Course Syllabus

GOVT 5301: Proseminar on Democratization,

Globalization, & International Relations (PRODGIR)
Spring 2008 – Wednesdays 2:30-5:15 pm in Green Hall 3.402

Instructor: Clint Peinhardt

Contact: clint.peinhardt@utdallas.edu
Office: 3.524 Green Hall (phone: 972-883-4955)
Hours: Mondays 10:00–11:30 am & by appointment

Course Pre-requisites, Co-requisites, and/or Other Restrictions

Graduate Standing in the School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, or permission
from the instructor. You should also have some familiarity with the library’s electronic
databases for finding journal articles as well as basic word processing skills.

Course Description
This course is an introduction to the field of international politics for graduate students. As
such, it bridges the typical subfields of comparative politics and international relations,
whose distinctions have eroded in recent years. We will cover major topics in both subfields,
but focus on integrating them into a common perspective (for me, the best framework for
doing so is the two-level game, originally described by Putnam 1988). This basically means
that we will examine the influence of domestic politics on international politics, and vice
versa. Doing so is somewhat controversial methodologically because it allows so many
moving parts into study simultaneously, but most political scientists would probably admit
that it is empirically inaccurate to examine foreign domestic and international politics
separately in the 21st century.

The disadvantage of covering both of these courses together is that there are a lot of classics
in political science that we will not read in this course. Rather than focus on such works, I
have chosen good overviews of a topic where appropriate, along with a selection of some of
the best recent work.

Student Learning Objectives/Outcomes

At then end of the course, students will have a good idea of the state of the literature for
many topics, and have at least a rough idea of the needs of future research. The short
critical literature reviews, combined with the constructive comments on your peers in class
and the instructor’s grading, should provide a firm understanding of how to approach this
portion of any research project. Our in-class discussions will highlight the strengths and
weaknesses of previous research, and so should lead to natural questions for further
research. Students should also be well prepared to proceed to more specialized coursework
in the Democratization, Globalization, and International Relations subfield and to do research
in this field.

Course Syllabus Page 1

Required Textbooks and Materials
Acemoglu, D. and J. A. Robinson. 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hiscox, M. J. 2002. International Trade & Political Conflict. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Powell, R. 1999. In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics.
Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press.
Sandler, T. 2004. Global Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Suggested Course Materials

Carlsnaes, Walter, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons. 2002. Handbook of International
Relations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Katznelson, Ira, and Helen Milner, eds. 2002. Political Science: State of the Discipline. New
York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Assignments & Academic Calendar

# Readings marked with this sign will be distributed by course instructor.
* Readings marked with an asterisk should be available via online reserves. The URL to our
Electronic Reserves course page is
http://utdallas.docutek.com/eres/
The password is “prosem” (without the quotation marks). Please let me know if you
encounter any difficulty using the online reserves system.

Week One: Introductions – January 9, 2008

Week Two: Methods – January 16, 2008

* Wight, Colin. 2002. Philosophy of Social Science and International Relations. In
Handbook of International Relations. Pp. 23-51.
Bueno de Mesquita, B., S. Krasner, et al. 1985. Symposium on Science and the Study of
World Politics. International Studies Quarterly 29(2): 119-154. (skim)
Bennett, Andrew, and Colin Elman. 2006. Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in
Case Study Methods. Annual Review of Political Science 9: 455-76.
# Braumoeller, B. F. and A. Sartori 2004. The Promise and Perils of Statistics in International
Relations. Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for Studying International
Relations. D. F. Sprinz and Y. Wolinsky-Nahmias. Ann Arbor, MI, University of
Michigan Press: 129-151.
* Fearon, James, and Alexander Wendt. 2002. Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical
View. In Handbook of International Relations. Pp. 52-72.

What are we as social scientists about? Before we can agree on whether we know anything
about international politics we have to get a handle on what constitutes social science, and
how we evaluate different theories of the world. Wight takes a big picture approach. The
1985 symposium provides a little bit of perspective here, so it’s fine just to skim. In the 20-
odd years since then, mainstream political science has converged around a multiple
methods approach, reflected in the Bennett and Braumoeller-Sartori readings. The Fearon-
Wendt piece is the odd fit here, but because the debate between quantitative and qualitative
methods is so tied in with the rational-choice vs. constructivism debate, it’s good to read
their piece in this context. What conflicts still exist between methodologies? Why do those
persist even when their tradeoffs are clearly identified?

Course Syllabus Page 2

Week Three: Modeling the International System – January 23, 2008 –
Last Day to Withdraw without W
Powell, R. 1999. In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics.
Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press. Chapters 1, 3, and 4.
* Biersteker, Thomas J. 2002. “State, Sovereignty, and Territory.” In Handbook of
International Relations.
*Kahler, Miles. 2002. “The State of the State in World Politics.” In State of the Discipline,
pages 56-83.

No longer in vogue, systemic theories served as the basis for much theorizing in international
relations. Powell provides a game theoretic work on these foundational theories, which focus
on great power rivalry. What are the major rival theories about when great powers fight?
How does his formalization help clarify previous questions? Where does it fail? Kahler
presents an overview of where international relations has gone since leaving its fascination
with the interstate system, and that is to focus on the characteristics of states themselves.
Biersteker is my attempt to inject a bit more questioning of the big assumptions behind
much IR theory – states as undifferentiated units with common evolutionary origins. How
might allowing for the real history of state creation in the post-war era change these
theories?

Week Four: Cooperation Theory – January 30, 2008

Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the Security Dilemma. World Politics 30: 167-214.
Sandler, T. (2004). Global Collective Action. Ch. 1-4 and Ch. 10.
Stein, A. (1982). Coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world. International
Organization 36(2): 299-324.
Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is What States Make of It. International Organization 46(2): 391-
425.

Much of the ink spilled in theoretical debates in IR has covered the extent to which states are
willing to cooperate. Realists tended to argue that states rarely, if ever, change policy to
cooperate. Others, such as Axelrod and Stein here, believe that cooperation is not
uncommon and that realists had no way to explain it. Wendt is the leading proponent of
constructivism, which argues that anarchy alone does not determine states’ behavior, but
that it evolves in the relationships among states. Which of these camps is most persuasive,
and which (if any) should be jettisoned?
Sandler summarizes the findings of collective action theory for this debate. He calls
himself a realist, yet believes that cooperation is more likely in some instances than others.
The nice thing about his work is that he provides some very concrete answers to when
cooperation is most likely, but Chapter 10 points out some elements that are missing in the
collective action theory for state interactions. What are its strengths and weaknesses?

No Class on February 6, 2008.

Week Five: Compliance and International Organizations – February 13, 2008

Chayes, A. and A. H. Chayes. 1993. On Compliance. International Organization 47(2): 175-
205.
Downs, G., D. Rocke, et al. 1996. Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about
Cooperation? International Organization 50(3): 379-406.
Abbott, K. W. and D. Snidal. 1998. Why States Act through Formal International
Organizations. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 42(1): 3-32.

Course Syllabus Page 3

Lipson, C. 1991. Why Are Some International Agreements Informal? International
Organization 45(4): 495-538.
Fearon, J. 1998. Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation. International
Organization 52(2): 269-306.
Koremenos, B. 2005. Contracting around International Uncertainty. American Political
Science Review 99(4): 549-566.

This week is really a follow-up to the theory of cooperation literature. Why do states choose
to cooperateand when they do, why are formal agreements and new organizations used
instead of alternate forms of cooperation? Chayes and Chayes are (ex?) lawyers, and tend to
believe that states do what they say and what they mean. Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom are
political scientists and are more skeptical about states’ willingness to cooperate in
meaningful ways. Lipson and Abbott and Snidal tackle the questions of when states
approach cooperation through different means. Fearon points out a wrinkle in the
theoretical argument of the cooperation literature more generally, and Koremenos is an
empirical piece that flows from this literature. So, why do states ever choose to delegate
power to an international organization?

Week Six: Democratization (Domestic Sources) – February 20, 2008

Robinson, James A. 2006. Economic Development and Democracy. Annual Review of
Political Science 9: 503-27.
Acemoglu and Robinson. 2006. Carefully read Ch. 1-3, 6, 11. Skim Ch. 4, 5 (before reading
Ch. 6).

Historically, most political scientists have searched for the causes of democratization in
domestic politics. Robinson’s Annual Review piece is a criticism of the entire set of empirical
tests, and as such should provoke the next set of innovations. The latest take on this
enormous literature is the Acemoglu and Robinson book, which includes a series of formal
(game theoretic) models that shed new light on the choice of regime, and transitions
between democracy and non-democracy. It has been widely praised in both economics and
political science, but it errs on the side of generality, and reduces democratization to its most
basic components. Even if you don’t have much background in modeling, try to understand
the building blocks of their approach. How does it differ from previous theories about
democratization? What new insights does it provide, and do those insights square with the
empirical evidence we’ve been accumulating for so long?

Week Seven: Democratization (International Sources) – February 27, 2008

* Whitehead, Laurence. 2001. Three International Dimensions of democratization. In
Laurence Whitehead, ed. The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe
and the Americas. Oxford University Press. Pages 3-25.
Brinks, Daniel, and Michael Coppedge. 2006. Diffusion Is No Illusion: Neighbor Emulation in
the Third Wave of Democracy. Comparative Political Studies 39(4): 463-89.
Rudra, Nita. 2005. Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy in the Developing
World. AJPS 49(4): 704-.
Kelley, Judith. 2008. Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International
Election Monitoring, International Organization. Forthcoming
Pevehouse, J. 2002. Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and
Democratization. International Organization 56(3): 515-550.
Knack, Stephen. 2004. Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy? International Studies
Quarterly 48(1): 251-66.

Course Syllabus Page 4

# Finkel, Steven F., Anibal Preez-Linan, Mitchell Seligson, and Dinorah Azpuru. 2006.
Effects of US Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Results of a Cross-national
Quantitative Study. Final Report. USAID. January 12, 2006. Version no. 34.
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/imp
act_of_democracy_assistance.pdf (skim)

Searching for the roots of democratization in domestic politics after (or perhaps even during)
the Cold War is increasingly an incomplete strategy. This week’s authors all suggest external
reasons for democratization. Pevehouse’s work is the most well known here, but others are
new and worth considering. How do this week’s readings impact the completeness of the
Acemoglu and Robinson book?

Week Eight: Institutions Part I – March 5, 2008

Hall, Peter, and Rosemary Taylor. 1996. Political Science and the Three New
Institutionalisms. Political Studies 44(3): 936-957.
Thelen, Kathleen. 1999. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. Annual Review
of Political Science 2: 369-404.
Greif, Avner, and David Laitin. 2004. A Theory of Endogenous Institution Change. American
Political Science Review 98(4): 633-652.
Pierson, Paul. 2000. Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics.
American Political Science Review 94(2): 251-267.
Diermeier, Daniel, and Keith Krehbiel. 2003. Institutionalism as Methodology. Journal of
Theoretical Politics XLIV: 936-57.

“Institutionalism” is claimed by several different schools of thought. Hall & Taylor help sort
through those. Each of the others is a good example of one of those schools. Thelen is the
historical institutionalism representative; Greif and Laitin and Tsebelis the rational choice
institutionalism representatives. Pierson might fall into the former camp but does some
important bridge work. Sociological institutionalism doesn’t get as much attention in political
science, but it is an important source for Wendt and other constructivists (see Week Four).

Spring Break – No Class – March 12, 2008

Week Nine: Institutions Part II (Electoral Rules & Parties) – March 19, 2008
Blais, Andre, and Louis Masicotte. 1997. Electoral Formulas: A Macroscopic Perspective.
European Journal of Political Research 32(1): 107-29.
Stokes, Susan. 1999. Political Parties and Democracy. Annual Review of Political Science
2: 243-268.
Clarke, Harold and Marianne Stewart. 1998. The Decline of Parties in the Minds of Citizens.
Annual Review of Political Science 1: 357-78.
Cox, Gary. 1999. Electoral Rules and Electoral Coordination. Annual Review 2: 145-62.
Boix, Carles. 1999. Setting the Rules of the Game: the Choice of Electoral Systems in
Advanced Democracies. APSR 93(3) : 609-24.
Mozaffar, Shaheen, James R. Scarritt, and Glen Galaich. 2003. Electoral Institutions,
Ethnopolitical Cleavages, and Party Systems in Africa’s Emerging Democracies.
APSR 97(3): 379-2003.
* Manin, B., A. Przeworski & S. Stokes. 1999. “Elections & Representation.” In Democracy,
Accountability, and Representation. Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes, eds. Pages 30-
53.

Course Syllabus Page 5

This collection of readings investigates common political institutions and explains the role of
institutions in aggregating preferences. Blais and Massicotte is a very basic overview of
electoral rules – called by some the most important political institution in any country.
Stokes and Manin, Przeworski and Stokes present the conventional wisdom on political
parties and how they represent societal interests. Clarke and Stewart examine reasons for
the decline of this most common political institution in recent years. Cox ties the party
system to the electoral system, and provides the link from Blais & Massicotte to the other
readings here. Boix and Mozaffar are two current pieces that provide applications to rich
countries and new African democracies, respectively. What is the relationship between
electoral rules and parties?

Week Ten: Democratic Peace – March 26, 2008

Ray, J. L. 1998. Does Democracy Cause Peace? Annual Review of Political Science 1: 27-46.
Bueno de Mesquita, B., J. Morrow, et al. (1999). An Institutional Explanation of the
Democratic Peace. American Political Science Review 93(4): 791-807.
Schultz, K. 1999. Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? International Organization
53(2): 233-66.
Rosato, Samuel. 2003. The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory, American Political
Science Review 97:585-602.
Forum Articles from 2005 American Political Science Review 99(3): 453-472:
• Kinsella, David. No Rest for the Democratic Peace.
• Slantchev, B., A. Alexandrova, and E. Gartzke. Probabilistic Causality, Selection Bias,
and the Logic of the Democratic Party.
• Doyle, Michael. Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace.
• Rosato, Sebastian. Explaining the Democratic Peace.

The democratic peace might be the closest thing that international politics has to an
empirical law. Or it might not. This was a very hot debate throughout the 1990s, and
continues to receive attention. Ray is the overview, although you’ll get a bit of the in the
BdM2S2 article as well. Schultz tries to distinguish between two explanations for the
democratic peace. Rosato, a graduate student when this piece came out, provoked a lot of
backlash when he disputed the basic tenets of the theory. The backlash is here too. On
what do the proponents of democratic peace agree and disagree? What critiques are the
most persuasive to you?

Week Eleven: Arms & Allies – April 2, 2008

Morrow, J. 1995. Arms versus Allies. International Organization 47(2): 207-34.
Smith, A. 1995. Alliance Formation and War. International Studies Quarterly 39: 405-25.
Fearon, J. D. 1997. Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs. The
Journal of Conflict Resolution 41: 68-90.
Powell, R. 1999. In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics.
Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press. Chapter 5 & 6.
Lake, D. 1996. Anarchy, Hierarchy and the Variety of International Relations. International
Organization 50(1): 1-34.

Security-seeking states have two primary tools for achieving that goal. Internally, states that
have the industrial capacity can produce their own arms and armies. Externally, states can
allly with other states who have more or different arms production capabilities. Morrow
argues that these two choices are a tradeoff, and that states should systematically prefer
one or the other path depending on their willingness to sacrifice autonomy. Smith is a
watershed in the study of alliances, since he explains many of the prior findings in a coherent

Course Syllabus Page 6

theoretical package. Fearon presents a signaling model to explain security choices. Powell
expands on his previous chapters here to include the choice of alliance. So when do states
engage in security cooperation instead of manufacturing their own security? What are the
implications of alliances for war?

Last Day to Withdraw with Automatic W – April 3, 2008

Week Twelve: Trade – April 9, 2008

* Alt, J.E., J. Frieden, M.J. Gilligan, D. Rodrik, and R. Rogowski. 1996. The Political Economy
of International Trade: Enduring Puzzles and an Agenda for Inquiry. Comparative
Political Studies 29(6): 689-717.
Hiscox, M. 2001 International Trade and Political Conflict: Commerce, Coalitions, and
Mobility. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Alt and his coauthors present an excellent overview of the trade literature. Hiscox takes up
their challenge and incorporates the two most prominent theories of trade policy preferences
into one theory and then proceeds to test it across countries. Note his research design and
data sources, which required some serous archival work. Does Hiscox solve the historic
tension between the two neoclassical models of trade?

Week Thirteen: Globalization – April 16, 2008

Garrett, G. 2000. Causes of Globalization. Comparative Political Studies 33(6/7): 941-991.
* Held, D. and A. McGrew. 2003. “The great globalization debate: an introduction.” In The
Global Transformations Reader. Held & McGrew, eds. 2nd edition. Ch. 1.
Evans, Peter. 1997. The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of
Globalization. World Politics 50(1): 62-87.
Fischer, Stanley. 2003. Globalization and Its Challenges. American Economic Review
93(2): 1-30.
Goldberg, Pinelopi K., and Nina Pavcnik. 2007. Distribution Effects of Globalization in
Developing Countries. Journal of Economic Literature 45(1): 39-82.

Globalization has inspired a great deal of academic work. Finding a short sample of that
material is extremely difficult, but weeks twelve and fourteen cover topics that are often
synonymous with globalization. This week’s readings approaches the topic more generally
and provides an overview of globalizations causes and effects. Garrett summarizes the
factors behind the rise of globalization. Fischer, an economist and currently Governor of the
Bank of Israel, presents a typical view from his discipline. Evans writes from considerably
further left, where he tries to salvage state autonomy. What important research questions
remain in this literature? What do we actually know about economic globalization?

Week Fourteen: 2nd image Reversed/2-level games – April 23, 2008

Gourevitch, P. 1978. The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic
Politics. International Organization 32(4): 881-912.
Putnam, R. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics. International Organization 42: 427-60.
Kayser, Mark. 2007. How Domestic Is Domestic Politics? Globalization and Elections. Annual
Review of Political Science 10: 341-62.
Ruggie, J. G. 1982. "International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism
in the Postwar Economic Order." International Organization 36(2): 379-415. (skim)
* Hall, Peter A. and David Soskice. 2001. An Introduction to the Varieties of Capitalism. In
Hall and Soskice, eds. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of
Comparative Advantage. Oxford University Press. Chapter 1, esp. pp. 54-68.

Course Syllabus Page 7

Swank, Duane. 1998. “Funding the Welfare State: Globalization and the Taxation of
Business in Advanced Market Economies.” Political Studies 46: 671-692.
Hays, J. C., S. D. Ehrlich, et al. 2005. Government Spending and Public Support for Trade in
the OECD. International Organization 59(2): 473-494.

The final week’s readings combine two things: an overview of the multiple levels of analysis
approach (two-level games) and some applications of such an approach. Gourevitch is the
classic here, and he focuses exclusively on one type of causal pattern: when the international
system impacts domestic politics. Putnam’s piece is exclusively about international
bargaining, but the approach is being used to study other state interactions as well. Kayser
injects an interesting new take on the effects of globalization. The other pieces all deal with
the “room to maneuver” debate – how much freedom do states have to choose their own
policies (primarily monetary and fiscal) in light of capital’s ability to move about so freely?
Ruggie explains the political foundations of the Bretton Woods system. Hall & Soskice
introduce readers to the varieties of capitalism literature. Swank and Hays, Ehrlich and
Peinhardt show evidence that globalization is not changing the basic political-economic
tradeoffs regarding policy choices. Are these papers successful in simultaneously
incorporating multiple levels of analysis?

Grading Policy
Each student will write five short (4-6 pages) papers that summarize and reflect on the
week’s readings. The focus of these papers should be your reflections on the papers – I
already know what the authors say, so pick out the points that you want to highlight as
emblematic of the author’s work or contradicting other authors. The papers should have an
introduction and a conclusion, and are best modeled on book reviews in current political
science journals (e.g., Perspectives on Politics). Summaries integrated into a broader
framework with greater focus on reflection will receive higher grades. Papers longer than six
pages will not be graded and must be revised and resubmitted with a grade penalty. The
grade penalty will also apply to late papers (see next section) or those with unusual text sizes
or margin settings (double-spaced 10-12 point fonts, 1 or 1.25 inch margins are standard).
During the first class students will select four weeks’ readings about which they will write,
and all students will write a short paper on the readings for the methods readings (week
two).

No research paper is required in this course. As an introductory course, the goal is to focus
on the readings, and it may be useful at times to consult other sources mentioned in the
required readings. Grades will be based on both the papers (60%) and class participation
(40%). Class participation includes attendance, so please inform me of necessary absences.

Course & Instructor Policies

Papers are due at the beginning of each class. Those turned in after the first fifteen minutes
are subject to a late penalty of one letter grade, and this penalty will increase with the
tardiness of the paper.

Attendance is expected at all classes. Students who are unable to attend due to illness,
childcare commitments, deaths of loved ones, or any other legitimate reason, should contact
the professor prior to the class to receive an excused absence.

Course Syllabus Page 8

Additionally, participation in classroom discussion is expected of all students. Each class will
begin with a brief summary from each student of his or her thoughts and impressions of the
week’s readings. Following these initial remarks, one (pre-selected) student will provide a
10-minute overview of the readings and outline an agenda for discussion. At that point, the
floor will be opened to all students again. Those who contribute thoughtful, constructive
criticism of both the readings and other student and professor comments will receive the
highest grades for participation.

Field Trip Policies

Off-campus Instruction and Course Activities
Off-campus, out-of-state, and foreign instruction and activities are subject to state law and University
policies and procedures regarding travel and risk-related activities. Information regarding these rules
and regulations may be found at the website address
http://www.utdallas.edu/BusinessAffairs/Travel_Risk_Activities.htm. Additional information is
available from the office of the school dean. Below is a description of any travel and/or risk-related
activity associated with this course.

Student Conduct & Discipline

The University of Texas System and The University of Texas at Dallas have rules and regulations for the
orderly and efficient conduct of their business. It is the responsibility of each student and each
student organization to be knowledgeable about the rules and regulations which govern student
conduct and activities. General information on student conduct and discipline is contained in the UTD
publication, A to Z Guide, which is provided to all registered students each academic year.

The University of Texas at Dallas administers student discipline within the procedures of recognized
and established due process. Procedures are defined and described in the Rules and Regulations,
Board of Regents, The University of Texas System, Part 1, Chapter VI, Section 3, and in Title V, Rules
on Student Services and Activities of the university’s Handbook of Operating Procedures. Copies of
these rules and regulations are available to students in the Office of the Dean of Students, where staff
members are available to assist students in interpreting the rules and regulations (SU 1.602,
972/883-6391).

A student at the university neither loses the rights nor escapes the responsibilities of citizenship. He
or she is expected to obey federal, state, and local laws as well as the Regents’ Rules, university
regulations, and administrative rules. Students are subject to discipline for violating the standards of
conduct whether such conduct takes place on or off campus, or whether civil or criminal penalties are
also imposed for such conduct.

Academic Integrity
The faculty expects from its students a high level of responsibility and academic honesty. Because the
value of an academic degree depends upon the absolute integrity of the work done by the student for
that degree, it is imperative that a student demonstrate a high standard of individual honor in his or
her scholastic work.

Scholastic dishonesty includes, but is not limited to, statements, acts or omissions related to
applications for enrollment or the award of a degree, and/or the submission as one’s own work or
material that is not one’s own. As a general rule, scholastic dishonesty involves one of the following
acts: cheating, plagiarism, collusion and/or falsifying academic records. Students suspected of
academic dishonesty are subject to disciplinary proceedings.

Plagiarism, especially from the web, from portions of papers for other classes, and from any other
source is unacceptable and will be dealt with under the university’s policy on plagiarism (see general

Course Syllabus Page 9

catalog for details). This course will use the resources of turnitin.com, which searches the web for
possible plagiarism and is over 90% effective.

Email Use
The University of Texas at Dallas recognizes the value and efficiency of communication between
faculty/staff and students through electronic mail. At the same time, email raises some issues
concerning security and the identity of each individual in an email exchange. The university
encourages all official student email correspondence be sent only to a student’s U.T. Dallas email
address and that faculty and staff consider email from students official only if it originates from a UTD
student account. This allows the university to maintain a high degree of confidence in the identity of all
individual corresponding and the security of the transmitted information. UTD furnishes each student
with a free email account that is to be used in all communication with university personnel. The
Department of Information Resources at U.T. Dallas provides a method for students to have their U.T.
Dallas mail forwarded to other accounts.

Withdrawal from Class

The administration of this institution has set deadlines for withdrawal of any college-level courses.
These dates and times are published in that semester's course catalog. Administration procedures
must be followed. It is the student's responsibility to handle withdrawal requirements from any class.
In other words, I cannot drop or withdraw any student. You must do the proper paperwork to ensure
that you will not receive a final grade of "F" in a course if you choose not to attend the class once you
are enrolled.

Student Grievance Procedures

Procedures for student grievances are found in Title V, Rules on Student Services and Activities, of the
university’s Handbook of Operating Procedures.

In attempting to resolve any student grievance regarding grades, evaluations, or other fulfillments of
academic responsibility, it is the obligation of the student first to make a serious effort to resolve the
matter with the instructor, supervisor, administrator, or committee with whom the grievance originates
(hereafter called “the respondent”). Individual faculty members retain primary responsibility for
assigning grades and evaluations. If the matter cannot be resolved at that level, the grievance must
be submitted in writing to the respondent with a copy of the respondent’s School Dean. If the matter
is not resolved by the written response provided by the respondent, the student may submit a written
appeal to the School Dean. If the grievance is not resolved by the School Dean’s decision, the student
may make a written appeal to the Dean of Graduate or Undergraduate Education, and the deal will
appoint and convene an Academic Appeals Panel. The decision of the Academic Appeals Panel is
final. The results of the academic appeals process will be distributed to all involved parties.

Copies of these rules and regulations are available to students in the Office of the Dean of Students,
where staff members are available to assist students in interpreting the rules and regulations.

Incomplete Grade Policy

As per university policy, incomplete grades will be granted only for work unavoidably missed at the
semester’s end and only if 70% of the course work has been completed. An incomplete grade must
be resolved within eight (8) weeks from the first day of the subsequent long semester. If the required
work to complete the course and to remove the incomplete grade is not submitted by the specified
deadline, the incomplete grade is changed automatically to a grade of F.

Disability Services
The goal of Disability Services is to provide students with disabilities educational opportunities equal
to those of their non-disabled peers. Disability Services is located in room 1.610 in the Student Union.
Office hours are Monday and Thursday, 8:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m.; Tuesday and Wednesday, 8:30 a.m. to
7:30 p.m.; and Friday, 8:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.

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The contact information for the Office of Disability Services is:
The University of Texas at Dallas, SU 22
PO Box 830688
Richardson, Texas 75083-0688
(972) 883-2098 (voice or TTY)

Essentially, the law requires that colleges and universities make those reasonable adjustments
necessary to eliminate discrimination on the basis of disability. For example, it may be necessary to
remove classroom prohibitions against tape recorders or animals (in the case of dog guides) for
students who are blind. Occasionally an assignment requirement may be substituted (for example, a
research paper versus an oral presentation for a student who is hearing impaired). Classes enrolled
students with mobility impairments may have to be rescheduled in accessible facilities. The college or
university may need to provide special services such as registration, note-taking, or mobility
assistance.

It is the student’s responsibility to notify his or her professors of the need for such an accommodation.
Disability Services provides students with letters to present to faculty members to verify that the
student has a disability and needs accommodations. Individuals requiring special accommodation
should contact the professor after class or during office hours.

Religious Holy Days

The University of Texas at Dallas will excuse a student from class or other required activities for the
travel to and observance of a religious holy day for a religion whose places of worship are exempt from
property tax under Section 11.20, Tax Code, Texas Code Annotated.

The student is encouraged to notify the instructor or activity sponsor as soon as possible regarding the
absence, preferably in advance of the assignment. The student, so excused, will be allowed to take
the exam or complete the assignment within a reasonable time after the absence: a period equal to
the length of the absence, up to a maximum of one week. A student who notifies the instructor and
completes any missed exam or assignment may not be penalized for the absence. A student who fails
to complete the exam or assignment within the prescribed period may receive a failing grade for that
exam or assignment.

If a student or an instructor disagrees about the nature of the absence [i.e., for the purpose of
observing a religious holy day] or if there is similar disagreement about whether the student has been
given a reasonable time to complete any missed assignments or examinations, either the student or
the instructor may request a ruling from the chief executive officer of the institution, or his or her
designee. The chief executive officer or designee must take into account the legislative intent of TEC
51.911(b), and the student and instructor will abide by the decision of the chief executive officer or
designee.

These descriptions and timelines are subject to change at the discretion of the Professor.

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