ESTRADA vs ESCRITOR

FACTS:
In a sworn-letter complaint dated July 27, 2000, complainant
Alejandro Estrada requested Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding
judge of Branch 253, Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, for an
investigation of respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said
court, for living with a man not her husband, and having borne a child
within this live-in arrangement. Estrada believes that Escritor is
committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus
she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might
appear that the court condones her act. Consequently, respondent
was charged with committing disgraceful and immoral conduct
under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the Revised
Administrative Code. Respondent Escritor testified that when she
entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband
having died in 1998. She admitted that she started living with
Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more than
twenty years ago when her husband was still alive but living with
another woman. She also admitted that she and Quilapio have a
son.] But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, respondent
asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their
religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation. In fact,
after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991, a
Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness.For Jehovahs Witnesses, the
Declaration allows members of the congregation who have been
abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. The
Declaration thus makes there salting union moral and binding within
the congregation all over the world except in countries where divorce
is allowed. As laid out by the tenets of their faith, the Jehovahs
congregation requires that at the time the declarations are executed,

the couple cannot secure the civil authorities approval of the marital
relationship because of legal impediments. Only couples who have
been baptized and in good standing may execute the Declaration,
which requires the approval of the elders of the congregation. As a
matter of practice, the marital status of the declarants and their
respective spouses commission of adultery are investigated before
the declarations are executed.
ISSUE:
By invoking the religious beliefs, practices and moral standards of
her congregation, in asserting that her conjugal arrangement does
not constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct, may the respondent
be held administratively liable?

HELD: No. the court finds that in this particular case and under these
distinct circumstances, respondent Escritors conjugal arrangement
cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from
the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The
Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that
freedoms - including religious freedom - may been joyed. In the area
of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state
interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation
will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the
freedom. In the absence of a showing that such state interest exists,
man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.

REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN

GR No. 166676, September 12, 2008

FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33
of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff
Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appears that
Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons
possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan
grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition,
Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing
that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which
certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of
Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital,
who, in addition, explained that "Cagandahan genetically is female
but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs
did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female."
The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor
General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same
was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because
the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the change of sex or gender and name of respondent
is valid.
HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held
that, in deciding the case, the Supreme Court considered the
compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.

The Supreme Court made use of the available evidence presented in

court including the fact that private respondent thinks of himself as a
male and as to the statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan's
body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), which is
preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.
The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the
diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature
has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court respects the
respondents congenital condition and his mature decision to be a
male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. The Court
added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial
discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the
consequences that will follow.

SILVERIO VS REPUBLIC
FACTS
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio
filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth
certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila
to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on
April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes
Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was
registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is,
"anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that
he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling
trapped in a mans body, he consulted several doctors in the United
States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment
and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
"woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex
reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter
examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical
certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the
procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged
to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate
changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male"
to "female."
ISSUE
Whether or nor petitioner is entitled to a change of entries in his birth
certificate

HELD
No. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and
entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a
privilege, not a right. RA 9048 now governs the change of first
name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for
change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over
applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. RA 9048 likewise provides
the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous,
tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known
by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his
sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible
with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery.
However, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or
civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the
ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion,
changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only
create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas and the solicitor general

CANADIAN CITIZEN. It ruled that ONLY THE FILIPINO spouse can

avail of the remedy, under Art. 26, of the Family Code.

Facts:
Issue:
Gerbert Corpuz (Gerbert) was a former Filipino citizen who
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization. He later
married a Filipina, Daisylyn Sto. Tomas (Daisy). Gerbert left for
Canada soon after the wedding because of his work. He returned
after 4 months to surprise Daisy, but discovered that she was having
an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned
to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of
Justice in Ontario, Canada granted his petition for divorce. Two
years after the divorce, Gerbert found another Filipina to love.
Gerbert went to the Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian
divorce decree on his and Daisys marriage certificate. Despite the
registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) informed him that the marriage between him and
Daisy still subsists under Philippine law. To be enforceable, the
foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court, pursuant to a NSO Circular.
Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC. Daisy did
not file any responsive pleading and offered no opposition to the
petition. In fact, Daisy alleged her desire to file a similar case but was
prevented by financial constrains. She, thus, requested that she be
considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
The RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert
was NOT THE PROPER PARTY to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a NATURALIZED

WON Art. 26, extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this
jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
Held:
The alien spouse can claim no right under Art. 26, of the Family
Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the
FILIPINO SPOUSE.

NINAL vs. BAYADOG

FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26,
1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie,
petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter
died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of
Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma
Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted
an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years
exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car
accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma
alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
ISSUE:
WON the second marriage of Pepito was void?
HELD:
The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the
marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though they
instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5
years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved
to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had
elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other
that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their fiveyear period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by
law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be
the source of rights. It can be questioned even after the death of one

of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage.

MORIGO vs. PEOPLE

FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They
lost contacts for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete and
various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got
married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991
she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted.
In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a
complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there
was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy
and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case
pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo
pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void
ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in
good faith.
ISSUE:
WON Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his
marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free
from the bigamy case.
HELD:
Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there
was no actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a
solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage

contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity
of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with
Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the
case filed.

SIOCHI V. GOZON
18 March 2010
Facts:
This case involves a 30,000 SQ.M. parcel of land
(property)registered in the name of the Spouses Gozon.
Elvira filed with Cavite RTC a petition for legal separation against her
husband Alfredo. Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, while the legal
separation case was still pending. Meanwhile, Alfredo and Mario
Siochi (Mario) entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell involving
the property for the price of P18 million. They stipulated that Alfredo
was to remove the notice of lis pendens on the title, to have the land
excluded from the legal separation case and to secure an affidavit
from the wife Elvira that the property was the exclusive property of
Alfredo.
However, despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to
comply with these stipulations. After paying the P5 million earnest
money as partial payment of the purchase price, Mario took
possession of the property in September 1993.
Meanwhile, the courts declared the Gozon spouses legally
separated. As regards the property, the RTC declared it conjugal.
Alfredo also executed a deed of donation over the said property in
favour of their daughter Winifred without annotating the notice of lis
pendens. Alfredo, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney executed

in his favor by Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional

Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for P18 million.
Mario then filed with the Malabon RTC a complaint for
Specific Performance and Damages, Annulment of Donation and
Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order. RTC ruled in favour of Mario. CA
affirmed. Mario appealed, contending that the Agreement should be
treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the
acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Since
Elviras conduct signified her acquiescence to the sale, Mario prays
for the Court to direct Alfredo and Elvira to execute a Deed of
Absolute Sale over the property upon his payment of P9 million to
Elvira.
IDRI alleges that it is a buyer in good faith and for value.
ISSUE:
Could Alfredo /dispose alienate the property? NO.
Was Alfredos share in the conjugal property already forfeited in
favour of their daughter by virtue of the decree of legal separation?
NO.

HELD:
This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since
the disposition of the property occurred after the effectivity of the
Family Code, the applicable law is the Family Code.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers
do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must

have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition
or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property
because Elvira, with whom Alfredo was separated in fact, was
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property.
However, as sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot
sell the property without the written consent of Elvira or the authority
of the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is void. The
absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale
void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the
spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively
participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other
spouses written consent to the sale is still required by law for its
validity. The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was
without the written consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely
void.
As regards Marios contention that the Agreement is a continuing
offer which may be perfected by Elviras acceptance before the offer
is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by
Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the
offer was already withdrawn.
We disagree with the CA when it held that the share of Alfredo in
the conjugal partnership was already forfeited in favour of the
daughter. Among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that
the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the
offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits
earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredos share in the

net profits which is forfeited in favor of Winifred. Clearly, what is

forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredos share in the conjugal
partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal
partnership property.
With regard to IDRI, we agree with the Court of Appeals in
holding that IDRI is not a buyer in good faith. As found by the RTC
Malabon and the Court of Appeals, IDRI had actual knowledge of
facts and circumstances which should impel a reasonably cautious
person to make further inquiries about the vendors title to the
property.