should not be applied by analogy to the interrogatories
served on the PCGG. That the interrogatories are addressed only to the PCGG, without
naming any specific commissioner o officer thereof, is utterly of no consequence, and
may not be invoked as a reason to refuse to answer. As the rule states, the
interrogatories shall be answered "by any officer thereof competent to testify in its
behalf."
That the matters on which discovery is desired are the same matters subject of a prior
motion for bill of particulars addressed to the PCGG's amended complaint and
denied for lack of merit is beside the point. Indeed, as already pointed out above, a
bill of particulars may elicit only ultimate facts, not so-called evidentiary facts. The latter
are without doubt proper subject of discovery. 44
Neither may it be validly argued that the amended interrogatories lack specificity. The
merest glance at them disproves the argument. The interrogatories are made to relate
to individual paragraphs of the PCGG's expanded complaint and inquire about details of
the ultimate facts therein alleged. What the PCGG may properly do is to object to
specific items of the interrogatories, on the ground of lack of relevancy, or privilege, or
that the inquiries are being made in bad faith, or simply to embarass or oppress it. 45 But
until such an objection is presented and sustained, the obligation to answer subsists.

2. That the interrogatories deal with factual matters which will be part of the PCGG's
proof upon trial, is not ground for suppressing them either. As already pointed out, it is
the precise purpose of discovery to ensure mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts on
the part of all parties even before trial, this being deemed essential to proper litigation.
This is why either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his
possession; and the stage at which disclosure of evidence is made is advanced from
the time of trial to the period preceding it.
3. Also unmeritorious is the objection that the interrogatories would make PCGG
Commissioners and officers witnesses, in contravention of Executive Order No. 14 and
related issuances. In the first place, there is nothing at all wrong in a party's making his
adversary his witness .46 This is expressly allowed by Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court, viz.:
Sec. 6. Direct examination of unwilling or hostile witnesses. A party may . . . call an
adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation
or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party, and interrogate him by
leading questions and contradict and impeach him in all respects as if he had been called
by the adverse party, and the witness thus called may be contradicted and impeached by
or on behalf of the adverse party also, and may be cross-examined by the adverse party
only upon the subject-matter of his examination in chief.

The PCGG insinuates that the private respondents are engaged on a "fishing
expedition," apart from the fact that the information sought is immaterial since they are
evidently meant to establish a claim against PCGG officers who are not parties to the
action. It suffices to point out that "fishing expeditions" are precisely permitted through
the modes of discovery. 47 Moreover, a defendant who files a counterclaim against the
plaintiff is allowed by the Rules to implead persons (therefore strangers to the action) as
additional defendants on said counterclaim. This may be done pursuant to Section 14,
Rule 6 of the Rules, to wit:
Sec. 14. Bringing new parties. When the presence of parties other than those to the
original action is required for the granting of complete relief in the determination of a
counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as defendants, if
jurisdiction over them can be obtained."

The PCGG's assertion that it or its members are not amenable to any civil action "for
anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by . . (Executive)
Order (No. 1)," is not a ground to refuse to answer the interrogatories. The disclosure of
facto relevant to the action and which are not self-incriminatory or otherwise privileged
is one thing; the matter of whether or not liability may arise from the facts disclosed in
light of Executive Order
No. 1, is another. No doubt, the latter proposition may properly be set up by way of
defense in the action.
The apprehension has been expressed that the answers to the interrogatories may be
utilized as foundation for a counterclaim against the PCGG or its members and officers.
They will be. The private respondents have made no secret that this is in fact their

intention. Withal, the Court is unable to uphold the proposition that while the PCGG
obviously feels itself at liberty to bring actions on the basis of its study and appreciation
of the evidence in its possession, the parties sued should not be free to file
counterclaims in the same actions against the PCGG or its officers for gross neglect or
ignorance, if not downright bad faith or malice in the commencement or initiation of such
judicial proceedings, or that in the actions that it may bring, the PCGG may opt not to be
bound by rule applicable to the parties it has sued, e.g., the rules of discovery.
So, too, the PCGG's postulation that none of its members may be "required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial . . proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance," has no application to a judicial proceeding it has itself initiated. As just
suggested, the act of bringing suit must entail a waiver of the exemption from giving
evidence; by bringing suit it brings itself within the operation and scope of all the rules
governing civil actions, including the rights and duties under the rules of discovery.
Otherwise, the absurd would have to be conceded, that while the parties it has
impleaded as defendants may be required to "disgorge all the facts" within their
knowledge and in their possession, it may not itself be subject to a like compulsion.
The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be sued
without its consent. But it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its
sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit, descending to the level of an
ordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the State,
even while assuming to represent or act for the State. 48
The suggestion 49 that the State makes no implied waiver of immunity by filing suit
except when in so doing it acts in, or in matters concerning, its proprietary or nongovernmental capacity, is unacceptable; it attempts a distinction without support in
principle or precedent. On the contrary
The consent of the State to be sued may be given expressly or impliedly. Express
consent may be manifested either through a general law or a special law. Implied consent
is given when the State itself commences litigation or when it enters into a contract. 50
The immunity of the State from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties
in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions
open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against the private
parties, the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of the
defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up
whatever claims and other defenses he might have against the state. . . . (Sinco,
Philippine Political Law, Tenth E., pp. 36-37, citing U.S. vs. Ringgold, 8 Pet. 150, 8 L. ed.
899)" 51

It can hardly be doubted that in exercising the right of eminent domain, the State
exercises its jus imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights or jus gestionis. Yet,
even in that area, it has been held that where private property has been taken in
expropriation without just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit
cannot be set up by the State against an action for payment by the owner. 52

The Court also finds itself unable to sustain the PCGG's other principal contention, of
the nullity of the Sandiganbayan's Order for the production and inspection of specified
documents and things allegedly in its possession.
The Court gives short shrift to the argument that some documents sought to be
produced and inspected had already been presented in Court and marked preliminarily
as PCGG's exhibits, the movants having in fact viewed, scrutinized and even offered
objections thereto and made comments thereon. Obviously, there is nothing secret or
confidential about these documents. No serious objection can therefore be presented to
the desire of the private respondents to have copies of those documents in order to
study them some more or otherwise use them during the trial for any purpose allowed
by law.
The PCGG says that some of the documents are non-existent. This it can allege in
response to the corresponding question in the interrogatories, and it will incur no
sanction for doing so unless it is subsequently established that the denial is false.
The claim that use of the documents is proscribed by Executive Order No. 1 has already
been dealt with. The PCGG is however at liberty to allege and prove that said
documents fall within some other privilege, constitutional or statutory.
The Court finally finds that, contrary to the petitioner's theory, there is good cause for
the production and inspection of the documents subject of the motion dated August 3,
1989. 53 Some of the documents are, according to the verification of the amended
complaint, the basis of several of the material allegations of said complaint. Others,
admittedly, are to be used in evidence by the plaintiff. It is matters such as these into
which inquiry is precisely allowed by the rules of discovery, to the end that the parties
may adequately prepare for pre-trial and trial. The only other documents sought to be
produced are needed in relation to the allegations of the counterclaim. Their relevance
is indisputable; their disclosure may not be opposed.
One last word. Due no doubt to the deplorable unfamiliarity respecting the nature,
purposes and operation of the modes of discovery earlier
mentioned, 54 there also appears to be a widely entertained idea that application of said
modes is a complicated matter, unduly expensive and dilatory. Nothing could be farther
from the truth. For example, as will already have been noted from the preceding
discussion, all that is entailed to activate or put in motion the process of discovery by
interrogatories to parties under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court, is simply the delivery
directly to a party of a letter setting forth a list of least questions with the request that
they be answered individually. 55 That is all. The service of such a communication on the
party has the effect of imposing on him the obligation of answering the questions
"separately and fully in writing underoath," and serving "a copy of the answers on the
party submitting the interrogatories within fifteen (15) days after service of the
interrogatories . . ." 56 The sanctions for refusing to make discovery have already been
mentioned. 57 So, too, discovery under Rule 26 is begun by nothing more complex than
the service on a party of a letter or other written communication containing a request

that specific facts therein set forth and/or particular documents copies of which are
thereto appended, be admitted in writing. 58 That is all. Again, the receipt of such a
communication by the party has the effect of imposing on him the obligation of serving
the party requesting admission with "a sworn statement either denying specifically the
matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he
cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters," failing in which "(e)ach of the
matters of which admission is requested shall be deemed admitted." 59 The taking of
depositions in accordance with Rule 24 (either on oral examination or by written
interrogatories) while somewhat less simple, is nonetheless by no means as
complicated as seems to be the lamentably extensive notion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without pronouncement as to costs. The
temporary restraining order issued on October 27, 1989 is hereby LIFTED AND SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., I also join Justice Cruz's concurrence.
Romero, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I am delighted to concurr with Mr. Justice Andres R. Narvasa in his scholarly ponencia
which, besides reaching a conclusion sustained by the applicable law and
jurisprudence, makes for reading both pleasurable and instructive. One function of the
court not generally appreciated is to educate the reader on the intricacies and even the
mustique of the law. The opinion performs this function with impressive expertise and
makes the modes of discovery less esoteric or inaccessible to many members of the
bar.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I am delighted to concurr with Mr. Justice Andres R. Narvasa in his scholarly ponencia
which, besides reaching a conclusion sustained by the applicable law and
jurisprudence, makes for coding both pleasurable and instructive. One function of the
court not generally appreciated is to educate the reader on the intricacies and even the
mustique of the law. The opinion performs this function with impressive expertise and
makes the modes of discovery less esoteric or inaccessible to many members of the
bar.

Footnotes
1 Petition, Annex D.
2 Id., Annex E.
3 Id., Annex F.
4 Rollo, p. 7.
5 Id., pp. 7, 145.
6 Id., p. 7.
7 Petition, Annex G.
8 Rollo, pp. 56-87.
9 Petition, Annex H.
10 Id., Annex I.
11 Id., Annex J.
12 Id., Annex K.
13 Rollo, p. 9.
14 Petition, Annex L
15 Id., Annex M.
16 Rollo, p. 9.
17 Petition, Annex N.

18 Id., Annex O.
19 Petition, Annex R; Rollo, p. 220.
20 Id., Annexes A and B; Rollo, p. 11.
21 Rollo, pp. 244, 245, 245-A.
22 189 SCRA 459.
23 Id., p. 317. The Solicitor General also withdrew his appearance in other cases
involving the PCGG, to wit: G.R. Nos. 74302 (Tourist Sandiganbayan, et al.); 86926
(Cesar E.A Virata v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al.); 89425 (Republic, etc., et al. v.
Sandiganbayan . . et al.); 90478 (Republic v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, etc. et al.); 93694
(Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, etc., et al. v. PCGG, et al.).
24 Id., p. 320.
25 Id., pp. 328 et seq.
26 Governed by Rule 25.
27 Governed by Rule 27.
28 Moran (Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979 ed., Vol. 2, pp. 5-6), for instance,
points out-citing the recommendations of the committee of the American Judicature
Society that drafted the Model Rules of Civil Procedure that "The English and
Canadian experience has been of more value than any other single procedural device, in
bringing parties to a settlement who otherwise would have fought their way through to
trial.
N.B. Actions could very well be ended by summary judgments (Rule 34) on the basis of
the results of discovery.
29 Surprises, it has been observed, are "most dangerous weapons" in a "judicial duel"
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963, ed., Vol. 2, p. 6).
30 16 Phil. 315, 322 (July 26, 1910); emphasis supplied.
31 Section 1, Rule 8, Rules of Court.
32 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979 ed., Vol. 2, pp. 5-6; see footnote 28,
supra.
33 SEE Hickman v. Taylor, et al., U.S. Sup. Ct. Rpts., 91 Law Ed., 51, 455, cited in Feria,
Civil Procedure, p. 1969 ed., p. 435; 35A CJS Sec. 527, pp. 785-786; 23 Am Jur. 2d, See,
156, p. 493.
34 Sec. 5, Rule 25 ("Interrogatories to Parties") also allows inquiry as "to any matters that
can be inquired into under section 2 of Rule 24 . ."

35 Feria, op. cit., p. 436, citing Hickman v. Taylor, et al., supra; SEE 23 Am Jur 2d., Sec.
150, pp. 484-487.
36 Sec. 1, Rule 24; Sec. 1, Rule 25; Sec. 1, Rule 26.
37 SEE Everett v. Asia Banking Corp., 49 Phil. 512.
38 Rule 29.
39 SEE Secs. 16 and 18, Rule 24.
40 Hickman v. Taylor, et al., supra, cited in Feria, op. cit., p. 436.
41 SEE footnote 5, supra.
42 Cf. Uy Chao v. de la Rama Steamship Co., Inc., 6 SCRA 69.
43 SEE footnote 17, supra.
44 SEE discussion at page 8, and footnote 30 and related text, supra.
45 Cf. Lopez, etc., et al. v. Maceren, etc., et al. 95 Phil. 754; Cojuangco v. Caluag, 97
Phil. 982 (unrep.); Villalon v. Ysip, 98 Phil. 997; Caguiat v. Torres, 30 SCRA 109-110;
Jacinto v. Amparo, 93 Phil. 693.
46 SEE Cason v. San Pedro, 9 SCRA 925, where such objections as that the
interrogatories transferred the onus probandi from plaintiffs to defendants, or the latter
were being made to prove the former's case, or that anyway, the facts may be proven by
plaintiffs through their own evidence, were overruled.
47 SEE Tan Chico v. Concepcion, 43 Phil. 141 (1922).
48 It should be pointed out that the rulings in PCGG v. Pea 159 SCRA 556 (1988) and
PCGG v. Nepomuceno, etc., et al., G.R. No. 78750, April 20, 1990 are not inconsistent
with that in this proceeding, the facts and basic issues therein involved being quite
distinct from those in the case at bar. Unlike the present case, where the PCGG instituted
a civil action against Tantoco, et al. in the Sandiganbayan neither Pea nor Nepomuceno
involved any suit filed by the PCGG, the acts therein challenged being simply its
extrajudicial orders of sequestration; and in both said cases, the Regional Trial Courts
issued writs of preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement and implementation of the
sequestration orders. This Court nullified those injunctive writs on the ground that the
PCGG, as an agency possessed of primary administrative jurisdiction (particularly
concerning sequestration) and exercising quasi-judicial functions, was co-equal to a
Regional Trial Court which therefore had no jurisdiction to review or otherwise restrain or
interfere with its acts, that power being exclusively lodged in the Sandiganbayan, subject
only to review by this Court. In Nepomuceno, it was additionally ruled that there was
prima facie basis for the challenged order of sequestration; that the take-over of the
property in question by the PCGG fiscal agents was necessitated as much by the
resistance and defiance of the holders thereof to the PCGG's authority as by the desire of
the PCGG to preserve said property; and that since the power to seize property to
conserve it pending the institution of suit for its recovery was sanctioned by the Freedom
Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, the PCGG must be deemed immune from any
suit which would render that authority inutile or ineffectual.

49 Of the Solicitor General in his Reply to Answer, etc.: Rollo, pp 168-169.

50 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1991 ed., p. 33.
SEC. 5, Act No. 3083 (eff., March 16, 1923) provides that,
"When the Government of the Philippine Islands is plaintiff in an action instituted in any
court of original jurisdiction, defendant shall have the right to assert therein, by way of
set-off or counterclaim in a similar action between private parties."
51 Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., 95 Phil. 905, 912.
52 Ministerio vs. City of Cebu, 40 SCRA 464, cited with approval in Santiago vs.
Republic, 87 SCRA 294.
53 Petition, Annex O, pp. 206-208.
54 At page 6, last paragraph, supra.
55 Sec. 1, Rule 25, Rules of Court.
56 Sec. 2, Rule 25.
57 SEE footnote 38 and related text.
58 Sec. 1, Rule 26.
59 Sec. 2, Rule 25; see also footnote 38 and related text, supra.

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