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Conducting judicial proceedings in a manner and with an attitude that affirms the dignity of

such proceedings is crucial to maintaining public confidence in the judiciary.243 Judges should not
yield to first impression, reach hasty conclusions or prejudge matters.244 They have a duty to ensure
that the minority status of the accused plays no part in their decisions.245 Neither should judges insult
witnesses in the hallway or in pleadings filed before the Supreme Court.246 Likewise, judges may not
use derogatory or condescending language in their judgment when dealing with a rape complaint.247
Due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to
reassure litigants that the judicial system is fair and just.248
Conducting judicial proceedings in a manner and with an attitude that affirms the dignity of
such proceedings is crucial to maintaining public confidence in the judiciary.243 Judges should not
yield to first impression, reach hasty conclusions or prejudge matters.244 They have a duty to ensure
that the minority status of the accused plays no part in their decisions.245 Neither should judges insult
witnesses in the hallway or in pleadings filed before the Supreme Court.246 Likewise, judges may not
use derogatory or condescending language in their judgment when dealing with a rape complaint.247
Due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to
reassure litigants that the judicial system is fair and just.248
245 Castillo v. Judge Juan, G.R. Nos. 39516-17, January 28, 1975, 62 SCRA 124.
People v. Orvillas, G.R. No. 137666, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 659.
Sy v. Judge Fineza, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1808, October 15, 2003.
Iglesia ni Kristo v. Gironella, A.M. No. 2440-CFI, July 25, 1981, 106 SCRA 1.
Castillo v. Judge Juan, supra, Mateo v. Villaluz, G.R. No. 34756, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 18.

The concern is not only with the judges actual decision but the manner in which the case is
decided. As the Supreme Court has put it, a judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and
the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to his fairness and as to his

integrity.84 It is the duty of all judges not only to be impartial but also to appear impartial.85
5 People of the Philippines vs. Nuguid, G.R. No. 148991, January 21, 2004, 420 SCRA 533; Kaw vs.
Osorio, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1801, March 23, 2004, 426 SCRA 63.
In disposing of a criminal case, a judge should avoid appearing like an advocate for either
party. It is also improper for the judge to push actively for amicable settlement against the wishes of
the complainant. A judges unwelcome persistence makes the judge vulnerable to suspicions of
favoritism. Montemayor vs. Bermejo, Jr., A.M. No.MTJ-04-1535, March 12, 2004, 425 SCRA 403.

SECTION 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the


occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding
cases.
The need for judges to conduct themselves in so as to minimize their disqualification has been
the subject of repeated Supreme Court warnings against judges fraternizing with litigants before their
courts.92
Judges may, in their exercise of sound discretion, restrict themselves voluntarily from sitting
in a case, but such a decision should be based on good, sound or ethical grounds, or for just and valid
reasons. It is not enough that a party casts some tenuous allegations of partiality at the judge. No less
than imperative is that it is the judge's sacred duty to administer justice without fear or favor.
Another issue is the possibility that no judge would be available to decide a case because
judges with jurisdiction over the case would opt to recuse from the case. Hence, it is imperative that
judges ensure that they would not be unnecessarily disqualified from a case. This is sometimes
referred to as the duty to sit.93
In Parayno vs. Meneses, 94 G.R. No. 112684, April 26, 1994, 231 SCRA 807.
94 the Supreme Court explained the nature of the voluntary inhibition
expected of a judge:

The majority view is that the rule of disqualification of judges must yield to demands
of necessity. Simply stated, the rule of necessity means that a judge is not
disqualified to sit in a case if there is no other judge available to hear and decide the
case. For example, members of the Supreme Court were entitled to adjudicate the
validity of a statue placing a limit of 5 percent in the costs of living increase for
judges, where it was apparent that all state judges had at least an involuntarily
financial interest in the case. * * * Actual disqualification of a member of a court of
last resort will not excuse the member from performing his official duty if failure to
do so would result in a denial of a litigant's constitutional right to have a question,
properly presented the court, adjudicated. In other words, when all judges would be
disqualified, disqualification will not be permitted to destroy the only tribunal with
power in the premises. The doctrine operates on the principle that a basic judge is
better than no judge at all. Under such circumstances, it is the duty of the disqualified
judge to hear and decide the controversy, however disagreeable it may be.

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