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1. Due Process Is process due, and if so, how much?

a. Quick facts, at minimum:


i. Get opportunity for a hearing before deprivation
ii. As well as notice and opportunity to respond.
b. Is process due must have a liberty or property deprivation
i. Property (Roth) legitimate claim of entitlement
1. Ex: federal/state law to entitlement Goldberg welfare benefits; Goss school
education, Mathews social security benefits.
a. Contractual relationship against gov Roth and Perry professors
b. C/L claim against the gov, etc.
i. Doesnt have to be federal/state law.
ii. Liberty lots of definitions:
1. Roth and Paul - Stigma + change in legal status, that gov has given you (ex: fired
and stigmatized; defamation then fired)
a. Paul stigma of being identified as known thief or active shoplifter is not
enough. Need a change in legal status.
2. Paul- Legit Claim
a. Ex: gov gives you a right to buy alcohol, a drivers license, etc. The gov
cannot take it away w/o a hearing in advance.
b. Gives you liberty interest, than tries to take it.
3. Meyer broad language; liberty idea is really old from ol English days. Rhetorical
background argument.
4. Ingraham free from corporal punishment, most basic form.
iii. Exam Advice:
1. W/ liberty interest, dont ignore property interest. Explain why there is no
property interest. Explain thyself.
2. W/ liberty question, talk about all of them even if its straightforward. Explain
your knowledge, nothing conclusory.
a. Either way, just check off every interest.
b. Assume theres a liberty/property interest, get to Mathews.
c. Never stop your analysis!!!
c. Mathews Inquiry: To determine how much process is due, a court must weigh:
i. Private Interest what is the government taking from you?
1. Discuss weight on Goss Goldberg spectrum.
ii. Procedural Safeguards are the safeguards sufficient? Would more process help? Good
analysis of Mathews on big outline, pg. 8.
iii. Government Interest includes function involved, amount of cash burned,
administrative burden of more process, etc.
1. Discuss a weight to each factor, with a huge spectrum from Goss (minimal
interest of school suspension and the school wants to end the disruption; informal
given and take) to Goldberg (max interest get food on the table; 6th
amendment). Huge range of how much process.
a. Other examples:
i. Mathews lots of process w/ SS disability

ii. Cleveland Board pre termination hearing gets employee: notice


of charges, employers explanation of the charges, and opportunity
to respond but only in writing.
1. Not full-fledged evidentiary hearing.
2. Process is usually less than Goldberg.
3. Exam tip: Londoner/Bi-metallic dont matter here.

The APA
d. Adjudication
i. Types of cases (wide range government is giving or taking something)
1. Enforcement of law Steadman, Antoniu (SEC securities)
2. Licensing Seacoast, Withrow
3. Benefits Goldberg
4. Contracting Sameena, Darby
ii. When does the APA apply? Doesnt apply to state interests.
1. ONLY in the federal contexts. APA applies across the board in Federal context.
iii. First big question with adjudication:
1. Formal or Informal?
a. Triggering Language adjudication to be determined by hearing on the
record. APA554
i. Seacoast Presumption only in 1 circuit, OR case by case
approach.
1. Seacoast if we read public hearing, we presume that the
hearing must be on the record UNLESS Congress explicitly
says otherwise. Thus public hearing = formal adjudication.
ii. Case by Case Approach - Majority:
1. If the statutory language is ambiguous w/ respect to
formality and doesnt include triggering language, there
is NO PRESUMPTION in favor of formality.
2. Case by Case - Agency generally has discretion to use or
not use procedures, then court determines if it is
reasonable.
iii. Good review of hooking language CB 139, FN 13.
iv. Exam tip: Look at the fact pattern. If it says hearing on the record,
its going to be formal adjudication.
2. Once its formal under 554, there are formal adjudication requirements that must
be met:
a. Impartial and unbiased presiding officer
b. Notice and Opportunity to participate in hearing
c. Right of parties to appear w/ counsel
d. Right to present oral and written evidence
e. Right to conduct a cross examination
f. Right to submit proposed findings, conclusions & exceptions
g. Compilation of an exclusive record on which agency must base its
decision; i.e decision on the record.
h. Limits on ex parte communication.
iv. Key APA Adjudication Issues:
1. Who may participate or intervene? Most anyone who can show they have an
interest.
a. APA interested party may intervene.
2. Evidentiary rules are very flexible:

a. Standard of proof prep of evidence


b. H/S is admissible
i. Rationale: ALJ is an expert and should be able to decide what
evidence is good; capable of hearing evidence over broad range
and deciding what should be kept out. Also, encourage common
man to participate/not complicated.
1. Material, relevant and non-duplicative evidence comes on.
c. No residuum rule at federal level (whole case could be based on hearsay,
and you can lose entire case on H/S)
v. Possible Challenges to Process:
1. Combo of Functions (multiple hats) loser argument
a. Withrow P alleged violation of DPC when Agency had investigatory and
decision making powers.
i. H court presumes fairness; p actually has to show unfairness.
b. APA 554(d) actual investigators on the ground should not be making
decisions.
i. See FN 16 and FN 20 CB 147 where combo of functions alone
violated the DPC = actual investigators, judge did everything, etc.
2. Bias (actual, risk/probability, appearance is bad too) winning A
a. If there is an appearance of bias, this is a due process concern.
b. If a disinterested observer may conclude that the Agency has in some
measure judged the facts in advance of hearing, there should be a
disqualification.
c. Attack for appearance of bias.
3. Ex parte contacts this is a winner; decision makers cannot have ex parte
contacts DURING a case w/ the parties. Big No No.
a. Rule: Contact cannot occur during the pendency of a case AND
substantially prejudice the opposing party.
b. Purpose of rule: preventative measure to ensure that admin decisions are
not based on improper grounds and based solely on the record.
c. No ban on ex partes with informal adjudications. Policy of allowing
communications between the agency and regulated parties.
4. Holding Gov Accountable:
a. Estoppel loser
i. Rationale enforce procedure, encourager gov to provide informal
advice, avoid judicial overload.
ii. Rare situations where estoppel may apply: affirmative misconduct,
K or advice from high ranking official.
b. Document disclosure/open meetings:
i. FOIA guarantees the right of citizens to know how their
government works, absent privileged material (e.g. natl security,
personnel files, etc)
1. FOI request must:
a. Reasonably describe the records,

b. Follow rules,
c. Then hopefully, absent the exceptions, Agency
gives you the documents.
e. Rulemaking
i. Roadmap of rulemaking:
1. Types include:
a. Informal (notice and comment)
b. Formal (very rare, dont worry about it)
c. Hybrid = Informal + other stuff
ii. Quick Facts
1. National Petro Refiners Court preferred rulemaking over adjudication because:
efficiency (just one rule), Uniformity, Predictability, Clarity, openness,
reviewability.
a. FTC could enact octane rules, even when not expressly given, because
rule making is good policy and the statue doesnt prohibit it.
1. General Ban on retroactive rules: An agency cannot enact a rule that applies
retroactively unless: given express authority by Congress, or really really good
reason for doing so.
iii. Big question: Formal v. informal
1. Triggering language hearing on record
a. FL East Coast unlike formal adjudication context (case by case
approach), the Court will read the statute to lead to more informal
rulemaking than formal rulemaking.
i. Magic Words test hearing on the record.
1. Stature must contain on the record for formal rulemaking
trigger.
ii. Formal rulemaking is really cumbersome, ok to go to informal
which also has lots of process.
2. Formal Rulemaking consists of: Hearing create record Agency decision
based solely on the record.
3. If it is formal, the hearing rules are basically the same as for formal adjudication
(APA556 and 557)
a. Formal rulemaking isnt very important, wont be on exam.
b. Just doesnt happen today.
iv. Hybrid no triggering language but Informal rulemaking AND a hearing
v. Informal Rulemaking = Notice and Comment
1. Meat and bones, most of the action, mostly important
2. *Note - No right to a hearing in Notice and Comment Rulemaking (only get
hearing when with triggering language of APA).
3. Phases of informal Rulemaking:
a. Prior to promulgation:
i. Notice (chocolate manufacturers) &
Informal Rulemaking: Notice
& Comment; then Concise
1. Notice tells parties where the proceedings, other general
general statement upon
facts.
promulgation.

2. Adequate Notice:
a. Inquiry: have commentators had a fair opportunity
to present their views on the contents of the final
rule.
b. Adequate Notice TEST:
i. Changes in the original rule must be in
character with the original scheme of the
rule, and
ii. New rule is a logical outgrowth of the
notice and comments given.
3. Ultimately the Agency cannot materially alter the issues
involved or substantially depart from the proposed rule. A
big change must relate to comments received.
a. After adverse comments, Agency cannot go ahead
w/ major changes.
ii. Comment
b. Upon promulgation:
i. Concise general statement
1. TEST - Should see major issues of policy and why the
agency reacted to these issues.
2. Note: exclusivity of the record; court only reviews evidence
in the record. You cannot introduce new evidence during
the tiral. Get everything on the record.
ii. Must respond to major issues raised!!!
1. If it fails to, maybe a re-do.
4. Limits on Judicial Review of Agency Procedure (VT Yankee)
a. Once an agency has complied with the requirements of the APA, the
Courts may not impose higher levels of process. The agencies may add
more process. For ex, once an agency decides to do a hearing, court cannot
require on the record.
b. Agency must meet APA requirements, then thats it. Courts then have to
stay out!!
c. Basic tenet agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of
procedure.
5. Exceptions to Informal Rulemaking Requirements:
a. General Statements of Policy merely provides guidance to agency
official in exercising their discretionary power, while preserving their
power to make individual determination.
i. How the agency is going to enforce its own law.
ii. Two party test for GSP; the provision must:
1. Operate only prospectively, and
2. Must not establish a binding norm or be a final
determination.

iii. When is a GSP not a GSP when its BINDING!!! Simply


because agency action has a substantial impact on the rights of a
party does not mean it is subject to notice and comment.
b. Interpretative Rules rules issued by an agency to advise the public of
the agencys construction of the statutes and rules it administers.
Interp Rule:
i. Not making law, purely legal determination of what something
Addresses ambiguity
and tells the public
means.
how the agency
ii. Agency is trying to fill out a gap, give a binding interpretation.
construes a statute.
Clarification of an ambiguity.
c. Good Cause emergency and agency must do it, ex: case in Hawaii where
helicopters were crashing, FAA was allowed to impose emergency rules.
i. Very rare.
d. **Note:
i. GSPs only agency employees are bound (not agency, courts, etc.)
ii. Interpretative rules apply to more entities (Agency, agency
employees and arguably courts)
iii. Finally: generally agencies must have notice and comment when
making policy.
6. But must an agency make rules to set/change policy? NO (Chenery and Bell)
Agencies do not have to do rulemaking to set policy. They can do that through the
adjudications.
a. Agency has discretion to decide whether to proceed by rulemaking or
adjudication.
i. Rationale: Congress intended Agencies to develop expert decisions
and we should trust their discretion on the RM/Adj issue.
ii. To perform their function, Agencies must be able to act.
b. Can make policy through adjudication.
7. Avoiding Adjudication through Rulemaking OK this is allowed if not
prohibited by the statute, and the rule is not arbitrary and capricious.
a. Under Heckler v. Campbell, the statutes expressly entrusted the Admin
with the power (to classify SS disability), so review is limited to whether
the regs promulgated exceeded the statutes authority and if they are A/C.
8. An agency must obey its own rules (Sameena)
a. Agency must follow its own regulations b/c, failure to do so tends to
cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice and consequently
may result in a violation of an individuals constitutional right to due
process.
Summary:
f. Chenery II and Bell: how much an agency can do w/o rulemaking.
g. Campbell: how much an agency can do w/o rulemaking
h. Agencies can be flexible.
i. Ways to challenge rulemaking:
i. Directly (After its made) - National Petro, VT Yankee

ii. Collateral:
1. In enforcement action (Nova Scotia)
2. In appeal from agency hearing (Campbell).

2. Judicial Review (3 areas review of fact, law and discretion)


a. Review of fact
i. Quick summary:
1. Substantial evidence review occurs when reviewing factual decision in formal
rulemaking & formal adjudication
a. More than a mere scintilla of evidence
b. Could a reasonable decisionmaker have reached the decision the agency
reached?
2. Arbitrary and Capricious informal RM and A
a. Std just like substantial evidence, reasonable person could reach this
agency decision.
ii. Scope of Review of facts defined in Universal Cemera
iii. Judicial Review of findings of fact is deferential:
1. Formal court looks for substantial evidence based on whole record.
2. Relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
a. Also Agencys get the deference, but reviewing court must account for:
i. Hearing officers decision based on witness credibility, and
ii. Agency expertise/policy judgment.
1. Agency usually wins with factual determination.
3. Informal court looks to see whether the factual finding is arbitrary and
capricious (i.e., could a reasonable person have found what the court found;
defined by the APA)
iv. Deference on factual findings is to agency, not to the hearing officer/examiner/ALJ
v. When agency overrules hearing officers findings, reviewing court should take into
account whether:
1. Hearing officers findings were based on credibility of witnesses
2. Agencys conclusion was based at least in part on agency expertise or policy
judgment
b. Review of law Skidmore, Chevron, Mead, talk America and Brand X
i. Basic scenario: theres a statute, Agency has interpreted its own statute.
1. I should the agency defer to the agencys interpretation?
2. Chevron Steps:
a. Was Congress clear in its interpretation?
i. If clear, no deference. Congress clear view holds the day!! If no,
go to #2 is it reasonable, then they get deference.
3. Mead did Congress really want us to defer to the Agency (does Chevron apply)?
To figure this out, did Congress give agency the :
a. (1) Power to make rules w/ the force of law, and
b. (2) Did the Agency use that rulemaking power in this particular case?
i. If either informal rulemaking or formal adjudication, this suggests
Congress gave the Agency the power.
ii. It depends on the formality.
c. Under Mead, can the Agency make rules under the statute and did they use
that rule.

d. Say the Agency doesnt use formality, under Mead the Agency gets no
deference. It must use its formal adjudication or informal rulemaking.
e. Another trick: case where agency uses 1 not 2, or 2 not 1 (had the power
but did no rulemaking), go back to Skidmore deference.
i. Does the Agencys interpretation persuade us that they properly
interpreted the statute?
4. Brand X (another wrinkle): ex say under Chevron the EPA doesnt use rule w/
force of law, no rulemaking, tries to enforce but is shot down in Court.
a. Under Brand X, EPA can go back to use rulemaking and gets a do over.
b. EPA can use its authority, create a rule, then the Agency overrules the
lower courts interpretation. Its interpretation holds the day.
c. Rare case where Agency has the power, but doesnt use it. It can go back
and get a re-do, thus overruling the lower courts interpretation. Unless,
statute is clear. If its crystal clear, Congress wins!
i. Remains to be seen whether SCOTUS can be overruled, right now
just the lower court.
ii. Scope of Review of law continued
1. In state court, courts give no deference to agencies on statutory construction and
interpretation.
2. Skidmore Deference Agencys view is not binding but given some deference
(here only an amicus brief, not rulemaking). Agency decisions constitute a body
of experience and informed judgment to which courts should look to for guidance
the weight of the Agencys judgment will depend on:
a. Thoroughness
b. Validity of its reasoning,
c. Its consistency w/ earlier pronouncements,
d. Other persuasive factors.
3. Chevron how much deference we give to an Agencys interpretation
(rulemaking) of its own rules or relevant statutes Two part test for Court
deference to Agencys statutory construction:
a. Step 1: Has Congress directly spoken to the precise question at issue? Ct
gives effect to Congress unambiguous effect
i. Yes agency must give effect to Congress unambiguous intent.
ii. No step 2
b. Step 2 if the statute is ambiguous, is the Agencys answer a reasonable
construction of the statute?
i. Yes, defer to agency and allow the agencys regulation to stand.
ii. No Court may overturn or substitute its own construction.
c. MCI applied Chevron Modify expresses Congress unambiguous
intent; doesnt allow Agency to exercise such discretion.
4. Mead asks, should Chevron apply? Yes if,
a. (1) Congress has delegated agency power to make rules with force of
law, AND

i. Delegation depends on formality of rulemaking: formal A,


formal RM, informal RM get deference (see Gonzo for non-formal
factors)
ii. No deference w/ informal A.
b. (2) Agency is exercising this authority in this case.
c. Even if no Chevron deference, may still get Skidmore deference.
5. Brand X Agency can trump judicial interpretation of an ambiguous statute.
a. How this plays out: agency has authority to make rules with the power of
law, BUT the agency did not use that authority and it gets shot down in the
lower courts.
b. Agency can come back and use its authority after the lower court has
overturned its original construction.
6. Talk America Agency interpretation of its own regulations is hugely deferential
(given Auer deference, which is plainly erroneous).
7. Gonzalez v. Oregon different ways to show force of law.
a. Gonzo Holding formal authority is NOT exclusive way to prove Agency had
power to make rules with force of law. Gonzo illustrates that the Court will look
to other indications (non-formal) that Congress granted Agency such authority.

b. Gonzo says that there are 2 ways agencies have authority to make rules
with force of law:
i. General Rule Making authority
ii. Authority to make rules in particular fields.
o

CHEVRON FINAL REVIEW


Chevron/Mead/Gonzeles Decision Tree
Is the statute clear? (Chevron Step 1)
o Yes No deference
o No Go to next
Did Congress expressly give the agency interpretive authority? (E.g., formal
MEMORIZE THIS!!
rulemaking, informal rulemaking, formal adjudication)
o Yes, then ask if the interpretation is reasonable (Chevron Step 2)
Reasonable Deference
Unreasonable No deference
Per Mead and Gonzales, (1) did Congress give the agency authority to make rules
with force of law generally or in the particular substantive field covered by the
agencys rule (Gonzo court) and (2) did the agency use that authority?
o Yes to both Ask if the interpretation is reasonable (Chevron Step 2)
Reasonable Deference
Unreasonable No deference (remand)
No to either Skidmore deference
Yes to (1) and no to (2) possible Brand X Internet overrule by agency (of
ambiguous statute)

iii. Review of Discretion Overton Park, Seat Belt Case


1. Not really interpreting the statute, did they use their discretion?
a. Under the APA, the ONLY standard of review we can apply to a discretionary
decision is A/C review.
2. MVMA Court defined the standard of review of abuse of discretion: Based on the
whole record, is it A/C?

TEST WHEN MAKING A/C Review (An agencys ruling would be arbitrary and capricious):
1.
Did the Agency consider factors that Congress did NOT want to consider,
2.
Did the Agency fail to consider an important aspect of the problem,
3.
Did the Agency present an explanation that is inconsistent with the record, or
Test
4.
Is the decision given an unreasonable explanation?
for
A/C
iv. Basically, engage in reasoned decision-making. Must be a rational connection between
review
the facts found and the choice made.
v. Overton Park Admin must certify 1-40 can go through the park using informal
adjudication; purely an exercise in discretion because there is no mandatory process. Can
SCOTUS review? Y
1. There only time there is NO review of Agency discretion is where there is no
law to apply.
2. Ct remands and once they get a reasoned decision, review the discretion under
A/C standard.
Exam Tips:
Substantive Review/Substantive Challenges (agency made the wrong decision under 3 areas)
Exam tips: are the factual determinations made by the Agency based on the record.
Did they interpret the law? Apply Chevron tree.
If theres a review of discretion, apply the test. Even if not relevant, just talk about everything.
Attack the fact pattern!!!!
c. Judicial Review threshold issues
i. Reviewability Johnson, Bowen, Webster
1. Just address it on test, probably get past reviewability.
a. Congress prohibited review of certain agency decisions b/c of consistency
(let the experts do it) and the volume of decisions.
i. These concerns do not apply to Constitutional challenges.
b. Presumption of Judicial Review; overcome by clear and convincing
evidence. Congress can preclude review of regs directly or by
Congressional silence (expression unius) and inferences Not a clear
stmt rule. C & C can be met in a variety of ways not a magic words test.
c. Webster v. Doe the language of the statute strongly suggest that
Congress intended to commit the action entirely to agency discretion, thus
there is no law to apply (where statute is so clear that a court would
have no standard to judge the agencys discretion).
i. Nothing for the judiciary to review.
ii. Note: APA precludes review of agency decisions where Congress
has expressly committed the action to agency discretion.
iii. But the Court will hear the Constitutional claim b/c the NSA is
silent on this issue
iv. Courts are very willing to hear Constitutional challenges. Doesnt
challenge the cult of expertise/overburden of courts problems.
ii. Standing

1. Art III Lujan, Atkins, Bennet


a. Art III cases and controversies require at the bare minimum
i. Injury in fact:
1. Concrete and particular; &
Art III Standing
2. Actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical
ii. Causality claimants injury can be traced to Agency action.
iii. Redressability ability of court to provide relief. Must be likely
and not speculative.
b. s
2. Prudential/Zone of Interests Chicago Junction, Bama Power, Data Processing,
Air Courier, NCUA
a. Zone of interests - Look at statute. Can the P make a straight-faced
argument that they are arguably in the statute? Talk about the statute and
why this plaintiff may or may not have an argument.
i. C/L generally competitors.
b. Old law: Chicago Junction (gave competitors a right to be free of
monopolies), Bama Power (no legal right), Sanders Brothers (D had
standing b/c they were applying for a license which was protected under
FCC)
i. Must have a protected legal interest in addition to Art II standing.
This protected legal right comes from Congress.
c. Data Processing Is the interest to be protected by the complainant
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute?
i. Applied (Straight faced argument was statute intended to protect
the challenger, regardless of your injury):
1. Postal were not focus of PES, which was concerned with
serving the whole country, creating reveunue, etc.
2. Data processers were arguably within that statute.
iii. Finality SoCal (consummation of agency process, binding legal effect on the parties);
this isnt about pre-enforcement, they are enforcing it.
1. Finality Test:
a. Decision was NOT definitive, AND
b. Decision had no legal force (that is, Ds rights arent affected)
i. Mere litigation costs dont count.
2. Other way to put it:
a. Consummation of Agency Action, AND
b. Rights have been affected (more than mere litigation)
3. Finality applied in SoCal.
a. FTC issuance of complaint was not final agency action. Agency
complaint is not a definitive statement or position.
iv. Ripeness Pre-enforcement Review (Abbott Labs and Toilet Goods) hit EVERY
FACTOR even if one is probably not met. It gives you points.
1. Test for Ripeness:

a. Fitness of the issues for judicial decision:


i. Nature of Issue (is it purely legal? Or factual?)
ii. Finality (has agency completed process)
1. Leg agency use expertise, dont bog down the system.
b. Hardship to the parties of w/o court consideration
2. Ripeness Applied:
a. Abbott purely legal (proper construction of statute), final agency action
under APA (notice and comment), huge impact on Industry (pharma is
fucked and has to make huge changes)
b. Toilet Goods more legal, more facts would help, Cosmetics dont have
to change a thing.
v. Exhaustion
i. Balancing test is out, presumption that exhaustion is NOT mandatory unless
the statute or Agency rules expressly mandate review.
ii. Darby Summary. You must exhaust when:
a. Congress requires exhaustion, OR
b. If the Agency, by Rule:
i. Requires exhaustion, AND
ii. States that the challenged Agency action is inoperative until all
administrative remedies are exhausted (get ur shit til its over)
2. Old law applies at state law exhaust agency law
3. In federal, under Darby, a final agency decision can usually get reviewed unless
statute or rule + keep your shit.

3. Constitutional Issues
a. Art III issues
i. Look at p.56 of outline:
1. Law - Art III requires Art III courts to review legal questions de novo.
2. Fact
a. Public Rights may vest in Art I courts
b. Private Rights vest if Adjunct
i. Northern Pipeline says that Art III doesnt give jurisdiction to nonCongressionally created rights.
1. Ex: C/L claims in bankruptcy court.
ii. If Congressionally created (like in Crowell, derived from federal
regulatory scheme), vesting is fine.
ii. When is an Art. I court not taking on an essential attribute of Art III court power:
1. Narrow, specialized findings of fact
2. Statutorily channeled fact finding
3. Limited relief
4. Court may set aside agency ruling
5. Non-final, non-binding, unenforceable judgments.
b. Art III Bottom Line after Stern:
i. Types of cases that MUST go to Art III court:
1. Court with broad substantive juries, on C/L regime that doesnt derive from
Congressional delegation.
ii. Art I tribunal thats fine:
1. Courts martial
2. Territorial Courts
3. Public Rights (these are now broadly defined --- [Person v Person; Person v Gov]
a. Definition: integrally related federal government action (ex: Schor, federal
securities brokers) is SO tied to federal action that it can go to Art I court.
4. Possibly adjunct of court of private rights (Crowell), not clear
a. Law is still evolving here.
iii. What was the problem in Northern Pipeline and Stern (bankruptcy courts):
1. Purely private rights claim AND court like tribunal (thus not involved with
federal scheme and its a C/L right)
c. Non-delegation doctrine: its a loser, dont argue it!!!!! Only 2 have ever won.
i. A.L.A. Schecter Poultry v. United States 1935
1. Quick facts:
a. NIRA gave FDR extremely broad and sweeping authority to fix the
economy.
b. Problem: standard less delegation of authority to FDR
i. Only Congress makes laws.
ii. When they do delegate power, Congress must articulate an
intelligible principle.
1. If Congress has not done its essential obligation of setting
the standard, Agency power is unfettered.
ii. Functions of Non-delegation:
1. Congress sets policy, then
2. Agency gets intelligible principle, then

a. Ex: OSHA knows if cost or health matters more in benzene ruling this
is Congress job.
3. Courts get standard of review
a. If Congress does their job, the Court will know how to review
Congressional policy.
d. Legislative Veto dead under Chadha
i. One house veto over AGs finding that Ds deportation should be stayed.
1. Not constitutional, this is a legislative act and must follow the Constitutional
requirements.
2. Legislative actions must meet Bicameralism (pass both houses) and Presentment.
e. Executive Power to Appoint and Remove ignore this shit
i. Wont be on EXAM!!!!!!

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