Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Salvatierra, et al vs. CA
The registration of an instrument in the Office of the Register of Deeds
constitutes constructive notice to the whole world, and, therefore, discovery
of the fraud is deemed to have taken place at the time of registration. Such
registration is deemed to be a constructive notice that the alleged fiduciary
or trust relationship has been repudiated. It is now settled that an action on
an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the date the
right of action accrued.
The complaint for reconveyance was filed by the Longalong spouses on
November 22, 1985, only five (5) years after the issuance of the O.C.T. No. 04221 over Lot No. 26 in the name of Anselmo Salvatierra. Hence prescription
has not yet set in.
the real owner of the registered land. The Torrens System is intended to
guarantee the integrity and conclusiveness of the certificate of registration
but it cannot be used for the perpetuation of fraud against the real owner of
the registered land.
LU V MANIPON
Before acquiring the mother lot from the bank, he knew of respondents
claim of ownership and occupation
Registration is not the equivalent of title. Under the Torrens system,
registration only gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land.
It was not established as a means of acquiring title to private land because it
merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership.
Equally important, under Section 44 of the Property Registration Decree
(Presidential Decree No. 1529), every registered owner receiving a certificate
of title in pursuance of a decree of registration and every subsequent
purchaser of registered land taking such certificate for value and in good
faith shall hold the same free from all encumbrances, except those noted on
the certificate and enumerated therein.
True, the purchaser of a registered land is not required to go behind the title
to determine the condition of the property. However, a purchaser cannot
close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard
and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no
defect in the title of the vendor. His mere refusal to believe that such defect
exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a
defect in his vendors title, will not make him an innocent purchaser for
value, if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it
appears that he had such notice of the defect as would have led to its
discovery had he acted with that measure of precaution which may
reasonably be required of a prudent man in a like situation.
All told, the right of a buyer to rely upon the face of the title certificate and to
dispense with the need of inquiring further is upheld only when the party
concerned had no actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should
impel a reasonably cautious man to conduct further inquiry.
C. PROCEEDINGS IN ORIGINAL REGISTRATION UNDER THE
TORRENS SYSTEM
PURPOSE OF TORRENS SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION
prime purpose: to decree land titles that shall be final, irrevocable and
undiputable.
The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take
notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.
REGISTRATION ONLY CONFIRMS EXISTING TITLE
System for registration of land only and not a system established for the
acquisition of land.
LAWS GOVERNING LAND REGISTRATION
PUBLIC LAND ACT (voluntary)
PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE (voluntary)
CADASTRAL ACT (compulsory)
IPRA LAW (voluntary)
PROCEEDINGS ARE JUDICIAL AND IN REM
REGISTRATION UNDER THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE
WHO MAY APPLY:
1.Those in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession of patrimonial
property of state under bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier
2.Those who acquired ownership of private land by prescription
3.Those who acquired ownership of private lands by right of accretion
4.Those who acquired ownership in any manner provided for by law
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. IAC and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC.,
Bought from the dumagat tribe
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the
time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then
still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the
other hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional
prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations
obviously does not apply.
open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed
by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite
period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land
and becomes private property
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite
immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually
confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious
10
question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the
1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or
acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of socalled "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that corporations
could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The
purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis
of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain
cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate
transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous
circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The
Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of said period, ipso jure.
Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said
corporation's holding or owning private land.
NATIVIDAD V CA AND RP
TCMC
Under the facts of this case and pursuant to the above rulings, the parcels of land in question had already been converted
to private ownership through acquisitive prescription by the predecessors-in-interest of TCMC when the latter purchased
them in 1979. All that was needed was the confirmation of the titles of the previous owners or predecessors-in-interest of
TCMC.
Being already private land when TCMC bought them in 1979, the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against corporations
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain except through lease (Article XIV, Section 11, 1973 Constitution) did not
apply to them for they were no longer alienable lands of the public domain but private property.
The Director's contention that a corporation may not apply for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act
141, the Public Land Act, was disposed of in the Acme case where this Court ruled that the defect in filing the confirmation
proceedings in the name of a corporation was simply an "accidental circumstance, ... in nowise affecting the substance and
merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings." (Director of Lands vs. IAC and Acme Plywood
& Veneer Co., Inc., 146 SCRA 509, 522.) Since the petitioners could have had their respective titles confirmed prior to the
sale to TCMC, it was not necessary for the corporation to take the circuitous route of assigning to natural persons its rights
to the lots for the purpose of complying, on paper, with the technicality of having natural persons file the applications for
confirmation of title to the private lands.
11
RP V CA AND LUCENA
A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who will
always be one at a time), in some particular station, who are incorporated by
law in order to give them some legal capacities and advantages, particulary
that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons they could not have had. In
this sense, the King is a sole corporation; so is a bishop, or deans distinct
from their several chapters
There is no doubt that a corporation sole by the nature of its Incorporation is
vested with the right to purchase and hold real estate and personal property.
It need not therefore be treated as an ordinary private corporation because
whether or not it be so treated as such, the Constitutional provision involved
will, nevertheless, be not applicable.
IMPERFECT TITLE/TITLE IN FEE SIMPLE
a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the registration proceedings must be made. If they
were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative.
If, on the other hand, they were already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private
corporation or association obviously does not apply.
12
prescription. Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such
express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains
property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition
by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared
by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run.
13
PRESCRIPTION LACHES
Effect of delay
Fact of delay
Matter of time
Question of
inequity of
permitting a
claim to be
enforced, this
inequity
being founded on
some change in
the condition of
the property or
the
relation of the
parties
Statutory
Not statutory
14
15
when the reconstitution is based on an extant owners duplicate TCT, the main
concern is the authenticity and genuineness of the certificate, which could best be
determined or contested by the government agencies or offices concerned. The
adjoining owners or actual occupants of the property covered by the TCT are
hardly in a position to determine the genuineness of the certificate; hence, their
participation in the reconstitution proceedings is not indispensable and notice to
them is not jurisdictional. (but CAs decision already final and executory)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ASSOCIACION BENEVOLA de CEBU ET AL
It is also worthy to note at this point that the adjudication of the land in a registration or
cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one
year after the entry of the final decree. As long as the final decree is not issued, and the
one year within which it may be revised has not elapsed, the decision remains under the
control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after
hearing, may set aside the decision or decree or adjudicate the land to another party
The rule is established that in land registration cases, the appellant must show that his
rights or interests have been prejudiced by the decision appealed from; and that he
challenged the application for registration, or participated in the proceedings before his
appeal may be properly entertained. This has been complied with in this case.
16
Assuming in gratia argumenti that the opposition was not filed on time, nevertheless, an
oppositor is still allowed to present evidence to prove ownership of the disputed land
despite the declaration of general default against him provided that a decision has not
been rendered or that a decree of registration has not been issued in this case
GOMEZ VS CA ET AL
Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration
proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration
of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration. 9 This Court, in several
decisions, has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land
Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from
date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court
rendering it.
Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must be stated in
convenient form for transcription upon the certificate of title and must contain an
accurate technical description of the land. This requires technical men. Moreover, it
frequently occurs that only portions of a parcel of land included in an application are
ordered registered and that the limits of such portions can only be roughly indicated
in the decision of the court. In such cases amendments of the plans and sometimes
additional surveys become necessary before the final decree can be entered. That
can hardly be done by the court itself; the law very wisely charges the Chief Surveyor
of the General Land Registration Office with such duties (Administrative Code, section
177).
Thus, the duty of respondent land registration officials to render reports is not limited to the
period before the court's decision becomes final, but may extend even after its finality but
not beyond the lapse of one (1) year from the entry of the decree.
It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in
conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion
in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of
the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court
and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. 12 They are specifically called upon
to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings ."
LUCERO V LOOT
there was a final decree in a land registration case which arose from a decision promulgated
in 1938, the final decree being issued on October 29, 1941. It was not incorrect for the lower
court to state, therefore, that "the issuance of a writ of possession is only a matter of course
if nothing in the past has been issued in favor of the registered owner." 11 It is equally true, as
likewise mentioned therein, that there is "no period of prescription as to the issuance of a
writ of possession, ..."12In Pasay Estate Co. v. Del Rosario,13 it has been made clear that the
purpose of the statutory provision empowering the then Court of Land Registration, now the
ordinary courts of first instance, to enforce its orders, judgments or decrees in the same way
that the judiciary does is so that the winning party could be placed in possession of the
property covered by such decree. Thereby, there would be an avoidance of the
inconvenience and the further delay to which a successful litigant would be subjected if he
were compelled "to commence other actions in other courts for the purpose of securing the
17
18
SERRA VS CA
In a land registration case, a writ of possession may be issued only pursuant to a decree of
registration in an original land registration proceedings "not only against the person who has
been defeated in a registration case but also against anyone adversely occupying the land
or any portion thereof during the proceedings up to the issuance of the decree." It cannot
however, be issued in a petition for reconstitution of an allegedly lost or destroyed certificate
of title. Reconstitution does not confirm or adjudicate ownership over the property covered
by the reconstituted title as in original land registration proceedings where, in the latter, a
writ of possession may be issued to place the applicant-owner in possession.
TUMIBAY VS SORO
As a general rule, the writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion of the
decision to be executed; an execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original
judgment or award. The settled general principle is that a writ of execution must conform
strictly to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated, 13 and may not vary the
terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment
sought to be executed.14
Nonetheless, we have held that a judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of
the decision, but extends as well to those necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto.15 Thus, in Perez v. Evite,16 where the ownership of a parcel of land was decreed in
the judgment, the delivery of possession of the land was considered included in the decision
where the defeated party's claim to possession was based solely on his claim of ownership.
In Buag v. Court of Appeals,21 we explained that a judgment for the delivery or restitution of
property is essentially an order to place the prevailing party in possession of the property. If
the defendant refuses to surrender possession of the property to the prevailing party, the
sheriff or other proper officer should oust him. No express order to this effect needs to be
stated in the decision; nor is a categorical statement needed in the decision that in such
event the sheriff or other proper officer shall have the authority to remove the
improvements on the property if the defendant fails to do so within a reasonable period of
time. The removal of the improvements on the land under these circumstances is deemed
read into the decision, subject only to the issuance of a special order by the court for the
removal of the improvements
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION vs. CLT REALTY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Otherwise stated, what is actually issued by the register of deeds is the certificate of title itself,
not the decree of registration, as he is precisely the recipient from the land registration office of
the decree for transcription to the certificate as well as the transcriber no less.
A decree of registration is an order issued under the signature of the Commissioner of
Land Registration (formerly Chief, G.L.R.O.) in the name of the Judge to the fact that the land
described therein is registered in the name of the applicant or oppositor or claimant as the case
maybe. When this is transcribed or spread in toto in the registration book and signed by the
register of deeds, the page on which the transcription is made become the original
19
In the present case, the one-year period before the Torrens title
becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible has not yet expired; thus, a
review of the decree of registration would have been the appropriate
remedy
RAMOS V RODRIGUEZ
In the case at bench, Administrator Bonifacio filed his report as an officer of the court
precisely to inform the latter that the NLTDRA cannot comply with the order to issue a
decree because the subject lot sought to be registered was discovered to have been
already decreed and titled in the name of the Payatas Estate. Under these
circumstances, the LRA is not legally obligated to follow the court's order.
21
testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair
and just determination of the case."
RABAJA RANCH DEVPT V AFP RETIREMENT
Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive.
Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional
deception
practiced
by
means
of
the
misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact.
Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud because
of its detrimental effect upon public interests and
public or private confidence, even though the act is
not done with an actual design to commit positive
fraud or injury upon other persons.
Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud
is regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts
pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or
where the acts constituting the fraud were or could
have been litigated therein. The fraud is extrinsic if it
is employed to deprive parties of their day in court
and thus prevent them from asserting their right to
the property registered in the name of the applicant.
The distinctions assume significance because only
actual and extrinsic fraud had been accepted
and is contemplated by the law as a ground to
review or reopen a decree of registration. Thus,
relief is granted to a party deprived of his interest in
land where the fraud consists in a deliberate
misrepresentation that the lots are not contested
when in fact they are; or in willfully misrepresenting
that there are no other claims; or in deliberately
failing to notify the party entitled to notice; or in
inducing him not to oppose an application; or in
misrepresenting about the identity of the lot to the
true owner by the applicant causing the former to
withdraw his application. In all these examples, the
overriding consideration is that the fraudulent
scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party
from having his day in court or from presenting his
case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and
goes into the jurisdiction of the court.
We have repeatedly held that relief on the ground of
fraud will not be granted where the alleged fraud
22
It has been consistently ruled that a forged deed can legally be the root
23
the actual amounts that the lots were sold for; the grant deeds said merely that the
transactions were "for valuable consideration x x x receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged."Yet, Silverio continued not to disclose the actual amounts of those
considerations despite the suit filed in court and the trial that followed. He even uses to
his personal advantage the non-mention of those amounts in the grants of deed, saying
that those grants of deed do not prove profit on their faces.
But, since it is Silverio alone who was in a position to say whether or not the "valuable
consideration" mentioned in those grants spelt profit for the sellers, the call for truth
nudges at him. His suppression of it gives rise to the assumption that its disclosure would
hurt his interest,43 that it would show him to have made a profit from the resale of the lots
and so be liable to the Almedas for that profit. Since the agreement places a cap of
$100,000.00 on the additional compensation arising from the resale, the CA was correct
in ordering Silverio to pay the same.
SAJONAS V CA
Inscription of the notice of levy on execution on the TCT should be
cancelled
whether or not plaintiffs are buyers in good faith of the property of the spouses Uychocde
even notwithstanding the claim of the defendant that said sale executed by the spouses
was made in fraud of creditors, the Court finds that the evidence in this instance is bare of
any indication that said plaintiffs as purchasers had notice beforehand of the claim of the
defendant over said property or that the same is involved in a litigation between said
spouses and the defendant. Good faith is the opposite of fraud and bad faith, and the
existence of any bad faith must be established by competent proof
Under the Torrens system, registration is the operative act which gives validity to the
transfer or creates a lien upon the land. A person dealing with registered land is not
required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only
charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the
register or certificate of title. [20]
i
Although we have relied on the foregoing rule, in many cases coming before us, the
same, however, does not fit in the case at bar. While it is the act of registration which is
the operative act which conveys or affects the land insofar as third persons are concerned,
it is likewise true, that the subsequent sale of property covered by a Certificate of Title
cannot prevail over an adverse claim, duly sworn to and annotated on the certificate of
title previous to the sale. [21] While it is true that under the provisions of the Property
Registration Decree, deeds of conveyance of property registered under the system, or any
interest therein only take effect as a conveyance to bind the land upon its registration, and
that a purchaser is not required to explore further than what the Torrens title, upon its
face, indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently
defeat his right thereto, nonetheless, this rule is not absolute. Thus, one who buys from
ii
25
the registered owner need not have to look behind the certificate of title, he is,
nevertheless, bound by the liens and encumbrances annotated thereon. One who buys
without checking the vendors title takes all the risks and losses consequent to such
failure
UNCHUAN V CA
Note however, that since the filing of the adverse claim, Unchuan has done nothing to prosecute his claim of ownership over
onehalf of the property. He has not, for instance, compelled Jaldon to execute the property instrument so that the sale could be
registered (Assuming that the land was indeed sold to him) and the proper title issued in his name. In fact, the mortgage to the
bank had been foreclosed, and a new title had been issued in the name of Philippine Banking Corporation, but all the Unchuan did
was file an adverse claim.
The Civil Code provides that if the- Rame immovable property is sold to different vendees, "the ownership shall belong to the
person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property" [Art. 1544, Civil Code.] Presidential Decree No.
1529 extends the protection given to an innocent purchaser for value to an innocent mortgagee. [Art 32, Pres. Decree No. 1529
(1978).] Thus grande that Unchuan indeed bought one-half of the property" long before November 3,1976," since he filed his
adverse claim only after the land was mortgaged to the bank, the right of the bank to the property is superior to that of Unchuan.
YU V PACLEB
Spouses Yu not valid purchasers
The law protects to a greater degree a purchaser who buys from the registered owner
himself. Corollarily, it requires a higher degree of prudence from one who buys
from a person who is not the registered owner, although the land object of the
transaction is registered. While one who buys from the registered owner does not need
to look behind the certificate of title, one who buys from one who is not the registered
owner is expected to examine not only the certificate of title but all factual
circumstances necessary for him to determine if there are any flaws in the title of the
transferor, or in his capacity to transfer the land.
DOMINGO V REED
Not in good faith
When dealing with land that is registered and titled, as in this case,
buyers are not required by the law to inquire further than what the
Torrens certificate of title indicates on its face. It is also settled,
however, that purchasers cannot close their eyes to known facts
that should put a reasonable person on guard. They cannot
subsequently claim to have acted in good faith in the belief that
there was no defect in the vendors certificate of title. Their mere
refusal to face up to that possibility will not make them innocent
purchasers for value, if it later becomes clear that the title was
26
indeed defective, and that they would have discovered the fact, had
they acted with the measure of precaution required of a prudent
person in a like situation.
NRSI V TANJUATCO
28
29
i
ii