The Arab Uprisings at first appeared to be an anomaly to the average observer: a band of

Muslim voices spanning countries, denouncing in unison their own governments, rather than the
West or Israel. In a post-colonial era, the shift of accusation mostly toward their own societies and
the unequivocal demand for debate, freedom, democracy and good governance (Roy, 9),
indicated, at surface level, a break with Arab and Islamic tradition. Is the time for political Islam
over? Has a new space been created, now occupied by the secular Arab whose plight is now
informed by globalized norms? While the political playing field for political Islam has certainly
altered, to say that we have entered an era of post-Islamism is a hasty conclusion.
When attempting to determine the future of political Islam, it is crucial to keep in mind that
Islamism is not a homogenous entity or ideology. Rather, its manifestation varies from context to
context, as does its nuanced concerns. In this sense, it is better to understand Islamism as a
religious-cultural-political framework for engagement on issues that most concern politically
engaged Muslims (Fuller, 413). With the onslaught of the Arab Uprisings, the issues most
concerning the majority of politically engaged Muslims are not religiously related. Rather, these
issues are thoroughly secular and revolve around dignity, elections, democracy, good governance,
and human rights (Roy, 5). Taking this into consideration, Islamist groups in the countries that the
Arab Uprisings has touched that first and foremost do not adapt their stances to democratization
will fail.
The Arab Uprisings has revealed the transforming demographics of the countries involved.
With the education and employment of women, shifting family structures, and a more informed
youth who are becoming mobilized the voter culture has changed, thus affecting the rhetoric and
positions of many Islamists. Those Islamist groups that wish to maintain any credibility in these new
political settings must now adhere to the majority calls for democracy that reject any monopoly
claim on power by a single party or ideology (Roy, 9). The Islamists that take a defensive posture
based on rejection of the external world rather than focusing on the positive goal of improving
governance and society in the Muslim world (Fuller, 414), will fail. The Islamists that refuse to
soften to political openness by condemning liberal voices, will fail. Much of the success, then, of
political Islam in this new political climate is contingent upon how much these groups strive to be a
vanguard of change (414). It is contingent upon how willing moderate Islamists are to engage in
public critique of their fundamentalist counterparts and how honest they are in actualizing their
promises.

To say that Islam no longer plays an important role in the lives of Muslims is simply untrue.
However, the role of Islam, or religiosity, has changed for many of this new demographic. This new
religiosity, liberal or not, is compatible with democratization because it delinks personal faith from
traditions, collective identity, and external authority (Roy, 10). Islamists seeking to impose a topdown, authoritarian model of Shariah no longer hold credibility for many. On the contrary, religion
has become more and more a matter of personal choice (10). This isnt to say that political Islam
will now fail now that religiosity has begun to occupy a more personal realm. Rather, the success of
many Islamists depends on how creative and open they are to developing their own independent
values (Fuller, 417). Instead of pushing for a distorted model of Shariah frozen in time, Islamists
who continuously engage in re-interpretation, and identify the values of Islam that speak to a larger
audience just governance and a just society (418) will succeed.
It is again important to point out how Islamism shouldnt be understood in terms of a
homology with revolutionary movements of the left (Mandaville, 345). Not all Islamist groups are
concerned with capturing the state to establish a strong central power, nor are all fixated on a
utopian conception of an Islamic state (Roy, 9). It is also important to take into consideration
that the concept of an Islamic state may vary from Islamist to Islamist. Not all view it as a Shariah
based society, where there already exists a concrete body of law that will automatically answer all
needs if only fully applied (Fuller, 419). Rather, many easily conceive of an Islamic state being one
that views Islam as providing a rich body of philosophical and moral thought that can offer general
guidance, insight, and wisdom to troubled contemporary societies (419). Thus, to define political
Islam strictly in terms of law and a concrete association with the religious, is to reduce the
phenomenon entirely.
Ultimately, the Arab Uprisings has not and will not necessarily bring about an era of postIslamism. A more accurate way to picture things would be to see the changing dynamics as a
combination of the shift from old to new Islamism, the bottom-up approach to Islamization,
andthe rise of new forms of religious authority outside the framework of either traditional
religious scholarship or conventional Islamist politics (Mandaville, 348). The Arab Uprisings is
perhaps a blessing for political Islam in that it is its panacea for not only survival, but for its revival
as well.