Kitzberger Argentina Brasil Medios

___________________________
Demands for Media Democratisation and the Latin

American New Left:
Government Strategies in Argentina and Brazil in
Comparative Perspective
Philip Kitzberger
No 261
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November 2014
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GIGAWorkingPapers
261/2014
DemandsforMediaDemocratisationandtheLatin
AmericanNewLeft:
GovernmentStrategiesinArgentinaandBrazilin
ComparativePerspective
Abstract
Thispaperexaminesthedeterminantsofgovernmentstrategiesvisvisdominantmedia
actorsintheLatinAmericancontext,wherethemediasroleindemocraticpoliticsisin
creasinglybeingquestioned.ItcomparesthefirsttwoKirchneristpresidenciesinArgentina
withthefirsttwoWorkersPartyledgovernmentsinBrazil.Whilethesegovernmentsini
tiallyadoptedaccommodationstrategiestowardsmediaorganisations,politicalcrisessub
sequentlydisturbedthefragilecoexistenceofmediaandgovernment,triggeringdivergent
strategicresponsesthatrequireexplanation.
Usingaccountsrelyingonideologicalpreferences,thestudyestablishestheimportanceof
environmentalfactorsandcriticaljuncturesasdeterminantsofgovernmentsstrategicop
tions.Significantdifferencesintheinstitutionalconfigurationsandarticulationsofmedia
interests in the two countries are found to be relevant. However, the study shows that
such constraints do not tell the whole story. Consequently, the analysis also focuses on
howcertainjuncturesaffectgovernmentperceptionsofmediapowerand,inturn,inform
governmentsstrategicstances.
Keywords:Argentina,Brazil,mediapolitics,governmentstrategy,democratisation
Prof.PhilipKitzberger
isapoliticalscienceprofessorattheUniversidadTorcuatoDiTellainBuenosAiresanda
researcherattheConsejoNacionaldeInvestigacionesCientficasyTcnicas(CONICET)of
Argentina.ThispaperwaswrittenduringastayattheGIGAInstituteofLatinAmerican
Studies in 2014 that was funded by a scholarship from the Alexander von Humboldt
Foundation.
Contact:
<pkitzberger@utdt.edu>
Website:
<www.utdt.edu>
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DemandsforMediaDemocratisationandtheLatinAmericanNewLeft:
GovernmentStrategiesinArgentinaandBrazilinComparative
Perspective
PhilipKitzberger
ArticleOutline
1 Introduction
2 AnalyticalConsiderations
3 ParallelDevelopments
4 DivergentPaths
5 Conclusion
1 Introduction
AcommonfeatureoftherecentwaveofleftleaninggovernmentsinLatinAmericahasbeen
theeruptionofintensemediawars.Theseconflictshaveraisedquestionsabouttheircauses
andabouttheirconsequencesfordemocracy.Growingmediatisationcombinedwithpersis
tentelitismand(ownershipandaudience)concentrationinLatinAmericasmediasystems
haveoftenbeenadvancedasanexplanation.Theoccurrenceofopenconflictsandtheirde
greeofradicalismhaveinturnbeenattributedtothepopulistorsocialdemocraticnatureof
thegovernmentsinvolved.
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PhilipKitzberger:DemandsforMediaDemocratisationandtheLatinAmericanNewLeft
Ifocushereonthedeterminantsofgovernmentalstrategiestowardsdominantmediaac
tors in contexts of increased questioning of the medias role in democratic politics. I argue
thatbesidespriorpoliticalidentities,ideologicalbeliefs,andpolicypreferencesregardingthe
media,theadoptionofconfrontationalcounterhegemonicoraccommodationstrategiesde
pendsonparticularconstraintsandopportunities.TherearealsoIclaimparticularjunc
turesanddevelopmentsthatinfluencehowgovernmentaldecisionmakersinterpretcorrela
tionsofforces,andhowtheyperceivetheirchancesofpoliticalsurvival.
IcomparethetwofirstKirchneristpresidenciesinArgentinawiththetwofirstWorkers
Party (PT)led governments in Brazil. The cases comprise Nstor Kirchners presidency
(20032007) and Cristina Fernndez de Kirchners first presidency (20072011) on the one
handandLuisIncioLuladaSilvastwoterms(20032010)ontheother.Despitetheirdif
ferencesintermsofidentityandpathtopower,theinitialphasesofthesegovernmentswere
strikinglysimilarintermsoftheirmediapolitics.Infact,LulaandKirchnereachinaugurated
their presidencies in 2003 by adopting an accommodation strategy towards their countrys
dominantmediaorganisations.Thesepragmaticapproacheswerereflectedinpoliticaldeci
sionsfavouringGloboandClarnBrazilandArgentinaslargestmediaorganisationsand
inthepreferentialtreatmentgiventotheirjournalisticoutlets.
Inbothcases,politicalcrisestheMensaloscandalinBrazil2005andArgentinasagrar
ian conflict three years later shook this initial equilibrium, shifting the way these outlets
covered government. However, the two governments responded differently to these new
scenarios. While Lula abandoned the former accommodation strategy after 2005, thereby
changing his stance on the Globo Group, he did not enter into the overt war with leading
media players that has characterised Kirchnerism since 2008. These divergent reactions re
quirefurtherexplanation.Toaccountfortheresponsesadoptedintheaftermathofthecrises,
I first explore the constraints in the politicalinstitutional realm and in the media sphere. I
thenreconstructsomeepisodesandprocessesthatfollowedthecrisestoprovehowongoing
eventsledtogovernmental(re)interpretationsofthepoliticalsituationthatdecisivelyinflu
encedthestrategiesadopted.
Thepaperisorganisedasfollows:Istartbyintroducingsomeanalyticalconsiderations.
Then,Idelineatetheparalleldevelopmentsinbothcases:therespectivedominantmediaac
tors,thepoliticalcontext,theinitialgovernmentalpoliticsofaccommodation,andthepoliti
cal crises. In the third section I address the divergent paths each government took in re
sponsetothecriticaljunctures,firstoutliningthestrategiesadoptedandthenexploringdif
ferentvariablesthatexplainthem.
2 AnalyticalConsiderations
The variation in governmental media strategies in the context of LatinAmericas left turn
has often been described but seldom theorised. Most accounts establish a connection be
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tweenradicalconfrontationalstrategiestowardstheestablishedmediaandthepopulistvari
ant of leftist governments.1 Following Waisbord, LatinAmerican populists share a view of
themediathatisrootedinamixtureofMarxismandnationalism:themediaarethepower
fulinstrumentsofdominationofantipopularminorities.Suchaviewsupportsacallforradi
calreforms.Whilenotdenyingotherinterveningfactors,thisperspectivesuggeststhatideas
andbeliefsplayaprominentroleinpolicyformation.
This view, however, doesnt account for the cases. Lula, his inner circle, and the PT in
generalsharedcriticalbeliefsaboutthemediaaseliteorclassactors,andadvocatedmedia
democratisation reforms.2 The Kirchners, in contrast, had no previous public commitments
onthesubject.Still,thelattereventuallypushedforanaggressivereform,whereasthefor
merdidnttranslatetheirideologicalcommitmentsintopolicy.
Furthermore,programmaticbeliefs(eitherpopulistorleftist)aboutthemediadontex
plainwhybothgovernmentsinitiallyaccommodatedmediainterestsandwhy,intheafter
math of equivalent crises, both recast their strategies in the ways they did. If ideas are the
primaryfactorsshapinggovernmentalchoices,thenpoliticalactorsshouldbemuchlesssen
sitivetoexternalenvironmentsthanappearstobethecase.3Thisisnottosaythatideasplay
noroleatall,butthattheydosoonlyunderfavourableconditions.Ideasdoaffecttheways
inwhichactorsmakesenseoftheworldtheyface;politicalinstitutionalsettingsandvested
interestsconditiontheirviability.4
Turningawayfromvoluntaristicaccountsofpolicychoicesassimpleexpressionsofideo
logicalpreferences,scholarlyresearchonthevariationsinthewaytheLatinAmericanLeft
actually governs has focused instead on the context. Economic and social policy variation,
especially the degree of radicalism and elite defiance, has been explained by politico
institutional variables such as path to power, party system, and political competition pat
terns.5SeveralstudiesonBrazilhavereconstructedthepoliticalsystemconstraintsandveto
pointsthatcurtailedtheabilityofthePTledgovernmenttotranslateitspreferencesintopolicy.6
1 Silvio Waisbord, Between Support and Confrontation: Civic Society, Media Reform and Populism in Latin
America,Communications,Culture&Critique4(2011),pp.97117;Voxpopulista.Medios,periodismoydemocracia
(BuenosAires:Gedisa,2013);PhilipKitzberger,TheMediaActivismofLatinAmericasLeftistGovernments:
Does Ideology Matter?, GIGA Working Paper Nr. 151 (2010);Alberto Koschtzke and Elizabet Gerber (eds),
Progresismoypolticasdecomunicacin:manosalaobra(BuenosAires:FES,2011).
2 Margaret Keck, The Workers Party and Democratization in Brazil (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1992).Seealsothe1989electoralprogramme:<www.fpabramo.org.br/uploads/democracia.pdf>.
3 Sheri Berman, The Social Democratic Moment. Ideas and Politics in the Making of Interwar Europe (Cam
bridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1998).
4 DietrichRueschemeyer,WhyandHowIdeasMatter,inRobertGoodinandCharlesTilly(eds),TheOxford
HandbookofContextualandPoliticalAnalysis(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2006),pp.227251.
5 StevenLevitskyandKennethRoberts(eds),TheResurgenceoftheLatinAmericanLeft(Baltimore,MD:The
JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,2011).
6 Hernn Gmez Bruera, Lula, the Workers Party and the Governability Dilemma in Brazil (New York:
Routledge,2013);WendyHunter,TheTransformationoftheWorkersPartyinBrazil,19892009(Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversityPress,2010).
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Thesehardinstitutionalfactorsinfluencegovernmentalperceptionsofthepoliticalviability
ofdifferentpolicyoptionsvisvisthemedia.
Outside of formal political institutions, media institutions can themselves function as
constraintsor even veto players.Media conglomeratesare widely perceived especially in
LatinAmericasinstrumentalistmediacultureasstrategicactorsthatcontrolkeyresources
(agendas,information,publicreputations)capableofinfluencingpoliticalprocessesor,spe
cifically,theabilityofagovernmenttolastovertime.Herethesubjectivedimensionofcon
straintsthefactthattheyareperceivedratherthanobjectivebecomesclear.Perceivedin
fluence, and not actual influence, is thus the relevant factor. Media power is, ultimately,
reputational power: As long as politicians and regulators believe that media has great ef
fects,theywillusuallyactinconsequence.Attheregionallevel,LatinAmericanpoliticians
perceivehugemediainfluencesonpolicymaking.7
Incontrasttounderstandingsofthemediaoriginatingfromideologies,theseperceptions
are usually forged contextually along political paths to institutional power. However, the
waysinwhichmediapowerreputationscoexistorcompetewithideologicalbeliefs,andhow
theyaffectstrategicshifts,cannotbesettledmerelythroughstaticdescriptionsofinstitutional
constraints or governmental beliefs about the media. While important, preexisting beliefs
mustinsteadbeexaminedintheirinterplaywithshorttermexperiencesandwithchallenges
facedduringthegoverningprocess.Timesensitivenarrativescouldilluminatehowsuchde
velopmentsreinforceoralterpreheldbeliefs,andhowtheyinfluencethewayinwhichgov
ernmentaldecisionmakersevaluatecorrelationsofforcesandtheirownchancesofsurvival
shiftingoradjustingtheirstrategiesaccordingly.
Two mechanisms can be hypothesised regarding how shortterm events and sequences
affectthegovernmentalperceptionsthat,inturn,influencestrategicchoices:
The first consists of demonstration effects. Early incidents or episodes and the reactions
theyprovokeamongbothpotentialopponentsandalliescanhavesignificantdemonstration
effects thataffect later transactioncost evaluations for certain courses of action. When con
sideringchoices,governmentsestimatethelikelyavailabilityofsupportforapossibleswitch
towardsconfrontingestablishedactors.8Adecisiontodefythedominantmediaassumesthat
onehasthecapacitytomobilisecrediblevoicesandtoresisthostilenarrativesinthemedia
dominatedpublicsphere.
The secondmechanismconsists ofjudgements of causality. The real influence thatmedia
contenthasonpublicattitudesandbehaviourisconstitutivelyopaque.Governmentsfillthis
cognitive gap with judgements of causality instead. Sequences of events experienced influ
encehowjudgementsaboutlikelymediaeffectsareconstructed.Inthepresentexperiment,
7 SallieHughesandPaolaPrado,MediaDiversityandSocialInequalityinLatinAmerica,inMerikeBlofield
(ed.), The Great Gap: Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution in Latin America (University Park, PA:
PennsylvaniaUniversityPress,2011),p.138.
8 GmezBruera,Lula,theWorkersPartyandGovernability,pp.9394.
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bothgovernmentswereplacedinasettingofsuddenmediacoveragethatwasperceivedby
them as hostile, followed later by elections. The electoral results gave the governments a
measure of media power. The causal force assigned to media coverage, in turn, informed
thesegovernmentsassessmentsoftheirprospectsforpoliticalsurvival,andiscentralinre
constructingtherationaleunderlyingtheirstrategicchoicesandshifts.
3 ParallelDevelopments
By2000,ArgentinasandBrazilsmediasystemswerelikemostofLatinAmericasexhibit
inghighlevelsofconcentrationandapersistentlyelitistcharacter.Bothmediasystemswere
characterisedbythepresenceofdominant,familycontrolledmediaconglomerates.
Through its alliance with the military regime, Roberto Marinhos Rede Globo had
achievedabsolutedominanceinBrazilstelevisionmarketaveraginga75percentshareof
thenationalaudiencebythe1980s.Thefirstdirectpresidentialracein1989inwhichLula
was defeated by Fernando Collor, to whom the network was committed represented the
apex of TV Globos political influence. Throughout the 1990s opportunities for competitors
openedup.However,until2008TVGlobomanagedtokeepitsaudienceshareabove50per
cent,farabovethe16percentofitsnearestrivalandonlycomparabletoTelevisastelevision
dominance in Mexico. By 2002, with 223 stations or affiliates, the network was reaching
55millionhomes.In2005itstotalrevenuewastriplethatofthecountryssecondandthird
networks, and it received over half of Brazils advertising budget. The conglomerate addi
tionallycontrollednewspapers,newsweeklies,radiostations,payTVnetworks,production
companies,andotherinterestsinculturalindustries.However,TVGloboshegemonicposi
tion rested not only on its overall size but also on its communicativesymbolic power. Its
newscast,theJornalNacional(JN),thefirsttobeairedsimultaneouslyonallaffiliatestations
in1969,playedacentralroleinconsolidatingasenseofnationalidentity,andsincethenit
hasbeenbyfarthemostinfluentialnationalnewsproviderandagendasetter.Inadditionto
its TV journalism, Globos telenovelas have had an unprecedented influence on Brazilian
popularculture.9
ArgentinasClarncompanystartedasamodestnewspaperin1945.Itwasonlyduring
the1970sthatitbegantoexpand.Clarnspragmatictiestothemilitaryregimeledtoanas
sociationwiththestateintheproductionofnewsprint.Bythe1980sithadbecomethecoun
tryslargestandmostinfluentialdaily.Itsexpansionandtheparallelcrisisoftraditionalpo
liticalactorsincreasedClarnsautonomyfromthepoliticalfieldandenhanceditscapacityto
9 John Sinclair, LatinAmerican Television.A Global View (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Elizabeth
Fox and Silvio Waisbord (eds), Latin Politics, Global Media (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2002);
VencioLima,Mdia.CrisepolticaepodernoBrasil(SoPaulo:FundaoPerseuAbramo,2006);MauroPorto,
Media Power and Democratization in Brazil. TV Globo and the Dilemmas of PoliticalAccountability (New
York:Routledge,2012).
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organisethepublicagenda.Theliberalisationandprivatisationprocessinitiatedin1989un
derCarlosMeneminitiateditstransformationintoamultimediaconglomerate.Theremoval
ofcrossmediaownershiprestrictionsenabledthenewspapertomoveintothebroadcasting
sector,whereitacquiredleadingtelevisionandradiostations.
Throughoutthe1990stheClarnGroupexpandedhorizontallyandvertically,frompub
lishing and broadcasting to cable TV and internet provision, news agencies, audiovisual
production,andsoccertransmission,amongotherinterests.ControlledbyErnestinaHerrera
deNoble,thefounderswidow,andHectorMagnetto,itsCEO,thegroupbecameoneofthe
countrysleadingeconomicconglomerates.Since1999ithasbeenfinancedthroughinterna
tional capital markets. Its undisputed ascendancy in public agenda and opinion formation
hasbeenmadepossiblebyitsmultiplepopularoutletsandbyitsprestigiousnewsmedias
capacity to act in a coordinated fashion, headed by its newspaper and its 24hour news
channel.10
3.1 ThePoliticsofAccommodation
TheelectoraltriumphsofLulain2002andKirchnerin2003formedpartoftheinitialwaveof
leftist victories that occurred in the context of the regional economic downturn from 1998 to
2002.DespitetheirdifferentpathsKirchner,aPeronistfromaremoteprovince,emergedin
theaftermathofthe2001crisisasapoliticaloutsider;Lula,aunionandleftistpartyleader,fol
lowedagradualpartyinstitutionalroutebothrosetogovernmentpromisinganalternative
toneoliberalism.11However,thesepromisescoexistedwithconcernsaboutgovernability.The
latterresultedinimportantincentivestoprivilegekeystrategicactorslikeGloboandClarn.
Kirchner took on the presidency in the aftermath of the 2001 mass protest mobilisations
andpoliticalrepresentationcrisis.DuetoMenemsdefectionfromtherunoff,Kirchnereventu
allywonthepresidencywithonly22percentofthevote.Thenewlyelectedpresidenttackled
his first challenge to reconstruct political authority by promising a renewal of politics
aimedatbuildingsupportamongthescepticalurbanmiddleclasses.Inthiscontext,hisrela
tionshipwiththepublic,themedia,andespeciallytheClarnGroupassumedstrategicim
portance for his political future.12As discussed below, Kirchner shared and overstated the
commonsenseofpoliticalleaders regardingClarnsrole ingovernability.Kirchnercared
about Clarn not only because of its perceived power but also because he believed that its
outletsaudiencesoverlappedwithhisownpotentialconstituency.13
10MartnSivak,Clarn.Elgrandiarioargentino.Unahistoria(BuenosAires:Planeta,2013);GuillermoMastrini
andMartnBecerra,Periodistasymagnates.EstructurayconcentracindelasindustriasculturalesenAmrica
Latina(BuenosAires:Prometeo,2006);FoxandWaisbord,LatinPolitics.
11LevitskyandRoberts(eds),TheResurgenceoftheLeft,p.10.
12PhilipKitzberger,Lamadredetodaslasbatallas:Elkirchnerismoylosmediosdecomunicacin,inAn
drsMalamudandMiguelDeLuca(eds),LapolticaentiemposdelosKirchner(BuenosAires:Eudeba,2011),
pp.179189.
13Sivak,Clarn,p.13.
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10
In 2002 Lula competed for the presidency for the fourth time.A long deradicalisation
processhadmadehis1989leftistplatformseemfaraway.Whilehehadoncedenouncedthe
mediaaspartoftheestablishmentandhadbeenconfrontedbyGlobo,Lulasprofessional
isedcampaignhiredmarketinggurustocommunicateamoderatemessage.Toappeasethe
establishment, Lulas inner circle decided to signal continuity with the macroeconomic or
thodoxyinaLettertotheBrazilianPeople.Toensureavictoryintherunoff,thePTallied
withnonleftistpartiesandleaderswhowere,inturn,alliesoftheGlobonetwork.Predictably,
demandsformediademocratisation,partofthehistoricalagendaofthePTanditscivilsociety
allies, disappeared. Shortly before the election Lula held private meetings with the Marinho
family. The night he was elected he appeared on a popular Sunday show broadcast by TV
Globo.ThenextdayhesatbesidetheJNanchorduringtheentirenewscast,commentingonthe
elections.ThesefactssignalledthatLulawouldseekanunderstandingwiththemediaactors.14
Fortheirpart,themediaconglomeratesalsohadincentivesforseekingaccommodation
attheoutsetofLulasandKirchnerspresidencies.Inthecontextofthe1990sinflationcon
trolpolicies,whichpeggedtherespectivelocalcurrenciestotheUSdollar,bothgroupsmade
investments, thereby amassing significant debt in US dollars. When currency devaluations
resultingfromthe1998crisisoccurredin1999inBrazilandin2002inArgentinaplusthe
crisisinducedmarketcontractionthetwoconglomerateswereleftinavulnerableposition.
In 1999, Globos debt amounted to 2 billion USD. By 2002, Clarn faced the possibility of a
cramdowninotherwords,ofbeingtakenoverbyitscreditors.
EvenbeforeLulaandKirchnertookofficetheysignalledgoodwillregardingthegroups
problems. In mid2002, prior to the upcoming elections, the PT supported a constitutional
amendmentthatwouldallowupto30percentforeigncapitalincommunicationsenterprises.
During its first days, Lulas government showed a willingness to extend credits to Globo
throughtheNationalDevelopmentBank.15DuringDuhaldesinterimgovernmentinArgen
tina,andafterintenselobbyingbyClarn,Congresshadapprovedalawestablishingacap
on foreign ownership of cultural industries, thereby preventing the groups holders from
losingcontroloftheirassetstoforeigncreditors.Thisinitiative,dubbedbycriticstheClarn
Law,wasfinallyapprovedbytheexecutiveafewdaysafterKirchnerhadtakenoffice.Itis
plausible that Clarns financial weakness reinforced the conglomerates initial benevolence
towardstheKirchneradministration.Observersalsoconsiderittobeanexampleofabroader
patternwhereinClarnagreeswithgovernmentsintheirinitialphase,onlytobecomeatena
ciouscriticonceithasachieveditsgoals.16
14Ricardo Kotscho, Do golpe ao Planalto: uma vida de reprter (So Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2006),
pp.235256;Porto,MediaPower,p.115.
15Fearingthenegativerepercussionsofacceptingstatehelp,Globofinallyoptedforaprivatelynegotiateddebt
restructuring.CarlosE.LinsdaSilva,TelevisioninBrazil,inDavidWard(ed.),TelevisionandPublicPolicy:
ChangeandContinuityintheEraofGlobalLiberalization(NewYork:Taylor&Francis,2009),pp.2743.
16MartnBecerraandSebastinLacunza,Wikimedialeaks.LarelacinentremediosygobiernosdeAmricaLa
tinabajoelprismadeloscablesdeWikileaks(BuenosAires:EdicionesB,2012),p.48.
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11
Certainly,theseconsiderationsdonotexhaustthereasonsfortheinitialbenevolence.For
Globo,asforanymediainstitution,opposingLulasrisingpopularitywouldhavebeencostly.
Kirchner,meanwhile,tookofficeasanunknownfigure.Hispopularityonlyincreasedlater.
GiventhecontextofpoliticalandeconomicinstabilityinArgentina,however,ClarnsCEO
andtheconglomeratesjournalisticleadershipstoodbehindtheinitialgovernmentdecisions,
whichwereseenasconducivetonationalrecovery.17
Theinitialcoveragereflectedtheseincentives.Globoseemedtocelebratetheelectionof
thepoliticalleaderithadtraditionallyopposed.Infact,incontrasttothepaulistaprintmedia,
which was critical from the outset, the groups [network] news coverage of Lulas first
monthsinofficewascharacterisedbyaverypositivetone.18Clarn,foritspart,praisedthe
mainpolicies,exaltedthepresidentsvirtues,andtookamostlygentletoneduringKirchners
firstthreeyearsinoffice.19
Bothadministrationsreciprocated.Duringhispresidency,Kirchnerinvestedinapersonal
relationshipwithMagnetto.Healsoappointedanofficersympathetictosectoralrequeststo
thebroadcastingregulatoryauthority.Clarnwasfavouredbyseveraldecisions.In2003,the
mainnationalbroadcastershadtheirlicencesrenewedfortenyears.In2005,adecreegranted
an additional tenyear grace period for all television licensees. Three days before handing
overthepresidencytohiswife,Kirchnerapprovedthemergerofthecountrystwoleading
cableproviders,grantingClarnadominantpositioninthecableTVandinternetprovision
marketssectorsthat,by2007,represented60percentoftheconglomeratesrevenues.Ad
ditionally,Clarnretainedasignificantshareoftheofficialadvertising;itbenefitedfromthe
blocking of new cable distribution permit requests, while its journalistic outlets obtained
privilegedaccesstoandscoopsfromgovernmentsources.Until2008,Kirchnertriedtofavour
the groups expansion ambitions regarding the telecommunications sector. Simultaneously,
however,healsosoughttocounterbalancethegroupsdominantpositionbytryingtotempt
foreignbusinessorganisations(TelmexandPrisa)toentertheArgentinemediasectorandby
strengtheningotherlocalentrepreneurs.20
WhiletheKirchnerswerepragmaticatthelevelofownersandeditors,theirrapportwith
thepresswastensefromtheoutset.InadditiontochoosingtheconservativeLaNacinasthe
governments ideological opponent right from the beginning, the Kirchners tended to pre
sent journalism as dependent on nonelected powers and intellectually subordinate to neo
liberaltechnocratic common sense. The executive viewed itself as leading the recovery of
17Sivak,Clarn,p.387.
18Porto,MediaPower,p.115;AntonioRubimandLeandroColling,Poltica,culturaeacoberturajornalstica
das eleies presidenciais de 2006, in Jefferson Goulart (ed.), Mdia e democracia (So Paulo: Annablume,
2006),pp.6378.
20Graciela Mochkofsky, Pecado original. Clarn, los Kirchner y la lucha por el poder (Buenos Aires: Planeta,
2011),pp.163169;Sivak,Clarn,p.386387.
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12
politics autonomy in the face of the medias fake neutrality. This viewpoint, sporadically
present in discourse from 2003 on, would become commonplace after 2008.At the level of
governmental communications practices, Kirchner routinely resorted to controlled events,
exertedstrictverticalcontroloversources,andresistedcomplyingwithjournalisticconven
tions such as interviews and press conferences. These tactics contributed to tension with
journalists.21
TheearlyaccommodativeimpulsesofLulasadministrationcan,inadditiontotheabove
mentionedprivilegesaccordedtoTVGlobo,alsobedetectedinaseriesofgovernmentdeci
sions and nondecisions. The PT had historically been aligned with media democratisation
agendas,andthecivilsocietyorganisationsthathadcometogetherduringthe1990sinthe
Frum Nacional pela Democratizao da Comunicao (FNDC) were organically linked to
theparty,withimportantoverlappingmemberships.Whilethesedemocratisationdemands
hadbeensilencedduringthe2002campaign,therewasuncertaintyaboutwhatwouldhappen
afterwards.ThiscontrastswithArgentinasexperience.Asshownbelow,theBraziliangov
ernments initial strategy of accommodating Globo also entailed containing or deflecting
pressuresfrominsidethepartyandfromitscorealliesinsociety.
With Lula in office, the partys radical factions and other leftist allies in Congress re
newedtheirenthusiasmformediademocratisation.AsTable1shows,thenumberoflegisla
tive initiatives to regulate broadcasting jumped abruptly in 2003. This activism was not,
however,echoedinPlanaltoPalace.
Table1:LegislativeInitiativesAffectingtheBroadcastingSectorinbothFederalChambers
1996
5
1997
7
1998
6
1999
12
2000
11
2001
15
2002
7
2003
26
2004
12
2005
25
2006
17
2007
44
2008
35
2009
62
2010
46
Source:AuthorsadaptationofdatafromABERT,Relatriodegestao.Bienios2006/2008,2008/2010.
Thekeyagencyappointmentsmadetheaccommodationimpulsesandcontainmentstrategies
within the government even more apparent. The Ministry of Communications (MINCOM)
hadhistoricallybeenconcededtoclosealliesofthebigbroadcasters.In2003,despiteinitial
expectations,theMINCOMdidnotgotothePT.MiroTeixeira,Lulasinitialchoice,wasan
ambiguous actor. While his party was heir to Varguista trabahlismo, he represented a prag
maticpositionandcultivatedgoodrelationswiththeMarinhosandotherbigbroadcasters.
DespitehisappointmentofsomeFNDCcadresinlowertiers,nosignificantthreattoGlobo
emergedfromTeixeirastenure.22
However,inthecontextofthetransitiontodigitaltelevision,adecreesanctionedunder
TeixeirastimulatedthecreationofaBrazilianstandardandcreatedanadvisoryboardthat
21Kitzberger,MediaActivism,pp.2324.
22Interviews with Marcos Dantas, former planning secretary, MINCOM, 7 July 2011; Gustavo Gindre, FNDC
member,6July2011;JamesGrgen,advisortotheexecutivesecretary,MINCOM,29June2011.
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includedrepresentativesfromcivilsociety,thuscreatingsomeinstitutionalspaceforvoices
that viewed this transition as an opportunity to subordinate commercial interests to civic
politicalgoals.ThisinitiativerepresentedachallengetoGlobosinterests,asthecompany,in
associationwiththeelectronicequipmentsupplierNECdoBrasil,hadinvestedinadopting
theJapanesestandard.ByJanuary2004,TeixeirahadbeenreplacedbyaconservativePartido
do Movimento Democrtico Brasileiro (PMDB) politician, yet the progressive groups com
mittedtodevelopingtheBraziliannormkeptworkingautonomously.Withtheoutbreakof
theMensalo,Lulawasforcedtoredistributecabinetposts.Aspartof thisreshuffle,Hlio
Costa, another conservative PMDB member and himself a former TV Globo correspondent
andmediaentrepreneur,wasdesignatedheadofMINCOMinJuly2005.Asmanyobservers
agree,hismainagendawastoguidethedigitaltransitioninGlobosinterest.In2006,revers
ingprevioushopes,theJapaneseBrazilianstandard(ISDBT)wasadoptedbydecree.23
ThesepragmaticmovestowardsGlobocoexistedwithtensionsbetweengovernmentand
pressinstitutions.Afterabriefhoneymoon,aggressivepresscoveragerevivedoldpetistacrit
icalviewsofthemediaanddividedLulasinnercircleovertheattitudetobeassumed.Al
thoughhewastornhimself,Lulasprudentialavoidanceofconfrontationmostlyprevailed.24
Additionally, a trend that would fully emerge after the 2005/06 crises was already visible:
Lulaembodiedthemanofthepovo(commonpeople)whohadreachedthetoppoliticalposi
tion, previously the exclusive domain of social elites, and brought latent class prejudice in
reportingtothefore,whilehisdirectcommunicationappealsweredenouncedaspopulist.
Thegovernmentalcommunicationspracticesadoptedregularpresidentialbroadcasts(Caf
comoPresidente),refusaltocomplywithjournalisticconventions,andstagedeventsusedas
agendasettingdevicesfurtheralienatedjournalists.25
Amidstthisinitialtension,twobriefbutdisruptiveepisodeswouldhaveimportantcon
sequences.Bothweresparkedbyalliesinitiatives,notbytheexecutiveitself.First,intheaf
termath of the scandal around a New York Times column that claimed Lula had a drinking
problem,thejournalistsunionpromotedthecreationofaFederalJournalismCouncil(CFJ),
a nongovernmental body intended to set ethical standards and regulate professional con
duct.Second,agroupofprogressivefilmmakersworkingattheMinistryofCultureintended
tocreateaNationalAgencyforCinemaandAudioVisualActivities(ANCINAV)withregu
latoryauthorityovertheaudiovisualsector,includingtelevision.Bothinitiativestriggereda
fiercemediareaction,withtheprojectspresentedasthreatstopressfreedomandexpressions
ofthegovernmentsauthoritarianstatism.Thesehostilereactionsledgovernmenttorapidly
shelve both proposals. While the first initiative reached the legislative proposal stage, the
secondwasleakedtothepressasafirstdraft.
23BecerraandLacunza,Wikimedialeaks,p.274.
24SeeLulaspresssecretarysmemoirs:Kotscho,DogolpeaoPlanalto,pp.251255.
25Kitzberger,MediaActivism,pp.2627.
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3.2 PoliticalCrisisandMediaCoverage
Inbothcases,itwasapoliticalcrisisthatdisruptedtheequilibrium.InBrazilthecrisiswas
initiatedbyacorruptionscandal,whileinArgentinaitwastriggeredbyanagrarianconflict.
ThecoverageoftheseepisodesbyGlobosandClarnsnewsoutlets,alignedtomostofthe
mainstream media, signalled a shift. Both governments, and their closest allies, interpreted
thischangeasanunmistakablesignofpoliticalactivismultimatelyaimedatoustingthem
fromthepresidencybythemediaelites.
The fragile harmony between the government and Clarn began to come under strain
during the last year of Nstor Kirchners presidency. Divergences over political decisions
andbusinessinterestsincreasedmutualdistrustandwerereflectedinnewscoverage.26But
theturningpointcameafewmonthsafterCristinaFernndezsappointment,inthecontext
of the agrarian conflict that occurred between March and June 2008.After the government
passed a resolution that adjusted export taxes for agricultural products to fluctuations in
worldmarketprices,farmerslaunchedalockoutwithmassiveroadblocks,therebyparalys
ingthecountry.
Astheagrarianconflictunfoldedandfarmersprogressivelygainedsupportfromsignifi
cant segments of the urban middle classes, the Kirchners blamed the growing hostility to
wardsthegovernmentonClarnscoverageofevents.TheClarnoutletsframingofthepro
test as a historical strike and the extensive live coverage of the protesters convinced the
government that Clarn was taking sides with those who wanted to oust the president a
persuasionitstartedtovoicepublicly.
Thegovernmentwasnotaloneinharbouringthisperception.Awidersegmentofsociety,
especially middleclass progressives, started to criticise the biases of Clarn and the other
mainstreammediaorganisations.Thesesegmentsconstitutedthepotentialsupportbasefor
theKirchnersnascentcounterhegemonicmediapolicy.Onecentralaspectofthecoverage
thatmobilisedthesevoiceswastheprevalenceofabinarynarrativebasedonclassandrace
stereotypes.Theantigovernmentprotestswerepresentedaslegitimatespontaneousactions
by honest, productive, autonomous white citizens in opposition to the spurious political
machinebasedmobilisationofpoor,nonwhiteclienteles.27
Yet the framing contest was a difficult challenge for the government. To counter the
framethatopposedafreelymobilisedpeopleandaclientelistmachine,thegovernmentuti
lisedtheclassicpopulistdividebetweenthepeople(pueblo)andthepowerfulminorities(oli
26CristofMauersberger,TobePreparedwhentheTimehasCome:ArgentinasnewMediaRegulationandthe
Social Movement for Democratizing Broadcasting, Media, Culture and Society, 34: 5 (2012), pp. 588605; Sivak,
Clarn,pp.396398.
27GabrielVommaro,Acelchoripnsepaga:movilizacinpolticaygrupossocialesenelrecienteconflicto
entornoalasretencionesalasexportacionesdegrano,inRicardoAronskindandG.Vommaro(eds),Cam
posdebatalla.Lasrutas,losmediosylasplazasenelnuevoconflictoagrario(BuenosAires:PrometeoUNGS,
2010),pp.181226.
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garquas).Eventually,though,theoppositionbecamesomassivethatthegovernmentlostthe
SenatevoteovertheexporttaxresolutioninJune2008.Thisoutcomefuelledperceptionsthat
wouldcontributedecisivelytothesubsequentdynamic.
FromJune2005untilthe2006elections,aseriesofscandalsshookBrazilianpolitics.The
Mensaloscandalbeganwithrevelationsbyafederaldeputyconcerningaschemeofmonthly
allowancestoCongressmembersinreturnfortheirsupportforgovernmentlegislation.The
schemeinvolvedPTleadersandtopgovernmentofficials.ThiswasfollowedbytheSangues
sugasscandal,whichuncoveredpaybackstolegislators(fromboththegovernmentcoalition
andtheopposition)fortheapprovalofbudgetamendmentsfortheacquisitionofambulances.
On the eve of the presidential election, the police detained two members of the PT with a
largesumofmoneyinahotelwhoweresupposedlybuyingphotographsthatprovedthein
volvement of Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) oppositional leaders in the
aforementionedambulancepurchases.Themediasuseoftheimagesofthearresttriggered
thesocalleddossierscandal.WhileLulawasultimatelyreelectedinarunoff,theexposs
hadahighpoliticalcost:manyofthepresidentscloseadvisorshadtoresign,andthePTs
imagewasseverelytarnished.
WiththeoutbreakoftheMensalo,TVGloboabandoneditspreviouslybenevolentatti
tudeandjoinedthemainnewspapersintheirincreasedhostilitytowardsboththepresident
andhisparty.Corruptionbecamethealmostexclusivetopicofpoliticalcoverage.Adenun
ciation(denuncismo)frenzypossessedjournalists,frequentlyattheexpenseofprofessionalism.
Moralcategoriesdominatedtheframesusedinpoliticalreporting,andotherrelevantdimen
sionsofpoliticsandpolicyprocesseswerethusomittedanddistorted.28
Thesetendenciesintensifiedasthe2006electionsapproached.AccordingtoPorto,while
TVGlobomaintainedrelativelybalancedairtime,Lulascoveragewaspredominantlynega
tiveandfocusedheavilyondenunciationsagainsthimandhisparty.JNdevotedunprece
dentedattentiontotheelectionstwothirdsofitsairtimeinthefinaltwoweeks.Mostofthe
coveragedealtwiththedossierscandalthathadcometolightinthelasttwoweeksbefore
thefirstround.Twodaysbeforethisround,JNrepeatedlybroadcastpicturesoftheconfis
catedmoney,thusamplifyingthescandal.Subsequentresearchhassuggestedthatthismedia
frenzy had an impact on voting behaviour and prevented Lula from winning the first
round.29
Asaresultofthereportingonthesescandals,theperceptionofamediabiasagainstthe
PTgovernmentdeliberateornotaimedatinterruptingitsmandateoratleastimpeding
itsreelection,gainedgroundamonggovernmentofficials,partymembers,leftistmilitants,
progressiveintellectuals,journalists,andsectorsofcivilsociety.Atthepeakofthecrisisand
withimpeachmentapendingpossibility,Lulamobilisedsupportfromamonghissocialbase.
In June 2005, over 40 organisations published a statement in which they accused the elites
28VencioLima,Amdianaseleiesde2006(SoPaulo:FundaoPerseuAbramo,2007);Lima,Crisepolitica.
29Porto,MediaPower,pp.9596;Lima,Amdianaseleiesde2006.
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and the mass media of launching a campaign to demoralise both the government and the
presidentinordertounderminehisadministrationortooverthrowhim.30
Theovertbiasalsodrewcriticismfromscholars,journalists,activists,andmediaobservers.
Mediabehaviourbecameamatterofdebate.The2005/2006crisiscoverageseemedtomany
to be a regression to Globos manipulative practices of 1989. Others criticised coordinated
behaviour on the part of big media taken to include Globo, EditoraAbril, Folha Group,
andEstadaoGrouptocontrolthepublicagenda.Besidescorporateinterests,criticsdetected
ideological and class factors as also being behind antilulismo and antipetismo.31A documen
tary comparing Marinho to Citizen Kane was widely circulated in leftist circles. Militants
frequentlyreferredtothegolpemiditicoofApril2002inVenezuelaasanantecedent.Others
pointedtolacerdismoandtheroleofthepressinthe1964coup.TheexpressionPIG(Partido
daImprensaGolpista)becamewidelyusedamongcriticaljournalistsandleftistbloggers.
TheairtimedevotedbyJNtothephotosofthedossierscandalgeneratedspecialcontro
versy.ThegovernmentleaningnewsweeklyCartaCapitalclaimedthatthephotoshadbeen
leaked deliberately to damage Lulas candidacy. It accused TV Globo and several newspa
persofactivelyplottingagainstLulabyomittingimportantfactsabouttheleakitselfandby
failingtoreporttheinvolvementofPSDBpoliticiansinthescandal.Thesecontroversiesre
sulted in resignations, firings, andprotests byjournalists and media professionals working
forTVGloboandforothermedia.32
ThecaseofFranklinMartins,aformerguerrillafighterinthe1960sandnowappointed
columnistforJN,wouldhaveamajorimpactonsubsequentdevelopments.InMay2006,al
legingreasonsbasedonaudienceresearch,Globocancelledhiscontract.Martinsattributed
hisdismissaltohisrefusaltojointhenewsmediastendencytopresentfaciledenunciations
thatlacksufficientevidence.Martinscommentarieswereusuallymorecautiousaboutthe
allegationsinvolvingthepresident,whencomparedtothegeneraltoneofthenewsmedia,
and,accordingtohim,TVGlobosexecutivesandeditorsgrewincreasinglyuncomfortable
withit.33
4 DivergentPaths
Despitethestrikingsimilaritiesintheinitialsettingsandsubsequentdevelopmentofthere
lationships between governments and the dominant media actors, the critical junctures of
2005/2006and2008drewdivergentresponsesfromtheLulaandKirchneristadministrations.
However,thedifferencesinthestrategiesdeployedbybothgovernmentsshouldnotobscure
acommonality:bothresponsessignalledadeparturefrompurelyelitecentredstrategies.In
30GmezBruera,Lula,theWorkersPartyandGovernability,p.98.
31SeeLima,Amdianaseleiesde2006.
32Porto,MediaPower,pp.9697;Lima,Amdianaseleiesde2006,pp.1723,appendix.
33FranklinMartins,Aeradapedranolagoacabou,CarosAmigos,35,September2006;Porto,MediaPower,p.118.
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otherwords,theysharedtheunderlyingdiagnosisthatrelyingexclusivelyonaccommodat
ingpowerfulactorsandacceptinggivenpowerrelationsinthemediaspherewasnolongera
viableor,atleast,reasonablepoliticalstrategy.Thisinsightopenedupsomespaceorop
portunitiesforreformistdemandsandinitiativesthathadpreviouslybeenignored.
4.1 TheKirchneristResponse
FromtheendofMarch2008,afewweeksaftertheagrarianlockouthadbegun,thesteady
escalationbetweentheArgentinegovernmentandthedominantmedia(mainlyClarn)de
velopedintoalloutconfrontation.Thismotherofallbattleswasfoughtoneveryfront.The
government deployed all its political resources, with the ultimate aim of radically altering
powerrelationsinthemediasphereinotherwords,ofcrushingClarnsdominantposition.
InApril2008,beginningwiththereplacementoftheheadofthebroadcastingregulatory
agency,theKirchnersapproachedcivilsocietysectorscommittedtoachievinglegalreforms
todemocratisethemedia.Afteralongprocess,thisallianceconcludedwiththesanctioning
inOctober2009ofacomprehensivemedialaw,theLeydeServiciosdeComunicacinAudio
visual (LSCA). This legislation mainly addressed plurality and diversity through structural
regulations aimed at reversing media ownership and audience concentration via bans on
crossownership, limits on broadcasting licence numbers, and subscriber caps for payTV
services,amongotherpolicymechanisms.UndersuchrulestheClarnGroupandotheror
ganisationsalbeittoalesserdegreewouldbeforcedtodivestanumberofassets.34
TheagrarianconflictalsoledtheKirchnerstogopublicwithadiscoursethatdefinedthe
dominantmediaastherealandunelectedopposition.Thisdepictionofthemediagradually
developedintoaculturalwar,foughtonscreens,papers,andinnewmedia;anexpanding
circle of allies popularised academic, mediacritical discourses that deconstructed the ideo
logical, corporate, and journalistic biases in dominant media narratives on a daily basis.
TheseGramsciantacticswerecentraltomobilisingsupportduringthelegislativedebateon
theLSCA.35
Simultaneously, myriad specific political, judicial, and administrative measures were
undertaken to undermine Clarns interests and credibility. The public questioning of Cla
rnsroleduringthedictatorshipespeciallytheallegedappropriationbyNobleswidowof
children of the desaparecidos and the acquisition (together with La Nacin) of shares in the
newsprint factory Papel Prensa, supposedly through extortion and in complicity with the
military led to the risk of criminal prosecution for Clarns and La Nacins directors.36 In
2009, the government bought the transmission rights for firstdivision soccer from the na
34Clarn resisted thelaws enforcement by filing judicial complaints. InOctober 2013,the Supreme Court dis
missedClarnsclaimsaboutthelawsunconstitutionality.
35Mauersberger,Tobeprepared;Kitzberger,Lamadredetodaslasbatallas;BeatrizSarlo,Laaudaciayelclculo.
Kirchner20032010(BuenosAires:Sudamericana,2011).
36Mochkofsky,Pecadooriginal;Sivak,Clarn,pp.379384.
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tionalfootballassociationtobroadcastgamesonfreetoairtelevision.Indoingso,thegov
ernmentoverturnedthelongstanding,exclusivepossession(since1991)oftheserightsbya
payperviewchannelcoownedbyClarnakeyresourceintheexpansionofthegroups
business operations. Additionally, the government unblocked the distribution of cable li
cences,decidedtoadopttheJapaneseBrazilianstandardfordigitaltelevision(althoughClarn
had an interest in the US standard), reduced official advertising in Clarns outlets, and
fuellednewprogovernmentmedia.
4.2 TheLulaGovernmentsResponse
TheBraziliangovernmentsresponsetotheperceivedmediahostilityunleashedbytheMen
salocontrastswiththeKirchneristconfrontationstrategy.However,itcannotbeaccurately
described as continued accommodation. In his second term Lula in fact exhibited a hybrid
strategy,withelementsofbothaccommodationanddefiance.
Lulasgovernmentdidnotembarkonlegislativereformsofmediaregulation.Nordidit
challengethebroadcastingstatusquobyappointinguncomfortablefigureslinkedtoreformist
agendastoheadregulatoryauthorities.HlioCosta,mentionedabove,remainedcommuni
cationsministerforthewholeofLulassecondterm.Nevertheless,significantchangesgrad
uallybecamevisible.Despitehisavoidanceofalloutpublicconfrontation,Lulascritiquesof
media bias and distortion became more audible and were increasingly framed in terms of
themagainstussoastoemphasisetheBrazilianmediaselitism.37Thegovernmentended
TVGlobosprivilegedrelationship,increaseditsownuseofdirectcommunicationdevices,
andincreasinglycircumventedjournalists.Inaddition,duringLulassecondtermnewspaces
openedupinsidethestateapparatuswherecertainreformswerepromotedandcivilsociety
was mobilised around establishing a communications reform agenda by the end of the
presidency.
In March 2007, Lulaappointed Franklin Martins, the fired JN columnist,asheadof the
Presidential Secretariat for Social Communication (SECOM), thus sending an unmistakable
signal that the government was distancing itself from Globo. From the SECOM, Martins
deepenedtheredirectionofgovernmentadvertisingawayfromtraditionaltoalternativeand
regional media outlets.Authorised by the president, he also went beyond SECOMs estab
lishedtasksandintrudedonsomeofMINCOMsresponsibilities.In2008,inamovedriven
by Martins and justified with theneed to counterbalance marketbased logic and promote
debatesthatcommercialtelevisionwasnotinterestedin,thegovernmentcreatedanational
publicmediasystemtheEmpresaBrasildeComunicaothatunitedexistingpublicradio
stationsandcreatedanationalpublictelevisionstation.
This promotion of debates and institutional opening remobilised civil society, which in
turn helped invigorate human rights and civicoriented policies in the media realm. This
37See Lulas interview with Piau magazine, December 2008, available online at: <www.info.planalto.gov.br/
exec/inf_entrevistasdata.cfm>(20April2010).
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feedbackeffectwasclearlyvisibleinthelongstruggletoregulatechildrensrightsregarding
televisionthroughtheestablishmentofbroadcastinghoursregulationsandacontentrating
systemforchildren,which,givenBrazilsmultipletimezones,affectedthescaleeconomies
of national broadcasters. These initiatives had existed since Fernando Henrique Cardosos
presidency.However,until2007bigmediahadsuccessfullyvetoedeachregulatoryattempt
throughPRcampaignsandjudicialaction.Inthenewcontext,however,thegovernmentfi
nallysucceededinupholdingaMinistryofJusticedecreeimposingcertainobligationsover
unfetteredprofitmaximisation.
Theclimax ofthisgovernmentsponsoredremobilisationofcivil societywasreachedin
2009whenLula,attheWorldSocialForum,summonedtheFederalCommunicationConfer
ence (CONFECOM). This national public policy conference, a participatory constitutional
mechanism,entailedextensivemobilisationatthemunicipal,state,andfederallevels.InDe
cember2009,over1,600electednationaldelegatesvotedonover570proposalsthat,accord
ing to Lula, would constitute the input to a future regulatory law. The participants who
weredemonisedorignoredbybigmediawerenotlimitedtoNGOsorsocialmovements.
While the Brazilian Broadcasters Association (ABERT), dominated by Globo, and the Na
tionalNewspaperAssociation(ANJ),representingthebignewspapers,retiredfromthede
bates, other business organisations representing telecommunications companies and dissi
dentbroadcastersremained.Lulasabilitytomanageintrabusinessconflictsofinterestun
derminedGloboscapacitytokeepregulatorydebatesbehindcloseddoors.Bytheendofhis
second term Lula had established an unprecedented level of public debate on the need for
democratic media regulations in Brazil. This new climate, as Table 1 has shown, sparked a
new peak of legislative activism between 2009 and 2010. Six months before handing over
power to Dilma Rousseff, Lula created a commission, led by Martins, intended togenerate
proposalsforanewregulatoryframeworkforbroadcasting.38
As a former FNDC member has put it, the governmental strategy since Lulas second
termhasnotconsistedofopenconfrontationbutratherofeatingfromtheborders:Lulaex
pandedstateactivityinthoseareaswithlessresistance,enabledcriticalvoicesincivilsociety,
promotedsomepublicdebateontheneedformediaregulation,andisolatedthetraditional
media.
4.3 ExplainingVariationsinStrategy
Focusingonpoliticalinstitutionalvariablescanilluminateimportantopportunitiesandcon
straintsthataffecttheperceivedviabilityofdifferentstrategicchoices.Forinstance,anexami
nationofthecorrelationofforcesinCongressshowswhylegalreformwasneveranoption
during Lulas presidencies. Brazils institutional design imposes severe political constraints
on governments. Its combination of presidentialism, federalism, and proportionality in the
38Lima,Porquenoseavananascomunicaes.
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nationallegislaturehasstrongfragmentingeffectsonpartyrepresentation,forcingstrategies
of coalition presidentialism. To achieve governability, presidents need to distribute jobs
(especiallycabinetposts)andporksoastoformbroad,pragmaticlegislativecoalitions.The
PTgovernmentwasnoexceptiontotherule.Infact,theMensalowasaconsequenceofthe
executivesinitialdifficultycopingwithcoalitionbuilding.In2003,thePT,thebiggestlegis
lativebloc,obtained91of513(17.7percent)seatsinthelowerchamber.IntheSenateitwas
thirdinsize,withonly14of81seats(17.3percent).Whenalliedleftistpartieswerecounted,
theblocheldanestimated30percentofthelowerchamberseats.Damagedbythescandals,
thePTwasinanevenweakerpositionafterthe2006elections.Inthelowerchamberitse
curedonly83seats(16.2percent),whileintheSenateitformedthefourthlargestblocwith
11members.Fromacomparativeperspective,thePThadthelowestnumberofcongressional
representativesofanyotherprogressivepartyingovernmentinLatinAmericaatthetime.39As
aconsequence,duringLulaspresidenciesthePTledgovernmentincludedbetweeneightand
12partiesmanyofthemideologicallyheterogeneousinitslegislativecoalitions.
Thisfeature,abarriertoreformistagendasingeneral,lookedevenworseintherealmof
mediaregulationgiventhelinkagesbetweenpoliticalelitesandmediapowers.Theselinks
had begun to take shape under Jos Sarney (19851990). After appointing Antnio Carlos
Magalhes,aconservativepoliticianandclosefriendtoMarinho,ascommunicationsminister,
Sarneydistributed1,028broadcastinglicencesasawaytoobtainsupportespeciallyonthe
eveofthe1988constituentassembly,atwhichtime91legislatorsobtainedlicences.40Known
ascoronelismoeletrnico(electronicclientelism),anewstructurethatarticulatedstateoligar
chies and media empires was consolidated. Sarney and Magalhes best exemplified this
structureastheybuiltmediagroupsintheirrespectivestatesofMaranhoandBahiathat,by
becoming Rede Globo affiliates, secured audience domination. In the 1990s, the most im
portantstationsallownedbylocaloligarchsin12of21federalstatesfunctionedasGlobo
affiliates.41
Underthe1988constitution,licenceconcessionsrequiredalegislativedecreeinaddition
to executive approval. Consequently, the new constitution banned legislators from holding
broadcastlicenses.Nonetheless,asignificantnumberofthemstilldirectlyorindirectlyown
broadcaststations.In2005,51federaldeputiesheldsuchlicences.In2007,23senatorswere
identifiedasdirectowners.Observersconsiderasocalledbancadadamdia(legislativeme
diabloc)toexist,whichisestimatedtototalabout30percentofcongressmen.42
These entanglements have also been evident in the Science, Technology, Communica
tionsandInformaticsCommittee(CCTCI)ofthelowerchamber.In2003,16ofits51mem
bers (including the president) held 37 licences. In 2004, 15 of 33 members held 29. In 2007,
40Later,Cardosoalsousedlicencestobargainforaconstitutionalamendmenttoallowpresidentialreelection.
41Lima,Crisepolitica;Porto,MediaPower,pp.6364.
42InterviewswithSuzydosSantos,academicUFRJ,7July2011;EmilianoJos,federaldeputyPTBA,29June2011.
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fiveoutof17senatorsintheupperchambersequivalentcommitteewerelicensees.Mostof
theselegislatorsregularlyvotedonlicencerequestsandrenewals,sometimesevenincases
concerningthemselves.43
PTlegislatorsandtheirleftistalliesdidnotparticipateinelectronicclientelism.However,
itiscommonpracticeamongthePTsnonleftistcongressionalallies.Intheassetdeclarations
registered in 2011, 59 of 513 deputies (11.5 per cent) admitted to holding licences. Of the
140representatives from the three biggest allied parties (PMDB; Partido da Repblica, PR;
PartidoDemocrticoTrabalhista,PDT),21(15percent)arelicenseesafiguregreaterthan
thechamberaverage.44
Media organisations impact on political careers should also be considered a congres
sional constraint. Brazilian federal representatives are elected via an openlist proportional
representationsystemthatpromptsvoterstochooseindividualcandidatesbasedonpersonal
qualitiesandactivities.Thismakesmediaaccessalongsideporkbarrellingacentralcam
paignresource.45
In contrast,Argentinas closed blockedlist electoral system increases the role of parties
and discipline over individualism, distancing career success from media performance. This
makes Argentine legislators less sensitive to media interests.46 Here, as in most of Latin
America, local politicians frequently control local media. However, these outlets are not
linked to big media as in Brazils affiliate system. Therefore, Argentina has no equivalent
trend to Brazils coronelismo eletrnico. Moreover, because Congress has no jurisdiction over
broadcastingconcessions,whichremainanexecutiveprerogative,nothingcomparabletothe
bancadadamdiahasdeveloped.47
Additionally,thecorrelationoflegislativeforceslookedverydifferentinArgentinaun
derKirchnerismthanitdidinBrazil.Inthe2007elections,thegovernmentsFrenteparala
Victoria obtained 130 seats out of 257 in the deputy chamber. After the agrarian conflict,
manylegislatorsdesertedandthegovernmentblocdecreasedtoabout110seats.However,
themedialawsreformistnature,itsrecognitionbyinternationalorganisationsfreedomof
expressionrapporteurs,andsomeconcessionsforamendmentshelpedthelegislativecoalition
expandtoinclude(mostlyleftist)oppositionparties.48Thelawobtained147votes,with105of
them from the official bloc and 42 from opposition representatives. In the Peronist Party
43Lima,Crisepolitica;TransparnciaBrasil,Comosonossosparlamentares(SoPaulo:TransparnciaBrasil,2008).
44Online:<www.transparencia.org.br/>(14September2012).
45BarryAmes.ElectoralStrategyunderOpenListProportionalRepresentation,AmericanJournalofPoliticalSci
ence,39:2(1995),pp.406433.
46Forananalysisofhowelectoralsystemsaffecttheinfluenceofestablishedmediainterestsonlegislators,see
HernnGalperin,NewTV,OldPolitics:TheTransitiontoDigitalTVintheUSandBritain(Cambridge:Cam
bridgeUniversityPress,2004).
47BesidesBrazil,asimilarexpressionexistsonlyinMexico.
48Javier Zelaznik, Las coaliciones kirchneristas, in Malamud and De Luca, Poltica en tiempos de Kirchner,
pp.95104.
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dominated Senate, the bill passed with 44 affirmative versus 24 negative votes. These disci
plinedmajoritieswerealsoeasedbythefactthatthegovernmentpushedthebillimmediately
afterthemidtermelections,furtherreducingthemediascapacitytopressurelegislators.
Moreover, inArgentina the broadcasting sector lacks strong interest groups capable of
successful lobbying, as a consequence of the fact that broadcast television was under state
control between 1973 and 1989.49 In sharp contrast,ABERT, the Brazilian sectoral organisa
tionrepresentingcommercialbroadcastersandpresentlydominatedbyGlobo,wasbornin
1962,whenitsuccessfullyrepealedmostofJooGoulartspresidentialvetoestoatelecom
munications regulatory bill and initiated a long tradition of legislative lobbying against re
formistattempts.50
Still,theconstrainingpowerofmediaorganisationsisnotpredominantlyreliantontheir
capacitytolobbythroughformalinstitutions.Asalreadysuggested,mediapowerisafunc
tionofthemediasreputationamongpoliticalelitesforbeingcapableofaffectingcareersand
governability.SurveysshowthatalloverLatinAmericapoliticalelitesincreasinglyperceive
mediaactorsasleadingpoderesfcticos(defactopowers).51Thedifferencesintheintensityof
these perceptions betweenArgentina and Brazil are difficult to assess. One proxy could be
generalmediacredibility.Theimplicitassumptionisthatcredibilityimpactsthelikelyinflu
enceonpublicopinion.SurveydatarevealspersistentlyhighermediacredibilityinBrazil.In
a2003pollbyLatinobarmetro,74.1percentofBrazilianrespondentsexpressedsatisfaction
with media objectivity while only 45.9 per cent ofArgentineans did so. LAPOP data from
2010assessedmediaconfidenceona0100scale.WhileBrazilobtained69.9points,Argentina
only received 53.6. This suggests that higher media credibility could correlate with accom
modationstrategies,becauseconfrontationisperceivedashavingahighercost.
Mediapowermight,inturn,dependonmarketconcentrationandjournalisticfielddom
inance,sincetheseincreaseownerscapacityforstatecapturethroughsuchcoordinatedac
tionsasmediashutdownsorreputationaldamagecampaignstowouldbereformers.52Itis
difficulttoassessdominancedifferentialsfortherespectivecasesofClarnandGlobo.Both
enjoy,asdemonstratedabove,dominantpositionsintheirrespectivecontextsandhaveused
theirleveragetomaintainorexpandtheirpositions.Theexistenceofwidespreadbeliefs,an
ecdotes,andmyths,sharedespeciallyamongelites,atteststotheirreputation.
Concerning Globo, Porto reports the following statement attributed to presidentelect
TancredoNeves:IcanfightwiththePope,withtheCatholicChurch,withPMDB,withany
one,butIwillnotfightwithDoctor(sic)Roberto[Marinho].53Someanecdotesthatserveas
49Hernn Galperin, Regulatory Reform in the Broadcasting Industries of Brazil and Argentina in the 1990s,
JournalofCommunication,50:4(2000),pp.176191.
50SeetheirselfpresentationinABERT,Relatriodegestao.Bienios2006/2008,2008/2010(Brasilia:ABERT,2011).
51ProgramadeNacionesUnidasparaelDesarrollo,LademocraciaenAmricaLatina(BuenosAires:PNUD,2004).
52HughesandPrado2011,p.138.
53Porto,MediaPower,p.1.
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examplesofshutdownsandmedialynchingscirculateinBrazil.Oneexampleisthecaseof
SaturninoBraga,chairtotheParliamentaryInvestigativeCommitteeinchargeofinvestigating
illegalpartnershipsbetweenGloboandTimeLifeinthe1960s.AnotherisOrlandoFantazzini,
a PT representative who started a campaign against violence and lowbrow television pro
grammes.54
In Clarns case phrases such as no government resists more than five negative Clarn
frontpagesrepresentasortofcommonsense.55AsamemberoftheKirchnersinnercircle
stated, Like every democratic president before him, Kirchner believed that treating Clarn
wellwouldguaranteereciprocalgoodtreatment.HesawinClarnmuchmorethananews
paper,aTVstation,acableprovider,aradio,etc.;heconsidereditoneofthegreatestpower
factors in Argentina, an absolutely assembled system of news control.56 This quotation
points to possible differences with Brazil. InArgentina, the memories of the 2001 political
collapsemayhaveheightenedtheperceptionofthemediasimpactongovernmentstability.
ThisoverstatedperceptioninformedKirchnerscommunicationstyle.Duringthe2005mid
term campaign he declared that governments that do not exercise a permanent campaign
[...]aretakenawaywiththehelicopter.57HewasreferringtotheimageofDelaRasfall.
AccordingtoSivak,everygovernmentsinceredemocratisationhadbeeninterestedininflu
encingtheheadlines,especiallyClarns.ThenoveltyofKirchnerismolayinitsdaily,obses
siveefforttoinfluence,debateandevendisputetheheadlines.58
While important, these static similarities and differences in the mediarelated beliefs in
both countries do not illuminate how governmental strategies were shaped and shifted, in
differing directions, after the respective crises. A different sort of account, one describing
how concrete experiences and sequences resignified governmental actors perceptions, is
thusrequired.
The early regulatory proposals initiated by close allies of the PT government illustrate
suchexperiences.TheproposalstocreatetheCFJandthedraft59aimedataudiovisualsector
regulation aroused hostile media reactions and resulted in a strong informal veto. In both
casesawarovermeaningbrokeout.Bigmediaunanimouslyframedtheinitiatives,drawing
onpreexistingfearsaboutthePT,asathreattofreedomofexpressionthroughoutdatedstatist
interventionism.Thefierceapplicationofthesenarrativestotheregulatoryattemptsraisedthe
perceivedtransactioncostsofanyproposalformediaregulation.Theshowdownhadasignifi
cantdemonstrationeffectthatmadeithighlyunlikelythatanythingsimilar[wouldinfuture]
54InterviewsGindre,Jos.
55Sivak,Clarn;Mochkofsky,PecadoOriginal.
56Mochkofsky,PecadoOriginal,p.158.
57Kitzberger,LaMadredetodaslasbatallas,p.181.
59Accordingtooneoftheinitiativesauthors,thefirstdraftwasintentionallyleakedsoastokillit.
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beputforwardagain.60Thereweretwoaspectstothisdemonstrationeffect.Notonlywerethe
episodesanindicationofhowthemediareactedtoregulatoryinitiatives,buttheyalsomade
clearthat thesamesocialalliesthat promotedsuch initiativeshad only alimitedcapacityto
mobilise, to unite civil society around them, and to counter hostile portrayals. Indeed, the
groupsthathadsuccessfullymobilisedaroundtheFNDCintheearly1990shadfadedandfis
suredaftertheCardosoyears.Theperceptionthatsocialmovementswerenotattheirpeak
anddoubtsabouttheirabilitytosustaincounterhegemonicmobilisationwerewidelyshared
bymembersofLulasinnercircleduringhisfirstyearsingovernment.61
WhilethePTshistoricalalliesinthemediademocratisationmovementweresomewhat
disappointedwithLulasmoderationstrategyof2002,thePTdidnotalienatethemafterit
cametopower.Theshiftsinthegovernmentslinkstocivilsocietyafter2003arebetterde
scribedasachangeinthenatureoftherelationship.Toavoiditsalliesdisaffection,thePT
government counted on three appeasement resources: rewards, interpersonal linkages, and
Lulas strong leadership and symbolic identity. For media democratisation activists, some
materialrewardsexistedbutweresomewhatirrelevant,consistingmainlyofcertainsecond
tierministerialappointmentsandtheincreaseddistributionofstateadvertisingtoalternative
media. The other two resources were far more important: Interpersonal linkages created
complicity,mutualunderstanding,andanacceptanceofthelogicunderwhichthegovern
menthadtooperatetosurvive.Thepresidentssymboliccapitalandlegitimacyenabledhim
to ask for patience, to control mobilisation, to set the pace, to appease social movements,
andtobuytime.Mediademocratisationactivistsmostlyacceptedtheexistingobstaclescon
stituted by the Brazilian political system and the power of the big media to halt reforms,
whilestilltrustingLulasgradualismandcapacitytoseizeopportunities.62
TheKirchnersrelationshipwithsocialmovementslooks,inimportantways,likeanin
vertedmirrorofthesituationinBrazil.TheKirchners,asanascendingleftistmovementwith
nopriortiestoorganisedpopularactorsandwithoutprogressivecredentials,hadopposite
incentives. While Lula could count on alreadyexisting support, and had assumed govern
mentinacontextofdecliningmobilisation,hewasnotpressedtocourtmovementsadvocat
ingradicalpolicies.Incontrast,theKirchnerswerecompelled,giventheirpriorisolationand
thehighlevelofsocialmobilisationupontheirarrival,tosendstrongsignalstopopularor
ganisationstogaintheirsupport.63
60FernandoLattmanWeltman,MediaandPolicyAnalysisinBrazil:TheProcessofPolicyProduction,Recep
tionandAnalysisThroughtheMedia,inJ.Vaitsman,J.MendesRibeiroandL.Lobato(eds),PolicyAnalysis
inBrazil(Bristol:PolicyPress,2013),p.169.
62GmezBruera,Lula,theWorkersPartyandGovernability,pp.136151.InterviewwithValterSanches,Metal
workersUniontelevisionnetworkdirector,17June2011.
63Sebastin Etchemendy and Candelaria Garay, Argentina: Left Populism in Comparative Perspective, in
LevitskyandRoberts,TheResurgenceoftheLeft,pp.283305.
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Asoutlinedabove,Kirchnerdidnotinitiallytakeuptheissueofmediademocratisation.
Howeverin2004,sensingthatthepoliticalclimatewaschanging,formerlyseparatecommu
nityradioorganisations,mediaworkersunions,communicationsscholars,andNGOsstarted
formingtheCoalitionforDemocraticBroadcasting(CRD).Kirchnersearlyoutreachonhu
manrightsissueswasanincentivetocohesivelyframemediareformasamatterofhuman
rights and democracy, and thus overcome divisions within the coalition.Additionally, de
spite disillusionment with governmental concessions to big media, the CRD attained the
support of prestigious human rights organisations, which the government had also ap
proached.Infact,theleadersofMadresandAbuelasdePlazadeMayohelpedmembersof
the CRD and its agenda to gradually access government offices. By the end of Kirchners
term,thecoalitionsleadershadmetthepresidentandobtainedsomevaguepromises.Simul
taneously, some rather unnoticed government measures regarding legalisation and public
recognitionofnoncommercialbroadcastersreinforcedthebridges.64
As the agrarian conflict erupted, these bridges facilitated cooperation on the issue. But
thegovernmentpromisetosanctionanewmedialawinthemidstoftheconfrontationwith
ClarnarousedawaveofsocialsupportthattranscendedtheCRDactivists:
TheKirchnersobtainedsupportfromintellectuals,personalitiesfromculture,journal
ism,education,cinema,arts,literature[]whichtheysecuredfortheirsideduringthe
conflict with the landowners. These intellectuals had perceived the resurgence of a
classist antiPeronistArgentina during the crisis, and in a public document they had
condemned how certain media, among them the Clarn Group, had covered the con
flict.[]Thegovernmenthadwon,additionally,acriticalmass,aminoritythoughre
levant group, that backed its discourse against the excessive power of Clarn and
agreedtocurtailit.65
However,thismobilisationofsupportwasnotalinearprocess.Whilemobilisationwasin
tense during the agrarian conflict, a period of retreat followed the governments June 2008
defeatinparliament.Weakened,andfacingmidtermelections,theKirchnersreconsidered
theirstrategyandevencontemplatedreachingasettlementwithClarn.66Thesedoubtswere
reflectedinthelossofimpetusvisvislegalreform,andconsequentlygeneratedworryand
discomfortamongallies.InNovember2008,theCRDsentalettertothepresidentreminding
hertotakeonthecommitmentandseizetheopportunity(themomentisnow),reaffirming
their readiness to mobilise and support her efforts.67 While Clarn remained intransigently
hostile, the government continued to be ambivalent until the elections of June 2009. It was
64InterviewwithDaminLoreti,CRDmember,26July2012.NstorBussoandDiegoJaimes(eds),LaCocinade
laLey.ElprocesodeincidenciaenlaelaboracindelaLeydeServiciosdeComunicacinAudiovisualenAr
gentina(BuenosAires:FARCO,2011),pp.1925;Mauersberger,TobePrepared.
65Mochkofsky,PecadoOriginal,p.190.
66KirchnermetMagnettoatleastonceaftertheconflict.Mochkofsky,PecadoOriginal,p.186.
67SeeBussoandJaimes,Lacocinadelaley,appendix.
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onlyaftertheseelections,wherethegovernmentfaredbadly,thattheKirchners(re)adopted
a confrontational strategy. Feeling threatened after the political defeat,theysaw radicalisa
tionasadefensivetactictoretainthecoreofsocialsupportwhichwouldotherwisedissi
pategainedduringtheagrarianconflict.Infact,theparliamentarymedialawdebatethat
occurred between August and October 2009 (re)mobilised massive support through street
rallies, forums, Facebook groups, and a successful broadcasting show wherein public per
sonalitiesexplicitlyrevealedtheiralignment.68
Themedialawwasthemaincomponentofawidersetofinitiativesaddressingprogressive
demands, raised by the government, that helped consolidate Kirchnerism as a distinct and
highly mobilised political identity.69 While between 2008 and 2009 the government had lost
widersupport,thereformistagendaitdefensivelyadoptedledacoreofyoung,middleclass,
andintellectualsectorsheirstothe2001politicalcrisistoidentifywithKirchnerism.70
Additionally,themobilisationaroundthemedialawinArgentinawasframedasacon
flictbetweendemocracyanddictatorship,basedonthefactthattheexistingmediaregula
tionsstemmedfromthewidelyrepudiatedauthoritarianregime.Clarnsdealingswiththe
military were, therefore, continually played up. In contrast, Brazils regulatory framework
antedatedthe19641985militaryregime,whichwasalsonotunanimouslycondemned.Mo
bilisingaroundGlobospastrecorddidnot,therefore,seemtooffersuchclearpayoffs.71
A timesensitive narrative also illuminates variations in the perceived consequences of
themediaactorshostilebehaviourforpoliticalsurvival.Asmentioned,theKirchnersshared
(andoverstated)ageneralbeliefinClarnsstrategicimportanceforgovernability.Thelatters
hostilecoverageduringtheagrarianconflictconvincedthemthatthegroupsCEOhadtaken
sideswiththosedeterminedtotopplethegovernment.TheyascribedClarnresponsibilityfor
thegrowingurbansupportforlandowners.Thismotivatedafirststageofconfrontationthat
coincidedwiththeagrarianconflict.YetaftertheirdefeatinCongress,theKirchnersdoubted
thepoliticalviabilityofconfrontationandthussoughttoreapproachClarn.TheClarnside,
however,(wrongfully)interpretedthecongressionaldefeatasadefinitivepoliticaldefeatand
thusignoredthegovernmentscalls,insteadengaginginfurtherdiscreditingthegovernment
soastoacceleratethesuccessionandthebirthofapostKirchneristorder.72
During the 2009 midterm elections campaign, the Kirchners found themselves heavily
opposedbyClarnandmostoftheothermainstreammedia.Theelectoraldefeatreinforced
theirbeliefsaboutmediapower.Therefore,intransigentmediaoppositionledthemtoallout
confrontationastheonlychoicetoensurepoliticalsurvival.Itwasonlyinthepostelectoral
68Sarlo,Laaudacia.
69Otherinitiativesweresamesexmarriageandthereversionofthe1990spensionfundprivatisation.
70JosNatanson,Porqulosjvenesestnvolviendoalapoltica?DelosindignadosaLaCampora(Buenos
Aires:Debate,2012).
71Onlyafterthe2013streetprotestsdidGlobopubliclyapologiseforhavingsupportedthe1964coup.
72Sivak,Clarn,p.389;Mauersberger,TobePrepared,p.596.
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context that the final mobilisation required to pass the media law, the reversal of soccer
transmissionrights,andsomeoftheotherradicalmeasureswouldtakeplace.
Thelossesinpopularityandtheelectoraldefeat,whichthegovernmentascribedtome
diahostility,appear,fromawiderperspective,toberelatedtotheeconomiccycle.In2009,
theArgentineeconomywasstillfeelingtheeffectsofthe2008financialcrisis.From2010on,
economicrecoveryrevampedthegovernmentspopularitybeyonditscoreconstituency.
In Brazil, the timing of the political, economic and media cycles was different. In 2005,
whenthepoliticalcrisisfirsterupted,thecountrywasexpandingandleavingthe19982002
economiccrisisbehind.Socialpolicies,mainlyBolsaFamlia,andminimumwageswereim
proving the living conditions of numerous formerly excluded groups, particularly in the
Nordeste region. Meanwhile, the mainstream media, caught up in a moral frenzy, fuelled
and reflected a climate of outrage among the urban middle and upper classes. While Lula
andespeciallythePTwerelosingfavouramongthesestrata,undetectedsupportwasgrow
ingelsewhere.Whilegovernmentalliesinitiallyperceivedandcontestedamediacampaign
tounderminetheadministration,asthe2006generalelectionsapproachedsomeindividuals
closetoLulastartedsensingthatthemediafrenzydidnotreflecttherealpoliticalsituation.
Notbychance,FranklinMartinswas,beforeLulasappointment,thefirsttomakethisper
ceptionpublic.Inaninterviewgivenbeforetheelections,Martinsannouncedthepresenceof
AveryimportantnewphenomenonforBrazilianpoliticallife[]whichisthefollow
ing:theeraofthestoneinthelakeisover.Wehadabehaviourpatternfromtheendof
thestruggleagainstthedictatorship:[]themiddleclassformedanopinionaboutit
andthatopinionextendedtotheperiphery.Likeastoneinthelake:thestonefellinthe
middleclass,formingconcentricwavesinalldirections.Themiddleclasswastheclass
ofthesocalledopinionleaders:youconqueredthemandyouhadsolveditall.What
didweseewiththeMensalocrisis?Themiddleclassformedthebeliefthatthegov
ernment was taken by a gang, by banditry, etc. [] It formed that belief, threw the
stoneinthelake,thewavesbegan[]theyhitsomewhere,therewasadike,andthe
wavesreturned.Wheredidtheyhit?TheyhittheCclass.Itistheguyswhoearnfrom
twotofiveminimumwages[].Nowthatmylifeimprovedyouwanttooverthrow
thisgovernment?AndsotheCclassalsosayswhatithastosay;thatmeans,nowwe
starthaving more thanone centre of information and opinion. Fromnow on it isthe
Cclassthatformsopinion.[]Theprocessofpoliticalmajorityformationinthecoun
tryhasbecomemuchmorecomplexthanfiveyearsago.[]Thenewspapersdirected
attheAandBclasseshavenotgrownforalongtime;thosedirectedattheCclassare
proliferatingalloverthecountry.Thisindicatesthatmanymorepeoplewhoinprinciple
havedifferentaspirations,lifestories,concerns,habits,tics[]arebeingincorporated
inthemarketandincitizenship.[]Inacertainway,Lulaselectionmeantthatthese
peoplearefeelinglikepartofthegame.73
73Martins,Aeradapedra.
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Afterthe2006elections,thisperceptionspreadamonggovernmentmembers,allies,andPT
intellectuals.74Ina2008interviewLulahimself,atthepeakofhispopularity,declaredhisin
differencetothehistoricalideologyandbehaviourofBrazilsmedia.Thebiasednatureofthe
media,hereasoned,hadlostimportancesinceaudienceshadbecomeintelligentandableto
discernforthemselveswhatwentbeyondfact.75
If after the Mensalo the perception gained ground that Globo, with other big media,
soughttotoppleLula,ontheeveofthe2006electionsthegovernmentnucleuslearnedthat
thepowerofthesemediawasrelative.Thelatterreassertedtheirelitismandpartisanship(as
theoldPTbeliefsheld),theirantipetismoandantilulismo,buttheylosttheirperceivedcen
tralityforpoliticalsurvival.Therefore,itwasreasoned,evenwhenattacked,thebeststrategy
mightbetosimplyignoreorcircumventinsteadofengaginginenergyconsumingwarsthat
couldnotbewoninCongressoronthescreens.Toadvancemediachange,itwouldbebetter
tomakegradualandsubtlermoves.TheactionstakenduringLulassecondtermhavebeen
consistentwiththisdiagnosis.
5 Conclusion
IncontemporaryLatinAmericatherealmofthemediahasbecomeoneofthecentralarenas
ofpoliticalstruggle.Thepresenceofpowerfulmediaconglomeratesthatfunctionasstrategic
actorsfollowingtheirowncorporateandideologicalagendaspresentsimportantdilemmas
for democratic politics. While the growing power of media organisations in the region has
increaseddemandsfordemocraticregulation,theirperceivedvetocapacityandstatecapture
hasledpoliticalplayerstoseeaccommodationastheonlyviablecourseofaction.
This paper has focused on the strategic choices visvis dominant media actors of two
governmentsthat,inadditiontoexperiencingthepressuretoaccommodatebigmedia,held
or established some form of commitment regarding media democratisation demands. In
steadofrelyingonpriorpoliticaltraditionsorideologicalidentities(suchasthepopulistor
nonpopulist Left), this study has established the importance of environmental factors and
critical junctures as determinants of governments strategic choices. Drawing on the litera
tureontheimpactofinstitutionalfactorsonpolicypreferences,ithasfoundthatsignificant
differencesininstitutionalconfigurationsandthepoliticalarticulationofmediainterestscre
ate contrasting political opportunities. However, it has also shown that such hard con
straints, while important, do no tell the whole story. In contrast to other policy areas, the
powerofthestrategicactorsinthemediasphereismainlyreputational,afactthatemphasises
thesubjectivenatureoftheopportunitiesandconstraintsthatunderpinpoliticalaction.Con
74LulassecondtermpressspeakerwrotearesonantanalysisofLulasnewsocialcoalition:AndrSinger,Razes
sociaiseideolgicasdoLulismo,NovosEstudos,85(2009),pp.93102;seealsoJosDirceu,Fatosefotos,
JornaldoBrasil9/08/2007onthedisconnectionbetweenthemediaandvoters.
75SeeLula,Piauinterview.
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29
sequently,theanalysishasfocusedonhowcertainjuncturesandsequencesofeventsaffected
government perceptions, which, in turn, decisively informed the two governments respec
tivestrategicstances.
Thisanalysisoftheperceptionofpoliticalopportunitiesandconstraintsintherealmof
mediapoliticscontributestothebroaderliteratureonLatinAmericasleftturnbyinvesti
gating variation in policy and elite defiance within the governments of different countries.
Demonstrationeffectsandjudgementsofcausalityhavebeenshowntooperateascognitive
mechanismsthatshapegovernmentsassessmentsofthecorrelationofforces,theavailability
ofsupport,andchancesofpoliticalsurvival.
Theperceivedconsequencesofthemediashostilebehaviourforpoliticalsurvivalduring
therespectivecriseswerefoundtobecrucial.However,thecausalconclusionsdrawnbythe
respectivegovernmentsregardingmediaeffectswereoppositeinthetwocases.Government
evaluationsofmediapowerandsubsequentstrategiesvisvisdominantmediadepended
on whether hostile media coverage occurred during phases of economic expansion or eco
nomiccrisis.Differentoverlapsdecisivelyinfluencedgovernmentalassessmentsofthemedia
groups capacity to affect their own political fortunes. These varying assessments, in turn,
cruciallyinfluencedsubsequentgovernmentalstrategies.
Insum,whileideasandpreheldbeliefsremainimportant,thisstudyhasemphasisedthe
centrality of institutional environments and political junctures in shaping political choices.
However, as theArgentine case has made clear, under certain circumstances, the pressing
needtostabiliseapoliticalidentitycanbeachievedbygoingpublicwithideologicalbeliefs.
Certain ideas that resonate among possible constituencies have the potential to create new
politicalidentitiesandfacilitatecollectiveaction.76Therefore,whileprioridentitiesmatter,at
certaincriticaljuncturespoliticalactorstakedecisionsbasedonshortterm,perceivedcorre
lationsofforcesthat,aposteriori,definepoliticalidentities.
76Rueschemeyer,WhyandHowIdeasMatter,p.244.
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