Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19450

May 27, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.
PAREDES, J.:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with
the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said
accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The
complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City,
having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary
of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial
of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any
payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was
questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the
position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he
ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the
appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17,
1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.
Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule
from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35,
Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that
City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right
of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law practice.
This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which
rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read:
The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended
party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be
represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the
Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear
that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity.
As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the
prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the

prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible
conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo
and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out,
the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend
to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal
action.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear
before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this
criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.
WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos,
Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed,
without costs.
The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.
The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.

1wph1.t

Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which
we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation
of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or
other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage
in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City
Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We
believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within
the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of
law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs.
Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive
as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the
Solicitor General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to
be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is
a relative.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is
hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant..
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and
Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.

A.M. No. 177-MJ November 27, 1975

CONCEPCION DIA-AONUEVO, complainant,
vs.
MUN. JUDGE BONIFACIO B. BERCACIO OF TABACO, ALBAY, respondent.

MUOZ PALMA, J.:

Respondent, incumbent Municipal Judge of Tabaco, Albay, faces this administrative complaint for
conduct unbecoming a judge on two counts: (1) engaging in the practice of law, and (2) failure to
return promptly to complainant, Concepcion Dia-Aonuevo, the money deposited with him.
The following are the undisputed facts:
Mrs. Concepcion Dia-Aonuevo, to whom We shall refer henceforth as complainant, claims to be a
co-owner of an undivided interest of a certain parcel of irrigated riceland situated in Cabilogan, Sto.
Nio, Sto. Domingo, Albay. This property was the object of a deed of sale executed by Maximo
Balibado, Justo Balibado and Petrona Balibado de Barrios in favor of Alfredo Ong and
acknowledged before Municipal Judge Bonifacio Bercacio, respondent herein, as ex-officio notary
public, on January 25, 1972. Having been apprised of the execution of this deed of sale, complainant
went to the office of Judge Bercacio to verify the matter. Upon being shown a copy of the deed of
sale, complainant informed respondent judge that the vendors owned only one-third undivided
portion of the property and that she and other cousins of hers owned two-thirds thereof. Judge
Bercacio advised the complainant to redeem or repurchase the property from the vendee, Alfredo
Ong. Complainant then requested the judge to intercede in their behalf with the vendee to allow
them to redeem the property and for that purpose she gave respondent the amount of P3,500.00 to
be used to pay Alfredo Ong. Respondent agreed and received the amount of P3,500.00 for which he
issued the corresponding receipt which reads:
This is to certify that MRS. CONCEPCION DIA-AONUEVO of Sto. Domingo, Albay,
has deposited with the undersigned, the sum of THREE THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED (P3,500.00) PESOS Philippine Currency, for the purpose of exercising
her right to the legal redemption of the property sold to MR. ALFREDO ONG by
Messrs. Maximo Balibado, Justo Balibado and Mrs. Petrona B. de Barrios as per
Doc. No. 7, Page 3, Book No. 1, Series of 1972, of the Notarial Register of the
undersigned, dated Jan. 25, 1972.
Tabaco, Albay, February 23, 1972.
(Sgd.) BONIFACIO B. BERCACIO
(Exhibit C)
Judge
Respondent sent the corresponding letter to Alfredo Ong but the latter did not answer. Forthwith a
complaint was filed on March 8, 1972 with the Court of First Instance of Albay (Civil Case No. 4591)
entitled: "Concepcion Dia-Aonuevo, et al., plaintiffs, versus Maximo Balibado et al., defendants" for
"annulment of sale of real property and redemption with damages." This complaint was prepared on

February 26, 1972 by "Eligio R. Berango & B.B. Bercacio & Ass." as counsel for the plaintiffs, with
Eligio R. Berango signing the complaint. (Exhibit B)
During the pendency of the civil case, complainant asked respondent judge to allow her to withdraw
P1,500.00 from the P3,500.00 she had deposited with him as she was then in need of money, but no
action was taken by respondent. The verbal request was followed by a registered letter dated
January 24, 1973 advising Judge Bercacio that complainant herein was withdrawing the amount of
P3,500.00 deposited with him and requesting him to remit the said amount within ten days from
receipt of the letter. (Exhibit D) There was still no response from respondent Judge, hence, another
letter was sent dated February 21, 1973, which We quote:
San
Roque
Sto.
Domin
go
Albay
Februa
ry 21,
1973
Hon. Bonifacio Bercacio
Municipal Judge of Tabaco
Tabaco Albay
Sir:
This is a tracer of my letter to you dated January 28, 1973,
demanding from you the return of the amount of Three Thousand
Five Hundred Pesos (P3,500.00), which I entrusted to you for the
redemption of my land which is involved in Civil Case No. 4591
entitled "Concepcion Dia-Aonuevo, et al., vs. Maximo Balibado, et
al.," which is now pending in the Court of First Instance of Albay,
Branch III. Inasmuch as you failed to deposit that amount to the Clerk
of Court, Court of First Instance of Albay, I am demanding from your
good self the return of said amount to me because I need it very
badly.
I have spent a lot of money in going back and forth from Sto.
Domingo to your residence to demand from you the amount but of no
avail for almost one year. Failure on your part to comply with the
same, I will be constrained to take the necessary action on the matter
against you.
Thank you.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) Mrs. CONCEPCION DIAAONUEVO
(Exhibit E)

As the foregoing letter elicited no reaction from the Judge, complainant Mrs. Aonuevo sought the
assistance of a lawyer in the person of Atty. Rodolfo A. Madrid who accordingly wrote to respondent
on March 16, 1973, giving the lattera final period of grace within which to return the sum of
P3,500.00, otherwise proper measures would be taken to protect the interests of his client. (Exhibit
F)
Respondent finally broke his silence and answered with a letter given hereunder:
T
a
b
a
c
o
,
A
l
b
a
y
M
a
r
c
h
2
1
,
1
9
7
3
Atty. Rodolfo A. Madrid
El Casino Bldg.
Legazpi City
Dear Dolfo:
I am in receipt today of yours dated the 16th. inst.
Frankly, I am indeed surprised at the tenor of your letter, particularly
the threat it contains despite the explanation I verbally gave you when
you dropped at my office. .
If you would re-examine the receipt I issued to Mrs. Concepcion D.
Aonuevo, dated February 23, 1972, you will note that the amount
was entrusted to me to make it available anytime "for the purpose of

exercising her right to the legal redemption of the property sold to Mr.
Alfredo Ong." The case instituted by the plaintiffs, among whom is
Mrs. Aonuevo for the determination of their right is still pending in
Court due to the illness of Judge Zurbano and the prolonged vacation
of the Presiding Judge.
When the money was entrusted to me, I was made to understand that
the amount was not exclusively hers alone. I regret that legal ethics
forbid me from revealing to you what was imparted to me in
confidence which I have the moral obligation to keep inviolate.
Your insinuation of inaction on my part is false because I summoned
Mrs. Aonuevo to my office after I received her letters; she
apologized and did not insist that the money be returned pending the
termination of the civil case. From reliable sources I have learned that
she is being made a conveyance tool for sinister motives and there is
ample ground to suspect that this matter is being used as a vehicle
for revenge.
The case now pending in the CFI is being handled by another lawyer
who should have some say on this matter.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) BONIFACIO B. BERCACIO
(Exhibit G)
Due to the non-remittance of the aforementioned amount, Atty. Madrid filed with the Court of First
Instance an urgent motion dated August 20, 1973, praying that Judge Bercacio be directed to
consign in court the amount deposited with him by the plaintiff, Mrs. Aonuevo. (Exhibit H)
Upon receipt of the foregoing motion, respondent manifested to the trial judge that he would be
ready to deliver the money as soon as the plaintiffs won the case. On September 13, 1973, the trial
court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, and on the same date, issued an order directing
Judge Bercacio to deposit with the Clerk of Court the amount of P3,500.00 within five (5) days from
receipt of the order (t.s.n. February 1, 1974, p. 19). On September 17, Judge Bercacio received a
copy of the order and on September 26, 1973, he turned over the amount to Atty. Rodolfo Madrid
(t.s.n. Ibid. pp. 22-24)
1. Respondent violated Section 77 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, which provides in part:
All provisions relative to the observance of office hours and the holding of sessions
applicable to courts of first instance shall likewise apply to municipal judges, but the
latter may, after office hours and with the permission of the district judge concerned,
engage in teaching or other vocation not involving the practice of law ... (Emphasis
supplied)
and which was implemented by Circular No. 37 of the Secretary of Justice dated June 22, 1971 to
the effect that

... no Municipal Judge shall ... engage in private practice as a member of the bar or
give professional advice to clients ... (emphasis supplied)
Respondent submits that it was Atty. Berango and not he who assisted the complainant, Mrs.
Aonuevo, and her co-plaintiffs as counsel in the civil case; that when he saw his name in the
complaint as one of the lawyers, he called Atty. Berangos attention to the mistake and this was
immediately corrected in the subsequent pleadings by deleting his name.
Respondent's claim is belied, however, by the active interest he took in the case of Mrs. Aonuevo
manifested as follows: (a) He gave Mrs. Aonuevo legal advice on the remedy available to her and
her co-owners with regards to the property sold to Alfredo Ong. (b) He accepted from Mrs.
Aonuevo the sum of P3,500.00 for purposes of redeeming the property from the vendee, plus
P100.00 for incidental expenses (t.s.n. January 28, 1974, p. 9). (c) He wrote to Alfredo Ong for and
in behalf of Mrs. Aonuevo and her co-owners offering to redeem the land in question (t.s.n.
February 19, 1974, p. 89). (d) When his attempts at an out-of-court settlement failed, he caused the
filing of the complaint in Civil Case No. 4591 (t.s.n. February 1, 1974, p. 24), for which he was issued
a receipt for docket and legal research fees (t.s.n. February 19, 1974, p. 119). (e) He was present
together with Atty. Berango at the pre-trial of July 5, 1972, and although, as he claims, it was Atty.
Berango who made an appearance for that pre-trial, the trial Judge nonetheless took note of
respondent's presence so that the Order dictated on that occasion reads: "Attys. Berango and
Bercacio are notified of the date of the trial." (t.s.n. February 19, 1974, p. 67)
Moreover, it has not escaped Our attention that as claimed by complainant herein it was respondent
Judge who dealt with her all along in connection with the conduct of her case. This is borne out by
the letter of Atty. Berango asking respondent to collect from Mrs. Aonuevo the amount of P500.00
as his attorney's fees (Annex 3 of respondent's comment, p. 11, rollo), and the fact that respondent
invited Mrs. Aonuevo to a conference in his office to discuss the matter with Atty. Berango. (see
Annex A, Ibid., p. 12, rollo) If Atty. Berango indeed was the lawyer of Mrs. Aonuevo, why did he
have to seek the intervention of respondent to collect his attorney's fees and why did respondent
have to call Mrs. Aonuevo to his office for that purpose?
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or participation in court proceedings
but also includes preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a litigation, giving of legal
advice to clients or persons needing the same, etc. (Martin, Comments on Rules of Court, Vol. 6,
1974 Ed., p. 251; Moran, Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., Vol. 6, p. 206) Hence, even if we were to accept
respondent's explanation that it was Atty. Berango who represented Mrs. Aonuevo and her coplaintiffs in court, respondent's actuations as noted above still fall within the prohibition.
The rule disqualifying a municipal judge from engaging in the practice of law seeks to avoid the evil
of possible use of the power and influence of his office to affect the outcome of a litigation where he
is retained as counsel. Compelling reasons of public policy lie behind this prohibition, and judges are
expected to conduct themselves in such a manner as to preclude any suspicion that they are
representing the interests of a party litigant.
2. Respondent's failure to return the amount of P3,500.00 to herein complainant upon her demand is
highly reproachable, to say the least.
Mrs. Aonuevo gave to respondent the aforesaid amount with the understanding that it would be
offered to Alfredo Ong for purposes of redeeming the property sold by Mrs. Aonuevo's co-owners.
When Alfredo Ong refused the extra-judicial offer of redemption, respondent should have either
returned the money to Mrs. Aonuevo or consigned it in court.

Respondent contends that he kept the money because he wanted it ready for payment to the
vendee should the complaint for redemption prosper. In fact, according to respondent, he brought
the amount with him during the pre-trial of July 5, 1972, just in case an amicable settlement would be
effected between the parties, but when this failed, he gave the P3,500.00 to Atty. Berango for
custody. However, on April 9, 1973, Atty. Berango returned to him the money because Mrs.
Aonuevo had secured the services of another counsel. Due to this development, he wrote to
complainant herein to come to his office for a conference with Atty. Berango on the latter's attorney's
fee and also in order that she may get back the money she had deposited. (t.s.n. February 19, 1974,
pp. 95-100)
The explanation of respondent fails to convince Us of his good faith. Even if we were to concede that
his intention in keeping the money was to have it ready at any time for payment to Alfredo Ong
should the civil case prosper, nevertheless, when complainant herein made demands on him, verbal
as well as written, to return the money, he should have immediately turned it over to complainant to
forestall or erase any possible suspicion that he had spent it; or he could have deposited it in court,
anyway, his purpose, as he said, was to keep the money available at all times.
Respondent's obstinate refusal or failure to accede to complainant's request for almost a year led
the latter to secure the services of another counsel who was compelled what to him must have
been an unpleasant task to ask from no less than a member of the Judiciary the return of the
P3,500.00 deposited with the latter otherwise he would have to take the necessary steps to protect
the interest of his client. That demand of Atty. Madrid was made in March of 1973, but instead of
delivering the amount, respondent still held it putting up the excuse in a letter to Atty. Madrid (see
pp. 4-5 of this Decision) that the money did not belong entirely to Mrs. Aonuevo and that the latter
had agreed to his keeping the money during the pendency of the case. That of course was untrue,
because, first, there was nothing in the record to show that the P3,500.00 belonged to persons other
than Mrs. Aonuevo from whom respondent received it, and secondly, it was Mrs. Aonuevo who
had personally been asking all along for the return of said amount. It is to the discredit of respondent
that it took a court order issued on September 13, 1973, for him to return complainant's money to
Atty. Madrid.
While the Court does not make a categorical finding that respondent made use of the money
deposited with him, nonetheless, We hold that by his actuations, respondent placed his honesty and
integrity under serious doubt.
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary. A
magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or
otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of
integrity and justice. To a certain degree, respondent herein failed to meet these exacting standards
of judicial conduct.
WHEREFORE, We find respondent Judge Bonifacio B. Bercacio guilty as charged, and hereby
suspend him from office for a period of six (6) months effective immediately upon finality of this
decision, with the warning that commission of other acts unbecoming of a Judge will warrant a more
severe penalty from the Court.
So Ordered.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.
and Martin, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 46396

September 30, 1939

ALEJANDRO DE GUZMAN, petitioner,

vs.
VISAYAN RAPID TRANSIT CO., INC., NEGROS TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., and NICOLAS
CONCEPCION,respondents.
Licerio Floirendo and Eulogio de Guzman for petitioner.
E.P. Virata for respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals of September 20, 1938,
in the above-entitled case on various alleged errors of law.
The Visayan Rapid Transit Co. and the Negros Transportation Co., Inc., during the time the legal
services are claimed to have been rendered by the petitioner, were operating automobile lines in the
Province of Occidental Negros. The respondent, Nicolas Concepcion, was at the time the president,
general manager, and controlling stockholder of these two transportation companies. In January,
1933, Concepcion engaged the professional services of the petitioner, who was then a law
practitioner in the City of Manila. The employment was for the purpose of obtaining the suppression,
reduction and refund of certain toll rates on various bridges along the line operated by the
respondent transportation companies. According to the petitioner, these toll bridges are in places
known as Bago, Calatrava, Danao, Hinigiran, Malogo, Talavan-Dacu, Talabangay, Bagacay,
Binmalayan and Sicaba. At the time of the employment of the petitioner, it appears that the
respondent transportation companies had paid the sum of P89,816.70 as toll charges up to
December 31, 1932, an amount said to represent one-seventh of their gross income up to that date,
and in view of their high rates, the payment of the toll charges were detrimental to the transportation
business of the respondent if not remedied in time. The herein petitioner accordingly took steps to
obtain first the suppression, and later the reduction of toll rates on said bridges and also the refund
of P50,000 of toll charges already collected by the Province of Occidental Negros. For this purpose,
he appears to have signed Exhibit A which Concepcion brought to Manila, asking that the Bago and
Malogo bridges be declared free, and said petition was filed with the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications in January, 1933.
Believing that the suppression of tolls on the Bago and Malogo bridges could not be effected, the
petitioner filed with the said Secretary of Public Works and Communication, petition Exhibit B asking
for the reduction of toll charges over the eleven (11) bridges in Occidental Negros. This fact was
brought to the knowledge of Nicolas Concepcion who in turn wrote to the petitioner, Exhibit K-1, the
pertinent part of which reads thus:
Now compadre if this toll business will not all be effected I would like to request you therefore
to work for at least 50 per cent reduction on all toll bridges, so that our little business will
prosper a bit. We will always hope of course for the best to come. (In English.)
The Insular authorities readily saw the justice of the transportation companies' petition and urged the
provincial board of Occidental Negros to act favorably. The provincial board, however, declined to
follow the suggestion. The Secretary of Commerce and Public Works warned the provincial officials
by sending them the communication, dated April 23, 1934, with the admonition that "if the toll rates
have not been revised by . . . June 15, 1934, this office, much to its regrets, will be forced to
withdraw its approval of the existing toll rates." By reason of this communication, the provincial
board, on March 7, 1934, with the conformity of Nicolas Concepcion, adopted a resolution reducing

the tolls for 2-ton trucks or more, the only kind of motor vehicles operated by the respondents, from
P1.20 to P0.50 on one bridge, and from P1.20 to 0.40 on the other. And on April 10, 1935 "upon
authority of the Insular Auditor, concurred in by the Department of the Interior" the provincial board
refunded P50,000 as bridge tolls illegally collected from the Visayan Rapid Transit Company, Inc.,
and the Negros Transportation Company, Inc., said amount to be applied to future payments for tolls
by said companies. As a result of this reduction of tolls, the respondents have been benefited with
an economy of P78,448 for every eighteen months. (Exhibit V.)
The various incidental questions raised by the petitioner revolves around the reasonable
compensation to which he is entitled, and we pass on to the consideration of this point.
Although the professional services rendered by the petitioner are purely administrative and did not
require a high degree of professional skill and experience, the fact remains that these services were
rendered and were productive of substantial beneficial results to his clients. It is clear that for these
services the petitioner is entitled to compensation, and the only question is the reasonable amount to
which he is entitled. He claimed in the lower court the sum of P20,000. The trial court awarded him
P10,000. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reduced this amount to P3,500.
Section 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "a lawyer shall be entitled to have and
recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for the services rendered, with a
view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, to the extent of the services
rendered, and the professional standing of the lawyer . . .." The following are the circumstances to
be considered in determining the compensation of an attorney: the amount and character of the
services rendered; the labor, time, and trouble involved; the nature and importance of the litigation or
business in which the services were rendered; the responsibility imposed; the amount of money or
the value of the property affected by the controversy, or involved in the employment, the skill and
experience called for in the performance of the services; the professional character and social
standing of the attorney; the results secured; and whether or not the fee is absolute or contingent, it
being a recognized rule that an attorney may properly charge a much a larger fee when it is to be
contingent that when it is not. The financial ability of the defendant may also be considered not to
enhance the amount above a reasonable compensation, but to determine whether or not he is able
to pay a fair and just compensation for the services rendered, or as as incident in ascertaining the
importance and gravity of the interests involved in the litigation. (Delgado vs. De la Rama, 43 Phil.,
419; Panis vs. Yangco, 52 Phil., 499.)
The services of the petitioner in this case were not limited to the preparation and filing with the
authorities concerned of the petitions Exhibits A and B and other papers submitted in evidence, for
he appears to have had various conferences with the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Labor and the Insular Auditor, and
had otherwise taken steps to secure the objectives of his clients. The importance, merits and value
of professional services of a lawyer are measured not alone by his work taken separately, but by his
work taken as a whole. There are services which, when taken separately, may not in themselves
have any noticeable special merit, but when considered in connection with the other works and
services of the lawyer to which they are related, acquire an unquestionable value. That is why even
the time employed is not itself an appropriate basis for fixing the compensation.
(Haussermann vs. Rahmeyer, 12 Phil., 350; Bachrach vs. Teal and Teal Motor Co., 53 Phil., 631,
634.)
The respondents in their brief insinuate that the services of the petitioner were unsolicited and
unauthorized. The trial court as well as the Court of Appeals, upon the proof submitted, concluded
that the employment of the petitioner was duly made and solicited by the president and manager of
the respondent corporations, and such finding cannot be disturbed. "It is elementary that an attorney

is entitled to have and receive the just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the
special instance and request of his client . . . That is to say, as long as the plaintiff was honestly and
in good faith trying to serve and represent the interest of the client, he should have a reasonable
compensation for his services. . . ." (Wolfson vs. Anderson, 48 Phil., 672, 675.)
The amount of the professional fees to be paid to the petitioner had not been fixed, but the intention
and promise to pay him is evidently shown by the records in this case. And in any case, whether
there is an agreement or not, the courts can fix a reasonable compensation which lawyers should
receive for their professional services. (Panisvs. Yangco, 52 Phil., 499, 502.)
No hard and fast rule can be stated which will serve even as a guide in determining what is or what
is not a reasonable fee. That must be determined from the facts in each case. (2 Thornton on
Attorney at Law, p. 783.)
We have noted in the beginning that the services here were rendered in a case of an administrative
nature. But that does not alter the application of the proper rule:
Professional services, to prepare and advocate just claims for compensation, are as
legitimate as services rendered in court in arguing a cause to convince a court or jury that
the claim presented or the defense set up against a claim presented by the other party ought
to be allowed or rejected. Parties in such cases require advocates; and the legal profession
must have a right to accept such employment and to receive compensation for their services;
nor can courts of justice adjudge such contracts illegal, if they are free from any taint of
fraud, misrepresentation, or unfairness. (Stanton vs. Embry, 23 Law. ed [U.S.], 983, 985.)
As warranted by the records, it is obvious that as a result of the reduction of the rates of the toll of
the bridges in the said province, the respondents were benefited with an economy of P78,448. The
refund to the said corporations of the amount of P50,000 is a great relief and enhancement of their
business. Facts and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that the reasonable
compensation of the petitioner is P7,000, deducting therefrom, however, the sum of P1,280 which
the petitioner had already received.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly modified, without pronouncement regarding
costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues
are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the
political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time
of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
-elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a
legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the

practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using
a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters,
negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting
fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.
v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights
under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside
of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick
v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in mattersconnected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's
claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts
and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and
the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have
no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law
bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which

rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] ,
p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted
in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144).
(Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the
profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for
attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some
one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within
the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a
manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions
on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief
statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the
Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for
by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" I
am quoting from the provision "who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar
who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make
the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar
does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have
to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA
are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA,
then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or
commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and
Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation
may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards

members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is
taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a
lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set
forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although
it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal
work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would
have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on
qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And,
therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is
equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and
two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants
with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the
word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that
the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.).
Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called
"firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may
be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the
members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more
inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law
is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870
[1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because

lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role
for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p.
593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much
of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.).
Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most
developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that
in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner,
the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in
medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients,
and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig
usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow
specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to
an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency.
(Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare
types a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will
require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which
the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are
those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in
corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those
members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that
understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to
intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate

understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of
the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "modelmaking" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of
traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and
weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the
necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need
for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use
of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic
data processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved
decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making
process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects
flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and
projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received
relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing
corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal
research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained
primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable
decisional context and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers,
particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or
management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some
appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which
are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the
services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise
from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue
raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the
"abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a
clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain
what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed
by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many
smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law
firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation
have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal
affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia:
corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in
board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies

(including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which
require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal
affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such
matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis
supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the
action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the
orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his
work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be
more closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a
multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After
all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law
firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills
is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs
go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international
practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p.
4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To
borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer
is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties,
and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to
speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining
the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion
as well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of
learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular
significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins
applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion
to the organization and management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared
area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it
forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For
that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the
resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to
make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The
salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global
multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms

increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other often with
those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation
is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a
stakeholder in some cases participating in the organization and operations of
governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often
these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are
perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for
global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward
the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for
promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require
approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and
traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons
to be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples
of collaborative efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world
famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel
comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of
organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within
organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the groupcontext interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the
environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within
the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team
performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis
the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking
ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand
relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective
tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate
problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates
of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems physical,
economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now
make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers including
corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving
complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to
appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize
the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used
directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such
tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on

instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture

may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern
three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a
major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial
law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and
maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or
similar facts are being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those
activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly
supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms
change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and
theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to
make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel
has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal
profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's
strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved
relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded
liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers,
coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough
to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how
the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim
is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the
very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be
able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem
corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a
passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many
would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires
next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk
opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does
not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's

nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in
the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as
an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic,
and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco
Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and
economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He
appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the
farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the
agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal
knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and
Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to
reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a
negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal
officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations
officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the
members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines,
Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the
law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan
Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business
terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5)
events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program.
For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they
score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries'
sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development

Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal

adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the
Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in
Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31,
1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely
renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and
agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work
with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a
model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a
mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only
with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate
technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine
External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987,
p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of
terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to
perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only
define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to
either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt
restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis
issine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in
domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but
where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and
serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third
and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers
of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager,
a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both
the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the
officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that
the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified
who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations
of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other
legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to

the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no
authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more
qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of
a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion
vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the
discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in
the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of
confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking,
posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on
Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of
the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven
years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of
the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of
the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as
distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern
connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual
law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law
practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that
law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but
only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by
"traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the
phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a
lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt.
For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming

that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent
President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by
law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is
beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment.
In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no
abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the
Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission
has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress)
decides to confirma Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S.
Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah
(who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon
hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming
with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied:
"Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying
on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does
not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the
Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment
thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and
consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted
not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position
of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office.
My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all
parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification.
Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already
showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he
had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as
COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the
constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately,
the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision
requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987
Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial
resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial

department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and
defining constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these
are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the
bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it
connotes an active, habitual,repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or any profession for
that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually,
repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing
aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a
clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is
employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a
Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of
law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of
law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for
such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis
supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it
prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes
"practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding
one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing
State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular
announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v.
Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a
notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil.
968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary
action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise
(People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be
in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or
in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging
for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge

and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and
Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176
N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806
citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is
expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with
the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the
existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity
which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as
teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the
practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not
respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years
at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT
LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am
persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not
do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly
considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the
rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify
his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be
a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in theactive and continued practice of the legal profession and that his
professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of
his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not
qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same.
There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent
simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my
view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the
appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body.
Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing
authority tochoose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required
qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the
required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he
has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate
proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised
citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but
whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been
too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically
toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable
feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as
his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the
insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice
on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another
business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers
every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A.
Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected
by some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact,
again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be
considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or
consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such
transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be
deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules
and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any
acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely
nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in
the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be
workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged
in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough
that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or

regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom
dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that
he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as
an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied
the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman
and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued
that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in
the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and
priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these
capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless
eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must
regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for
public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not
the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the
practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing
his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the
result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official
leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the
deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of
persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error.
We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief
that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in
management, educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant
recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is
before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never
engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has
practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he
has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can
claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for
appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we
have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-

finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law,
whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they
happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The
deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated,
occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an
activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of one's
decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or
pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the
Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year
period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law
practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D.
degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice
law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal
of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said
resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III
of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board
shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take
whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the
Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of
Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member
and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter
adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay
the membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to
Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were
required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth
submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety
and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The
respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as
the Court Rule) 1 in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated and to the
provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the
IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in
Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:

SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of

this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the
Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official national body to
be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose
names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such
annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his
status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues,
and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of
the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of
Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but
is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that
inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the
practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise
of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the
Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the
Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all
these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments
adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of
factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and
legally unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished
from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an
official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to
all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a
code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient
reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for
discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public
interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the
restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of
individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have
been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important
profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most
important functions of the State the administration of justice as an officer of the court. 4 The
practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of
control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court
through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of
"subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).

When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did
so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards
of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the
integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the
Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No.
181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by
a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty,
property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order
to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for,
as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To
this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority
because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted
power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some
freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in
the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5
(5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts,
and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may
adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No.
6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme
Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional
declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and
supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his
exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power
of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the
proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If
he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have
clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to
become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is
unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative
of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually
does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive
group of which every lawyer is a ready a member.8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. 9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring
payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court,
under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice
of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution)
which power the respondent acknowledges from requiring members of a privileged class, such as
lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession
to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of
a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under
the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its
existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure
is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with
the lawyer's public responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a
lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are
indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding
such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar
Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court,
sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and
qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power
which is inherent in this court as a court appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper
administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating
to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has
limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a
brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave
responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an
honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the
duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to
the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the
fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in
the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent
Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos,
Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.