THE PATTON REPORT

No. 5 A Loss Control Publication June, 1969

THE HALF THAT SELDOM IS

Old Bones

A million for the sprinkler heads. The people came from everywhere,
Another for the water. As night turned bright as day.
A well protected plant it was, They tell me you could see the flames,
Well.. .protected sorta. A hundred miles away.

Old Bones the night watchman, The fire trucks could not maneuver,
Was paid five bucks a night. As people blocked the street.
I have yet to see a fire, It turned into a Mardi gras,
That old man could fight. When old friends began to meet.

But fire came a calling, Of course the plant was ruined.

One night in early June. But Old Bones deserves some praise,
The sprinklers knocked the fire down, Because he found another job that very night.
But Bones closed the valve too soon. And he even got a raise.

Written by: Richard M. Patton

The idea that a corporation would spend two million dollars on fire protection and
then "nickel and dime" the human element behind it to the point of total loss ap-
pears ridiculous. Yet, as most of us know, the events depicted are all too real.

Yes, the complete voiding of fire protection thru gross human carelessness is a
sad but common story to fire protection.

Why?

Those who are familiar with my writings know that I believe that there are reasons
for all conditions that exist. When the human element cannot be trusted there is
a reason for it. The reason will be developed in this report.

Many fire protection men"throw up their hands" with this problem of human action
under emergency conditions. They feel that human carelessness is inevitable. The
human being is an untrustworthy animal they reason (except for a few of us who
wear the fire triangle).

And since man cannot be trusted, the solution lies in making everything mechanical,
automatic, and of a fail safe nature. During my career I guess I've heard a thou-
sand fire experts on a thousand occasions agree the answer to the human fault pro-
blem is to eliminate the human. Remove the human element is the banner cry of
fire protection. This will lead us to perfection.

This attitude, in my opinion, has led us further into the forest of confusion.

The solution to human failure does not lie in eliminating the human factor for
the very simple reason that the human factor cannot be removed!
An effort to eliminate the human element is like digging a hole in the sand at
the beach. The faster you dig the faster the hole fills up.

Past efforts at complete mechanization of fire protection have produced systems

that are more complex and therefore more in need of human attention.

Look at the computer. This great replacer of human beings has spawned an in-
dustry with a fantastic need for human talent.

But if perfection in protection does not and cannot lie in complete mechaniza-
tion and total elimination of humans, then where does it lie?

It lies in the recognition of the importance of the human element in industrial

fire protection and the incorporation of this potential asset into the overall
plan of protection. It lies in usin9 humans rather thay trying to eliminate or
ignore them!

If I were to divide fire protection into two components - human and mechanical -
and evaluate their roles in a total protection program I would say that the
human element counts for 50% and mechanical protection counts for 50%. Yet if
I were to judge the average fire protection program in the average "protected"
industrial plant, I would say that 95% of the attention given the program is
oriented toward the mechanical side. Look at the recommendations in the in-
spection reports. They are mostly mechanical or structural.

Most industrial fire protection programs are basically a product of an outside

organization (an insurer). Probably far less than 1% of American industrial
concerns have a qualified fire protection specialist within their own organiza-
tion, and those very few that do usually have a man trained in the insurance in-
dustry and oriented toward the insurance philosophy of protection.

The insurance industry has developed complex systems of evaluating and classify-
ing physical protection to determine rates and acceptability of risk. But the
industry apparently feels unable to evaluate or materially influence the human
side.

Oh, there are the usual recommendations to "organize a fire brigade" or to

"establish emergency procedures", but basically the main concern seems to be
to get one man to stand by the sprinkler valve to be sure it's open and another
than to go to the fire pump to be sure it starts.

If I had to choose between a plant •that had full sprinkler protection and a good
water supply, but poor organization; and another that had no sprinklers but did
have very fine fire prevention and emergency programs, I would choose the latter.
But the former could have a nickel fire rate while the latter might be termed
"uninsurable" in todays market.

The best solution is a balanced program. A good fire prevention program. Care-
fully drawn up emergency procedures. Adequate training of personnel. Neat and
orderly premises. And an adequate, well designed, but not overpriced fire pro-
tection system. Good liaison with the fire department is essential.
A program should fit an industrial facility like a 9Jave fits the
14!,x ID'otection
hand. The indiscriminate application of requirements of codes and standards does
not produce a balanced and effective program, yet the cost can be unnecessarily
high.

To clarify the concepts I am advocating, and to illustrate the degree to which

the presently accepted methods miss the mark, I will briefly discuss one facet
of the human side of fire protection. It is the fire brigade.

Today it is quite usual for a fire brigade to train once a month by laying out
inch hose lines and squirting water into the outside of the "involved" build-
21/2
ing, them putting the hose away until the next time.

This is the most useless fire protection procedure I can conceive of.

The evaluation of the effectiveness of the brigade is often made by an inspector

who opens the door of the hose house, counts the pieces of equipment, and asks
when the hose was last pressure tested.

This is the crux of the matter. The value of the human in protection is being
judged by people who cannot or will not judge people, who cannot or will not
look beyond the mechanical side of protection.

The policy that heavy hose lines must be used by brigades runs directly counter
to good protection and it is a hang over from the days when permanent, low fric-
tion loss, light weight 11/2 inch hose and combination nozzles were not available.

Today, when a man says that small hose cannot be effectively employed with hose
lays of more than 50 or 75 feet it simply means he doenstt know how to fit a
nozzle to a hose line.

The fact that brigades are still forced to use antiquated equipment and methods
is just one of many indications of the need for far more attention to the use of
human talent in our fire protection programs.

I said at the beginning that I would state the reasons for widespread human fail-
ings which cause great fire loss. Here they are.

First, the failures are usually caused because management does not use adequate
standards in the selection of the men for the job or does not adequately train
the man in protection procedures.

But underlying this is the fact that corporate management in the U. S. has gen-
erally gone outside the corporate structure to the insurer for the knowledge and
advise on how to prevent losses. And the insurance concept of protection is gear-
ed to physical protection, structural conditions, use of standards for design,
and averaging of losses. The insurer protects himself, not management.

There are two solutions to the problem.

The insurance industry, having been dealt some grievous blows in recent years
which should prove to them that there are some very serious flaws in their present
concepts, could develop some new philosophies of protection that would include
the human being, among other things.

Or, corporate management could let go of the apron strings of the insurance in-
dustry and develop well rounded, practical, economical, and more reliable in-
ternal protection programs of their own design.

Richard M. Patton, Loss Control Consultant, 647 Colts Neck Road,.Freehold, New
Jersey 07728 - Telephone No. (201) 431-2752