National Identities

Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2006, pp. 41
59

Violent civic nationalism versus civil

ethnic nationalism: Contrasting
Indonesia and Malay(si)a
Peter Kreuzer

In 1963 the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah formed the
Federation of Malaysia. In the same year Indonesia gained control over West Papua.
In the first case the integration was accomplished participatory and peacefully, in the
second violence reigned supreme. I argue that different visions of community, nation and
state, developed during the decades of decolonisation and the early years of state- and
nation-building, are responsible for the different outcomes. Contrary to the expectations
of the predominant theories on nationalism the ethno-cultural variant of nation-building
in Malaysia proved to be much more integrative than the civic variant espoused by the
Indonesian nation-builders.

Keywords: Nation-building; State-building; Ethnic Violence; Political Culture; Ethnic-

nationalism; Civic Nationalism; National Identity; Indonesia; Malaysia

Contrasting ways of incorporating territories and peoples1

Early in the 1960s the Federation of Malaya and Indonesia incorporated new
territories and peoples. With the integration of Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak in 1963
the Federation of Malaya changed its name to Federation of Malaysia. In the same
year, the Republic of Indonesia, after a short intermezzo given by a handful of United
Nations administrators, occupied the formerly Dutch West Papua. While the
enlargement of the Federation of Malaya has been characterised by peaceful and
fair negotiations among all contending parties, the Indonesian occupation of West
Papua has been authoritarian and extremely violent. Regarding Sabah, Sarawak and
Singapore the proceedings leading to the integration were characterised by a high
degree of transparency and public participation. In contrast, the people of West

Peter Kreuzer is in the Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt. Correspondence to: Peter Kreuzer, PRIF Leimenrode
29 60322 Frankfurt, Germany. E-mail: kreuzer@hsfk.de

ISSN 1460-8944 (print)/ISSN 1469-9907 (online) # 2006 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/14608940600571289
42 P. Kreuzer
Papua never had a chance to voice their concerns, let alone participate in the decision
about their future.
I argue that the different courses of Malaya and Indonesia towards the integration
of new territories and people should not be explained by mere arguments of political
interest, but by taking recourse to a historical perspective which centres on the
development
in Anderson’s terms ‘the imagination’
of modern political
community and politics. In both countries various strands of Malayan tradition
were reframed in the process of colonisation, the decades of decolonisation and the
early years of nation- as well as state-building in order to provide cultural frames for
political action.
Traditional notions of power and community have not been extinguished by
colonial rule but were partially overwritten and reframed. Traditional cultural
patterns, characteristics of social organisation emerging from socio-structural as well
as economic key features amalgamated with new economic and political structures
induced by the specifics of the colonial systems and the ingredients of modernist
western political ideologies in order to produce very specific cultures and practices of
conflict. Traditional notions resurfaced albeit in new frames, with slightly altered
meanings and integrated in new institutional environments. These re-formed
patterns of political perception were not only developed during the decades of
decolonisation, but at the same time put to use in affectively and motivationally
highly loaded conflict-situations. The evolving cognitive as well as emotive and
motivational patterns were deeply inscribed into the collective memory and in turn
set the tone of later conflict-behaviour.
The interpretation of concepts of political order by the Malayan and Indonesian
political elites reveal significant differences which, as will be seen, have grave
consequences for political action. While the Malayan political elite conceived of the
nation in ethno-cultural terms, the Indonesian politicians choose a civic version of
nationalism for their nation-building effort. While Malaysia promoted a rather clear-
cut differentiation between nation and state, Indonesia chose the concept of a civic
nation-state. Surprisingly, it was not the civic concept which resulted in civil
that is
violence free and participatory
politics, but the ethno-culturally grounded view on
community. The Malayan state, founded on the ideas of a politicisation of ethnicity
and inter-ethnic bargaining, enabled a sufficient degree of political participation for
the large and potentially competing ethnic groups, whereas the Indonesian variant of
civic nation-building quickly foundered by reverting to a leader-centred polity and a
near complete negation of individual and group rights in the face of the overarching
collectivity of the Indonesian nation.

Comparing Cultures and Practices of Nation-and State-building

The arguments put forward so far point to the centrality of understanding the
cultural schemes of leadership, power, and political community (people and nation),
which translate into vastly different conflict-styles. The choice of interpretations by
 National Identities 43

the indigenous political leaders proved decisive for future developments, which then,
with all the idiosyncrasies of historical chance, led to further polishing and
adaptation of cultural concepts as well as conflict resolution strategies. Due to space
restrictions the processes of meaning-development as well as meaning-change can
only briefly be summarized.

Malay(si)a: Rational Bargaining between Ethno-cultural Nations in one State

Malaysia is the latest product of a protracted process of state-building by which
eleven rather small independent sultanates were partially and asymmetrically
integrated within a larger colonial framework only to be reframed as a federation
upon the eve of the colonial era. With the advent of sovereign statehood in 1957 they
evolved into the Federation of Malaya.
This complex process, which lasted for more than half a century, was characterised
by co-operative and constructive bargaining between the representatives of social
groups which were organised along ascriptive lines. Even the most important political
bargaining on the future state was organised as a strongly regulated and rule-bound
intra-elite event, where the leaders of the three ethnically defined groups came
together to flesh out an integrative solution to the problems vital for all of them:
security, identity, and fairness/equality. All of these needs were to be guaranteed by
the rule-bound and self-restricting co-operation of conservative leaders of the largest
ascriptive groups. Thereby ethnic identity became one cornerstone of the modern
political system. By separating community (nation) and state, the last could be
conceived of as a rational instrument for inter-national (inter-ethnic) bargaining.

Developing an Ethnicity-based Multi-national Mode of State-building

The successful Malay(si)an state-building was enabled by several developments in the
ideological and cultural realm, which were initiated in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century and resulted in a significant reframing of the concepts of political
leadership, power, and identity-group.
Traditionally, the Raja was perceived to be all-powerful in his local sphere,
nevertheless he was only one of several neighbouring rulers of basically equal rank.
Therefore, power and leadership at the very top were conceived of in a framework of
conflict and co-operation among equals. The relationship between the Rajas was
perceived to be non-hierarchical. Hierarchisation by means of territorial aggrandise-
ment or subjugation was no aim of Royal rule. The Malayan particularistic view of
political order, exalted the negeri (the small state ruled by a sultan or Raja) but not
the idea of an overarching negara. Political identity was bound to the negeri, whereas
since the late nineteenth century on the elite level cultural identity was increasingly
expressed on the basis of the Muslim faith.2
The incorporation of western concepts of race and descent in the 1920s led to a
significant reframing of the political and cultural identity groups. The religious frame
44 P. Kreuzer
was overshadowed by a competing ethnic frame of the Bangsa Melayu (the Malay
community/nation). Within a few decades the former was basically integrated into
the latter insofar as adherence to the Muslim faith became a central criterion of
Malayness. However, political identity remained anchored in the various negeri.
Adhering to the negeri not only transformed the constituent parts of traditional
Malaya into one central focus of modern political identity but also enabled the
representatives of the traditional negeri to continue as symbols of political and
Muslim identity. This reframing of political and religious identity is clearly mirrored
in the institutional set-up, which eventually emerged in the course of the
constitutional debates. The new state was devised as a federation. The states
comprising the federation were offshoots of the old kingdoms and the rulers
succeeded not only in becoming the figureheads of the new states but in maintaining
their positions as representatives of the Malays/Muslims as well. As none of them
could claim superior status, the ‘natural’ outcome of the debate about their role on
the federal level was a council of equals and the rotation of the position of supreme
ruler (Yang di-Pertuan Agong).
From the very outset of modern state- and nation-building both, the conservative
Malay political elite as well as their Chinese counterparts defined the political
community in ethno-cultural terms. They never aimed at supplanting them with a
fictitious all-encompassing civic identity. For them political loyalty was owed to one’s
ethnic community (Malay: bangsa; Chinese: minzu). Similar to the Malay concept of
bangsa,3 the Chinese minzu-concept was built upon the idea of rights of culturally
defined ascriptive groups. Both clearly did not stand for individual rights (Tan 1988).
Malay and Chinese elites maintained that the community was identical neither
with state nor society. Rather, the Malayan state was conceived as an endeavour in
multi-community co-operation, even though the ethno-cultural concept was
employed in securing symbolical primacy for the Malay segment of the population
as the owners of the Malay Land (Tanah Melayu). The polity was devised as a multi-
ethnic arena whereas the land itself was perceived to be the heritage of one particular
ethno-cultural group. This recourse to the concept of indigenousness was also used to
legitimise Malay dominance (Ketuanan Melayu) and the special rights given to the
Malays.4 Although being inherently hierarchical, this double-standard enabled the
open settlement of group-conflict because sub-national ethno-cultural groupness was
perceived to be legitimate in the political realm. The double-frame of equality and
hierarchy laid a basis for striving for betterment without taking recourse to violent
means and thereby safeguarding intra-societal peace to a degree which is outstanding
in regional comparison.
In the following years, these concepts were translated into a distinctive practice of
accommodative power-sharing at the elite level, which primarily aimed at securing
group-rights. The elites of the large communal groups legitimised their position not
by nation-, but by successful state-building, which was largely measured by its socio-
economic output. Integration should be accomplished by taking recourse to a joint
state, not a joint nation. On the one hand, the Federation was to be defined in civic
 National Identities 45

terms, insofar as all people living in Malaya for a prolonged time-span and willing to
pledge loyalty to the new Federation of Malaya could enter the community of citizens

an option which resulted in the naturalisation of many Chinese immigrants within
a few years.5 On the other hand, Malaya was defined in ethno-cultural terms as Land
of the Malays (Tanah Melayu) whereby the Bangsa Melayu was understood as a
nation constitutive for the state (Staatsnation). This collective identity found its
expression in the choice of Islam as the state religion and the symbolically strong
position of the rulers, by which the modern polity was anchored in the Malay past.
In effect, the Malayan elites fused three different visions of the nation by
constructing a multicultural state (multicultural nationalism) based on the idea of
citizenship for all people owing allegiance to Malaya irrespective of their descent
(civic nationalism). All citizens were obliged nevertheless to define themselves in
ethno-cultural categories for all purposes of political co-operation (ethno-cultural
nationalism). The whole of the Malay(si)an population was seen as an assemblage of
its constituent ethno-cultural parts.
This mix enabled (and enforced) a permanent balancing act in which competing
collective interests had to be negotiated and integrative solutions arrived at. The
political process had to satisfy the needs for identity, security and well-being of all
ethnic groups. The state was not so much perceived as a symbol of sovereign power
but as a rational instrument designed for problem-solving. Within a few years
Malay(si)a developed a highly rule- and institution-oriented ‘quasi-bureaucratic’
conflict-style for the mediation of inter-communal policy-making at the elite-level.6
All groups accepted that all parties to the conflict had a right to be heard and
participate in its resolution and that conflict resolution had to take into account the
interests of all contending parties. Compromise was seen as an aim of conflict-
management, not as a strategy or tactic for achieving maximalist aims. Since the
people were not conceived of as a fictitious entity but only as the sum of its
constituent parts
the communal groups
none of the groups could subordinate
the others by taking recourse to the will of the people.
The collective good could only be determined as the good which could be achieved
in a fair bargaining process. It emerged as the largest possible common denominator
of all particular aims held by the communal groups comprising the Malayan society.
To sum up the Malayan way:
1. Give priority to state-building over nation-building.
2. Accept the basic equality of all ethnic groups in respect to the legitimacy of their
basic needs of identity, security and well-being (equality/justice).
3. Accept the legitimacy of competing identity-claims.
4. Utilise a conflict-perspective which,
4a. Values compromise between balanced collective actors and integrative strategies
safeguarding the most fundamental interests and meeting the largest possible
number of requests of all parties to the conflict.
46 P. Kreuzer
4b. Stimulates non-public intra-elite bargaining, while discouraging broad-based
political participation and delegitimising political strategies which rely on mass-
mobilisation.

The transition from Malaya to Malaysia

An application of the political style sketched above can be found in the bargaining-
process leading from Malaya to Malaysia: Here the basic patterns developed and
learned during the last decades were adapted to a completely new set of actors and
problems.
On 27 May 1961, the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman,
commented at a press conference in Singapore that his country was very interested
to devise some arrangements, by which the Malayan Federation, Singapore and the
territories of British Borneo could co-operate more effectively.7 Directly after his
proposal, the Malayan government initiated confidence-building measures. Accom-
panied by the Head of the Federation of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman toured
Brunei and Sarawak where he repeatedly stressed that the new states would ‘be
partners of equal status, no more and no less than the other States now forming the
Federation of Malaya. . .. The days of imperialism are gone and it is not the intention
of Malaya to perpetuate or revive them’ (cited in Milne and Ratnam, 1974: p.26).
Despite these assurances all indigenous groups rejected the proposals and established
a united front to defeat the idea of independence through merging with Malaya. The
destiny of the peripheral regions of Indonesia as well as the plight of the Moros in the
Philippines were interpreted as warning examples of failed efforts of integration,
which turned out to be hegemonic endeavours to push through the visions and
interest of the strongest groups which had usurped national leadership.
For Malaya a first chance to plead her case arose at the regional conference of the
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, which was attended by the most
important political leaders of British Borneo. This time, the Tunku
in close co-
operation with the Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew
succeeded in
changing the non-negotiable position of the Bornean representatives into clearly
articulated interests, which had to be safeguarded in any case. Now, every single
reason given could be scrutinised, possible measures for alleviating fears and
safeguarding interests could be discussed. All parties agreed that this would be
worthwhile and consequently founded the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Com-
mittee in which they were represented on an equal footing. The post of chairman
went to Donald Stephens, a prominent Kadazan leader from Sabah and one of the
most outspoken critics of the Malaysia Plan.
Aided by their control over the chairmanship, the Bornean leaders could exercise
significant influence on the negotiation-process. Most of their demands were met.
The Malayan leadership also realised that the creation of Malaysia had to proceed
from the premise of symbolic equality between all partners
similar to the concept
 National Identities 47

of a civic nation, which comes into being by free agreement of all its future members.
Therefore, the future Malaysia had to be a merger of equal partners: a new state.
Parallel to these talks, the Malayan government initiated a comprehensive program
of confidence-building: Bornean politicians and community leaders visited Malaya
and discussed their concerns and the Malayan experience in state- and nation-
building with an array of bureaucrats and politicians. To guarantee the democratic
character of the Malaysia-process, the Malayan and British governments decided to
send a Commission to the Bornean territories to assess the opinion of the population.
It was made clear that the Malaysia-plan would have to be discontinued if the
majority of the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak opposed it. The so called
Cobbold Commission held dozens of public hearings in all districts of Sabah and
Sarawak. Nearly 700 groups sent representatives to air their views. More than 2.200
people and groups submitted written comments. The findings reported by the
commission were: 2/3 of the population were positively inclined towards the
Malaysia-plan if the Bornean demands were met. 1/3 were against the merger or
would only accept it if the Bornean territories were granted independence before. In
her report the Commission stressed that the Government of Malaya should accede to
the requests of the Bornean elite as far as possible
a demand which was
immediately met by the Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman.8
In the new Inter-Governmental Committee (IGC), mandated with finalising
the text for the Constitution of the new Federation, the people’s representatives from
the two colonies of Sabah and Sarawak were given equal status with the delegations
from the Federation of Malaya and Great Britain. The results of the negotiations,
made public on the 27th of February 1963, were a complete victory of the Bornean
representatives. Extraordinary guarantees were enshrined into the new Constitution,
including:
1. Although Islam was to be the official religion and Malay the future national
language of the Federation of Malaysia, these constitutional clauses did not apply
to the Bornean territories.
2. Only the Bornean states could control internal migration. Special regulations for
the public services allowed the Bornean states to retain the services of British
officers until enough qualified Borneans were able to take over.
3. In order to guarantee a strong voice for the Bornean governments at the federal
level, their share of seats in parliament did not correspond to their population.
Sabah as well as Sarawak was clearly over-represented.9
4. Last but not least the indigenous Bangsa were to be redefined so that the
provisions for the preferential treatment of Malays could also be applied to the
natives of the Bornean territories. The ethno-cultural basis of the state was
adapted according to the principle of indigenous rights of ownership. The old
concept of Bangsa Melayu was extended by a new concept of Bumiputera (Son of
the Soil), which signified all groups who could claim inherited ownership rights to
their territories.
48 P. Kreuzer
At the last moment, Brunei opted against joining the federation. The ‘Agreement
relating to Malaysia’ was eventually signed by representatives from Great Britain,
Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak on 9. July 1963.10 Two and a half months
later Malaysia came into being.

Several prominent characteristics of the process of unification stand out:

1. The highly discursive and compromise-oriented style of the Malayan elite made it
easy for the Bornean representatives to accept the negotiations and to develop
high levels of inter-group trust and to think about the hitherto unthinkable of
gaining independence through a merger with other territories.
2. Of central significance for the success was that the Federation of Malaya perceived
this project from an eminently pragmatic concept of state and nation. Both were
understood as malleable, artificial products of imagination. Therefore, the
necessary state-building could be oriented towards the fulfilment of the basic
needs of all groups concerned.
3. The Malay elite accepted from the outset, that all parties to the negotiation have
legitimate needs in the realms of identity, security and well-being which can not be
compromised. Apparently the central aim of the negotiations was to arrive at a
‘needs-based, integrative (win-win) solution
one in which the basic human
needs of. . . all sides are met’ (Avruch, 1998, p.89).
4. Although the Malays insisted on the ethno-cultural base of their claim to
nationhood and their supreme rights on the Malayan territory as Tanah Melayu,
they used the same principle in granting the same rights to the indigenous
population of the Bornean territories. These communities’ claim to symbolic
equality with the Malays was accepted by designing the new common identity of
Sons of the Soil (Bumiputera). Within this concept, all ethnic groups were allowed
to retain their character as peoples. At the same time, the non-indigenous groups
(mainly Chinese) were classified in the same category as they had already been in
Malaya. They were accepted as citizens but had to concede the prior rights of the
indigenous population of the country.

Indonesia: Totalising concepts of power and policies of subjugation

Casting the new state in the mould of ancient empires
During the last decades of colonial rule, the indigenous Indonesian elite embraced a
decidedly different vision of the future nation. In the Indonesian debate the most
overarching and totalising vision of nation, state, society, and territory gained
acceptance. Together with the espoused maximalist territorial claim the nationalists
inherited a vision of indivisible power and absolute centre-orientation. The new
nation-state was seen as continuing a national history grounded in the empires of
Majapahit (late thirteenth to early sixteenth century) and Srivijaya (seventh to
thirteenth century). The imagined territorial frame as well as the imperial form of
 National Identities 49

rule were used as models for the future nation-state. For all practical purposes the
largest parts of these ‘empires’ had been self-governing entities. Under conditions of
modernity, however, the imperial fiction of control had to and could be
implemented. Now the imperial claim to reign could be translated into power-based
rule covering all islands.
The official national political ideology, the Panca-sila, was presented as a re-
enactment of the Indonesian tradition, as an ideal adaptation of true Indonesian
order to the new principles of territorially based sovereign statehood.
The dominant group within the Indonesian nationalists believed in a basic identity
of state and society. In their view, there was no society outside the state. The state was
imagined as an entity revolving around its uppermost leader, who was thought to be
the centre of all power, which could be legitimately exercised as the symbolic
representation of the national collective will. This vision of concentrated power
reduced all other components of state and society to mere instruments of the ruler’s
will. None of the constituent parts of society could claim any legitimate rights itself
but could only ask for favours. Conflict as well as the existence of alternate centres of
power could not be tolerated insofar as they pointed to the incomplete concentration
of power and thereby to deficiencies of the power holder. Conflict-management had
to integrate all centres of power into the network/streams of power emanating from
the capital. Where this was not possible in form of subjugation, it had to be
accomplished in symbolic terms at least. The supreme power-holder had to be able to
force other (potentially contending) power-holders to participate in displays of his
own power. Only thereby could he show his outstanding ‘ability to concentrate
opposites’ (Anderson, 1972: p.14).11
The later President Sukarnos has since the beginning of his political career in the
1920s consistently maintained that nationalism, religion, and communism could not
only be reconciled, but aim at the same overarching good. By laying claim to all three
leading streams (aliran) of political legitimacy Sukarno in effect claimed supreme
power over all these contending forces (Anderson, 1972). This ideological fixation on
synthesis and centralization found its political expression in Sukarnos drive to
develop an all-encompassing party: the Partai Nasional in the 1920s, the Marhaenist
party in the 1930s, the Putera of the 1940s, and the Partai Nasional Indonesia after
the proclamation of an independent Indonesia in August 1945. All these parties were
designed to provide the institutional correlate to the state in the sphere of societal
political organization. After independence this political drive towards unity,
homogeneity and centralization was replicated in the efforts to create a centralised
administration.
The idea of a federal set-up was never contemplated in earnest. Even if, after 1945,
the Dutch proposal of a federal United States of Indonesia was rated as a plot against
Indonesian sovereignty this was not the only reason for discarding federalism and
power-sharing. More important, in my view, was that the idea of power-sharing did
not fit into the Javanese concept of power and the perceived needs of power-
concentration. In the same vein I argue that in the 1950s the remnants of liberal
50 P. Kreuzer
democracy had to give way because liberal democracy rested on premises of bounded
and counter-balanced power incompatible with the Javanese concept of centralised
and total power.
The illiberal avenue to nation-building was inaugurated by Sukarno himself who,
in the summer of 1945, succeeded in becoming president of the new republic without
any real responsibility to the legislative power for a short time. Had he prevailed,
neither the prime minister nor the cabinet would have been responsible to the
legislative assembly, and politics would have been organized only by one party: his
own Partai Nasional Indonesia.
His move, however, was counteracted by opposition forces under Sutan Sjahir and
Amir Sjarifuddin. With the active collaboration of Vice-President Hatta,12 they
succeeded in changing the political structure decisively towards parliamentary
democracy (Feith, 1962). Their victory proved to be shallow as successive
governments failed and parliamentary government regularly ended in chaos and
confrontation. Without a symbolic overlord there were no rules which could be
accepted by all sides. Contending forces generally felt free to abrogate agreements and
change arenas according to purely opportunistic motives of unilateral interest
maximisation. The drift towards chaos and anarchy was decisively escalated by a large
number of regional rebellions. In 1957 democracy in Indonesia had failed.13
In response Sukarno returned to his concept of ‘genuinely’ Indonesian ‘Guided
Democracy’. In this ideology ‘Democracy’ had a clear-cut mission: to help unite
the nation. Sukarno first reduced the five principles of the official Indonesian
worldview
that is nationalism, internationalism, mufakat (unanimity), well-being,
belief in God
to three, which were combined in one all-encompassing principle, the
‘Gotong Rojong state!’ This concept stands for ‘one endeavour, one act of service, one
task. . .. Gotong rojong means toiling hard together, sweating hard together, a joint
struggle to help one another’ (Sukarno in Feith and Castles, 1970: p.49).14 In 1945
already Supomo and others had argued that since there should not be any autonomy
for society, there also was no need for individual or group rights ‘because the
individual is an organic part of the state, with . . . an obligation to help realize the
state’s greatness’ (Supomo in Feith and Castles, 1970: p.191)
a vision presented
under the label of the ‘integralist state’. . . All had to submit themselves to the
historical mission of Indonesia: the completion of the national revolution, which was
conceived as the return of the empire of Majapahit. In this tradition Sukarno argued
in 1959 for ‘total mobilization, to gather material strength totally, to collect spiritual
power totally. . . to. . . smash our way through every hindrance, we will push aside
every obstruction. . .. . .. And whoever refuses to be directed there, or whoever does
not want to be subordinated, is an obstructer of the Revolution’ (Sukarno, 1959:
pp.53
54, 59).
It hardly needs mentioning that Sukarno’s ‘Guided Democracy’ conceived of
Indonesia as a uni-national state. Ethno-cultural fragmentation had to be overcome
and diversity had to be superseded by a newly constructed bangsa Indonesia. In
Indonesia, nation-building was given priority over state-building. All communal
 National Identities 51

identities had to be de-politicised and supplanted by the overarching black-box of

Indonesian identity. The principles that were supposed to unite the people of
Indonesia were neither based on ethnic nor religious identity, but on territoriality and
insofar can be called civic. Nevertheless, this civic nationalism was of a decisively
illiberal brand since it was highly intolerant towards political demands and expression
of other, competing ascriptive identity groups. The idea of popular sovereignty was
purported as an order in which the actual sovereignty does not lie with the individual
but with the collectivity. Since Javanese history was essentially posing as national
history, from the standpoint of the population of the outlying areas the project of
nation-building was perceived as a hegemonic endeavour designed to destroy their
cultural identities. Nation-building as seen from the multiple minorities evolved as a
strategy of cultural ‘domination by some other rival ethnic, racial, or linguistic
community [the Javanese] that is able to imbue that order with the temper of its own
personality.’15 In this case as in the case of different ideological streams, the only
strategy applied repeatedly in the 1950s was the use of force with the aim of imperial
control and subjugation of all alternative politically salient ethno-cultural identities.

The Subjugation of West Papua

Indonesian claims on West Papua date back to July 194516 when the leaders of the
Indonesian revolution met to discuss the nature and boundaries of a future
independent Indonesia. Eventually, the maximalist position, according to which
Indonesia should comprise not only the territories of the Netherlands-Indies but also
British-Borneo, most territories of the later Federation of Malaya and the Portuguese
colony of East Timor succeeded: 39 of the 64 delegates opted for Indonesia Raja
(Greater Indonesia).17 This extravagant claim was legitimated by taking recourse to
the image of the Indonesians (including the Papuans) as a ‘Charaktergemeinschaft’
(community united by common character). Sukarno also argued that an Indonesian
Nation already existed due to the heavenly design of ‘geopolitics ordained by God
Almighty’ (Sukarno, 1970: p.42). From this point of view, there was no need or right
for self-determination for any community within the Indonesian nation.
When declaring independence on the 17 August 1945 this decision did not play a
role, but the territorial vision of a ‘Greater Indonesia’ should be kept in mind for the
analysis of later developments not only in respect to West Papua, but also to East
Malaysia and East Timor. In the declaration of independence, the Indonesian elites
were content with a middle position according to which Indonesia should unfold in
the boundaries of the former Netherlands-East Indies. Facing years of fierce fighting
against the Dutch military and constabulary forces, the new republic hardly managed
to control the heartland of the newly proclaimed state. Later on the Indonesian
armed forces fought rival claims to legitimacy put forward in a large number of
regional rebellions, which were only put down in the early 1960s. Keeping this in
mind, it seems only natural that West Papua did not figure prominently in the early
negotiations with the Dutch. In a first agreement (treaty of Lingadjati, March 1947)
52 P. Kreuzer
the parties agreed that any future independent Indonesia would be of a federal nature,
that its territory was identical to the territory of the Netherlands Indies and that the
population of all the territories within the federation should have the right ‘not to
join Indonesia at all. These rights of self-determination would have to be exercised ‘by
means of a democratic procedure’, according to the agreement’ (Lijphart, 1966: p.11).
In spite of the agreement, violence continued unabatedly.
After two further years of fighting, the United Nations became involved in the
conflict-resolution process. Under severe pressure from the United States the
contending parties finally signed a treaty in which the Netherlands agreed to accept
Indonesian independence and the Indonesian Republic accepted a new political form
for the Indonesian state: the United States of Indonesia. The question of West Papua
remained shelved for the time being. Both parties agreed to negotiate a solution for
this territory within the next year but nothing came out of these negotiations.
Indonesia in order to enhance its negotiating-position, tried to internationalise the
conflict by engaging the UN General Assembly. After small initial successes this
strategy threatened to turn against the Indonesian interests when the Netherlands
used the argument of self-determination for the Papuans. In 1957 Indonesia returned
to purely bilateral arenas and initiated a policy of escalation. Large numbers of Dutch
holdings in Indonesia were nationalised, several tens of thousands of Dutch citizens
were forced to leave the country. Slowly the Indonesian leadership prepared for a
military engagement for the ‘liberation’ of West Papua. In 1961 President Sukarno
issued his famous ‘People’s Command for the Liberation of West Irian’ (Sukarno,
1961), in order to pre-empt a declaration of independence by West Papua, which
seemed to be in the offing. This change in strategy was enabled by a significant
relaxation of domestic military vigilance after the final suppression of the largest
rebellion on North-Sulawesi in summer 1961. In the run-up to the Indonesian
decision, the Dutch position advocating self-determination for the Papuans had
received a significant boost by the UN. The Dutch had put forward a plan whereby
the Netherlands would hand over sovereignty over West Papua to the UN or any
other trustee (but not to Indonesia), if this institution would guarantee a meaningful
act of self-determination. On top of that the new Dutch strategy of fast economic and
political modernisation, which included building up institutions for the democratic
representation of the Papuan citizens, had begun to bear fruit. Their policy of
empowerment of the local population led to elections for a majority of the members
of the Volksraad (people’s council) inaugurated in April 1961
The trigger for Sukarno’s command was the agreement of seventy leaders of
the Papua on a name, an anthem, and a flag for the future independent West
Irian (Irian Barat). This decision was accepted by the Volksraad and a few days
later, on 1 December 1961, the new flag was hissed alongside the Dutch tricolour.
It seemed quite clear that an independent West Papua was merely a question of
time. Only three weeks later Sukarno gave his command leading to the first
military clashes. Simultaneously Indonesian paramilitary forces began infiltrating
 National Identities 53

West Papua
a strategy of destabilisation which would be repeated two years later in
the crusade against Malaysia.
The fate of West Papua was sealed by the decision of the US not to support the
Netherlands but to accept the Indonesian claims. The reasons were purely strategic.
Whereas the US decision-makers perceived Indonesia to be the central key for control
over Southeast Asia, West Papua was no more than ‘a few thousand square miles of
cannibal land’ (Memo of presidential adviser cited in Osborne, 1985: p.27). Dutch
rule over West Papua ended 1 October 1962 and after a short UN-interlude Indonesia
took control on 1 May 1963.
Several specifics of Indonesian conflict-behaviour in the integration process of
West Papua stand out:
1. The population of the respective territory was only an object of politics. The
interests and identity of the constituent parts of a potential Indonesian nation
counted for nothing compared to the hegemonic demands of the proclaimed
unitary collective will of the people.
2. The political conflict was categorised not only as a zero-sum game, but as a game
in which compromise was impossible as there could only be a total victory or a
total defeat. Compromise could only be sought as temporary tactics in a drawn
out struggle for supremacy and not as possible solutions for a complicated
conflict. In 1949, the Netherlands ‘bowed the knee and recognised the sovereignty
of the Republic of Indonesia’ (Sukarno, 1961: p.6), a feat that was in Sukarno’s
view no result of negotiation and diplomacy but of sheer power and will. The
opponent bowing the knee to Indonesian superiority was the only result
acceptable in the case of West Papua, too.
3. Confidence-building was neither a strategy nor an aim of political action. Conflict
was defined in terms of existential warfare; the political opponent was seen as
enemy who had to be subjugated.
4. Rational cost-benefit arguments were subordinated to ideological positions which
conceptualised the West Papua conflict as a last building-stone of Indonesian
greatness and as a symbol or relentless anti-imperialistic struggle.

These four characteristics structuring conflict perception had far-reaching results for
the behaviour of the Indonesian representatives in the respective arenas of conflict-
management. As the conflict was treated as a dramatised and ideologised but
nevertheless minor line of action within a larger political spectacle, which might
tentatively be called ‘the Resurrection of Indonesian imperial Greatness’ and ‘Return
to Totalising Leadership and Concentrated Power’ there was an abundance of public
arenas where action was aimed at the consuming audience. To a significant extent, the
conflict was treated as an opportunity for monologues in which a complete social,
political and moral order was constructed. The conflict thereby became permeated by
the notion of a struggle between good and evil, truth and falseness, right and wrong.
All arenas which might have been fit for informal discussion, for the sounding of
compromise ranges or at the very least for an open exchange of views on the subject,
54 P. Kreuzer
turned into stages of the Indonesian drama. Actively striving for compromise would
have been interpreted as treason to the cause of nationalism and anti-colonialism.
Arenas for negotiations were therefore redefined as arenas for the display of power
and conviction. Actions in these arenas were structured accordingly.

Contrasting conflict-perceptions and strategies for management

The different concepts of power, state, people, nation, and community were directly
reflected in the approaches of the two political elites towards the integration of new
territories into their respective states. The Malay political elite started from the
premise that all parties to political conflict should have their say in negotiations
between equals. The new state of Malaysia was perceived to be the result of a
patterned process of rational negotiations of interests, whereby the most fundamental
interests of all groups had to be safeguarded: security, well-being, and identity. At no
point in time did the Malayan side try to hark back on a notion of a larger Malaya
(Melayu Raja) which would have enabled them to frame the Malaysia question as a
question of re-uniting parts of a larger community thereby proclaiming it a domestic
issue and denying the other Asian parts to the negotiations their right to a collective
identity.
While the Malay political elite accepted that the merger would have to take place in
the international realm, Indonesia behaved as if the future of West Papua was a purely
domestic affair. The uppermost objective towards which all conflict-management
strategies were oriented were a) asserting undiminished sovereignty and b) regaining
actual control over the stipulated territories. In this mindset compromise could not
be a legitimate aim insofar as it would have meant treason to the hard won
sovereignty of the Indonesian state. Viewed through the lens of the concept of
sovereignty there could be no legitimate competing values, interests or rights of other
collective actors since sovereignty reigned supreme. State action, therefore, had to use
self-help-based strategies of pure uni-lateral action. Since the aspirations and interests
of all other parties to the conflict (the Dutch and the Papuans) were deemed
illegitimate, they could not be accepted as partners in a joint effort at (re)solution. In
this sense Indonesian patterns of conflict perception closely followed the patterns
Ross developed in his study as ‘commonalties among failures’ (Ross, 1993). These
perceptive impediments to co-operative conflict resolution did result from funda-
mental assumptions about the nature of power, leadership and conflict as well as
specific meaning sets associated with the concepts of community, people, nation, and
state. They did not result from the specific antagonists in the concrete conflict over
the future of West Papua.
In this article most of the arguments illustrated the continuity and path-
dependence of patterns of conflict-perception and conflict-behaviour. In hindsight,
we might argue that a conservative-led transition to modernity and sovereignty as can
be witnessed in the case of Malaya, has decisive advantages compared to a
revolutionary nationalist style of nation- and state-building. The soft authoritarian
 National Identities 55

cloak of elite rule, the pragmatic devaluation of potentially conflict-prone symbols, as

well as the anchoring of modernity in histories of communal belonging, proved in the
end to be a more liberal foundation for politics than the nationalistic and civic
orientation of the Indonesian revolutionary leadership.
From the comparison of these two cases we might learn that civic nationalism need
not be liberal, if it refers not to ‘the actual sovereignty of individuals, [but] becomes
reinterpreted to refer only to the theoretical sovereignty of a collective will, so that
‘the select few dictate to the masses who must obey’’ (Brown, 2000: p.61). Viewing the
democratic disaster which befell not only Indonesia but most of the countries, which
after decolonisation initially adopted the civil variant of nationalism as foundation
for their new identities, we should turn with renewed interest to countries like
Malaysia which self-consciously not only adopted a policy of ‘asymmetrically
differentiated citizenship’ (Hefner, 2001: p.29), but also designed the state as an
arena for inter-communalist discourse and rule-bound contention. The case of
Malaysia illustrates that ethno-cultural nationalism might be accommodating as long
as it is embedded in a multicultural frame of reference.

Notes
[1] I would like to thank Susanne Buckley-Zistel, Mirjam Weiberg and Heidrun Zinecker who
read the manuscript and made valuable suggestions. I greatly profited from the critical
remarks made by the two anonymous reviewers. However, I am solely responsible for any
and all shortcomings.
[2] On these and the following themes see for example: Ginsburg and Roberts (1958); Gullick
(1958); Milne (1967); Simandjuntak (1969); Means (1970); Tan (1988); Ariffin (1993);
Milner (1998, 1995); Shamsul (1998); Hefner (2001); Cheah (2002); Hng (2004).
[3] On the varying meanings of ‘Malay’ see Nagata (1974 and 1982).
[4] See Means (1972: p.51). Enshrining special rights into the constitution had the effect to
narrow access to the political arena for the non-Malay groups. Only those representatives,
who were ‘willing to acknowledge the basic Malay identity of the country and to avoid any
challenge to the system of Malay special rights’ were allowed to participate.
[5] Nevertheless the elections of the 1950s were lopsided, because a large number of Chinese
were not registered as voters. In 1955 they constituted only 11 per cent of the electorate, in
1959 the percentage had risen to 34 per cent and in the 1964 elections, a full 37 per cent of
the electorate were Chinese (Grossholtz, 1970: p.98). From then on the racial distribution of
the electorate basically resembled the actual distribution of the population.
[6] It should be pointed out that this style was not only the product of three ’enlightened’ elites,
but also of a bundle of circumstances which, however, due to considerations of space can not
be dealt here in detail. However, a few words on the emergency and the inter-ethnic violence
of 1945 seem in order. The communist subversion, which began properly in 1948, was as a
very strong external force in pointing to the shared interests of the conservative elites of the
three ethnic groups (Simandjuntak 1969: pp.56
70; Cheah, 2002: pp.22
39) The war waged
by the Chinese dominated Malayan Communist party made clear to UMNO that too much
pressure on non-Malays might result in even higher levels of violence. This led to a softening
of UMNO’s stance on citizenship (Thompson, 1967: pp.63
64). To the conservative Chinese
elites the violent rebellion served as a stark reminder, that their only chance for survival lay in
the cooperation with the dominant Malay force, i.e. UMNO. Seen from their vantage point,
56 P. Kreuzer
the Communist insurrection also aimed at their leadership over the Chinese community.
Considering the history of the Malayan Communist Party and the fact that it was
overwhelmingly led and manned by Chinese, the insurrection can be interpreted as an image
of the struggle between the Guomindang (GMD) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
in China. The defeat of the GMD in 1949 closed the doors to China for the moderate or
conservative Chinese whose future fate now completely relied on their new Malayan
existence, a fact, which had significant repercussions on their readiness for compromise. The
insurrection had not only catalytic effects on the indigenous elites, but on the British colonial
power as well, since it ‘forced the British Government to accelerate its plans further for
Malaya’s decolonisation’ (Cheah, 2002: p.22). Besides the pressure provided by the
Communist insurrection, the remembrance of the inter-racial violence in the weeks between
the Japanese surrender and the return of the British haunted the political actors. During
these crucial weeks, the fighters of the basically Chinese Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army
(MPAJA), who had spearheaded the anti-Japanese resistance in Malaya, settled scores with all
those people whom they believed to have collaborated with the Japanese occupation forces.
This heightened inter-ethnic tensions which had already been fostered by the Japanese over
the years before.
[7] This occasion does not mark the beginning of Malayan interest in state-enlargement. Its
roots can be traced back to the late 1940s at least (Sopiee, 1973). For an introduction into the
developments in Sabah and Sarawak preceding the Formation of Malaysia see the Report of
the UN Malaysia Mission (1963). On the process of integration and the first years of
Malaysia see Ongkili (1972); Milne and Ratnam (1974); Roff (1974). On the role of the
British and their ‘Grand Design’ for a Greater Malaysia see Tan (2003).
[8] It can be stated that the readiness with which the Malayan political elite accepted all Bornean
demands is due to their overarching interest to safeguard an indigenous majority and
provide a strong counterweight against Chinese assertiveness in the new federation. This
underestimates their strategic opportunities at the negotiation table. Both the Singapore
leadership under Lee Kuan Yew and the British colonial power had an overwhelming interest
in a ‘Grand Design’ (albeit for different reasons). The British overlords of Sabah and Sarawak
had aimed at the formation of a Greater Malaysia since the late 1940s, because they felt their
interests best represented by such a solution. They clearly pushed the local elites of the two
territories to accept Tunku Abdul Rahman’s overture. In contrast, it was the Malay side
which initially had no interest in these proposals. As late as 1960 the Tunku, while showing
some interest in the integration with Brunei and Sarawak was ‘quite happy to let the British
retain North Borneo for defence purposes, as a ‘British fortress’ colony outside his
association’ (Tan, 2003: p.158). The British were advised to ‘dangle the Borneo Territories as
an incentive if they were to have a chance of persuading the Tunku to accept a merger with
Singapore’. Therefore the Malay bargaining position would have been rather strong, if they
had chosen to opt for a maximalist position.
[9] The House of Representatives was to have 159 Members, of which only 104 were to represent
population of the former Federation of Malaya (/9 million). The Bornean territories
received 40 seats even though they had a population of only 1.5 million. Singapore, with a
population of more than one million people received only 15 seats.
[10] For the text of the agreement see Ongkili (1967: pp.130
134).
[11] See also Moedjanto (1990).
[12] In a way, Sutan Sjahir can be seen as a counter-model to the one personalised by Sukarno.
Sjahir showed a high degree of empathy for the positions and arguments of his political
opponents and also knew that in politics learning and progress could only come from
openness und a willingness for real negotiation, which had to involve compromise. He also
insisted on the adoption of the Western form of Democracy, whereas for Sukarno ‘true
democracy was embodied in the Indonesian system that was his model’ (Dahm, 1969:
 National Identities 57

p.329). Perhaps it is more than mere coincidence that the most prominent critics of Suharto
were natives of Sumatra, while his successor in the position of president once more displayed
the attitude of the Javanese ruler In respect to the question of centralization most non-
Javanese politicians ‘supported regionalist claims, especially after Sukarno began to favour
the establishment of new, even more centralized political institutions’ in the late 1950s
(Bertrand, 2004: p.36).
[13] See Feith (1962).
[14] On the conceptual development of Gotong royong see for example Rigg, Alliott, Harrson,
Kratz (1999).
[15] See Geertz (1963: pp.105
157. The citation is on p.09.
[16] For excellent studies of the process of incorporation of West Papua see Chauvel (1997 and
1998). Chauvel debates a host of issues, which, for constraint of space, cannot be discussed
here. Overall, he comes to a conclusion similar to the one advanced here (see for example
Chauvel 1997: pp.559, 572). For further literature see also Lijphart (1966); Sharp (1977);
Savage (1978); Lagerberg (1979); Osborne (1985); May (1991); Browne (1998); Rutherford
(2002); Bertrand (2004). A host of literature on West Papua has been published recently,
most of which, however, focuses on later events. See Chauvel (2003) and various studies by
the ICG (see: www.crisiweb.org).
[17] It has to be pointed out, that there were counter-tendencies opting for more restraint and
openness and counselling against a new imperialism now perpetrated by the centre of the
former colony against its own periphery. Most prominent among them was Mohammad
Hatta, who argued against the inclusion of West Papua into a future independent Indonesia
(Hatta, 1945: pp.442
443). However, with respect to West Papua Hatta ‘was singular among
the main leaders in contemplating other options’ than Indonesian national aggrandizement
(Chauvel, 1998: p.19). Not only in 1945 but throughout the following decade these voices,
while audible, never took centre stage. With the introduction of Guided Democracy they had
been effectively and definitely silenced.

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