G.R. No.

L-24693

July 31, 1967

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC.
and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant.
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is
whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. The lower court
held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." For reasons to be more
specifically set forth, such judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to
sustain an attack against its validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners,
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a
certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the second petitioner" against the
respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general
power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the
faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner nonstock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) members
"operating hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and
city authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not less than 2,500 person and
representing an investment of more than P3 million."1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that on June 13, 1963,
the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by
the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par.
3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion
of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would
regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no
reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for
being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for
first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; that the provision in the same section which
would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging
house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter
to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all
times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the
address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the
room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his
residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person
signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and records kept and
bound together, it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging
houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly
authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not only for being
arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for
the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of
the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance of certain
minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and
laundry similarly offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and
oppressive, a conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to
have a dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less
than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn

unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager,
keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof
more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section
4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the
license of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments,
there is once again a transgression of the due process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above
ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary
injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after
July 8, 1963.
In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal circumstances regarding
the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or motel
business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity,
whether on statutory or constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause
of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a proper purpose, which is to
curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power and that only the guests or customers not
before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against
self incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary
to law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated
September 28, 1964, which reads:
1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del
Mar Inc. are duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the
City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chin is the president and general manager of Hotel del Mar
Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue
and be sued;
2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of
the City of Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of
Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such
ordinances;
3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and motels
in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;
4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760,
which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City
Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections 661,
662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila besides
inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the
respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th Indorsement dated February 15,
1963 (Annex B);
5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with the
proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is attached
hereto as Annex C;
6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from license fees
paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of Manila.

1wph1.t

Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on the
presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of conformity to the
Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable
American authorities. Such a memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced by
2

petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the memorandum for
petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition, with citations of what they
considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for a judgment declaring the challenged
ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction
issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association, and referring to
the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court observed: "The only remaining
issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with the nod of the Court, agreed to file
memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then that
without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision passed upon the alleged infirmity on
constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper the
untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels, and came to
the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional
and, therefore, null and void." It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued against respondent
Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a
fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation
of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto
been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically
by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected
representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of
things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and
circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting
the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people x
x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of
personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.2
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to
rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. The
principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford
Fire Insurance Co.,3 where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly
summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of
the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation
prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying
questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the
statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on
the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment
against the ordinance set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as being
repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with the due
process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure
being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting
purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly
restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,4extending as it does "to all the great public
needs."5 It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it
could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public
morals, public safety and the genera welfare.6 Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary
power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of
society.7

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as
annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and
fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes
and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of
transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a
registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing
several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of
transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage
"establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase
"the income of the city government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from
sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval, ordinances
punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant;8 provide a license tax for and
regulating the maintenance or operation of public dance halls;9 prohibiting gambling;10 prohibiting
jueteng;11 and monte;12prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal
holidays;13 prohibiting the operation of pinball machines;14 and prohibiting any person from keeping,
conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is smoked or otherwise
used,15 all of which are intended to protect public morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the
police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the
requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties however, the
exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject
to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious,
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is raised to the
question of due process.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes
though a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life,
liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which
must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any
governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action,
to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due
process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been
identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.17 It exacts
fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of
reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political
thought."18 It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances,"19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into
fundamental principles of our society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.21
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a
municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious
exercise of authority. It would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount
to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of
public morals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a remedial
measure. It provided it with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case must be found in
the records, and, as has been set forth, none is even attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such
character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend
any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on due
process grounds to single out such features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment
of the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged vagueness.
4

Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challenged
ordinance for hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter, first-class motels being
required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled law
however, as far back as 1922 that municipal license fees could be classified into those imposed for
regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or
enterprises and for revenue purposes only.22 As was explained more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng
case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right to
exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license
fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the
former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be
unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such
discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage
in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the determination of the amount of
this kind of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have
frequently been upheld, especially in of licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees
have rarely been declared unreasonable.23
Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier
announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's police
power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by
the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of
subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for public purposes, just and uniform.25
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing
licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given to municipal
corporations in determining the amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if
it were viewed purely as a police power measure.26 The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close
with this pertinent citation from another decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffsappellees that the enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them of their lawful occupation and means
of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also
dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under certain
conditions is permitted x x x . And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in the community may be
deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of
the police power. As was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public
need and interest be affected by the exercise of the police power embark in these occupations subject to
the disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that power."27
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful
for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house,
tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours,
with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion. Again, such a
limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate
use to which such premises could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being devoted. How
could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a correspondence between the undeniable
existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, petitioners
cannot be unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which as pointed out
by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs through all these different
conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it
is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the
greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he
pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to
reasonable restraint by general law for the common good x x x The liberty of the citizen may be
restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the
proper scope of the police power."28
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state
5

x x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because
then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then
the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority
in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant
equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.29
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue deprivation of
freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle. The policy
of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of
intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest.31 What may be stressed sufficiently
is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most
rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.32 How justify then the allegation
of a denial of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by invoking the
principles of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that what seems
to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed and specific rather
than vague or uncertain. Petitioners, however, point to the requirement that a guest should give the
name, relationship, age and sex of the companion or companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of
the necessity for determining whether the companion or companions referred to are those arriving with
the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room With him at about the same time or
coming at any indefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as to
whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion of its owners or
operators; another proviso which from their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full rate
of payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It
may be asked, do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness
or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it. From Connally v. General Construction
Co.33 toAdderley v. Florida,34 the principle has been consistently upheld that what makes a statute
susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the
situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to all the
generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using
common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."35
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the arguments pressed
with such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged ordinance cannot be
considered a success. Far from it. Respect for constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so
uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. With
costs.