Mariette Duque vs Garrido

Petitioners claims:
Complainant is the alleged common-law wife of the murdered victim in the aforementioned
Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580. She claimed that the respondent Judge violated Section 15,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution for rendering a decision beyond the 90 day
reglementary period without requesting an extension of time from this Court. She alleged
that the prosecution filed its Memorandum submitting the case for resolution on August 10,
2005, but the respondent issued a Decision on December 12, 2005 which was promulgated
on January 27, 2006. Complainant further alleged that neither the offended party nor the
handling prosecutor was notified of the promulgation.
Respondents claims:
Respondent judge denied the accusation that the decision in Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580
was rendered beyond the 90-day period as prescribed by the 1987 Constitution.
He explained that while the last pleading - the Memorandum for the Prosecution was filed on August 10, 2005, the Order declaring the case submitted for resolution was
issued on September 13, 2005. Respondent further explained that the Decision dated
December 12, 2005 was promulgated only on January 27, 2006 because he was on official
leave from December 15, 2005 to January 15, 2006 as he left for the United States.
Respondent maintained that there was no impropriety or procedural infirmity in
the promulgation of the decision even though the complainant and the handling prosecutor,
Robert M. Visbal, were not present at that time. He reasoned that the complainant is not
entitled to be notified of the promulgation as she is neither the private complainant nor a
witness, while the prosecution was duly represented during the promulgation by
Prosecutor Edgar A. Sabarre who was also assigned in the RTC. Respondent pointed out
that the court had already set the schedule of the promulgation. Hence, when Prosecutor
Visbal opted not to attend, it was for a reason only known to him.
Issue :
WON Respondent Judge Garrido violated both the Constitution and the Code of Judicial
Conduct when he failed to decide Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 within the 90-day period
to decide cases prescribed for the lower courts.
Ruling:
Failure of a judge, such as respondent herein, to decide a case within the prescribed period
is inexcusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting a disciplinary sanction.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido is hereby found GUILTY of
GROSS INEFFICIENCY for delay in the disposition of a case and for which he is FINED Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). He is likewise found GUILTY of violation of Presidential
Decree No. 26 for which he is ADMONISHED. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of the
decision be attached to his personal record.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, vs. JUDGE HARUN B. ISMAEL,

Respondent.
Petitioners claims:
OCA claimed that Judge Ismael acted with gross inefficiency due to the fact that he was
unable to decide on cases within the reglementary period prescribed by law. Consequently,
respondent was ordered to immediately cease hearing cases in his sala and confine himself
to deciding or resolving cases submitted for decision or resolution. In respondents stead,
Judge Edilberto G. Absin was directed to handle active cases, other than cases submitted for
decision, until respondent could comply with the directives or until he retired. The OCA
likewise directed Atty. Insor A. Pantaran to explain the results of the audit, as was required
of respondent.
Respondents claim:
On examination of Atty. Pantarans May 19, 2006 letter/compliance, the OCA found that
respondent had partially complied with the directives of the June 9, 2005 memorandum,
having already decided or resolved some of the cases he was directed to act on.
Issue:
WON respondent has committed gross inefficiency due to the delay of deciding pending
cases in his sala
Ruling:
It is settled that failure to decide or resolve cases within the reglementary period
constitutes gross inefficiency7 and is not excusable.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge shall perform all judicial duties,
including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable
promptness.10 Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code11 admonishes all judges to dispose of the
courts business promptly and decide cases12 within the period specified in Section 15 (1)
and (2), Article VIII of the Constitution.13
We emphasize that the administration of justice is a joint responsibility of the judge and the
lawyer.14 As aptly held in Salvador v. Judge Limsiaco:15
A judges foremost consideration is the administration of justice. Thus, he should follow the
time limit set for deciding cases. xxx Failure to comply within the mandated period
constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy
disposition of their cases. It also undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the
judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute. Decision making, among other
duties, is the most important duty of a member of the bench.

Angeles vs Sempio Diy

Petitioners claims:
As for the reasons proffered by respondent Judge Sempio-Diy for the repeated cancellation
and resetting of the dates for promulgation of judgment, complainant Judge Angeles argues
that: (1) respondent Judge Sempio-Diys medical check-up could have been done on any
other day that would not conflict with the scheduled promulgation; (2) the neck ailment
was not as serious as it was made to appear because respondent Judge Sempio-Diy was able
to travel abroad to attend a symposium; and (3) the claim that she needed time to study the
voluminous case records is not a valid excuse because respondent Judge Sempio-Diy found
time to travel abroad instead of attending to her pending cases.
In fine, complainant Judge Angeles is adamant in her contention that the Joint Decision in
the subject criminal cases was rendered way beyond the 90-day period prescribed by the
Constitution. In addition, complainant Judge Angeles raises another instance where
respondent Judge Sempio-Diy is supposed to have incurred unjustifiable delay.
Respondents claims:
Judge Sempio Diy vehemently denies the material allegations in the complaint. She claims that
complainants charges are harsh, rash and baseless, calculated merely to harass and destroy the
reputation of a younger sister in the profession.[3] Respondent Judge Sempio-Diy likewise
attributes the inadvertent delay to the unfortunate crises that befell her, her mother, and the courts
personnel sometime in May to July of 2009. She reported to the Office of the Court Administrator that
they received a series of death threats which caused, among others, disorientation. Thus, it was only
on 30 July 2009, after the semi-annual inventory, that an Order submitting the matter for resolution
was issued. She stresses that the incident was resolved within thirty (30) days from its submission.
As for the snowpaked correction of the date of the said Order, she avers that this was simply due to
a typographical error.[5]

Issue:
WON Judge Sempio Diy be held guilty of unreasonable delay in rendering the Joint Decision in
Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690
Ruling:
The Court finds no evidence to sustain the charges of delay against Judge Sempio Diy in rendering the
Joint Decision in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690. It is the stance of the
complainant that Judge Sempio Diy merely sat on the cases for an unreasonable length of time and failed to
resolve them within the constitutionally prescribed 90-day period. This constituted gross inefficiency
warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions. Judge Angeles accuses respondent of concocting
requests for extension and making it appear that these requests were granted by this Court. Complainant
avers that she perused the records of the consolidated criminal cases but respondents alleged requests for
extension and the Courts Resolutions allowing them were nowhere to be found.
Complainants contentions fail.
Records reveal that Judge Sempio Diy timely sought for three successive extensions[7] of the period to
decide the consolidated criminal cases. All requests were favorably considered by this Court.[8]

City of cebu vs Gako

Claims:
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.
8.

Complainant charged respondent judge for having arrogated unto himself the duty which pertains
to that of a counsel, when respondent judge called to the witness stand a certain Mr. Darza as
witness of the court, when neither parties lawyers in the said civil case were interested to present
said person as their witness. During the appointed hearing, respondent judge, by himself,
conducted the lengthy examination, without even making an offer of the purpose for which the
witness testimony is presented, while the counsels refused to propound any question to the
witness.
Complainant City of Cebu accused respondent judge of procrastinating and virtually sitting on the
main case of injunction, which he voluntarily promised to resolve before the end of the month
(December 2003).
Complainant additionally accused respondent judge of having calculatingly failed to take
judicial notice of a decided case [Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) vs. City of Ilo-Ilo, G.R. No.
109791, July 14, 2003] which the city invoked as case law for the dismissal of the complaint and,
at the same time, relied upon by plaintiff CPA to champion in the latters main cause of action
It is further complained that respondent judge in this Feliciano case granted plaintiffs demand to
be relocated absent any law to support therefor or lacking proof in plaintiffs pleadings that they
were qualified and not disqualified beneficiaries for the relocation and settlement, as required
under Sections 16 and 17 of Republic Act. No. 7279; that the afore-cited laws were completely
disregarded by the respondent judge, as if they never exist. It is advanced that the act of
respondent judge of tolerating plaintiffs violation of certain requirement of the law amounts to his
own violation thereof.
Here, it is contended by Cebu City that despite its effort to bring this fact to the attention of
respondent judge, the latter, in open display of judicial arrogance, interfered with these orders of a
coordinate and co-equal court by giving due course to Civil Case No. CEB-30684, a case filed in
2004 subsequent to CEB-27643. Respondents act herein likewise constitutes disrespect of a final
ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 74053). Worse, said complainant, Judge Gako
granted plaintiffs application of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Complainant is referring to the alleged practice of respondent judge of resorting to injunction-forsale with the active meddling of a family member; allowing parties to write decisions for him;
and failure to rule on Cebu Citys motions for Consolidation and Summary Judgment in the
transport cases above-mentioned while allowing the other party to present evidence to prove
damages, in effect, proceeding to trial proper without pre-trial.
Complainant claims that the foregoing acts of respondent also infringe various canons in the
Code of Judicial Conduct
Finally, to complainant, all of the foregoing charges relative to the comportment of respondent
judge during the proceedings in the cited cases, which earn him the charges of Serious Misconduct
and Gross Ignorance of the Law, Willful Violation of Rules and Laws, Judicial Interference on
several counts, demonstrate grave incompetence; running afoul to Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the cited
Code: A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.

Issue: WON Judge Ireneo Lee Gako, Jr acted with serious misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, willful
violation of rules and laws, judicial interference, tolerating forum-shopping, and violation of the Code of
Judicial Ethics.

Ruling: After weighing the arguments and the evidence of the parties, the Investigating Justice found the
respondent judge liable only for undue delay in deciding Civil Case No. CEB-29570. As a final note, we
reiterate our incessant reminder that all members of the bench should comport themselves blamelessly in
order to advance public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

ESPINA & MADARANG CO. & MAKAR AGRICULTURAL COMMERCIAL &

Petitioners claim:
The intervenors, Makar Agricultural Corporation and Espina and Madarang Company by counsel
respectfully move the Honorable Court to order the Withdrawal or Revocation of the Certificate of
Finality of the Order of this Honorable Court dated February 14, 2005 and in support of this motion
respectfully allege: THAT
1.

2.

3.
4.

The Intervenors were not served a copy of the order of this Honorable Court dated February 14, 2005
granting petitioners [the Olarte heirs] motion for enforcement of the VOID order of Judge Eduardo
Singayao dated December 7, 1983 declared NULL and VOID by the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No.
02613.
The Intervenors whose appearance in the case was approved by the Honorable Court filed a motion for
reconsideration on February 28, 2005 by Registered Mail per Registry Receipt No. 3180 of the Gen. Santos
City Post Office. Hence, said order has not become final and executory and the Sheriff should not yet
comply with the said order which was declared by the Court of Appeals and affirmed by the Supreme Court
NULL and VOID and permanently enjoined from execution.
The Clerk of Court, Abie M. Amilil, should be advised to immediately withdraw his certification.
Further, the insolvency case was ordered terminated and closed by Judge Japal Guiani on March 4, 1987
and affirmed by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 80784 promulgated on August 2, 1984, copy of which is
hereto attached as Annex A.

Respondents claim:
Not satisfied with the recall of the said orders, complainants filed the instant administrative case
charging respondents Judge Indar and Amilil with serious misconduct, grave abuse of discretion,
oppression, evident bad faith, manifest partiality and gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent Judge Indar claims that since the filing of the petition to revive the case was made on
May 3, 2004, neither party made any reference to the fact that the Order dated December 7, 1983 of Judge
Singayao had been nullified and set aside by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. He also asserts
that he issued the Order dated February 14, 2005 on the ground that he found the partys motion for
execution meritorious. It was only when complainants filed a motion for reconsideration to set aside the
said order did he come to know of the said Court of Appeals and Supreme Court decisions. Respondent
Judge Indar intimated that he even had to go through six volumes of rollo in the bodega and verify with the
Court of Appeals the authenticity of its decision dated November 21, 1986 since what he found attached to
the records was an unreadable and uncertified copy of the said decision.
Respondents Judge Indar and Amilil contend that the administrative case filed against them is
designed to harass and malign them. They allege that two other complaints have been filed against them by
the complainants for indirect contempt before the Court of Appeals, and for graft and corruption before
the Ombudsman for Mindanao. Thus, respondents Judge Indar and Amilil also seek the disbarment of
complainants counsels for allegedly being dishonest and in bad faith when they filed the instant
administrative case.
Issue: Whether or not the final and executory order can be implemented after the lapse of the 5-year and/or
10-year prescriptive period provided for under Rule 39
Ruling: Clearly, the acts of respondent Amilil constitute simple neglect of duty for which he must be made
administratively liable. Under the Civil Service Rules and the Omnibus Rules implementing it, simple
neglect of duty is a less grave offense penalized with suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six
(6) months for the first offense; and dismissal for the second offense.
Respondents Judge Indar and Amilil are reminded that as public officers, they are recipients of public trust,
and are thus under obligation to perform the duties of their offices honestly, faithfully, and to the best of
their ability.

IMELDA R. MARCOS, Complainant,- versus -JUDGE FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, Respondent.

Petioners Claims:
Marcos averred that the act of Judge Pamintuan in reversing a final and executory order constituted gross
ignorance of the law. In her complaint, citing A.M. No. 93-7-696-0, she argued that final and executory
judgments of lower courts were not reviewable even by the Supreme Court. Judge Pamintuan reversed a
final and executory order not upon the instance of any of the parties in Civil Case No. 3383-R but motu
proprio. He even failed to indicate where he obtained the information that the Golden Buddha sitting in his
sala was a mere replica. Marcos claimed that his order was in conflict with Rule 36 of the Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure which provides that a judgment or final order shall state clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it (his order) is based xxx.
Respondents claims:
In his Comment, Judge Pamintuan argued that Marcos could have just filed a pleading manifesting lack of
interest or moving for the recall of the subpoena, but she did not. In fact, her counsel, Atty. Robert Sison,
entered his appearance and actually appeared in court. With her appearance through counsel, she subjected
herself to the jurisdiction of the court. She should have filed a motion for reconsideration of the August 15,
2006 Order instead of filing an administrative complaint. As she did not, Judge Pamintuan opined that her
lost judicial remedies could not be substituted with the filing of this case.
Issue:
WON Judge Pamintuan was liable for gross ignorance of the law
Ruling:
Judge Pamintuan indeed made a serious error in making such a pronouncement in the
challenged order.
It is axiomatic that when a judgment is final and executory, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or even by
this Court. The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose, to
wit: (1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge
of judicial business; and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is
precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely.[2]
It is inexcusable for Judge Pamintuan to have overlooked such basic legal principle no matter how
noble his objectives were at that time. Judges owe it to the public to be well-informed, thus, they are
expected to be familiar with the statutes and procedural rules at all times. When the law is so elementary,
not to know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
In this case, the Court finds Judge Pamintuan accountable for gross ignorance of the law. He
could have simply been suspended and fined, but the Court cannot take his previous infractions lightly. His
violations are serious in character. Having been previously warned and punished for various infractions,
Judge Pamintuan now deserves the ultimate administrative penalty dismissal from service.

EMIL MEDENILLA, PEDRO ANONUEVO, JERICHO INOCENTES, CARLITO SALOMON AND ATTY.
JESUS F. ACPAL AGAINST JUSTICE SOCORRO B. INTING OF THE CA
Petitioners claims: The complaint-affidavit alleges in substance that two sets of candidates, one from

the Pagbabago Party and the other from the Balisado Performance Team, competed in the June 19,
2011 elections of their Association's officers and trustees. The Pagbabago group won the positions of
President, Secretary, Treasurer, Auditor, and PRO while the Balisado group won only the seats of the
Vice-President and Business Manager.[2] For the Board of Trustees, however, eight from the Balisado
group, including Justice Inting, won the majority of the 14 positions of trustees. The Pagbabago group
won the remaining six positions.[3]Complainants further alleged that:
1.

Justice Inting opposed the passage of the resolution, however, claiming that the newly elected
officers and trustees had not as yet properly assumed their offices in view of the required 60-day
turn-over transition from the outgoing officers provided in Section 6, Rule 11 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act 9904 (R.A. 9904) [4] although these
rules did not suppose to take effect yet.
2. Justice Inting joined some members of the association in filing complaints of grave abuse of
authority, among others, against its newly elected officers before, the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB)[6] where her impartiality might reasonably be questioned should the
case reach the CA where she worked.
3. Justice Inting and other trustees of the Association prodded Evangeline Bersabe, its accountant,
to disobey the President's order for her to surrender the association documents and keys in her
possession.[
4. Justice Inting and others in the Board of Trustees supposedly passed Resolution 2011-21,
entitled Strengthening the Internal Control and Disbursement Policies of the Association,[9] when
such matter did not appear in the August 27, 20 U special meeting agenda or in its minutes.
5. Justice Inting used her title as justice of the CA to justify the supposed board action.[10]
6. Justice Inting and her cohorts usurped the general and management powers of the Association's
President to reassign or reshuffle its employees to other positions or to perform other duties and
responsibilities.
7. She violated Rule 5.01 (d)[13] and Rule 5.10[14] of Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct when she
joined the political party of her group and contributed to its party funds.
Respondents claim: Justice Inting assails the complaint as motivated by ill will, malice, and a desire
to prevent her from fulfilling her duties as member of the Association's board of trustees. [17] It was
unavoidable, she says, that she and the others in the board had to institute their action against
complainants even if there was a chance that the matter could go up to the CA where she worked.
But, since she was involved in the case in her personal capacity as a trustee of the Association, she
simply would have to inhibit herself voluntarily if such matter be assigned to her Division.[18] Justice
Inting claims that the action they filed with the HLURB was not altogether groundless since the
HLURB even granted their application for a cease and desist order against complainants' group. [19]
She rejects as baseless the charge that the Association's elections partake of political activities. And,
although she was active in the affairs of the Association, she excelled in her work as Justice of the CA
as borne by its records.
Issue: The issue before the Court is whether or not there is sufficient basis to warrant further
administrative investigation of the complaint against Justice Inting.
Ruling: The closest to her invoking her judicial rank was when she stood on the middle of the street
to confront the village security personnel who removed and seized the posters that the Board of
Trustees put up to announce the need for the Association to comply with its resolution enjoining
compliance with the internal controls and disbursement policies that it had enacted. It is plain that
those security personnel used raw force to silence the voice of the Board of Trustees expressed
through those posters. And, assuming that Justice Inting mentioned the fact that she was a Justice of
the CA when she confronted the security personnel, she appears to have done so spontaneously to
show that she knew what she was talking about or to discourage those security personnel from using
physical force against her that they seemed quite capable of.
While it is the Court's duty to investigate every allegation of wrong-doing against judges and other
court personnel, it is also its duty to protect them from frivolous charges.[25]cralaw
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the present administrative complaint against Justice Socorro B.
Inting of the Court of Appeals for want of substance.

OCA vs Indar
Claim:
This case originated from reports by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City to the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) that they have received an alarming number of decisions, resolutions, and
orders on annulment of marriage cases allegedly issued by Judge Indar.
To verify the allegations against Judge Indar, the OCA conducted a judicial audit in RTC-Shariff Aguak,
Branch 15, where the Audit Team found that the list of cases submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of
Manila and Quezon City do not appear in the records of cases received, pending or disposed by RTCShariff Aguak, Branch 15. Likewise, the annulment decisions did not exist in the records of RTC-Cotabato,
Branch 14. The Audit Team further observed that the case numbers in the list submitted by the Local Civil
Registrars are not within the series of case numbers recorded in the docket books of either RTC-Shariff
Aguak or RTC-Cotabato.
In this case, Judge Indar issued decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases which do not exist in
the records of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 or the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court, Cotabato City. There is nothing to show that (1) proceedings were had on the questioned cases; (2)
docket fees had been paid; (3) the parties were notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared; (4) hearings
had been conducted; or (5) the cases were submitted for decision. As found by the Audit Team, the list of
case titles submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City are not found in the list of
cases filed, pending or decided in RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, nor in the records of the Office of the
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. In other words, Judge Indar, who had sworn to
faithfully uphold the law, issued decisions on the questioned annulment of marriage cases, without any
showing that such cases underwent trial and complied with the statutory and jurisprudential requisites for
voiding marriages. Such act undoubtedly constitutes gross misconduct.
The Court condemns Judge Indars reprehensible act of issuing Decisions that voided marital unions,
without conducting any judicial proceedings. Such malfeasance not only makes a mockery of marriage and
its life-changing consequences but likewise grossly violates the basic norms of truth, justice, and due
process. Not only that, Judge Indars gross misconduct greatly undermines the peoples faith in the
judiciary and betrays public trust and confidence in the courts. Judge Indars utter lack of moral fitness has
no place in the Judiciary. Judge Indar deserves nothing less than dismissal from the service.
Issue: The sole issue in this case is whether Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty.
Ruling: We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice.
Judge Indar cannot feign ignorance of the administrative investigation against him because aside from the
fact that the Courts Resolution suspending him was mailed to him, his preventive suspension was reported
in major national newspapers.18 Moreover, Judge Indar was repeatedly sent notices of hearings to his
known addresses. Thus, there was due notice on Judge Indar of the charges against him. However, Judge
Indar still failed to file his explanation and appear at the scheduled hearings. Consequently, the
investigation proceeded ex parte in accordance with Section 4, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.19
Public office is a public trust.20 This constitutional principle requires a judge, like any other public servant
and more so because of his exalted position in the Judiciary, to exhibit at all times the highest degree of
honesty and integrity.21 As the visible representation of the law tasked with dispensing justice, a judge
should conduct himself at all times in a manner that would merit the respect and confidence of the
people.22 Judge Indar miserably failed to live up to these exacting standards.

Ulaso vs Lacsamana

Claims:
Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for Irene Bides, the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. SCA-2481 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, while Busmente was the counsel for the
defendant Imelda B. Ulaso. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that Ulasos deed of sale over the property subject of
Civil Case No. SCA-2481 was annulled, which resulted in the filing of an ejectment case before the MTC,
where Busmente appeared as counsel. Another case for falsification was filed against
Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty.
Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa would accompany Ulaso in court, projecting herself
as Busmentes collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa signed the minutes of the court proceedings nine times.
Noe-Lacsamana further alleged that the court orders Dela Rosa as Busmentes collaborating counsel. NoeLacsamana alleged that upon verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she
discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was
his paralegal assistant for a few years. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosas employment with him ended in
2000 but Dela Rosa was able to continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help
of Regine Macasieb, Busmentes former secretary. Busmente alleged that he did not represent Ulaso in
Civil Case No. 9284 and that his signature in the Answer 1 presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was
forged.
Issue: The

issue in this case is whether Busmente is guilty of directly or

indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law that warrants his
suspension from the practice of law.
Ruling: We agree with the IBP. Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
The Court ruled that the term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the
public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services. 5 The Court
further ruled that holding ones self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such
as identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a
partner of a law office for the general practice of law. Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD
that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Busmente was guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. We agree with the recommendation of the IBP, modifying the
recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that Busmenteshould be suspended from the practice of law for six
months

Hegna vs. Paderanga

Petitioners claims:
Complainant is a layman who filed his own Position Paper unaided by counsel while
Respondent is a lawyer. Nevertheless, Complainant managed to present one (1) piece of evidence not
squarely addressed by Respondent Paderanga: the letter handwritten by Respondents clients,
written in Cebuano, asking the Complainant for mercy and forgiveness in relation to the forcible
entry case. Such letter was no longer necessary if indeed there was a GENUINE transfer of ownership
of properties owned by the Panaguinip spouses to their lawyer, Respondent Paderanga. This letter,
attached to the Complaint, was never refuted in any way by Respondent Paderanga who may have
skirted the issue by inadvertence or by design. The letter dated March 1, 2002 indicates that the
Panaguinip spouses still believe and assert ownership over these properties despite the existence of
a Deed of Sale allegedly dated March 5, 2002. Complainant also went further by attaching an Affidavit
by a Third Person who stated that the Panaguinip spouses still assert ownership over the parcel of
land and vehicle. Defendants were rendered to be in default and subsequently a Decision in favor
of complainant was made ordering defendants to vacate the leased premises and pay for
compensatory damages.MTCC thereafter granted the Motion for Execution of Judgment filed by
the complainant and issued a Writ of Execution on Feb. 18 2002.
Respondents claims:
Respondent Atty. Goering G.C. Paderanga filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim over Lot No.
3653-D-1 and FUSO vehicle, which he bought from the defendants in 2001, both of which could
be erroneously levied by the writ of execution.
Because of the delay in issuing the writ, herein complainant in June 3, 2002, filed with the OBC a
complaint against Paderanga for deliberately falsifying documents causing delay and a possible
denial of justice to be served in the Civil Case.
In respondent's comment on the administrative complaint, he argued that he did not falsify the
document and that the genuiness and the due execution of the DOS was not affected by the fact
that he failed to register them. He also alleged that the MTCC have no jurisdiction over the case
for being based on spurious claims.
Issue: WON Atty. Paderanga is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct.
Ruling: HELD: The Court ruled that Atty. Paderanga is guilty of engaging in dishonest and
deceitful conduct.
Had respondent been the rightful owner of a parcel of land and motor vehicle that were still
registered in the name of defendants-spouses, he should have immediately disclosed such fact
immediately during the time when respondent and Panaguinip had engaged in previous meetings
and filed a third- party claim,
Respondent violated the Lawyers Oath, which mandates that he should support the
Constitution, obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein,
and do no falsehood or not consent to the doing of any in court. Further, he has also failed to live
up to the standard set by law that he should refrain from counseling or abetting activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

SAA vs. IBP

Petitioners claim:
Petitioner Rolanda Saa filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Freddie A.
Venida on December 27, 1991 in this Court. In his complaint, Saa stated that Atty. Venidas act of
filing two cases[1] against him was oppressive and constituted unethical practice. [2] Saa now questions
the resolution of the IBP in this petition for certiorari.[13] He ascribes grave abuse of discretion to the
IBP when it adopted and affirmed the report of the investigating commissioner dismissing his
complaint. According to him, the investigating commissioners report did not at all mention the
dismissal of OMB 1-90-1118 and A.C. P-90-513, even if the existence of both cases was admitted by
the parties. The dismissal of his complaint for disbarment was therefore grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises and conjectures.
Respondents claims:
In a resolution dated February 17, 1992,[3] Atty. Venida was required to comment on the
complaint against him. In his belated and partial compliance[4] with the February 17, 1992 resolution,
Atty. Venida averred that Saa did not specifically allege his supposed infractions. He asked to be
furnished a copy of the complaint. He also prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
Finally, Atty. Venida filed his full comment[7] on September 4, 1995 which, without doubt,
was a mere reiteration of his partial comment. Atty. Venida also added that he was merely
performing his duty as counsel of Saas adversaries.[8]
The matter was thereafter referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. In a report dated August 14, 1997, Commissioner George
S. Briones recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. [9] It found no evidence that
the two cases filed by Atty. Venida against Saa were acts of oppression or unethical practice.[10]
The Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve the investigating
commissioners report and dismissed the complaint.[11] Saa filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied.
Issue: WON Respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion
Ruling: We disagree. Grave abuse of discretion refers to a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or
despotic exercise of judgment by reason of passion or personal hostility as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. There was no grave abuse of discretion in this case. There was in fact a dearth of
evidence showing oppressive or unethical behavior on the part of Atty. Venida. Without convincing
proof that Atty. Venida was motivated by a desire to file baseless legal actions, the findings of the IBP
stand.

Nonetheless, we strongly disapprove of Atty. Venidas blatant refusal to comply with various
court directives. As a lawyer, he had the responsibility to follow legal orders and processes.
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for
violation of the lawyers oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in
the Code of Professional Responsibility

Pobre vs. Santiago

Petitioners claim: The statements of the speech delivered by Santiago reflected a total disrespect on the
part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and
constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other
disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.
Respondents claim: In her comment on the complaint, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny
making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were covered by the
constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of
her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to
bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She
averred that she wanted to expose what she believed to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council
[JBC], which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of
Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would
qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that nonsitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.
Issue: WON Santiago should be administratively liable for the so called offensive speech that she has
delivered and if there has been an abuse of her power as a senator.
Ruling: Accdg. to Art. VI Sec. II of the Constitution, A Senator or Member of the House of
Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No
member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof. But there is
also an existence of what we call parliamentary rights as stated in the constitution
meaning the Senator is still entitled to be reprimanded by the SC despite the
freedom of speech. The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the
language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect
on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly
crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent
that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance.

SESBREO v CA
Facts:
Raul Sesbreo replaced Atty Pacquiao as counsel for 52 employees in a case against the Province of Cebu
and Governor Espina for reinstatement to work and backwages.
32 of the employees agreed that Sesbreno would be paid 30% of the backwages as attorneys fees and
20% for expenses of litigation.
RTC granted employees petition. CA affirmed. Judgment became final.
Later on, a compromise was made between the employees and the Province of Cebu whereby said
employees waived their right to reinstatement. Cebu released P2.3M (representing back salaries, terminal
leave pay, gratuity
pay) to Sesbreno for the employees as Partial Satisfaction of Judgment.
10 of the employees asserted that they only agreed to give 40% of their back salaries to Sesbreno. Lower
court agreed with them and fixed attorneys fees for Sesbreno at 40% plus the 20% expenses.
Employees filed an MR asserting that there was inadvertence in placing 60% where it should only be
50%. This was granted.
Sesbreno was not satisfied by the decision so he went to the CA. CA deemed the award of 20% of the
back salaries as the fair, equitable, and reasonable amount for attorneys fees. Punta siya ngayon sa Padre
FauraSupreme Court
Issue:
Whether the court acted properly in reducing Sesbrenos attorneys fees despite a pre-existing contract
between the
parties.
Held:
Yes. It is a settled rule that what a lawyer may charge and receive as attorneys fees is always subject to
judicial control. When the courts find the amount to be excessive or unreasonable, public policy demand
that the contract be disregarded to protect the client. When a lawyer takes his oath, he submits himself to
the authority of the court and subjects his professional fees to judicial control. A stipulation on a lawyers
compensation in a written contract for professional services ordinarily controls the amount of fees that the
contracting lawyer may be allowed, UNLESS the court finds such stipulated amount unreasonable or
unconscionable. Though generally, a much higher compensation is allowed in a contingent fee agreement
(as in this case) in consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails. But contingent
fee contracts are under the supervision of the court in order that clients may be protected from unjust
charges. Its validity rests largely on the reasonableness of the stated fees under the circumstances of the
case. An attorneys fee is unconscionable when it is so disproportionate compared to the value of the
services rendered. Nevertheless, the existence of an unreasonable fee (no matter the degree) does not bar
recovery. It is only that the courts will fix a reasonable amount. Quantum Meruit which means as much
as he deserves is often the courts basis for determining the amount. Considering its a labor case, an
award of 50% of back salaries is excessive. The 20% award is justified.

Falame vs. Baguio

Petitioners claim: In their Complaint2 against respondent, complainants alleged that on 15 July
1991, their father, the late Lydio "Jerry" Falame (Lydio), engaged the services of respondent to
represent him in an action for forcible entry and entitled "Heirs of Emilio T. Sy, represented by
Anastacia Velayo Vda. De Sy and Belen V. Sy vs. Lydio 'Jerry' Falame, Raleigh Falame and Four
3
(4) John Does," in which Lydio was one of the defendants.
Complainants recounted that respondent, as counsel for the defendants, filed the answer to the
complaint in the first civil case. Subsequently, when the parties to the first civil case were required
to file their respective position papers, respondent used and submitted in evidence the following:
(1) a special power of attorney dated 1 July 1988 executed by Lydio in favor of his brother,
Raleigh Falame, appointing the latter to be his attorney-in-fact; and (2) the affidavit of Raleigh
Falame dated 23 July 1988, executed before respondent, in which Raleigh stated that Lydio
4
owned the property subject of the first civil case.
Complainants claimed that even after the Municipal Trial Court of Dipolog City had ruled in favor
of the defendants in the first civil case, Lydio retained the services of respondent as his legal
5
adviser and counsel for his businesses until Lydio's death on 8 September 1996.

Respondents claim:
Respondent controverted complainants' allegations. He emphasizes that it was only Raleigh
Falame who personally engaged his legal services for him and on Lydio's behalf and that, in fact,
it was Raleigh who paid him the attorney's fees. Respondent likewise contended that he did not
knowingly make any misleading or untruthful statement of fact in the complaint in the second civil
case and neither did he employ any means inconsistent with truth and honor in the hearing of the
case. Respondent vigorously averred that Lydio had not retained him as counsel in any case or
transaction. Stressing the long interval of twelve years separating the termination of the first civil
case and his acceptance of the second civil case, respondent pointed out that the first civil case
was not between Lydio and Raleigh but rather between the heirs of Emilio T. Sy on one hand and
Lydio and Raleigh on the other where physical possession of property was at stake. Respondent
further averred that in contrast the second civil case is one involving the spouses Raleigh and
Noemi Falame as plaintiffs, and Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr., all surnamed Falame, and Sugni Realty
Holdings and Development Corporation, as defendantsa case which arose from the wrongful
14
acts committed by Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr. after Lydio's death. Respondent maintained that
since the second civil case was still pending before the trial court, the IBP had no jurisdiction over
the instant administrative case. He added that complainants filed this administrative case when
15
Raleigh could no longer testify in his own favor as he had died a year earlier.
Issue:
Whether or notAtty. Baguio is guilty of representing conflicting interests between his clients
RULING:
Yes, Atty. Baguio is guilty.
A lawyer may not act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client as
provided in Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or
merely probable or the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests. Furthermore, the termination of
attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client.The
client's confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of professional employment
or even death.