Spinozas Metaphysics

Baruch (or, in Latin, Benedict) de Spinoza (1632-1677)

was one of the most important rationalist philosophers in the early modern period, along with
Descartes, Leibniz, and Malebranche. Spinoza is also the most influential atheist in Europe
during this period. Atheist at the time meant someone who rejects the traditional Biblical
views concerning God and his relation to nature. In his most important book, titled Ethics
Demonstrated in a Geometrical Manner, Spinoza argues for a radically new picture of the
universe to rival the traditional Judeo-Christian one. Using a geometrical method similar to
Euclids Elements and later Newtons Principia, he argues that there is no transcendent and
personal God, no immortal soul, no free will, and that the universe exists without any
ultimate purpose or goal. Instead, Spinoza argues the whole of the natural world, including
human beings, follows one and the same set of natural laws (so, humans are not special), that
everything that happens could not have happened differently, that the universe is one
inherently active totality (which can be conceived of as either God or Nature), and that
the mind and the body are one and the same thing conceived in two ways.
Spinozas Ethics appeared provocative to his contemporaries. First, many of them found his
arguments clear and compelling. Spinoza begins Ethics by defining key terms and
identifying his assumptions. Most of these would have seemed commonplace to Spinozas
contemporaries. He then derives theorems, which he calls propositions, on the basis of
this foundation. Many of the philosophers and theologians who first read Spinozas Ethicsn
found these definitions and assumptions unproblematic, but were horrified by the theorems
which Spinoza proved on the basis of them. Second, by all accounts Spinoza was an
especially good man who lived a modest and virtuous life. The mere possibility of a virtuous
atheist, however, severed one of the most popular arguments in favor of traditional Biblical
religion: that without it, living a moral life was impossible.
This article examines some fundamental issues of Spinozas new atheistic metaphysics, and
it focuses on three of the most important and difficult aspects of Spinozas metaphysics: his
theory of substance monism, his theory of attributes, and his theory of conatus.

Table of Contents
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.

The Formal Structure of the Ethics

The Basic Metaphysical Picture: Substance, Attributes, and Modes
Substance Monism
1. Leibnizs Objection to Spinozas Substance Monism Argument
2. Why Does the One Substance Have Modes?
Attributes
1. Subjectivism
2. Objectivism
3. Modal Parallelism
Conatus
1. Conatus and Purposive Action
2. The Conatus Argument
References and Further Reading
1. Original Language
2. English Translations
3. Historical Studies
4. Philosophical Studies

1. The Formal Structure of the Ethics

The Ethics is broken into five parts:
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.

Of God
Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind
Of the Origin and Nature of the Affects
Of Human Bondage, or the Power of the Affects
Of the Power of the Intellect, or of Human Freedom

Part I concerns issues in general metaphysics (the existence of God, free will, the nature of
bodies and minds, etc.) Part II concerns two issues related to the mind: (i) what the mind is
and how it relates to the body, and (ii) a general theory of knowledge. In Part III, Spinoza
presents his theory of emotions (which he calls affects) and a fully deterministic human
psychology. In Parts IV and V, Spinoza presents his ethical theory.
Each part of the Ethics is broken into definitions of key terms, axioms (assumptions),
propositions (theorems proven on the basis of the definitions, axioms, and the previous
propositions), demonstrations (proofs), corollaries (where Spinoza often draws attention to
other claims which can be proven on the basis of his propositions, but which are not part of
his main argument), and scholia (where Spinoza breaks out of his rigorous structure to
comment, argue, or restate the demonstrated material in a more easily accessible way.)
To this classic geometrical structure, Spinoza adds three additions to the Ethics. (1) Spinoza
ends Parts I and IV with appendices. In these appendices he comments on the previous part,
clarifies his position, and adds new arguments. (2) In Part II and after proposition 13, Spinoza
interrupts his argument to include a short discussion on physics and the laws of motion. This
part of the Ethics is sometimes called the Physical Digression, Physical Interlude, or the
Short Treatise on Bodies. (3) At the end of Part III Spinoza includes an organized list of the
definition of the affects (emotions) as argued for in Part III.

When citing the Ethics begin with the Part number, then use the following shorthand:
a
d
l
post.
p
c
d
s
exp.

Axiom
Definition
Lemma
Postulate
Proposition
Corollary
demonstration
Scholium
Explanation

For example, to cite the demonstration of the 14th proposition of Part III one would write
3p14d. A number of minor variations exist. Some authors also put an E at the beginning
of the citation to stand for Ethics to distinguish the Ethics from Spinozas other book
written in a geometrical manner, the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy Demonstrated in a
Geometrical Manner (1663). For example, the demonstration of the 14th proposition of Part
III is often cited as E3p14d. Other scholars mark the part number with Roman numerals,
thus citing the proposition as IIIp14d or EIIIp14d.
So why does Spinoza utilize this cumbersome method of proof in the Ethics? Scholars have
given a number of different answers to this question. One common explanation concerns how
people thought about science in this period. In the 17th century, mathematics was the
paradigmatic science. It was widely admired for offering conclusive and incontrovertible
proofs which no rational person (who understood them) could reject. Many philosophers
attempted to replicate Euclids success in other areas and so found other sciences as
conclusive and demonstrable as mathematical science. For example, Hobbes attempted to
organize political concepts geometrically in his Leviathan. Descartes also considered the
possibility of organizing his entire philosophy geometrically in the Second Replies, though he
never made a serious attempt to do so.) Spinoza, however, geometrically reorganized the first
two books of Descartes Principles (along with other original material) in his first published
book: Principles of Cartesian Philosophy Demonstrated in a Geometrical Manner (1663).
Other scholars argue that there is a deeper reason for Spinozas use of the geometrical
method. The goal of the Ethics, Spinoza says, is to prove those things that can lead us, by
the hand, as it were, to the knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness
(Preface to Part II). Ethics is supposed to be a philosophical therapy which helps its readers
to overcome their passions and superstitions and become more rational. Working through the
proofs, Spinoza promotes these goals by forcing us to think carefully, and so promotes the
therapeutic aim of his book. For more on the purpose of the geometrical method see Wolfson
1958, I 3-32; Bennett 1988, 16-28; Garrett 2003; Nadler 2006, 35-51.

2. The Basic Metaphysical Picture: Substance, Attributes,

and Modes
According to Spinoza, everything that exists is either a substance or a mode (E1a1). A
substance is something that needs nothing else in order to exist or be conceived. Substances
are independent entities both conceptually and ontologically (E1d3). A mode or property is

something that needs a substance in order to exist, and cannot exist without a substance
(E1d5). For example, being furry, orange, hungry, angry, etc. are modes that need a substance
which is furry, orange, hungry, angry, etc. Hunger and patches of orange color cannot exist
floating around on their own, but rather, hunger and patches of orange color need something
(namely, a substance) to be hungry and have the orange color. Hunger and colors are,
therefore, dependent entities or modes.
According to almost all of Spinozas predecessors (including Aristotle and Descartes) there
are lots of substances in the universe, each with their own modes or properties. For example,
according to Descartes a cat is a substance which has the modes or properties of being furry,
orange, soft, etc. (Though some have argued that Descartes cannot actually individuate
multiple extended substances. See Curley 1988, 15-19; 141-2 n. 9.) Spinoza, however, rejects
this traditional view and argues instead that there is only one substance, called God or
Nature. Cats, dogs, people, rocks, etc. are not substances in Spinozas view, but rather,
cats, dogs, people, rocks, etc. are just modes or properties of one substance. This one
substance is simply people-like in places, rock-like in other places, chair-like in still other
places, etc.
One can think of substance as an infinite space. Some regions of this one space are hard and
brown (rocks), other regions of space are green, juicy, and soft (plants), while still other
regions are furry, orange, and soft (cats), etc. As a cat walks across the room all that happens
in Spinozas view is that different regions of space become successively furry, orange, and
soft (See Bennett 1984: 88-92 for more on space and the extended substance in Spinoza).
This one substance has an infinite number of attributes. An attribute is simply an essence; a
what it is to be that kind of thing. According to Descartes, every substance has only one
attribute: bodies have only the attribute of extension, and minds have only the attribute of
thought. Spinoza, however, argues against this claim that the one substance is absolutely
infinite and so it must exist in every way that something can exist. Thus, he infers that the one
substance must have an infinite number of attributes (E1p9). An attribute, according to
Spinoza, is just the essence of substance under some way of conceiving or describing the
substance (E1d4). When we consider substance one way, then we conceive of its essence as
extension. When we consider substance another way, then we conceive of its essence as
thought. (See Della Rocca 1996a: 164-167.) While substance has an infinite number of
different attributes, Spinoza argues that human beings only know about two of them:
extension and thought.

3. Substance Monism
The most distinctive aspect of Spinozas system is his substance monism; that is, his claim
that one infinite substanceGod or Natureis the only substance that exists. His argument
for this monism is his first argument in Part I of the Ethics. The basic structure of the
argument is as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Every substance has at least one attribute. (Premise 1, E1d4)

Two substances cannot share the same nature or attribute. (Premise 2, E1p5)
God has all possible attributes. (Premise 3, Definition of God, E1d6)
God exists. (Premise 4, E1p11)
Therefore, no other substance other than God can exist. (From 1-4, E1p14)

That is, there is only one substance (called God or Nature) which has all possible
attributes. No other substance can exist because if it existed it would have to share an
attribute with God, but it is impossible for two different substances to both have the same
attribute. Spinoza defends each of his four assumptions as follows:
The Argument for Premise One (E1d4)
If a substance existed which did not have any attributes, then (by Spinozas definition of
attribute at E1d4) the substance would not have an essence. However, according to Spinoza,
it makes no sense to claim that something exists which does not have an essence. Thus,
every substance has at least one attribute. This premise is not particularly controversial.
The Argument for Premise Two (E1p5)
Spinozas argument for the second premise (Two substances cannot share the same nature or
attribute) is much more controversial. Here Spinoza argues that if two substances share one
and the same attribute, then there is no way to tell the two substances apart. If substance A
and substance B both have attribute 1 as their nature, then in virtue of what are there two
different substances here? Why arent A and B just one substance? Since no cause can be
given to explain their distinctness, Spinoza infers that they must actually be the
same. Formally, the argument is as follows:
1. Two substances are distinguished from each other either by a difference in attributes
or a difference in modes. (Premise 1)
2. Substance is prior in nature to its modes. (Premise 2, E1p1)
3. If two substances A and B are indistinguishable, then they are identical. (Premise 3)
4. If substances A and B differ only in attributes, then A and B are two different
substances with different natures. (From 1 and the definition of attribute.)
5. If substances A and B differ only in modes and share an attribute, and if the modes are
put to one side and the substances are considered in themselves, then the two
substances would be indistinguishable. (From 1, 2)
6. But if substances A and B are indistinguishable, then they are identical. (From 3, 5)
7. Thus, no two substances can share a nature or attribute. (From 4, 6)
The Arguments for Premise Four (E1p11)
In the demonstration of E1p11, Spinoza explicitly provides a number of different proofs for
the existence of a substance with infinite attributes (namely, God.) One proof is a version of
the Ontological Argument also used by Anselm and Descartes. Spinozas argument is
interesting, however, because he provides a very different reason for claiming that the
essence of each substance includes existence. Spinozas Ontological Argument, once
unpacked, is as follows:
1. When two things have nothing in common, one cannot be the cause of the other
(Premise 1, E1p3).
2. It is impossible for two substances to have the same attribute (or essence) (Premise 2,
E1p5).
3. Two substances with different attributes have nothing in common (Premise
3, E1p6d).
4. Thus, one substance cannot cause another substance to exist (From 1, 2, 3. E1p6).

5. Either substances are caused to exist by other substances, or they exist by their own
nature (Premise 4, E1p7d).
6. Thus, substances must exist by their own nature (that is, the essence of a substance
must involve existence.) (From 4, 5. E1p7)
This argument differs from the Ontological Arguments offered by Anselm and Descartes in
that (i) Spinoza does not infer the existence of God from the claim that our idea of God
involves existence and (ii) Spinoza does not assume that existence is a perfection (and so a
property). Spinozas argument, therefore, can avoid some of the more common objections to
the Ontological proofs as formulated by Descartes and Anselm. See Earle 1973a and Earle
1973b for a partial defense of Spinozas Ontological Argument.

a. Leibnizs Objection to Spinozas Substance Monism Argument

Spinozas Argument for Substance Monism is generally deemed a failure by contemporary
philosophers. There are a number of ways to attack the argument. The most common way is
to reject Spinozas second premise (E1p5: That two substances cannot share the same nature
or attribute.) One of the most popular arguments against this promise was first presented by
Leibniz. Leibniz argued that whereby it might be impossible for two substances to have all
of their attributes in common (because then they would be indistinguishable), it may be
possible for two substances to share an attribute and yet differ by each having another
attribute that is not shared. For example, one substance may have attributes A and B and
another substance has attributes A and C. The two substances would be distinguishable
because each has an attribute the other lacks, but both substances would nevertheless share an
attribute. This objection was first presented by Leibniz to Spinoza himself. Though Spinoza
did not find the objection persuasive, he never offered an explicit reply. See Della Rocca
2002: 17-22 for a plausible solution on Spinozas behalf based upon the conceptual
independence of the attributes.

b. Why Does the One Substance Have Modes?

If Spinozas Substance Monism Argument were sound, it would prove that the only substance
which exists is God or Nature (a substance with an infinite number of attributes). But why
does this one substance have any finite modes (properties)? Spinoza provides an answer at
E1p16. Here Spinoza argues that from the necessity of the divine nature there must follow
infinitely many things in infinitely many ways (that is, everything which can fall under an
infinite intellect) (E1p16). Spinoza argues that the greater something is, the greater the
number of properties which follow from its nature or essence. For example, it follows from
the nature of a triangle that it has three sides. Why do triangles have interior angles of 180
degrees? Because of the kind of things that they are (that is, because of their essence.)
The greater the essence of the thing, the more properties that follow from it. Gods essence is
the greatest possible essence. Thus, the greatest possible number of properties (that is, an
infinite number) must follow from Gods essence or nature. Thus, an infinite number of
finite modes must follow from the essence of God in just the way that certain properties of
triangles (having interior angles of 180 degrees, for example) follow from the essence of a
triangle. Because a triangles essence is finite only a finite number of properties follow from
it; because Gods essence is infinite an infinite number of properties follow from it. Human
beings, chairs, tables, cats, dogs, trees, etc. are some of the properties that follow from Gods
essence or nature.

Spinoza claims that one important consequence of this proof is that modes are properties of
substance. The view that modes are properties of substance has been denied by at least one
prominent interpreter of Spinoza (Curley 1988: 31-39). Curleys view has, however, proven
unpopular (See Carriero 1999; Malamed 2009.) The dominant interpretation today is that
modes are properties of the one substance.

4. Attributes
Spinozas theory of the attributes (extension, thought, etc.) is the most original, difficult, and
controversial aspect of his metaphysics. According to Descartes, the attribute of a substance
is simply the substances essence (Principles I.53.) Given this definition, Descartes infers
that each substance has only one attribute. Spinoza modifies Descartess definition at E1d4
and states that by attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of a substance as
constituting its essence. The Latin here is per attributum intelligo id, quod intellectus de
substantia percipit, tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens. Spinoza then claims that the
one substance (God or Nature) has an infinite number of attributes (E1d6.) A number of
scholars have found it hard to understand how one substance could have multiple attributes
each one of which is what the intellect perceives as constituting its essence. Either
Spinoza is claiming that the one substance has multiple essences, or that the attributes are not
really the essence of the substance but only seem to be.
The interpretive problems with Spinozas theory of attributes begin with his definition. In the
definition he uses the word tanquam which can be correctly translated into English both as
as if and as as. If tanquam is translated as as if, then that translation suggests that the
attributes are not really the essence of substance but only seem to be the essence of
substance. If, however, tanquam is translated as as, then that translation would seem to
indicate that each attribute really is the essence of substance. The problem is then to explain
how we can have one substance with more than one essence. Thus, the first problem with
Spinozas theory of attributes is to explain the relation between the attributes and the essence
of substance.
According to some scholars (often called subjectivists) each attribute is not really the
essence of substance but merely seems to be. According to these scholars, substances
essence is in some way hidden from the intellect and unthinkable. All we can know is
how the essence of the one substance appears to the intellect (either as extension or as
thought.) According to other scholars (often called objectivists) each attribute really is the
essence of substance. The problem is then to explain how one substance can have multiple
essences and still remain one substance.
The second problem with Spinozas theory of attributes is to explain how the attributes are
related to one other. If each attribute really is the essence of the one substance, then how do
they relate to each other? Are they identical? Or is each attribute really different from every
other attribute? If they are identical, then why does the intellect distinguish them? If they are
different, then how can one substance have more than one essence? Some subjectivists (such
as Wolfson 1958: 142 ff.) argue that there is really only one attribute which is distinguished
wrongly into numerous attributes by the intellect. Objectivists, on the other hand, argue that
there is more than one attribute and that they are really distinct from each other.
In summary, there are two major problems with Spinozas theory of attributes:

1. The Attribute-Essence Problem: How do the attributes relate to the essence of

substance? Are they identical to the essence of substance or distinct?
2. The Attribute-Attribute Problem: How do the attributes relate to each other? Are they
identical or distinct?

a. Subjectivism
The most influential defense of the Subjectivist interpretation of the attributes is presented
by Wolfson 1958 Vol. 1: 142-157. Wolfson argues that
the two attributes appear to the mind as being distinct from each other. In reality, however,
they are one. For by [E1p10], attributes, like substance, are summa genera (conceived
through itself.) The two attributes must therefore be one and identical with
substance. Furthermore, the two attributes have not been acquired by substance after it had
been without them, nor are they conceived by the mind one after the other or deduced one
from the other. They have always been in substance together, and are conceived by our mind
simultaneously. Hence, the attributes are only different words expressing the same reality
and being of substance (Wolfson 1958 Vol. 1: 156.)
That is, substance has only one essence and that essence is the sum total of all of its
attributes. The attributes are all identical (and also identical with the substance itself). The
attributes are distinguished from one another merely conceptually (only different words
expressing the same reality), but in reality the attributes are all one and the same. The
essence of substance is therefore the one attribute extension-thought-etc. This one attribute
cannot be thought as it is, but is instead mentally broken into pieces and considered only
partially. Wolfson thus explicitly provides answers to both the Attribute-Essence Problem
and to the Attribute-Attribute Problem. In both cases Wolfson claims that the relation is
identity. Each attribute is identical to every other attribute (in reality, there is only one super
attribute) and the essence of substance is this one unthinkable super attribute. Wolfson
goes further, however, and also argues that substance is identical to this one unthinkable
super attribute.
A very different theory of attributes, which also goes by the name of Subjectivism, is
offered by Bennett. Bennett argues that the attributes do not constitute the essence of
substance at all. Instead the essence of substance is really the infinite series of finite
modes. The attributes merely appear to constitute the essence of substance. Bennett
disagrees with Wolfson in that Bennett believes that Nature really has extension and
thought, which really are distinct from one another, but that they are not really fundamental
properties, although they must be perceived as such by any intellect (Bennett 1984:
147.) Thus, Bennetts solution to the Attribute-Essence Problem is to claim that the essence
and attributes are distinct. But he differs from Wolfson in regard to the Attribute-Attribute
Problem. Here Bennett argues that the attributes are not identical (as Wolfson claims.)
One thing to note here is the looseness of the term Subjectivism. Both Bennett and
Wolfson are considered Subjectivists because they each deny at least one of the following
two claims:
1. The attributes are really distinct.
2. The attributes constitute the essence of substance.

Wolfson denies both; Bennett denies only the second.

b. Objectivism
There are significant problems with both Wolfsons and Bennetts Subjectivism. The
problem is that there is strong textual evidence in favor of the two claims:
1. The attributes are really distinct.
2. The attributes constitute the essence of substance.
The argument in favor of (i) is that Spinoza claims at E1p10d that all intellects can conceive
of the attributes as really distinct (that is, one without the help of the other.) Thus, even the
infinite intellect (that is, Gods Mind) must conceive of the attributes as really distinct. But
the infinite intellect understands everything exactly as it is
(E1p32). Therefore, the attributes must be really distinct. This argument has persuaded
almost all recent scholars that (i) is true.
The argument in favor of (ii) also relies on the infinite intellect. Spinoza claims at E2p3 that
the infinite intellect has an adequate and true idea of Gods essence. But on both Wolfsons
and Bennetts subjectivist accounts that is not true. On Wolfsons account the infinite
intellect cannot have an adequate idea of the one super attribute extension-thought-etc. The
infinite intellect can only have an idea of the different fragmented pieces, namely, extension,
thought, etc. On Bennetts account the essence of substance isnt even an attribute. Both
scholars have to admit that the infinite intellect does not have an adequate idea of the essence
of substance, which contradicts Spinozas claim at E2p3. See Della Rocca 1996a: 157-171
for more on the case against Subjectivism.
If both claims (i) and (ii) are true on Spinozas view, then the attributes are really distinct,
and yet each one constitutes the essence of substance. This is a significant problem. How
can there be only one substance if this substance has multiple distinct essences? Edwin
Curley answers this question by claiming both that the attributes of substance satisfy the
definition of substance (Curley 1988: 29) and that the attributes come together to form one
essence because this particular complex is a complex of very special elements (Curley
1988: 30.) The attributes on Curleys view are a collection of an infinite number of
substances that come together in much the same way that numbers come together to form a
number line. The number line is a unity composed of an infinite amount of very special
elements.
Thus, Curleys solution to the Attribute-Essence Problem is to claim that each attribute
pertains to the essence of substance. Concerning the Attribute-Attribute Problem, Curley
claims that the attributes are really distinct from each other. A similar view may also have
been held by Gueroult 1968 Vol. 1. Objectivism is often characterized by three theses:
1. The attributes are really distinct.
2. The attributes constitute the essence of substance.
3. The attributes are substances.
The third claim, however, has been disputed by some more recent Objectivists. Della Rocca
in his 1996 book Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza offers what is
currently the most influential objectivist interpretation of Spinozas theory of the

attributes. Della Roccca accepts claims (i) and (ii), but rejects the idea that attributes are
themselves substances. Della Roccas interpretation centers on the idea of referential
opacity. Della Rocca claims that a context is referentially opaque if the truth value of the
sentence resulting from completing the context does depend on which particular term is used
to refer to that object (Della Rocca 1996a, 122.) That is, the truth value of a particular
sentence depends upon how the objects in the sentence are described. If the description
changes, then the truth value of the sentence may change too. For example, consider the
morning star and the evening star. The following sentence is true: Bob believes that the
morning star rises in the morning. However, if you replace the morning star without
another equally correct description of the same object, then the sentence turns out
false. Because Bob does not know that the morning star and evening star are actually the
same thing (namely, Venus) the following sentence is false: Bob believes that the evening
star rises in the morning. Because the truth-value of the sentence depends upon the
description of Venus used in the sentence, this context is referentially opaque.
Della Rocca provides the example of a spy. One may know that there is a spy in the
community and even hate this spy, without knowing that the spy is ones brother. In this case
the truth-value of sentences such as I hate the spy, I believe that the spy is a spy, etc. all
depend upon the term used to pick out the spy. If we replace the spy with the term my
brother, the truth value of these two sentences changes: I hate my brother, I believe that my
brother is a spy. Because the truth-value changes when the term used to pick out the person
changes, these contexts are referentially opaque.
Della Rocca believes that referential opacity is the key to understanding Spinozas theory of
attributes. The idea here is to understand that attribute contexts are referentially opaque. So,
the sentence the essence of substance is thought and the sentence the essence of substance
is extension are referentially opaque contexts. Della Rocca claims that Spinozas definition
of attribute should be interpreted as saying: by attribute I understand that which constitutes
the essence of a substance under some description or way of conceiving that substance
(Della Rocca 1996a, 166.) When substance is considered in one way, then the essence of
substance is thought; when substance is considered in another way, then the essence of
substance is extension. What the essence of substance is taken to be will depend upon how
the substance is being considered.
By arguing that attribute contexts are referentially opaque, Della Rocca believes that he can
avoid the central problem of Subjectivism: the claim that God misunderstands his own
essence (contra E2p3). Thus, though Della Roccas view may at first sound like a form of
Subjectivism, it avoids the central problem. The attributes are really distinct on Della
Roccas interpretation in that each attribute is the essence of substance under some
description of that substance: each really distinct description gives one a different
essence. The attributes also constitute the essence of substance on this view, so long as we
add the phrase under some description or way of conceiving of that substance to the
end. Della Rocca, however, does not have to accept that attributes are themselves
substances. An attribute is not a substance according to this view (contra Curley); an
attribute is simply the essence of a substance under some description or way of conceiving of
that substance.

c. Modal Parallelism

How one interprets Spinozas theory of attributes will significantly affect the rest of his
metaphysics. For example, one of Spinozas most important claims is that the order and
connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things (E2p7.) That is, the
order of modes under the attribute of extension is the same as the order of modes under the
attribute of thought. Spinoza explains this idea in an important and controversial
scholium. He claims that
a circle existing in nature and the idea of the existing circle, which is also in God, are one and
the same thing, which is explained through different attributes. Therefore, whether we
conceive nature under the attribute of Extension, or under the attribute of Thought, or under
any other attribute, we shall find one and the same order, or one and the same connection of
causes, i.e., that the same things follow one another (E2p7s.)
The view that one and the same order exists under each of the attributes is called modal
parallelism. The word parallelism is used because not all scholars believe that the
relationship between a body and the mind of that body is identity. How one interprets modal
parallelism in Spinoza will depend upon ones interpretation of Spinozas theory of the
attributes. Two of the most developed and influential recent interpretations of Spinozas
parallelism are Bennett 1984 (who argues that the mind and body are not identical) and Della
Rocca 1996a (who argues that the mind and body are identical).
Bennett and others reject the numerical identity interpretation of parallelism on the grounds
that it commits Spinoza to a contradiction. Spinoza claims that there is no causal interaction
between minds and bodies at E3p2. If he then claimed (so the argument goes) that minds and
bodies are identical, then he would seemingly be committed to the following contradiction: if
mind M causally interacts with mind N and body 1 is identical with mind M, then it seems as
though body 1 must also causally interact with mind N (thus violating Spinozas explicit
claims at E3p2.) This argument is presented by both Bennett 1984, 141 and Delahunty 1985,
197 to argue against the identity of minds and bodies in Spinoza.
But Spinoza does say that the mind and the body are one and the same thing conceived in
two ways (E2p7s). What could that mean if not that minds and bodies are identical? Bennett
argues that in Spinoza a mind and a body merely share a part (which he calls a transattribute mode). Minds and bodies are not fully identical. (See Bennett 1984, 141). One
trans-attribute mode can combine both with the attribute of thought (creating a mind) and
the attribute of extension (creating a body) at the same time. Thus, my body is a transattribute mode combined with the attribute of extension; my mind is that same trans-attribute
mode combined with the attribute of thought. Bennett thus rejects the interpretation of
parallelism whereby a body and a mind are one and the same thing. A body and its parallel
mind merely share a part (namely, a trans-attribute mode).
By contrast Della Rocca argues that minds and bodies in Spinoza are fully identical. Della
Rocca argues that the notion of referential opacity (see the Objectivism section above) can
allow Spinoza to accept both the identity of minds and bodies without accepting that minds
and bodies causally interact. Della Rocca claims that causal contexts in Spinoza are
referentially opaque. That is, x is the cause of y only under certain descriptions or ways of
thinking about x. It is not the case that the sentence x causes y is true under all possible
ways of describing or conceiving of x. For example, x under a mental description caused y
can be true while x under a physical description caused y is false. Thus, Della Rocca
argues that the claim that minds and bodies are identical does not entail that minds and bodies

causally interact because whether x caused y or not depends upon how x is described. (See
Della Rocca 1996a, 118-140, 157-167.)

5. Conatus
In Part III of the Ethics, Spinoza argues that each mode (that is, every physical and mental
thing) strives to persevere in its being (E3p6.) The word translated into English as
strives is the Latin conatus. (Conatus is also sometimes translated as
endeavor.) From the claim that every mode strives to persevere in its being, Spinoza infers
that each modes conatus is the actual essence (E3p7.) That is, what it is to be a cat is just to
strive in a certain cat-like way. What it is to be a desk is for the complex body to strive in a
certain desk-like way. Every thing that existsevery particle, rock, plant, animal, planet,
solar system, idea, mind, etc.is striving to survive. From the claim that the essence of
every mode is its striving to persist Spinoza derives much of his physics, psychology, moral
philosophy, and political theory in Parts III, IV, and V of the Ethics.
Despite the importance of Spinozas theory of conatus, there are a number of interpretive and
philosophical difficulties with it and Spinozas argument for it. First, there is the widely
debated issue of whether Spinozas theory of conatus should be interpreted teleologically or
non-teleologically. Is each mode trying to survive? Are modes goal-oriented things? Or is
Spinoza simply claiming that everything that modes do helps them to survive (while not
claiming that modes are acting purposively)?
Second, Spinozas argument for the theory of conatus (which takes place in Part III of the
Ethics from propositions 4 to 6) has been subject to considerable scrutiny and many scholars
have argued that it is multiply invalid. A few recent scholars have, however, attempted to
defend Spinozas argument for his conatus theory against the charge of invalidity. Garrett
2002, for example, provides an influential defense of the validity of the argument. Likewise,
Waller (2009) provides a partial defense of the first third of the argument.

a. Conatus and Purposive Action

Spinoza clearly denies the claim that God or Nature has a purpose or plan for the
universe. The universe simply exists because it could not fail to exist. God did not make the
universe with any predetermined goal or plan in mind; instead the universe simply follows
from Gods essence in just the way that the properties of a triangle follow from the essence of
the triangle (E1p16, E1p32c1, E1p33). In the Appendix to Part I of the Ethics Spinoza claims
that
[People] findboth in themselves and outside themselvesmany means that are very
helpful in seeking their own advantage, for example, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing,
plants and animals for food, the sun for light, the sea for supporting fish. Hence, they
consider all natural things as means to their own advantage. And knowing that they had
found these means, not provided them for themselves, they had reason to believe that there
was someone else who had prepared the means for their use And since they had never
heard anything about the temperament of these rules, they had to judge from
themselves. Hence, they maintained that the gods direct all things for the use of men in order
to bind men to them and be held by men in the highest honor. But while they sought to
show that Nature does nothing in vain (that is, nothing not of use to men), they seem to have

shown only that Nature and the gods are as mad as man. Not many words will be
required to show that Nature has no end set before it, and that all final causes are nothing but
human fictions (Ethics Part I, Appendix.)
The earth does not exist so that we may live on it. The universe is not designed for the good
of human beings. The universe has no purpose; it simply exists. These ideas were
revolutionary in the seventeenth century and remain controversial even today.
But some scholars (most influentially, Bennett 1984) argue that Spinozas rejection of
purpose or goals in nature goes much further than a simple rejection of Divine purposes or
goalsBennett argue that Spinoza rejects all purposive or goal directed activities
whatsoever, including human purposive action. The claim that human actions are not
purposive or goal-oriented is startling and presents us with a very different theory of what
human beings are.
To understand the impact of this claim, consider the following example: if I walk across the
room to get a drink of water, we might believe that this activity is purposive or goaloriented. I am walking across the room in order to get a glass of water. My behavior is
partly explained in the common sense view by my goal or purpose (that is, getting a drink of
water.) Bennett 1984, 240-251, however, claims that according to Spinoza this explanation
of my behavior must be wrong. According to Bennetts Spinoza, I do not walk across the
room in order to get water. Rather I walk across the room because my organs were organized
in a certain way such that when light strikes my eyes, it moves certain parts of my brain,
which in turn moves certain tendons in my legs, which in turn causes my legs to move back
and forth in certain ways, carrying my body to the counter, moving my hand toward the water
fountain, etc. That is, my behavior can be fully and completely understood mechanistically,
just like a watch. The springs inside a watch do not move so that the watch may indicate the
correct time, rather the clock indicates the correct time because the springs and levers move
in a certain way. Similarly with human beings, they do not walk in order to get to certain
places; they get to certain places because they walk. (When considering a human being under
the attribute of thought, Spinoza would claim that certain ideas follow logically from other
ideas in just the way that certain effects follow necessarily from certain causes in the physical
world.) In just the way that the universe exists without any purpose or goal, so every action
performed by every human similarly is done for no purpose or goal. We do what we do
simply because we could not fail toour actions simply follow from the organization of our
many complex parts.
Bennetts interpretation of Spinoza as denying all purposive or goal-oriented action is
controversial because Spinoza does claim in a number of different places that while the whole
of nature has no purpose or ultimate goal, individuals do act purposively. In the Appendix to
Part I, where Spinoza makes his clearest claims against Divine purposes, he also claims that
men act always on account of an end. This passage and other similar ones have been a
problem for Bennetts interpretation. (See Curley 1990 and Bennett 1990 for more on this
debate.)
The issue of whether purposive action is possible is important to the interpretation of
Spinozas theory of conatus. Does Spinozas theory of conatus entail that every physical
thingevery animal, plant, rock, planet, solar system, idea, and mindacts in order to
persevere in its own being? Is all of nature goal-oriented, even though the whole of nature is
not? Some (including Garrett 1999) think so. If Garrett is right, then Spinozas physical

theory may be a lot closer to Aristotles than it is to Descartes. Spinoza does not seem fully
consistent on the point. In the words of one recent scholar, Spinoza is having trouble getting
the blind efficient causality of the new science and the end-governed efficient causality of
human activity into the same frame, so to speak (Carriero 2005, 146.) When Spinoza
attempts to treat all of nature, including human behavior and emotions, in a completely
deterministic scientific wayas if human beings were just complicated clockshe struggles
to remain consistent.

b. The Conatus Argument

The argument for Spinozas claim that everything strives to persevere in its own being is
found at the very beginning of Part III of the Ethics. The argument is usefully summarized
by Garrett 2002 as follows:
1. The definition of a thing affirms, and does not deny, the things essence, or it posits
the things essence, and does not take it away.
2. While we attend only to the thing itself, and not to external causes, we shall not be
able to find anything in it which can destroy it. (from 1)
3. 3p4 Nothing can be destroyed except through an external cause. (from 2)
4. If [things insofar as they can destroy one another] could agree with one another, or be
in the same subject at once, then there could be something in the same subject which
could destroy it.
5. [That there could be something in the same subject which could destroy it] is absurd.
(from 3)
6. 3p5 Things are of a contrary nature, that is, cannot be in the same subject, insofar as
one can destroy the other. (from 4-5)
7. 1p25c Singular things are modes by which Gods attributes are expressed in a
certain and determinate way.
8. 1p34 Gods power is his essence itself.
9. Singular things are modes that express, in a certain and determinate way, Gods
power, by which God is and acts. (from 7-8)
10. No thing has anything in itself by which it can be destroyed, or which takes its
existence away. (from 3)
11. [Each thing] is opposed to everything which can take its existence away. (from 6)
12. 3p6 Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being
(from 9-10).
That is, Spinoza begins by arguing that no thing can destroy itself (E3p4). He argues for this
claim on the basis of the claim that the definition affirms and does not deny the things
essence. From the claim that no thing can destroy itself, Spinoza then infers that no two
things which can destroy each other can be parts of the same whole (E3p5.) From this claim
Spinoza infers that each thing must strive to persevere in its own being (E3p6).
There seem to be numerous invalid inferences here. The first occurs right at the beginning of
the argument. In the first three lines, Spinoza infers that since a definition of something does
not contain anything inconsistent with the thing, that a thing contains nothing contrary to its
own nature. But this inference seems invalid. If we understand a definition to be a statement
of a things essence (see E2d2), then it does validly follow that the essence includes nothing
inconsistent with itself (if the essence were internally inconsistent, then it could not
exist.) But it does not follow that a thing cannot have certain accidental properties (not

mentioned in the definition) which are capable of destroying the thing. Thus, Spinoza seems
to mistakenly infer a claim about the whole thing (both essential and accidental properties)
from a premise which merely concerns the essence. (See Bennett 1984, 234-237; Della
Rocca 1996b, 202-206. For a recent defense of Spinozas argument see Waller forthcoming.)
Another invalid inference occurs toward the end of the argument in lines 6 and 11. Spinoza
infers that since two things cannot both be parts of the same whole, they must actively oppose
one another. However, perhaps they could simply be in a passive relation to one another. It
is one thing to passively resist, and it is quite another to actively resist. (See Garber 1994,
61-63 for more on this objection and its roots in Leibniz.) A few recent scholars have
attempted to respond to these charges on Spinozas behalf. See, for example, Garrett 2002.

6. References and Further Reading

a. Original Language

Gebhart, Carl. (ed.) Spinoza Opera. (Heidelberg: Carl Winters, 1925.)

o This is the standard original language edition of Spinozas works.

b. English Translations

Edwin Curley, trans. The Collected Works of Spinoza Vol. 1. (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1985.)
o This translation is the standard English translation.
R.H.M. Elwes, trans. On the Improvement of the Understanding, The Ethics,
Correspondence. (New York: Dover, 1955.)
o An out-of-date English translation first published in the nineteenth century.
Samuel Shirley, trans. and Michael Morgan, editor. Spinoza: Complete Works.
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002.)
o The only single volume English translation of Spinozas complete works
currently available. Shirleys translation is often much easier to read, but a
little less accurate than Curleys.

c. Historical Studies

Israel, Jonathan. Radical Enlightenment. (New York: Oxford, 2001.)

o This book is the most extensive and authoritative historical study of the rise
and influence of Spinoza and Spinozism during the Enlightenment (16501750.) Israel argues that Spinoza is the one of the key figures of the Radical
Enlightenment.
Nadler, Steven. Spinoza: A Biography. (New York, Cambridge, 1999.)
o This is the most authoritative biography of Spinoza.
Stewart, Matthew. The Courtier and the Heretic. (W.W. Norton: 2006.)
o This book is an entertaining novel for the non-specialist on the relationship
between Leibniz and Spinoza.

d. Philosophical Studies

Bennett, Jonathan. A Study of Spinozas Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1984.)

An influential and often critical study of Spinoza. The book is widely cited in
secondary literature. Much of the recent scholarship on Spinoza has been an
attempt to defend Spinoza against Bennetts criticisms.
Bennett, Jonathan. Spinoza and Teleology: A Reply to Curley in Spinoza: Issues
and Directions. Edited by Edwin Curley and Pierre-Francois Moreau. (New York:
E.J. Brill, 1990), p. 53-57.
o An important defense of the view that there is no purposive action in Spinoza.
Carriero, John. On the Relationship Between Mode and Substance in Spinozas
Metaphysics in The Rationalists: Critical Essays on Descartes, Spinoza, and
Leibniz. Edited by Derk Pereboom. (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), p.
131-164.
o This article defends the claim that modes are individual accidents or
tropes as opposed to universals (as Bennett maintains.)
Carriero, John. Spinoza on Final Causality in Oxford Studies in Early Modern
Philosophy Vol. II. Edited by Daniel Garber and Steven Nadler. (New York:
Claredon Press, 2005), 105-148.
o This article concerns the metaphysics of causation in early modern philosophy
and argues that the rejection of final causes in the early modern period forces a
change in the conception of efficient causality. The article clarifies different
issues related to the notion of teleology in Spinoza.
Curley, Edwin. Spinozas Metaphysics. (MA: Harvard University Press, 1969.)
o Curley argues in this book for a controversial interpretation of the modesubstance relation. Instead of arguing that modes are properties or tropes, he
argues that they are merely causally dependent entities. This conclusion has
been widely criticism and is currently unpopular.
Curley, Edwin. Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinozas Ethics.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.)
o A more recent defense of Curleys controversial interpretation of Spinoza
which replies to many of the criticisms offered by Bennett and others.
Curley, Edwin. On Bennetts Spinoza: the Issue of Teleology in Spinoza: Issues
and Directions. Edited by Edwin Curley and Pierre-Francois Moreau. (New York:
E.J. Brill, 1990), p. 39-52.
o A critique of Bennetts view that there is no purposive action in Spinoza.
Della Rocca, Michael. Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza. (New
York: Oxford, 1996a.)
o This book is one of the most influential books on Spinoza written in English in
the last thirty years. In this book Della Rocca argues for a new interpretation
of the attributes, defends the mind-body identity thesis, and works out the
necessary and sufficient conditions for representation in Spinoza.
Della Rocca, Michael. Spinozas Metaphysical Psychology in The Cambridge
Companion to Spinoza. Edited by Don Garrett. (New York: Cambridge, 1996b.)
o A study of Spinozas deterministic psychology. One of the most influential
parts of this study is Della Roccas analysis of various possible interpretations
of E3p6.
Della Rocca, Michael. Spinozas Substance Monism in Spinoza: Metaphysical
Themes. Edited by Olli Koistinen and John Biro. (New York: Oxford, 2002), p. 1137.
o This article defends Spinozas argument for substance monism from a number
of common objections.
Della Rocca, Michael. Spinoza (Routledge Philosophers Series). (Routledge: 2008.)

Della Rocca argues for a double use of the Principle of Sufficient Reason in
Spinoza. First, everything has an explanation. Second, that explanation can
be given in terms of explanatory concepts. Della Rocca uses this double use
of the Principle of Sufficient Reason to interpret many of Spinozas more
difficult doctrines.
Earle, William. The Ontological Argument in Spinoza reprint in Spinoza: A
Collection of Critical Essays. Edited by Marjorie Grene. (Garden City: Anchor Press,
1973a), p. 213-219.
o A limited defense of Spinozas ontological argument.
Earle, William. The Ontological Argument in Spinoza: Twenty Years Later in
Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays. Edited by Marjorie Grene. (Garden City:
Anchor Press, 1973b), p. 220-226.
o A meditation on the ontological argument and various misinterpretations of it.
Garrett, Aaron. Meaning in Spinozas Method. (Cambridge: 2003.)
o This book is the most extensive and authoritative study of Spinozas
geometrical method. Garrett argues that the method has moral import and is
supposed to help readers view the world and themselves in a different way.
Garrett, Don. Teleology in Spinoza and Early Modern Rationalism in New Essays
on the Rationalists. Edited by Rocco J. Gennaro and Charles Huenemann. (New
York: Oxford, 1999), p. 310-335.
o This article defends an Aristotelian interpretation of Spinozas theory of
teleology.
Garrett, Don. Spinozas Conatus Argument in Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes.
Edited by Olli Koistinen and John Biro. (New York: Oxford, 2002), p. 127-158.
o An extremely influential defense of the validity of Spinozas Conatus
Argument. Garrett bases his interpretation on a novel theory of inherence.
Gueroult, Martial. Spinoza. 2 Volumes. (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1968, 1974.)
o An extremely influential two volume work among both French and English
scholars on the first two parts of Spinozas Ethics. Gueroult presents the
classic case against the Subjectivism of Wolfson. These volumes have not to
date been translated into English.
Kulstad, Mark. Leibniz, Spinoza, and Tschirnhaus: Metaphysics a Trois, 16751676 in Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes. Edited by Olli Koistinen and John
Biro. (New York: Oxford, 2002), p. 221-240.
o An interesting and useful analysis of the relationship between Leibniz,
Tschirnhaus, and Spinoza during a critical period in Leibnizs philosophical
development.
Melamed, Yitzhak. Spinozas Metaphysics of Substance: The Substance-Mode
Relation as a Relation of Inherence and Predication, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research (1): 2009. 17-82
o In this article Melamed argues against Curleys interpretation of modes and in
favor of the claim that modes are properties that both inhere in substance and
are predicated of substance.
Nadler, Steven. Spinozas Ethics: An Introduction. (New York: Cambridge, 2005.)
o A good general introduction to Spinozas Ethics which takes into account
much of the recent scholarship.
Pruss, Alexander. The Principle of Sufficient Reason. (New York: Cambridge, 2007.)
o A recent defense of a weakened form of the Principle of Sufficient
Reason. Pruss both defends the PSR against all of the classical objections to it
and provides a number of arguments in favor of it.

Waller, Jason. Spinoza on the Incoherence of Self-Destruction, British Journal for

the History of Philosophy, 17 (3) 2009, 507-523
o This article is a defense of the validity of Spinozas demonstration of E3p4
(No thing can be destroyed except through an external cause.) Waller
argues that the conclusion follows validly given Spinozas views on causation
and destruction.
Wolfson, Harry. The Philosophy of Spinoza, Vols 1 and 2. (New York: Meridian
Books, 1958.)
o Wolfsons book contains the classic statement of subjectivism. The
scholarship of the book is extremely impressive, however, Wolfsons
conclusions are often criticized for providing a reductionist account of
Spinoza.