IN RE CUNANAN

Facts:
This is the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 case.
As per the Rules of Court. A bar candidate must have a general average of 75% in all subjects without
failing below 50% in any subject.
In spite of this, the court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an
average of only:
72% in 1946
69% in 1947
70% in 1948
74% in 1949
In 1950 to 53, the 74% was raised to 75%
A few candidates who missed the above marks set by the courts approached Congress. Congress
made a bill, which was allowed by the president to become a law without his signature. This is RA 972.
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have
obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in
1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be
permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar,
notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has been
invariably followed since 1950.
A breakdown of the numbers is on page 538.
The additional candidates who want to be admitted claim that they suffered from insufficiency of
reading materials and of inadequacy of preparation.
Issue:
W/N RA 972 is valid.
Held:
RA 972 is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had
inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession. The public interest demands of the legal
profession, adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problems evolved by the
times become more difficult.
In decreeing that bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general
average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the
practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment a judgment revoking those
promulgated by this Court during the years affecting the bar candidates concerned
Although the SC certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less
certain that only the SC, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any attempt
on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as in this case.
Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this court, but the authority and
responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys-at-law and
their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court.
Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:
"Section 13.
The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said
rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish increase or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed
as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter
and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in
the Philippines."

The Constitution has not conferred on Congress and the SC equal responsibilities concerning the
admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes
continue to reside in the SC.
Had Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing
over which to exercise the power granted to it.
The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly
attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to
repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for
a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its
responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the
legal profession.
There is no motive stated by the authorities for the qualification in RA 972 because of this, the
classification is fatally defective.
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952,
and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations
subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to
be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations
of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a
general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject,
are considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this
decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of
office as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the Chief Justice may set.
CAYETANO V MONSOD
Facts:
Pres. Aquino nominated Christian Monsod to the position of COMELEC chairman.
The Commission on Appointments affirmed the nomination and appointed Monsod to the
position.
Renato Cayetano now assails the appointment. He says that Monsod is not qualified to the
position because he has not been engaged in the practice of law for ten years (requirement is
provided by Consti Art. 9-C Sec. 1(1)).
Issue:
W/n Monsod is qualified for the position of COMELEC chairman.
Held:

SC says yes. Monsod passed the bar in 1960 and had been consistently paying his professional
fees. He worked in a law firm for several years after graduating but after that, had been more
engaged in business and politics (for a list of his jobs, see p.238). Still, the SC said that he can still
be considered as practicing law, if we consider the modern concept of the practice of law. This
modern concept pertains to any act, whether in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
SC now says that since most of Monsods jobs involved the law, even if he has not been
engaged in traditional lawyering (i.e. making pleadings or appearing in court), he can still be
considered as to have been engaged in the practice of law.

Dissents:
Most of the dissents focused on the issue that the Consti requirement pertains to habitual
practice of law. The dissenters pointed out that for the past ten years, Monsod really seldom
practiced law. This group believed that the Consti required that the practice of law be on a
regular basis. Justice Padilla even came up with qualifications habituality; compensation;
application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure; and atty.-client relationship to
determine w/n a person has been engaged in the practice of law..

CAYETANO V MONSOD
September 3, 1991
NATURE
Petition to review decision of Commission on Appointments
FACTS
- April 25, 1991 Atty. Christian Monsod was appointed by Pres. Aquino as Chairman of COMELEC
- Rene Cayetano opposed such appointment as citizen and taxpayer because Monsod allegedly does
not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10
years
- June 18, 1991 Monsod took his oath of office
- Monsods credentials
> member of Philippine Bar since 1960
> after bar, worked in law office of his father
> 1963-1970 in World Bank Group as operations officer in Costa Rica and Panama involves getting
acquainted with laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic and
project work
> 1970 in Meralco Group as CEO of investment bank
> since 1986 rendered service to various companiesas legal and economic consultant or CEO
> 1986-1987 secretary-general and national chairman of NAMFREL (election law)
> co-chairman of Bishops Businessmens Conference for Human Development
> 1990 - Davide Commission quasi-judicial body
> 1986-1987 member of Constitutional Commission as Chairman on Accountability of Public Officers
- AIX-C Sec1(1) - Commission on Elections chairman shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years
- no jurisprudence on what constitutes the practice of law
ISSUE
WON Monsod is qualified as Chairman of COMELEC in fulfilling the requirement engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years
HELD
YES. Practice of Law means any activity, in or out of court which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Monsod as lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager,
lawyer-entrepreneur, lawyer-negotiator, and lawyer-negotiator is proof he is engaged in practice of law
for more than 1- years
- Blacks Law Dictionary
> Rendition of service requiring the knowledge and application of legal principles and technique to
serve the interest of another with his consent
> not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces
the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and giving all legal advice to clients
- Land Title Abstract and Trust Co v Dworken
> one who in representative capacity engages in business of advising clients as to their rights under law,
or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court
- UP Law Center
> advocacy, counseling, public service
- Alexander SyCip
> appearance of lawyer in litigation is most publicly familiar role of lawyers as well as an uncommon role
for the average lawyer
> more legal work is transacted in law offices that in the courtrooms
> business counseling than trying cases; as planner, diagnostician, trial lawyer, surgeon
- article on Business Star
> emerging trends in corporate law
SEPARATE OPINION
NARVASA [concur]
- concur only in the result
PADILLA [dissent]
- Practice refers to actual performance of application of knowledge as distinguished from mere
possession of knowledge; it connotes active, habitual, repeated or customary action TF lawyer

employed as business executive or corporate manager, other than head of Legal Department cannot
be said to be in the practice of law
- People v Villanueva
> Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind
- Commission on Appointments memorandum
> practice of law requires habituality, compensation, application of law, legal principle, practice or
procedure, and attorney-client relationship
CRUZ [dissent]
- sweeping definition of practice of law as to render the qualification practically toothless
- there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman
must know about and observe
- performance of any acts in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law which
tells us absolutely nothing
GUTIERREZ [dissent]
- practice is envisioned as active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent,
incidental, seasonal or extemporaneous
- nothing in the bio-data even remotely indicates Monsod has given the law enough attention or a
certain degree of commitment and participation
- difficult if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of law
- Monsod was asked if he ever prepared contracts for parties in real-estate transaction; he answered
very seldom
- Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such is incidental and consists of
isolated activities which do not fall under the denominations of practice of law
PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN
PUNO; April 12, 2005
NATURE
Special civil action in the SC. Certiorari and prohibition.
FACTS
-1976: General Bank and Trust Co. (Genbank) encountered financial difficulties, prompting the Central
Bank to extend to it emergency loans reaching a total of P310 million. Despite this, Genbank failed to
recover and the following year Central Bank had to issue a resolution declaring Genbank insolvent and
ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of Genbanks assets was held; Lucio Tan Group submitted the
winning bid.
-Former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with CFI praying for the courts assistance
and supervision in the liquidation as mandated by RA 265, section 29.
-After EDSA I, Pres. Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of Marcos, his
family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, PCGG filed a complaint for reversion, reconveyance,
restitution, accounting, and damages against respondents Lucio Tan Group and the Marcos family. This
was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the 2nd division of the Sandiganbayan (SB). In connection with
this, PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on the properties of the Lucio Tan Group.
-Lucio Tan Group questioned the writs through petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and injunction with the
SC. The latter referred the cases to the SB for proper disposition. In these cases docketed as Civil Case
Nos. 0096-0099 Lucio Tan Group was represented by their counsel, former SolGen Estelito Mendoza who
has then resumed private practice.
-05 Feb 1991: PCGG, invoking Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), filed motions to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents in Civil Case Nos. 0005 & 0096-0099. The motions
allege that Atty. Mendoza intervened in the acquisition of Genbank by the Lucio Tan Group when, in
his capacity as then SolGen, he advised the Central Banks officials on the procedure to bring about
Genbanks liquidation& appeared as counsel for the central Bank in connection with its petition for
assistance in the liquidation.
-22 April 1991: SB denied the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 for PCGGs failure
to prove the existence of an inconsistency between Mendozas former function as SolGen and his
present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group; it also ruled that Mendozas appearance as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of
Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. PCGG did not file a
MFR.
-When Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the SBs 2nd Division to the 5th Division, the latter
also denied the motion to disqualify. PCGGs MFR was denied. Hence this petition.

KEY ISSUE
WON Rule 6.03 of the CPR applies to Atty. Mendoza.
Rule 6.03: A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.
Obiter
The History of Rule 6.03
-17th and 18th centuries: ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive in England and other parts of
Europe; the principal thrust of the standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It
underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation to the client.
-colonial and early post-revolutionary America: The forms of lawyer regulation did not differ markedly
from those in England. Only three of the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive
in the formal, positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness,
competency and reasonable fees.
-19th century: the dark ages of legal ethics in the United States.
-mid 19th century: American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways: (1) David Dudley Field, the
drafter of the highly influential New York Field Code, introduced a new set of uniform standards of
conduct for lawyers; (2) legal educators, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many
other lawyers were working to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties.
-As in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did not
provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties.
-end of 19th century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in their practice the bar
association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers
for lawyers. 2 primary sources of ethical guidance: academic discourses & the bar association codes
-1887: Alabama - the 1st state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. 1887 Alabama
Code of Ethics was the model for several states codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar
Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.
-1917: Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional
Ethics.
-1924: some ABA members start to question the form and function of the canons. Among their concerns
was the revolving door or the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter government
service from private life and then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit
information, contacts, and influence garnered in government service.
(a) Adverse-interest conflicts - exist where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents
a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while
employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are adverse.
(b) Congruent-interest representation conflicts are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to
former government lawyers.
-ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new canons, individual amendments and
interpretative opinions. To deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was
minted to disqualify such lawyers both for adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest
representation conflicts.
Canon 36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he
has previously acted in a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his
retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon
while in such office or employ.
-1946: the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics.
-mid 20th century: growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more meaningful revision. 1964: ABA
President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study the adequacy and
effectiveness of the ABA Canons. The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it with Canon
9 in the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 9 states: A lawyer should avoid
even the appearance of professional impropriety.
-The drafting committee reformulated the canons into the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
which was approved by the ABA House of Delegates in August 1969. Canon 9 was supplemented by
Disciplinary Rule 9-101(b): A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had
substantial responsibility while he was a public employee.
-Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite
standards.
-August 1983: ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, doing away with Canon 9,
citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety on the subjective views of anxious
clients as well as the norms indefinite nature.

-1980: Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of Professional Responsibility
which it submitted to SC for approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions,
and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities.
-21 June 1988: SC promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility. CPR Rule 6.03 which deals
particularly with former government lawyers retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase investigated and passed upon
with the word intervened. It is, therefore, properly applicable to both adverse-interest conflicts and
congruent-interest conflicts.
SUB-ISSUES
1. WON this case involves the adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03
2. WON there exists a congruent-interest conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from
representing the Lucio Tan Group.
2a. WON Atty. Mendozas act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate
Genbank is included within the concept of matter under Rule 6.03
2b. WON the intervention of Atty. Mendoza in the liquidation of Genbank is significant and substantial
HELD
2a. NO. Ratio American Bar Association Formal Opinion 342s definition of matter : any discrete,
isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific
party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.
Reasoning Based on PCGGs case for disqualification, the matter or the act of Atty. Mendoza as
Solicitor General involved here is advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks
liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.
-The procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, sec. 29. Said legal
provision provides for the role of the SolGen in proceedings upon insolvency.
-Also, CPR Rule 6.03 cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a
SolGen in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 (liquidation of Genbank) is an intervention on a matter different from the
matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096 (sequestration of the stocks in Allied Bank, the successor of
Genbank, on the ground that they are ill-gotten).
2b. NO. Ratio in light of the history of CPR Rule 6.03, the 2nd meaning is more appropriate to give to the
word intervention. The intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant.
Reasoning 2 interpretations of the intervene (basis: Webster):
(a) intervene includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has no
effect or little influence.
(b) intervene only includes an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject
proceedings.
-The petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by Atty.
Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. The record is arid as to the actual participation of
respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings.
-The principal role of the court in this proceeding for dissolution is to assist the Central Bank in
determining claims of creditors against the Genbank. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of
justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a
proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator
protecting the interest of government.
Obiter
Balancing Policy Considerations
-CPR Rule 6.03 represents a commendable effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers
in the government service. It should not be interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government
recruitment of able legal talent.
-At present, it is already difficult for government to match compensation offered by the private sector
and it is unlikely that government will be able to reverse that situation. It is true that the only card that
the government may play to recruit lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the
experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income in private practice. To make
government service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter.
-In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass
opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The danger that the
rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork.
-Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which
will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion
causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the
client has confidence.
-The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the
official independence of lawyers in the government service.

-No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of the freedom to
exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a former government
lawyer may extend to all members of his law firm.
-As well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best
which can lead to untoward results. Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected
in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
-Also the switching sides concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. The danger that
confidential official information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. There are no inconsistent
sides to be bothered about in the case at bar. In lawyering for the Lucio Tan Group, Atty. Mendoza is
indirectly defending the validity of the action of Central Bank in liquidating Genbank and selling it later
to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding.
Disposition Petition denied. No costs.
SEPARATE OPINION
PANGANIBAN [dismiss]
-The petition should be dismissed on two grounds: (1) res judicata, specifically, conclusiveness of
judgment; and (2) prescription.
-The material issue in the present controversy is whether Atty. Mendoza may still be barred from
representing these respondents despite (1) a final Order in another case resolving the very same ground
for disqualification involving the same parties and the same subject matter as the present case; and (2)
the passage of a sufficient period of time from the date he ceased to be solicitor general to the date
when the supposed disqualification (for violation of the CPR) was raised.
-There is no need to delve into the question of whether Rule 6.03 has been transgressed; there is no
need to discuss the merits of the questioned Sandiganbayan Resolutions allowing Atty. Mendoza to
represent private respondents in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. After all, a Resolution issued by the same
court resolving the very same issue on the disqualification of Atty. Mendoza in a case involving the
same parties and the same subject matter has already become final and immutable. It can no longer
be altered or changed.
-CPR Rule 6.03 does not expressly specify the period of its applicability or enforceability. But it cannot
be inferred that the prohibition is absolute, perpetual and permanent. All civil actions have a
prescriptive period. Unless a law makes an action imprescriptible or lays down no other period, the
action is subject to a bar by prescription five years after the right of action accrued. (Arts. 1140-1149,
Civil Code; Tolentino v CA)
SANDOVAL-GUTTIERREZ [dismiss]
-In evaluating motions to disqualify a lawyer, our minds are not bound by stringent rules. There is room
for consideration of the combined effect of a partys right to counsel of his own choice, an attorneys
interest in representing a client, the financial burden on a client of replacing disqualified counsel, and
any tactical abuse underlying a disqualification proceeding.
-An order denying a motion to disqualify counsel is final and, therefore, appealable. The issue of
whether or not Atty. Mendoza should be disqualified from representing Tan et al. is separable from,
independent of and collateral to the main issues in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099. In short, it is separable
from the merits. Clearly, the present petition for certiorari is dismissible.
-The Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 constitutes a bar to similar motions to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza under the doctrine of res judicata. The PCGG may not relitigate such issue of
disqualification as it was actually litigated and finally decided in G.R. Nos. 112707-09.
-Atty. Mendozas participation in the liquidation of GENBANK does not constitute intervention. CPR Rule
6.03 cannot apply to Atty. Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in
Special Proceedings No. 107812 is an intervention in a matter different from the matter involved in Civil
Case No. 0096.
CARPIO-MORALES [grant]
-The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment does not apply since in the case at bar, the question of
whether the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza should be granted is undoubtedly a legal
question. Also, this is the first time that the issue to disqualify Atty. Mendoza has been elevated before
the SC.
-We cannot characterize the denial of PCGGs motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as a final order. It is
only interlocutory since it does not finally dispose of the case.
-the prohibition in Rule 6.03 is perpetual. It does not prescribe in 5 yrs.
-Atty. Mendozas lack of participation in the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK is
immaterial. What is material is his role in facilitating the liquidation of GENBANK through his legal
expertise. In advising the Central Bank, Atty. Mendoza did not just mechanically point to section 29 of
Republic 265. As then Solicitor General, and as a lawyer known for his keen legal acumen, Atty.
Mendoza synthesized facts, which by reason of his position he was privy to, and law with a view to
successfully liquidate the bank.

-While it is desirable to recruit competent lawyers into government service, this does not justify the
disturbance of our mores. The canons and rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility must be strictly
construed.
-While financial considerations are important, they are not the sole factor affecting recruitment of
lawyers to the government sector. I would like to think that serving in government is its own reward. One
needs only to look at all of us members of this Court to know that money is not everything. All of us
have, at one point in our legal careers, been tempted by the promise of financial success that private
practice usually brings. But in the end, we decided to take the road less traveled and serve in
government. And I would like to believe that each and everyone of us has made a difference. There is
more to this mortal coil than the pursuit of material wealth.
CALLEJO, SR. [partially grant]
-The Code of Professional Responsibility is not designed for Holmes proverbial bad man who wants to
know just how many corners he may cut, how close to the line he may play, without running into trouble
with the law. Rather, it is drawn for the good man as a beacon to assist him in navigating an ethical
course through the sometimes murky waters of professional conduct. (General Motors Corp. v City of
New York)
-CPR establishes the norms of conduct and ethical standards in the legal profession and the Court must
not shirk from its duty to ensure that all lawyers live up to its provisions. The Court must not tolerate any
departure from the straight and narrow path demanded by the ethics of the legal profession.
-The Resolution denying PCGGs similar motion to disqualify Mendoza was an interlocutory order as it did
not terminate or finally dispose of the said case. It merely settled an incidental or collateral matter
arising therein. As such, it cannot operate to bar the filing of another motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza
in the other cases.
-Atty. Mendozas present engagement as counsel for Lucio Tan Group in Civil Case No. 0096 violates
the ethical precept embodied in Rule 6.03.
-The subject matter in Civil Case No. 0096 is connected with or related to a matter, i.e. the liquidation
of Genbank, in which Atty. Mendoza had intervened as the Solicitor General
-Rule 6.03 applies even if Atty. Mendoza did not switch sides or did not take inconsistent sides. Rule
6.03 applies even if no conflict of interest exists between Atty. Mendozas former government client
(Central Bank) and his present private practice clients (respondents Tan, et al.)
-Rule 6.03 purposely does not contain an explicit temporal limitation since cases have to be resolved
based on their peculiar circumstances. The peculiar circumstances of this case justify the strict
application of said rule.
TINGA [partially grant]
-Section 6.03 cannot be made applicable in the present case to Atty. Mendoza, as to do so would be
violative of his right to due process. Whether it be at the time then Solicitor General Mendoza
participated in the process of the dissolution of General Bank in 1977, or at sometime in 1987 when he
agreed to represent the respondents, the Code of Professional Responsibility had not yet been
promulgated.
-The Code of Professional Responsibility was promulgated by the Supreme Court on 21 June 1988. Prior
to its official adoption, there was no similar official body of rules or guidelines enacted by the Supreme
Court other than the provisions on Legal Ethics in the Rules of Court.
-Atty. Mendoza may have violated Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, which some
authorities deemed as a source of legal ethics prior to the Code of Professional Responsibility. But the
prohibition under Canon 36 was not prescribed by this Court or by statute as a norm until the
enactment of the Code of Professional Responsibility in 21 June 1988. Accordingly, when Atty.
Mendoza agreed to represent the respondents, there was no definitive binding rule proscribing him from
such engagement or penalizing him for such representation.