Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
June 2010
* * *
To set the scene, it is useful to enumerate the neighbours of Byzantium in AD
925. As will appear in Part IV, many of these neighbours were also enemies.
We will proceed anticlockwise, beginning in Eastern Europe. The territory
of [1] the Bulgar Khanate or Bulgarian Empireits ruler had assumed the
cheeky or defiant title of Tsar in 913still lay on both sides of the lower
Proxy (area,
location)
Population in
AD 1000
(millions) and
rank
Major cities
Data from
McEvedy & Jones
1978
(Muslim) Buyid
Emirates (Iraq
and western
Iran)
Modern Iraq x 3
6 [3rd]
BADHDAD, Shiraz,
Isfahan, Rayy, Basra,
Wasit
(Muslim)
Emirates of
Mosul,
Diyarbakir and
Aleppo
Modern Syria x 2
3 [7th if counted
as a group]
Mosul
(Christian)
Kingdoms of
Armenia, Iberia
and Abasgia
2/3 Caucasia
0.30
(none)
Fatimid
Caliphate
Algeria, Tunisia,
Libya, Egypt,
Palestine/Israel and
Lebanon
9 [1st]
Byzantine
(Roman)
Empire
8 [2nd]
CONSTANTINOPLE,
Antioch
West
Bulgarian
Empire
1.4 [9th]
(none)
Kingdom of
Hungary
120% of modern
Hungary
0.6
(none)
Principality of
Russia
3/5 of Russia-inEurope
2.4 [8th]
(none)
German Empire
4+ [5th]
(none)
Kingdom of
France
3/5 of modern
France
3.9 [6th]
(none)
Kingdom of
England
90% of modern
England and Wales
1.35 [10th]
(none)
Umayyad
Caliphate
5 [4th]
10
11
12
Grains
Very light
300
332
Light, in relation
to modern game
hunting
400
Ounces
Grams
19
22
0.91
Typical American
Indian arrow, 19th
C (*)
26
30
Typical medieval
Ottoman arrow
(**)
1.0
Medium, in
relation to
modern game
hunting
500
1.14
32
Heavy, in relation
to modern game
hunting
600
1.37
39
800+
52+
13
60
14
* * *
McGeer, pp.68, 207, says that the Byzantine heavy infantry bow of AD 975
was capable of sending an arrow over 300 metres, with a killing distance of
perhaps 200 metres. The smaller cavalry bows, he says, could shoot arrows
as far as 130 metres, with a killing range of perhaps 80 metres.
As we also noted, John France 1994: 148 proposes that the effective, or
killing, range of a Seljuq cavalry bow of the 11th century was likewise over 60
metres.
To repeat: Hildinger has suggested that the Asian composite recurve
bow was only accurate at up to 80 yards (75 m) when shot from horseback,
but "shooting in arcade" (at 45 degrees above horizontal) allowed for much
greater ranges. Modern champion archers likewise maintain that one cannot
guarantee a hit on an individual target at more than 80 yards (metres) with
any bow whatsoever, but of course one could always hit a massed army of
thousands of individuals.
It is not clear from Leo VI whether archery was already declining or remained
all-important into the 10th century. His insistence that every East-Roman boy
should learn to shoot could be read as implying that many or most did not
(wholly neglected and has fallen into disuse). This too may be indicated by
his order that, in the provinces, every house, or at least every soldiers
house, is to keep one bow and 40 arrows. On the other hand, if the order was
15
16
17
18
19
Recurve
composite
bow:
Turkish and Mongol heavy
infantry bow, maximum
demonstration range
(Note 1):
*750+
metres
Presumed absolute
maximum range,
Byzantine heavy infantry
bow:
550
The distance to be
*528 m
Longbow
Remarks
20
(nearly
1/3 of
a mile)
*434 m
(400
yards)
400
yards
Byzantine infantry
bow, maximum
distance, i.e. not its
killing range (Sylloge,
cited by McGeer pp. 68,
207, 213):
*330
m
*329 m
*305 m =
334 yds.
275 m
250+
21
yards
English longbow;
maximum range
(Strickland & Hardy p.18)
Maximum ranges of
several English-style
infantry longbows, 173195 cm in length, tested
by Pope (cf BBC 2006
result, below):
*290 (250330 m)
Experimental result. A
heavy-pull 667 N (150
lbf) 'Mary Rose' replica
longbow was able to
shoot a largish 53.6 g
(1.9 oz) arrow 328 m
(360 yd) and a massive
95.9 g (3.3 oz) arrow a
distance of 249.9 m (272
yd).
*240
metres; or
more like
200 m for
an average
archer.
*243229 m
Effective range,
Byzantine cavalry bow
(Hyland 1994: 29, citing
Bivar):
230 m
22
200
metre
s
200 m
200
yards
150-200
metres
(Hurley
1975: 21
says 'nearly
300 yards').
Killing distance,
unarmoured target,
English longbow:
200 m
*160
sic!
150-175
Composite bow:
effective (potentially
killing) range against
unarmoured men and
horses (Luttwak p.27)
Up to
150m
135
Cf up to 80 metres from
experiments (below).
Volley fire.
23
120
Armour-piercing
range, Byzantine
cavalry bow (Hyland
1994: 29, citing Bivar):
90
Killing distance,
Byzantine cavalry
bow (McGeer):
80
*80
75-80
75-80
60-70
Up to 60 m.
50-75
metres
But cf Dawsons
experimental result of
just 20 m against
lamellar armour.
50
24
*30-40 m
English longbow
punctures but does not
penetrate through a
steel breastplate of
unstated thickness (test
done by BBC):
Medium-pull (82 lbs at
full 33 inch draw)
composite recurve bow,
steel-hardened arrow
point fails against
Byzantine lamellar
armour (experiment by
Dawson 1998):
English longbow
penetrates right through
plate armour and
underlying doublet coat
to the flesh (BBC):
*30
Key datum. Shows the
worth of plate armour.
*20 m
*20
metres
26
27
Man without
armour dead;
horse wounded:
Fired by
cavalry:
50 metres:
Karpowicz; 60
France; 80 McGeer;
120 or under 230
Bivar; 400 Hurley.
90 Bivar; 200
Hurley
Fired by
infantry:
250+ metres:
Hurley
The figures in the tables above, although they do not always agree, suggest
that probably a soldier carrying a shield and wearing armour would be quite
safe from arrows fired from a cavalry bow at a good distance: beyond say
100 m. But unarmoured light troops could be killed and, importantly, horses
could be wounded by foot-archers at about 200 metres.
In other words, horse-archers would be effective against soldiers wearing
mail only when they had closed on their enemy, i.e. to within perhaps 50
metres. And, if the enemy could deploy enough foot-archers, then horsearchers would presumably be reluctant to ride very close, i.e. not within
about 150 m . . .
Foot archers would be most effective against cavalry charging towards or
past them: certainly within 100 m; and also when firing an arrow storm into
enemy infantry, e.g. from the rear ranks of a Romaic infantry unit moving to
close with enemy infantry.
Against horse-archers from the steppes, e.g. the Magyars, Leo VI advised
that the imperial cavalry should engage quickly without exchanging
preliminary arrow fire; by immediately charging, the Byzantines heavier
lancer-cavalry could break them. So too could the Byzantine infantry with
their more powerful bows, which shot further, enabling them to shoot down
the Magyar horses before the Magyars closed (Hyland p.50, citing Oman).
28
29
Poisoned arrows: In Leos Taktika we learn that the Saracens are better
versed in military science than all other peoples; this information the emperor
knows from generals who have fought them, from reports to preceding
emperors and from his father, Basil I (Leo, Taktika XVIII.123). Also, since the
Arabs make great use of cavalry, the Romans should use poisoned arrows to
kill their horses. The Arabs place high value on these apparently unarmoured
fast-attack horses; if they know that the Byzantines are using poisoned
arrows, they will retreat in order to save their horses, because without the
horses, they cannot save themselves (XVIII.135-136).
Against horse-archers from the steppes, e.g. the Magyars operating in
Bulgaria and Thrace, Leo VI advised that the imperial cavalry should engage
quickly without exchanging preliminary arrow fire; the Byzantines heavier
cavalry could break them with their maces and thrusting spears. So too could
the Byzantine infantry with their more powerful bows, which shot further,
enabling them to shoot down the Magyar horses before the Magyars closed
(Hyland p.50, citing Oman). Archery is a great weapon and an effective one,
especially for use against the Saracens and Turks [i.e. Magyars] . . . Foot
archers [are] their special dread, since the bow of the infantry archer is larger
and carries further than that of the horsemen, wrote Leo, quoted by
Toynbee 1973: 315. fff
Leo the Deacon (II.2) reports that Leo Phokas used night attacks against
the Magyars, no doubt because this prevented them from using their usual
fast maneouvering.
c. Servants, Groomsmen, Drivers
Carts or wagons were used, although sometimes in the Balkans nearly all the
equipment must have been carried on the backs of pack-mules. One muleattendant/servant was assigned to every 16 infantrymen to transport the
tents, provisions and other equipment (including a hand-powered grain-mill)
and munitions such as spare bows, arrows and caltrops (Leo, Taktika, cited
by Dawson 2007b: 45).
One imagines that pack-animals far outnumbered two-wheel carts, with
four-wheel wagons limited to carrying the heaviest items. A pack-mule can
carry no more than 90-100 kg for extended periods (Haldon 1999: 282; Pryor,
in Pryor ed, Logistics of Warfare 2006: 18).
If there were 10,000 infantry, the mule-attendants numbered 625.
Assuming (which is not certain) that each mule required one driver, we have
perhaps 350 pack-mules, 180 cart-mules pulling 90 carts, and 95 wagonmules pulling 20 larger wagons . . .
Mobile Artillery
Leo also mentions artillery devices. The fact that they revolved at both ends
or in a circular fashion makes it almost certain that these alakatia were small
traction (rope-pulled) trebuchets. They were probably pole-frame models
that could be transported in wagons, quickly assembled, and operated by one
or a few soldiers, much as depicted in the illustrated Madrid Skylitzes
30
31
32
Above: Late 10th C Byzantine military dress and equipment. Left to right:
medium cavalry, heavy cavalry and heavy infantry.
Points to note: two shield types including (left) the almond or kiteshaped type; lamellar armour over mail and the bronze greaves on the
central figure; high boots; baldrics; the long infantry pike. Not shown
here is the epilorikon or thick padded surcoat.
* * *
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
Bodyguards
Tagmata
842:
Theoph
ilus:
400 (*)
20,000:
Four (**)
cavalry
regiments
each of
4,000; and
two infantry
Themes/
Land themes
Includes
cavalry and
infantry.
95,600+
Of which
70,000 in the
Asian themes
(Treadgold
1982: 16,
citing the
Navy
/incl.
naval
themes/
[oarsme
n]
Remarks
34,200***
Some 120,000
paid land soldiers
including Themes.
41
Arab writer
Qudamah).
Bodyguards
959:
Consta
ntine
VII
1,200
1025:
Basil II
1,200
Tagmata
Themes/
Land
themes
Includes
cavalry and
infantry.
Navy /incl.
naval
themes/
[oarsmen]
Remarks
28,000. Note 1.
Of which
20,000 cavalry
and 8,000
infantry.
114,800 in
the
Themes.
34,200
naval
oarsmen.
Note 2.
42,000 /sic/.
Of which
24,000 cavalry
and 18,000
infantry
including 6,000
Varangians.
Note 3.
204,600
34,200
oarsmen
42
43
AD 285633:
Largest recorded:
Range for
major
campaigns:
15-30,000
15-30,000.
After 1081:
5-10,000
1204-1453:
500 to 2,000.
44
45
46
47
48
49
Above: The East. In AD 900 Trabzon (Trebizond) was the seat of the
border Byzantine Theme of Chaldia. Caesarea (modern Kayseri) was the
seat of the Byzantine Theme of Cappadocia. In Cilicia the Empire
controlled a smaller part in the west while the Caliphate controlled a
larger segment in the east: Byzantium captured Tarsus in 965 and
pressed thence into Syria by 969. All of northern Mesopotamia and most
of eastern Armenia was controlled by the Caliphate or its subordinate
emirs in 900. The region marked Sophene on this map was a contested
no mans land between the Empire and Caliphate. The Byzantines
pushed east thereafter, taking Erzurum (Gk Theodosiopolis) in 931.
Poson, 863
The Battle of Poson was fought at a location not precisely identified:
somewhere in NW Anatolia east of the Halys [Kzlrmak] River or south of the
Upper Halys: perhaps near Sivas. It is regarded by some historians as the
beginning of an Imperial counter-offensive against Islam in the East.
Alternatively, the beginning of the counter-offensive can be dated to 900. At
any rate, the victory at Poson put an end to serious Arab-Muslim raiding in
Anatolia.
The young emperor Michael III, aged 23 in 863, and his uncle Petronas,
leading their troops in three very large corps, achieve a major victory against
a modest force led by the emir Omar or Amer [Umar ibn Abdallah ibn
Marwan] of Melitene/Malatya, who is killed. Omar was returning from Amisus
(Samsun) on the shore of the Black Sea east of Sinope, so the battle would
have taken place somewhere between Samsun and Malatya.
Armenia and the Pauliciansthe large community of quasi-Christian
heretics living in the borderlands of Armeniawere also defeated.
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
Sicily, 964
Nikephoros II Phokas sent to Sicily an army of supposedly 40,000 men,
mainly Armenians, Thracians (some of whom were Paulicians) and Slavs
(Rus), under the elderly eunuch patrician Nicetas and Nikephoross young
nephew Manuel Phocas. Nicetas held the post of droungarios of the Fleet,
while Manuel was commander of the cavalry (Leo Diac. IV:7). They
captured Messina in October 964.
Nicephorus II Phocas sent the Romaic fleet to Sicily under the command of
the navarchos or drungaire (admiral) of the fleet, the eunuch patrician
Nicetas, who was defeated, taken prisoner and imprisoned in what is now
Tunisia (Leo the Deacon 65-67; Cedr. II 360).
Pryor & Jeffreys p.385 list this as one of the more disastrous defeats
suffered by the imperial navy.
Responding to an appeal from the people of Rametta [modern Rometta] in
the NE corner, the last Christian stronghold on the island, the emperor sent
(964 or 965: October 964 is probably the best dating) a huge East Roman
force, including a few super-heavy cavalry, to Sicily. This included troops
from Thrace, Armenia and Russia (Slavs and Viking Rus). Most or all of the
soldiers and their weapons were transported in what Leo Diac. IV:7 calls
large merchantmen. Siege machines too were taken in specialised
transports.
The expedition lands near Messina and captures it but is crushed (964 or
965) in an ambush by the Kalbites (Muslims) at nearby Rametta. On 25
October a fierce battle between the Byzantines and the Kalbids resulted in a
defeat for the former. Manuel himself was killed in the fray (or rather:
captured and beheaded), along with 10,000 of his men. The emperor had
great affection for Nicetas, the brother of Michael his protovestiary or Master
of the Wardrobe, the patrician praepositus and vestes, and he ransomed
Nicetas.
The Muslims then take the town of Rametta by storm (Ahmad p.31; Loud in
NCMH vol 3 p.611; Rodriquez dates this to 963-64).
The Kalbidi dynasty, also called Kalbids, ruled Sicily from 947 to 1040.
Ruler in 964: Hassan al-Kalbi, r. 948-964; he dies during the siege of Rametta.
Luitprand of Cremona, the Italian who served the German kings on several
embassies to Constantinople, writes thus: [the galleys of] the Saracens
engaged in battle near Scylla and Charybdis in the Sicilian waters [i.e. near
the northern end of the Strait of Messina] with the patrician Manuel, the
nephew of Nicephorus. And when they had laid low his immense forces - they
took his own self and beheaded him and hung up his corpse. And when they
had captured his companion and colleague [admiral Nicetas], who was of
neither gender [a eunuch], they scorned to kill him; but having bound him
and kept him to pine in long imprisonment, they sold him [to the emperors
agents] for a price at which no mortals who were sound in their heads would
have bought him. And with no less spirit, encouraged by this same prophecy,
they shortly after met the general Exachontes [sic].* And when they had put
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71
72
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DROMON = J H PRYOR & Elizabeth JEFFREYS, 2006: The Age of the Dromon:
The Byzantine Navy, ca 500-1204. Leiden: Brill.
John FRANCE, 1994: Victory in the East: A Military History of the Crusades.
Cambridge, UK.
Arthur FERRILL, 1986: The Fall of Rome: the Military Explanation. London.
Richard GABRIEL & Karen Metz, 1991: From Sumer to Rome: the military
capabilities of ancient armies. Volume 108 of Contributions in military
studies. ABC-CLIO, 1991
Robert, GARDINER ed., 2004: The Age of the Galley. London: Conway.
Joseph GENESIUS (fl. 886): Chronicle, On the reigns of the emperors. A.
Kaldellis (trans.) Byzantina Australiensia, 11. Canberra: Australian Association
for Byzantine Studies, 1998.
GIBBON: The Decline and Fall. First published in 1776.
IBN AL-ATHIR: Accounts of the Rus (10th to 13th centuries): Online 2010 at
www.deremilitari.org/resources/sources/athir.
Ibn KHURDADHBIH: Abu'l Qasim Ubaid'Allah ibn Khordadbeh [d. AD 912; book
written ca 870]: Kitab al Masalik wal Mamalik (The Book of Roads and
Kingdoms). Cited in various secondary sources.
John HALDON, 1990 (trans): Constantine Porphryogenitus: Three Treatises on
Military Expeditions. (Vienna).
John HALDON, 1995: State, Army and Society in Byzantium: approaches to
military, social, and administrative history, 6th-12th centuries. Brookfield, Vt.,
USA: Variorum.
John HALDON, 1999: Warfare, state and society in the Byzantine
world, 565-1204. Routledge
John HALDON, 2001: The Byzantine Wars, Battles and Campaigns of the
Byzantine Era. Stroud, UK: Tempus.
John HALDON, in Jonathan Harris ed., 2005: Palgrave Advances in Byzantine
History. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
John HALDON, 2006a: Roads and communications in the Byzantine empire:
wagons, horses and supplies, in J H Pryor ed., Logistics of warfare in the Age
of the Crusades. Ashgate.
John HALDON, 2006b: Greek Fire Revisited, in Jeffreys ed., Byzantine Style,
Religion and Civilization. Cambridge University Press.
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