De Bumanglag vs. Bumanglag [A.M. No.

188 November 29, 1976]

Post under case digests, Legal Ethics at Saturday, February 25, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic
Mind
Facts: Esteban T. Bumanglad, the respondent, was found by the Court in its decision of
September 24, 1973 guilty of gross immoral conduct and ordered his suspension from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years;
Respondent filed several motions for reconsideration but the same were denied;
As a result of such denial, the respondent wrote a petition to the President of the Philippines that
he promulgate(s) a decree that the order of suspension by the Supreme Court be set aside and
that your humble self be allowed to become an active member of the New Society.
The respondent alleged in the same petition that he was deprived of due process of law;
The Clerk of Court, by way of an indorsement from the Assistant Executive Secretary, received a
copy of the petition and was requested to comment and/or appropriate action on the subject
matter;
However, in a subsequent letter to the President the respondent retracted and acknowledged his
non observance of protocol of separation of powers;
In the end, the respondent asked for an apology from the members of the Honorable Court.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not respondent may be disciplined for gross ignorance of the law and of the
Constitution in not observing the protocol of separation of power by asking the President to set
aside by decree the decision of the Court imposing suspension upon the respondent
(2) Whether or not a decision duly promulgated by the Supreme Court may be set aside by a
Presidential Decree
Held:
(1) Respondent is hereby administered a reprimand for gross ignorance of the law and of the
Constitution in having asked the President to set aside by decree the Court's decision which
suspended him for two years from the practice of law, with warning that the commission of any
transgression in the future of his oath and duties as a member of the bar will be severely dealt
with.
(2) Since respondent has apologized for his "big mistake" and now appreciates that under the
fundamental principle of separation of powers enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,
a decision of this Court may not be set aside by the President, the Court is disposed to view his
misconduct and/or ignorance with liberality and will administer a reprimand with warning of severe
action on any future transgressions, considering respondent's unenviable record.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. 188 November 29, 1976
RICARDA GABRIEL DE BUMANGLAG, complainant,

vs.
ESTEBAN T. BUMANGLAG, respondent.
RESOLUTION

TEEHANKEE, J.:
In the Court's decision of September 24, 1973, the Court found respondent guilty of gross
immoral conduct and ordered his suspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years. Respondent filed several motions for reconsideration, all of which were denied per the
Court's Resolutions of November 20, 1973, December 19, 1973, January 9, 1974 and October
30, 1974.
On March 31, 1975, the Clerk of Court received a 1st Indorsement dated February 21, 1975 from
then Assistant Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora "requesting comment and/or appropriate
action" on the therewith enclosed petition of respondent to the President of the Philippines that he
"promulgate(s) a decree that the order of suspension by the Supreme Court be set aside and that
your humble self be allowed to become an active member of the New Society".
The Court per its Resolution of June 16, 1975 directed the Clerk of Court "to furnish the Office of
the President through Assistant Executive Secretary Zamora with copies of the Court's decision of
September 24, 1973 wherein the Court in a spirit of liberality by majority vote imposed a lesser
penalty of two-year suspension instead of disbarment (as voted by a minority composed of
Justices Castro and Makasiar) and of the Court's resolutions of November 20, 1973 and
December 19, 1973 denying for lack of merit respondent's two motions for reconsideration dated
October 18, 1973 and December 12, 1973"; and further resolved "to require respondent to show
cause within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be subjected to further disciplinary
action for making false statements and misrepresentations in his petition to the President that he
has been allegedly deprived of due process of law contrary to the facts of record as stated in the
Court's decision, and for gross ignorance of the law and of the Constitution in asking the
President to set aside by decree this Court's decision imposing upon him two-year suspension
from the practice of law".
In a 2nd Indorserment of June 18, 1975 and received by the Clerk of Court on the same day, then
Assistant Executive Secretary Zamora forwarded respondent's letter of the same date to the
President stating that "(T)he undersigned by now (has) come to realize that I made a big mistake
by making said letter to you, Your Excellency, because the Honorable Supreme Court may
believe that I may be challenging the decision which is already final and executory and as such
do not observe the doctrine of protocol of separation of power(s)", and withdrawing and asking
the President to disregard his first letter.
Respondent in his Explanation of July 23, 1975 cited the fact that he had "immediately" withdrawn
his letter asking for the President's intervention and that "lately, however, he has fully realized that
the Chief Executive is bereft (of) any authority to set aside or modify the decision of this
Honorable Supreme Court" and "with folded hands begs and asks an apology from the members
of this Honorable Court, with the full assurance that nothing of this sort will be repeated by him in
the future."
Respondent served his two-year suspension, as duly noted in the Court's Resolution of
November 7, 1975. Since respondent has apologized for his "big mistake" and now appreciates
that under the fundamental principle of separation of powers enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, a decision of this Court may not be set aside by the President, the Court is
disposed to view his misconduct and/or ignorance with liberality and will administer a reprimand
with warning of severe action on any future transgressions, considering respondent's unenviable

record.
A final word is called for on respondent's statement in his Explanation inferring that he was led to
file his petition with the President by the fact that his motions for reconsideration "were only
denied by the Clerk of Court without any comment whatsoever". As the Court has had occasion to
state in People vs. Catolico * and earlier cases, this remark of respondent exposes his lack of
appreciation or disregard of the time-honored usage of the Court that minute resolutions,
summons and processes of the Court, upon being duly adopted and recorded are transmitted to
the interested parties by and upon the signature of the Clerk of Court who is duly authorized to do
so. With the thousands of resolutions approved monthly by the Court, it would unduly tax the time
and attention of the Chief Justice and members of the Court to the prejudice of the administration
of justice if all such papers, other than decisions, could be released only upon their own
signatures.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby administered a reprimand for gross ignorance of the law
and of the Constitution in having asked the President to set aside by decree the Court's decision
which suspended him for two years from the practice of law, with warning that the commission of
any transgression in the future of his oath and duties as a member of the bar will be severely
dealt with.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Muoz-Palma, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.

LEGAL ETHICS
Victoria Legarda vs. Court of Appeals Canon 15G.R. No. 94457 March 18, 1991Facts
: Petitioner engaged the services of counsel to handle her case. Said counsel filed his
appearance with an urgent motion forextension of time to file the answer within 10 days from
February 26, 1985. However, said counsel failed to file the answer withinthe extended period
prayed for. Counsel for private respondent, New Cathay House Inc. filed an
ex-parte
motion to declarepetitioner in default. This was granted by the trial court on March 25, 1985 and
private respondent was allowed to presentevidence
ex-parte
. Thereafter, on March 25, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of private
respondent. Copy of saiddecision was duly served on counsel for the petitioner but he did not
take any action. Thus, the judgment became final andexecutory. On May 8, 1985, upon motion of
private respondent, a writ of execution of the judgment was issued by the trial court.At public
auction, the sheriff sold the aforestated property of petitioner to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. After the
one year redemptionperiod expired without the petitioner redeeming the property, ownership was
consolidated in the name of Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr.The sheriff issued a final deed of sale on July
8, 1986 in his favor. Upon learning of this, petitioner prevailed upon her counsel, toseek the
appropriate relief. On November 6, 1986 said counsel filed in the CA a petition for annulment of
judgment calling attentionto the unjust enrichment of private respondent in securing the transfer in
its name of the property valued at P 2.5 million without justification; that when the complaint was
filed in court by private respondent against the petitioner, the parties came to anagreement to

settle their differences, the private respondent assuring petitioner that the complaint it filed shall
be withdrawn sopetitioner advised her lawyer that there was no longer any need to file an answer
to the complaint. On February 22, 1985, privaterespondent nevertheless filed an
ex-parte
motion to declare the petitioner in default. The documentary evidence presented byprivate
respondent, which served as the basis of the decision, is falsified and tampered with, giving rise
to a presumption of fraud.An amended petition was filed by counsel for petitioner in the Court of
Appeals raising the additional issue that the decision is notsupported by the allegations in the
pleadings or by the evidence submitted. The CA rendered its decision and made the
ff.observations: xxx
Thus, it
is our belief that this case is one of-pure and simple negligence on the part of defendant's counsel
whosimply failed to file the answer in behalf of defendant, But counsel's negligence does not stop
here
.
For after it had been furnished with copy of the decision by default against defendant, it should
then have appealed therefrom or file a petition from relief from theorder declaring their client in
default or from the judgment by default
.
[sic]
Again, counsel negligently failed to do either
. xxx. It wasonly in March 1990 when the secretary of counsel for petitioner informed the latter of
the adverse decision against her only afterpersistent telephone inquiries of the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether counsel committed gross negligence.
Held/Ruling:
Petitioner's counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and dean of a law school. It is to be
expected that he wouldextend the highest quality of service as a lawyer to the petitioner.
Unfortunately, counsel appears to have abandoned the cause of petitioner. After agreeing to
defend the petitioner in the civil case filed against her by private respondent, said counsel did
nothingmore than enter his appearance and seek for an extension of time to file the answer.
Nevertheless, he failed to file the answer.Hence, petitioner was declared in default on motion of
private respondent's counsel. After the evidence of private respondent wasreceived
ex-parte
, a judgment was rendered by the trial court.Said counsel for petitioner received a copy of the
judgment but took no steps to have the same set aside or to appeal therefrom.Thus, the judgment
became final and executory. The property of petitioner was sold at public auction to satisfy the
judgment infavor of private respondent. The property was sold to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr.,
representative of private respondent, and a certificateof sale was issued in his favor. The
redemption period expired after one year so a final deed of sale was issued by the sheriff in
favorof Cabrera, who in turn appears to have transferred the same to private respondent.During
all the time, the petitioner was abroad. When, upon her return, she learned, to her great shock,
what happened to her caseand property, she nevertheless did not lose faith in her counsel. She
still asked Atty. Coronel to take such appropriate action possibleunder the circumstances.As
above related, said counsel filed a petition for annulment of judgment and its amendment in the
Court of Appeals. But that wasall he did. After an adverse judgment was rendered against
petitioner, of which counsel was duly notified, said counsel did notinform the petitioner about it.
He did not even ask for a reconsideration thereof, or file a petition for review before this Court.
Thus,the judgment became final. It was only upon repeated telephone inquiries of petitioner that
she learned from the secretary of hercounsel of the judgment that had unfortunately become final.
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his rights and theexertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing
can be taken or withheld from his client except in accordancewith the law. He should present
every remedy or defense authorized by the law in support of his client's cause, regardless of

hisown personal views. In the full discharge of his duties to his client, the lawyer should not be
afraid of the possibility that he maydisplease the judge or the general public.
epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 94457 March 18, 1991

VICTORIA LEGARDA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NEW CATHAY HOUSE, INC., THE HONORABLE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 94, respondents.
Singson, Valdez & Associates for petitioner.
Lenito T. Serrano for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:p
Nothing is more settled than the rule that the mistake of a counsel binds the client. It is only in
case of gross or palpable negligence of counsel when the courts must step in and accord relief to
a client who suffered thereby.
The present case is a typical example of such rare exception.
Petitioner Victoria Legarda was the owner of a parcel of land and the improvements thereon
located at 123 West Avenue, Quezon City. On January 11, 1985 respondent New Cathay House,
Inc. filed a complaint against the petitioner for specific performance with preliminary injunction
and damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for Quezon City alleging, among others, that
petitioner entered into a lease agreement with the private respondent through its representative,
Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., of the aforestated property of petitioner effective January 1, 1985 until
December 31, 1989 or for a period of five (5) years; that the rental is P25,000.00 per month with
5% escalation per year; that on November 23, 1984, private respondent deposited the amount of
P72,000.00 with petitioner as down payment of rentals; that respondent drew up the written
contract and sent it to petitioner, that petitioner failed and refused to execute and sign the same
despite demands of respondent; and that the respondent suffered damages due to the delay in
the renovation and opening of its restaurant business. The private respondent prayed that
pending the resolution of the case a restraining order be issued against petitioner or her agents
enjoining them from stopping the renovation and use of the premises by private respondent. It
was also prayed that after due hearing the petitioner be ordered to execute the lease contract; to
pay actual compensatory, exemplary and other damages in such amount as may be proved
during the trial including P30,000.00 attorney's fees plus P300.00 per appearance of counsel, and
to pay the expenses of litigation. 1
Petitioner engaged the services of counsel to handle her case. Said counsel filed his appearance
with an urgent motion for extension of time to file the answer within ten (10) days from February
26, 1985. 2 However, said counsel failed to file the answer within the extended period prayed for.
Counsel for private respondent filed an ex-parte motion to declare petitioner in default. This was

granted by the trial court on March 25, 1985 and private respondent was allowed to present
evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, on March 25, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant Victoria G. Legarda to execute
and sign Exhibit "D":, the lease contract for the premises at 123 West Avenue, Quezon City.
Accordingly, the preliminary injunction earlier issued on January 31, 1985 is hereby made
permanent.
Judgment is likewise rendered ordering defendant to pay exemplary damages in the sum of
P100,000.00 to serve as example and deterrent for others, and actual and compensatory
damages as follows:
1. For loss and destroyed goodwill and reputation in the amount of P100,000.00;
2. The sum of P61,704.40 as adjustments in the costs of labor and materials for the renovation of
the premises;
3. The sum of P50,000.00 as unearned income for the delay of plaintiff 's operations from January
1, 1985 up to February 25, 1985 or a period of almost two (2) months;
4. The sum of P16,635.57 and P50,424.40 as additional compensatory damages incurred by
plaintiff for the extension of the lease of its premises at Makati and salaries of idle employees,
respectively;
5. The sum of P10,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees; and
6. The costs of suit. 3
Copy of said decision was duly served on counsel for the petitioner but he did not take any action.
Thus, the judgment became final and executory. On May 8, 1985, upon motion of private
respondent, a writ of execution of the judgment was issued by the trial court. 4
At public auction, the sheriff sold the aforestated property of petitioner to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr.
for the sum of P376,500.00 to satisfy the judgment. The sheriff issued a certificate of sale dated
June 8, 1985 covering the said property. 5 After the one year redemption period expired without
the petitioner redeeming the property, ownership was consolidated in the name of Roberto V.
Cabrera, Jr. The sheriff issued a final deed of sale on July 8, 1986 in his favor. Cabrera registered
the same in the office of the Register of Deeds on July 11, 1986.
Upon learning of this unfortunate turn of events, petitioner prevailed upon her counsel, to seek
the appropriate relief. On November 6, 1986 said counsel filed in the Court of Appeals a petition
for annulment of judgment calling attention to the unjust enrichment of private respondent in
securing the transfer in its name of the property valued at P 2.5 million without justification; that
when the complaint was filed in court by private respondent against the petitioner, the parties
came to an agreement to settle their differences, the private respondent assuring petitioner that
the complaint it filed shall be withdrawn so petitioner advised her lawyer that there was no longer
any need to file an answer to the complaint; that on February 22, 1985, private respondent
nevertheless filed an ex-parte motion to declare the petitioner in default; that petitioner was
deprived of the right to present her defense through false pretenses, misrepresentation and fraud
practiced upon her by private respondent warranting the annulment of the judgment; that the
documentary evidence presented by private respondent, which served as the basis of the
decision, is falsified and tampered with; that as an example, the voucher filed by petitioner,
contains typewritten entries to the effect that the term of the lease is for five (5) years to which
petitioner never agreed, and that the option to buy the property was given to the private
respondent; that the fact that the property worth P2 million was sold at public auction at a

shockingly and questionably low price of P376,500.00 is by itself a sufficient basis for annulling
the sale for being grossly inadequate to shock the conscience and understanding of men, giving
rise to a presumption of fraud. 6 Thus, it was prayed that a preliminary mandatory injunction issue
ordering the private respondent to surrender the property to petitioner and to enjoin the former
from further harassing and threatening the peaceful possession of petitioner; and that after
hearing, the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-43811 and the sheriffs certificate of sale
7 be likewise annulled; that private respondent be adjudged to pay petitioner no less than
P500,000.00 actual and moral damages, as well as exemplary damages and attorney's fees in
the amount of P50,000.00, plus the costs of the suit. 8
On February 2, 1987 an amended petition was filed by counsel for petitioner in the Court of
Appeals raising the additional issue that the decision is not supported by the allegations in the
pleadings or by the evidence submitted. 9
In due course, a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals on November 29, 1989. 10 The
appellate court made the following observations:
On the other hand, petitioner's above allegation of fraud supposedly practiced upon her by
Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. is so improbable as to inspire belief. For the Coronel Law Office had
already entered its appearance as petitioner's counsel by then, so that if it were true that Cabrera
had already agreed to the conditions imposed by petitioner, said law office would have asked
plaintiff to file the proper motion to dismiss or withdraw complaint with the Court, and if plaintiff
had refused to do so, it would have filed defendant's answer anyway so that she would not be
declared in default. Or said law office would have prepared a compromise agreement embodying
the conditions imposed by their client in the lease contract in question which plaintiff had allegedly
already accepted, so that the same could have been submitted to the Court and judgment on a
compromise could be entered. All these, any conscientious lawyer of lesser stature than the
Coronel Law Office, headed by no less than a former law dean, Dean Antonio Coronel, or even a
new member of the bar, would normally have done under the circumstances to protect the
interests of their client, instead of leaving it to the initiative of plaintiff to withdraw its complaint
against defendant, as it had allegedly promised the latter. Thus, it is our belief that this case is
one of-pure and simple negligence on the part of defendant's counsel who simply failed to file the
answer in behalf of defendant, But counsel's negligence does not stop here. For after it had been
furnished with copy of the decision by default against defendant, it should then have appealed
therefrom or file a petition from relief from the order declaring their client in default or from the
judgment by default. [sic] Again, counsel negligently failed to do either. Hence, defendant is
bound by the acts of her counsel in this case and cannot be heard to complain that the result
might have been different if it had proceeded differently (Pulido vs. C.A., 122 SCRA 63; Ayllon vs.
Sevilla, 156 SCRA 257, among other cases). And the rationale of this rule is obvious and clear.
For "if such grounds were to be admitted as reasons for opening cases, there would never be an
end to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that the prior
counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, or experienced, or learned" (Fernandez vs. Tan Tiong
Tick, 1 SCRA 1138). 11
Despite these findings, the appellate court nevertheless dismissed the petition for annulment of
judgment with costs against the petitioner. A copy of the said judgment appears to have been
served on counsel for the petitioner. However, said counsel did not file a motion for
reconsideration or appeal therefrom, so it became final.
It was only in March 1990 when the secretary of counsel for petitioner informed the latter of the
adverse decision against her only after persistent telephone inquiries of the petitioner.
Hence, petitioner secured the services of another lawyer who filed this petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is prayed that the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-43811, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
10487 and the sheriff's sale at public auction of the property in question be annulled, as the same

are attributable to the gross negligence and inefficiency of petitioner's counsel, whose blunder
cannot bind the petitioner who was deprived of due process thereby. It is further prayed that
private respondent Cathay House, Inc. be ordered to reconvey to petitioner the property covered
by TCT No. 270814, which was sold at public auction to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. and in whose
favor its ownership was consolidated, and thereafter ownership appears to have been transferred
to private respondent.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Petitioner's counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and dean of a law school. It is to be
expected that he would extend the highest quality of service as a lawyer to the petitioner.
Unfortunately, counsel appears to have abandoned the cause of petitioner. After agreeing to
defend the petitioner in the civil case filed against her by private respondent, said counsel did
nothing more than enter his appearance and seek for an extension of time to file the answer.
Nevertheless, he failed to file the answer. Hence, petitioner was declared in default on motion of
private respondent's counsel. After the evidence of private respondent was received ex-parte, a
judgment was rendered by the trial court.
Said counsel for petitioner received a copy of the judgment but took no steps to have the same
set aside or to appeal therefrom. Thus, the judgment became final and executory. The property of
petitioner was sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment in favor of private respondent. The
property was sold to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., representative of private respondent, and a
certificate of sale was issued in his favor. The redemption period expired after one year so a final
deed of sale was issued by the sheriff in favor of Cabrera, who in turn appears to have
transferred the same to private respondent.
During all the time, the petitioner was abroad. When, upon her return, she learned, to her great
shock, what happened to her case and property, she nevertheless did not lose faith in her
counsel. She still asked Atty. Coronel to take such appropriate action possible under the
circumstances.
As above related, said counsel filed a petition for annulment of judgment and its amendment in
the Court of Appeals. But that was all he did. After an adverse judgment was rendered against
petitioner, of which counsel was duly notified, said counsel did not inform the petitioner about it.
He did not even ask for a reconsideration thereof, or file a petition for review before this Court.
Thus, the judgment became final. It was only upon repeated telephone inquiries of petitioner that
she learned from the secretary of her counsel of the judgment that had unfortunately become
final.
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that
nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with the law. He should
present every remedy or defense authorized by the law in support of his client's cause, regardless
of his own personal views. In the full discharge of his duties to his client, the lawyer should not be
afraid of the possibility that he may displease the judge or the general public. 12
Judged by the actuations of said counsel in this case, he has miserably failed in his duty to
exercise his utmost learning and ability in maintaining his client's cause. 13 It is not only a case of
simple negligence as found by the appellate court, but of reckless and gross negligence, so much
so that his client was deprived of her property without due process of law.
In People's Homesite & Housing Corp. vs. Tiongco and Escasa, 14 this Court ruled as follows:
Procedural technicality should not be made a bar to the vindication of a legitimate grievance.
When such technicality deserts from being an aid to justice, the courts are justified in excepting
from its operation a particular case. Where there was something fishy and suspicious about the

actuations of the former counsel of petitioner in the case at bar, in that he did not given any
significance at all to the processes of the court, which has proven prejudicial to the rights of said
clients, under a lame and flimsy explanation that the court's processes just escaped his attention,
it is held that said lawyer deprived his clients of their day in court, thus entitling said clients to
petition for relief from judgment despite the lapse of the reglementary period for filing said period
for filing said petition.
In Escudero vs. Judge Dulay, 15 this Court, in holding that the counsel's blunder in procedure is
an exception to the rule that the client is bound by the mistakes of counsel, made the following
disquisition:
Petitioners contend, through their new counsel, that the judgments rendered against them by the
respondent court are null and void, because they were therein deprived of their day in court and
divested of their property without due process of law, through the gross ignorance, mistake and
negligence of their previous counsel. They acknowledge that, while as a rule, clients are bound
by the mistake of their counsel, the rule should not be applied automatically to their case, as their
trial counsel's blunder in procedure and gross ignorance of existing jurisprudence changed their
cause of action and violated their substantial rights.
We are impressed with petitioner's contentions.
Ordinarily, a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will not be a substitute or cure
for failure to file a timely petition for review on certiorari (appeal) under Rule 45 of the Rules.
Where, however, the application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of
justice, the rule may be relaxed.
xxx xxx xxx
While this Court is cognizant of the rule that, generally, a client will suffer the consequences of the
negligence, mistake or lack of competence of his counsel, in the interest of justice and equity,
exceptions may be made to such rule, in accordance with the facts and circumstances of each
case. Adherence to the general rule would, in the instant case, result in the outright deprivation of
their property through a technicality.
In its questioned decision dated November 19, 1989 the Court of Appeals found, in no uncertain
terms, the negligence of the then counsel for petitioner when he failed to file the proper motion to
dismiss or to draw a compromise agreement if it was true that they agreed on a settlement of the
case; or in simply filing an answer; and that after having been furnished a copy of the decision by
the court he failed to appeal therefrom or to file a petition for relief from the order declaring
petitioner in default. In all these instances the appellate court found said counsel negligent but his
acts were held to bind his client, petitioner herein, nevertheless.
The Court disagrees and finds that the negligence of counsel in this case appears to be so gross
and inexcusable. This was compounded by the fact, that after petitioner gave said counsel
another chance to make up for his omissions by asking him to file a petition for annulment of the
judgment in the appellate court, again counsel abandoned the case of petitioner in that after he
received a copy of the adverse judgment of the appellate court, he did not do anything to save the
situation or inform his client of the judgment. He allowed the judgment to lapse and become final.
Such reckless and gross negligence should not be allowed to bind the petitioner. Petitioner was
thereby effectively deprived of her day in court.
Thus, We have before Us a case where to enforce an alleged lease agreement of the property of
petitioner, private respondent went to court, and that because of the gross negligence of the
counsel for the petitioner, she lost the case as well as the title and ownership of the property,
which is worth millions. The mere lessee then now became the owner of the property. Its true
owner then, the petitioner, now is consigned to penury all because her lawyer appear to have

abandoned her case not once but repeatedly.

The Court cannot allow such a grave injustice to prevail. It cannot tolerate such unjust enrichment
of the private respondent at the expense of the petitioner. The situation is aggravated by the fact
that said counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and the dean of a law school as the Court at
the beginning of this discourse observed. His competence should be beyond cavil. Thus, there
appears to be no cogent excuse for his repeated negligence and inaction. His lack of devotion to
duty is so gross and palpable that this Court must come to the aid of his distraught client, the
petitioner herein.
As member of the Philippine Bar he owes complete fidelity to the cause of his client. He should
give adequate attention, care and time to his cases. This is the reason why a practicing lawyer
should accept only so many cases he can afford to handle. And once he agrees to handle a case,
he should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he should do any less, then he is not
true to his oath as a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City dated March 25, 1985 in Civil Case No. Q-43811; the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated November 29, 1989 in CA-G.R. No. SP-10487; the Sheriff 's Certificate of Sale
dated June 27, 1985 of the property in question; and the subsequent final deed of sale covering
the same property, are all hereby declared null and void. Private respondent New Cathay House,
Inc. is directed to reconvey said property to the petitioner, and the Register of Deeds is ordered to
cancel the registration of said property in the name of private respondent and to issue a new one
in the name of petitioner. Costs against private respondent. Said counsel for petitioner is hereby
required to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be held
administratively liable for his acts and omissions hereinabove described in this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22536

August 31, 1967

DOMINGO V. AUSTRIA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ANTONIO C. MASAQUEL, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch II of the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan, respondent.
Primicias, Del Castillo and Macaraeg for petitioner.
Antonio C. Masaquel for respondent.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to annul or set aside the order of respondent Judge Antonio
Masaquel, dated February 10, 1964, in Civil Case No. 13258 of the Court of First Instance of

Pangasinan, declaring petitioner Domingo V. Austria guilty of contempt of court and imposing
upon him a fine of P50.00.
The facts that gave rise to the incident in question are not disputed. Petitioner was one of the
plaintiffs in the above-mentioned Civil Case No. 132581 against Pedro Bravo for the recovery of
three parcels of land one parcel being located at Bayambang and two parcels in San Carlos, in
the province of Pangasinan. On April 19, 1963, after trial, respondent Judge rendered a decision
declaring the plaintiffs the owners of the three parcels of land in question and ordering the
defendant to vacate the lands and pay the plaintiffs damages only with respect to the land located
at Bayambang. The plaintiffs filed a motion for the immediate execution of the judgment which
motion was granted by respondent Judge on May 31, 1963 and, upon the plaintiffs' having
posted a surety bond in the sum of P2,000.00, the sheriff placed them in possession of the lands
located at San Carlos.
On May 23, 1963, Atty. Mariano C. Sicat, a former assistant or associate of respondent Judge
when the latter was still in the practice of law before his appointment to the bench, entered his
appearance as the new counsel for defendant Pedro Bravo, vice Attorney Antonio Resngit. On
June 14, 1963, the defendant, through Atty. Sicat, filed a supersedeas bond to stay the execution
of the judgment, and on June 20, 1963 respondent Judge granted the stay of execution, over the
objection of plaintiffs, and ordered the sheriff to restore the possession of the lands in San Carlos
to the defendant. The petitioner likewise had asked for the appointment of a receiver over the
parcel of land located at Bayambang, which prayer was granted by respondent Judge on July 8,
1963; but upon the filing of a bond by the defendant for the non-appointment of a receiver, the
order receivership was set aside. On August 24, 1963, pending the approval of the defendant's
amended record on appeal, Atty. Sicat filed a motion for new trial and to set aside the judgment
and, over the vigorous objection of plaintiffs, the respondent Judge granted the said motion on
November 7, 1963. The hearing on the retrial was finally set for February 10, 1964.
Before the opening of the court's session in the morning of February 10, 1964, Atty. Daniel
Macaraeg, counsel for petitioner and his co-plaintiffs, saw respondent Judge in his chamber and
verbally transmitted to him the request of petitioner that he (the Judge) inhibit himself from further
hearing the case upon the ground that the new counsel for the defendant, Atty. Mariano C. Sikat,
was his former associate. The respondent Judge, however, rejected the request because,
according to him, the reason for the request of his inhibition is not one of the grounds for
disqualification of a judge provided for in the Rules of Court. Thereafter, when the case was
called for hearing in open court, the following transpired, as shown by the transcript of the
stenographic notes taken during said hearing:2
APPEARANCE:
ATTY. DANIEL C. MACARAEG:
appeared in behalf of plaintiffs. (After the case was called)
COURT:
Your client is here?
ATTY. MACARAEG:
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Where is he?

ATTY. MACARAEG:
He is here, Your Honor.
COURT:
What is your name?
PLAINTIFF:
Domingo Austria, sir.
COURT:
You are one of the plaintiffs in this case?
DOMINGO AUSTRIA:
Yes, sir.
COURT:
Atty. Macaraeg approached me in chambers requesting me to disqualify myself in hearing this
case. Did you authorize Atty. Macaraeg to approach me verbally to disqualify myself from hearing
this case because the lawyer of the other party was my former assistant?
DOMINGO AUSTRIA:
Yes, sir.
COURT:
Is that your reason why you requested Atty. Macaraeg to approach me, requesting me to
disqualify myself simply because the lawyer of the other party was my assistant?
DOMINGO AUSTRIA:
Yes, sir.
COURT:
All right. Do you doubt the integrity of the presiding Judge to decide this case fairly and impartially
because the lawyer of the other party was my former assistant? Do you doubt? Just answer the
question?
DOMINGO AUSTRIA:
Yes, sir.
COURT:
The Court hereby finds you guilty of contempt of Court and you are hereby ordered to pay a fine
of P50.00.
ATTY. MACARAEG:

With due indulgence of this Honorable Court I have learned, after I have conferred with you in
chambers, another ground of the plaintiffs for their requesting me to ask for the disqualification of
Your Honor in this case, and this ground consists of the rampant rumor coming from the
defendant Pedro Bravo himself that he is boasting in San Carlos that because he has a new
lawyer, that surely he is going to win this case.
COURT:
Why did you not wait until the case is finally decided and find out if that is true or not?
ATTY. MACARAEG:
And maybe, that is why the plaintiffs requested me to approach Your Honor because of that
rampant rumor that Pedro Bravo is spreading.
COURT:
You mean to say because of that rumor, you are going to doubt my integrity?
ATTY. MACARAEG:
As for me, I entertain no doubt, Your Honor.
COURT:
Your client expressed openly in Court his doubts on the integrity of the Court simply based on
rumors and that is a ground for contempt of court, if only to maintain the faith of the people in the
courts.
ATTY. MACARAEG:
Taking into consideration that these plaintiffs are laymen and we cannot expect from them the
thinking of a lawyer, I am most respectfully praying that the Order of this Court be reconsidered.
COURT:
Denied. Your client should pay a fine of P50.00. We will hear this case this afternoon.
ATTY. MACARAEG:
Yes, Your Honor.
The respondent Judge forthwith dictated the following order:3
Before this Court opened its sessions this morning, Atty. Daniel C. Macaraeg, counsel for the
plaintiffs, approached the presiding Judge of this Court in his chambers and manifested the
desire of his clients for the Judge to disqualify himself from trying the above-entitled case for the
reason that counsel for the defendant, Atty. Marciano C. Sicat was formerly an associate of the
Judge of this Court while he was still engaged in the practice of law. To this manifestation of Atty.
Macaraeg, the Presiding Judge informed the latter that such fact alone does not in itself constitute
a legal ground to disqualify the Presiding Judge of this Court, from trying this case.
When the above-entitled case was called for hearing, the Presiding Judge called on one of the
plaintiffs who was present, namely, Domingo Austria, and inquired from the latter if it was true that
he asked his lawyer Atty. Macaraeg to approach the Judge in chambers and to ask him to
disqualify himself from trying this case because defendant's lawyer, Atty. Sicat was formerly

associated with the said Judge. To this query Domingo Austria answered in the affirmative. When
he was also asked as to whether the said Domingo Austria has lost faith in the sense of fairness
and justice of the Presiding Judge of this Court simply because of his former association with the
defendant's lawyer, said Domingo Austria likewise answered in the affirmative.
The Court considers the actuation of the plaintiff Domingo Austria, in the premises, as offensive,
insulting and a reflection on the integrity and honesty of the Presiding Judge of this Court and
shows his lack of respect to the Court. The said Domingo Austria is not justified and has no
reason to entertain doubts in the fairness and integrity of the Presiding Judge of this Court, simply
because of the latter's former association with defendant's counsel. For this reason and in order
to maintain the people's faith and respect in their courts the last bulwark in our democratic
institutions the Presiding Judge declared said plaintiff Domingo Austria in direct contempt of
court and he was ordered to pay a fine of P50.00.
The Court found from the manifestation of plaintiffs' counsel Atty. Macaraeg that the basis of the
statement, of Domingo Austria that he has lost his faith in the Presiding Judge of this Court is the
rumors being circulated by the defendant Pedro Bravo that he will surely win in the present case
because of his new lawyer, Atty. Marciano C. Sicat. The Court believes that rumors of the sort do
not serve as a sufficient basis or justification for the plaintiff Domingo Austria to insinuate bias and
partiality, on the part of the Court and to express openly his loss of faith and confidence in the
integrity, fairness and capability of the Presiding Judge of this Court to perform his sworn duty of
upholding and administering justice, without fear or favor, and by reason of which this Court
denied the verbal motion to reconsider filed by counsel for the plaintiff Domingo Austria, finding
him guilty of contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P50.00.
SO ORDERED.
Given in open Court this 10th day of February, 1964, at Lingayen, Pangasinan.
Petitioner Domingo Austria, accordingly, paid the fine of P50.00 under protest. Having been
punished summarily for direct contempt of court, and the remedy of appeal not being available to
him, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari before this Court.
It is the position of the petitioner that under the facts and circumstances attendant to the hearing
of the Civil Case No. 13250 on February 10, 1063, he had not committed an act of contempt
against the court and the respondent Judge had acted in excess of his jurisdiction with grave
abuse of discretion when he declared petitioner in direct contempt of court and imposed on him
the fine of P50.00 as a penalty.
After a careful study of the record, We find merit in this petition.
The respondent Judge declared the petitioner in direct contempt of court. Our task, therefore, is
to determine whether or not the petitioner was guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near
a court or judge, as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, or had committed an
act of disrespect toward the court or judge.4
The respondent Judge considered the actuation of the petitioner, in the premises, as offensive,
insulting, and a reflection on his integrity and honesty and a showing of lack of respect to the
court. The respondent Judge considered that the petitioner was not justified and had no reason to
entertain doubts in his fairness and integrity simply because the defendant's counsel was his
former associate.1wph1.t
We do not agree with the respondent Judge. It is our considered view that when the petitioner
requested respondent Judge to inhibit himself from further trying the case upon the ground that
the counsel for the opposite party was the former associate of the respondent Judge, petitioner
did so because he was impelled by a justifiable apprehension which can occur in the mind of a

litigant who sees what seems to be an advantage on the part of his adversary; and that the
petitioner made his request in a manner that was not disrespectful, much less insulting or
offensive to the respondent Judge or to the court.
We are in accord with the statement of respondent Judge in his memorandum that the
circumstance invoked by petitioner in asking him to inhibit himself from further trying the case
that Atty. Sicat was his former associate in his practice of law is not one of the grounds
enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the new Rules of Court for
disqualifying a judge. While it is true that respondent Judge may not be compelled to disqualify
himself, the fact that Atty. Sicat, admittedly his former associate, was counsel for a party in the
case being tried by him, may constitute a just or valid reason for him to voluntarily inhibit himself
from hearing the case on a retrial, if he so decides, pursuant to the provision of the second
paragraph of Section 1 of the said Rule 137.5
The apprehension of petitioner regarding the probable bias of respondent Judge does not appear
to be groundless or entirely devoid of reason. The respondent Judge had decided the case in
favor of petitioner and his co-plaintiffs, and that upon plaintiffs' timely motion and filing of bond
they were already placed in possession of the lands in question pending appeal. It was when Atty.
Sicat took over as new counsel for defendant that the latter was given back the properties, upon a
motion to stay the execution of the judgment which was filed by said counsel and was granted by
respondent Judge over the opposition of petitioner's counsel. Again, when the same counsel for
defendant filed a motion for a new trial, said motion was granted by respondent Judge in spite of
the vigorous objection of counsel for the petitioner and his co-plaintiffs. And then the petitioner
became aware of the fact that his adversary, the defendant Pedro Bravo, had been boasting in
San Carlos that he was sure to win his case because of his new lawyer.
We believe that the petitioner the layman that he is did not take a belligerent or arrogant
attitude toward respondent Judge. What he did was to request his lawyer, Atty. Macaraeg, to
approach respondent Judge in his chamber and suggest to him to refrain from hearing the case
on the new trial, precisely in order that respondent Judge might not be embarrassed or exposed
to public odium. There is nothing in the record which shows that when respondent Judge refused
to disqualify himself, the petitioner insisted in asking for his disqualification. If the request of
petitioner for respondent Judge to disqualify himself came to the knowledge of the public it was
because respondent Judge himself brought up the matter in open court.
While We consider it improper for a litigant or counsel to see a judge in chambers and talk to him
about a matter related to the case pending in the court of said judge, in the case now before Us
We do not consider it as an act of contempt of court when petitioner asked his counsel to see
respondent Judge in his chamber and request him to disqualify himself upon a ground which
respondent Judge might consider just or valid. It is one thing to act not in accordance with the
rules, and another thing to act in a manner which would amount to a disrespect or an affront to
the dignity of the court or judge. We believe that the circumstances that led respondent Judge to
declare petitioner in direct contempt of court do not indicate any deliberate design on the part of
petitioner to disrespect respondent Judge or to cast aspersion against his integrity as a judge. On
the contrary, it may be said that petitioner wanted to avoid cause for any one to doubt the integrity
of respondent Judge. This is so because when a party litigant desires or suggests the voluntary
disqualification of a judge, it is understood, without saying it in so many words, that said litigant
having knowledge of the past or present relationship of the judge with the other party or counsel
feels that no matter how upright the judge is there is peril of his being unconsciously swayed
by his former connection and he may unwittingly render a biased or unfair decision. Hence, while
it may be conceded that in requesting the disqualification of a judge by reason of his relation with
a party or counsel there is some implication of the probability of his being partial to one side, the
request can not constitute contempt of court if done honestly and in a respectful manner, as was
done by petitioner in the present case. Perhaps the fault of petitioner, if at all, is his having asked
his counsel to make the request to respondent Judge inside the latter's chamber.

The following observation of this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Dizon, is relevant to the
question before Us:
Petitioner invoking the provisions of section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, argues that the
case of respondent judge does not fall under any one of the grounds for the disqualification of
judicial officers stated therein. Assuming arguendo that a literal interpretation of the legal
provision relied upon justifies petitioner's contention to a certain degree, it should not be forgotten
that, in construing and applying said legal provision, we cannot disregard its true intention nor the
real ground for the disqualification of a judge or judicial officer, which is the impossibility of
rendering an impartial judgment upon the matter before him. It has been said, in fact, that due
process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every
litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge (30 Am. Jur. p. 767).
Moreover, second only to the duty of rendering a just decision, is the duty of doing it in a manner
that will not arouse any suspicion as to its fairness and the integrity of the Judge. Consequently,
we take it to be the true intention of the law stated in general terms that no judge shall
preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent (30 Am.
Jur. supra) . . . . 6 (Emphasis supplied).
It is in line with the above-quoted observation that this Court, in amending the Rules of Court,
added the second paragraph under Section 1 of Rule 137, which provides that a judge in the
exercise of his sound discretion may disqualify himself from sitting in a case for just or valid
grounds other than those specifically mentioned in the first paragraph of said section.7 "The
courts should administer justice free from suspicion or bias and prejudice; otherwise, parties
litigants might lose confidence in the judiciary and destroy its nobleness and decorum." 8
Respondent Judge declared petitioner in contempt of court after the latter answered "Yes, sir" to
this question of the judge: "Do you doubt the integrity of the presiding Judge to decide this case
fairly and impartially because the lawyer of the other party was my former assistant? Do you
doubt? Just answer the question?" We believe that petitioner had not committed an act
amounting to contempt of court when he made that answer. The petitioner had not misbehaved in
court, or in the presence of respondent Judge, as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings. Neither
did the petitioner act in a manner that was disrespectful to respondent Judge. When petitioner
answered "Yes, sir" to the question asked by respondent Judge, petitioner simply expressed his
sincere feeling under the circumstances. In order that a person may be summarily punished for
direct contempt of court, it must appear that his behavior or his utterance tends to obstruct the
proceedings in court, or constitutes an affront to the dignity of the court. As stated by this Court,
"Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence, a
defiance of the court . . . ."9
We commend the zeal shown by respondent Judge in his effort to protect his own integrity and
the dignity of the court. We are constrained to say, however, that he had gone a little farther than
what was necessary under the circumstances. We are inclined to believe that respondent Judge
felt offended when petitioner answered "Yes, sir" to the question adverted to in the preceding
paragraph. But the petitioner was simply truthful and candid to the court when he gave that
answer. It would have been unfair to respondent Judge had petitioner answered "No, sir,"
because then he would not be sincere with the court, and he would be inconsistent with the
request that he made through his counsel for respondent Judge to inhibit himself from further
hearing the case. When respondent Judge asked that question, he necessarily expected a
truthful answer from petitioner, and indeed petitioner gave him the truthful answer. We are not
persuaded that in so answering petitioner meant to be disrespectful, offensive or insulting to
respondent Judge. Nor do We consider that in so answering petitioner meant to cast reflection on
the integrity and honesty of respondent Judge. We believe that in so answering the petitioner was
simply manifesting the misgiving of an ordinary layman about the outcome of his case that is
going to be tried by a judge who has been closely associated with the counsel for his adversary.
The petitioner would never have expressed that misgiving of his had respondent Judge not asked
him in open court a question that evoked that answer. A judge can not prevent any person

even a litigant or counsel in a case before him to entertain in his mind an opinion about him as
a judge. Certainly, any person is entitled to his opinion about a judge, whether that opinion is
flattering to the judge, or not. It would be different if a person would deliberately and maliciously
express an adverse opinion about a judge, without reason, but simply to malign and discredit the
judge. In the case now before Us We believe that petitioner did not mean to malign or discredit
respondent Judge in answering as he did. It can be said that petitioner was simply moved by a
desire to protect his interests in the case pending before the court, presided by respondent
Judge. A citizen of this Republic is entitled to expect that our courts of justice are presided by
judges who are free from bias and prejudice and it should not be made a count against the
citizen if he so expresses himself truthfully, sincerely, and respectfully. A judge, as a public
servant, should not be so thin-skinned or sensitive as to feel hurt or offended if a citizen
expresses an honest opinion about him which may not altogether be flattering to him. 10 After all,
what matters is that a judge performs his duties in accordance with the dictates of his conscience
and the light that God has given him. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride,
prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties. And a judge should always bear
in mind that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that
are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but
for the functions that they exercise.
It is worth mentioning here that numerous cases there have been where judges, and even
members of this Court, were asked to inhibit themselves from trying, or from participating in the
consideration of, a case, but scarcely were the movants punished for contempt even if the
grounds upon which they based their motions for disqualification are not among those provided in
the rules. It is only when there was direct imputation of bias or prejudice, or a stubborn insistence
to disqualify the judge, done in a malicious, arrogant, belligerent and disrespectful manner, that
movants were held in contempt of court. 11 And this liberal attitude of the courts is in keeping with
the doctrine that "The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its
inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must
falter or fail." 12 The power to punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature,
should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice. 13
Wherefore, the order of respondent Judge dated February 10, 1964, in Civil Case No. 13259 of
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, declaring petitioner in direct contempt of court and
ordering him to pay a fine of P50.00, is hereby annulled and set aside; and it is ordered that the
sum of P50.00, paid under protest by petitioner as a fine, be refunded to him. No costs. It is so
ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and
Fernando, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-95-1035 June 21, 1995

EMETERIO GALLO through Counsel Atty. Francisco C. Aurillo, complainant,
vs.

JUDGE JOSE CORDERO, MTC, Babatgon, Leyte, respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a sworn complaint dated September 8, 1994 of Emeterio Gallo, charging Judge Jose
Cordero of the Municipal Trial Court of Babatgon, Leyte with non-feasance, manifest bias, gross
ignorance of the law, and graft and rank favoritism.
The complaint is made in connection with Criminal Case No. 2194 entitled "People v. Cristuto
Barreta, Alberto Macabata, Danilo Morillo, and Rodolfo Villanueva," which complainant filed in
respondent judge's court on August 23, 1994 for violation of P.D.No. 772, otherwise known as the
Anti-Squatting Law. The criminal complaint alleged:
That several years ago, at Barangay Bagong Silang, municipality of Babatgon, Province of
Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
all taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the land owners, did then and there,
succeeded in occupying and possessing certain portions of the property of the latter against their
will for residential and small farming purposes, and have refused to vacate the property despite
demands for them to do so.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On August 26, 1994, respondent issued a subpoena 1 to complainant requiring him to appear and
to testify regarding his affidavit and to bring with him documents attesting to his ownership of the
land. Complainant appeared as directed on August 30, 1994 in respondent's office. According to
complainant's affidavit dated September 7, 1994, 2 the following transpired:
That on August 30, 1994 I saw Honorable Judge Jose Cordero in his office, having been
summoned to appear before him on that day;
That he then asked me if I have papers of ownership of land, such as tax declaration, and I said
yes but did not bring them as this was no trial; and besides, he already had the records submitted
by the chief of police;
That since he insisted on seeing our tax declaration, with his permission I went to the office of the
municipal assessor, secured a certified copy of the tax declaration of land in Bagong Silang, and
gave it to him; and noting the area to be 21 hectares the Judge commented that ours is quite a
big tract of land;
That when I asked the Judge if the accused have already been arrested, he said No; so I said,
what about this case of ours? And he asked what I really wanted. When I said I want them
ejected from our land the Judge said: "No, you cannot eject tenants now under the law." I
countered that the four accused are not tenants, but the Judge said, "Even then, nobody can
eject them.
That disappointed at his answers which clearly were biased for the accused, I asked permission
to leave, which was granted. But he added that I should see him again on Sept. 14, the day
before trial which he set for Sept. 15; . . . .
The following day, according to complainant, his son Roger Gallo went to respondent's office to
deliver his letter in which he inquired from the judge whether he had already issued a warrant of
arrest against the accused; that upon entering the office, Roger saw respondent conversing with
the accused in the criminal case; 3 that an aide of respondent received the letter and opened it;
that respondent did not however say anything nor reply to complainant's letter; that when Roger

left the office, respondent judge and the four accused continued their conversation. 4
Complainant charges that (a) in violation of art. 207 (malicious delay in the administration of
justice) and art. 208 (negligence and tolerance in the prosecution of crimes) of the Revised Penal
Code respondent judge refused to order the arrest of the accused in Criminal Case No. 2194; (b)
that respondent privately conferred with the accused in his office on August 31, 1994 which
"logically and naturally arouses suspicion of graft and rank favoritism;" and (c) that he acted with
bias and ignorance of the law in telling complainant, "You cannot eject tenants now under the
law," and that even if the accused were not tenants, "nobody can eject them." Complainant Gallo
prays that (1) respondent be preventively suspended or ordered to inhibit himself from hearing
the case and that another judge be assigned to handle the case and (2) after due hearing,
respondent be dismissed from the service.
In his comment, respondent alleges that he did not order the arrest of the accused for the
following reasons: (1) the complaint charges no offense under P.D. No. 772 because of "the
absence [of] recital in the body of [the] complaint that the property occupied possessed is within
the urban communities" per the ruling in People v. Echavez, 5 that the crime of squatting applies
only to urban communities, 6 (2) the complaint is defective because of its failure to state the
name of the offended party and the date and time of the commission of
the offense; (3) respondent acted in compliance with Administrative Circular No. 8-92 which
"reiterates to all trial court judges the need for a careful consideration of the proper application of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657) to avoid conflict of jurisdiction with the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Boards," and (4) he thought that complainant Gallo
was merely pressuring the accused to vacate the property through the filing of a criminal case
against them.
Respondent also contends that he cannot be liable under art. 208 of the Revised Penal Code,
because this provision applies to the failure of public prosecutors to prosecute for law violations.
Respondent denied uttering the statements attributed to him allegedly showing that he had
prejudged the case, the truth being that he merely
asked complainant certain questions to ascertain compliance with Rule 110 6 and 11 7 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
As for his alleged "private conference" with the accused, respondent claims that he merely tried
to advise them of their right to a counsel de oficio in case they could not afford to hire a lawyer.
With regard to complainant's demand for his inhibition, respondent alleges that there was no
basis for complainant to say that he could not expect justice from him (respondent judge)
because the case had just been set for the arraignment of the accused.
To be sure, Criminal Case No. 2194 was filed invoking the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
respondent judge's court, considering that under P.D. No. 772 the offense charged is punishable
by imprisonment ranging from 6 months to 1 year or a fine of not less than P1,000.00 nor more
than P5,000.00. 8 Hence, in accordance with Rule 112, 9(b), in relation to 3(a) thereof,
respondent's job was to determine at the outset if there was sufficient ground to hold the accused
for trial, on the basis of the complaint and affidavits submitted. If there was no sufficient ground to
hold the accused for trial, the judge should dismiss the complaint or information, otherwise, he
should issue a warrant of arrest after personally examining the complainant and his witnesses in
writing and under oath in the form of searching questions and answers.
Apparently, respondent judge found sufficient ground to hold the accused in the criminal case for
trial. That is why subpoenas were issued to the complainant and the accused. In the case of the
complainant, the subpoena required him to testify and bring with him the papers showing his title
to the land. But respondent judge did not examine him with a view to the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. Instead, as he now says in his comment, he subpoenaed complainant only to determine

the sufficiency of the complaint. Yet, respondent likewise required the accused to present their
evidence the next day, August 31, 1994.
It would thus appear that respondent was confused about what to do. He says in his comment
that he found the criminal complaint to be insufficient because it does not state the time of
commission of the offense and the name of the offended party. He also contends that it does not
charge an offense because in accordance with the ruling in People v. Echavez, 9 the offense
punished under P.D. No. 772 is committed only in urban communities, although in Jumawan v.
Eviota 10 we overruled People v. Echavez and held that what is punished by the law is squatting
on land which is used for residential, commercial or other purposes. Be that as it may, however,
what respondent should have done was to dismiss the criminal case. The fact, however, is that he
did not dismiss the complaint; neither did he, on the other hand, order the arrest of the accused in
that case.
Respondent judge also opened himself to charges of partiality and bias by meeting privately with
the four accused. He says that he merely wanted to apprise them of their constitutional right.
Whatever his purpose was, it was improper for respondent judge to meet them without the
presence of complainant. As already stated, the subpoena required the accused to appear in
court on August 31, 1994 to give their testimony. But no hearing was set on that date. In fact
complainant's son, Roger, merely chanced on the accused in the office of the judge on August 31,
1994 because he had been sent by his father to deliver the latter's letter inquiring whether the
judge had yet issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused.
Thus, respondent judge not only has shown gross ignorance of law and procedure but has also
failed to live up to the norm that "judges should not only be impartial but should also appear
impartial." 11 He thus violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that "a
judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities." In the words of
Rule 2.01 of that Canon, "A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
Respondent judge was compulsorily retired on March 11, 1995, after reaching the age of 70. This
fact, however, does not render this case moot and academic. As held in Zarate v. Judge
Romanillos: 12
[T]he jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost
by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his
case. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official innocent of the
charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and
pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. . . . If innocent, respondent official merits
vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and
faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and
imposable under the situation.
ACCORDINGLY, a FINE of P10,000.00 is imposed on respondent Judge Jose Cordero, the same
to be deducted from whatever retirement benefits he may be entitled to receive from the
government.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, and Puno, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 492

September 5, 1967

OLEGARIA BLANZA and MARIA PASION, complainants,

vs.
ATTY. AGUSTIN ARCANGEL, respondent.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Complainants Olegaria Blanza and Maria Pasion ask this Court to take disciplinary action against
respondent Atty. Agustin Arcangel for professional non-feasance. They complain that way back in
April, 1955, respondent volunteered to help them in their respective pension claims in connection
with the deaths of their husbands, both P.C. soldiers, and for this purpose, they handed over to
him the pertinent documents and also affixed their signatures on blank papers. But subsequently,
they noticed that since then, respondent had lost interest in the progress of their claims and when
they finally asked for the return of their papers six years later, respondent refused to surrender
them.
Respondent answered these accusations before Fiscal Raa to whom this case was referred by
the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. He admitted having received
the documents from complainants but explainer that it was for photostating purposes only. His
failure to immediately return them, he said, was due to complainants' refusal to hand him the
money to pay for the photostating costs which prevented him from withdrawing said documents
from the photostat service. Anyway, he had already advanced the expenses himself and turned
over, on December 13, 1961, the documents, their respective photostats and the photostat
service receipt to the fiscal.
Finding respondent's explanation satisfactory and considering that he charged complainants
nothing for his services, Fiscal Raa recommended the former's exoneration, or at most, that he
be reprimanded only. The Solicitor General, however, feels that respondent deserves at least a
severe reprimand considering (1) his failure to attend to complainants' pension claims for six
years; (2) his failure to immediately return the documents despite repeated demands upon him,
and (3) his failure to return to complainant Pasion, allegedly, all of her documents.
At the hearing of the case before this Court on October 21, 1963, only respondent, thru counsel,
appeared. In lieu of oral arguments, therefore, respondent submitted his memorandum, annexing
therewith an affidavit executed by Olegaria Blanza asking for the dismissal of the administrative
case.1
Respondent first submits that he was not obliged to follow up complainants' pension claims since
there was no agreement for his compensation as their counsel. Respondent, however, overlooks
the fact that he volunteered his professional services and thus was not legally entitled to recover
fees.2 But having established the attorney-client relationship voluntarily, he was bound to attend
to complainants' claims with all due diligence.
Nevertheless, We find the evidence adduced insufficient to warrant the taking of disciplinary
action against respondent attorney. There is no clear preponderance of evidence substantiating
the accusations against him.3
Respondent's explanation for the delay in filing the claims and in returning the documents has not
been controverted by complainants. On the contrary, they admitted4 that respondent asked them

to shoulder the photostating expenses but they did not give him any money therefor. Moreover,
the documents and their photostats were actually returned by respondent during the fiscal's
investigation with him paying for the photostating costs himself. And the condition of the
photostats themselves they appear to have been in existence for quite some time5 supports
respondent's allegation that they remained in possession of the photostat service for the failure of
the owners (respondents and/or complainants), to withdraw the same upon payment of the
corresponding costs. Hence, complainants themselves are partly to blame for the delay in filing
their respective claims.1awphl.nt
As for the alleged failure of respondent to return all her documents to complainant Pasion, the
former denies this. Fiscal Raa made no findings on the matter. The affidavit of Mrs. Blanza
pardoning respondent cannot prejudice complainant Pasion because res inter alios acta alteri
nocere non debet. Still, there is equiponderance of evidence which must necessarily redound to
respondent's benefit. Complainant Pasion had another opportunity to substantiate her charges in
the hearing set for October 21, 1963 but she let it go. Neither she nor her counsel of record
appeared.
But while We are constrained to dismiss the charges against respondent for being legally
insufficient, yet We cannot but counsel against his actuations as a member of the bar. A lawyer
has a more dynamic and positive role in the community than merely complying with the minimal
technicalities of the statute. As a man of law, he is necessarily a leader of the community, looked
up to as a model citizen. His conduct must, perforce, be par excellence, especially so when, as in
this case, he volunteers his professional services. Respondent here has not lived up to that ideal
standard. It was unnecessary to have complainants wait, and hope, for six long years on their
pension claims. Upon their refusal to co-operate, respondent should have forthwith terminated
their professional relationship instead of keeping them hanging indefinitely. And altho We voted
that he not be reprimanded, in a legal sense, let this be a reminder to Atty. Arcangel of what the
high standards of his chosen profession require of him.
Accordingly, the case against respondent is dismissed. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and
Fernando, JJ., concur