PSCI 6325 Decision Theory Course Syllabus

Fall 2006

Course Information
PSCI 6325.001: Decision Theory
GR 3.604
Fall 2006

Professor Contact Information

Patrick T. Brandt
Phone: 972 883 4923
E-mail: pbrandt@utdallas.edu
Office: GR. 2.802
Office Hours: M-W Noon-2pm

Course Pre-requisites, Co-requisites, and/or Other Restrictions

None. It is recommended that students have completed PSCI 5350 Logic, Methodology, and
Scope of Political Science

Course Description
Explores the development of decision-making models and theories across organizational and
institutional environments. Includes details analysis of decision-making under conditions of
certainty, risk and uncertainty; optimal decision rules; collective action problems; and
institutional environments.

Student Learning Objectives/Outcomes

 Introduce students to models of rationality and decision-making in political science.

 Provide an introduction to rational choice and related models in political science
 Discussion how to assess and evaluate models of decision-making empirically.

Required Textbooks and Materials

Mueller, Dennis. C. 2003. Public Choice III. Cambridge: CUP

Chong, Dennis. 2000. Rational Lives: Norms and Values in Politics and Society. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.

Jones, Bryan D. 2001. Politics and the Architecture of Choice: Bounded Rationality and
Governance. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Tetlock, Phillip E. 2005. Expert Political Judgement: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?
Princeton: PUP.

Course Syllabus Page 1

Amadae, S. M. 2003. Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational
Choice Liberalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hargreaves Heap, Shaun, and Martin Hollis. 1992. The Theory of Choice: A Critical Guide.
Blackwell Publishers.

Morton, Rebecca B. 1999. Methods & Models: A Guide to the Empirical Analysis of Formal
Models in Political Science. Cambridge: CUP.

Assignments & Academic Calendar

(Topics, Reading Assignments, Due Dates, Exam Dates)

Readings listed with bullets are required for each week. All required readings should be available
in the assigned texts on electronically through the UTD library.

Optional, supplemental or classics on the topic are listed separately for each week.

Week 1 (August 22): Introduction

During this first week we will review how this course is organized and what we will be doing. I
will also provide a general overview of decision theory, rational choice, social choice, and game
theory approaches

Week 2 (August 29): Examples of Decision Theory in Political Science and Political
Economy

The goal of this week’s readings is to introduce you to some examples of decision theory and
rational choice modeling in political science. The first two readings provide an introduction to
various assumptions about rationality and rational actor paradigms in the social sciences. The
Krehbiel readings provide an example of how rational choice / game theoretical models are
employed to describe and hypothesize about legislative behavior. These rational choice models
are built upon a set of rule-bound institutions that define the incentives and institutions that shape
choices. The Firmin-Sellers’ reading provides a different example where institutional choice and
design are important for producing a collective outcome. Here we see that there are tensions
between individual and societal rational action. The final reading by Geddes extends the rational
choice paradigm to explain the success and /or failure of political reform.

 “Homo economicus, Homo sociologicus” in Hargreaves Heap et al. 1992. Theory of

Choice. Chapter 5
 Camerer, Colin. 1995. “Individual Decision Making.” In The Handbook of Experimental
Economics. Roth and Kagel eds. Princeton: PUP. 587—701.
 Krehbiel, Keith. 1988. “Spatial Models of Legislative Choice.” Legislative Studies
Quarterly. 13(3): 259-318. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0362-
9805%28198808%2913%3A3%3C259%3ASMOLC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H
 Krehbiel, Keith. 1996. “Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock: A Theory of
Divided and Unified Government. Journal of Theoretical Politics. 8(1): 7-40.
 Kathryn Firmin-Sellers. 1995. “The Politics of Property Rights.” American Political
Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 4. (Dec., 1995), pp. 867-881. Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-
0554%28199512%2989%3A4%3C867%3ATPOPR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y

Course Syllabus Page 2

  Geddes, Barbara. 1994. "Reform as a Collective Good" Chapter 2 of Politician's
Dilemma: Building State capacity in Latin America Berkeley: University of California
Press. 24-42.

Optional:

 Camerer, Colin (2003) Behavioral Game Theory Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
 Lau, Richard R. (2003) “Models of Decision Making.” In Political Psychology D.O.
Sears, L. Huddy, and R. Jervis (eds.) Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Week 3 (September 5): Foundational topics I: Decision-making and rationality

This week’s readings address one on the basic building blocks in understanding decision theory
models: rationality. Much of the subsequent literature in this course will be concerned with the
rationality of individuals and groups. Thus, we must understand what this means and how it is
applied. The review piece by Kato looks at different applied strains of “new instituionalism” that
vary in terms of their conception of rationality. Satz and Ferejohn continue this line of analysis
pointing out how and when rational choice models can and should be applied—answering in part
the “what is this approach good for” question. The two readings from Hargreaves Heap et al.
look at different decision making environments where rational behavior is well known to differ:
decision-making with certainty versus risk (or uncertainty). This is a critical distinction in that
assumptions about risk lead us to question the presence and application of basic rationality as
defined and discussed in the Mueller chapters. We close by looking at a simple introduction to
game theory. One should consider how these different approaches to rationality do and do not
work in game theory and rational choice models.

 Mueller, Chapters 4-7.

 Kato, Junko. 1996. “Institutions and Rationality in Politics - Three Varieties of Neo-
Institutionalists.” British Journal of Political Science 26(4): 553-582.
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0007-1234%28199610%2926%3A4%3C553%3AIARIP-
%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3
 Satz, Debra and John Ferejohn. 1994. “Rational Choice and Social Theory.” Journal of
Philosophy. 91(2): 71-87. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-
362X%28199402%2991%3A2%3C71%3ARCAST%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2
 “Rationality” in Hargreaves Heap et al. 1992. Theory of Choice. Chapter 1.
 “Risk, Ignorance and Imagination” in Hargreaves Heap et al. 1992. Theory of Choice.
Chapter 4
 “Game Theory” in Hargreaves Heap et al. 1992. Theory of Choice. Chapter 7.

Optional:

 Ordeshook, Peter C. 1986. Game Theory and political theory. Cambridge; CUP.
 Tullock, Gordon. 1967. Toward a Mathematics of Politics. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press.
 Ordeshook, Peter C. 1993. “The development of contemporary political theory.” In
Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation. Williams A. Barnett,
Melvin Hinich and Norman Schofield, eds. Cambridge: CUP. Pp. 71-106.
 Kreps, David M. 1988. Notes on the Theory of Choice. Boulder: Westview.

Course Syllabus Page 3

Week 4 (September 12): Foundational topics II: Social Choice and (Im)possibilities
This week to turn to a different branch of decision theory: social choice theory. Social choice
theory is concerned with optimal decision-making and the rules and criteria for evaluating such
decisions. The analysis of the properties of decision rules and choices under certainty is known
as social choice and it is the main topic for this week. The goal is to understand what social
choice theory is and what is can and cannot tell us about decision-making. The most important
results is social choice theory is Arrow’s General (Im)possibility Theorem about social choice
aggregation functions. We will discuss this and its implications this week.

 Mueller, Chapters 23-27.

 “Social Choice” in Hargreaves Heap et al. 1992. Theory of Choice. Chapter 13.
 Morrow, James D. “Social Choice and System Structure in World Politics” World
Politics, 41(1): 75-97. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0043-
8871%28198810%2941%3A1%3C75%3ASCASSI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H

Optional:

 Suzumura, Kotaro. 1983/1990. Rational Choice, Collective Decisions and Social

Welfare. Cambridge: CUP. Chapters 1 and 2.
 Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey S. Banks 2005/2005. Positive Political Theory I and II.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
 Arrow, Kenneth J. 1951/1963. Social Choice and Individual Values/ New Haven: Yale
University Press.
 Riker, William H. 1982. Liberalism against Populism. Prospect Heights, Illinois:
Waveland Press.

Week 5 (September 19): Foundational Topics III: Behavioral and revisionist views of
rationality and its implications.

Until this week, we have considered only one type of instrumental rationality and goal orietnted
behavior. It turns out that this “strong” rationality models—assuming that people can calculated
perfectly and infinitely—do not marry well with reality. Rationale behavior and decision-making
often includes cutting corners and using short-cuts. This week we look at models and incorporate
these strategies. Bryan Jones’ book presents one account of this and its implications for political
science. The other readings present alternative views: Hargreaves Heap et al. and Opp survey
some of the major approaches; Ostrom’s Public Choice Society address looks at how institutions
rationality and decisions interact; Levy’s analysis uses prospect theory to look at international
relations.

 Jones, all
 “How People Choose” in Hargreaves Heap et al. 1992. Theory of Choice. Chapter 3.
 Opp, K.D. 1999. “Contending Theories of Rational Action.” Journal of Theoretical
Politics. 11(2): 171-202
 Ostrom, Elinor. 1986. "An Agenda for the Study of Institutions." Public Choice. 48:3-25.
 Levy, Jack S. 1997. “Prospect Theory, Rational Choice and International Relations.”
International Studies Quarterly. 41(1): 87-112. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-
8833%28199703%2941%3A1%3C87%3APTRCAI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I

Optional:

Course Syllabus Page 4

  Tversky, Amos and David Kahneman (1987) “Rational Choice and the Framing of
Decisions.” In Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Psychology R.
M. Hogarth and M.W. Reder editors. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Week 6 (September 26): Decision-making and political institutions

Decision-making does not happen in a vacuum. In fact, rules, institutions, and choice
mechanisms interact. Decision-making then is a reaction to incentives, constraints, and rules.
These rules, which are themselves part and parcel of institutions are critical for understanding
decision-making. This week we survey some of the major approaches to thinking about rule-
bound decisions and behavior. Archer’s chapter presents a taxonomy of how one can think about
rules and their impacts. Crawford and Ostrom go further, proposing a “grammar” that can be
used as an ontology for understanding how rules and institutions are interpreted in a game-
theoretic and rational choice context. Finally, the Krehbiel et al. forum shows how decision
theory tools—spatial and distributive politics models—explain the design and workings of
institutions and the outcomes thereof.

 Mueller, Chapters 10-14.

 Hargreaves Heap et al. 1992. Theory of Choice. Part II, Chapters 7-12.
 Archer, M.S. 1995. Realist Social Theory: the Morphogenetic Approach. Cambridge:
CUP. Chapter 1.
 Crawford, Sue E.S. and Ostrom, Elinor. 1995. “A Grammar of Institutions.” American
Political Science Review. 89(3): 582-600. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-
0554%28199509%2989%3A3%3C582%3AAGOI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A
 Keith Krehbiel; Kenneth A. Shepsle; Barry R. Weingast. 1987. “Why Are Congressional
Committees Powerful?” American Political Science Review. 81(3): 929-945.
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-
0554%28198709%2981%3A3%3C929%3AWACCP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3

Optional:

 Riker, William 1980. “Implications from Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for The Study
of Institutions” American Political Science Review. 74: 432-446.
 McKelvey, Richard D. 1976. “Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models And
Some Implications for Agenda Control” Journal of Economic Theory 2:472-482.
 Riker, William H. 1982. Liberalism against Populism. Prospect Heights, Illinois:
Waveland Press.
 Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row.
 Aldrich, John R. 1990. “Rational Choice and Turnout.” American Journal of Political
Science, 37(1): 246-278. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0092-
5853%28199302%2937%3A1%3C246%3ARCAT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K

Week 7 (October 3): Decision-making by groups, collective action I

Central to understanding political decision-making is the concept of collective action. We have

previously looked at how preferences of groups can (not) be aggregated. But even if there is a
collective will and rationality for certain outcomes (national defense, road construction, water
resource management), the individually rational behavior may be inconsistent (let someone else
pay / serve, use more water than necessary). This week we look at the circumstances where
individually rational political decisions are collectively irrational (and vice versa). The classic on
this topic is the seminal contribution of Mancur Olson. Hargreaves Heap et al. survey this topic

Course Syllabus Page 5

of collective action and its development since Olson. Ostrom and Ostrom (1987) and Ostrom
(1998) discuss variation in collective action and other choice problems. They highlight how the
nature of the decision (the outcome being decided upon and its properties – rivaly and
excludability) determine the approach to the problem. This also leads to suggestions of possible
solutions that generate socially optimal collective behavior. Final, the readings from Mark Twain
(!) and David Laitin present examples of solving collective choice problems.

 Hargreaves Heap et al. 1992. Theory of Choice. Part III, Chapters 13-18.
 Olson, Mancur. 1965. "The Logic of Collective Action" Chapter 1. pp. 1-52.
 Ostrom, Elinor. 1998. "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of
Collective Action." 1997 APSA Presidential Address. American Political Science Review
92(1) (March): 1-22. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-
0554%28199803%2992%3A1%3C1%3AABATTR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F
 Ostrom, Vincent and Elinor Ostrom. "Public Goods and Public Choices: The Emergence
of Public Economies and Industry Structures." Chapter 7 in Ostrom, Vincent. 1987. The
Meaning of American Federalism: Constituting a Self-Governing Society.
 Twain, Mark. "The Pilots' Monopoly" Life on the Mississippi Chapter XV.
http://ofcn.org/cyber.serv/resource/bookshelf/lmiss10/chapter15.html
 Laitin, David D. 1994. "The Tower of Babel as a Coordination Game: Political
Linguistics in Ghana" American Political Science Review. 88(3): 622-634.
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-
0554%28199409%2988%3A3%3C622%3ATTOBAA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S

Week 8 (October 10): Decision-making by groups, collective action II

This week we look at alternative ways to understand collective action and decision-making.
Dennis Chong’s book provides a new theory and analysis of the problem. The two articles offer
further experimental evidence for when collective behavior can be induced and at what cost.

 Chong, all
 James Andreoni; William Harbaugh; Lise Vesterlund . 2003. “The Carrot or the Stick:
Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation.” American Economic Review, 93(3): 893-902.
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-
8282%28200306%2993%3A3%3C893%3ATCOTSR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U
 Elinor Ostrom; James Walker; Roy Gardner. 1992. “Covenants With and Without a
Sword: Self-Governance is Possible” American Political Science Review, 86(2): 404-417.
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-
0554%28199206%2986%3A2%3C404%3ACWAWAS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-V

Optional
 Miller, Gary. 1990. Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy.
Cambridge: CUP.

Week 9 (October 17): Decision making, prediction and forecasting by elites

Political decision-making also includes forecasting and planning. This week we look at how this
is done in political science. Tetlock’s book on the topic is based on long term experimental and
field work on how elites forecast political events. His results are intriguing in that he finds that
there are significant differences in how people forecast and how well they do. The chapters in the

Course Syllabus Page 6

Armstrong volume survey different forecasting methods and how decisions are made for each.
The other readings present other empirical applications of forecasting in international relations.

 Tetlock all.
 Skim Chapter 4, pp. 57-144 of Armstrong, J. Scott, ed. 2001. Principles of Forecasting:
A Handbook for Researchers and Practicioners. New York: Springer.
 See the summary of forecasting and prediction papers on the Kansas Event Data System
(KEDS) website: http://www.ku.edu/~keds/papers.dir/forecasting.html
 See the Brandt and Freeman conflict forecasting site at http://yule.utdallas.edu

Optional
 Armstrong, J. Scott, ed. 2001. Principles of Forecasting: A Handbook for Researchers
and Practicioners. New York: Springer.

Week 10 (October 24): Models of decisions in rule-bound institutions

Institutions are one solution to decision-making and preference aggregation problems. Baron and
Ferejohn look at how legislative rules affect bargaining outcomes while Gilligan and Krehbiel
show how institutional design can help or hinder voting and policy bargaining in legislatures.
Note though that these institutional features are critical to the results: institutional design matters.

 Mueller, Chapters 16-17.

 Baron, David P. and John A. Ferejohn. 1989. “Bargaining in Legislatures.” American
Political Science Review, 83(4): 1181-1206. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-
0554%28198912%2983%3A4%3C1181%3ABIL%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N
 Gilligan, Thomas W. and Keith Krehbiel, 1994. “The Gains from Exchange Hypothesis
of Legislative Organization.” Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19(2):181-214.
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0362-
9805%28199405%2919%3A2%3C181%3ATGFEHO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B

Optional:
 Riker, Williams H. 1986. The Art of Political Manipulation. New Haven: Yale.
 Williamson, Oliver. E. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free
Press.
 VonNeumann, John and Oskar Morgenstern. 1943. Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior. New York: John Wiley.
 Luce, R. Duncan and Howard Raiffa. 1957. Games and Decisions. New York: John
Wiley & Sons.

Week 11 (October 31): Testing models of decision-making and rational behavior

Testing models of political decision-making is complicated by the structure and design of the
models used to explain these decisions. Morton’s book looks at how rational choice models
should and can be tested. Merlo’s article presents a similar survey with broader connections to
political economy. We will also be looking at other examples from the literature this week.
These include actual tests of rational choice models, measurement of key concepts such as
preferences and computational models. All will be responsible for the General readings this
week; the other topics will be subdivided among the students in the course.

General
 Morton, all.

Course Syllabus Page 7

  Merlo, Antonio. “Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues.”
http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~merloa/wpapers/ESWC_merlo.pdf

Examples

 Signorino, Curtis S. 1999. “Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of

International Conflict” American Political Science Review. 93(2): 279-298.
 Calvert, Randall and Richard F. Fenno. 1994. “Strategy and Sophisticated Voting in the
Senate.” Journal of Politics. 56(2):
 Krehbiel, Keith and Douglas Rivers. 1990. “Sophisticated Voting in Congress: A
Reconsideration.” Journal of Politics, 52(2): 548-578.
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-
3816%28199005%2952%3A2%3C548%3ASVICAR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3

Measurement
 Poole, Keith T. 1998. “Recovering a Basic Space From a Set of Issue Scales.” American
Journal of Political Science. 42(3): 954-993. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0092-
5853%28199807%2942%3A3%3C954%3ARABSFA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J. See also
Poole’s website at http://voteview.com
 Andrew D. Martin and Kevin M. Quinn. 2002. "Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via
Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999." Political Analysis.
10: 134-153. http://adm.wustl.edu/pdfs/pa02.pdf. See also Martin’s website at
http://adm.wustl.edu/supct.php

Computational
 Kollman, Kenneth and Scott Page (forthcoming) “Computational Methods and Modeling
Politics” in Handbook of Computational Economics vol. 2 L. Tesfastion and K. Judd
Editors. Pages 12-21.
 Jones, Brad et. al. 1995. “Condorcet Winners and the Paradox of Voting: Probability
Calculations for Weak Preference Orderings” American Political Science Review 89(1):
137-147.
 Kollman, Ken, John Miller and Scott Page 1992. “Adaptive Parties in Spatial Elections”
American Political Science Review 86: 929-937.

Optional

 Bates, Robert, Robert H. Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal.
1998. Analytic Narratives. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
 Munger, Michael. 2000. Analyzing Policy: Choices, Conflicts and Practices. New York:
W. W. Norton and Company.
 Poole. Keith T. 2005. Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting. Cambridge: CUP.

Week 12 (November 7): Decision theory, game theory and social choice comparisons

This week we return to the earlier discussions of how to build and interpret decision theory
models. We will focus especially on the connections (or disconnect) between strategic decision-
making and social choice. As an example, we will look at the theorem by Amartya Sen on the
“Impossibility of the Paretian Liberal”. We will then discuss how strategic decision-making,
uncertainty and institutions allow for the preservation of rights and choices.

 Mueller, Chapter 27.

Course Syllabus Page 8

  Sen, Amartya. 1974. “The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal.” The Journal of Political
Economy. 78(1):152-157. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-
3808%28197001%2F02%2978%3A1%3C152%3ATIOAPL%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U
 Sen, Amartya. 1999. “The Possibility of Social Choice.” American Economic Review.
89(3):349-378. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-
8282%28199906%2989%3A3%3C349%3ATPOSC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G

Optional

 Ordeshook, Peter C, ed. 1989. Models of Strategic Choice in Politics. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.
 Sen, Amartya. 1982. Choice, Welfare and Measurement. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
 Hayek, Friedrich A. 1960. The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.

Week 13 (November 14): Criticisms of rational choice and decision theory models I

The final two weeks readings address criticisms of rational choice and decision theory models in
political science. This has been a major epistemological debate for the last 20 years and one that
you need to be aware of. A major salvo at the rational choice approach was launched by Green
and Shapiro’s (1994) Pathologies of Rational Choice with responses by many rational choice
practicioners in a special issue of Critical Theory. Rather that read this (which you should if you
work in this tradition) we will begin with Mueller’s critical appraisal of the contributions of
rational choice approaches to political science and economy. We then turn to Cox’s rejoinder to
Green and Shapiro. In the final week we will look at S. M. Amadae’s recent intellectual history
and critique of the rational choice approach in political science.

 Mueller Chapters 28-29.

 Cox, Gary. 1999. “The Empirical Content of Rational Choice Theory: A Reply To Green
and Shapiro,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 11: 147-169.

Optional:

 Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, 1994. Pathologies of Rational Choice: A Critique Of
Applications in Political Science. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Week 14 (November 21): Criticisms of rational choice and decision theory models II

 Amadae, all.

Week 15 (November 28): Exam week

Course Syllabus Page 9

Assignments

There are four major required written components for this course:

1. Weekly questions: Each week you should submit three questions to the instructor about
the week’s readings. These questions will be the basis for class discussion and will be
used to guide how we address the material each week. These questions are due by noon
on the day of class.
2. Weekly memos: You are responsible for two weekly memos during the term. These are
in addition to the questions described above. Memos should be a critical review of the
weeks’ readings. Memos should be about 2 single-spaced pages long and submitted via
e-mail to me. Memos are due at noon on the day of class.
3. Exam: There will be a take-home final exam during the last week of the course. It will
be due during the day of the regular exam date for this course. The exam will cover all of
the material in the course and will consist of questions of the type that one would see on a
comprehensive exam.
4. Application / critical review paper: Each student will write a 10-15 page double-spaced
critical review or application paper. You should make an appointment to discuss this
paper with the professor prior to starting. The paper should either review the application
of a decision theory model or approach to a political science problem or apply a decision
theoretic approach to theorizing about a question. For the latter, you need not fully
derive or work out a model, but there should be a clear possibility of doing this and
having it be a major theory. In sum, you should view this paper as a part of a larger
project or dissertation—say a theory chapter, or part of the background work.

Grading Policy
(including percentages for assignments, grade scale, etc.)

Grades in this course will be based on 5 different kinds of assignments:

1. Weekly questions (15%)

2. Weekly memos (15%)
3. Exam (30%)
4. Application / critical review paper (30%)
5. Class attendance and participation (10%)

Grades are based on the standard grading scale: A = 100-90, B = 89-80,

C = 79-70, etc.

Late assignments and papers will be penalized. Late assignments and papers will be penalized
10% per day. Papers or assignments submitted via e-mail will be considered received by the date
and time stamp on the e-mail received in my e-mail inbox. The paper will be due on the last
scheduled class date (November 21, 2006).

It should go without saying that in a class of this size your attendance is easily noted and
therefore required. If you are unable to make a class or will be late, advise the instructor as far in
advance as possible.

Course Syllabus Page 10

Failure to take either the exam or complete the final paper will result in failing the course. In
addition, each weekly assignment (memos or questions) is worth about 2% of your final grade.
Failing to complete these assignments will likely result in a failing grade.

If you have any questions about your grade on an assignment, please wait until 24 hours after
receiving your assignment before discussing the grade with the professor. There are no
exceptions to this policy.

If you wish to have an assignment re-graded, it must be returned to the professor within two days
of the day it was returned (if I am not available that day, ask the staff of the School of Social
Sciences to leave it in my box). Assignments to be re-graded must include a memo stating the
reason why you believe they assignment should be re-graded. Finally, re-graded assignments can
be graded higher, lower, or the same as the initial grade.

Course & Instructor Policies

(make-up exams, extra credit, late work, special assignments, class attendance, classroom
citizenship, etc.)

The following rules apply in class:

Turn off your cell phone. I really do not care if they ring, but it is VERY distracting to others.
(Exceptions to this policy can be made, come to talk to me.)

Do not fall asleep. It is rude and distracting. Bring coffee if you need it (I do.)

Be polite and courteous to your fellow students.

Raise your hand when you want to be recognized to answer or ask a question. If you do not raise
your hand I will not recognize you or your answer.

You are reponsible for things: therefore if you miss something my response will be ``How is this
my problem?''

Note that this syllabus is not a contract. It is subject to change at my discretion. While we may
be studying the political science, this class is not a democracy.

Class starts at 4:00pm. Not 4:15. Be here on time.

Student Conduct & Discipline

The University of Texas System and The University of Texas at Dallas have rules and regulations
for the orderly and efficient conduct of their business. It is the responsibility of each student and
each student organization to be knowledgeable about the rules and regulations which govern
student conduct and activities. General information on student conduct and discipline is
contained in the UTD publication, A to Z Guide, which is provided to all registered students each
academic year.

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The University of Texas at Dallas administers student discipline within the procedures of
recognized and established due process. Procedures are defined and described in the Rules and
Regulations, Board of Regents, The University of Texas System, Part 1, Chapter VI, Section 3,
and in Title V, Rules on Student Services and Activities of the university’s Handbook of
Operating Procedures. Copies of these rules and regulations are available to students in the
Office of the Dean of Students, where staff members are available to assist students in
interpreting the rules and regulations (SU 1.602, 972/883-6391).

A student at the university neither loses the rights nor escapes the responsibilities of citizenship.
He or she is expected to obey federal, state, and local laws as well as the Regents’ Rules,
university regulations, and administrative rules. Students are subject to discipline for violating
the standards of conduct whether such conduct takes place on or off campus, or whether civil or
criminal penalties are also imposed for such conduct.

Academic Integrity

The faculty expects from its students a high level of responsibility and academic honesty.
Because the value of an academic degree depends upon the absolute integrity of the work done by
the student for that degree, it is imperative that a student demonstrate a high standard of
individual honor in his or her scholastic work.

Scholastic dishonesty includes, but is not limited to, statements, acts or omissions related to
applications for enrollment or the award of a degree, and/or the submission as one’s own work or
material that is not one’s own. As a general rule, scholastic dishonesty involves one of the
following acts: cheating, plagiarism, collusion and/or falsifying academic records. Students
suspected of academic dishonesty are subject to disciplinary proceedings.

Plagiarism, especially from the web, from portions of papers for other classes, and from any other
source is unacceptable and will be dealt with under the university’s policy on plagiarism (see
general catalog for details). This course will use the resources of turnitin.com, which searches the
web for possible plagiarism and is over 90% effective.

Email Use

The University of Texas at Dallas recognizes the value and efficiency of communication between
faculty/staff and students through electronic mail. At the same time, email raises some issues
concerning security and the identity of each individual in an email exchange. The university
encourages all official student email correspondence be sent only to a student’s U.T. Dallas email
address and that faculty and staff consider email from students official only if it originates from a
UTD student account. This allows the university to maintain a high degree of confidence in the
identity of all individual corresponding and the security of the transmitted information. UTD
furnishes each student with a free email account that is to be used in all communication with
university personnel. The Department of Information Resources at U.T. Dallas provides a method
for students to have their U.T. Dallas mail forwarded to other accounts.

Withdrawal from Class

The administration of this institution has set deadlines for withdrawal of any college-level
courses. These dates and times are published in that semester's course catalog. Administration
procedures must be followed. It is the student's responsibility to handle withdrawal requirements
from any class. In other words, I cannot drop or withdraw any student. You must do the proper

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paperwork to ensure that you will not receive a final grade of "F" in a course if you choose not to
attend the class once you are enrolled.

Student Grievance Procedures

Procedures for student grievances are found in Title V, Rules on Student Services and Activities,
of the university’s Handbook of Operating Procedures.

In attempting to resolve any student grievance regarding grades, evaluations, or other fulfillments
of academic responsibility, it is the obligation of the student first to make a serious effort to
resolve the matter with the instructor, supervisor, administrator, or committee with whom the
grievance originates (hereafter called “the respondent”). Individual faculty members retain
primary responsibility for assigning grades and evaluations. If the matter cannot be resolved at
that level, the grievance must be submitted in writing to the respondent with a copy of the
respondent’s School Dean. If the matter is not resolved by the written response provided by the
respondent, the student may submit a written appeal to the School Dean. If the grievance is not
resolved by the School Dean’s decision, the student may make a written appeal to the Dean of
Graduate or Undergraduate Education, and the deal will appoint and convene an Academic
Appeals Panel. The decision of the Academic Appeals Panel is final. The results of the academic
appeals process will be distributed to all involved parties.

Copies of these rules and regulations are available to students in the Office of the Dean of
Students, where staff members are available to assist students in interpreting the rules and
regulations.

Incomplete Grade Policy

As per university policy, incomplete grades will be granted only for work unavoidably missed at
the semester’s end and only if 70% of the course work has been completed. An incomplete grade
must be resolved within eight (8) weeks from the first day of the subsequent long semester. If the
required work to complete the course and to remove the incomplete grade is not submitted by the
specified deadline, the incomplete grade is changed automatically to a grade of F.

Disability Services

The goal of Disability Services is to provide students with disabilities educational opportunities
equal to those of their non-disabled peers. Disability Services is located in room 1.610 in the
Student Union. Office hours are Monday and Thursday, 8:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m.; Tuesday and
Wednesday, 8:30 a.m. to 7:30 p.m.; and Friday, 8:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.

The contact information for the Office of Disability Services is:

The University of Texas at Dallas, SU 22
PO Box 830688
Richardson, Texas 75083-0688
(972) 883-2098 (voice or TTY)

Essentially, the law requires that colleges and universities make those reasonable adjustments
necessary to eliminate discrimination on the basis of disability. For example, it may be necessary
to remove classroom prohibitions against tape recorders or animals (in the case of dog guides) for
students who are blind. Occasionally an assignment requirement may be substituted (for
example, a research paper versus an oral presentation for a student who is hearing impaired).

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Classes enrolled students with mobility impairments may have to be rescheduled in accessible
facilities. The college or university may need to provide special services such as registration,
note-taking, or mobility assistance.

It is the student’s responsibility to notify his or her professors of the need for such an
accommodation. Disability Services provides students with letters to present to faculty members
to verify that the student has a disability and needs accommodations. Individuals requiring
special accommodation should contact the professor after class or during office hours.

Religious Holy Days

The University of Texas at Dallas will excuse a student from class or other required activities for
the travel to and observance of a religious holy day for a religion whose places of worship are
exempt from property tax under Section 11.20, Tax Code, Texas Code Annotated.

The student is encouraged to notify the instructor or activity sponsor as soon as possible
regarding the absence, preferably in advance of the assignment. The student, so excused, will be
allowed to take the exam or complete the assignment within a reasonable time after the absence: a
period equal to the length of the absence, up to a maximum of one week. A student who notifies
the instructor and completes any missed exam or assignment may not be penalized for the
absence. A student who fails to complete the exam or assignment within the prescribed period
may receive a failing grade for that exam or assignment.

If a student or an instructor disagrees about the nature of the absence [i.e., for the purpose of
observing a religious holy day] or if there is similar disagreement about whether the student has
been given a reasonable time to complete any missed assignments or examinations, either the
student or the instructor may request a ruling from the chief executive officer of the institution, or
his or her designee. The chief executive officer or designee must take into account the legislative
intent of TEC 51.911(b), and the student and instructor will abide by the decision of the chief
executive officer or designee.

These descriptions and timelines are subject to change at the discretion of the Professor.

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