1|Page

Soller v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 139853, September 5, 2000

Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent (Saulong) were both candidates for mayor of the municipality
of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1998 elections. The petitioner was proclaimed as mayor by
the municipal board of canvassers. Private respondent filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the
proclamation. Later, private respondent filed an election protest against petitioner with the RTC. The
COMELEC dismissed the pre-proclamation case filed by private respondent, while the RTC denied
petitioners motion to dismiss. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but said motion was denied. Petitioner
then filed with the COMELEC a petition for certiorari contending that respondent RTC acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing private respondents election
protest. The COMELEC en banc dismissed petitioners suit. Petitioner now questions this decision of the
COMELEC en banc.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority to decide on the case.
RULING: The Supreme Court has ruled in previous cases that the COMELEC, sitting en banc, does not
have the requisite authority to hear and decide election cases including pre-proclamation controversies
in the first instance. This power pertains to the divisions of the Commission. Any decision by the
Commission en banc as regards election cases decided by it in the first instance is null and void. In the
SCs view, the authority to resolve petition for certiorari involving incidental issues of election protest, like
the questioned order of the trial court, falls within the division of the COMELEC and not on the COMELEC
en banc.

2|Page

FACTS
Petitioner and private respondent Fernando Cabitac were candidates for Vice-Mayor of Taytay, Rizal during the
May 2004 elections. Private respondent won the election and was proclaimed as Vice-Mayor. Petitioner after
compiling all copies of election returns filed a petition for correction of manifest errors in the election returns and
for a nullification of the proclamation of the private respondent as Vice-Mayor. The COMELEC First Division
dismissed the petition and was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc.
ISSUE
Whether or not COMELEC is required to go beyond the face of election returns and make the necessary correction
in a petition for correction of manifest errors in the election returns.
RULING
The COMELEC, in a petition for correction of manifest errors, is limited to an examination of the election returns
on their face and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind the face of the returns.
[ADELINA TAMAYO-REYES, M.D. vs. COMMISSION ONELECTIONS and FERNANDO R. CABITAC. G.R. No. 175121.
June8, 2007. Nachura, J.

3|Page

FACTS
Private respondent Ceasar Vicencio was a candidate for the post of punong barangay in the July 2002 Synchronized
Barangay Election. In his certificate of candidacy, private respondent stated his profession as a certified public
accountant. Private respondent won in the elections and was proclaimed. Petitioner charged him before the Law
Department of the COMELEC of misrepresenting himself as a CPA and evidences were attached to the complaint.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent misrepresentation of profession or occupation in the Certificate of Candidacy a
valid ground for disqualification
RULING
Profession or occupation is not a qualification for elective office, and therefore not a material fact in the certificate
of candidacy. A misrepresentation of a non-material fact is not a ground to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy.

NELSON T. LLUZ and CATALINO C. ALDEOSA, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CAESAR O. VICENCIO. G.R. No.
172840. June 7, 2007. Carpio, J.

4|Page

FACTS
Domiciano R. Laurena, Jr. and Nestor L. Alvarez were candidates for mayor in the City of Muoz, Nueva Ecija in the
May 10, 2004 elections. In the canvass of votes Laurena obtained 13,321 votes while Alvarez garnered 16,855
votes. With the3,534 votes difference Alvarez was proclaimed mayor of Muoz on May 14, 2004.On May 22, 2004,
Laurena, claiming that massive electoral fraud and irregularities attended Alvarezs victory, filed an election
protest impugning the results of the elections in all 175 precincts of Muoz. In an Order, the Second Division
denied protestees call for the dismissal of the case. It recognized that ballot revision is the most expeditious and
the best means to determine the truth or falsity of protestants allegations. It likewise laid down the guidelines for
the retrieval of the ballot boxes and directed the payment of the required cash deposits to defray revision
expenses. With the admission of the parties respective formal offer of evidence and the submission of their
memoranda, the Second Division issued the assailed Resolution dismissing the protest.

ISSUE Whether or not COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction.

RULING
Well-settled is the rule that the will of the voters is embodied in the ballots, and to ascertain and carry out such
will, the ballots must be read and appreciated according to the rule that every ballot is presumed valid unless there
is clear and good reason to justify its rejection. On this matter, the findings of the COMELEC are accorded great
respect, if not finality, by the Court. Votes cannot be nullified on the mere sweeping allegation of the petitioner
that fraud and irregularity attended the election. Ample and credible evidence is necessary to back up such claim.
This is especially true if the petitioner failed to make timely objections during the canvass of the votes, as in this
case.
DOMICIANO R. LAURENA, JR., vs. THE COMMISSION ONELECTIONS and NESTOR L. ALVAREZ G. R. No. 174499. June
29,2007. Nachura, J

5|Page

FACTS
Petitioner Sales and respondent Thelma Benemerito (Benemerito) were both candidates for Mayor in Pagudpud,
Ilocos Norte, in the 10 May 2004 localelections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Sales as the duly
elected Mayor of Pagudpud, Ilocos Norte.Aggrieved, Benemerito filed an election protest before the RTC
questioning the results in 54 precincts in Pagudpud, Ilocos Norte, on the ground that literate voters were allowed
to vote as illiterates. In his answer to the protest, Sales claimed that Benemerito's allegations were misplaced and
unsubstantiated; and he instituted a counter-protest also assailing the results of the 10 May 2004 local elections.

ISSUE
Whether there is a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of the
COMELEC in affirming the questionable Orders of the RTC.

RULING
It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not
consider questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where
the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would
be of no practical use or value.
There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the
dismissal of the petition. Sales term as mayor of Pagudpud, Ilocos Norte, as a result of the 10 May 2004 elections
expired on 30 June 2007, thus, the present Petition has been rendered moot and academic.
MARLON T. SALES vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.September 12, 2007. Chico-Nazario, J. G.R. No. 174668
September 12, 2007 CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

6|Page

AQUINO vs. COMELEC(248 SCRA 400) G.R. No. 120265

September 18, 1995 KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the
new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident
of the aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced with a petition for disqualification, he amended the entry on
his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections dismissed the
petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on a motion for
reconsideration of the above dismissal, the Commission on Election later issued an order suspending the
proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found
Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
ISSUE
Whether residency in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes domicile to warrant the disqualification of
Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
HELD
The place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may
be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the
Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The purpose is to exclude
strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community

from taking advantage of favourable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. Aquinos
certificate of candidacy in previous (1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San
Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. Aquinos connection to the Second District
of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a
permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short
length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of
other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to
acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of
Makati City. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections.

7|Page

Case Digest on Carlos v. Angeles G.R. No. 142907

November 29, 2000 PARDO, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the position of mayor of the municipality of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila (later converted into a City) during the May 11, 1998 elections. The Board of Canvassers
proclaimed petitioner as the mayor. The private respondent filed an election protest with the RTC. The court
came up with revision reports which also showed that the petitioner got the highest number of votes.
Nevertheless, in its decision, the trial court set aside the final tally of valid votes because of its finding of
significant badges of fraud, which it attributed to the present petitioner. The court then declared private
respondent as the winner. The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC, and also filed a petition to the SC questioning
the decision of the RTC. The private respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the SC.
HELD: Both the SC and COMELEC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus over decisions of trial courts of general jurisdiction (RTCs) in election cases involving elective municipal
officials. The Court that takes jurisdiction first shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Relative to the
appeal that petitioner filed with the COMELEC, the same would not bar the present action as an exception to the
rule because under the circumstances, appeal would not be a speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
The power to nullify an election must be exercised with the greatest care with a view not to disenfranchise the
voters, and only under circumstances that clearly call for such drastic remedial measure. More importantly, the
trial court has no jurisdiction to declare a failure of election. It is the COMELEC en banc that is vested with
exclusive jurisdiction to declare a failure of election. Assuming that the trial court has jurisdiction to declare a
failure of election, the extent of that power is limited to the annulment of the election and the calling of special
elections. The result is a failure of election for that particular office. In such case, the court cannot declare a
winner.

8|Page

Case Digest on Basher v. COMELEC G.R. NO. 139028 (April 12, 2000) G.R. No. 139028
PANGANIBAN, J.:

April 12, 2000

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for Punong Barangay. The election was declared a
failure and a special one was scheduled. Again, the election failed and was reset. However, the voting only started
at 9PM because of the prevailing tension in the locality. Private respondent was proclaimed the winner. Petitioner
filed a petition with the COMELEC to declare the election as a failure alleging that no election was conducted in the
place and at the time prescribed by law. COMELEC dismissed the petition.
HELD: The SC ordered the conduct of a special election. The Court held that the peculiar set of facts in the present
case show not merely a failure of election but the absence of a valid electoral exercise. The place where the voting
was conducted was illegal. As to the time of voting, the law provides that the casting of votes shall start at 7 in the
morning and end at 3 in the afternoon. The election officer did not follow the procedure laid down by law for
election postponement or suspension or the declaration of a failure of election. The electorate was also not given
ample notice of the exact schedule and venue of the election.

9|Page

Paras v. COMELEC Paras v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996) FRANCISCO, J.:

FACTS:
A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Barangay. The recall election was
deferred due to Petitioners opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within one
year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local
election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be
instituted.

ISSUE:
W/N the SK election is a local election.

HELD:
No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it must be considered together
and kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local official to
recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law,
determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase regular local election to include SK election will
unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. In
interpreting a statute, the Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation
should be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless, inoperative
or nugatory.

10 | P a g e

MARIANO, JR. VS. COMELEC, digested

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995 PUNO, J.:

G.R. No. 118627; 242 SCRA 213, March 7, 1995 (Constitutional Law Requirements in challenging the
constitutionality of the law)

FACTS: Petitioners suing as tax payers, assail a provision (Sec 51) of RA No. 7859 (An Act Converting the
Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati) on the ground that the same
attempts to alter or restart the 3-consecutive term limit for local elective officials disregarding the terms
previously served by them, which collides with the Constitution (Sec 8, Art X & Sec 7, Art VI).

ISSUE: Whether or not challenge to the constitutionality of questioned law is with merit.

HELD: No. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well-delineated. They
are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the
proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the
decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

11 | P a g e

Quinto vs Comelec
G. R. No. 189698, December 1, 2009 NACHURA, J.:

FACTS: Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy
as ipso facto resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision
from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.

HELD: NO. In the Farias case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with appointive officials.
Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there was no
violation of the equal protection clause. However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the
equal protection clause was an obiter dictum since the issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It
didnt squarely challenge Sec. 66.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a valid
classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirement that it must be germane to the
purpose of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote
ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is further
aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the
discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The
restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in
office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their
campaign rather than to their office work.

12 | P a g e

Mutuc vs. COMELEC

AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. NO. L-32717
November 26, 1970
FERNANDO, J.:
FACTS:

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) prohibited petitioner Amelito Mutuc, a candidate for the position of a
delegate to the Constitutional Convention, from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems
and loud speakers on 22 October 1970. Petitioner impugned the act of respondent as violative of his right to free
speech. Respondent however contended that the prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional
Convention Act, which made it unlawful for candidates to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots,
or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or
materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.
It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer
and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the phrase and the like.

ISSUE:
Whether jingles falls down on the prohibited electoral propaganda gadgets of R.A. No. 6132.

RULING:

For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order. We view the matter differently.
What was done cannot merit our approval under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words
following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred
to. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred
to as means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for distribution.

13 | P a g e

G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976 MARTIN, J,:

PABLITO V. SANIDAD - petitioner; newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a
weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras
COMELEC - respondent; through its Solicitor- General
Type of petition filed: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
ISSUE:
Whether Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is constitutional or not.

FACTS:
COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 was promulgated due to the enacted RA No. 6766 (An Act Providing for an Organic
Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region) last October 23, 1989, which paved for a call of a plebescite fo its
ratification (original schedule was reset from December 27, 1989 to January 30, 1990.
Allegations of Sanidad:
1.Unconsitutional as it it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press
2.Constitutes a prior restraint on his constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press bause of its penal provsions
in case of violation
Responses of COMELEC
-Not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press but only a valid
implementation of the power of the Comelec to supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite periods
as enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of RA 6646
-Does Not absolutely bar petitioner from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the Organic
Act. He may still express his views or campaign for or against the act through the Comelec space and airtime
(magazine/periodical in the province)

HELD:
Petiton is GRANTED- Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional .
TRO made permanent due to the follwing reasons:
1. It has no statutory basis
2. Form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason
3. affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum
where the right to expression may be exercised.

14 | P a g e

VILLABER vs. COMELEC Case Digest

VILLABER vs. COMELEC
369 SCRA 126
G.R. No. 148326

November 15, 2001 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Facts: Both petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for
a congressional seat in the First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections.
Cagas filed with the COMELEC, a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the
latters certificate of candidacy, alleging that Villaber was convicted for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22. Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence, under Section 12 of
the Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to run for any public office.
COMELEC issued the resolution declaring Villaber disqualified as a candidate. The latter filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude, which would disqualify
Villaber as a candidate for and from holding any public office.
Held: COMELEC believed it is, applying Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code that any person
who has been sentenced by final judgmentfor any offense for which he has been sentenced for a
crime involvingmoral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office.
Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes
his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and circumstances surrounding the
commission of the crime. In effect, he admits all the elements of the crime for which he was
convicted. There was no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent COMELEC
in issuing the assailed Resolutions.

15 | P a g e

Imbong v Comelec G.R. No. L-32432

September 11, 1970
RA 6132: delegates in Constitutional Convention
Ponente: Makasiar
FACTS:
This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are 2 separate but related petitions of running candidates for
delegates to the Constitutional Convention assailing the validity of RA 6132.Gonzales: Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec 8,
and validity of entire law Imbong: Par 1 Sec 8
ISSUE:
Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention and whether the parameters set by such a
call is constitutional.
HOLDING:
The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent Assembly. Furthermore,
specific provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as constitutional.
RATIO:
- Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution
-Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:
Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or call for convention for the
purpose by votes and these votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4
- Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough that the basis employed for such
apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonzales is not reasonable for that case granted more
representatives to provinces with less population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the number of
delegates I other provinces with more population.
- Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof. Furthermore, this
disqualification is only temporary. This is a safety mechanism to prevent political figures from controlling elections
and to allow them to devote more time to the Constituional Convention.
- Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure candidates equal opportunity
since candidates must now depend on their individual merits, and not the support of political parties. This
provision does not create discrimination towards any particular party/group, it applies to all organizations.

16 | P a g e

TELEBAP vs. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 132922, April 21, 1998 (289 SCRA 337) MENDOZA, J.:
Facts:
TELEBAP and GMA Network together filed a petition to challenge the validity of Comelec Time due to the fact that
said provisions: (1) have taken properties without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) it denied
the radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the
power given to the Comelec to regulate the operation of media communication or information during election
period.
Held:
Petitioners' argument is without merit, All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by
the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast
than there are frequencies to assign. 9 A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amended by
Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that "any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be
subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires."
Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by amendment of the franchises of radio and television
broadcast stations and, until the present case was brought, such provisions had not been thought of as taking
property without just compensation. Art. XII, 11 of the Constitution authorizes the amendment of franchises for
"the common good." What better measure can be conceived for the common good than one for free air time for
the benefit not only of candidates but even more of the public, particularly the voters, so that they will be fully
informed of the issues in an election? "[I]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount." 11
Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the requirement that broadcast stations give free air time.
Even in the United States, there are responsible scholars who believe that government controls on broadcast
media can constitutionally be instituted to ensure diversity of views and attention to public affairs to further the
system of free expression. For this purpose, broadcast stations may be required to give free air time to candidates
in an election.
In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and
frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary
privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be
burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service.

17 | P a g e

Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
G.R. No. 161872
April 13, 2004 TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared
petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not
nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his
right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by
limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or
are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most
qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for
the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national
organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has
practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.
ISSUE:
Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?
RULING:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right.
There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of
the sort.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid
limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination,
however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by
the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at
bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

18 | P a g e

Manuel de Guia vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 104712. May 06, 1992]
15
AUG
Ponente: BELLOSILLO J.
FACTS:
[C]ongress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the President on November 26, 1991. It is An Act Providing for
Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for
Other Purposes. Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 2313, adopting rules and
guidelines in the apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
in provinces with only one (1) legislative district and the Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila
Area for the preparation of the Project of District Apportionment by the Provincial Election Supervisors and
Election Registrars, Resolution No. 2379, approving the Project of District Apportionment submitted pursuant to
Resolution No. 2313, and Resolution UND. 92-010 holding that pars. (a), (b) and (c), and the first sentence of par.
(d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to
COMELEC in promulgating the aforementioned resolutions, and maintained that election of Sanggunian members
be at large instead of by district.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners interpretation of Sec.3 of R.A. 7166 is correct in assailing the aforementioned
COMELEC Resolutions.
HELD:

NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit

RATIO:
Spirit and purpose of the law The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the explanatory note of
Senate Bill No. 1861, and that respondent COMELEC is cognizant of its legislative intent.
No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile. We must therefore, as far as we can,
divine its meaning, its significance, its reason for being. As it has oft been held, the key to open the door to what
the legislature intended which is vaguely expressed in the language of a statute is its purpose or the reason which
induced it to enact the statute.
The true import of Par. (d) is that Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district cities and the Sangguniang Bayan
of the municipalities outside Metro Manila, which remained single-districts not having been ordered apportioned
under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166 will have to continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992, elections, although
starting 1995 they shall all be elected by district to effect the full implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A.
7166.

19 | P a g e

G.R. No. 189698

February 22, 2010
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, C.J.:
Facts:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No.
8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of
Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs,
petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and
who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the
declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend that
Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions.
These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso
facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.
Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause
Held: Yes.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their
CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly
discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold
appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional
norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with,
namely:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

It must be based upon substantial distinctions;

It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
It must apply equally to all members of the class.

There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The classification
simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in
the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the
equal protection clause.

20 | P a g e

FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC Case Digest

FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC
174 SCRA 245
G.R. No. 87193
June 23, 1989 CRUZ, J.:

Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect and assume office in due time. The League of
Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation on the
ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted the
allegation but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that his naturalization was merely forced upon himself
as a means of survival against the unrelenting prosecution by the Martial Law Dictators agent abroad.
Issue: Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election.
Held: No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other
qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V,
Section 1, of the Constitution.
Even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of
automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure.
Frivaldo declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as a Governor of the
Province of Sorsogon.

21 | P a g e

SANCHEZ, vs. COMELEC Case Digest

SANCHEZ, vs. COMELEC
114 SCRA 454, 1987
Facts: Candidate Sanchez filed a petition praying that Comelec after due hearing, be directed to conduct a recount
of the votes cast in the 1987 senatorial elections to determine the true number of votes to be credited to him and
prayed further for a restraining order directing the Comelec to withhold the proclamation of the last four (4)
winning senatorial candidates on the ground that votes intended for him were declared as astray votes because of
the sameness of his surname with that of disqualified candidate Gil Sanchez, whose name had not been crossed
out from the Comelec election returns and other election forms.
On July 16, 1987, the Comelec, by a vote of four to three, promulgated its decision dismissing petitioner Sanchez
petition for recount. On July 24, 1987, however, respondent Comelec, by a vote of five to two, reversed its order of
dismissal and granted Sanchez petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of ballots.
Issue: Whether his petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of ballots filed with the Comelec may be considered
a summary pre-proclamation controversy or an election protest.
Held: The Court rules that Sanchez petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of the ballots cast in the senatorial
elections does not present a proper issue for a summary pre-proclamation controversy.
The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated under sec. 243 of the Omnibus
Election Code. The enumeration therein of the issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy, is
restrictive and exclusive. In the absence of any clear showing or proof that the election returns canvassed are
incomplete or contain material defects (sec. 234), appear to have been tampered with, falsified or prepared under
duress (sec. 235) and/or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, the difference of which
affects the result of the election (sec. 236), which are the only instances where a pre-proclamation recount maybe
resorted to, granted the preservation of the integrity of the ballot box and its contents, Sanchez petition must fail.
The complete election returns whose authenticity is not in question, must be prima facie considered valid for the
purpose of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates.
The law and public policy mandate that all pre-proclamation controversies shall be heard summarily by the
Commission after due notice and hearing and just as summarily decided.

22 | P a g e

GALIDO vs. COMELEC Case Digest

GALIDO vs. COMELEC
193 SCRA 78 G.R. No. 95346
January 18, 1991 PADILLA, J.:
Facts: Petitioner Galido and private respondent Galeon were candidates during the January 1988 local elections for
mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol. Petitioner was proclaimed the duly-elected Mayor. Private respondent filed an
election protest before the RTC. After hearing, the said court upheld the proclamation of petitioner. Private
respondent appealed the RTC decision to the COMELEC. Its First Division reversed the RTC decision and declared
private respondent the duly-elected mayor. After the COMELEC en banc denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration and affirmed the decision of its First Division. The COMELEC held that the fifteen (15) ballots in the
same precinct containing the initial C after the name Galido were marked ballots and, therefore, invalid.
Undaunted by his previous failed actions the petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari and injunction
before the Supreme Court and succeeded in getting a temporary restraining order. In his comment to the petition,
private respondent moved for dismissal, citing Article IX (C), Section 2(2), paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution,
that Final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in election contests involving elective municipal offices are
final and executory, and not appealable.
Issue: Whether or not a COMELEC decision may, if it sets aside the trial courts decision involving marked ballots,
be brought to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari by the aggrieved party?
Held: The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a
special civil action of certiorari. Under Article IX (A), Section 7 of the Constitution, which petitioner cites, it is
stated, Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
(Constitutional) Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt thereof. We resolve this issue in favor of the petitioner. We do not, however, believe
that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
rendering the questioned decision. The COMELEC has the inherent power to decide an election contest on physical
evidence, equity, law and justice, and apply established jurisprudence, in support of its findings and conclusions;
and that the extent to which such precedents apply rests on its discretion, the exercise of which should not be
controlled unless such discretion has been abused to the prejudice of either party. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is
DIMISSSED.

23 | P a g e

ABELLA vs COMELEC Case Digest

ABELLA vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 100710 September 3, 1991 GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
201 SCRA 253
Facts: Initially, Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to intervene) filed a petition with the COMELEC to
disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she misrepresented her
residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It was alleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc
City like her husband who was earlier disqualified from running for the same office. The COMELEC granted the
petition. However, when the Commission granted the decision, Larrazabal was already proclaimed the Governor,
hence, when she was disqualified, Abella, who gathered the second highest votes in the said area, sought to take
his oath as governor of Kananga, Leyte.
Issue: Whether or not the candidate who got the second highest vote may be proclaimed as governor when the
candidate for such position was disqualified.
Held: The Supreme Court held that while it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due course
to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed, the fact remains
that the local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a
bona fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified
candidate for the position of governor. Her votes were counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The
net effect is that the petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate.

24 | P a g e

ADIONG v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 103956 March 31, 1992 GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
March 31, 1992
FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by
the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws. Section
15(a) of the resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the
authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.
It is unlawful:
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public or
private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the COMELECs
Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving
vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section
11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on mobile places, public or
private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.
HELD: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the COMELEC
providing that decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in
paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof is DECLARED NULL and VOID. The COMELECs prohibition on posting of decals
and stickers on mobile places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC
itself is null and void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizens fundamental right
of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by
the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the
freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with
him.

25 | P a g e

Moreno vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168550 August 10, 2006 TINGA, J.:
Facts: Norma Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Urbano Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground
that the latter was convicted by final judgment of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment
of 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months by the RTC. Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition
states no cause of action because he was already granted probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v.
Mutia, the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended.
Moreno also argued that under the Probation Law, the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to
him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine
imposed. The order of the trial court dated December 18, 2000 allegedly terminated his probation and restored to
him all the civil rights he lost as a result of his conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for in the July 15,
2002 elections.
The Investigating Officer of the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar recommended that Moreno be
disqualified from running. The Comelec First Division adopted this recommendation. On motion for
reconsideration filed with the Comelec en banc, the Resolution of the First Division was affirmed.
In this petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a)1 of the Local Government Code (LGC)
applies only to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not serve the
adjudged sentence. He alleges that he applied for and was granted probation within the period specified
therefore. He never served a day of his sentence as a result. Hence, the disqualification under the LGC does not
apply to him.
Issue: Whether or not Moreno is qualified to run, which is dependent on WON his sentence was served
Held: Morenos sentence was not served, hence he is qualified to run for Punong Barangay.
The resolution of the present controversy depends on the application of the phrase within two (2) years after
serving sentence found in Sec. 40(a) of the LGC.
Citing the case of Baclayon v. Mutia to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public office,
from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running for a
public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the
probation.
Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with service of the sentence
adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of
the sentence. During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by
the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order.

26 | P a g e

Montejo v. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 118702
16 March 1995
Ponente: Puno, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Cirilo Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution
No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte as it is said to violate the principle of equity
of representation. Petitioner now seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second
District of the province.
ISSUES:
Whether COMELEC has the jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736
HELD/RULING:
The basic powers of COMELEC are spelled out in Section 2(c), Article IX of the Constitution, which states:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment
herein made.
The meaning of minor adjustments is found in the debates of the Commission wherein it was stated that the
transfer of one municipality in a district to another district is not a minor adjustment; rather it is a substantive one.
Minor adjustments does not allow the change in allocations per district.
It is then held that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
promulgated Section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736. Section 1 is then annulled and set aside. The petition praying
for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte is
denied.

27 | P a g e

Guerrero vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 137004. July 26, 2000 QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts: Guillermo Ruiz sought to disqualify respondent Farinas as a candidate for the position of Congressman in the
First District of Ilocos Norte. Ruiz alleged that Farinas had been campaigning as a candidate for Congressman in the
May 11, 1998 polls, despite his failure to file a certificate of candidacy for said office. On May 8, 1998, Farinas filed
his certificate of candidacy substituting candidate Chevylle Farinas who withdrew on April 3, 1998. On May 10,
1998, the COMELEC dismissed the petition of Ruiz for lack of merit.
After the election, Farinas was duly proclaimed winner. Thereafter, Ruiz filed a motion for reconsideration,
contending that Farinas could not validly substitute for Chevylle Farinas, since the latter was not the official
candidate of LAMMP, but was an independent candidate. Another person cannot substitute for an independent
candidate. Ruiz claimed that Farinas certificate of candidacy was fatally defective. On June 3, 1988, Farinas took
his oath of office as a member of the House of Representatives. The COMELEC dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the determination of
the validity of the certificate of candidacy of respondent Farinas is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

Held: There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it held that its jurisdiction over the
case had ceased with the assumption of office of respondent Farinas as Representative for the first district of
Ilocos Norte. While COMELEC is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its
refusal to exercise that power following the proclamation and assumption of the position by Farinas is a
recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC and the HRET. Under Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the
Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed,
taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
Thus, the COMELECs decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case is justifiable, in deference to the
HRETs own jurisdiction and functions.

28 | P a g e

G.R. No. 152295

July 9, 2002
Montesclaros, et al vs. Comelec, et al CARPIO, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners sought to prevent the postponement of the 2002 SK election to a later date since doing so may render
them unqualified to vote or be voted for in view of the age limitation set by law for those who may participate. The
SK elections was postponed since it was deemed "operationally very difficult" to hold both SK and Barangay
elections simultaneously in May 2002. Petitioners also sought to enjoin the lowering of age for membership in the
SK.
Issue:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction imputable to
respondents.
Held:
The Court held that, in the present case, there was no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of
judicial review.
While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable
to a resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to
July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners. Under the same law, Congress merely restored the age
requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which fixed the maximum age for membership in the SK
to youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of the age requirement
under Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
RA 9164 which resets and prescribes the qualifications of candidates and voters for the SK elections was held to be
applicable on the July 15 2002 election. Its constitutionality not having been assailed in the first place.
The Court ruled that petitioners had no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit, that the petition
presented no actual justiciable controversy, that petitioners did not cite any provision of law that is alleged to be
unconstitutional, and that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents.

29 | P a g e

G.R. No. 190582

April 8, 2010 DEL CASTILLO, J.:
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Facts:
Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization composed of men and women who identify
themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs),as a party list based on moral
grounds. In the elevation of the case to the Supreme Court, Comelec alleged that petitioner made
misrepresentation in their application.
Issue:
Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list.
Ruling:
Ang Ladlad LGBT Partys application for registration should be granted.
Comelecs citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioners application was a violation of the nonestablishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The proscription by law relative to acts
against morality must be for a secular purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is
detrimental or dangerous to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"),
rather than out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing
registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society.
The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on the basis of their
sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own laws or by any international laws by
which we adhere.

30 | P a g e

G.R. No. 163193

June 15, 2004 CALLEJO, SR., J.:
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., petitioner,
JOSE CONCEPCION, JR., JOSE DE VENECIA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, DR. JAIME Z. GALVEZ-TAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
FRISCO SAN JUAN, NORBERTO M. GONZALES, HONESTO M. GUTIERREZ, ISLETA, AND JOSE A. BERNAS, Petitionersin-Intervention,
vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Facts:
Comelec issued resolutions adopting an Automated Elections System including the assailed resolution, Resolution
6712, which provides for the electronic transmission of advanced result of unofficial count. Petitioners claimed
that the resolution would allow the preemption and usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the
votes for President and Vice-President and would likewise encroach upon the authority of NAMFREL, as the
citizens accredited arm, to conduct the "unofficial" quick count as provided under pertinent election laws.
Comelec contended that the resolution was promulgated in the exercise of its executive and administrative power
"to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections Comelec added that the issue is beyond judicial
determination.
Issue:
Whether or not Comelec's promulgation of Resolution 6712 was justified.
Ruling:
The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing Resolution
6712. The issue squarely fell within the ambit of the expanded jurisdiction of the court.
Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further bolstered by RA 8436, vest upon Congress the sole and exclusive
authority to officially canvass the votes for the elections of President and Vice-President. Section 27 of Rep. Act No.
7166, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, solely authorize
NAMFREL, the duly-accredited citizens arm to conduct the unofficial counting of votes for the national or local
elections. The quick count under the guise of an unofficial tabulation would not only be preemptive of the
authority of congress and NAMFREL, but would also be lacking constitutional and/or statutory basis. Moreover, the
assailed COMELEC resolution likewise contravened the constitutional provision that "no money shall be paid out of
the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." It being unofficial, any disbursement of
public fund would be contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the 2003
General Appropriations Act.
The Omnibus Election Code in providing the powers and functions of the Commission subjects the same to certain
conditions with respect to the adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices, to wit: (1)consideration
of the area and available funds (2) notification to all political parties and candidates. The aforementioned
conditions were found to have not been substantially met.
Resolution 6712 was null and void.

31 | P a g e

G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004 CARPIO, J.:

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO and
SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the manner by which the simultaneous regular and special elections of 2001 were conducted
by the COMELEC.Petitioners contend that, if held simultaneously, a special and a regular election must be
distinguished in the documentation as well as in the canvassing of their results. Thirteen senators were proclaimed
from the said election with the 13th placer to serve that of the remaining term of Sen. Guingona, who vacated a
seat in the senate.
Petitioners sought for the nullification of the special election and, consequently, the declaration of the 13th
elected senator.
Issue:
1Whether or not Court had jurisdiction.
2Whether or not the petition was moot.
3Whether or not petioners had locus standi.
4Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term
Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001
RULING:
On the issue of jurisdiction, Court had jurisdiction because what petitioners were questioning was the validity of
the special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was elected and not to determine Honasans right in the
exercise of his office as Senator proper under a quo warranto.
On the issue of mootness, it was held that courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition
yet evading review.
On the issue of locus standi, the court had relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to
give due course to voters suits involving the right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in this petition is
likely to arise again
On the VAlidity of the Election, the Court held that the May 14, 2001 Election was valid.
The Court held that COMELECs Failure to Give Notice of the Time of the Special Election as required under RA
6645, as amended, did Not Negate the Calling of such Election. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in
case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next
succeeding regular election. The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELECs
failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate it.
Further, there was No Proof that COMELECs Failure to Give Notice of the Office to be Filled and the Manner of
Determining the Winner in the Special Election Misled Voters. IT could not be said that the voters were not
informed since there had been other accessible information resources. Finally, the Court held that unless there
had been a patent showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not interfere with the affairs and conduct of
the Comelec.

32 | P a g e

G.R. No. 180363

April 28, 2009 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
EDGAR Y. TEVES, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERMINIO G. TEVES
Facts:
In Oct 2007, petitioner was officially disqualified to run for a congressional seat in the May 2007 election because
of a Sandiganbayan decision rendered against him in 2005 involving a crime, allegedly, of moral turpitude.
The Comelec likewise rendered the issue raised by petitioner as moot since the latter lost in the said election.
Issue:
Whether or not there WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION when
Comelec disqualified petitioner in view of the petitioners conviction.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the crime for which petitioner was convicted in Sandiganbayan in 2005 did not involve moral
turpitude.
As found in the Sandiganbayan, petitioner, then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence, authority or power to
gain pecuniary or financial interest in the cockpit. Second, while possession of business and pecuniary interest in a
cockpit licensed by the local government unit is expressly prohibited by the present LGC, however, its illegality
does not mean that violation thereof necessarily involves moral turpitude or makes such possession of interest
inherently immoral
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. It was held that it was not for the
judiciary to settle questions which is for other branches of the government to deal with.
Being so, the Court reversed the Comelecs decision of disqualifying petitioner. The case was not moot since the
resolution of which would determine petitioners qualification in future elections.

33 | P a g e

UTUTALUM vs. COMELEC Case Digest

UTUTALUM vs. COMELEC
181 SCRA 335 G. R. No. 84843-44 January 22, 1990 MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
Facts: Petitioner Untalum obtained 482 votes while respondent Anni received 35,581 votes out of the 39,801
voters. If the returns of Siasi were excluded, petitioner would have lead of 5,301 votes. Petitioner filed written
objections to the returns from Siasi on the ground that they appear to be tampered with or falsified owing to the
great excess of votes appearing in the said returns.
COMELEC issued annulling the Siasi List of Voters on the ground of massive irregularities committed in the
preparation and being statistically improbable, and ordering a new registration of voters for the local elections.
Petitioner contends that the issue he raised referred to obvious manufactured returns, a proper subject matter
for a pre-proclamation controversy and therefore cognizable by the COMELEC; that election returns from Siasi
should be excluded from the canvass of the results since its original List of Voters had already been finally
annulled.
Issue: Whether or not the election returns from Siasi should be excluded from the canvass of the results since the
original List of Voters had been finally annulled.
Held: The Siasi returns, however, do not show prima facie that on the basis of the old List of Voters, there is
actually a great excess of votes over what could have been legally cast considering that only 36,000 persons
actually voted out of the 39,801 voters.
Petitioners cause of action is not a listed ground for a pre-proclamation controversy. To allow the COMELEC to do
so retroactively would be to empower it to annul a previous election because of the subsequent annulment of a
questioned registry. The list must then be considered conclusive evidence of persons who could exercise the right
of suffrage in a particular election. The preparation of a voters list is not a proceeding before the Board of
Canvassers. A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to challenges directed against the Board of Canvassers, not
the Board of Election Inspectors and such challenge should relate to specified election returns against which the
petitioner should have made verbal elections.

34 | P a g e

AGUAM vs. COMELEC G.R. No. L-28955

23 SCRA 883, 1968

May 28, 1968 SANCHEZ, J.:

Facts: In the November, 1967 elections, amongst the aspirants for Mayor of Ganassi, Lanao del Sur, were:
petitioner Uso Dan Aguam, respondent Alim Balindong, and Ali Daud B. Marohombsar. At the canvassing held in
Marawi City on November 20, 1967, petitioner Aguam was proclaimed Mayor-elect of Ganassi, with a margin of
only two votes. Petitioner took his oath and thereafter assumed office as Mayor of Ganassi. On January 6, 1968,
respondent Balindong went to Comelec with a petition for the annulment of the November 20, 1967 canvass and
proclamation, and for the opening of the ballot box in Precinct 8. Respondent averred that the election return for
Precinct 8 was tampered with by making it appear that Alim Balindong obtained 8 votes in said precinct when in
fact he obtained 13 votes; and that as a result of such tampering, petitioner Uso Dan Aguam herein was made to
win against respondent Alim Balindong by a margin of 3 votes.
Petitioner Aguam seeks to annul the resolution of the respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec) of April 27,
1968 declaring that it has jurisdiction to open the ballot box in Precinct 8 of the municipality of Ganassi, Lanao del
Sur, and to conduct an investigation into the authentic electoral return therefrom, upon petition of respondent
Alim Balindong.
Issue: Whether or not Comelec has the jurisdiction to inquire into the nullity of the Nov. 20, 1967 proclamation &
consequently to inquire into the tampering of the election return in Precint 8.
Held: By constitutional mandate, Comelec shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of
all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it
by law. The Constitution enjoins Comelec to decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative
questions, affecting elections. And, all of these are aimed at achieving an ideal: free, orderly, and honest
elections. Implementing the constitutional precept, Congress legislated in Section 3 of the Revised Election Code
that, in addition to the powers and functions conferred by the Constitution, Comelec has direct and immediate
supervision over the provincial, municipal, and city officials designated by law to perform duties relative to the
conduct of elections.

35 | P a g e

PERALTA vs. COMELEC Case Digest

PERALTA vs. COMELEC G.R. No. L-47771
82 SCRA 30

March 11, 1978 ANTONIO, J.:

Facts: Section 4 of the 1978 Election Code provides that the election period shall be fixed by the Commission on
Elections in accordance with Section 6, Article XII[C] of the Constitution. The period of campaign shall not be more
than forty-five days immediately preceding the election, excluding the day before and the day of the election.
Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the 45-day campaign period because: (a) it was decreed by the
President and not by the Commission on Elections as provided by Section 6 of Article XII-C and (b) the period
should cover at least ninety days (90). They argue that Section 6 of Article XII-C of the Constitution provides that
the election period shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter.
Issue: Whether or not the 45-day period is unconstitutional
Held: The 45-day campaign period is constitutional. Although the campaign period prescribed in the 1978 Election
Code for the election of the representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa is less than 90 days and was
decreed by the President and not by the Commission on Elections as provided by Section 6 of Article XII-C of the
Constitution, the same does not violate the Constitution, because under Amendment 1, the manner of election of
members of the interim Batasang Pambansa shall be prescribed and regulated by law, and the incumbent
President under Amendment No. 5, shall continue to exercise legislative power until martial law shall have been
lifted. Moreover, the election for members in the interim Batasang Pambansa is an election in a state of
emergency requiring special rules, and only the incumbent President has the authority and means of obtaining
information on the peace and order condition of the country within which an electoral campaign may be
adequately conducted in all regions of the nation. But even assuming that it should be the Commission on
Elections that should fix the period of campaign, the constitutional mandate is complied with by the fact that the
Commission has adopted and is enforcing the period fixed in Section 4, Article 1, of the 1978 Election Code.

36 | P a g e

NOLASCO vs. COMELEC Case Digest [G.R. No. 122250 & 122258. July 21, 1997 PUNO, J.:
NOLASCO vs. COMELEC
275 SCRA 762
Facts: Florentino P. Blanco and Eduado A. Alarilla both vied for the mayoral position of Meycauayan, Bulacan
during the election held 8 May 1995. Blanco garnered the highest number of votes. Edgardo Nolasco was elected
vice-mayor. On 9 May, Alarilla filed with the Comelec a petition to disqualify Blanco on grounds that the latter
committed acts in violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, i.e. for giving money to influence, induce
or corrupt the voters or public officials performing election functions; for committing acts of terrorism to enhance
his candidacy; and for spending in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the Election Code
(P10 million against 97,000 registered voters). On 15 August, the Comelec disqualified Blanco on the ground of
vote-buying and ordered the Board of Canvassers of Meycauayan, Bulacan to reconvene and to determine the
winner out of the remaining qualified candidates who shall be immediately proclaimed. Blanco moved for
reconsideration while Nolasco, as vice mayor, intervened in the proceedings. Nolasco urged that as vice-mayor he
should be declared mayor in the event Blanco was finally disqualified. Both motions were denied. Hence, the
petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether the disqualification of the mayor-elect warrants the declaration of any of the remaining qualified
mayoral candidates, upon the canvassing of votes, as mayor.
Held: In a mayoralty election, the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes cannot be
proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. Permanent vacancies (i.e. when an elective local
official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily
resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office) in the Offices of the
Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor are governed by Section 44, Chapter 2 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 and Article 38 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. ViceMayor Edgardo C. Nolasco was adjudged as Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan in view of the disqualification of
mayor-elect Florentino P. Blanco.

37 | P a g e

Ampatuan, et al. vs. COMELEC

G. R. No. 149803. January 31, 2002 PARDO, J.:
The petitioners were proclaimed victorious in the May 14, 2001 Maguindanao Provincial election after the order
suspending such proclamation was lifted by the COMELEC, which issued the same. Respondents petitioned, before
the Supreme Court, the suspension of the effects of the said proclamation and insisted that there had been a
failure of election. The COMELEC ordered the consolidation of respondents petitions and a random technical
examination on several precincts.
Petitioners contended that by virtue of their proclamation, the proper remedy available to respondents was not a
petition for declaration of failure of elections but an election protest.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC had jurisdiction to act on respondents petitions even after proclamation of petitioners
as winners
Ruling:
The Comelec en banc has the authority to annul election results and/or declare a failure of elections.
The Court held that respondents allegations of massive fraud and terrorism, which led to a failure to elect, fell
squarely within Sec 6. Of the Omnibus Election Code (Failure of Election). The Comelec is duty-bound to conduct
an investigation as to the veracity of respondents allegations of massive fraud and terrorism that attended the
conduct of the May 14, 2001 election. There can be no assumption that petitioners proclamation and assumption
into office on June 30, 2001, was legal precisely because the conduct by which the elections were held was put in
issue by respondents.
The Court, in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, directed COMELEC to proceed with the hearing of the
consolidated petitions and the technical examination with deliberate dispatch.

38 | P a g e

Nicolas-Lewis, et al vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 162759 August 4, 2006 GARCIA, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners were dual citizens by virtue of RA 9225. Petitioners sought to avail their right of suffrage under RA 9189
or the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Comelec, however, did not allow petitioners to vote in the 2004
election, reasoning the petitioners faield to comply with the requirement of 1-year residency prior the elections as
provided for under Article 5, Sec 1 of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners may participate in the election sans the compliance of the 1 year residency.
Ruling:
The Court held that those who retained or reacquired their citizenship under RA 9225 may exercise their right to
vote under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, RA 9189.
Article 5, Section 2 of the Constitution provides for the exception to the residency requirement in Section 1 of the
same article. The voting mechanism in RA 9189 was practically set forth to provide a system wherein Filipinos of
dual citizenship and are, at the same time, not residing in the Philippines are empowered to vote.
The Court held that present day duals may now exercise their right of suffrage provided they meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189

39 | P a g e

AKBAYAN YOUTH vs. COMELEC Case Digest

AKBAYAN YOUTH vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147066, March 26, 2001 BUENA, J.:
Facts: Petitoners, representing the youth sector, seek to direct the Comelec to conduct a special registration
before the May 14, 2001 General Elections of new voters. According to the petitioners around 4 Million youth
failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent Commission under R.A.
8189. On January 29, 2001 Commissioners Tantangco and Lantion submitted Memorandum No. 2001-027
requesting for a two-day additional registration of new voters, to be set on February 17 and 18, 2001 nationwide.
Subsequently, Comelec issued Resolution No. 3584 denying said request, it was the consensus.
Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, which seeks to nullify respondent
Comelecs resolution and / or to declare Sec. 8 of R.A. 8189 unconstitutional insofar as said provision effectively
causes the disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly situated.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 3584
dated Feb. 8, 2001 as it denies petitioners right to vote.
Held: The act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration is part and
parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election process. Section 8 of R.A. 8189, provides
that no registration shall be conducted 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election.
In the light of the foregoing the assailed resolution must be upheld. The so-called stand-by powers or residual
powers of the Comelec, as raised by the petitioners is provided under the relevant provisions of Section 29 of R.A.
No. 6646 and adopted verbatim in Section 28 of R.A. No. 8436, wherein the commission shall fix other periods and
dates for the accomplishment of pre-election acts if it is no longer possible to observe the dates and periods
prescribed by law, cannot be applied in this case. The Supreme Court held that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies for
the purpose of upholding the resolution. Section 28 of R.A. 8436, presupposes the possibility of its being exercised
or availed of and not otherwise. In the case at bar the Comelec stated the operational impossibility of holding
the additional two-day registration, and therefore Section 8 of R.A. 8436 may not apply. Comelec acted within the
confines of the applicable law in denying the petitioners request.

40 | P a g e

SUMULONG vs. COMELEC Case Digest

SUMULONG vs. COMELEC
73 P.R. 288, 1942
G.R. No. L-48609
October 10, 1941 ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Facts: Under the authority of Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 657, Comelec adopted a resolution providing for
the appointment of election inspectors to be proposed by the political parties and persons named therein.
Petitioner, Juan Sumulong, President of the political party Pagkakaisa ng Bayan, claims the exclusive right to
propose the appointment of such inspectors. He contends that the resolution of the Comelec, by giving the socalled rebel candidate or free-zone faction of the Nationalista Party the right to propose one election inspector for
each of the precincts in each of the 53 legislative districts, contravenes Section 5 of the Commonwealth Act No.
657. He argues that under that section the Nationalista Party has the right to propose one, and only one inspector
for each precinct, and that the resolution has the effect of giving that party two inspectors in each and every
precinct within those legislative districts. Petitioner maintains that the discretion given by Section 5 of
Commonwealth Act No. 657 to the Comelec in the Choice of election inspectors is not absolute, but limited by the
provision of the Act that the majority party shall have the right to propose only one inspector.
Issue: Whether or not the Comelec, in giving the so-called rebel candidates and free-zone factions of the
Nationalista Party the right to propose election inspectors, has acted within the limits of the discretion granted to
it by law.
Held: The present case is not an appropriate case for review by the Supreme Court. The Comelec is a constitutional
body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. It should be allowed
considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for
which it was created free, orderly, and honest elections. The Supreme Court may not agree fully with its choice
of means, but unless these are clearly illegal / constitute grave abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere.
The Comelec because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived
from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide
complex political questions. Due regard to the independent character of the Commission, as ordained in the
Constitution requires that the power of the Supreme Court to review the acts of that body should, as a general
proposition, be used sparingly, but firmly in appropriate cases.

41 | P a g e

G.R. No. 161434

March 3, 2004
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and VICTORINO X. FORNIER,
G.R. No. 161634
March 3, 2004
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs.FPJ
G. R. No. 161824
March 3, 2004
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FPJ
VITUG, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification in the presidential elections for having allegedly
misrepresented material facts in his (Poes) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen
despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen.
Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic
issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding qualification of a candidate for the presidency
or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution,
refers to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the
Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President
before the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondents birth, provided that among
the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."

Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latters death certificate was
identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at the
age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1980. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzos place of
residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou
would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so,
Lorenzos citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---respondents father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to Bessie, though an American citizen, was a Filipino citizen
by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondents birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on
citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous
marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on
respondents citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in
relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.

42 | P a g e

LOONG vs. COMELEC Case Digest

LOONG vs. COMELEC
216 SCRA 760, 1992 G.R. No. 133676. April 14, 1999 PUNO, J.:
Facts: On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with respondent Commission his certificate of candidacy for the
position of Vice-Governor of the Mindanao Autonomous Region in the election held on 17 February 1990. On 5
March 1990 (or 16 days after the election), respondent Ututalum filed before the respondent Commission a
petition seeking to disqualify petitioner for the office of Regional Vice-Governor, on the ground that the latter
made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age.
Petitioner Loong sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the respondent COMELEC has no
jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss was denied by the COMELEC in a resolution which is the subject of this petition.
Petitioner Loong contends that SPA No. 90-006 (a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner
Loong) was filed out of time because it was filed beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Issue: Whether or not SPA No. 90-006 was filed within the period prescribed by law.
Held: No. The petition filed by private respondent Ututalum with the respondent COMELEC to disqualify petitioner
Loong on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age, clearly
does not fall under the grounds of disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly covered by Rule 23 of
the Comelec Rules of Procedure governing petitions to cancel certificate of candidacy. Moreover, Section 3, Rule
25 which allows the filing of the petition at any time after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy but
not later than the date of proclamation, is merely a procedural rule issued by respondent Commission which,
although a constitutional body, has no legislative powers. Thus, it can not supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code which is a legislative enactment

43 | P a g e

RODRIGUEZ vs. COMELEC Case Digest

RODRIGUEZ vs. COMELEC
259 SCRA 296, 1996
G.R. No. 120099. July 24, 1996 FRANCISCO, J.:
Facts: The petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez was a candidate for Governor in the Province of Quezon in the May 8,
1995 elections. His rival candidate for the said position was Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr., herein private respondent.
Private respondent filed a petition for disqualification before the COMELEC based principally on the allegation that
Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice. Private respondent revealed that a charge for fraudulent insurance claims,
grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property is pending against the petitioner before the Los
Angeles Municipal Court. Rodriguez is therefore a fugitive from justice which is a ground for his disqualification/
ineligibility under Section 40 (e) of the Local Government Code according to Marquez.
Rodriguez, however, submitted a certification from the Commission of Immigration showing that Rodriguez left the
US on June 25, 1985- roughly five (5) months prior to the institution of the criminal complaint filed against him
before the Los Angeles Court.
Issue: Whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice.
Held: No. The Supreme Court reiterated that a fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The definition thus
indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates ones flight from a particular jurisdiction.
And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the
fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment or of a promulgated judgement of conviction.

44 | P a g e

Albana vs. COMELEC

(Albaa v. Commission on Elections)
G.R. No. 163302
July 23, 2004
G.R. No. 163302

July 23, 2004 CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Facts:
During the May 14, 2001 elections, the petitioners and private respondents ran for the positions of Mayor, ViceMayor and Members of the Sangguniang Bayan in the Municipality of Panitan, Capiz.
On May 18, 2001, the petitioners were duly elected and proclaimed winners.
On June 23, 2001, the private respondents filed a complaint against the petitioners with the COMELEC Law
Department, alleging that the latter committed acts of terrorism and engaged in vote-buying.
The Law Department found a prima facie case and recommended the filing of an Information against the
Petitioners.
Acting on the said Resolution, the COMELEC En Banc issued, on February 28, 2003, a Resolution directing its Law
Department to file the appropriate Information against the petitioners and directing the Clerk of the Commission
to docket the electoral aspect of the complaint as a disqualification case.
The Clerk of the Commission is likewise directed to docket the electoral aspect of the complaint as a
disqualification case and immediately assign the same to a division which shall resolve the case on the basis of the
recommendation of the Law Department.
Issues: W/N the COMELEC acted with GADLEJ in issuing the Resolutions
Held: Yes. Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 is as clear: COMELEC is mandated to dismiss a complaint for
the disqualification of a candidate who has been charged with an election offense but who has already been
proclaimed as winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers
In Bagatsing v. COMELEC, this Court ruled that a complaint for disqualification filed after the election against a
candidate before or after his proclamation as winner shall be dismissed by the COMELEC.
Second, as laid down in paragraph 2, a complaint for disqualification filed after the election against a candidate (a)
who has not yet been proclaimed as winner, or (b) who has already been proclaimed as winner. In both cases, the
complaint shall be dismissed as a disqualification case but shall be referred to the Law Department of the
COMELEC for preliminary investigation.
In the case at bar, the complaint for disqualification was filed 7 days after the elections. Thus, the disqualification
case should have been dismissed and instead referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department.
Therefore, if the COMELEC finds no probable cause, it is mandated to dismiss the complaint for disqualification.

45 | P a g e

DUMLAO vs. COMELEC

95 SCRA 392
L-52245
January 22, 1980
G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980 MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
Facts: Petitioner Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy
for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner Dumlao specifically
questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal
protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution which provides that .Any retired elective provincial
city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law
and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be
elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. He likewise
alleges that the provision is directed insidiously against him, and is based on purely arbitrary grounds, therefore,
class legislation.
Issue: Whether or not 1st paragraph of section 4 of BP 22 is valid.
Held: In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office,
there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the
challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government
work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired
and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume
again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision.
Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit of such denial.
The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is
arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon
substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the low and applies to all those
belonging to the same class.
WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid.

46 | P a g e

JUANITO C. PILAR vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTION

G.R. No. 115245. July 11, 1995. QUIASON, J.:
245 SCRA 759
Facts: On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of
candidacy. In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the
COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos for failure to file his statement of contributions
and expenditures. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures
notwithstanding his having withdrawn his certificate of candidacy three days after his filing.
Held: The petitioner is liable. Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that every candidate has the obligation to file his
statement of contributions and expenditures. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish,
courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. No distinction is to be made in
the application of a law where none is indicated. In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or
qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term every candidate
must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his
candidacy.

47 | P a g e

Victoria vs. Comelec [299 SCRA 269] G.R. No. 109005 January 10, 1994 QUIASON, J.:
Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011
(Local Government, Succession, Ranking in the Sanggunian)
Facts: Under the LGC, the position of vice-governor should be occupied by the highest ranking Sanggunian
member, and for purposes of succession, ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the
proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district.
In the Elections, petitioner candidate Victoria from the 2nd district garnered 32, 918 votes and respondent
candidate Calisin from the 1st district garnered 28, 335 votes.
The COMELEC issued a resolution certifying respondent as 1st in the order of ranking with petitioner as 2nd
ranking member pursuant to the provisions above.
Petitioner claims that the ranking should not only be based on the number of votes obtained in relation to the
total number of registered voters, but also on the number of voters in the district who actually voted therein.
Issue: Whether or not the proportion of the the votes obtained to the number of registered voters of each district
shall be factored to the number of voters who actually voted in determining the ranking in the Sanggunian.
Held: No. The law is clear that the ranking in the Sangguninan shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of
the votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters of each district.

48 | P a g e

BAUTISTA vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 133840. November 13, 1998 MELO, J.:
296 SCRA 480, 1998
Facts: Petitioner Cipriano Efren Bautista was a duly registered candidate for the position of Mayor of Navotas,
Metro Manila in the May 11, 1998 elections. A certain Edwin Efren Bautista also filed a certificate of candidacy
for the same position. Petitioner filed a petitioner praying that Edwin Bautista be declared nuisance candidate.
Comelec, in a resolution dated April 30, 1998, declared Edwin Bautista as a nuisance candidate and accordingly, his
name was not included in the list of candidates for mayor. Edwin Bautista filed a motion for reconsideration, which
was still pending at the date of election. During the counting of votes, separate tallies of ballots on which were
written Efren Bautista, Efren, E. Bautista, and Bautista were made by the Board of Election Inspectors. The
municipal board of canvassers refused to canvass as part of the valid votes of petitioner theses separate tallies.
Issue: Whether or not these votes should have been included to those cast for petitioner.
Held: It must be emphasized that the instant case involves a ground for disqualification which clearly affects the
voters will and causes confusion that frustrates the same. This is precisely what election laws are trying to protect.
They give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voter. Thus, extreme caution should be observed before
any ballot is invalidated. Further, in the appreciation of ballots, doubts are resolved in favor of their validity.
A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real intention of the voter. This is, however,
not the situation in the case at bar. Significantly, it has also been established that by virtue of newspaper releases
and other forms of notifications, the voters were informed of the Comelecs decision to declare Edwin Bautista as a
nuisance candidate.
It is improper and strained to limit petitioners votes to the ballots which only indicate the name Cipriano when it
is of public knowledge that petitioner is also known by the appellation and nickname Efren which he in fact
registered as his nickname.

49 | P a g e

Punzalan vs Comelec Case Digest

ERNESTO M. PUNZALAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 126669
G.R. No. 126669. April 27, 1998

April 27, 1998 KAPUNAN, J.:

Facts: Danilo Manalastas, Ferdinand Meneses and Ernesto Punzalan were among the four (4) candidates for mayor
of the municipality of Mexico, Pampanga during the May 8, 1995 elections. On May 24, 1995, the Municipal Board
of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Ferdinand Meneses as the duly elected mayor. Danilo Manalastas and Ernesto
Punzalan filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. After hearing the
election protests, the trial court rendered judgment on September 23, 1996 declaring Punzalan as the duly elected
mayor. Thereafter, Meneses filed a notice of appeal from the aforesaid decision On December 8, 1997, the
COMELEC promulgated a resolution setting aside the trial courts decision and affirming the proclamation of
Meneses by the MBC as the duly elected mayor of Mexico, Pampanga. Punzalan filed a motion for reconsideration
of the aforesaid resolution. Punzalan maintains that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring
as valid the ballots credited to Meneses which did not bear the signature of the BEI chairman at the back thereof,
invoking the ruling of the Supreme Court in Bautista v. Castro wherein it was held that the absence of the signature
of the BEI chairman in the ballot given to a voter as required by law and the rules as proof of the authenticity of
said ballot is fatal.
Issue: Whether or not the ballots without the BEI Chairmans signature are valid.
Held: A ballot without BEI chairmans signature at the back is valid. While Section 24 11 of Republic Act No. 7166,
otherwise known as An Act Providing For Synchronized National and Local Elections and For Electoral Reforms,
requires the BEI chairman to affix his signature at the back of the ballot, the mere failure to do so does not
invalidate the same although it may constitute an election offense imputable to said BEI chairman. Nowhere in
said provision does it state that the votes contained therein shall be nullified. It is a well-settled rule that the
failure of the BEI chairman or any of the members of the board to comply with their mandated administrative
responsibility, i.e., signing, authenticating and thumbmarking of ballots, should not penalize the voter with
disenfranchisement, thereby frustrating the will of the people.

50 | P a g e

DUMAYAS vs. COMELEC Case Digest

DUMAYAS vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 141952-53 April 20, 2001 QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts: Petitioner Dumayas and respondent Bernal were rival candidates for the position in Mayor of Carles, Iloilo in
the May 1998 synchronized elections. During the canvassing by the MBC, petitioner sought the exclusion of
election returns for 3 precincts of Barangay Pantalan owing to alleged acts of terrorism, intimidation and coercion
committed in said precincts during the casting and counting of votes. The MBC denied petitioners objections and
proceeded with the canvass which showed respondent Bernal garnering more votes than the petitioner.
Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC Second Division which excluded election returns from 3 precincts and
directed the MBC to reconvene and finish the canvass of the remaining or uncontested returns and then, to
proclaim the winning mayoralty candidate. Private respondent Bernal moved for reconsideration of the decision of
the Second Division with the COMELEC en banc.
The MBC proclaim petitioner winner of the election. Private respondent Bernal filed an urgent motion to declare
void petitioners proclamation. The duly proclaimed Vice-Mayor Betita, and private respondent Bernal filed n
action for quo warranto against petitioner before the RTC of Iloilo. Petitioner filed with COMELEC en banc a motion
to cancel Bernals motion for reconsideration and motion declare void petitioners proclamation on the ground
that respondent Bernal should be deemed to have abandoned said motion when he filed quo warranto action.
The COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of the Second Division, annulled the petitioner Dumayas
proclamation; and constituted a new MBC. Respondent Bernal was proclaimed by the newly-constituted MBC as
the duly-elected Mayor of the Municipality.
Petitioner Dumayas asked the Supreme Court to set aside the COMELEC en banc resolution.
Issue: Whether the COMELEC was correct in including in the canvass the election returns of the contested
precincts?
Held: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. The only evidence presented by the petitioner to prove the
alleged irregularities were the self-serving contracts of his watchers and inspectors. Returns cannot be excluded on
mere allegations that the returns are manufactured or fictitious when the returns on their face appear to be
regular and without any physical signs of tampering. The election irregularities cited by the petitioner would
require the presentation of evidence which cannot be done in a pre-proclamation controversy which is summary in
nature.

51 | P a g e

ATIENZA vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 108533 December 20, 1994 KAPUNAN, J.:
Facts:
Private respondent Antonio G. Sia was elected mayor of the Municipality of Madrilejos, Cebu in the 1998 local
elections. Following Sias proclamation, petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court
questioning the results of the elections in a number of precincts in the municipality. Consequently, in the revision
ordered by the lower court, petitioner obtained a plurality of 12 votes over the private respondent. The Regional
Trial Court rendered its decision declaring petitioner the winner of the municipal elections and ordering the private
respondent to reimburse petitioner the amount of P300,856.19 representing petitioners expenses in the election
protest. Private respondent appealed.
Meanwhile, the Regional trial Court granted petitioners motion for execution pending appeal, which was opposed
by respondent. The Comelec issued a preliminary injunction stopping the enforcement of the order of execution.
The Comelec, en banc, on April 7, 1992 issued an Order setting aside the preliminary injunction and thereby
allowing petitioner to assume as mayor of the Municipality of Madrilejos pending resolution of his appeal.
However, following the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992, the Presiding Commissioner of the Comelecs
Second Division issued an Order dated July 18, 1992 dismissing petitioners appeal for being moot and academic.
Issue: Whether or not the Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion in reversing the lower courts judgment.
Held: The dismissal of an appeal in an election protest case for having become moot and academic due to the
election of new municipal officials referred only to that part of the appealed judgment which was affected by the
election and not to that portion relating to the award of damages. However, it would appear virtually impossible
for a party in an election protest case to recover actual or compensatory damages in the absence of a law
expressly providing for situations allowing for the recovery of the same. This, petitioner has been unable to do. The
intent of the legislature to do away with provisions indemnifying the victorious party for expenses incurred in an
election contest in the absence of a wrongful act or omission clearly attributable to the losing party cannot be
gainsaid in fine, Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code merely provides for the granting of actual and
compensatory damages in accordance with law. The intent, moreover, to do away with such provisions merely
recognizes the maxim, settled in law that a wrong without damage or damage without wrong neither constitutes a
cause of action nor creates a civil obligation.

52 | P a g e

RAMIREZ vs. COMELEC Case Digest

RAMIREZ vs. COMELEC
270 SCRA 590, 1997 G.R. No. 122013. March 26, 1997 MENDOZA, J.:
Facts: The Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) of Gipolos, Eastern Samar proclaimed petitioner Ramirez winner
in the vice-mayoralty race over another candidate, private respondent Go based on the results showing that
Ramirez obtained more votes than Go.
Go petitioned COMELEC for correction of manifest error claiming that owing to error in addition, he was credited
with lesser votes. The COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution directing the MBC to reconvene and recompute the
votes in the Statement of Votes and proclaim the winning candidate. Acting on separate motions filed by Ramirez
and Go, the COMELEC en banc affirmed its earlier resolution.
Ramirez petitioned the Supreme Court to annul the 2 COMELEC en banc resolutions and to reinstate his
proclamation as the duly elected vice-mayor. He alleged that the COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction over the
controversy since it was not yet acted upon by a division of the COMELEC.
Issue: Whether the COMELEC en banc has jurisdiction to act directly on the petition for correction of manifest
error filed by private respondent Go?
Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative, citing Rule 27, Section 5 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules which
provides correction of manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of results during the canvassing as one of the
pre-proclamation controversies which maybe filed directly with the COMELEC en banc.
The Supreme Court annulled the COMELEC resolutions but directed COMELEC to reconvene the MBC or if this is
not feasible, to constitute a new MBC in Gipolos, Eastern Samar and to order it to promptly revise the Statement
of Votes based on the election returns from all the precincts of the Municipality and thereafter, proclaim the
winning candidate.

53 | P a g e

KILOSBAYAN vs. COMELEC ( G.R. No. 128054, Oct. 16, 1997 ) G.R. No. 128054
JR., J.:

October 16, 1997 HERMOSISIMA,

Facts:
Special Provision No. 1 of the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under Republic Act No. 7180, allocates a
specific amount of government funds for infrastructure and other priority projects and activities. In order to be
valid, the use and release of said amount should have the following mandatory requirements: (1) Approval by the
President of the Philippines; (2) Release of the amount directly to the appropriate implementing agency; and (3)
List of projects and activities.
Respondent Cesar Sarino, the then DILG Secretary, requested for authority to negotiate, enter into, sign
Memoranda of Agreements with accredited Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in order to utilize them to
implement the projects of the CDF provided for under R.A.
No. 7180. Respondent Franklin Drilon, the then Executive Secretary, granted the abovementioned request of
Secretary Sarino. Such an authority was extended to all the Regional Directors of the DILG. Pursuant to the abovedescribed authority granted him, respondent Tiburcio Relucio, on April 24, 1992, entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement with an accredited NGO known as the Philippine Youth Health and Sports Development Foundation,
Inc. (PYHSDFI). COMELEC received from petitioner Kilosbayan a letter informing the former of two serious
violations of election laws, among them that the amount of P70 million was released by the Budget Department,
shortly before the elections of May 11, 1992, in favor of PYHSDFI a private entity, which had reportedly engaged
in dirty election tricks and practices in said elections and requesting that these offenses and malpractices be
investigated promptly, thoroughly, impartially, without fear of favor.
Issue: Based on recommendations by the Comelec Law Department, the Commission en banc dismissed the lettercomplaint for lack of evidence.
Held: The constitutional and statutory mandate for the Comelec to investigate and prosecute cases of violation of
election laws translates, in effect, to the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving
election offenses for the twin purpose of filing an information in court and helping the Judge determine, in the
course of preliminary inquiry, whether or not a warrant of arrest should be issued.
Although only a low quantum and quality of evidence is needed to support a finding of probable cause, the same
cannot be justified upon hearsay evidence that is never given any evidentiary or probative value in this jurisdiction.

54 | P a g e

BADOY vs. COMELEC G.R. No. L-32546

35 SCRA 285

October 17, 1970 MAKASIAR, J.:p

Facts: Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr. avers that he is a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the lone
district of North Cotabato. He prays that Section 12(F) of RA 6132 be declared unconstitutional as the same denies
individuals, who are not candidates, their freedom of speech and of the press; and candidates the right to speak
and write, discuss and debate in favor of their candidacies or against the candidacies of others. Section 12 (F)
provides that the Comelec shall endeavor to obtain free space from newspapers, magazines and periodicals which
shall be known as Comelec space, and shall allocate this space equally and impartially among all candidates within
the areas in which the newspapers are circulated. Outside of said Comelec space, it shall be unlawful to print or
publish, or cause to be printed or published, any advertisement, paid comment or paid article in furtherance of or
in opposition to the candidacy of any person for delegate, or mentioning the name of any candidate and the fact of
his candidacy, unless all the names of all other candidates in the district in which the candidate is running are also
mentioned with equal prominence. Comelec Resolution RR-724, as amended, merely restates the ban in Section
12 (F).
Issue: Whether the ban in Section 12 (F) is valid or constitutional.
Held: Under Section 12 (F), the moneyed candidate or individual who can afford to pay for advertisements,
comments or articles in favor of his candidacy or against the candidacy of another or which mention his name and
the fact of his candidacy, is required to mention all the other candidates in the same district with equal
prominence, to exempt him from the penal sanction of the law. The evident purpose of the limitation is to give the
poor candidates a fighting chance in the election. The restriction is only one of the measures devised by the law to
preserve suffrage pure and undefiled and to achieve the desired equality of chances among all the candidates.
Considering the foregoing limitation in Section 12(F) in the light of the other provisions of RA 6132 designed to
maximize, if not approximate, equality of chances among the various candidates in the same district, the said
restriction on the freedom of expression appears too insignificant to create any appreciable dent on the
individuals liberty of expression. It should be noted that Section 8(a) of the same law, prohibiting political parties
from aiding candidates and thus was more restrictive than Section 12(F), was previously upheld to be valid. The
limitation in Section 12(F) is a reasoned and reasonable judgment on the part of Congress. It is not
unconstitutional.

55 | P a g e

Occena vs. Commission on Elections

[GR 56350, 2 April 1981]; also Gonzales vs. National Treasurer [GR 56404]
G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981 FERNANDO, C.J.:
Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa
Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional
infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the
1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather
unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the
Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.
Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions
and the present petitions were promulgated and filed, respectively.
Held: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive
portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare
invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This being the vote
of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect."
Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the
atmosphere. It made manifest that as of 17 January 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect.
With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what
the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was
removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It
is as simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive
and a negative aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme Court
can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches
but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be
stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning
of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The
latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the
effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.

56 | P a g e

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997) G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997 DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Facts:
Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials,
through Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides
for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution.
Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing
and thereafter set the case for hearing. At thehearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang
Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenorsoppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable
by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil
action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the
several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the
constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The
peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits
constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme Court granted the
Motions for Intervention.
Issues (2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
Held:
The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated, cannot be
delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the
latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to peoples initiative.

57 | P a g e

Mendoza vs Comelec, GR 188308, October 15, 2009 BRION, J.:

Posted by Pius Morados on November 13, 2011
(Admin Law, Comelec, quasi-judicial power)
Facts: Petitioner Mendoza asserts that the COMELEC, exercising judicial power, conducted proceedings in the
election contest within SET premises for the gubernatorial position of the Province of Bulacan, between him and
the respondent Pagdanganan, without due regard to his fundamental due process rights of notice and
participation.
The COMELEC, claims that its decision-making deliberations are internal, confidential and do not require notice to
and the participation of the contending parties.
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC has judicial power.
Held: No. Judicial power in our country is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
The COMELECs adjudicative function is quasi-judicial since it is a constitutional body, other than a court, vested
with authority to decide election contests, and in the course of the exercise of its jurisdiction, to hold hearings and
exercise discretion of a judicial nature; it receives evidence, ascertain the facts from these submissions, determine
the law and the legal rights of the parties, and on the basis of all these decides on the merits of the case and
renders judgment. Despite the exercise of discretion that is essentially judicial in character, particularly with
respect to election contests, COMELEC is not a tribunal within the judicial branch of government and is not a court
exercising judicial power in the constitutional sense; hence, its adjudicative function, exercised as it is in the course
of administration and enforcement, is quasi-judicial.
Under these terms, the COMELEC under our governmental structure is a constitutional administrative agency and
its powers are essentially executive in nature (i.e., to enforce and administer election laws), quasi-judicial (to
exercise original jurisdiction over election contests of regional, provincial and city officials and appellate
jurisdiction over election contests of other lower ranking officials), and quasi-legislative (rulemaking on all
questions affecting elections and the promulgation of its rules of procedure).

58 | P a g e

Libanan vs Comelec Case Digest

MARCELINO C. LIBANAN vs. HRET G.R. No. 129783. December 22, 1997 VITUG, J.:
G.R. No. 129783. December 22, 1997
Facts: Petitioner Marcelino Libanan and private respondent Jose Ramirez were among the candidates for the lone
congressional seat of Eastern Samar in the May 1995 elections. After the canvass of the returns was made on 13
May 1995, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Eastern Samar proclaimed respondent Ramirez to have been duly
elected Representative of the District.
Petitioner Libanan filed an election protest before the HRET claiming, among other things, that the absence of the
BEI Chairmans signature at the back of the ballots could not but indicate that the ballots were not those issued to
the voters during the elections thus, indicating that they were spurious and invalid. He averred that the law would
require the Chairman of the BEI to authenticate or sign the ballot before issuing it to the voter.
Issue: Whether or not the ballots without the BEI Chairmans signature are valid.
Held: A ballot without BEI chairmans signature at the back is valid and not spurious, provided that it bears any one
of these other authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark; and (b) in those cases where the
COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent, the presence of red and blue fibers in the ballots. What
should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule laid down by the HRET that a ballot is considered valid and
genuine for as long as it bears any one of these authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b)
the signature or initials, or thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI; and (c) in those cases where the COMELEC
watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the presence of red or blue fibers in the ballots.
It is only when none of these marks appears extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject to
rejection.

59 | P a g e

CAASI vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990 GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
191 SCRA 229, 1990
Facts: Private respondent Merito Miguel was elected as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan during the local
elections of January 18, 1988. His disqualification, however, was sought by herein petitioner, Mateo Caasi, on the
ground that under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code private respondent was not qualified because he is a
green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao.
Issues:
1. Whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States.
2. Whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior
to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
Held: The Supreme Court held that Miguels application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S.
and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of
the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as
indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that
he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local
election on January 18, 1988, the Courts conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence,
his election thereto was null and void.

60 | P a g e

LABO vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989 CRUZ, J.:
176 SCRA 1
Facts: Petitioner Ramon Labo, elected mayor of Baguio City was questioned on his citizenship. He was married in
the Philippines to an Australian citizen. The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney
on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous. According to Australian records, Labo is still an Australian
citizen.
Issue: Whether or not Petitioner Labo is a citizen of the Philippines.
Held: The petitioners contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest
him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino
because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal
and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such
naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, renouncing all
other allegiance. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine
citizenship.

61 | P a g e

United Democratic Opposition vs Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 56515 April 3, 1981 BARREDO, J.:
In 1981, the BP proposed amendments to the 1973 Constitution. The amendments were to be placed to a
plebiscite for the peoples approval. The YES vote was being advanced by KBL Marcos Party. While the NO vote
was being advanced by UNIDO. To ensure parity and equality, COMELEC issued Resolutions 1467-1469 w/c
basically provided that there be equal opportunity, equal time and equal space on media use for campaigns for
both sides. On 12 Mar 1981, Marcos campaigned for the YES vote via TV and radio from 9:30pm to 11:30pm. The
same was broadcasted live by 26 TV stations and 248 radio stations nationwide. UNIDO petitioned before the
COMELEC that they be granted the same opportunity as Marcos has pursuant to Resns 1467-69. COMELEC denied
the demand. UNIDO assailed the denial as a denial of equal protection before the laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not UNIDO was denied equal protection by virtue of COMELECs denial of their request.
HELD: The SC ruled that UNIDO was not denied due process nor were they not afforded equal protection. It is the
considered view of the SC that when Marcos conducted his pulong-pulong or consultation with the people on
March 12, 1981, he did so in his capacity as President/Prime Minister of the Philippines and not as the head of any
political party. Under the Constitution, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet shall be responsible . . . for the
program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy. In instances where the head of state
is at the same time the president of the political party that is in power, it does not necessarily follow that he
speaks with two voices when he dialogues with the governed. The president is accorded certain privileges that the
opposition may not have. Further, the SC cannot compel TV stations and radio stations to give UNIDO free air time
as they are not party to this case. UNIDO must sought contract with these TV stations and radio stations at their
own expense.