KOHA SUMMARY # 96

FRONT PAGE: WHAT IS SAID AND WHAT DO WE THINK ABOUT KOSOVA?

Date: 20 March 1996

EDITORIAL

MAO STROLLS IN BELGRADE

by VETON SURROI

An idea launched by the wife of the Serbian president and the managers of the daily
"Politika", a newspaper which proclaims the ideas of the United Left headed by Mrs.
Milosevic, spins in full seriousness, whereas among the opposition, it ranks with a loud
mockery. The issue regards the construction of Chinatown in Belgrade, similar to the ones to
be found in most of the big Western-European and American towns.

Serbia wouldn't be what it is, if it didn't denigrate even attractive ideas such as this one
regarding Chinatown. It's not a matter of opening restaurants with marvellous food which is
consumed by at least one fourth of the globe, but on the contrary, it's a matter of political
parallels which are awakened by the regime of the Serbian president. Beyond Chinese
noodles, Beijing duck and squids of sweet and sour taste, the idea of constructing Chinatown
brings up associations about the Serbian president's desire to repeat what is called the Chinese
miracle with the help of a strong centralist government, the suffocation of chances for free
expression (especially in electronic media) and a market economy controlled by the Party. To
have the free economic initiative coexist within the communist political system.

The problem stands mainly on the fact that a miracle can not be repeated. China, in the eyes
of foreign capital, is the most perspective market in the world, with over a billion consumers
and at the same time, a place of natural resources and cheap work power which could turn it
into a place of high industrial development in the future decades. And, the Chinese
economical overture was conditioned by the fear of Maoist and post-Maoist leaders that
political reforms could take the country out of control.

The Serbian president, on the other hand, leads a country which is not a particularly important
market nor a future area of development. The only thing that could link Milosevic with China
is the will not to lose the political governing power of people with red cards or, in the
concrete case, his personal rule. They are also linked by a historical coincidence: in the time
when the Chinese government sent tanks against reformist students, Milosevic sent tanks
against Kosovan children and youth.

I don't doubt that the wife of the Serbian president likes Chinese food. It is truly delicious.
But, in order to eat it, she had no need to think about the construction of Chinatown. She
could have visited these restaurants during her trips outside Serbia, anywhere in Western

The weekly Koha (The Times) was published in Prishtina (Kosovo) between 1994 and 1997. Edited by Veton
Surroi, a young Kosovar journalist and one of the pioneers of democratisation in former Yugoslavia, Koha
soon became a symbol of quality among the region's media. In 1997 it started to be published daily under the
name of Koha Ditorë. W ith the kind permission of Mr. Surroi, Koha digests were originally posted on
http://koha.estudiosbalcanicos.org.
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Europe. Or, at the outskirts of Western Europe, from Zagreb, Shkupi and up to Tirana, where
five such restaurants have been opened in the past two years.

KOSOVA

WHAT IS SAID ABOUT KOSOVA

by KOHA / Washington, London, Belgrade & Prishtina

The leaders of Albanian politics in Kosova will quickly have the possibility to see the
international re-organization on intermediation spheres for former Yugoslavia. With the
signing of the Dayton (Paris) agreement, the International Conference on former Yugoslavia
has also been terminated formally. Instead, the practical carrying out of the political side of
this agreement as well as the supervision of "problematic regions" in former Yugoslavia has
been taken over by High Commissioner Karl Bildt, seated in Brussels and in Sarajevo.

Bildt, busy with the burden of the political application of the Dayton agreement in Bosnia has
planned, according to diplomatic sources, to engage two western diplomats, T.Lutz from the
German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and D. Austin, a British counterpart, to deal with the
obligations regarding the "other problematic parts" of former Yugoslavia. Lutz, would in
reality, be the replacement for Gert Arens, who during the Conference on former Yugoslavia
was assigned with the "ethnic and minorities questions". In the same way, Lutz will work
with "the question of minorities under the Belgrade administration" , which means that he
will deal not only with the Kosova Albanians, but also with Muslims in Sandzak and the
problems in Vojvodina. He will also be assigned with the problems of Albanians in
Macedonia, and partly with the Serb question in Croatia... D. Austin will be the closest
assigned to deal with Kosova.

Lutz knows the situation in former Yugoslavia, his diplomatic mandate in Belgrade was
ending precisely when Yugoslavia was dissipating. He also got to know the current Albanian
political leaders in Kosova during meetings held with the former German ambassador Eif.
Acquaintance with the situation in the former Yugoslavia can also be attributed to the British
diplomat Austin, who as secretary at the British Embassy was assigned to follow the situation
in Kosova, up until two years ago, when he was transferred in international missions on
former Yugoslavia.

The German diplomat Lutz was, until now, commissioned in Bonn on Economic Questions of
Central and Eastern Europe, an important and strategic German sector, but at the same time a
sector which will contribute to the importance of his negotiating arguments. Especially
because of the Belgrade administration whose every other question is linked to the possibility
of money influx.

This is not the only re-organization concerning former Yugoslavia. After the departure of
Richard Holbrooke from his post at the State Department, the man that had succeeded him,
Robert Galucci, suddenly departed himself too, now becoming the Dean of Foreign Political
Studies at the famous University of Georgetown. Holbrooke's old team will most likely also
be abandoned by the best expert on Albanians, Chris Hill, former American diplomat in
Tirana, who according to the announcements will be the new American ambassador to Shkup.

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According to the current line up, the American team assigned for former Yugoslavia, besides
Holbrooke's current successor, Cornblum, will be made up of two persons which were until
recently in Belgrade. The first one, Rudolph Perrina, was the former Chargé D'Affaires of the
American Embassy in Belgrade. A good connoisseur of the situation, who had a discrete
posture in regard to the American diplomacy, which culminated with Dayton. The second,
James Swygert, who worked in Belgrade from the very moment when the last American
ambassador Zimmerman left, and has followed closely the whole political panorama of the
dissipation of former Yugoslavia.

Such re-organizations usually come parallel with announcements that there will soon be talks
about Kosova. However, this will seemingly not be a question of weeks, as announced at the
beginning of the year. For example, the first visit of the Europeans will not take place before
the end of April or beginning of May. Among other things, also because of a necessary
consultations with the Americans.

During the first visits, no important initiatives should be expected. First of all, these
preliminary visits will be presented as "fact finding missions". Second, because the European
diplomats' approach (and this was announced eariler by the previous American team) is that
of "step by step", which means each problem in Kosova will be treated separately. This means
that it will be looked into education, health care, information etc. The problem with this
method is that it will take a lot of time and energy, and as it happened with the process
initiated by ambassador Arens, it will lead to a dead-end, to that of a constitutional conflict
about whom does Kosova belong to.

There are no announcements about different approaches. Even, as it is being repeated in

diplomatic sources in London, there is no other political movement. From the Serbian side,
there are the same explanations about Serb Kosova and about their readiness for dialogue,
whereas in practice they're always expressing their non-readiness for such a thing. From the
Albanian side, president Rugova has said to the British Minister Rifkind the same things that
he says to the press every Friday at the regular press conferences. The atmosphere of no
political movements in and around Kosova can preserve the situation for even more
unfavorable conditions. Now, even more than before, there is an expressed willingness of
some great powers (the Europeans) for Belgrade's membership in the OSCE, which would be
a first political step for the inclusion of "FRY" in international institutions. When the
announcement of the number of European ambassadors that will be assigned to Belgrade is
added to this, then it becomes obvious that the outer-wall sanctions will remain short for
some more bricks.

On the other hand, the incidents in Bosnia can again bring the attention to this part of former
Yugoslavia. If the Muslim-Croat crisis was to happen as well as the rapidity of the process
Bosnia's division, Milosevic would again enter the international game as an indispensable
player for the West. In those conditions, Kosova would be ever less relevant.

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SURVEY

INDEPENDENCE BEFORE UNIFICATION

by KOHA's SURVEY TEAM / Prishtina

For some time now there has been an increase of the number of statements about the
necessity of dialogue between Serbs and Albanians, the status of Kosova and Albanian
representation in these talks. All these have created a particular political atmosphere which
has not been researched for quite some time in Kosova.

If the starting point is the fact that all these are also reflected in the political life in Kosova
and the relations and interactions of the Albanian political subjects and also in an eventual
change in political relations, we can say that we have initiated a quite broad survey. Aiming at
getting the opinion of the people about the above topics, "KOHA" carried out an investigation
in Prishtina and the surroundings, where 283 persons were polled as a chance sample of the
population. The data from this research, which we have separated in blocs, will be published
in several sequels.

It is largely supposed that this year will be the turning point, the beginning of the solution of
the Kosova question. So, in reference to these suppositions, we asked the question concerning
the possibilities of the initiation of dialogue in 1996. Those who think that there will not
come to such a dialogue do not represent an important majority (11.6%), same as those that
have no particular opinion about this (7.07%). Those which think that there can be dialogue,
with the good will of both sides, without intermediation or pressure from a third party, make
up a minority (11.31%). The majority of persons questioned have declared that dialogue is
possible only with pressure exerted by the international factor (69.61%). So if the number of
those who believe that dialogue will commence is added to the number of those that believe
that dialogue will start with pressure exerted by the international factor, it comes out that the
absolute majority expect dialogue to commence in 1996.

On the other hand, the dilemma concerning who will carry out the possible dialogue on behalf
of the Albanian party is often manifested among the public opinion. I.e., who should Serbia
talk to, so dialogue could have the support and be legitimate. The absolute majority believe
that the dialogue should be carried out with the Albanian legal representatives and with the
presence of the third party (83.75%), which in one way would also be a warrant for the talks
and agreements to be reached. Only 6.01% of the questioned believe that the dialogue should
be carried out by someone else, but from the answers of those questioned it has not been
possible to determine a more global or widespread position. Therefore, these answers can be
considered more as dispersed answers in determined particular postures.

Same is the number of those polled thinking that dialogue should be carried out between the
Serb and Albanian sides without the intermediation of a third party. Only 3.89% have no
particular position.

Concerning the role that Tirana should play in the possible dialogue and in the process of the
solution of the Kosova question, the absolute majority has declared that it should be more
active, 84.1 %. Those that think that the part played by Tirana should be as it has been so far,
compose 8.13%, but only 0.35% think that Tirana should be less active concerning this
problem. The number of those of the opinion that Tirana should not play any part at all in the

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process of the solution of the Kosova question, is not to be considered that negligible
(5.65%).

In regard to the status that has the most realistic probabilities of realization, the answers are
split between several possibilities, apart from the modality of the independent and sovereign
Republic of Kosova, which, according to the survey, appears as the most realistic, 48.41%. It
is very interesting that there is no dominating percentage for any of the other statuses. 15.55%
of the questioned think that a Republic within the present Yugoslav federation is a realistic
probability. The number of those that think that unification with Albania is possible and
realistic makes up 9.89% of the polled. There is another fact that was evidenced in this case:
that of a limited autonomy and the possibilities or realistic probabilities of such an outcome.
The polled that have answered for such a status are small, 7.42%.

While trying to register what the public opinion declares about one or the other status, the
question concerning what status they would personally most readily support was posed. From
the data gathered, it appears that the majority of the questioned declares itself for the status of
an independent, sovereign Republic of Kosova, 72.79%. The data deduced from the results of
the survey concerning the unification with Albania are interesting. Only 20.86% of the
questioned have declared themselves in favor of this solution. If the fact that this question is
tied with what is wished for Kosova's future status, then it comes out that unification with
Albania is not a widespread position. The 1974 model autonomy is not so accepted by the
polled (1.41%). The same goes for a limited autonomy (0.35%). The number of those
pronounced when asked about the consequences these statuses may cause to for peace or war
in Kosova, is spread onto the possible options. Thus, for example, a Republic within the
Yugoslav Federation according to the polled (14.84%) is an option which could endanger
peace. A Republic, independent and sovereign, which is most acceptable among the polled,
comes out as an option which can lead towards war (25.09%). From the data, another
worrying fact can be extracted, concerning the possibility of solving the Kosova question,
since the public has no position about any of the statuses which would endanger peace.
Opinions are divided, and in all status the possibility of endangering peace is expressed. Even
a limited autonomy, according to the polled, can lead to war (18.02%). Same thing
concerning the 1974 model autonomy, where the polled (5.3%) pronounce that it is a solution
which could lead towards war. The unification with Albania is not very far from independent
Kosova. The ones thinking that unification with Albania could endanger peace make up
26.86%.

Referring to the status that could evade war, the data is also diverse.

Those of the opinion that an independent Republic of Kosova can elude war make up
35.69%. The number of those pronounced that a unification with Albania would elude war,
13.43%, is not small. Here, the number of those polled who think that a limited autonomy is a
status which can elude war is increased to 9.89%. Also the number of those that think that the
1974 autonomy model is the status which can elude war is higher, 13.43%. All these data
which are extracted from the research, are, at first sight, contradictory and don't speak much
for coherence in the public opinion. Such are the impressions gained only if the Serbian non-
readiness to offer a solution is taken into consideration. On the other hand, if the public
opinion is considered, it comes out that Albanians too can endanger peace in case that there
doesn't come to an equitable solution which is close to their demands concerning the Kosova
question. If the Serb determined position about the political control of Kosova is taken into
account, then at least a status of Kosova with a limited autonomy could elude an open Serb-

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Albanian conflict, but data show that this can't be considered as a possible solution. This
could be the possible interpretation of these results.

The most preferable way to solve the question of Kosova, as far as the polled are concerned,
comes out as being dialogue or agreement. For dialogue, as a way of solving the problem,
38.52 of the polled are in favor. Whereas 37.46% are pronounced in favor of a possible
conference for Kosova, which would lead towards some standing agreement. Therefore, this
category shows that the majority of the polled (75.98%) think that dialogue and agreement are
forms which can lead towards the solution. Also the number of those which think that war is
the way that can lead to the solution is not small, they make up 17.67% of the persons polled.
A very few of the polled have pronounced that nonpolitical tools - violence and terror can
lead to the solution of the problem.

ROUND TABLE

HOW TO JUMP OVER THE WALL ?

by YLBER HYSA / Belgrade

"National questions and borders..." is such a broad and complicated topic, maybe even as big
as the unsolved national and borders questions in the Former Yugoslavia. But in the breadth
of this Belgrade conference topic, organized by the British Embassy in Belgrade and by the
British Council, it seems that the shadow of this umbrella was conceptualized to cover Serb-
Albanian relations, or better said the Kosova question, which is becoming ever more present,
as facing the "outer wall" sanctions which are significant for the integration of "RFY" in
international structures is made more imminent.

But, besides this fact, the direct representatives of the government (if "Nova Demokratija's"
representatives are not counted) didn't take part in the meeting organized by the British, under
the direct supervision of the British Charge d'Affaires, Ivor Roberts, who is known for his
ability to attain close contacts with the Serbian leader. Anyhow, despite the good
organization, with proficient lecturers which reflected competent and attractive positions, the
Serb government and the state controlled media didn't pay it the necessary significance. This
can also be said for the relevant Serb opposition (no representatives of SPO, DSS, DS, GS...).

No matter how it was, this does not mean that the government's "ear" wasn't present in the
room and that it didn't listen attentively to everything that was being said. The same goes for
the opposition. While the lecturers, mainly British, were divulging some of the concepts that
lay from multiculturalism up to sovereignty and security (which according to the competent
lecturer Gow, expert on military studies and counselor at The Hague Tribunal, is built "from
below and from above" since sovereignty has quite changed by definition lately), to end with
the very interesting lecture on the Albanian question in the Balkans delivered by James
Pettifer; furtheron, with Serb intonations on "universalism" as a concept that should be
covering all as far as the borders are concerned, but also human rights and similar, whereas
the participants from Kosova, on the other hand, were very clear and unique as far as the
demands of the Albanians, which do not go under self-determination!

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Besides this, the meeting awakened the interest of many diplomats, especially Turkish and
Hungarian, which could not conceal their interest about why this meeting was being held by
the British, why now and in this way!

It seems that the Albanian diplomats weren't interested, since they didn't visit the meeting at
all.

The (dis)interest of the Serb government seems to be inspired by the burden of the problems
which can be posed, and which in accord with the competence and the situation, would seek
answers and their direct involvement.

"They say - we are always interested in dialogue with Albanians, but when they get the
opportunity they do not come"- said one of the British explaining that even Margit Savovic
was invited. "We have invited all Serb parties" - said Roberts at the end of the meeting, at the
press conference- ranging from SPS and the rest, except the radicals!" But, they didn't come.
Only the representatives of the "Nova Demokratija" who with the stubbornness of oriental
merchants, through "hall diplomacy", tried to get to some talks or meeting with the
Albanians, but without any success... "If you want to converse, converse with the main man" -
is a motto which is known even to the pettiest blackmarketeers.

The representatives of the Sandzak Muslims, Vojvodina (Hungarians and Croatians

represented by Agoston and Tonkovic), said that the Kosova question "is not a classical
minority question". Thus wanting to show that they can value the real forces, they (the
Hungarians or Hungary) suggested at half voice, something like a - "Dayton for minorities"!

But, all knew that the issue was linked to that of the Albanians and Kosova, which (together
with The Hague) is the highest brick of the "outer wall". This would suggest the logic that
Serb leaders demonstrate the readiness to "build a modern multicultural civil society" without
the help of "foreign intermediation", with which they would be digging the wall from
beneath. But, this didn't happen, and it left puzzled all those (especially the diplomats) that
tried to find an excuse: "does this come from the fact that Britain has exerted pressure on
Serbia to recognize Macedonia" to climb over the "wall..." (because of which it would
directly anger Greece, which has made this clear, and thus Milutinovic has been in Zagreb to
recognize some of the "neighboring republics"); "Is it early for Serbia to accept pressures
without being certain about the reward"; or "Serbia doesn't want to engage in transparent
adventures with the British and quarrel with the Americans (who through Christopher have
made clear the conditions for climbing over "the wall"...) ?!

Especially knowing that when "the wall..." is torn down, the two-way highway will be opened
- for the Serbian integration in international monetary institutions, on one side and on the
other, for the entrance of foreign capital into Serbia (a race which seems to have already
started)!

Anyhow, the dilemmas will continue... In the meantime, as if the Serbian leader makes it
clear that in order to bargain with him, a more adequate time, a clearer bargain and offers
with more clients should be found...

Until then, it is not known what will happen to the mortar that holds "the wall..", which is
pushed and sustained by many parties, on both of it's sides.

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INTERVIEW

CHRIS CVIIC, expert on international affairs

NOTHING IS OVER, YET

Interviewed by DUKAGJIN GORANI / London

Christopher Cviic, (Krsto Cvijic) was born in 1930 in Nova Gradiska, Croatia. After
graduation at the Zagreb Faculty of Law, in 1954 he emigrated to Britain, and got employed
in the then Yugoslav section on the BBC in London. In the meantime, he studied economics
and political science at the London School of Economics, he accomplished his postgraduate
studies at Oxford and from 1969 until the end of 1990, he worked as an editor for Eastern
European and Balkan questions for the renowned British weekly magazine "The Economist".
For ten years now, he is the editor-in-chief of the monthly bulletin of The Royal Institute of
International Affairs in London. While persisting on political research, last year he published
the study "Remaking Balkans".

KOHA: We are in a kingdom with a rich tradition of influence and interest for the Balkans
and the Balkan question...

CVIIC: The Balkans, in its wider definition including Albania and Kosova, especially, is
present only in the sense of a problematic region, among the British political circles. I think
that the geo-strategic concept has endured root changes, from the times when the Balkans and
the whole Eastern Europe were a territory for which the European powers were competing,
when one empire after another was destroyed - the Ottoman and the Russian: be it for the
stopping of the Russians spilling towards the west, which were the British tendencies - be it
for war interests, such as that of pre-Hitler Germany. At that time, these were the important
components of Western European politics towards the Balkans. Today, I am afraid that the
Balkans have lost a lot of their political and strategic importance. Maybe the last time when
the Balkans, and with them Yugoslavia, had a high rating in the international aspect, was in
times of the cold war, when Yugoslavia had a main geo-strategic position, lying between two
antagonistic blocs. With the conclusion of the cold war, with the withdrawal of the former
Soviet Union from it's direct positions - Yugoslavia lost it's strategic importance, today from
an economical viewpoint, this so-called federal Yugoslavia represents very small interests;
strategically, I wouldn't say that there is a particular political and economical need that would
mobilize whatever western power that would manifest it's interest through a more active
involvement in this region. The Balkans and former Yugoslavia represent an international
problem, but not because of the excessive involvement of foreign countries but - exactly
because of their lack of involvement! During the war which exploded five years ago, we were
witnesses of a complete ignorance of the situation, nobody wanted to be involved. I think that
today, the Balkan problem stands on the marginal qualities it has won, and not on it's big
importance, as it is regarded - as a competing place between superpowers. I think it is of great
importance that local factors have this in mind when demanding constructive solutions for the
situation with which they are confronted. Today, foreign capital, a key factor for former
Yugoslavia and the newly created states- shifts very easily. Big companies easily manoeuvre
searching for new markets and favorable conditions. And vice-versa. So, this is what I wanted
to say: nobody should feel more important just because of having some mines or natural
resources - such a geo-political role has lost the importance it had up to know.

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KOHA: How do you imagine tomorrow's political map of the Balkans? The new inter-state
hierarchies...?

CVIIC: One thing is for sure: there can be no more talk about the restoration of former
Yugoslavia which has disappeared forever. The successors exist, and they have gained their
juridical status. As far as the formal shape of the Balkans goes, I don't think there will be any
visible changes. Personally, I believe that the future of Macedonia, which caused so much
commotion, is quite safe now, precisely because of the fact that it's eventual disappearance, in
the context of territorial claims, would create a far more complicated situation to the
neighboring countries. Far more complicated, then it does today with it's existence. Often a
status quo is much more appropriate than an extreme solution: in the case of Macedonia, the
Balkan status quo assured it's existence.

KOHA: Which remain the problematic points in the Balkans' future?

CVIIC: One state, which will probably display a source of social problems for a relatively
long time, remains, nevertheless: Serbia. Or the so-called FR of Yugoslavia. Today it is
composed of two entities which will hardly be called harmonious, in relation to one another,
for a long time. I refer to Serbia and Montenegro. The latter seeks it's identity as an
independent state turned towards the Mediterranean and neighboring countries. From here it
must be understood that Croatia and Albania represent more stable interests for Montenegro
than Serbia does. Montenegrin separatist tendencies, which are constantly increasing, must be
understood as logical and normal. It's a small country and it sees the solution to it's situation
in a different sphere, not with the status of a Serb satellite. Prosperity also depends on the
adequate structures: if it's the one that won and is getting rich from day to day, or the one that
has lost the war and has withstood a total economical and political collapse, and has been
identified by the whole international community as the aggressor. In this context, Montenegro
remains a potential factor of instability to Serbia, maybe more than any other region.
Naturally, a strong juridical and political base for the Montenegrin separatism, supported by
the West, exists: Montenegro was a republic in the Former Yugoslavia and an independent
state before it.

KOHA: How do you see Kosova and the position of the Albanians?

CVIIC: A former federative fraction destined to continually suffer... Even though, after 1968
and 1974, it had a status similar to that of a republic, it was precisely this "similarity" which
showed great political confusion and was the cause of Prishtina-Belgrade conflicts. Probably,
somebody needed the absence of definition of this status, I don't doubt this. Ground was left
for police control of the country and for the creation of the conviction on selective
independence. And also, space for its annulment, whenever the need was observed. And so it
happened. There has always existed a Serb non-historical viewpoint regarding Kosova. I
remember a Serb academician, whom I asked, after a conversation we had at the beginning of
the 80s, about the situation in Kosova and the solution to this problem. He replied in this way:
"Give us another 20-30 years of occupation over there and there won't be any problem". Truly
a banal and an un-historical concept. I think that from a practical side, if not from the
ideological one, a lot has changed in this aspect even in Belgrade, which is politically and
economically shaken. Keeping Kosova under occupation can not be measured in decades any
more. For Serbs, this is a bitter reality which they have to face very soon.

KOHA: What do you think about the fate of this so-called Yugoslavia?

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CVIIC: I don't believe that this Yugoslavia will be dissolved, not so soon anyway, contrary to
the increase of political and social discontent in it's antagonistic components. Such a thing
can be noticed also in the post-Dayton atmosphere - the international community stubbornly
tries, through ultra-concessions to Serbia, to create an atmosphere of order and peace in this
losing state. Which I think is anachronic and very dangerous. Again, such international steps
resemble sweeping the dust under the carpet. The recognition of this Yugoslavia is an almost
concluded thing and this I consider the greatest concession made to an aggressive regime.

KOHA: .... About Dayton?

CVIIC: It was a real disaster. It represents the legalization of an aggression, of genocidal

ethnic cleansing, only so that "once and for all" the headache called former Yugoslavia, could
be terminated. Today's situation cannot remain unchanged. Personally I believe that even
Belgrade is on the brink of a period of concessions towards those which were unfortunate
enough to remain under it's tutorship. First of all, the Kosova Albanians. Not because the
West's recognition will depend on the peace with Albanians, even though everyone is
interested in this, but precisely because the governmental peace and security in Belgrade will
depend on the situation in Kosova. I think now is the time of political games: through
reorganization of state structures, through a new constitution, acceptance of the Albanians as
(also) a political factor in Yugoslavia, etc. Maybe with this, without wishing this, I am
anticipating the status of Kosova as a Yugoslav entity, but, as far as the western plans towards
the south Balkans can be deciphered, Kosova does not seem to be seen an independent state.
Nor as a part of Albania. I am referring to a line of occurrences which in politics, very often,
don't end the same way they begin. The SFRY federation after the war, was nothing but a
totalitarian layer. But later such a concept began to take shape... All this sounds as a possible
repetition of history, a foreseen political deja vu, and whoever is to govern in the future
Yugoslavia must keep such a thing in mind. Serbs are constrained to undertake concrete steps
towards pacifying the situation. And it is precisely this "undertaking of steps", which will
represent a political manoeuvring area for the Albanians, in the years to come.

KOHA: Do you think that Serbia lost the war?

CVIIC: Maybe not formally. But, in practice, all it's imperialist aspirations, for which it
started all the massacres, have failed. Serbia is in a deep economical and political collapse,
from which it can't come out of in a short time...

KOHA: ... In these conditions war is a good popular stimulus.

CVIIC: I don't believe that there is any more practical strength and popular will for such a
thing. Then, even if there were will for war, Serbia would not be in the position to initiate it
even after a 50 years period! The war of '91 has definitely soiled the core of the greater Serbia
ideal, by disappointing and reducing to the minimum the simple Serb citizen. This, I take as a
definite and long-term war loss. The war has ended and there is no more laboratories for
stimulating public politics, as was towards the end of the '80s, when the leaders of Serb
intelligentsia were the ones to lead the insanity that occurred. I think that Serbia, i.e., the so
called FRY, is facing a difficult post-war period today: threat of social perturbations,
economic catastrophe, and even citizens altercation. These problems- which have existed all
the time, but haven't been looked after, since there was, as I said, a public "stimulus" - Serbia
will unconditionally have to return to. If the Kosova problem is added to this, and the

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problem of organized public resistance in Kosova, it will be difficult for Serbia to survive
without liberalization and the necessary concessions.

KOHA: Maybe the last demonstrations of the Belgrade opposition proved that Milosevic
remains the true "owner" of Serbia and the only negotiator...

CVIIC: Displeasing, but true. This shouldn't be such a misfortune for the Albanians, as much
as it is a public moral bankruptcy for Serbs among themselves and in the eyes of the world.
Since Milosevic is interested only in ruling in Belgrade, I believe that he would easily enter
the dialogue about Kosova. There still are a few democratic forces in Serbia, which would
completely lose their political credibility and would come under silent cleansing from the part
of the government. Which, stubbornly attempts to build a political system similar to that of
the PR of China: a strong state, a leftist party in government, state controlled capitalism,
selective control of the media, etc. And if such a thing is hoped for, then I believe that it's a
fruitless hope. On the other hand, I don't see how can a quiet social transition take place. In
short, the end of the war in Bosnia, will mean bad news for Serbia, since the last thing
Milosevic needs today, is the destruction of Serbia from the inside, the victims and war
invalids, the numerous and hopeless refugees- the unsolved problem of Kosova.

KOHA: Despite all this, the belief remains that Milosevic is the one pampered by the West.
This is testified by the (awaited) recognition of FRY and the lukewarm conditions for it, the
closing of the eyes during the pursuit of the war criminals in Bosnia, successions of the
former Yugoslavia in favor of this FRY...

CVIIC: True. These are tragic concessions made by the West, which terminated the war in
Bosnia when it was coming to it's logical end. It also practically saved Serbia from military
defeat too. The West wasn't ready to deal with the enormous mass of refugees which would
have been the outcome after the destruction of the state of Karadzic and Mladic. What
happened to the former Krajina, even though it was expected and calculated, affirmed the risk
from a public storm. I believe that, since the West is responsible for the salvage of this
governing structure in Serbia, then the West should be aware of it's responsibility about not
blessing the present situation there as something definite.

KOHA: ...It seems that the European states agree about such a concept?

CVIIC: ...Except the USA. I think that the insistence of America for a critical re-examination
of the situation in Serbia and Montenegro, affirms that it has been noticed that with the
unconditional recognition of the FRY the problems will not be eliminated. From the desire to
achieve short-term results, shortsighted politics is applied. Which, I am afraid, creates
favorable grounds for future conflicts.

KOHA: What do you think of the politics of Tirana towards Kosova and the question of
Albanians in former Yugoslavia?

CVIIC: I ask forgiveness for this parallelism, but it is difficult not to get the impression that it
is very similar to earlier politics, during the leadership of Enver Hoxha. Albania is a state and
it has it's state interests, which require a careful attitude with the neighbors and international
partners. For example, we all know that official Tirana tolerated the breaking of the embargo
towards FRY and the smuggling of fuel, cargoes which were transported to Bosnia. Paradox?
I would firstly say it was in their interest. But, an interest in opposition to that of the

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Albanians in Kosova. I think, we must understand Albania to be a country which is under
pressure and largely dependent on the European Community and the USA. I think that it is
very important for Albania to cultivate good relations with Greece, which shows
unscrupulousness when blackmailing Albania, through eviction of Albanians employed in
Greece, through repression and economic monopoly. This is a phase when Albania is very
vulnerable, so, up to a point, the "ignorance" of the repression of it's fellow nation should be
justified...

KOHA: What do you think about the political course of the Albanians of Kosova up till now,
about peaceful resistance, the parallel system...?

CVIIC: I don't believe that there was a large spectre of solutions of political positions, after
the destruction of Yugoslavia: either war politics or peace politics. Since they were
unprotected, Albanians chose that which was most logical - as you call it, peaceful resistance.
It would be difficult to answer the question if Albanians would have achieved more with
other political ways: in Croatia there is the conviction that Tudjman was wrong to wait for
Slovenia to be attacked by the former Yugoslav Peoples' Army (instead of getting involved in
the conflict) and not to encourage and support more the Albanians of Kosova (and make them
join the war...). Only history could provide straight answers to these dilemmas. It remains true
that Albanians have suffered a lot, not just during these war years, but much earlier. I think
that, politics such as Rugova's, was maybe the only choice, but the politics of concessions can
have later repercussions. I think that such a topic is posed as a current dilemma among
Albanians. I believe this to be normal. I think that today, the major option would be to
understand the real situation, and especially the situation in former Yugoslavia after Bosnia
and Dayton. I think that Albanians should consider the new political topography created by
the West. It can be changed, but with new methods and means. The end of the war affirmed
the end of a methodology for the construction of national states...

MACEDONIA

THE TRANQUIL BEGINNING OF AN UNCERTAIN SOMETHING

by ISO RUSI / Shkup

The long announced and dragged break-up of the coalition partners of the League for
Macedonia, with the election of the reconstructed government, with the replacement of the
Speaker of the Parliament, came to a careless solution. After this, the new government and
the party that took the responsibility in the future to, in recreated conditions, govern the state,
is acting "normally" - weeks are passing by, the Parliament is holding meetings and taking
decisions which are in it's competence. The former partners the Liberals, headed by Stojan
Andov, who chaired the Parliament in the past five years and used to be Number 2 of the
tripartite coalition, have for sure started acting as the angered opposition. Following a written
statement on Andov's resignation, after the reconstruction of the government when his (party
members) ministers were deposed, he "released" some fierce arrows to the government.
Andov was hosted in the most popular programme on MTV, "Without title, but with pretext".
With a tranquil tone, he announced that as an "abandoned partner", who clearly knows a lot,
he aims at becoming a fierce opponent to the government, in the way that he and his (feeble)
party be strengthened in order to get a better start in the anticipated elections.

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Andov used the, until now unclarified incident (of the "Hard Rock" disco-club, which was
demolished by the "enraged" boys who were the security of the League for Macedonia during
the election campaign) in order to place his argument that if the government forgets or erases
such incidents (the incident didn't come before justice), then responsibility as such becomes
absurd. If someone demolishes an expensive and elite interior, and it's owner (who's in the
government) does whatever is in his power to eliminate any legal traces, then it is almost
impossible to insist to cash in the parking tickets in this country. Andov, among other things,
opened the question of the undefined system, starting from the Constitution, the role of the
President and the government, etc. What is most important is that, he is now openly siding the
extra-parliamentarian opposition, which demands new extraordinary elections. He has, in
fact, decisively announced that his MPs will sign a petition for the dissolution of the
Parliament, however will not ask for new elections. Conscious of who has the majority in
Parliament and what the results of this initiative will be, he has only made the government
aware that he is an opponent to be respected. The elaboration of this issue is a deja-vu - the
electorate has been deceived, disappointed and has voted for the League for Macedonia, and
now the government of the Social-Democratic League of Macedonia, which has broken the
electoral coalition, talks about the opposite, but, all in all the public didn't swallow this.
Andov has openly told his former partners in government, that if what they say is true - that
they have the support of the electorate -, then they should go into new elections and prove
this, because if the people are with them, then they have no reason for fear. In this occasion
he has again quite clearly reiterated that the reconstruction of the government, as it was
carried out, is contrary to the Constitution, adding that Gligorov was not consulted at all.

The reasoning of the extra-parliamentarian opposition and Andov is upheld by the survey
carried out by "Nova Makedonija" according to which, the split between the Social-
Democrats and the Liberals is explained by prevalence of party interests (30.5%) and the
attempt of a new political reconstruction before the new elections (28.5%).

In the meantime, the Parliament is carrying on it's work normally and adopting decisions, as
was the case with the election of the judges of the Court of Appeal. In fact, at last the process
of the judicial power segments has started. But, this has also arisen dilemmas. Because, the
judges are chosen for lifelong mandates and all this was interfered by current politics, which
probably wanted to place it's men on these posts. And, if possible, without altering the spirits.

The columnist of the weekly "Puls", the retired journalist and the owner and chief of
"Makedonsko Vreme" (the news-magazine which is published in Macedonian and English),
as well as the current chairman of the Writers' Association of Macedonia, Jovan Pavlovski,
referred to two interviews given by two Albanians, in his last column.

First of all, he refers to the statement given by Ali Aliu which he names as "Rugova's former
ambassador to Tirana". Pavlovski, in connection to the refusal of the state to register the
Albanian Writers' Association in Macedonia, says: " From some circumstances, I know
where the activities of Ali Aliu were directed towards, during his stay in Kosova. Despite
this, I don't say that an "individual" as he, is the reason for the deterioration of the relations
between my people and the minorities in Macedonia. No, why should I deprive him of the
right to dream of Illirida and Greater Albania". And this is where he interlinks with the
interview of Arbën Xhaferi (who is referred to as Aliu's student): "See, Arbën Xhaferi, a
Kosovan student, MP and leader of PPDSH, at least is honest, contrary to the pampered and
always benefitted Ali Aliu. He admits what the University of Tetova means and what is the
aim of its creation; what would actualizing the Albanian Writers' Association in Macedonia

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really mean. He doesn't say that "some individuals" when confronted with ideas, when
confronted with positions and actions, and not with the Albanian people, least of all with the
Albanian people, are guilty why the relations between the Macedonians and the Albanians are
cold. I, based on some polls and talks with both nationalities, published in the daily press,
thought that these relations are to say the least, cold. This is what at least, appears from what
the newspapers are writing."

Naturally, Pavlovski is ironic about "brotherhood & unity" in his reports "from the field",
published in "Nova Makedonija", in which the "simple man", Macedonian and Albanian deny
the deterioration of relations between them.

This column is not surprising, because even before, and not just from the Albanian side, it has
been called Albanophobic, not to use a stronger expression. The core of the interviews of
Aliu and Xhaferi is that they, do not want to see themselves and their people in a oppressed
position, but rather as completely equal, because after all, Macedonia is their country too.

The other weekly "Fokus", a news-magazine with the highest circulation in Macedonia (12
000 copies), has gained recognition for it's policy in which regularly, without any
interference, gives space "to others" to express what they consider important. In the regular
column "texts from the Albanian press", it publishes interviews with Albanian politicians,
and even in what its opponents call "yellow press" there is space for Albanians.

The last edition of "Fokus" brings the interview with Ibrahim Rugova, titled "Macedonians
should be scared of Albanian demands". Rugova speaks of his last meeting with President
Gligorov, of relations between Macedonia and Kosova: "I believe that we should keep good
contacts, besides the border in between. I hope that tomorrow or the day after tomorrow we
will have good economic relations; for now it's important that we keep good political
contacts". Rugova is an optimist, despite the incident in which Albanians were involved in
Macedonia. "Things are getting better, not only after this meeting. I have thanked him
through my envoys who came to Macedonia. We have to open new paths, new contacts, and
to develop our relations in this direction. They shouldn't break down because of something
that has happened". The leader of the LDK and the President of the Republic of Kosova, in
his interview repeats that Albanians in Macedonia should remain a part of the system, which
he advised in a previous interview ("I have made this suggestion in order for us to observe in
a more analytical way what can be gained and what lost by this decision").

In account of the interview of Arbën Xhaferi, that the Albanians in Macedonia are far from
their desire of being constituents, Rugova says: "I don't think that, but I know the aim is to
arrive at the goal step by step. It is necessary to be part of the parliament, government, to be
present, to work there".

Answering the question whether there exists such a disposition from the side of the
Macedonian government, Rugova answers positively and adds: "It is understood that this
would happen parallel to the implementation of the structures of the government and the
implementation of some demands. The active relation linked with this question is necessary".
He grounds his optimism on the "joint efforts in the Parliament and in the government, and
the positive pressure of the Albanian parties in this direction". About the incidents in
Ladorishtë, Bit-Pazar, Reçicë e Vogël...they are not an obstruction to optimism: "All right,
but I hope that such things will not happen anymore, because in the future we should turn
toward new relations. With this I do not shut the door to criticism, coming not only from

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Xhaferi, but also from other parties, which, for example, say that there is nothing in Kosova,
that no work is being done".

In this way it seems that the political events in Macedonia are going towards inertia - nothing
dramatic is happening. But, what is coming through to the public opinion from the opponents
to the current government, the opposition, but also from politically active parts of other
nationalities (Albanians, Serbs...), is a announcement of (imminent) changes.

ECONOMY

OUR DAILY BREAD...

by IBRAHIM REXHEPI / Prishtina

After the suspension of the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, a small crisis of flour
supply appeared. Nevertheless, there was enough bread. Now the market is stabilized, there's
sufficient flour, but at a much higher price than before. Albanian businessmen have
comments for these fluctuations. Mustafë Ibrahimi, one of the managers "Letplast", a private
enterprise, said that during those days there was fear that we would be left without bread.
People snatched all the flour they could find, so in a few days the warehouses became empty.
At this time, the exportation of wheat had increased. But the lack of this article was artificial.
All this was a market game, where the political leadership of Serbia was involved. The profit
from the export (especially to Russia) was gained only by those close to the Serb government.
When those persons completed their work, a control concerning the export of this product
was fixed. Now there's sufficient flour, but we have to know that the previous price had a
social character, whereas the economic one should be somewhere around 0.50 DM per
kilogram. This means that the price hasn't yet reached it's possible limit.

The export euphoria developed another business, previously impossible. A businessman from
Cacak found a connection and sent a considerable quantity of wheat to the market of Albania.
The ship which transported the wheat remained a long time at the Durrës harbour, since the
packaging of the article was problematic. The exporting firm was compelled to withdraw the
merchandise and to sell it, maybe even at a lower price than what the firm had paid for it,
only so that it wouldn't have to throw it all away.

Does Kosova have to always be dependent on wheat produced outside it's fields, and from the
market fluctuations? Bashkim Kabashi, says that Kosova has a surface of more than one
million hectares, of which 584,882 hectares is farmland. This means that there are 0.25
hectares of farmland per inhabitant or 0.18 hectares of tillable land, which is quite a low land
standard. What's even worse is that, this standard has the tendency to continually decrease.

In 1981, around 24% of the population was engaged in farming as a primary occupation,
whereas 67.5% of the population lived in the village. Here we must mention a very important
characteristic for Kosovan farming: while potatoes, summer goods, meat etc. were produced
even for export, the production of cereals, sugar beet and sunflower was continually deficient.
There are potentials for a dynamic development in farming, despite the difficult political
conditions, since 391,286 hectares, or 66.9% of the land is in private ownership. The

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population that owns the farmland and tillable land is even more appropriate, because the
state has no reason why to interfere in 88.6% of the surface.

Kabashi emphasizes that the tillable land in Kosova is decreasing at a rate of 1,000 hectares
per year, because of different usurpation and utilization for non-farming purposes. This
negligence towards bread is illustrated thus: 91,000 hectares belong to the first category. This
is land with high producing capabilities. It's endangered because of an uncontrolled usage,
mainly for building and purposes foreign to farming. It is unbelievable, but it's a fact, that
nearly 115 thousand hectares of the second category are out of use, occupied by constructions
and other buildings. There are 96,000 hectares in the third category. This land is good for
tillage, but in order for it's high producing possibilities to be restored, it is necessary to
administer enriching procedures. Unfortunately, the largest part of the land, 208 thousand
hectares, is of low soil fertility and is characterized by a limited fecundity.

Taking into consideration the possible sowing surface, especially the fact that it's biggest part
is in private ownership, then that Kosova has 35,277

tractors, of which 2.8% belong to the state, and that each tractor must work on 11.8 hectares
of land, which is a higher standard to that in Vojvodina, the following question is asked -
why should we always be dependent on someone else? There is no justification to say that
there are only 301 reaping machines, which are insufficient for the crops to be completed at
an optimal deadline and that because of this the produce is decreased.

- Our population mainly eats wheat bread, therefore this is the best definition of the
importance that wheat has for us. Ensuring bread for the following year means to stop
importing, so that the foreign currency can be oriented towards an increase of standard. At the
same time, this means being independent in this area. Today, wheat sowing has the same fate
as agriculture in general, which, in conditions under occupation, is destined to destruction,
but this is also our irresponsibility, since we must learn to be responsible for our failures, and
not only to grieve and blame others - says Shukri Fetahu, agricultural engineer.

As far as the state in the field of wheat production is concerned, especially in securing bread,
our collocutor has made a few comparisons. According to the statistics, in 1988 Kosova had
103,443 hectares of wheat sowed. The yield was 3,662 kg/hectare or 37,865 wagons of
wheat. According to the Kosova headquarters for reaping, in 1994 there were only 70,000
hectares of wheat sowed. The produce obtained was around 4,000 kg/hectare or 280,000 kg.
of wheat produced. The area sowed last autumn can only be guessed. But, let's suppose that
there was 30% less land sowed compared to last year, this means 20 hectares less, or 50,000
hectares of land sowed. In order for the produce of 4,000 kg/hectare to be achieved there are
some pre-conditions: that the agro-climatic conditions are favorable, that the adequate
technique is used, that there is sufficient quality seed and fertilizers. This is a supposition for
a very high production, but almost no farmers can create such conditions. This means that,
from our fields, there are 180,000 tonnes of wheat to be reaped, or 20,000 wagons less than in
1988. The presumed quantity is even smaller than that of 1994.

-Such failures are due to, firstly, our own institutional and political irresponsibility and then
come the difficulties caused by Serbia. In autumn, the price of flour was very cheap and,
according to the then present calculations, farmers couldn't afford to sow wheat. But it was
forgotten where this flour would come, from local production, or from Vojvodina? This was a
wrong assumption. We are to blame, because of an absence of institutionalization and

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professionalism in agriculture, at all levels - local, communal and republican. There is no
assemblage of market wheat surplus, no regression is carried out, especially the stimulation of
reproductive materials, chemicals for the protection of plants, chemical fertilizer, fuel, spare
parts etc. There is a complete social disorder and the absence of work power, because of the
exodus of the young, that can be felt. Based on statistical data, and taking into consideration
the above mentioned elements, a simple calculation can show us where is our hard currency
going to: to buy flour and bread. If one inhabitant, according to the earlier standards,
consummated 152 kg of wheat within one year, this quantity could be even higher now, and
knowing the quantity produced today, it can be best seen if we are an organized society or
not. My comment concerning this is brief: "Others produce wheat and we give them our
foreign currency" - says Shukri Fetahu.

There are no precise data as to the land that remained desolate in autumn. As, Agron Dushi,
lecturer at the Faculty of Agriculture says, now is not the time to experiment by sowing a
different variety of wheat this spring. Failures can be compensated only if those lands are
sowed with spring culture, be it cereals, fruit or vegetables, since each experiment carries
with it the risk of new failures, as well as unnecessary expenses.

Unfavorable weather conditions are not the only to blame for the insufficient quantity of
sowed wheat. It was a human error to believe that the market can provide sufficient flour, and
at low prices. We should remember the past couple of years, on the threshold of the war in
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, when 1 kg of flour cost 1 DM, and sometimes even more.
It's not true that there wasn't enough wheat or flour back then, but Serbia purposely wanted to
create a bread crisis. The crisis was especially present in Kosova. So, on an arbitrary decision,
Serbia can easily decide to control this article. Economically, this theory does not stand, but
in certain circumstances, political decisions haven't got much to do with economy or market
rules.

WEEKLY

MARCH 30 - THE END OF THE EXIT VISA

by BATON HAXHIU / Prishtina

Five years, thousands of fined Albanians, the majority condemned to passport withdrawal.
The sole reason - going to Albania. And now, after all these years, news from the self-
proclaimed Yugoslav government: it's cancelling of the exit visas.

Why this step? Why is this moment chosen and could there be a political background to this?
According to the information published, such a step was taken after increased pressure
exerted on the Serbian president Milosevic by foreign delegations - in connection to the
existence of a regime of exit visas for Kosova Albanians. Even Warren Christopher asked the
Serbian president this question and received the answer that he wasn't aware or such a
resolution, in other words, that there are no exit visas for Albanians. A month later it was
proved that such visas do indeed exist.

Diplomatic pressure, has prevailed, but the question posed is, what will this state demand
now from Kosova Albanians for a trip to Albania? Will they be put under police control with

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the emergence of every Albanian visa, or will they be called in for informative talks at the
well-known offices of the state security?

The news for the cancelling of the visas was proclaimed by the Ministry of Information of the
so called Yugoslavia and was broadcast by all the media. But, when approached for a
comment on the issue, the Ministry of Information referred us to the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, which confirms the exactness of this news, but asks us to approach Kontic's cabinet
and get information about the details. From the cabinet we learn that "exit visas have been
cancelled and that this decision is expected to enter in force within 8 to 10 days", but it is also
suggested that this news should be confirmed at the Judiciary cabinet by Mr. Susnjar.

From the Judiciary department we learn that Kosova Albanians shouldn't travel to Albania
until March 30, when this decree of the government of the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia enters
in force. Until then the resolution taken years before, stands.

The questions posed (as we were told this was within the competency of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs) about what's going to happen with all those which have crossed the border
without an exit visa and with those whose passports have been "confiscated", remained
unanswered.

It remains to be seen what is the next Serbian step towards the 2 million Kosova Albanians,
which wish to be, including Kosova, Albania forever.

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