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RULE 73
RULE 73
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Held:
No to Both.
This Petition is meritorious. The motion to reopen proceedings
was filed out of time, and it is not proper to make a finding in
an intestate estate proceeding that the discovered will had
been revoked, it had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition
for probate of the alleged will. Thus, the finding in special
proceeding No. 1736 is not a bar to the present petition, and
the lower court is directed to proceed to hear the petition in
special proceeding No. 2176
CUIZON v. RAMOLETE (129 SCRA 495)
BERNARDO v. CA (7 SCRA 367)
Facts:
Eusebio Capili died before her wife Hermogena Reyes.
Eusebios will was admitted to probate wherein he left his
properties to his wife and cousins. Hermogena Reyes then
during the pendency of the probate proceedings died
intestate, thus she was substituted by her collateral relatives
as petitioned by Bernardo, the executor of Eusebios estate
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Issue:
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Held:
1. Whether or not the Negros Court erred in dismissing Special
Proceeding No. 6344 - NO
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RULING:
(1) Yes, LINNIEs estate still exists and the proceedings
therefor have not closed.
While it is true that LINNIE adjudicated her entire estate to
CHARLES, she still had her own estate for which the
proceedings in which AVELINA is administratrix could proceed.
LINNIEs estate consists of those properties which are her part
in the conjugal partnership. However, given the murky factual
circumstances, the Court cannot make a final determination
which of the properties in the conjugal partnership belong to
LINNIEs estate.
The Supreme Court stated that two hanging issues are better
left to the trial court since these are issues of fact: (a) whether
CHARLES indeed renounced LINNIEs inheritance and (b)
whether there is a conflict of applicable laws (laws of the
Philippines and that of Texas, where the couple has
properties), applying the renvoi doctrine and Art. 16 of the
Civil Code.
For the meantime, the Supreme Court advised both
the administrators to act in conjunction with the other and
never proceed with one estate independently.
DEL ROSARIO v. DEL ROSARIO (67 Phil 652)
FACTS:
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ISSUE: (1) Whether there exists, still, LINNIEs estate (on the
theory that her estate is practically closed since she
bequeathed everything to her husband)?
(2) If so, how much does she still have that would go to
her siblings? Are the siblings entitled to anything (on the
theory that the will contained substitutions)?
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RULING:
Yes. The appealed judgment is affirmed.
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RULING:
1. Unless wife #2 and the heirs by both marriages, as well
as the Bishop of Jaro and other creditors of the estate,
come to an agreement, the partition should be made
with the intervention of all the interested parties
according to law.
2. Thus
a. All debts and administration expenses shall first
be paid
b. Conjugal properties of 1st marriage must be
liquidated to determine the shares of the
children (as heir of wife #1) and the deceased.
c. Conjugal properties of 2nd marriage must also
be liquidated to determine the share of wife #2
and that of the deceased.
d. Properties corresponding to the deceased
(from process (b) and (c)) constitute his estate.
e. Estate shall be partitioned among the ff heirs
i. Children by 1st and 2nd marriage
ii. Wife #2
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Held:
Yes, an action lies for liquidation and partition.
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FLORES land:
- Land belonged to conjugal partnership. Land was
sold to Alejandro with right to repurchase.
ANGELES failed to exercise right of repurchase.
After his death, wife (TOMASA) repurchased land
and sold to FLORES.
Issue: W/N Alfonso is entitled to maintain the action for the
recovery of the lands?
Held:
FLORES land: the repurchase of land by TOMASA gave
her the sole ownership; heirs of husband acquired no
rights by her repurchase.
NATIVIDAD land: in the absence of proof that money
with which land was bought belonged to the wife,
declared to be conjugal property.
o Conjugal partnership dissolved by the death of
the husband. As to settlement of partnership
affairs: debts and obligations of the partnership
affairs shall be discharged, then of the net
proceeds be considered as the exclusive
property of the deceased spouse. It is necessary
to that the executor or administrator appointed
is the one entitled to the custody of the
property while settlement is being made
o No lien in favor of NATIVIDAD over the land nor
entitle him to retain it until his debt was paid
all other property of the partnership will be
held for payment of debts.
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Held:
The sale of the property made by the sheriff in execution of
the judgment rendered against Eulalio Calma for the collection
of the indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal property,
is void and said property should be deemed subject to the
testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit.
The probate proceedings were instituted in accordance with
Act No. 3176:
SEC. 685. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the
husband or wife, the community property shall be
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Held:
SC of US merely decided on the issue of adultery and
did not touch on the issue regarding division of the
conjugal partnership. It remanded the case to SC of
Phils precisely to decide on the issues it did not
address.
CFI erred in fixing the amount at P81,042.75.
Article 1418 provides, except in certain cases, an
inventory shall at once be made.
We have held in the case of Alfonso vs. Natividad that
when the partnership is dissolved by the death of the
husband this inventory must be made in the
proceedings for the settlement of his estate.
In the case of Prado vs. Lagera we ruled that the
inventory thus formed must include the bienes
parafernales of the wife.
It is very evident from the provisions of the Civil Code
that the inventory includes the capital of the husband,
the dowry of the wife, the bienes parafernales of the
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Held:
YES.
Article 1407 of the Civil Code provides: All the property of the
marriage shall be considered as partnership property until it is
proven that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the
wife.
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Issue:
Whether Gatchalian could be compelled to deliver all the
properties demanded from her.
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RULE 74
UTULO v. VDA DE GARCIA (66 Phil 302)
Issue:
whether there was a need for appointment of
administrator
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Facts:
Held:
[1.] Yes. There is a conflict of authority as to whether an
agreement of partition is such a contract as is required to be
in writing under the statute of frauds. The reason for the rule
that excludes partition from the operation of the SOF is that
partition is not a conveyance but simply a separation and
designation of that part of the land which belongs to each
tenant in common.
-the law has been uniformly interpreted to be applicable to
executory and not to completed or executed contracts.
Performance of the contract takes it out of the operation of
the statute. SOF does not declare the contracts therein
enumerated void and of no legal effect but only makes
ineffective the action for specific performance.
-On gen. principle, courts of equity have enforced oral
partition when it has been completely or partly performed.
-Sec. 1 of Rule 74 contains no express or clear declaration that
the public instrument therein required is to be constitutive of
a contract of partition or an inherent element of its
effectiveness as between the parties. The requirement that a
partition be put in a public document and registered has for its
purpose the protection of the creditors and the heirs
themselves against tardy claims. Hence, the intrinsic validity
of the partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is
not affected when there are no creditors or the rights of the
creditors are not affected, as in this case.
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Issues:
[1.]W/N lower court erred in refusing to admit oral evidence
for proving a contract of partition among the heirs on the
ground that it was not admissible.
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ISSUE:
RULING: No.
The claim of the decedents debts is unsubstantiated.
ALBERTO did not specify from whom and in what manner the
said debt was contracted. The bare allegation that "the estate
has an existing debt of P50,000.00 from third persons" cannot
be considered as concise statement to constitute a cause of
action.
If other properties are not included in the deed of
extrajudicial partition in the possession of one of the heirs, the
questions such as the titles and their partition if proven to
belong to the intestate can be properly and expeditiously
litigated in an ordinary action of partition and not in an
administration proceeding.
Thus, where the decedent left no debts and heirs or
legatees are all of age, as in this case, there is no necessity for
the institution of special proceedings and the appointment
of an administrator for the settlement of the estate, because
the same can be effected either extra-judicially or through an
ordinary action for partition. If there is an actual necessity for
court intervention in view of the heirs' failure to reach an
agreement as to how the estate would be divided physically,
the heirs still have the remedy of an ordinary action for
partition under Rule 74.
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ISSUES:
1. Whether the administration proceedings (Petition #2),
upon the averment that the estate left no debts and all
the heirs are of age, was properly dismissed
2. Whether the cadastral action (Petition #1) was the
more proper proceeding under the circumstances
Issue: Was Agcaoili a buyer in bad faith? Using Sec 4 Rule 74,
do the petitioners have a lien on the title?
Held: No to Both
Agcaoili is not expected to know Celerinas relatives even if he
is a townmate. There is no clear proof he knew of the
existence of petitioners.
The lien petitioners speak of is effective only for a period of
two years. From September 28, 1946, when a TCT was issued
to Celerina, to September 8, 1949 when the deed of sale in
favor of Agcaoili was issued and registered, more than two
years had elapsed
The right to have such lien cancelled became vested on
appellee Agcaoili and that the same had become functus
oficio.
Also, there being no fraud in the transaction on the part of
Agcaoili, nor proof that he knew of any legal infirmity in the
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Held: NO
Ratio:
As a general rule, when a person dies leaving property, the
same should be judicially administered and the competent
court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established in Sec 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will
or in case he left one should he failed to name an executor. An
exemption to this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74,
when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts
due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the
property without instituting the judicial administration or
applying for appointment of an administrator.
Section 1 of Rule 74 however does not preclude the heirs from
instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has
no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good
reasons to an ordinary action for partition. Where partition is
possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be
burdened with an administration proceeding without good
and compelling reasons.
In this case, the only two surviving heirs are the spouse and
sister who are both or age. They admit that there are no
debts. The estate is also not substantial. What is apparent is
that these two heirs are not in good terms and that Rita wants
to administer the estate because she wants to take possession
of the properties, this is not a compelling reason which will
necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of the
deceased.
JEREZ v. NIETES (30 SCRA 905)
Facts:
In 1960 Nicolas Jalandoni died. A special proceeding for the
settlement of his estate was filed before the CFI of Iloilo, and
his widow, Lucrecia Jerez, was appointed as administratrix. In
1966, a project of partition and final accounting was
submitted, and the respondent Judge Nietes approved the
same.
Lucilo Jalandoni, alleging that he is an acknowledged natural
child of the late Nicolas Jalandoni, and Victoria Jalandoni de
Gorriceta, alleging that she is an illegitimate daughter, sought
to be allowed to intervene on the ground that they were
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Issue:
Whether a judicial administration proceeding is necessary
where there are no debts left by the decedent as in this case?
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Held:
Judge Nietes is directed to require private respondents Lucilo
Jalandoni and Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta to present
evidence to justify their right to intervene in Special
Proceeding No. 1562 re Intestate Estate of Nicolas H.
Jalandoni pending before such sala.
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RULES 75 76
FERNANDEZ v. DIMAGIBA (21 SCRA 428)
FACTS:
1) Ismaela Dimagiba (respondent) submitted petition for probate
of purported will of Benedicta delos Reyes as the sole heir of
deceased. Later, heirs Dionisio Fernandez, et. al. (oppositors) filed
opposition to the probate on grounds of forgery, vices of consent,
laches, and revocation of the will on deeds of sale.
2) CFI found will genuine and properly executed but deferred
resolution on estoppel and revocation grounds until intrinsic
validity will be passed upon. Oppositors insisted that estoppel and
revocation issues be considered but CFI overruled claim until
opportune time. Later, CFI ruled that Benedictas will was
unrevoked by deeds of sale.
3) CA admitted will to probate and upheld finality for lack of
opportune appeal, that it was appealable independently of issue
of revocation, affirmed CFI.
ISSUES:
1) W/n decree of CFI allowing probate had become final for lack
of appeal?
2) W/n order overruling estoppel had become final?
3) w/n Benedictas will had been impliedly revoked by her deeds
of sale?
testator and proper execution and witnessing of his last will and
testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and
unenforceable or otherwise. As such, the probate order is final
and appealable, and it is so recognized by express provisions of
Sec. 1 of Rule 109 (see enumeration of 6 instances when appeal
may be taken in specpro)
2) YES, CA correct, order overruling estoppel final. Estoppel
cannot be raised in probate proceedings: The presentation and
probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being primarily
designed to protect the testators expressed wishes , w/c are
entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedents ownership
and right of dispossession within legal limits. It would be a non
sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of
estoppel. W/n the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is
still appealable or not , the defense is patently meritorious.
3) NO, revocation of will doubtful; CA correct, existence of any
change from original intent of testatrix Benedicta is rendered
doubtful by the circumstance that subsequent alienations made in
favor of legatee Dimagiba and she paid no consideration
whatsoever, making it more doubtful that in conveying property
to legatee, testatrix Benedicta merely intended to comply in
advance with her testament, rather than a departure therefrom.
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HELD:
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ISSUES:
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Held:
1. YES. The probate court acted correctly in passing upon the
wills intrinsic validity even before its formal validity has
been established. The probate of a will might become an
idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically
void. Where practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it
is probated, the court should meet the issue.
2. NO. The will should have been upheld, considering that its
alleged defects have been cured by the husbands
conformity. The husbands conformity had the effect of
validating the will, without prejudice to the rights of
creditors and legitimes of compulsory heirs.
The rule is that the invalidity of one of several
dispositions contained in a will does not result in the
invalidity of the other dispositions if the first invalid
disposition had not been made. An interpretation that will
render a testamentary disposition operative takes
precedence over a construction that will nullify a provision
of the will.
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Her son, Felix Balanay, Jr. (Balanay Jr.) filed a petition for probate
of the will. This was opposed by his father (Balanay Sr.) and
Avelina Antonio on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity,
undue influence, and preterition. Balanay Sr. later withdrew this
opposition through a Conformation of Division and Renunciation
of Hereditary Rights wherein he waived and renounced his
hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their six children.
Issue:
1. Whether it was correct to pass upon the intrinsic validity
of the will before ruling on its allowance or formal validity.
2. Whether the probate court was correct in declaring that
the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding
into an intestate proceeding.
3. Whether it was correct to issue notice to creditors without
first appointing an executor or regular administrator.
Page
Testator Leodegaria Julian (Julian) died at the age of 67. She was
survived by her husband and six children. In her will, she stated
that:
(a) That she was the owner of the southern half of 9
conjugal lots;
(b) That she was the absolute owner of 2 parcels of land
which she inherited from her father;
(c) That it was her desire that her properties should not be
divided among her heirs during her husbands lifetime and
that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of
her properties.
(d) That after her husbands death, that her paraphernal and
all conjugal lands be divided in the manner set forth in the
will.
In effect, Julian disposed of in her will her husbands conjugal
assets.
While the action for reconveyance was still pending, the probate
court issed an order of executionand garnishment on August 20
1980, resolving the issue of ownership of the royalties payable to
Atlas and granting the legacy to Quemada. The probate court
issued an order on Nov. 1980 declaring that the probate order of
1972 indeed resolved the issue of ownership and the intrinsic
validity of the will.
Issue: whether or not the probate order resolved with finality the
questions of ownership and intrinsic validity as stated in the Nov.
1980 order
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Facts: the deceased Alvaro Pastor Sr. Was survived by his wife,
two legitimate children, Pastor Jr. and Sofia and an illegitimate
child, Quemada. Quemada filed a petition for the probate of the
alleged will of the deceased. The will contained only 1
testamentary disposition, which was a legacy in favor of Quemada
consisting of 30% of the $2% share of Pastor Sr. In the operation
of Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. Of some
mining claims.
Quemada was appointed special administrator. As such, Quemada
filed an action for reconveyance against Pastor Jr. and his wife,
regarding some roperties allegedly forming part of Pastor Sr.s
estate, including the property subject of the legacy.
Pastor Jr. and his wife files their opposition to the petition for
probate and the order appointing Quemada as special
administrator. However, the probate court admitted the will to
probate in 1972. In 1980, the probate court set a hearing on the
intrinsic validity of the will and required the parties to submit
their position papers as to how the inheritance would be divided.
C-5
Facts:
Issue:
whether the judge had jurisdiction to impose the sentence
of imprisonment on the accused
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petition for its allowance was filed yet because upon the will
being deposited, the court could, motu proprio have taken steps
to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the
corresponding notices to what is prescribed by Sec. 3, Rule 76 of
the Revised Rules of Court, to wit: When a will is deliver to, or
a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the Court
having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and place for
proving the will xxx and shall cause notice of such time and place
to be published xxx
-where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the
will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the
will was delivered. Since the will was delivered to the court of
Bulacan on March 4 while petitioners initiated intestate
proceedings in court of Rizal only on March 12, the precedence
and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable
-As to petitioners objection that the Bulacan court did not have
jurisdiction because the decedent was domiciled in Rizal, court
ruled that the power to settle the decedent;s estates is conferred
by law upon all CIFs, and the domicile of the testator only affects
the venue but not the jurisdiction of the court.
-Furthermore, the estate proceedings having been initiated in
Bulacan court ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a
case of wron venue by express provisions of Rule 73.
-Court also held that petitioners, in commencing intestate
proceedings in Rizal, were in bad faith, patently done to divest the
Bulacan court of the precedence awarded it by the Rules.
-Lastly, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to
testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid
and operative will (Art. 960 of Civil Code).
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RULING:
With the exception of that portion of the decision which
declares that the will in question has been duly executed
and admitted the same to probate, the rest of the decision
is set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a
quo for further proceedings.
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GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
C-11
RULING:
1. The Court had actually issued several resolutions which
constitute res judicata with regard to the present appeal,
to wit a. The judge acted within his jurisdiction in appointing
petitioners (Germano and sister) as administrators,
inasmuch as said petitioners have interest, as next
of kin, to petition for letters of administration. The
guardian of the minor children of the deceased is
not, as such, administrator of the estate of the
deceased until and after said estate has been
acquired by or adjudicated to the minors by proper
proceedings.
b. The jurisdictional facts are the death of the
decedent, his residence at the time of his death in
the province where probate court is sitting, or if he
is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left
his estate in such province. The name and
competency of the person(s) for whom letters of
administration are prayed is not a jurisdictional
fact. The guardian of the minors has no right to
administer the properties of the deceased until
said properties have been adjudicated or awarded
to them either by extrajudicial or judicial partition.
Since no partition has yet been made, the
properties of the deceased have never been placed
under the administration of the guardian of his
minor children.
Page
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged will was lost? And if can still be
probated?
Held:
Yes to both
The evidence is sufficient to establish the loss of the document
contained in the envelope. Respondents' answer admits that,
according to Barretto (attesting witness) he prepared a will of the
deceased to which he later became a witness together with Go
Toh and Manuel Lopez, and that this will was placed in an
envelope which was signed by the deceased and by the
instrumental witnesses. (Also Go Toh and Lopez corroborated the
statement that the brothers Suntay took the contents of the
envelope, and the brothers did not adduce evidence to the
contrary)
In court there was presented and attached to the case an open
and empty envelope signed by Jose B. Suntay, Alberto Barretto,
GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
C-12
Page
It will be noted that in the above cited case the last of the three
publications was on December 18, 1919, and the hearing on the
administrators final account was set for December 19 of that
year, only 15 days after the date of the first publication.
In view of the foregoing, it is held that the language used in Sec.
630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice,
referred to therein, should be published for three full weeks
before the date set for the hearing on the will. In other words,
the first publication of the notice need not be made 21 days
before the day appointed for the hearing.
DE ARANZ v. GALING (161 SCRA 628)
Facts:
Joaquin R-Infante filed with the RTC of Pasig a petition for probate
and allowance of the last will and testament of Monserrat RInfante y G-Pola. The petition specified the names and addresses
of the petitioners as lagatees and devisees. The probate court
then issued an order setting the petition for hearing. This order
was published in Nueva Era a newspaper of general circulation
once a week for three consecutive weeks. Joaquin was then
allowed to present evidence ex-parte and was appointed
executor.
The petitioners filed an MR alleging that as named legatees no
notices were sent to them as required by Section 4 of Rule 76 and
they prayed that they be given time to file their opposition. This
was denied.
GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
C-13
Page
Issue:
Whether or not the requirement under Section 4, Rule 76 is
mandatory and the omission constitutes a reversible error for
being constitutive of grave abuse of discretion?
Held: YES
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3D (2008-2009)
C-14
Page
Ratio:
It is clear for the Rule that notice in time and place of the hearing
for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated,
or other known heirs, legatees and devisees residing in the
Philippines at their places of residence, if such place of residence
be known.
GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
C-15
Held:
The CFI found that the testator was a citizen of the State of Illinois
and that the will was executed in conformity with the laws of that
State, the will was necessarily and properly admitted to probate.
Page
her behalf and noted an exception to the other admitting the will
to probate. On October 31, 1916, the same attorneys moved the
court to vacate the order of March 16 and also various other
orders in the case.
GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
C-16
Page
GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
C-17
Page
Held: No!
The Rules of Court (1940) allow proof (and probate) of a
lost or destroyed will by secondary evidence the testimony
of witnesses, in lieu of the original document. Yet such
Rules could not have contemplated holographic wills
which could not then be validly made here.
Holographic will is usually done by the testator and by
himself alone, to prevent others from knowing either its
execution or its contents, the above article 692 could not
have the idea of simply permitting such relatives to state
whether they know of the will, but whether in the face of
the document itself they think the testator wrote it.
Obviously, this they can't do unless the will itself is
presented to the Court and to them.
the courts will not distribute the property of the deceased
in accordance with his holographic will, unless they are
shown his handwriting and signature.
we reach the conclusion that the execution and the
contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be
proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen
and/or read such will.
In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish
and probate a lost holographic will, we think the evidence
submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with
improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure
GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
C-18
Page
Ordinary Wills
The gurantee of aunthencity is
the
testimony
of
the
subscribing or instrumental
witnesses
if the ordinary will is lost, the
subscribing
witnesses
are
available to authenticate
it is quite hard to convince
three witnesses (four with the
notary) deliberately to lie. And
then their lies could be checked
and exposed
in the case of a lost will, the
three subscribing witnesses
would be testifying to a fact
which they saw, namely the act
of the testator of subscribing
the will;
Holographic Wills
The
only
guarantee
of
authenticity is the handwriting
itself
The loss of the holographic will
entails the loss of the only
medium of proof
if
oral
testimony
were
admissible only one man could
engineer the fraud this way
Issue:
Whether the second will can be denied probate on the ground
that it has been revoked and cancelled.
Held:
YES. The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or
cancellation of a will to be preserved. It therefore becomes
difficult at times to prove the revocation or cancellation of wills.
The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place must
either remain unproved of be inferred from evidence showing
that after due search the original will cannot be found. Where a
will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the
possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in
the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was
cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is
shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot
be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has
been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or
GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
C-19
Page
GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
C-20
Page
Facts:
Martin Delfinado appeared through his attorney and files
an opposition to the allowance of the will of his father
Celestino Delfinado alleging that the will was not signed
by the deceased nor by any other person, in his presence
and by his express direction, and the attestation does not
comply with law
Petitioner, widow of the deceased, presented as witnesses
herself, Antonio Flor Mata (a justice of the peace of
Tayug) and Paciano Romero; Opposition had only 1
witness- Martin
The will was probated despite the fact that 2 of the
witnesses were not present
Issue: whether the court erred in admitting the will to probate
without having 2 of the subscribing witnesses called, although
they were living within the jurisdiction of the court or for not
requiring any showing why they were not produced
Held: Court erred in probating the will?
Our code provides that noncontested wills may be
admitted to probate upon the testimony of one of the
subscribing witnesses, but is silent as to the manner in
which they shall be proved when contested
GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
C-21
Page
the place where the probate proceedings are held, his testimony
may be taken in the form of a deposition in accordance with sec.
406 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Issues:
[1.]W/N a will can be admitted to probate upon the proof of a
single attesting witness, without producing or accounting for the
absence of the others
[2.]W/N the will is rendered invalid due to the fact that the
signature of the testator and the attesting witnesses are written
on the right margin of each page instead of the left margin.
Held:
[1.] Yes. When the petition for probate of a will is contested, the
proponent should introduce all three of the attesting witnesses, if
alive and within reach of the process of the court; and the
execution of the will cannot be considered sufficiently proved by
the testimony of only one, without satisfactory explanation of the
failure to produce the other two. Nevertheless, where the
attorney for the contestants raised no question upon this point in
the court below either at the hearing upon the petition or in the
motion to rehear, as in this case, the objection to the probate of
the will on this ground cannot be made for the first time.
-reasons why appellate courts are disinclined to permit questions
raised for the first time in the second instance: (a) it eliminates
the judicial criterion of the CIF upon the point there presented
and makes the appellate court in effect a CIF with reference to
that point, unless the case is remanded for a new trial; (b)if
permits, if it does not encourage, attorneys to trifle with the
administration of justice by concealing from the trial court and
from their opponent the actual point upon which reliance is
GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
Page
that testator was of sound mind and the will was properly
executed, hence admitted will to probate.
C-22
Held.
[2.] No, but the charge of extrinsic fraud was unwarranted: (1)
Defendant was aware of the Spl. Proceeding intended to be file by
petitioner as admitted in her complaint. Evidently, she was not
prevented from intervening but she stayed away by choice. (2)
Probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time
and place of hearing is required to be published. The publication
was constructive notice to the whole world. Defendant was not
deprived of her right to intervene for she had actual and
constructive notice of the same.
[3.] No. The property of the deceased is not reservable property
for he was not and ascendant, but the descendant of his mother
from whom he inherited the properties in question. Reserva
Troncal (Art.891) applies to properties inherited by an ascendant
from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or a
brother or a sister.
-Since the deceased died without descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews,
GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
C-23
Issues:
[1.]W/N RTC Branch 26 had jurisdiction to entertain civil case for
partition and recovery of defendant;s share of the estate even
while probate proceedings were still pending in Branch 23.
[2.] W/N defendant was prevented from intervening in Spl.
Proceeding through extrinsic fraud
*3.+W/N decedents properties were subject of reserve troncal in
favor of defendant
[4.]W/N defendant may recover her share of the estate after she
had agreed to place the same in the foundation
Page
Held:
The proceeding for the probate of a will is a proceeding in
rem, and the court acquires jurisdiction over all the
persons interested through the publication of the notice
prescribed by section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
and any order that may be entered is binding against all of
them.
Through the publication ordered by the lower court of the
application for the probate of the supposed will of
Francisco Villegas said court acquired jurisdiction over all
such persons as were interested in the supposed will,
including Gelacio Malihan
All the parties became bound by said judgment; and if any
of them or other persons interested were not satisfied
with the court's decision, they had the remedy of appeal
to correct any injustice that might have been committed,
GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
C-24
Page
Held:
NO. The reliefs provided by Sec. 513 are not applicable to probate
proceedings. Sec. 513 reads:
Sec. 513. When a judgment is rendered by a Court of First
instance upon default, and a party thereto is unjustly deprived of
a hearing by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence,
and the CFI which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned so
that no adequate remedy exists in that court, the party so
deprived of a hearing may present his petition to the Supreme
Court within sixty days after he first learns of the rendition of such
judgment, and not thereafter, setting forth the facts and praying
to have such judgment set aside.
Upon default
Though the action taken by a CFI in the probate of a will is
properly denominated as a judgment, it is not a judgment
rendered upon default even though no person appears to oppose
the probate.
By fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence
It is not alleged that any fraud has been attempted or committed,
or that the document probated is any other than a testamentary
memorial in which the decedent actually gave expression to his
GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
C-25
Page
When, however, the CFI has, be the expiration of six months, lost
the power to relieve from its own judgment under Sec. 113, the
remedy conceded by Sec. 513 may be resorted to, under
conditions stated in that section; and apart from the restriction
that the petition shall be filed within sixty days after the party
aggrieved first learns of the rendition of judgment, there is no
positive limitation as to the time within which the petition may be
filed in the SC.
Therefore, the Supreme Court cannot grant relief because the
remedy conceded in Sec. 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure has
no application to orders admitting wills to probate.
MANAHAN v. MANAHAN (58 Phil 448)
Facts: Petitioner Tiburcia Manahan, niece of the testatrix,
instituted special proceedings for the probate of the will of the
deceased Donata Manahan, who died in Bulacan. She was named
Issues:
1. Whether or not Appellant was an interested party, thus,
should have been notified of the probate
2. Whether or not the court did probate the will and not just
limit itself to decreeing its authentication
3. Whether the will is void
Held:
1. No. She was not entitled to notification of the probate of
the will neither had she the right to expect it for she was
not an interested party. The testatrix died leaving a will in
which the appellant has not been instituted as heir and
GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
C-26
The CFI which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned so that
no adequate remedy exists in that court
The Supreme Court will not entertain a petition filed under Sec.
513 to set aside a judgment and obtain a new trial in a CFI where
the latter court can still grant relief upon the same state of facts
under Sec. 113. The jurisdiction of the SC depends upon the lack
of remedy in the CFI.
as the executrix in said will. The court set the date for the hearing
and the necessary notice required by law was published
accordingly. On the hearing day, no opposition was filed, and after
the presentation of evidence, the court admitted the will to
probate.
1 yr. And 7 months later, Appellant Engracia Manahan,
deceaseds sister, filed a motion for reconsideration and a new
trial praying that the order admitting the will to probate be
vacated and the authenticated will be declared null and void. It
was denied. Appellant Manahan then appealed from the
judgment admitting the will to probate. She alleged that (1) she
was an interested party in the testamentary proceedings and as
such, was entitled to and should have been notified of the
probate of the will, (2) that the court, in its order, did not really
probate the will but limited itself to decreeing its authentication
and (3) the will is void on the ground that the external formalities
prescribed by law were not complied with.
Page
Page
C-27
GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
Issue: Whether or not the submission of the will and the copy of
the annotation is sufficient to allow probate of the will.
Held: No. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do nor prove
themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are
not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various
States of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as a fact.
Here the requirements of the law were not met. First, there is no
showing that the book from which an extract was taken was
printed and published under the authority of the State of West
Virginia. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the
certificate of the officer having charge of the original. No evidence
was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West
Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed. In
addition, the due execution of the will was not established. Lastly,
it was necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had
his dominical in West Virginia and not in the Philippine Islands. All
of these are required to be proved under the Philippine Code of
Civil Procedure.
MICIANO v. BRIMO (50 Phil. 867)
Facts: The judicial administrator of the estate of Joseph Brimo
filed a scheme of partition with the Philipppine Courts. Andre
Brimo, of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it, saying that
the partition puts into effects the provision of Joseph Brimos will
which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality. The court, however, approved it.
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3D (2008-2009)
C-28
Page
RULE 77
GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
C-29
Held: Yes. The fact is that Andre did not prove that said
testamentary disposition are not in accordance with the Turkish
laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what
the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of
evidence o n such laws, they are presumed to be the same as
those of the Philippines. There is therefore no evidence in the
record that the national law of the testator was violated in the
testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary
to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed.
this petition for probate so that she can get hold at once of the
entire amount invested in the annuity.) The court denied the
motion.
Page
ANGEL-GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
D-1
Page
RULES 78 to 87
ANGEL-GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
Page
D-2
ANGEL-GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
D-3
Page
ANGEL-GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
D-4
Page
ANGEL-GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
D-5
Page
ANGEL-GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
Page
D-6
Held:
No.
The beneficiaries under the will of Francisco Varela Calderon,
granting that they are illegitimate children, are not incapacitated
to take property under the will of their father. The CC provides
that a person who has no forced heirs may dispose by will of all
his property or any part of it in favor of any person qualified to
acquire.
The appellants in this case are not forced heirs of the deceased
and therefore have no right to any part of the property left by the
testator, once he had disposed of the same by will. If any of them
were forced heirs they would be entitled to intervene in this case
and protect their interest in so far as they may have been
prejudiced by the will. It is evident therefore that they have not
been injured or prejudiced in any manner whatsoever. Only
forced heirs whose rights have been prejudiced have a right to
intervene in a case of this character.
ANGEL-GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
D-7
Issue:
Did the trial court err in refusing to allow the appellants to
intervene?
Page
ANGEL-GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
D-8
Page
ANGEL-GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
D-9
Page
ANGEL-GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
D-10
Page
after the dowry and parapherna of the wife and the debts,
charges, and obligations of the conjugal partnership have
been paid, the capital or exclusive property of the husband
may be liquidated and paid in so far as the inventoried
estate may reach
If two separate administrators are appointed as done in
the present case, in every action which one of them may
institute to recover properties or credit of the deceased,
the defendant may raise the question or set up the
defense that the plaintiff has no cause of action, because
the property or credit in issue belongs to the class which is
being administered by the other administrator, which can
not be done if the administrator of the entire estate is only
one.
As under the law only one general administrator may be
appointed to administer, liquidate and distribute the
estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly follows that only
one special administrator may be appointed to
administer temporarily said estate, because a special
administrator is but a temporary administrator who is
appointed to act in lieu of the general administrator
"When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration occasioned by an appeal from the
allowance or disallowance of will, or from any other cause,
the court may appoint a special administrator to collect
and take charge of the estate of the deceased until the
questions causing the delay are decided and executors or
administrators thereupon appointed," (sec. 1, Rule 81)
Issues:
1. Whether Mrs. Gurrea should be appointed as
administratrix of the estate.
2. Whether support previously awarded to Mrs. Gurrea
should be continued.
Held:
1. NO. None of the conditions stated in the Rules obtains in
the case at bar. Carlos Gurrea has left a will, so it cannot
be said that he has died intestate. Said document names
Pijuan as executor thereof, and it is not claimed that he is
incompetent therefor. He has not only not refused the
trust, but has also expressly accepted it by applying for his
appointment as executor, and, upon his appointment as
special administrator, has assumed the duties thereof. It
may not be amiss to note that the preference accorded by
the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court to the
surviving spouse refers to the appointment of a regular
administrator or administratrix, not to that of a special
ANGEL-GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
D-11
Page
ANGEL-GEOFF-DAVS-WENG-JAM-LYRA-WILLGAN-JENN-JONEP-CHAR-DARWIN-KAY-KIT S-ELAINE-TOM-ETHEL-VIDA-TRISH
3D (2008-2009)
D-12
ISSUE:
Page
Issue: Whether or not the defendant Lee and his sureties are
liable to pay the amount of P54,700.39 to plaintiff?
Held: No. The plaintiff shall only have and recover from the
defendants jointly and severally the amount of P6,375 with legal
interest from the date when the complaint was presented.
The standard of responsibility of the administrator is best
measured as in essence the responsibility of the bailee. Like any
bailee, he must pursue his discretion honestly and in good faith,
or he will become personally liable, to those who are interested in
the estate, for waste, conversion or embezzlement. But where an
administrator, entrusted with the carrying on of an estate, acts in
good faith and in accordance with the usual rules and methods
obtaining in such business, he will not be held liable for losses
incurred.
The supreme court found that the personal responsibility of the
former administrator Lee and the sureties on his bond for losses
incurred by the estate during his administration, has not been
proved.
ISSUE:
[1] W/N the lower court has jurisdiction to pass upon the liability
of defendant under the bond in question
[2] W/N plaintiff should first file a claim against the estate of the
deceased administratrix, in conformity with section 6 of Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court.
HELD:
[1] Defendant contends that the lower court had no jurisdiction to
pass upon its liability under the bond in question, because it is
only the probate court that can hold a surety accountable for any
breach by the administratrix of her duty.
-Court held that although the probate court has jurisdiction over
the forfeiture or enforcement of an administrators bond, the
same matter may be litigated in an ordinary civil action brought
before the Court of First Instance.
-Though nominally payable to the Rep. of the Phils, the bond is
expressly for the benefit of the heirs, legatees and creditors of the
Estate of the deceased Aguedo Gonzaga. There is no valid reason
why a creditor may not directly in his name enforce said bond in
so far as he is concerned.
[2] Defendant alleged that plaintiff should have first filed a claim
against the Estate of the deceased administratrix Agueda Gonzaga
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the estate owed the plaintiffs less than P13,000 when the
commissioners passed on their claim part of which has already
been paid
where the plaintiffs, originally holding a claim originally for less
than P13,000 let the administratrix have money and effects till
their claim grow to P68,000 they can not be permitted to charge
this amount as expense of administration (they may be allowed to
charge the same to the current revenue of the hacienda)
administration expenses would be the necessary expenses of
handling the property, of protecting it against destruction or
deterioration, and possibly producing a crop
Issue: Whether or not Wilson should be held liable for the loss in
the estate.
Held: Yes. When Wilson was appointed special administrator, he
never made any report or file any account of any kind until 1927.
Neither did he apply to or obtain an order from the court of any
nature during that period to settle the debts of Charles Rear,
which, at the time of his death amounted to P1,300.00. It was the
legal duty of Wilson to at one apply to the court for an order to
sell the property to pay the debts of the deceased and the
expenses of administration. If the property of the state had been
promptly sold, when it should have been, and sold for its
appraised value, all the debts of the deceased and the court costs
and expenses of administration would have been paid and the
estate would have a balance left, instead of going negative.
Instead of doing that, and without any order, he continued the
operation of the plantation and employment of a manager, the
net result of which was that all of the property of the estate was
consumed, lost or destroyed, leaving a deficit against the estate.
(other salient parts of the case might help)
When appointed, it is the legal duty of the administrator
to administer, settle, and close the administration in the
ordinary course of business, without any unnecessary
delay. Neither does he, in particular, without a specific
showing or an order of the court, have any legal right to
continue the operation of the business in which the
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Issue: w/n the bonds were in effect from the 2 nd year onwards
considering the respondents failure to pay premium, and that the
court has approved the plan of partition as early as the 2nd year of
the administration of the estates
Held: yes
Ratio:
- The proper determination of the liability of the surety and
of the principal on the bond must depend primarily upon
the language of the bond itself.
- The bonds herein were required by Section 1 of Rule 81 of
the Rules of Court.
- While a bond is nonetheless a contract because it is
required by statute, said statutory bonds are construed in
the light of the statute creating the obligation secured and
the purposes for which the bond is required, as expressed
in the statute.
- The statute which requires the giving of a bond becomes a
part of the bond and imparts into the bond any conditions
prescribed by the statute.
- Section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court requires the
administrator/executor to put up a bond for the purpose
of indemnifying the creditors, heirs, legatees and the
estate. It is conditioned upon the faithful performance of
the administrator's trust.
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ISSUE:
Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to order the execution of
SORIANOs bond, given that the trial court was only sitting as
probate court.
RULING:
Yes, the CFI has jurisdiction.
It is true that the law does not say expressly or in so
many words that such court has power to execute the bond of
an administrator, but by necessary and logical implication, the
power is there as eloquently as if it were phrased in unequivocal
term.
It is thus clear that a CFI, exercising probate jurisdiction, is
empowered to require the filing of the administrator's bond, to fix
the amount thereof, and to hold it accountable for any breach of
the administrator's duty. Possessed, as it is, with an all-embracing
power over the administrator's bond and over administration
proceedings, a CFI in a probate proceeding cannot be devoid of
legal authority to execute and make that bond answerable for the
very purpose for which it was filed.
It should be observed that section 683 of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides that "Upon the settlement of the account of
an executor or administrator, trustee, or guardians, a person
liable as surety in respect to such amount may, upon application,
be admitted as a party to such accounting, and may have the right
to appeal as hereinafter provided." There is here afforded to a
person who may be held liable as surety in respect to an
administrator's account the right, upon application, to be
admitted as a party to their accounting, from which we may not
unreasonably infer that a surety, like the appellants in the case
before us, may be charged with liability upon the bond during the
process of accounting, that is, within the recognized confines of
probate proceedings, and not in an action apart and distinct from
such proceedings.
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6.
7.
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5.
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4.
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HELD: NO
RATIO:
Article 1430 of the Civil Code provides that the surviving
spouse and his or her children shall be given an allowance
for their support out of the general estate, pending the
liquidation of the inventoried estate, and until their share
has been delivered to them, but it shall be deducted from
their portion in so far as it exceeds what they may have
been entitled to as fruits or income.
As to the question of granting allowance from an insolvent
estate, The SC of Spain had rendered a decision granting
allowance to the widow from the general inventoried
estate at the time of the death of the husband until the
delivery of her share.
Mr. Manresa, commenting on said article 1430 relative to
the said judgment of May 28, 1896, wisely observes "That
the support does not encumber the property of the
deceased spouse, but the general estate, and that by the
general estate or the inventoried estate is meant the
dowry or capital of the wife; wherefore, even if the
indebtedness exceed the residue of the estate, the wife
can always be allowed support as part payment of the
income of her property. In any case, the support is given
prior to the termination of the liquidation of the
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1925, citing in its support article 1430 of the Civil Code and
section 684 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
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deceased but that they actually belong to, and were held
in trust for, the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision. The
court granted the petition.
Later, Tan executed, together with the other co-owners of
the Juna Subdivision, a power of attorney appointing
himself as attorney-in-fact to "sell (or) dispose upon terms
and conditions as he deems wise" the lots in the
subdivision. Only after this was he issued letters of
administration.
Now as a regular administrator, Tan filed a petition with
the respondent court, alleging that the deceased was the
manager of and a co-owner in the Juna Subdivision and
that he had been engaged in the business of selling the
lots, and praying for the approval by the court of the
power of attorney executed by him, in behalf of the
intestate estate, and appointing and authorizing himself to
sell the lots. The court granted the petition.
Petitioner Jaroda moved to nullify the two orders granted
by the court: 1. Allowing the withdrawals from PNB and 2.
Approving the power of attorney.
Page
Held: Yes, the order is void for want of notice and for approving
an improper contract or transaction.
Section 4 of Rule 89 of ROC requires "written notice to the
heirs, devisees, and legatees who are interested in the
estate to be sold" and, admittedly, administrator Tan did
not furnish such notice.
It is well settled that an executrix holds the property of her
testator's estate as a trustee
It is equally well settled that an executrix will not be
permitted to deal with herself as an individual in any
transaction concerning the trust property
Note that auto-contracts may be permissible but should
not be made to apply to administrators of a deceased
estate. A contrary ruling would open the door to fraud and
maladministration, and once the harm is done, it might be
too late to correct it.
In approving the power of attorney, the court allowed Tan
to be an agent or attorney-in-fact for two principals: the
court and the heirs of the deceased on the one hand, and
the majority co-owners of the subdivision on the other.
This dual agency of the respondent Tan rendered him
incapable of independent defense of the estate's interests
against those of the majority co-owners. It is highly
undesirable, if not improper, that a court officer and
administrator, in dealing with property under his
administration, should have to look to the wishes of
strangers as well as to those of the court that appointed
him.
A judicial administrator should be at all times subject to
the orders of the appointing Tribunal and of no one else.
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directly liable for payments of such debts. The creditor may direct
his action against said executors or administrators heirs. For
until all the creditors of a deceased person have been paid, there
can be no net inheritance divisible among the heirs.
ISSUE:
Whether the court a quo committed the errors alleged by
Domingo in its order in question NO
HELD:
The first assignment of alleged error consists in that the
court erred in disapproving the record on appeal
presented by the appellant and in ordering the
amendment thereof by eliminating certain pleadings,
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force on large cattle, the fact of the death of those animals was
proven by the testimony of Escudero based on personal
knowledge, and that such testimony was not timely objected to.
As to the third item: There was evidence proving such seizure, and
that it was also proved that there were no substantial produce
after possession was reverted to Escudero.
As to the fourth item: duly proven by evidence, not overthrown
by contrary evidence.
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Issues:
[1] W/N the administrator of the estate is entitled to the
reimbursement of counsel fees.
[2]W/N the administrator is entitled to per diem compensation for
his services
Held:
[1] No. The fees being claimed by the administrator all relate to
services rendered for the benefit of the administrator himself and
for that of the other natural children of Justiniano Dacanay and
not for the benefit of the estate. In this case, the administrator
deliberately and knowingly resorted to falsified documents (i.e.
inventory) for the purpose of defrauding the legitimate heirs of
the deceased and through his own breach of trust, brought the
litigation for which he now demands reimbursement for counsel
fees.
-The estate cannot be held liable for the costs of counsel fees
arising out of litigation between the beneficiaries thereof among
themselves or in the protection of the interests of particular
persons, but an administrator may employ competent counsel on
questions which affect his duties as administrator and on which
he is in reasonable doubt, and reasonable expenses for such
services may be charged against the estate subject to the
approval of the court.
-An administrator who brings on litigation for the deliberate
purpose of defrauding the legitimate heirs and for his own benefit
is not entitled to reimbursement for counsel fees incurred in such
litigation.
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Held: No. First, no docket fee was paid, hence, the court did not
acquire jurisdiction. Second, The Rules of Court provides that an
administrator or executor may be allowed fees for the necessary
expenses he has incurred as such, but he may not recover
attorneys fees from the estate. His compensation is fixed by the
rule but such a compensation is in the nature of executors or
administrators commissions, and never as attorneys fees. Where
the administrator is himself the counsel for the heirs, it the latter
who must pay therefore. Court ruled attorneys fees in the
amount of P15,000.00 can be recovered from the heirs and not
from the estate of Carmelita Farlin.
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Issue:
Whether the demand for rentals against Camon may be decided
upon by the Probate Court?
Held: No. It must be decided in a separate action
The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental over the subject matter herein is beyond debate.
However, acting as a probate court, said court is primarily
concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of
the estate.
With the foregoing as parting point, let us look at the
administrator's claim for rentals allegedly due. The amount
demanded is not, by any means, liquidated. Conceivably, the
lessee may interpose defenses. Compromise, payment, statute of
limitations, lack of cause of action and the like, may be urged to
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RATIO:
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Thus, while Felicidad's children may have correctly moved for the
dismissal of the case and the spouses Prades have forthwith
corrected the deficiency by filing an amended complaint, even
before the lower court could act on petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the denial of their motion to dismiss, the
action under Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which
allows the suit against the legal representative of the deceased,
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HELD:
-YES. Section 709 only provides a proceeding for examining
persons suspected of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed
away property of the deceased or withholds information of
documentary evidence tending to disclose rights or claims of the
deceased to such property or to disclose the possession of his last
will and testament. The purpose of the proceeding is to elicit
evidence, and the section does not, in terms, authorize the court
to enforce delivery of possession, recourse must be had to any
ordinary action.
-The bank maintains that the pledge is still in force. It may have
documentary evidence to that effect, and it was not under
obligation to turn such evidence over to the court or to a third
party, on the strength of a citation under section 709. The
possession of the certificates of the shares in question is a part of
that evidence and it is obvious that if they are surrendered to the
administrator of the estate and possibly disposed of by him, the
bank will lose its hold on the shares as a pledge. The bank, hence,
is entitled to its day in court, and its rights can only be determined
in a corresponding action.
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ISSUE:
-W/N the court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the delivery
of the shares to the administrator in a proceeding under section
709 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
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