Global Business: Answers to the Case Questions 2013-2014

Case 1-4: Acer, Inc: Taiwans Ramping Dragon

1) What accounts for Acers outstanding startup?

Traditional
Motivations

Marketseeking
behavior*
Access low-cost factors
of production*

Secure key supplies

Emerging
Motivations

Increase scale
economies*
Global scanning & learing
capability *

Competitive positioning

*Bold characters mean its applicable for Acer.

Established core values
Frugality
Human nature is essentially good
Maintaining fundemental pragmatism and accountability
Customer first
Sharing knowledge
2) How do you evaluate the companys and more in particular Leonard Lius
performance in the late 1980s?
Liu made employees accountable for profits&losses
He established RBUs&SBUs (regional&strategic business units)
Reduced management layers
He laid off worst performing employees (to raise money and motivate workers) in
contrast with the core values about trusting people and letting them make mistakes
and learn from them.
He wasted money on luxury (5 star hotel-stays or business flights, unnecessary stuff)
Liu Improved some of the core values while misregarding some of the previously
established ones
3) How effective is the client-server organizational model to fight Acers challenges in
the mid 1990s?
Client Server Model
Each business unit acts independently
Coordination between business units
Benefits: making use of Acers international resources
Challenges in mid 1990s
Increased competition with Hewlett Packard
Fast changing industry

 1992, even the largest RBU were still viewed as a little more than sales&dstrbution
arms
Client Server Model contributed in the following ways:
Responding quickly to changing trends
Threat of strenghtening competition nuclear option
Every man is lord of his castle & Let the market decide strategy presented by Shih
(Created a huge success)
4)Should AAC continue to lead this project? If yes, would you change its current role?
This is a perspective question, thus the following is not 100% correct and the only answer
that could be given.
YES!
AAC is an independent company
Improve the communcation between different business units
Make use of the international resources
Recent developments:
AAC led the project
Business unit independence resulted in problems in communication
National roll-out was not very successful
Aspire created losses (during the first years)
Aspire today is a well known product creating profit

Case 2:Global Wine War 2009 New World Versus Old

1. How did the French become the dominant competitors in the increasingly global
wineindustry for centuries? What sources of competitive advantage were they able to
develop? Wherewere they vulnerable?
By the Christian era, wine became part of the liturgical services and monasteries planted
vines and builtwineries and the European nobility began planting vineyards as a symbol of
prestige, competing inquality of wine they serve on their table, i.e. start of premium wine
market. French wine producersbecame the dominant competitor as a result of four reasons.
First, their geographic and climatic featuresplayed significant role. As France is in the middle
of Europe culture with suitable climate and soilcondition for harvesting grape, had accrued
first-mover advantage and established its place as thedominant competitor in the global wine
industry. Second, they became the first high-quality winemarket and gained a lot experience.
Especially,
the negociants traded wine between France and othercountries and this worked as word-ofmouth effect, increasing the reputation and dominance of Frenchwine. Third, they used the
latest innovations such as mass production of glass bottles, the use of cork stoppers and
pasteurization. These innovations increased the stability and longevity of wine whichallowed
the transportation of wine to distant places, and birth of global wine market. Lastly,
thegovernment support made significant effect on the reputation and improvement of French
wineindustry. Government controlled the wine production and quality, regulations like AOC
and VDQS, setdetailed and quite rigid standards for vineyards and wine makers.The main
vulnerable aspects of French wine industry were highly fragmented vineyard and
wineproduction, increasing vineyard prices per acre, complex distribution and sales system,
long multilevelvalue chain, risk of bad weather and disease; and poor roads and complex toll
and tax system.

2.What changes in the global industry structure and competitive dynamics led the
Franceand other traditional producers to lose market share to challengers from
Australia, US, and otherNew World countries?
Vineyards and wine makers had been set up in many New World countries since the
18thcentury, butconsumption was not as high as it was in European countries. By the 1960s,
the New World countriesentered in the wine industry and became a key player in the market
with challenging the production andmarketing norms.The New World countries had several
advantages over traditional producer countries in productionnorms. First, suitable land was
widely available and less expensive, allowing the growth of much moreextensive vineyards.
Second, unconstrained by tradition, they began to experiment with grape growingand
winemaking technology; they used mechanical harvesters, irrigation methods. Other
experimentswith fertilizers and pruning
methods increased yield and improved grape flavor. Third, they broke themany wine making
traditions and used on-site labs to provide analysis helpful in making growing andharvest
decisions. Lastly, as a result of these innovations in production they were able to reduce
theircost per tonne nearly to half of French wine.Also, there were challenges on marketing
and demand side. First of all, the consumption per capita of wine in traditional producer
countries were declining since 1966, but it was increasing for New Worldcountries. Secondly,
the New World countries were reinventing the marketing model. They came upwith
innovative packaging
designs like wine-in-a-box, screw caps instead of cork ones. Besides, theytried to appeal
the palates unaccustomed to wine, launched products for this market segment. The bigCPG
companies -like Coca-Cola, Nestle etc- entered the market, even they left after a decade,
theyinfluence the New World wine market with their customer focused attitude and
sophisticated marketingskills. Lastly, the New World producers controlled the whole value
chain, extracting margins at everylevel and retaining bargain power. Overall, changes in
production and marketing aspects of wine by New World countries led the market share loss
of the traditional wine
producer countries.
3. What advice would you offer today to the head of the French wine industry
association?To the owner of a mid-size, well-regarded Bordeaux vineyard producing
wines in the premiumand super premium categories?
One of the major disadvantages that French wine industry faces is the strict AOC
regulations. Up to apoint this is an advantage for French wine industry since these
regulations forces the French wineproducers to produce the best wine in the world but with
the emerge of the New World players, theindustry environment changed and these
regulations turned out to be encumbering the French wineindustry with reducing the
competitive power of French industry. If I were the
French wine industryassociation head, I would try to lessen the restrictions coming from
AOC. For example, I would try toincrease the usage of technology in wine production and
wine making, open labs to search betterharvests and better taste of wine. Besides, the
extreme government intervention should be stopped; the governments purchase of surplus
wine to be distilled into industrial alcohol has to stop eventually.They need to stop rewarding
the poor growers that make unsellable wine and let them go out of business so that their land
can be utilized by more productive and successful growers.About the owner of a mid-size,
well- regarded Bordeaux vineyard producing wines in the premium andsuper premium
categories; actually, he is lucky since there is a shift to quality wine in the global market.But,
he should be taking the advantage of technological improvements and be more responsive to
thepotential changes in taste of wine consumers, improve consumer focus attitude. Also, he
should bemore active on branding, for example in Bordeaux, there are 20,000 producers and
very low

possibilityto launch a brand; so, they have to unite and create their own brand, this will also
provide thembargaining power. In addition to these, he has to do something for simplifying
long and multilevel valuechain which at some part lacks of expertise to operate the system
efficiently. He should be aware of the retail industrys importance and integrate his product
with retail industry with controlling the margins and quality level through the supply chain.
While the French should be concentrating on the lucrativeU.K. market, one should not forget
about other possibilities. For example, Japanese market can be agood market for high
prestige French wine
or giant China market with its 39.5% growth rate of 2002-2006 is very promising and should
be entered by French wine industry.
4. What advice would you offer today to the head of the Australian wine
industryassociation? To the owner of a mid-size, well-regarded vineyard in the
Barossa Valley (a premierAustralian wine region) producing wines in the premium and
super premium categories?
The Australian wine industry association looks well-organized and I like their having a vision
andmission. For more than a decade, Australia's wine producers had become accustomed to
success. Theyachieved to be "the world's most influential and profitable supplier of branded
wines by 2025" and withtheir export rates, seems like they almost achieved this goal.
However, they have price and image problem as being cheap and cheerful; when we think
about the increasing cost of wine production in Australia, these are vital problem for the
Australians wine industry since they will lose their competitive advantage of low cost. I think
both the head of
association and individual producers shouldfocus on increasing the perception of Australian
wine quality and invest more in global marketingcampaigns, more seen with the celebrities
throughout the world. They can also use upscale restaurantsfor merchandising their products
and luxury magazines to give their ads. These are not only wine associations duty; individual
producers should be a part of the project with increasing the image of Australian
wine.Besides, the producers should try to find new techniques to reduce the cost of
production and increasethe efficiency. In addition to these, they should be doing research on
how to produce higher qualitywines like French ones. Lastly, they should not be just focused
on the UK and US market, they alsohave to make business with the China and Asian market
as well.
5. What advice would you offer today to the head of a major US wine industry
association?To the owner of a mid-size, well-regarded vineyard in the Napa Valley (a
premier US wineregion) producing wines in the premium and super premium
categories?
Some industry critics suggested that because American producers had long focused on their
large, highpriced domestic market, they had fallen behind the prevailing global price/quality
ratio, not only at thelow end, but even at the higher price points. The same quality of US
wines is
nearly 2.7 times moreexpensive than the same quality of Australian one, which is a weak
spot for US wine market. Majorreasons for these high land cost, labor and grape production
cost. So, they should decrease their cost bybecoming more mechanized in wine production
like Australia does.
Also, I think the change in the three-tier distribution system in US is a great risk for the wine
industry since it will erode the entrybarrier for the export products and with their cost
advantage exporters countries will be able capturesignificant market share in US.I would
advise the wine producers in US to also produce products for middle segment. Because of
theirhigh cost, vineyards in North Coast locations targeted the super-premium and ultrapremium segments at $12 a bottle and above. On the other hand, the Central Valley which
produced 70% of California'swine volume was focused on the basic segment with $1.99

price. This segmentation focus led to themiddle segment of the market ($5-$8 a bottle) being
underserved. If I were the producer in NapaValley, I would produce some products for this
segment also; otherwise the other countries will fill thisgap with their products. Also, branding
is the other issue that US dont have a brand, they should focus on branding. Lastly,
according to Exhibit 6, the per capita wine consumption in US is the least, so theyshould start
marketing and promotion campaigns to increase the domestic consumption and
producingwine regarding the domestic taste and income level.

Case 3: Lora Brill& Healthy Berry Crunch: Eurobrand Challenge

Suggestion: The case itself is very specific and unrealistic, case questions are
imaginary scenarios, thus exact correct answers are impossible to be given. Focusing
more on the chapter and its reading would probably benefit you more.
Founded in U.S.

Acquired British company

Expansion in Europe
National subsidiaries
Challenges to master
Product launch Healthy Berry Crunch
The Eurobrand

Protect domestic niches

Challenging global leader
Defending worlwide dominance

International structure: centralised hub

1)How should Lora Brill respond to Jean-Luc Michels urgent e-mail requesting
approval to launch Healthy Berry Crunch in France?
- Launch the product due to
-> Pressure from competitors
-> Growth opportunities
-> Defending the current market position

2)How should the company manage Healthy Berry Crunch (and other Eurobrands)?
-> Product: launch Herry Berry Crunch as a Eurobrand due to knowledge and expertise
sharing, cost reductions and the urgent competitive risk
-> Structure: one person in charge of a Eurobrand Team with clearly defined roles
- The Eurobrand team needs to respect the roles of local authorities and be aware of the lead
country issue and functionality concerns

Case 4:Philips vs. Matsushita

1. How did Philips become the leading consumer electronics company in the world
post war era? What distinctive competencies did they build? What incompetancies did
they build?
Prior to World War II, Philips had created a culture of embracing technical innovation. On the
production side, Philips was a leader in industrial research, and scrapped old plants in favor
of new machines or factories whenever advances were made. On the product side, strong
research enabled the company to broaden its product line, starting with light bulbs but
growing into vacuum tubes, radios and X-ray tubes by the 1930s.
Because Holland was such a small country, Philips was forced to start exporting in the early
1900s in order to have enough sales volume for its mass-production facilities. Philips evolved
into a highly centralized company with decentralized sales and autonomous marketing in 17
countries. Political events in the world during the 1930s forced Philips to change into a truly
multi-national company. First, the depression caused countries to erect trade barriers and
enact high tariffs, forcing Philips to build local production facilities in the foreign markets they
served. Second, in anticipation of World War II, Philips transferred its overseas assets into
trusts in Great Britain and the U.S. They moved the bulk of their research staffs to England,
and their top managers to the United States. With these assets, the national organizations
(NOs) became self- sufficient during the war, skilled at responding to conditions in countryspecific markets.
In the post-war environment, the NOs had a great advantage in being able to sense and
respond to differences in their local countries, and eventually product development became a
function of local market conditions. Philips was able to exploit their competencies in research
and localization until the late 1960s. At this time, their biggest incompetency was beginning
to get in the way of growth.
Philips was no longer able to act as a single unified company in order to bring new product
technologies to market or to react to recent manufacturing trends; instead each of the NOs
acted independently in their own self-interest. Top management was no longer able to
manage the multi-national company Philips had become. For example, Philips was unable to
standardize the company for a global push with its V2000 videocassette format when the
U.S. chose to license VHS from Matsushita instead. On the manufacturing side, printed
circuits were more efficiently produced in large plants, but the NOs were unwilling to
consolidate their local manufacturing facilities. Philips' attempts to set up Product Divisions
(PDs) to balance the NOs were largely a failure, and Philips began a long slide, unable to
launch new products or to take advantage of the global manufacturing opportunities in lowcost countries because they were unable to coordinate the NOs.
2. How did Matsushita succeed in replacing Philips as #1? What were its
competencies and incompetancies?
About the same time pre-war Philips was decentralizing its international structure, Matsushita
was a Japanese company that was expanding rapidly into consumer items such as battery
powered lamps, electric irons and radios. Post-war, Matsushita integrated horizontally,
selling 5,000 products, and vertically, opening 25,000 domestic retail outlets (which gave
then direct access to market trends and consumer reaction). Matsushita had a small central
research lab, but product development occurred in product divisions. While rarely an
innovator, they were very fast to market.

When local markets were saturated, Matsushita followed a global strategy of international
growth. They shifted basic manufacturing to low-wage countries, but high-value components
were still manufactured in Japan. Assembly plants were eventually established in Europe
and the Americas to satisfy protectionist sentiment, but the central product divisions kept
strong control over the overseas plants.
Contrary to Philips, Matsushita stayed in control of the company's subsidiaries: they
developed an effective network of expatriates to build relationships and teach their
management process to their foreign subsidiaries, foreign GMs traveled often to the Osaka
headquarters, and they stayed in constant contact with daily faxes and nightly phone calls.
With a unified global strategy, increased volumes enabled Matsushita to drive costs (and
prices) lower, and eventually they overtook Philips based on the strength of their
manufacturing operations.
This control, however, stifled creativity at the foreign subsidiaries, and innovation began to
lag. It seems that the foreign operations were little more than arms of the home
organizations, only implementing what they were told by the central organization. While it
seems that Matsushita may have desired for their local operations to be more independent
in words, in practice American engineers resigned due to excessive control that the their
central operations exercised. Unable to develop innovative overseas companies,
Matsushita tried to buy innovative companies (i.e. MCA), but the collapse of the Japanese
bubble economy and high Yen caused the Japanese economy to enter a protracted
recession, and Matsushita was forced to abandon this strategy.
3. What do you think about the changes each company has made to date? The
objectives? The implementation? The impact? Why is change so hard for both of
them?
It seems that Matsushita and Philips had adopted two cultural extremes in their
organizations; Matsushita with a highly centralized operation that dictated global
operations, Philips a conglomerate of similar businesses with little central coordination. It
seems that both realized that they needed to adopt the best practices from the other
company. In a mass-market like consumer electronics, this would mean a strong central
organization that could develop standards for emerging technologies in order to develop
economies of scale for production, yet has the flexibility to adapt the standards to fit the
desires of local markets.
On the Philips side, seven CEOs over 30 years tried to reshape the company. In the
70's, they tried consolidate the most efficient local plants into International Production
Centers (IPCs), each supplying multiple NOs. It turned out that the NOs were too
powerful, and the PDs were still unable to set direction for the company, so the local
operations prevailed. In the 80's, Philips began closing inefficient plants (40 in Europe
then 75 internationally), and identifying businesses as either core (where they were
technical leaders or strategically important) or non-core (candidates for divestiture).
They also repurchased the North American Philips Corp., in order to regain control. It
seems that they might have begun to turn the corner on control, but then Philips also
halved its spending on basic research, and made R&D the direct responsibility of the
businesses supported by the research. The CEO implied that R&D spending was being
wasted on impractical ideas, but it seems just as likely to me that money was being
wasted because the various NOs were unwilling to rally around the new technologies
being developed. Indeed, by 1994 it seemed that the cuts had left the company with
few who understood the technology for new businesses.
The 90's were marked by cost cutting; a 22% headcount reduction followed by divestiture on
1/3 of its 120 major businesses, and then shifts of thousands of jobs from North America to
APAC. After all of this, in mid-2001 Philips was again losing money, and looking to outsource
even more manufacturing.

Changing a company culture is incredibly difficult, and changing that of an international

company is even harder. It seems that Philips is finally turning the tide and just beginning to
get the cooperation necessary to get the scale from their investments in research and
manufacturing. Unfortunately, because of all the cost-cutting they needed to do while they
tried to get there, they seem to have lost much of their competence in R&D. Success in
consumer electronics requires constant innovation and efficient
manufacturing, and while manufacturing is beginning to improve, their innovation is
now lacking.
Matsushita, on the other hand, was trying to give more power to its overseas
subsidiaries, such as 1982's"Operation Localization," what gave local managers more
choice over the products they sold and
authorization to use more local parts. (Importantly, however, product divisions could
overrule a local subsidiary if a particular product was of strategic importance). In 1986,
Matsushita relocated several major regional headquarters to North America, Europe and
SE Asia from Japan. In the early 90's, the Japanese market for consumer electronics
collapsed, leaving Matsushita with a glut of capacity as prices collapsed.
While they shifted some production off-shore, Matsushita was unwilling to restructure its
increasingly inefficient domestic production facilities in Japan. By 2000, only 250 of the
company's 3,000 R&D scientists were located outside of Japan, and their latest CEO
finally decided to consolidate manufacturing facilities. They were slightly profitable (0.4%
in consumer electronics), but losing money on one-time cash cows TVs & VCRs.
Matsushita never really developed a competence in innovation of new products, and their
innovation in production seemed to remain largely on the mainland. They were slow to
react to the protracted recession in Japan, and as a result lost their edge in manufacturing
to other low-cost competitors.
4. What recommendations would you make to Gerald Kleisterlee? Kunio
Nakamura?
My recommendations for both companies are actually fairly similar. First, they need to be
investing in the development of new products in each of their operating segments, since the
key to success in consumer electronics is to keep developing new products then reducing
costs as volume increases. The products need to be designed so that their core is suitable
for any market in the world, but can be easily customized for any local differences. R&D
should be located where the best talent for each product line can be found (the data in the
case is very old; I would not locate Microprocessor research in France today).
Sales need to be organized by country or region, so they can learn what local consumers in
each area want. Sales should be matrixed with the product operations (honest two-way
communication), to ensure that the needs of each region are incorporated into product
plans, but in the end individual regions cannot be allowed to head in separate directions. The
IBM case outlined a promising way of starting new businesses; regions should be
encouraging the development of new businesses in a similar manner that can be enlarged
world-wide if successful.
Both companies need to clean up their manufacturing operations. I understand that the
cultures of Europe and Japan make it difficult to move or outsource production, but today's
economic realities leave them little choice but to move their basic manufacturing operations
to the lowest-cost countries as their competitors are doing. There may be a place for local
final assembly, but this needs to be under the control of manufacturing, not local sales
operations.
All of this is going to cost money. If Philips and Matsushita do not have the earnings
to support restructuring, then they are going to have to prioritize. Across the board
spending cuts are only going to prolong their difficulties, and they should divest any
areas where finances are eroding (in Philips case, 'Miscellaneous' is losing money

and seems an obvious candidate; Matsushita does not list profitability by sectors).

1. How was this obscure little firm of accounting and engineering advisors able
to grow into the worlds most prestigious consulting firm in fifty years?

2. What was the unique source of competitive advantage developed by James O.

McKinsey and later Marvin Bower?

Case 6-3 Eli Lilly in India: Rethinking the Joint Venture Strategy
1)Did Eli Lilly pursue the right strategy to enter the Indian market?
PRO :
o perfect timing-Easy entry
o no enormous upfront investment
o reliable partner with similar beliefs
o Growth rate and profitability
no signs of bad management decisions
o use of Ranbaxy's market knowledge and distribution network
o great opportunity to get presence and use knowledge of local companies
CONTRA:
o
o

dependency on the good intentions of Ranbaxy

same JV strategy failed before

2)How would you assess the overall performance of the IJV? What did the partners
learn from the IJV?

Ranbaxy:
o gain prestige to be a global player
o credibility from Lillys reputation in international market
o distribution network
o Learned code of ethical conduct like the Red Book of Lilly that leads to more honesty
and integrity
Lilly:

o
o
o
o
o
o

gain local knowledge

used Ranbaxys name to get into the market
distribution network
suppliers network
service as government approvals, licenses
built independent regulatory foundation

3)What action would you recommend regarding the Ranbaxy partnership?

o
o
o
o
o
o

despite successful JV different focuses

Eli Lilly innovation & discovery
Ranbaxy generics
Ranbaxy: cash flow difficulties sell share to improve financial situation
Eli Lilly: did not launch some of its products launch now on its own
100% foreign capital firms allowed
granted product patent recognition
Both should proceed on their own to concentrate on their core activities + have full
control.

Suggestion: Provide a link to the CAGE framework discussed in Meeting 2. What

insights does it give in the context of the alliance between Eli-Lilly and Ranbaxy?
Cultural:
Different languages: American English vs. Standard Hindi with English as secondary
official language but various other languages in different regions of India
Different ethnicities: various ethnicities in India e.g. Caucasoids, Australoids,
Mongoloids and Negritos and different castes
Different religions: Christians (majority in USA) vs. Hinduisum (80.5%)/Islam(13.4%)
different practices work schedules must be adjusted
Different social norms: http://www.globalbasecamps.com/blog/know-you-go-culturalnorms-india
Products affect cultural or national identity of consumers (food) Walmart example
Administrative:
1990s moving away from import substitution to an export-driven economy
Foreign direct investment was encouraged by increasing the maximum limit of foreign
ownership from 40% to 51% in the drugs/pharmaceutical industry
High government involvment
Geographic:
Physical Remoteness (great distance about 14000km)
transportation links are weaker in India
different climate zones in India: desert in the west, alpine tundra and glaciers in the
north, humid tropical regions supporting rain forests in the southwest, and Indian
Ocean island territories that flank the Indian subcontinent
Products are fragile , local supervision and operational requirements are high
Economic:
GDP per captia India: 3991$ and USA: 52839$ large difference

Case 7-4: Managing a Global Team: Greg James at Sun Microsystems, Inc.
1. How well has James managed his global team?
Positive Aspects:
- It was easy for him to set up the global team
- Often in contact with his direct reports (many times a week)
- Weekly conference calls to keep everyone updated
Negative Aspects:
- Scheduling of the weekly conference calls not satisfying for the team in India (too
late)
- A lot of misunderstandings among the team members
- Indian team feels not really important only responsible for customer service, would
like to be more innovative
- American team members get a higher salary then French team members French
feel less valued
- French team members have vacation by law, US team members dont also leads to
displeasure
- Different teams have the feeling that US team is the favorite team & that James has
the most contact to the US team other teams feel excluded
- Some personal problems among the team members
2. Who is responsible for the HS holding crisis?
Problems:
- Every team accuses the other teams for being responsible
- Indian team couldnt reach the US team even though they should be on call
3.
-

What role did diversity play on this team?

Diversity played an important role on this team
Team is split all over the world diverse cultures, daily routines, religions,
Difficult to manage
James had to make tradeoffs (e.g. the weekly conference call probably for one
team it is always not satisfying)

Case 8-1 Barrick Gold Corp: Tanzania

1) Despite Barricks efforts in the Lake Victoria Zone, protests, tension and
violence had not abated by early 2009. Why? What are the alternatives for
Barrick?
Agreements with government
Work together with NGOs
Local integration

2) What are the challenges faced by extractive mining corporations in their

attempt to establish subsidiary operations in developing nations?
Environmental issues
Corrupt governments
Unsatisfied NGOs
Poor infrastructure

Low educational standards

3) Why and how has Barrick adopted a global approach to address

corporate social responsibility issues in Tanzania?
WHY?
- Agriculture First Green Revolution -> sought for organizations to invest in
agriculture 80% of citizens relied on it
- In 2010 a new mining Act = required all TNCs to be listed in the country and give
the state a stake in future projects
- Lake Victoria overuse of natural resources disruption of traditional lifestyle social
and ecological concerns (fishing industry big firms took over costing locals lost of
jobs thus income, health problems due to the spread of hyacinth, dumping of
untreated sewage)
- African Mining Partnership with mining corps -> to promote sustainable development
as a way to ensure that their mining laws protected ecological and community welfare
while maximizing remittances from the mining TNCs to the gov-t budgets in a
transparent and accountable way
HOW?
- Locally based community social partnership addresses problems of unemployment,
poverty, diseases and environmental concerns in a sustainable way
- Western legal and property approvals follows to legitimate its mining activities
- Socialization > HRM > training department for university graduates
- Integrated Mining Technical Training > skills training for locals to be able to
participate in the mining sector
- Global Succession Planning Program > chance to increase knowledge and
expertise
- Core vision and values were to continue finding, acquiring, developing and producing
quality reserves in a safe, profitable and socially responsible manner
- CSR standards > business ethics, human rights and development
- Community departments to oversee development initiatives
PROBLEM: Corruption and weak institutional capabilities to enforce the democratic,
transparent and agreed-upon rules and laws -> source of ongoing problems