Offshore Wind 2AC Blocks

Offshore wind 2AC Blocks
Addons
. Hurricanes
2ac Hurricanes
OSW decreases hurricane magnitude best studies confirm
JACOBSON, ARCHER, & KEMPTON 14 a. Department of Civil and Environmental
Engineering, Stanford University b & c. all three are College of Earth, Ocean, and
Environment, University of Delaware [Mark Z. Jacobson, Cristina L. Archer, & Willett Kempton,
Taming hurricanes with arrays of offshore wind turbines, Nature Climate Change 4, 195200 (2014)
doi:10.1038/nclimate2120
Hurricanes are causing increasing damage to many coastal regions worldwide1, 2. Offshore wind turbines can
provide substantial clean electricity year-round, but can they also mitigate hurricane damage while avoiding
damage to themselves? This study uses an advanced climateweather computer model that correctly
treats the energy extraction of wind turbines3, 4 to examine this question. It finds that large turbine
arrays (300+ GW installed capacity) may diminish peak near-surface hurricane wind speeds by 2541 m s1 (5692
mph) and storm surge by 679%. Benefits occur whether turbine arrays are placed immediately
upstream of a city or along an expanse of coastline. The reduction in wind speed due to large arrays increases
the probability of survival of even present turbine designs. The net cost of turbine arrays (capital plus
operation cost less cost reduction from electricity generation and from health, climate, and hurricane damage avoidance) is estimated to
be less than todays fossil fuel electricity generation net cost in these regions and less than the net cost
of sea walls used solely to avoid storm surge damage.
Hurricane damage is increasing with expanding coastal development1 and rising sea levels2. Increasing temperatures
may also increase hurricane intensity, but it is uncertain whether hurricane intensity changes so far have exceeded natural
variability5.
Continuing a long-term problem of hurricane damage, Hurricane Sandy in 2012 caused ~$82
and 253 fatalities in seven countries. Hurricane Katrina
billion in damage to three US states6

destroyed much of New Orleans, Louisiana. Following Hurricane Sandy,
sea walls were proposed to protect cities from hurricane storm surge. Such walls might cost $10$29 billion for one city7, protect the
areas only right behind the walls, and limit the access of populations to coastal zones. Large arrays of wind-wave pumps, which bring deep, cool
water to the surface have also been proposed to reduce hurricane intensity8. This
technology also serves one purpose.
This study quantitatively tests whether large arrays of wind turbines installed offshore in front of major cities and
along key coastal areas can extract sufficient kinetic energy from hurricane winds to reduce wind speed and
storm surge, thus preventing damage to coastal structures as well as to the offshore turbines themselves. Unlike sea
walls, offshore wind turbines would reduce both wind speed and storm surge and would generate electricity year-round.
The hypothesis is tested here through numerical simulations with GATORGCMOM, a global-through-local climate
weatherair-pollutionocean forecast model 3, 4 (Supplementary Information). The model extracts the correct amount
of energy from the wind at different model heights intersecting the turbine rotor3 given the instantaneous model wind
speed, which is affected by turbulence and shear due to the hurricane and turbine itself (Supplementary Section 1.H). Several threedimensional computer simulations without and with wind turbines were run for hurricanes Katrina and Isaac (US Gulf Coast) and Sandy (US East
Coast; Methods and Table 1).
Controlling disasters key to save millions of lives

SID-AHMED 05 Managing Editor for Al-Ahali [Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, The post-earthquake
world, Issue #724, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/724/op3.htm+
The year 2005 began with a calamity, resulting not from conflicts between people but from an unprecedented natural
disaster that has so far claimed over 155,000 lives, a figure that is expected to rise still more over the coming period. Is this Nature's reaction
to the abuse it is suffering at the hands of the human race, its revenge on us for challenging its laws beyond acceptable limits?
The earthquake that struck deep under the Indian Ocean was the strongest in over a century. What is still
more critical is that what we have witnessed so far is only the beginning of the catastrophe. According to a spokesman from the World
Health organisation, "there is certainly a chance that we could have as many dying from communicable diseases
as from the tsunamis". The logistics of providing the survivors with clean water, vaccines and medicines
are formidable, and, with many thousands of bodies lying unburied, epidemics spread by waterborne diseases are expected to claim many
thousands of victims. There is also the possibility of seismic activity elsewhere in the world because disturbances in the inner structure of the
earth's crust have occurred and there are no means to foresee how they will unfold. Will they build up into still broader disarray and eventually
move our planet out of its orbit around the sun? Moreover, even if we can avoid the worse possible scenario, how can we contain the
earthquake's effects ecologically, meteorologically, economically and socially?
The contradiction between Man and Nature has reached unprecedented heights, forcing us to reexamine our understanding of the existing world system. US President George W Bush has announced the creation of an
international alliance between the US, Japan, India, Australia and any other nation wishing to join that will work to help the stricken region
overcome the huge problems it is facing in the wake of the tsunamis. Actually, the implications of the disaster are not only regional but global,
not to say cosmic. Is
it possible to mobilise all the inhabitants of our planet to the extent and at the speed
necessary to avert similar disasters in future? How to engender the required state of emergency, that is, a different type of
inter-human relations which rise to the level of the challenge before contradictions between the various sections of the world community make
that collective effort unrealisable?
The human species has never been exposed to a natural upheaval of this magnitude within living memory. What
happened in South Asia is the ecological equivalent of 9/11. Ecological problems like global warming and climatic
disturbances in general threaten to make our natural habitat unfit for human life. The extinction of the species has become a
very real possibility, whether by our own hand or as a result of natural disasters of a much greater magnitude
than the Indian Ocean earthquake and the killer waves it spawned. Human civilisation has developed in the hope that Man will be
able to reach welfare and prosperity on earth for everybody. But now things seem to be moving in the opposite direction, exposing planet Earth
to the end of its role as a nurturing place for human life.
Today, human conflicts have become less of a threat than the confrontation between Man and Nature. At least they are
less likely to bring about the end of the human species. The reactions of Nature as a result of its exposure to the onslaughts of human societies
have become more important in determining the fate of the human species than any harm it can inflict on itself.
Until recently, the threat Nature represented was perceived as likely to arise only in the long run, related
for instance to how global warming would affect life on our planet. Such a threat could take decades, even centuries, to reach a critical level.
This perception has changed following the devastating earthquake and tsunamis that hit the coastal regions of South Asia and, less
violently, of East Africa, on 26 December.
This cataclysmic event has underscored the vulnerability of our world before the wrath of Nature and shaken the
sanguine belief that the end of the world is a long way away. Gone are the days when we could comfort ourselves with
the notion that the extinction of the human race will not occur before a long-term future that will only materialise after
millions of years and not affect us directly in any way. We are now forced to live with the possibility of an imminent
demise of humankind.
Replaces Sea Wall Need

OSW is cost effective supplements sea wall development makes hurricane
protection better
JACOBSON, ARCHER, & KEMPTON 14 a. Department of Civil and Environmental
Engineering, Stanford University b & c. all three are College of Earth, Ocean, and
Environment, University of Delaware [Mark Z. Jacobson, Cristina L. Archer, & Willett Kempton,
Taming hurricanes with arrays of offshore wind turbines, Nature Climate Change 4, 195200 (2014)
doi:10.1038/nclimate2120
The estimated direct cost of offshore wind energy for a large future build such as that proposed here would not be the 19 kWh1 historical
average cost of offshore wind. A
better estimate is the best recent project cost for better managed projects
with winds such as those off New York, but in a still-immature industry of ~9.4 kWh1 (ref. 11). Costs of
integrating wind onto the grid are minimized when wind and solar, which are complementary in production times, are
combined on the grid, and stored energy in the form of hydroelectricity and hydrogen and vehicle-stored electricity are used to fill in gaps in
supply. In addition, using demandresponse management; forecasting wind and solar resources; and using excess wind for district heat or
hydrogen production rather than for curtailing, facilitates matching demand with supply12, 13, 14.
Including hurricane damage avoidance, reduced pollution, health, and climate costs, but not including tax credits or subsidies, gives the net cost
of offshore wind as ~48.5 kWh1, which compares with ~10 kWh1 for new fossil fuel generation. The health and climate benefits
significantly reduce winds net cost, and hurricane protection adds a smaller benefit (~10% for New Orleans), but at no additional cost. In
sum, large arrays of offshore wind turbines seem to diminish hurricane risk cost-effectively while
reducing air pollution and global warming and providing energy supply at a lower net cost than
conventional fuels.
Finally, what are the costs of sea walls versus offshore wind turbine arrays? Turbines
pay for themselves from the sale of

electricity they produce and other non-market benefits (Table 2), but sea walls have no other function than to reduce
storm surge (they do not even reduce damaging hurricane wind speeds), so society bears their full cost. Conversely, if wind
turbines are used only for hurricane damage avoidance, an array covering 32 km of linear coastline in
front of New York City would cost ~$210 billion with no payback (Supplementary Information), higher than the cost of
proposed sea walls, $1029 billion7. Thus, turbines cost much less than sea walls to protect a city, as turbines also
generate electricity year-round, but if turbines were used only for hurricane protection, sea walls would
be less expensive.
Escalation
Hurricanes inevitable damage control key to prevent escalation
COMFORT 06 Prof @ University of Pittsburgh [Louise K. Comfort, Cities at Risk: Hurricane
Katrina and the Drowning of New Orleans, Urban Affairs Review March 2006 vol. 41 no. 4 501-516]
Silent Threats and Long-Term Policy Planning

The impact of Hurricane Katrina on the City of New Orleans exemplifies a further problem in the process of
sustainable disaster risk reduction. Although the deteriorating condition of the levees was well known,
and computer models had shown that they would fail under the stress of a Category 3 hurricane, the levees posed a silent threat to the city.
The levee system was taken for granted; no specific group of business people, residents, or policy
analysts focused attention on the serious consequences for the city if the levees failed. The cost of rebuilding
was high; there was no hurricane on the immediate horizon; other issues demanded urgent attention and promised
quicker returns. Given the range of problems that the City of New Orleans was facing in the period from 2001 to late August 2005, the repair
of the levee system fell in the too hard pile of problems, with little thought given to the actual cost to the city, region, and nation if it failed.
This inability to recognize the increasing danger from aging infrastructure to U.S. cities represents a major
threat to urban regions across the nation.
Maintenance of engineered infrastructure for metropolitan regions is a long-term policy problem (Lempert, Popper, and Bankes 2003), one
that does not fit the annual budget cycles that drive most urban agendas. It is also a complex policy problem, as major engineering projects
were often financed with federal funding, but once built, states and cities were expected to maintain them. In uneven economic cycles and
as the industrial base for the City of New Orleans and state of Louisiana declined in recent decades, infrastructuremaintenance was delayed
repeatedly. Presumably delayed as a budget balancing measure, infrastructure maintenance needs to be redefined as a long-term policy
problem. The extraordinary costs incurred from the failure of the levee system following Hurricane Katrina discredit any form of justification
for delaying maintenance for budgetary reasons.
New methods of computational simulation offer a promising alternative for calculating potential risks, their costs and consequences, and
exploring policy options (Comfort, Ko, and Zagorecki 2004; Zagorecki, Ko, and Comfort 2005). Although these methods have long been used
by engineers, extending their application to guide decision making in actual policy problems represents a method of assessing the complexity
of urban environments and developing strategies for long-term policy planning.
Cities as Investments for the Nation

Underlying this inquiry into the impact of Hurricane Katrina on New Orleans is the recognition that cities
play an indispensable role in the economy and society of the nation. Cities represent a major investment
of not just local funds, but also substantial investments by the region, state, and nation. The contribution of
the City of New Orleans in terms of the national transportation of goods from this port city as well as its distinctive culture and history is
incalculable. Clearly, the
startling costs and consequences of the impact of Hurricane Katrina on this

vulnerable city require a different conception of the city in relation to the region and the nation. The
hurricanes will return; the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain are continuing constraints; the wetlands in the region could
become buffers to damaging storms and erosion, as they once were. But the vision of the city must change, if it is to become a sustainable,
resilient community (Comfort 2005).
Hurricanes Impact
Hurricane damage large & growing
DAVLASHERIDZE 12 PhD Department of Agricultural Economics, Sociology and
Education, Penn State [Meri Davlasheridze, The Effects of Adaptation Measures on Hurricane
Induced Property Losses, http://aese.psu.edu/directory/mzd169/job-market-paper
Hurricanes represent one of the costliest natural catastrophes in the United States. At the beginning of the
20th century, decadal total number of hurricane fatalities was 8,734 with the corresponding damage
cost of $1.45 billion (in year 2000 dollars) (Sheets and Williams, 2001). The last decade figures show that deaths have decreased by a
factor of 35 whereas costs have risen by a factor of 39 (Figures 1 and 2). Over time, hurricane fatalities have become less of a concern, partially
attributed to improved warning and weather forecasting systems in coastal counties (Sadowski and Sutter, 2005). This declining trend in loss of
human life, however, has not been accompanied by a decrease in property damage. Increased intensity
and frequency of
Atlantic basin hurricanes is considered to be partially responsible for direct as well as indirect economic
losses. Much property loss has also been inflicted because of increased population, rising standards of living and the consequent
accumulation of wealth in these coastal areas (Pielke, et al., 2008). If recent socio-economic developments persist (rising
coastal population and increase in wealth level) coupled with geophysical trends of hurricane intensities,
damage figures will likely grow astronomically. Pielke et al. (2008) find that the normalized damages of
hurricanes provides an important warning message for policy makers: Potential damage from storms is
growing at a rate that may place severe burdens on society. Avoiding huge losses will require either a change
in the rate of population growth in coastal areas, major improvements in construction standards, or other mitigation actions. Unless
such action is taken to address the growing concentration of people and properties in coastal areas
where hurricanes strike, damage will increase, and by a great deal, as more and wealthier people increasingly inhibit these
coastal locations. An obvious agenda for researchers and policy makers involves decisions on loss mitigation strategies and plans to lessen
these economic impacts. The domain of potential public and private coping and adaptation options is large. It goes beyond measures designed
to mandate and enforce stringent regulatory policies such as building codes, hazard planning, land zoning and development regulation. Often,
these measures are immensely costly and involve providing public protection via implementing and investing in major retrofitting and/or
structural projects such as dams, levees, acquisition of private property, etc. In addition to these proactive measures, devastating natural
disasters elicit post-disaster recovery and assistance programs primarily aimed to provide immediate relief to impacted communities.
Federal government spends millions of dollars annually to help communities recover from severe disasters. Since
1989 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has spent more than 13 billion dollars to help communities implement long term hazard
mitigation projects. Approximately 76% of total mitigation grant funding have been allocated for hurricane, storm and flood related disasters.
Even more was spent for public assistance projects. Around 45 billion dollars (in 2005$) was given to impacted communities, since 1999, in the
form of immediate assistance to help with disaster recovery.1 Approximately eighty percent of these funds were given in response to hurricane,
flood or severe storm related events (Figures 3 and 4). Furthermore,
these figures are higher when accounting for nondisaster governmental transfers, which are likely to increase substantially after major disasters (Deryugina,
2011).2 These numbers are striking and certainly raise public concern especially as the frequency and severity of hurricanes are projected to
increase in the future.
Case Blocks
2AC Inherency: A/T #1 Not Inherent *1/1+

1. The plan is inherent there is no national incentive policy for offshore wind energy
in the status quo. The negatives AWEA evidence simply says that the wind power
industry is doing well. Thats not the same thing as the plan, according to our 1AC
Schroeder evidence.
2. A coordinated, national policy is key
Jackson 2013
*Derrick, 3/2/2013, Politics imperil offshore wind sweet spots, http://bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/03/02/sour-politicsimperil-offshore-wind-sweet-spots/wZHvvjxVMtZKx2Y42iRpII/story.html]
Kyle Aarons, a fellow at the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, said that despite Obamas high-profile
advocacy of renewable energy in his State of the Union address, only 30 states have adopted renewable energy
standards, and most states without them are Republican strongholds that soundly voted against Obama for
president. No two state policies are alike, and were not really anticipating much progress on new states, Aarons
said. I wouldnt say were stuck on renewables overall. We have a lot of potential to still catch up. Onshore wind
will still probably do well, but without a national policy, I would imagine that offshore, being newer, will be pretty
slow. Rick Sullivan, Massachusetts secretary for energy and environmental affairs, agreed, saying in a telephone
interview that a national policy would likely speed up offshore wind development. I think youd not only see more
permits, but faster permitting should allow developers to take advantage of the most up-to-date wind technology
out there rather than it taking years to put up something that may be outdated, Sullivan said. Being outdated
weighed heavily on the minds of participants at the offshore conference. While Cape Wind and Block Islands
Deepwater Wind are finally poised to plunge their first platforms into the water, Europe had a record year in
offshore wind development, installing 369 turbines. Denmark announced it now gets 30 percent of energy from
wind. Investors at the conference said billions of dollars are sitting on the sidelines as Americas wind potential
waits for a national policy. Deepwater Wind board manager Bryan Martin gave credit to Salazar for getting wind
energy as far as he has, but were tapped out on the state-by-state model. The White House and Congress must
tap into a national model, or the United States will remain on the sidelines for good.
2AC Harms Economy: A/T #1 Doesnt Solve Growth *1/1+

1. The plan solves grid failure and electricity prices
Maracci 2012,
[Silvio Marcacci Silvio is Principal at Marcacci Communications, a full-service clean energy and climate-focused public relations
company based in Washington, D.C., 300,000 Jobs and $200 Billion Economic Potential from U.S. Offshore Wind,
http://cleantechnica.com/2012/09/14/300000-jobs-and-200-billion-economic-potential-from-u-s-offshore-wind/]
Beyond creating new jobs and economic activity building and operating all these new turbines, plugging offshore
wind into our nations grid can increase reliability and lower utility prices. Offshore winds blow strongest during
the day and in heat waves precisely the points when demand for electricity is highest and the risk of power
shortages most acute.
In addition, the greatest potential wind power lies along some of the East Coasts biggest cities. Grid congestion
has constrained the ability of cheaper power to reach these demand pools and created some of the highest power
prices in the country. But if these population centers could tap into steady electricity being generated just
offshore, growing demand could be met cheaply. In fact, New York States grid operator recently found consumers
save $300 million in wholesale electricity costs for every 1GW of wind on the grid.
2AC Harms Economy: A/T #2 US Not Key *1/1+

1. The United States is key to the global economy
A. We are the reserve currency for the entire globe.
B. Our dependence on energy in particular determines global economic trends
because we import and use more energy than the rest of the world by a wide
margin.
C. The 2008 recession proves Americas economic importance; when our economy
contracted, so did the rest of the worlds.
2. The US is key to the global economy other nations matter, but only the United
States can lead
Suominen 2012
*Kati, Resident Fellow at the Marshall Fund. America the Absent,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/06/america_the_absent?page=full]
In the 20th century, beginning with the creation of the Bretton Woods system in 1944, America's great
contribution was to champion an economic paradigm and set of institutions that promoted open markets and
economic stability around the world. The successive Groups of Five, Seven, and Eight, first formed in the early
1970s, helped coordinate macroeconomic policies among the world's leading economies and combat global
financial imbalances that burdened U.S. trade politics. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) spread the
Washington Consensus across Asia and Latin America, and shepherded economies in transition toward capitalism.
Eight multilateral trade rounds brought down barriers to global commerce, culminating in the establishment of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Meanwhile, a wave of bank deregulation and financial liberalization
began in the United States and proliferated around the world, making credit more available and affordable while
propelling consumption and entrepreneurship the world over. The U.S. dollar, the world's venerable reserve
currency, economized global transactions and fueled international trade. Central bank independence spread from
Washington to the world and helped usher in the Great Moderation, which has produced a quarter-century of low
and steady inflation around the world. Globalization was not wished into being: It was the U.S.-led order that
generated prosperity unimaginable only a few decades ago. Since 1980, global GDP has quadrupled, world trade
has grown more than sixfold, the stock of foreign direct investment has shot up by 20 times, and portfolio capital
flows have surged to almost $200 trillion annually, roughly four times the size of the global economy. Economic
reforms and global economic integration helped vibrant emerging markets emerge: The "Asian Tigers" (Hong Kong,
Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) that boomed in the 1980s were joined in the 1990s by the awakening giants
of Brazil, China, and India. It was the United States that quarterbacked the play, brokering differences among
nations and providing the right mix of global public goods: a universal reserve currency, an open-trade regime,
deep financial markets, and vigorous economic growth. Trade liberalization alone paid off handsomely, adding $1
trillion annually to the postwar U.S. economy. Talk about American decline notwithstanding, the economic order
created by the United States persists. In fact, at first blush, it appears to have only been reinforced in the past few
years. New institutions such as the G-20, a forum for the world's leading economies, and the Financial Stability
Board, a watchdog for the international financial system, are but sequels to U.S.-created entities: the Group of Five
and the Financial Stability Forum. Investors still view America as a financial safe haven, and the dollar remains the
world's lead currency. Open markets have survived, and 1930s-style protectionism has not materialized. The WTO
continues to resolve trade disputes and recently welcomed Russia as its 154th member, while the mission and
resources of the Bretton Woods twins -- the World Bank and IMF -- have only expanded. No country has pulled out
of these institutions; instead, emerging nations such as China and India are demanding greater power at the table.
Countries have opted in, not out, of the American-led order, reflecting a reality of global governance: There are no
rival orders that can yet match this one's promise of mutual economic gains.
2AC Harms Economy: A/T #3 No Impact *1/1+

1. Economic decline risks conflict. Leaders will attempt to divert attention from
domestic economic decline through global military maneuvers. Past conflicts like
World War II prove that there is a strong relationship between economic contraction
and global conflict thats our 1AC Royal evidence. Prefer our evidence it cites the
conclusion of a robust set of data and comes from a qualified expert in the field.
2. History proves that economic decline risks war
Yulu 2003
*Economic Analyst for the Peoples Daily (China). Economic Recession: The Blasting Fuse of War. Peoples Daily, 7/25/3 Lexis]
If one examines the wars broken out ever since more than a century ago, one will discover an interesting
phenomenon, that is, each fairly big economic recession (or economic crisis) was inevitably followed by the
eruption of a war. This is true with World I, World War II, the Gulf War, as well as the Iraq war. It can be said that
economic downturn is the blasting fuse of modern war.
3. Economic decline causes financial crises in unstable regions causes war

Kemp 2010
[Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan,
special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the
National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2010, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asias Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 233-4]
The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong
does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer
a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls
and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced
to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and
nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some
countries is challenged, and there are more failed states. Most serious is the collapse of the democratic
government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of
nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about
an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in
the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these
circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in
either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world
economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with
dire consequences for two-thirds of the planets population.
2AC Harms Climate: A/T #1 Doesnt Solve Climate *1/1+

1. The plan solves climate change.
A. Wind power is potentially infinite, so the plan would replace existing
conventional forms of energy because turbines can store the energy.
B. Wind power is emission-free, which is the type of energy we need to resolve
global warming. Thats our 1AC Chong and Jing evidence.
2. The plan solves climate change

Thaler 12
[Jeff, University of Maine Law School, Fiddling as the World Burns: How Climate Change Urgently Requires a Paradigm Shift in
the Permitting of Renewable Energy Projects, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2148122]
Unfortunately, as the economic and health costs from fossil fuel emissions have grown so too has the byzantine
labyrinth of laws and regulations to be navigated before a renewable energy project can be approved, let alone
financed and developed. 6 The root cause goes back to the 1970s when some of our fundamental environmental
laws were enacted, before we were aware of climate change threats, to slow down the review of proposed
projects by requiring more studies of potential project impacts before approval.7 But in our increasingly carbonbased 21st century, we need a paradigm shift. While achieving important goals, those federal laws and regulations,
and similar ones at the state and local levels, have become so unduly burdensome, slow, and expensive that they
will chill investment in, and kill any significant growth of, renewable carbon-free energy sources and projects,
thereby imposing huge economic, environmental and social costs upon both our country and the world8 unless
they are substantially changed. Indeed, by 2050 the U.S. must reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 80% to even
stabilize atmospheric levels of carbon, and can do so by increasing generated electricity from renewable sources
from the current thirteen percent up to eighty percent9-- but only if there are targeted new policy efforts to
accelerate, fifty times faster than since 1990, implementation of clean, renewable energy sources.10 Thus, Part II
focuses on one promising technology to demonstrate the flaws in its current licensing permitting regimes, and
makes concrete recommendations for reform.11 Wind power generation from onshore installations is proven,
generates no GHGs and consumes no water,12 is increasingly cost-competitive with most fossil fuel sources, and
can be employed relatively quickly in many parts of the United States and world. Offshore wind power is a
relatively newer technology, especially deep-water floating projects, and presently less cost-competitive than
onshore wind. However, because wind speeds are on average about ninety percent stronger and more consistent
over water than over land, with higher power densities and lower shear and turbulence,13 Americas offshore
resources can provide more than our current electricity use.14 Moreover, these resources are near many major
cities that are home to much of the population and electricity demand thereby reducing the need for new highvoltage transmission from the Midwest and Great Plains to serve coastal lands15 Therefore, in light Part IIs
spotlight on literally dozens of different federal (yet alone state and local) statutes and their hundreds of
regulations standing between an offshore wind project applicant and construction, Part III makes concrete
statutory and regulatory recommendations to much more quickly enable the full potential of offshore wind energy
to become a reality before it is too late. Greenhouse gases (GHGs) trap heat in the atmosphere; the primary GHG
emitted by human activities is carbon dioxide (CO2), which in 2012 represented 84 percent of all human-sourced
U.S. GHG emissions.16
2AC Harms Climate: A/T #2 No Impact *1/1+

1. Climate change is an existential risk.
A. Timeframe we are approaching the tipping point in the status quo. Another 4
degree rise would make the damage irreversible.
B. Existing ecosystems cannot adapt the climate is heating at a rate far too fast
for the environment to catch up. Thats our 1AC Roberts evidence.
2. Climate change causes extinction it would destroy the environment and overload
Earths carrying capacity.
Tickell 2008
*Oliver. Climate Researcher. On a Planet 4C Hotter, All We Can Prepare for is Extinction The Guardian, 8/11/8. ln+
We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week. At first
sight this looks like wise counsel from the climate science adviser to Defra. But the idea that we could adapt to a
4C rise is absurd and dangerous. Global warming on this scale would be a catastrophe that would mean, in the
immortal words that Chief Seattle probably never spoke, "the end of living and the beginning of survival" for
humankind. Or perhaps the beginning of our extinction. The collapse of the polar ice caps would become
inevitable, bringing long-term sea level rises of 70-80 metres. All the world's coastal plains would be lost, complete
with ports, cities, transport and industrial infrastructure, and much of the world's most productive farmland. The
world's geography would be transformed much as it was at the end of the last ice age, when sea levels rose by
about 120 metres to create the Channel, the North Sea and Cardigan Bay out of dry land. Weather would become
extreme and unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, floods and hurricanes. The Earth's carrying
capacity would be hugely reduced. Billions would undoubtedly die. Watson's call was supported by the
government's former chief scientific adviser, Sir David King, who warned that "if we get to a four-degree rise it is
quite possible that we would begin to see a runaway increase". This is a remarkable understatement. The climate
system is already experiencing significant feedbacks, notably the summer melting of the Arctic sea ice. The more
the ice melts, the more sunshine is absorbed by the sea, and the more the Arctic warms. And as the Arctic warms,
the release of billions of tonnes of methane a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon dioxide over 20
years captured under melting permafrost is already under way. To see how far this process could go, look 55.5m
years to the Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, when a global temperature increase of 6C coincided with the
release of about 5,000 gigatonnes of carbon into the atmosphere, both as CO2 and as methane from bogs and
seabed sediments. Lush subtropical forests grew in polar regions, and sea levels rose to 100m higher than today. It
appears that an initial warming pulse triggered other warming processes. Many scientists warn that this historical
event may be analogous to the present: the warming caused by human emissions could propel us towards a similar
hothouse Earth.
2AC Solvency: A/T #1 Incentives Fail *1/1+

1. Incentives are sufficient to spur widespread adoption of offshore wind power.
A. Incentives reduce the initial up-start cost of wind energy, which reduces the risk
to private companies interested in investing.
B. Federal incentives demonstrate the potential of offshore wind power
technology.
C. Its empirically proven the protection tax credit and investment tax credit for
on-shore wind power were sufficient to push the market toward wind energy.
Thats our 1AC Plovnick and Schroeder evidence.
2. Incentives are sufficient to spur a major market transition toward offshore wind
energy
Schroeder 2010
[Erica. JD UC-Berkeley Law. Turning Offshore Wind On The California Law Review, Vol 98 N5. 2010. Available via Lexis-Nexis]
In spite of the impressive growth in the U.S. wind industry, the United States has not kept pace with other
countries in developing offshore wind facilities. Though offshore wind has been used in other countries for nearly
twenty years, n11 none of the United States' current wind capacity comes from offshore wind. n12 An estimated
900,000 MW of potential wind energy capacity exists off the coasts of the United States n13 - an estimated 98,000
MW of it in [*1633] shallow waters. n14 This shallow-water capacity could power between 22 and 29 million
homes, n15 or between 20 and 26 percent of all U.S. homes. n16 The nation has failed to take advantage of this
promising resource. This failure can be ascribed in part to the unevenly balanced distribution of the costs and
benefits of offshore wind technology, as well as to the incoherent regulatory framework in the United States for
managing coastal resources. n17 While the most compelling benefits of offshore wind are frequently regional,
national, or even global, the costs are almost exclusively local. The U.S. regulatory framework is not set up to
handle this cost-benefit gap. As a result, local opposition has stalled offshore wind power development, and
inadequate attention has been paid to its wide-ranging benefits. The Cape Wind project in Massachusetts is a
stark example of how local forces have hindered offshore wind power development. The project is expected to
have a maximum production of 450 MW and an average daily production of 170 MW, or 75 percent of the 230MW average demand of Cape Cod and neighboring islands. n18 In addition to this electricity boon to energyconstrained Massachusetts, n19 Cape Wind will reduce regional air pollution and global carbon dioxide emissions.
n20 Nonetheless, local opponents to Cape Wind protest its effect on the surrounding environment, including its
aesthetic impacts. n21 Without an effective way to champion the regional, national, and [*1634] global benefits of
offshore wind, policymakers have been unable to keep local interests from controlling the process through protest
and litigation. After about ten years of waiting and fighting, Cape Wind developers have still not begun
construction. Although the failure of offshore wind power in the United States is discouraging, the Coastal Zone
Management Act (CZMA) offers a potential solution. With specific revisions, the CZMA could serve as the impetus
that offshore wind power needs for success in the United States.
T Blocks
2ac T its
1. we meet the US owns the land that gets developed.
2. Counter-interpretation its means belong OR associated with

Cambridge Dictonary NO DATE ( Its, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/its)
Definition
belonging to or relating to something that has already been mentioned
The dog hurt its paw.
Their house has its own swimming pool.

The company increased its profits.
I prefer the second option - its advantages are simplicity and cheapness.
Prefer our interpretation

a. grammatically its has to mean MORE than possession internal link turns predictability
b. checks back limits US still has to own the land.
3. No topical affs under development no one advocates US doing the developing

means only exploration affs thats worse.
4. Their definition is bad POSSESSIVE refers to a way of defining a pronoun NOT as

it must be owned by thats in cx.
5. We meet congressional grants would fund plan just helps them do it.
Del FRANCO 12 National Wind Power Staff [Mark Del Franco, DOE Offshore Wind Grants
Provide Impetus To Get 'Steel In The Water',
http://www.nawindpower.com/e107_plugins/content/content.php?content.10818#.UTebP6V2H04]
The DOE provided a major boost for the fledgling offshore wind industry by announcing grants for seven U.S.
offshore wind projects to ensure commercial operation in state and federal waters by 2017.
The projects will receive up to $4 million to complete the engineering, design and permitting phase of this award. The DOE
will select up to three of these projects for follow-on phases that focus on siting, construction and installation and aim to
achieve commercial operation by 2017. These projects will receive up to $47 million over four years, subject to
Congressional appropriations, according to the DOE.
6. Counter-interpretation Development includes USE OF OCEAN SPACE means the

aff does do ITS DEVELOPMENT since it uses the space
JIN 98 Japan Institute of Navigation, Ocean Engineering Research Committee, http://members.jnavigation.org/e-committee/Ocean.htm
2. Aim of Ocean Engineering Committee

Discussions of "Ocean Engineering" are inseparable from "Ocean Development." What is ocean
development? Professor Kiyomitsu Fujii of the University of Tokyo defines ocean development in his
book as using oceans for mankind, while preserving the beauty of nature. In the light of its significance
and meaning, the term "Ocean Development" is not necessarily a new term. Ocean development is
broadly classified into three aspects: (1) Utilization of ocean resources, (2) Utilization of ocean spaces,
and (3) Utilization of ocean energy. Among these, development of marine resources has long been
established as fishery science and technology, and shipping, naval architecture and port/harbour
construction are covered by the category of using ocean spaces, which have grown into industries in
Japan. When the Committee initiated its activities, however, the real concept that caught attention was
a new type of ocean development, which was outside the coverage that conventional terms had
implied.
7. No limits explosion since all affs still have to have the US act, and maintain
ownership, those are MEANS of funding which is T under theirs.
8. Counter-interp increase means to make greater if there is no current USFG

owned development then they eliminate that part of the topic.
9. Reasonability checks good is good enough
1ar T its overview

Two framing issues
A. ITS does not exclusively mean possessed by
it can just as easily means RELATED to their choice of a particular definition is arbitrary. It being
arbitrary internal link turns their reasonability argument. Even if it is less affs it isnt predictable
because its arbitrary.
B. Their limits impact is made up for 2 reasons

FIRST the possibility of doing development doesnt make an aff they still have to have solvency
evidence. Which would make those affs predictable but since that evidence doesnt exist, were fine.
SECOND all of those affs still have to have the USFG start the development which means they would
lose to the PIC out of the USFG to have the states do it or another actor that means the debate hasnt
changed the aff still has to win USFG action is good
Ext Counter-Interp of Development

Their interpretation of ITS begs the question of development. Even if they win it has
to be possessed by the USFG, the question is what has to be possessed. JIN 98 defines
OCEAN DEVELOPMENT as the utilization of the resources and the space. The plan
meets this interpretation because we give permits for the use of space and the
resources of the ocean.
2 reasons that means you vote AFF
A. they dont have a better definition of development they have to win that to win what has to be
POSSESSED.
B. makes the impacts to their its interpretation inevitable since the only thing that has to be done is
development.
Ext We Meet already funded
The federal government is already agreed to fund Wind Energy projects thats Del
FRANCO 12 which means they are prepared to fund them. Thats important because
their only argument is that the USFG has to be the one that pays for it its a trump
card to all of their ground args about US involvement. Couple of args:
FIRST no impact to their limits arg it still gets funded by the USFG.
SECOND we are the only ones with offshore wind specific evidence that conclusively
says the DOE and Congress would have APPROPRIATION POWER for all offshore
winds.
AND this doesnt make us effectually topical it just means that things the USFG has
already agreed to fund can still be topical thats the real world since the NOAA
budget has already been set for exploration.
DA Blocks
(--) Disads are non-unique: The Energy Department just gave $150 million to fund
offshore wind in Massachusetts
Bastasch 7/1/14 (Michael Bastasch, writer for the Daily Caller, 7/1/14, Feds Give Cape Wind Project $150 Million Loan
Guarantee, Daily Caller, http://dailycaller.com/2014/07/01/feds-give-cape-wind-project-150-million-loanguarantee/#ixzz388kDOpx5, mgsk-sd)
The Energy Department has given a conditional $150 million loan to the Cape Wind project in
Massachusetts in a move to fund the first offshore wind farm in the United States. Cape Wind will receive the $150
million loan after it secures $2.6 billion in financing, according to the Energy Department. Once it has secured the balance of the funding, it
will get taxpayer dollars to help construct 130 wind turbines that will have a capacity of 360 megawatts of
power. If built, the Cape Wind Project could transform the fishing ports and manufacturing towns in Eastern Massachusetts
into a hub for a vibrant U.S. offshore wind industry, said Peter Davidson, executive director of the DOEs loan program in a
statement. The lessons that could be learned from this project can help catalyze similar projects in other areas of the U.S. with excellent
offshore wind resources. Massachusetts Democrats hailed the loan as a boom to the state and a step in the right direction in fighting global
warming. Offshore
wind will not only provide a new, clean source of energy for the United States, it will reduce
American reliance on fossil fuel, mitigate climate change and jump start a new U.S. industry that will
create thousands of clean energy jobs, said Massachusetts Gov. Deval Patrick. This funding will help Massachusetts
make energy history and continue our leadership as a clean energy jobs hub for the entire nation, said Sen. Ed Markey.
(--) Your disads are non-unique: Millions in grants for offshore wind now will require
continual congressional appropriations
Del FRANCO 12 National Wind Power Staff [Mark Del Franco, DOE Offshore Wind
Grants Provide Impetus To Get 'Steel In The Water',
http://www.nawindpower.com/e107_plugins/content/content.php?content.10818#.UTebP6V2
H04]
The DOE provided a major boost for the fledgling offshore wind industry by announcing grants for seven U.S.
offshore wind projects to ensure commercial operation in state and federal waters by 2017.
The projects will receive up to $4 million to complete the engineering, design and permitting phase of this award. The DOE
will select up to three of these projects for follow-on phases that focus on siting, construction and installation and aim to
achieve commercial operation by 2017. These projects will receive up to $47 million over four years, subject to
Congressional appropriations, according to the DOE.
(--) Your disads are empirically denied: the federal government already expanded
production tax credits for wind power through 2012:
Erica Schroeder, J.D., University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, 2010 (California Law
Review, 2010, Turning Offshore Wind On, http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu
/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1069&context=californialawreview; Accessed 7/21/2014,
rwg)
The federal government appears to recognize the opportunities and benefits that wind power offers. In
February 2009, Congress

positioned wind power generation to continue its rapid growth 5 by renewing production tax credits for
wind power projects through 2012. Congress also gave the wind industry options for investment tax credits or U.S. Treasury
Department grants for certain wind power projects placed in service by 2012.7 In addition, in July 2009, DOE announced up to $30 billion in
loan guarantees for renewable energy projects, including wind power. President Obama continues to promote renewable energy, including wind
energy, as well. For example, in his 2010 State of the Union, the President spoke repeatedly about the need for renewable energy investment. 9
DOE predicts that by 2030 the United States could get as much as 20 percent of its electricity from wind, if the nation is able to overcome certain
challenges to wind power progress today.' 0
(--) US provides massive support for wind power now:

rwg)
Since 2006, the federal government has been providing significant support to wind power, importantly
in the form of tax incentives, which has allowed for record growth for wind power in the United States.31
None of this growth has occurred offshore, however. Technically speaking, wind is a type of solar energy. It is formed by the sun's
uneven heating of the atmosphere, irregularities on the Earth's surface, 32 and the Earth's rotation. A typical wind turbine has a horizontal axis with two or three blades
attached, which sits atop a tower, usually over 300 feet high to capture wind at faster speeds. 3 3 When wind blows through the blades, they turn and convert the
wind's kinetic energy into rotational shaft energy, a form of mechanical power. 3 4
AT: Bird Disad

(--) Wind kills far less birds than other causes:
Jeffrey THALER 12 Visiting Professor of Energy Policy, Law & Ethics, University
of Maine School of Law and School of Economics (Jeff Thaler, FIDDLING AS THE
WORLD BURNS: HOW CLIMATE CHANGE URGENTLY REQUIRES A PARADIGM SHIFT IN THE
PERMITTING OF RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECTS, Jeff Thaler University of Maine School of Law
September 17, 2012 Environmental Law, Volume 42, Issue 4,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2148122, Accessed 7/27/2014, rwg
Wind turbines can present hazards to birds and bats including *c+ollisions with the turbine blades,
towers, power lines, or with other related structures, and electrocution on power lines.207 Recent estimates put the
annual U.S. avian death toll from onshore wind turbines at 444,000,208 although that is far less than
mortality caused by glass windows, cars, motor vehicles, transmission lines, agriculture, communication
towers, or hunting.209 Given that there is no incidental take permit under the MBTA subjecting violators to strict liabilityand that
the Act protects virtually every species of bird in the United States, except for exotic or invasive species . . . there may be no way to avoid take
prohibited by the MBTA.
(--) Birds will be harmed more by warming than the plan:

Taber D. Allison, Terry L. Root, and Peter C. Frumhoff 2014 (American Wind Wildlife Institute,
Stanford University, Union of Concerned Scientists,
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-014-1127-y/fulltext.html, Accessed 7/27/2014,
rwg)
Rapid, large-scale expansion of low- and zero-carbon renewable energy sources is essential for limiting
the magnitude of global warming and its impacts on wildlife (Clemmer et al. 2013). Expansion of renewable
energy leads to concerns in the conservation community over harm to wildlife populations from injury
and death of individual birds and bats or from fragmentation of species habitat (e.g., Arnett & Baerwald 2013; Kiesecker et al.
2011). Threats to wildlife can be reduced by strategic siting and operation, yet the threat of global
extinctions rises the longer it takes to reduce carbon emissions (e.g., Warren et al. 2013). Consequently, efforts to
expand renewable energy at the needed scale should factor in both (a) the potential for direct harm to species local populations and (b) the
reduction in global biodiversity loss from limiting global warming.
(--) Non-unique: far more birds are killed from other sources:
Roger Drouin, 1/6/2014 (staff writer,
http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2014/01/birds-bats-wind-turbines-deadlycollisions, Accessed 7/27/2014, rwg)
Hundreds of thousands of birds
and bats are killed by wind turbines in the US each year, including some protected species such
as the golden eagle and the Indiana bat. That's only a small fraction of the hundreds of millions killed by buildings,
pesticides, fossil-fuel power plants, and other human causes, but its still worryingespecially as wind power is
experiencing record growth.
(--) The risk to birds is virtually nonexistent

Kowalski 6/23/14Kathiann M. Kowalski is an experienced journalist who writes on a wide range of
topics. To date, Kathi has written 25 books and more than 600 articles and stories. She welcomes the
challenge of new assignments for print, broadcast, and online media. Kathi obtained her Bachelor's
degree in political science from Hofstra University. Her law degree is from Harvard Law School, where
Kathi served on the Harvard Law Review. Kathi has been a Science Journalism Fellow in the biomedical
and environmental hands-on lab programs at MBL in Massachusetts. She has also participated in
workshops sponsored by the Society of Environmental Journalists, the National Science Foundation, and
the Institute for Journalism & Natural Resources. In addition to writing, Kathi has spent 15 years
practicing law, with an emphasis on environmental issues, corporate matters, and litigation. Kathi's
writing has won multiple awards and honors
the American Bird Conservancy and Black Swamp Bird Observatory voiced concerns to the Ohio Power Siting
Board. The groups earlier efforts halted a wind turbine at Camp Perry, Ohio, because of its location near migratory bird pathways. Now they want closer scrutiny of
Icebreaker. We didnt exactly oppose it, says Michael Hutchins, National Coordinator of the American Bird
Conservancys Bird Smart Wind Energy Campaign. What we did was call for all of the voluntary legal guidelines regarding the protection of birds to be
done. The southern shore of Lake Erie is incredibly important for bird migration, Hutchins stresses. Among
other things, Hutchins wants additional studies beyond the avian risk assessment prepared for LEEDCo
last fall by Curry & Kerlinger, an environmental consulting firm based in New Jersey. Risks to birds are
negligible, the study says. Most notably, the Icebreaker turbines will be seven miles from shore.
Because very few birds fly directly across Lake Erie there, the study estimates collision risks for Kirtlands
Warbler at about 1 death every 500 years. Risks to the Piping Plover would be five times lower, it says.
LEEDCo consulted extensively with fish and wildlife experts at the Ohio Department of Natural
Resources, says Wagner. We have done everything they asked us to do. Other types of electricity
generation affect birds too, notes Miller. If the fish are full of mercury because of coal power plants,
the birds are going to eat those fish, Miller says. Power lines, pesticides, house cats, cars, and even
buildings kill significantly more birds each year than wind turbines, she adds. Nor are birds the only
species that matter. We need to look at the entire ecosystem and all the various species that are affected, Miller says. Ultimately, we need to
move to wind energy, she concludes. Our planet will be healthier, our lakes will be healthier, and our
birds will be healthier, if we can cut our reliance on coal and nuclear and gas that are polluting our
planet. The Sierra Club, Environment Ohio, and Ohio Environmental Council are members of RE-AMP, which publishes Midwest Energy News. This entry was posted in News and tagged
This spring
Ohio, wind by Kathiann M. Kowalski. Bookmark the permalink.
(--) Wind industry will decrease bird deaths:

Roger Drouin, 1/6/2014 (staff writer,
http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2014/01/birds-bats-wind-turbines-deadlycollisions, Accessed 7/27/2014, rwg)
The pressure is now on for wind energy companies to reduce bird and bat mortality. Lindsay North,
outreach manager for the American Wind Energy Association, which lobbies for the industry, says wind
developers are committed to "doing our best to try to have the lowest impact on birds." The industry is
collaborating with wildlife researchers on promising technologies and approaches that are already being
field-tested, and on some experimental and even far-fetched ideas that could help reduce mortality in
the long term. "I am very optimistic we can make significant progress," said biologist Taber Allison,
director of research at the American Wind Wildlife Institute, a nonprofit partnership of wind companies,
scientists, and environmental organizations such as the National Audubon Society and the Sierra Club.
(--) Wind turbines kill very few birds:

Beth Buczynski, 12/12/2013 (staff writer, 4 Things That Kill More Birds Than Wind Farms,
http://www.care2.com/causes/4-things-that-kill-more-birds-than-wind-farms.html,
Accessed 7/27/2014, rwg)
Then I did a little bit of research, looking to bird conservation experts about what the
biggest threats are to bald eagle and

golden eagle populations (the two kinds of birds that prompted the fine in Wyoming). Interestingly, I didnt find a single one
that named wind energy development as a major threat. In fact, when you compare the numbers, wind turbines are
a relatively small threat (responsible for about 13 deaths a year), and there are some easy things we can do to alert birds to this new
danger.
(--) Studies prove: offshore wind doesnt hurt species:

rwg)
In addition, opponents frequently cite offshore wind power's environmental costs. These costs are site specific and
can involve harm to plants and animals, and their habitats. 8 2 This harm includes impacts on birds, which can involve disruption of migratory
patterns, destruction of habitat, and bird deaths from collision with the turbine blades. 8 3 However, these adverse impacts are generally less
dramatic than those associated with fossil fuel extraction and generation, and in a well-chosen site they can be negligible. 8 4 A
recent,
exhaustive study of the environmental impact of major offshore wind farms in Denmark concluded that
"offshore wind farms, if placed right, can be engineered and operated without significant damage to
the marine environment and vulnerable species.,, 8 5 A final concern is that offshore wind farms are more expensive to build,
and more difficult to install and maintain, than onshore wind farms. 8 6 The cost of an offshore wind project is estimated to be at least 50
percent greater than the onshore equivalent. 8 7 Short- and long-term technical improvements could help to lower offshore wind costs,
however, and government assistance may help them occur more quickly.
AT: Environment DA
(--) Wind energy has minimal environmental impact:
Mehmet Bilgili, (Electrical and Energy Department, Adana Vocational High School, Cukurova
University), 2011. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 15 (2011) 905915.
Furthermore,
it is well known that wind energy is one of the cleanest and most environmentally friendly
energy sources, and unlike fossil fuels, the wind will never be depleted. All forms of energy production have an
environmental impact, but the impacts of wind energy are low, local, and manageable. These environmental impacts are negligible when compared with conventional energy sources. The significance of wind energy
originates from its friendly behavior to the environment. Due to its clean, wind power is sought wherever possible for conversion to electricity
with the hope that air pollution from fossil fuels will be reduced [4]
AT: Electricity Prices DA

(--) Dependence on foreign imports of fossil fuels causes high energy prices:
Jacqueline S. Rolleri (law degree, Roger Williams University) 2010 (Roger Williams University
Law Review, Spring 2010, Lexis/Nexis, Accessed 7/22/14, rwg)
The United States, which "generates approximately 20% of the global total of greenhouse gas emissions," relies on foreign imports
of finite fossil fuels in order to meet the country's ever-increasing demand for electricity. n1 Dependence
on foreign countries' fossil fuel resources has contributed to high energy prices, national security issues and
environmental risks. n2 "In its Annual Energy Outlook 2007, the U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that U.S. electricity demand
will grow by 39% from 2005 to 2030." n3
(--) Turn: the plan decreases electricity costs:

In an effort to decrease its reliance on foreign countries and to help reduce carbon dioxide emissions, the United States has turned to wind as a
promising renewable energy resource. While the U.S. has been very successful in utilizing land-based renewable wind energy, it has yet to
produce electricity from offshore wind farms. n7 The world's first offshore wind farm was built in 1991 off the coast of Vindeby, Denmark, n8
and "all fully operational offshore wind farms are [currently located] in Europe." n9 In both coastal and offshore waters, wind is a powerful,
dependable and infinite resource. n10 Because "60% of the
U.S. [*219] population lives in coastal states," n11 placing

wind turbines offshore could help reduce electricity transmission costs and avoid issues commonly associated with
locating land-based wind turbines in close proximity to homes. n12
Average Price of Electricity Climbs to All-Time Record

Jeffery 7/29 Pulitzer Prize nominee (Terence P.
editor in chief of CNSNews.com, Average Price of Electricity Climbs to All-Time

Record,, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/terence-p-jeffrey/average-price-electricity-climbs-all-time-record, ASM)
CNSNews.com) - For
the first time ever, the average price for a kilowatthour (KWH) of electricity in the
United States has broken through the 14-cent mark, climbing to a record 14.3 cents in June,
according to data released last week by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Before this June, the highest the average price for a KWH had ever gone
was 13.7 cents, the level it hit in June, July, August and September of last year. The 14.3-cents average price for a KWH recorded this June is
about 4.4 percent higher than that previous record. Average Price for a KWH of Electricity Typically, the cost of electricity peaks in summer,
declines in fall, and hits its lowest point of the year during winter. In each of the first six months of this year, the average price for a KWH hour
of electricity has hit a record for that month. In June, it hit the all-time record. Although the price for an average KWH hit its all-time record in
seasonally adjusted electricity price index--which measures changes in the price of electricity relative to a value
of 100 and adjusts for seasonal fluctuations in price--hit its all-time high of 209.341 in March of this year , according to
June, the
BLS. In June, it was slightly below that level, at 209.144.
(--) Turn Denmark proves that OWP can substantially decrease costs.
Vagus 7/31 (Stephen Vagus 7/31/14, http://www.hydrogenfuelnews.com/cost-wind-energycontinues-fall-denmark/8518897/, Journalist, SSN)
Denmark has reached an important milestone in wind energy. The country has been embracing wind
power for some time, distancing itself from coal and oil in the hopes of becoming more energy
sustainable and environmentally friendly. In the past, the electrical power generated by the countrys
wind turbines had been significantly more expensive than the electricity produced through the
consumption of fossil-fuels. That may no longer be the case in the near future, as new wind turbines
become active. Energy produced by wind turbines is now less expensive than that produced by fossil-
fuels According to Denmarks government, the electricity produced by wind turbines will be half the
cost as the energy produced by fossil-fuels by 2016. New wind projects are taking form throughout the
country currently, with several onshore wind energy systems expected to begin producing electricity
within the next year. Government officials note that wind power is already less expensive than other
forms of renewable energy, and its costs are beginning to fall at a rapWind Energy Denmarkid pace.
(--) Electricity prices at all-time high

Hackbarth 8/1 (Sean, Blogger at U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Publisher at The American Mind, 08-0114, Average Price for Electricity Hits All-Time High, https://www.uschamber.com/blog/average-priceelectricity-hits-all-time-high, AS)
Here are a few energy-related items you might have missed this week. 1. Take
a look at your electrical bill. You are probably

paying more, as CNSNews.com reports: For the first time ever, the average price for a kilowatthour (KWH) of
electricity in the United States has broken through the 14-cent mark, climbing to a record 14.3 cents in
June, according to data released last week by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Before this June, the highest the average price for a
KWH had ever gone was 13.7 cents, the level it hit in June, July, August and September of last year. The 14.3-cents
average price for a KWH recorded this June is about 4.4 percent higher than that previous record. The story
also notes, In each of the first six months of this year, the average price for a KWH hour of electricity has hit a record for that month. In June, it
hit the all-time record.
(--) US electricity prices high now

Melvin 7/22 (Jasmin Melvin, correspondent for Platts McGraw Hill financial, 7/22/14, Some US
consumers may see high power prices for next several winters, http://www.platts.com/latestnews/electric-power/washington/some-us-consumers-may-see-high-power-prices-for-21952761//sd)
Electricity consumers in the US Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions could see higher-than-average prices for the
next several winters if last winter's bitter cold is repeated until additional natural pipeline capacity into the region is brought into
service, competitive energy retail supplier ConEdison Solutions said in a new report. ConEdison Solution, a unit of New York-based utility
Consolidated Edison, said the
polar vortexes that blasted the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic with sustained periods of brutal cold during the
2013-2014 winter led to a spike in the price generators paid for natural gas. The increase was largely due to inadequate
pipeline capacity, the report said. Gas-fired power generators, forced to buy gas from the spot market to deal with shortages, paid
prices that were in some cases 878% higher than the 12-month average, the report said, adding that gas prices at the the
Algonquin Gas Transmission city-gates in New England hit a high of $75.48/MMBtu on January 22, compared with the 12-month average of
$8.60/MMBtu. Article continues below... Request a free trial of: Megawatt Daily Megawatt Daily Megawatt Daily Megawatt Daily provides
detailed coverage of power prices in major US and Canadian electricity markets, up-to-date information about solicitations and supply deals,
and information about complex state and federal power regulations. Request a trial to Megawatt Daily Request More Information "Any
proposed project to provide relief by reducing pipeline constraints will likely take years to complete, so consumers exposed
to
energy markets over the next few winters should expect higher-than-average prices during those months," the
white paper said. "Whether prices will be higher or lower than this winter will depend on a number of factors, including the severity and
duration of cold weather." Last winter's cold also challenged the reliability of the electric grid, prompting PJM Interconnection to issue several
warnings and requests for curtailment in January. Consumers were asked to conserve electricity and real-time power prices skyrocketed to
$1,800/MWh during certain hours, a 2,798% increase above the $64.33/MWh 12-month average, the report said. "The unexpected extremes of
the Polar Vortex reminded us that energy users need to be vigilant," Richard Rathvon, vice president at ConEdison Solutions, said in
a statement Monday. "In a marketplace that often defies prediction, the energy consumer needs to fully comprehend the range of risks and
benefits that may be associated with the contracts they sign." Consumers paying variable market-based prices for their electricity saw the
biggest spikes, but even
some with fixed price contracts ended up paying more than expected. Those served by
"smaller, less-financially stable suppliers" that went out of business when the record-setting costs hit "were dropped back to their utility's
default service," and often had to pay prices above their fixed price contract, the company said. Utilities usually pass cost increases through to
consumers either as they are incurred or in future periods, the report said. The report recommended that consumers understand the energy
supply products they purchase, including how risk is shared between them and supplier and whether their contract has fixed prices or variable
market-based prices. The report argued for energy supplier transparency, putting the responsibility of informing consumers of their energy
options and the differences, risks and benefits of those options on the supplier.
AT: Intermittency
(--) Intermittency is an issue for onshore, not offshore, wind
Salih, writer for Huffington Post, July 2 (2014) (Swarah, 07/02/2014, Will Offshore Wind Pick
up the Speed?, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/swara-salih/will-offshore-wind-picku_b_5549967.html, GHS//TG)
Offshore wind facilities could offer a cost-effective and efficient means of drawing a highly abundant source of energy for residential and commercial use.
Conventional wind facilities on land, while essential for the renewable energy sector, are troubled by the intermittency of
wind strength. Sometimes the wind may blow too slowly, or it may not blow at all, casting public doubt on the reliability of terrestrial wind farms. Critics
and skeptics have referenced (and often over exaggerated) this particular issue, making it more difficult to incentivize developers. With the production tax credit
(PTC) out of effect, investors may have less overall confidence in wind energy's continued growth. Yet wind
power has maintained a steady

growth rate. In 2013, wind supplied 4.13 percent of all electric capacity in the U.S., or roughly 61,108 megawatts (MW) nationwide. Iowa and South Dakota
had 27.4 and 26 percent, respectively, of their total energy output coming from wind in 2013. Texas has the highest wind-generating capacity of all the states, with
around 12,355 MW installed, and holds six of the 10 largest wind farms in the U.S. However, this growth has still been slow, and depends heavily on the PTC, which
Congress allowed to expire four times in the past. This has put wind energy on what some experts call a "boom and bust" cycle: in the year following each
expiration, construction of wind facilities fell by over 50 percent relative to the previous year. The lack of a tax credit, along with the intermittency and other factors,
are roadblocks to the sector's development. However,
the wind blows constantly off the coasts, removing the

intermittency factor. Countries like Germany, England and the Netherlands generate hundreds of MW from this source.
Yet there are no offshore wind facilities in the United States. In fact, the first offshore windmill was only installed last year. Studies indicate that the U.S. has simply
failed to utilize potential capacity. The
Department of Energy (DOE), for example, has run multiple studies that
conclude that if we implement sufficient incentivizing measures now, and utilized all potential capacity,
including in the Great Lakes, offshore wind could provide the U.S. with over 4 million MW by 2030.
(--) Scientists have studied and prevented intermittency

Weaver 10 (Janelle, 04/05/2010, Chain of offshore Wind Turbines Could Power Atlantic Seaboard,
http://www.wired.com/2010/04/wind-power-chain/, science writer and editor, PhD, GHS//TG)
By connecting stations together, the system could eliminate the biggest downside of wind power: intermittency. The
concept is simple: If you spread out wind stations far enough, each one will experience a different weather
pattern. So its very unlikely that a slackening of the wind would affect all stations at once. The result is
steadier power. Were designing transmission in a different way, according to meteorological principles, said marine-policy expert Willett Kempton of
the University of Delaware in Newark, co-author of the research, published April 5 in the Proceedings of the National Academies of Sciences. Kempton and
a team of scientists analyzed five years of wind data from 11 meteorological stations buoys and towers off the
Atlantic coast, from Florida to Maine. They found that combining power from all stations with a transmission cable
could prevent massive power fluctuations.
AT: Politics Disad

(--) Offshore wind power has support from both sides of the political aisle:
Ben Deninger (associate in the law firm Cole, Scott & Kissane) 2014 (Texas Environmental Law
Journal, May 2014, Lexis/Nexis, Accessed 7/22/2014, rwg)
The idea of an offshore wind farm seems like a perfect way to comply with the Massachusetts RPS; however, nearly 12 years after
the projects' initial phases, no turbines have been erected. n20 Despite wide ranging support from environmental groups
like the Sierra Club, as well as expressions of political support from both sides of the aisle, the project has
flowed through various regulatory bodies and lawsuits incredibly slowly. Perhaps some of this is to be expected for the first offshore wind farm
in America, but according to Jim Gordon of EMI "most projects and most developers that would get involved in a process like that would
probably throw up their arms and walk away." n21 The project occupies about 25 square miles with turbines 258 feet tall and blades reaching
440 feet at the peak of their rotation, with a projected average capacity of 30%-40% of their maximum capacity of 468 MW. n22
(--) The plan would be palatable to Congress and give Obama a win:
rwg)
Further, it would give offshore
wind proponents support in combating local opposition to projects. This revision could come in tandem
with revisions to the Energy Policy Act or as part of an entirely new energy agenda. President Barack Obama has repeatedly
expressed interest in a new trajectory for energy policy in the United States that focuses on climate
change, energy efficiency, renewable energy, and energy independence. 2 6 9 Congress could take advantage of this
momentum to make these related revisions to the CZMA as well. In fact, reform of an existing, familiar set of
regulations, like the CZMA, may be more palatable to Congress, and an easy first step to take with regard to
renewable energy.
(--) The plan would be popular with the public:

Ed Feo (Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy law firm) 2009 (Roger Williams University Law
Review, Summer 2009, Lexis/Nexis, Accessed 7/22/2014, rwg)
With all the challenges facing offshore wind energy development, it would seem as though prospects for the future of the industry look bleak.
Nevertheless, motivated by
a lack of space onshore, attractive policy incentives, and increased public

support for renewable energy, offshore wind developers in Europe and the United States (in a more limited
capacity) are now employing creative ways to overcome or at least mitigate the impact of these challenges .
If such progress continues to be made in all the most problematic areas of offshore financing, construction and operation, it will not be long
before offshore development catches up with, and perhaps even outpaces, onshore wind energy development.
(--) The plan would be a win for Obama:

Despite all the latest activity in offshore wind development that has been seen in Delaware, Rhode Island and New Jersey, those states were by
no means the first in the United States to consider building offshore wind farms. Plans to build the Cape Wind project in
Massachusetts were first made public in 2001. Nevertheless, the project's development has been constantly delayed since a group of local
residents backed by Senator Ted Kennedy (among others) publicly opposed it due mainly to aesthetic and purported environmental and
navigational concerns. In 2007, the group filed a lawsuit challenging the state's decision to issue a final environmental report on the project,
and a judge refused to dismiss the suit. Later that year, the Cape Cod Commission rejected approval for the wind farm on procedural grounds.
The developer later sought to overturn that decision with the state Energy Facilities Siting Board, but the Board is still reviewing that request.
Between January and December 2008, the MMS, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Coast Guard all issued reports or
statements finding that the Cape Wind project would have little or no negative impact on the [*689] environment or navigation. United States
Representative James Oberstar, D-Minn., however, delayed the process once again by asking for more time to consider these issues before
release of the final MMS report. It was not until January 16, 2009 that the MMS was able to issue its final report, in which it confirmed that the
project would have minimal impact on the environment. But it remains unclear when the MMS will issue its decision on whether to actually
grant an approved lease to the project. n65 It
is hoped that the Obama administration will help speed this process
given the President's stated commitment to promoting renewable energy development in the United States,
which he repeatedly addressed during his campaign.
AT: Spending Disad

(--) Investments in offshore wind will decrease the cost of wind turbines:
Michael P. Giordano, 2010 (University of Richmond Law Review, March 2010, Accessed
7/27/2014, rwg)
New investments will positively influence innovation and new technologies to meet offshore wind
energy's growing needs. The industry will be better suited to develop larger turbines at a lower cost. As
the cycle continues and the industry becomes more and more mature, offshore wind energy may
someday gain a competitive advantage over other renewable energies and traditional fossil fuels.
AT: Wind Requires Fossil Fuels

(--) Wind energy achievable and requires no Fossil Fuels
Fischetti 13 (Mark Fischetti, Science writer and Senior editor for Scientific American, 4/15/14, How to
Power the World without Fossil Fuels, Scientific
American,http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-to-power-the-world/, mgsk-sd)
Three times now, Mark Jacobson has gone out on the same limb. In 2009 he and co-author Mark Delucchi published a cover story in Scientific American that
showed how the entire world could get all of its energyfuel as well as electricityfrom wind, water and solar
sources by 2030. No coal or oil, no nuclear or natural gas. The tale sounded infeasibleexcept that Jacobson, from Stanford
University, and Delucchi, from the University of California, Davis, calculated just how many hydroelectric dams, wave-energy systems, wind turbines, solar power
plants and rooftop photovoltaic installations the world would need to run itself completely on renewable energy. The article sparked a spirited debate on our Web
site, and it also sparked a larger debate between forward-looking energy planners and those who would rather preserve the status quo. The duo went on to publish
a detailed study in the journal Energy Policy that also called out numbers for a U.S. strategy. Two weeks ago Jacobson and a larger team, including Delucchi, did it
again. This
time Jacobson showed in much finer detail how New York States residential, transportation, industrial, and
heating and cooling sectors could all be powered by wind, water and sun, or WWS, as he calls it. His mix: 40 percent
offshore wind (12,700 turbines), 10 percent onshore wind (4,020 turbines), 10 percent concentrated solar panels (387 power plants), 10 percent photovoltaic cells
(828 facilities), 6 percent residential solar (five million rooftops), 12 percent government and commercial solar (500,000 rooftops), 5 percent geothermal (36 plants),
5.5 percent hydroelectric (6.6 large facilities), 1 percent tidal energy (2,600 turbines) and 0.5 percent wave energy (1,910 devices). In the process, New
York
would reduce power demand by 37 percent, largely because the new energy sources are more efficient than
the old ones. And because no fossil fuels would have to be purchased or burned, consumer costs would be similar to what they are
today, and the state would eliminate a huge portion of its carbon dioxide emissions. New York State could end fossil fuel use and
generate all of its energy from wind, water and solar power, according to Mark Jacobson. The New York Times heralded the study as scientifically groundbreaking
and practically impossible. But this time Jacobson, a professor of civil and environmental engineering, is digging in. He took his analysis a step further and found a
surprising way to sell his plan. And hes close to finishing a similar study for California, which will lend more depth to his vision. I asked Jacobson why hes out to
change the world, how he answers his critics and what it will take for his plans to get traction in government.
(--) Wind alternative energy requires no fossil fuels

Jacobson and Delucchi 10 (Mark Z. Jacobson and Mark A. Delucchi, Department of Civil and
Environmental Engineering from Stanford University and Institute of Transportation Studies from
University of California, 12-30-10, Providing all global energy with wind, water, and solar power, Part
I:Technologies, energy resources, quantities and areas of infrastructure and materials,
http://web.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/Articles/I/JDEnPolicyPt1.pdf, mgsk-sd)
Table 2 shows our estimates
of global and U.S. end-use energy demand, by sector, in a world powered entirely by WWS, with
zero fossil-fuel and biomass combustion. We have assumed that all end uses that feasibly can be electrified use
WWS power directly, and that the remaining end uses use WWS power indirectly in the form of electrolytic hydrogen (hydrogen produced by
splitting water with WWS power). As explained in Section 2 we assume that most uses of fossil fuels for heating/cooling can be
replaced by electric heat pumps, and that most uses of liquid fuels for transportation can be replaced by BEVs. The remaining,
non-electric uses can be supplied by hydrogen, which we assume would be compressed for use in fuel cells in remaining nonaviation transportation, liquefied and combusted in aviation, and combusted to provide heat directly in the industrial sector. The
hydrogen would be produced using WWS power to split water; thus, directly or indirectly, WWS powers the worldAs
shown in Table 2, the direct use of electricity, for example, for heating or electric motors, is considerably more efficient than is fuel combustion
in the same application. The use of electrolytic hydrogen is less efficient than is the use of fossil fuels for direct heating but more efficient for
transportation when fuel cells are used; the efficiency difference between direct use of electricity and electrolytic hydrogen is due to the energy
losses of electrolysis, and in the case of most transportation uses, the energy requirements of compression and the greater inefficiencies of fuel
cells than batteries. Assuming that some additional modest energy-conservation methods are implemented (see the list of demand-side
conservation measures in Section 2) and subtracting the energy requirements of petroleum refining, we estimate that an all-WWS world
would require 30% less end-use power than the EIA projects for the conventional fossil-fuel scenario.
CP Blocks
States Counterplan Answers

(--) States cant solve the AFF:
A) Increased centralization and influence is necessary to solvethats the 1ac
Schroeder evidence
B) Federal incentives are necessary to provide cost competitiveness for wind energy
thats the 1ac Giordano evidence
(--) Federal jurisdiction & expertise are necessary to solve for offshore wind:
rwg)
A. Federal Jurisdiction Federal jurisdiction begins more than three nautical miles from the shore, along the Outer Continental Shelf, and ends
two hundred nautical miles out to sea. 9 8 Analyses of offshore
wind capacity typically assume that wind farms will

be built in federal waters, more than five miles from the coast. 9 9 Thus, federal jurisdiction covers the
generation component of an offshore wind project, mainly the turbines. 0 0 This includes site approval
and permitting for project construction. 1 0 1 Section 388 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 grants the Department of the Interior
(DOI) primary authority over offshore wind farm approval and permitting.102 Section 388 specifies that the Minerals
Management Service (MMS), a branch of DOI, controls the offshore wind facility permitting process; the Secretary
of the Interior makes the final permitting decision.103 This grant of authority extends MMS's existing authority under the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), which gives it management rights over the Outer Continental Shelf primarily for offshore fossil fuel extraction.
Because of MMS's experience with managing offshore oil and gas extraction, Congress deemed it the
proper body for offshore wind permitting as well. 1 0 5 Opponents of the decision have been concerned with MMS's lack of
experience with marine habitat regulation and protection. 1 0 6 Fortunately, MMS appears receptive to coordinating with other agencies with
relevant experience, like the Army Corps of Engineers, National Marine Fisheries Service, Coast Guard, Department of Energy, and
Environmental Protection Agency, as well as appropriate state actors.1 0 7
(--) State FIAT illegitimate:

A) Not anticipated in the literatureno one assumes all 50 states will act at the
same timemeans no lit to answer the counterplan.
B) Not reciprocalthey get 50 actors we get one.
C) Reason to reject the counterplan.
(--) Federal mandate key to offshore wind power:
rwg)
Section 388 came in response to controversy over which federal agency had permitting authority during the early stages of the Cape Wind
project, which is described in more detail in Part IV. While Section 388 does not resolve all of the issues relating to federal jurisdiction over
offshore wind, 0 8 its designation of MMS as the primary permitting agency marks Congress's first step toward a unified review process for
offshore alternative energy.109 Nonetheless, the
current federal regulatory environment for offshore wind remains
confusing. In April 2009, President Obama took a first step toward remedying some of that confusion by announcing a coordinated
program, headed by DOI, for federal offshore renewable energy permitting. The program will cover not only offshore wind power generation,
but also other offshore renewable energy, such as electricity generated from ocean currents.' 1 0 Despite
this progress toward an

improved federal regulatory program, barriers to offshore wind power still exist, largely due to the
absence of a strong and effective federal mandate promoting offshore wind power development and the
powers that states retain over project siting."n
(--) Permutation: Do Both

Perm solves best Federal financial incentives are key:
Shott 14 (Corey Shott, Sr. Legislative Representative in Climate & Energy for National Wildlife Federation, no date,
Incentivizing Offshore Wind, National Wildlife Federation, http://www.nwf.org/~/media/PDFs/GlobalWarming/Offshore%20Wind/Incentivizing-Offshore-Wind-Fact-Sheet.pdf, mgsk-sd)
Climate change, fueled by carbon pollution from burning fossil fuels for energy, is the single greatest threat facing both
wildlife and people across the globe. The National Wildlife Federation is mobilizing our millions of members and partners
in support of a rapid transition to clean energy sources. America has massive offshore wind energy resources
off our coastlines, presenting a substantial domestic clean energy opportunity we can no longer afford to ignore.
There are more than 1,000 offshore wind turbines producing local, clean energy overseas and not one spinning here in the United States. If
America is to get serious about transitioning to clean energy, this has to change. As the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) map
shows, there are substantial wind resources off our Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts, as well as in the Great Lakes. NREL has estimated as much
as 212 GW of offshore wind power available in shallow waters off our East Coast alone. Harnessing a fraction of Americas offshore wind
potential could power our homes, businesses, and vehicles with job-producing, clean energy. Up and down the Atlantic coast, the federal
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) is working closely with States, offshore wind developers, and key stakeholders to advance
offshore wind development. Every state with significant offshore wind resources has some taken some steps forward on offshore wind,
including key research and policy development to facilitate offshore wind development. NWF is working closely with all involved to ensure that
offshore wind development moves forward in a manner that is protective of our coastal and marine wildlife resources. While there is much
positive momentum occurring to identify and permit appropriate sites for offshore wind development, this new industry faces tough challenges
in competing with our heavily subsidized fossil fuel energy sources. Federal
financial incentives are greatly needed to bring

this massive, clean domestic energy source to market. The National Wildlife Federation, in coordination with a diverse group of
clean energy industry, environmental, and conservation organizations call on Congress to provide tax certainty for the industry in order
to reduce the costs of future projects and bring the reality of a thriving offshore wind industry to America.
(--) National policy key to solve states arent uniform, investors dont believe the
states cp, faster federal permitting key to both more permits and access to the most
up to date wind technology.
Jackson, 13 (Derrick, An award-winning columnist for the Op-Ed section, known for his nature
photography, Bostons Museum of African American History, 3/2/2013, Politics imperil offshore wind
sweet spots, http://bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/03/02/sour-politics-imperil-offshore-wind-sweetspots/wZHvvjxVMtZKx2Y42iRpII/story.html//sd)
Kyle Aarons, a fellow at the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, said that despite Obamas high-profile advocacy of renewable energy in his
State of the Union address, only 30 states have adopted renewable energy standards, and most states without them are Republican
strongholds that soundly voted against Obama for president. No
two state policies are alike, and were not really

anticipating much progress on new states, Aarons said. I wouldnt say were stuck on renewables overall.
We have a lot of potential to still catch up. Onshore wind will still probably do well, but without a
national policy, I would imagine that offshore, being newer, will be pretty slow. Rick Sullivan, Massachusetts
secretary for energy and environmental affairs, agreed, saying in a telephone interview that a national policy
would likely speed up offshore wind development. I think youd not only see more permits, but faster
permitting should allow developers to take advantage of the most up-to-date wind technology out there
rather than it taking years to put up something that may be outdated, Sullivan said. Being outdated weighed heavily
on the minds of participants at the offshore conference. While Cape Wind and Block Islands Deepwater Wind are finally poised to plunge their
first platforms into the water, Europe had a record year in offshore wind development, installing 369 turbines. Denmark announced it now gets
30 percent of energy from wind. Investors
at the conference said billions of dollars are sitting on the sidelines as

Americas wind potential waits for a national policy. Deepwater Wind board manager Bryan Martin gave credit to Salazar for
getting wind energy as far as he has, but were tapped out on the state-by-state model. The White House and
Congress must tap into a national model, or the United States will remain on the sidelines for good.
(--) Conditionality is a voting issue:

A) Time skew: can make our offense disappear at no cost.
B) Strategy skew: cant read our best answers to the counterplan.
C) Voting issue: letting them kick the counterplan only gives them what they
want.
(--) Federal coordination is necessary:
While states may be in the best position to create marine spatial plans for adjacent coastal waters, the
federal government must provide legislation that would help coordinate such planning in state and
offshore waters in order to guarantee interstate and intergovernmental coordination and consistency.
The federal government should consider creating new legislation for a federal Ocean Zone Management Act ("OZMA"), through which the state
and federal governments can utilize marine spatial planning in a manner that is consistent on both a state-to-state and national basis, and
which accounts for conflicting user interests and cumulative impacts.
States Cant Solve AFF: 1ar Extensions

(--) You should view the counterplan through the lens of optimalityif there is the
tiniest risk it doesnt solve the whole case you should vote to solve extinction
(--) Their solvency evidence is all genericit doesnt take into account offshore wind
(--) Extend the Schroder evidence: you need increased CENTRALIZATION to solve
dividing power to the states ruins solvency
(--) Federal incentives are key to cost competitivenessmeans less windmills are built
in a world of the Counterplan.
(--) Denmark provesstrong federal control key to offshore wind power:
rwg)
Not surprisingly, offshore
wind power development has been most successful in places with a powerful,
centralized government implementing a strong pro-offshore wind power policy.237 Denmark in
particular has been successful in its promotion of wind power, especially offshore wind power. 2 3 8 By the end of 2006,
Denmark was generating 20 percent of its electricity from 239 wind, both offshore and onshore. Since 1991, Denmark has erected eight offshore wind farms, with a
total capacity of 423 MW,240 meeting about 4.5 percent of Denmark's power needs.241 The Danish Energy Authority, the governmental agency that oversees energy
facility construction, required the construction of the two largest Danish offshore wind farms-Horns Rev and Nysted. 2 4 2 Its requirement resulted from a
governmental action plan outlining the expansion of wind power in Denmark, which emphasized the expansion of 243 offshore wind power in particular. The Danish
government has promoted wind power generation for decades, and the Danish Energy Authority serves as the centralized head of the Danish 244 government's
offshore wind policy implementation. The Energy Authority is a "one stop shop" for the many parties interested in offshore wind power 245 development2. It
determines whether to pursue an Environmental Impact Assessment, which it then uses, along with relevant legislation, to determine whether to allow offshore
development. 2 4 6 At the same time, the government has worked to win support from a wide range of stakeholders, including energy companies, industry,
municipalities, 247 research institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and consumers. In localities around the Horns Rev offshore wind farm, people expressed
concerns before construction regarding the lack of local involvement in the process, the negative visual and aesthetic impact of the project, and the resulting negative
effect on tourism.248 After construction, and after no drop in tourism occurred, attitudes gradually shifted to neutral or even somewhat positive towards the
project.249 Denmark
offers a lesson in the power of constructed offshore wind projects to change negative
attitudes. 2 5 0 The same transformation might be possible in the United States. In 2007, after nearly a year of
negotiations, the Danish government committed to increasing its wind power generation capacity by 1,300 MW by 2012, bringing its capacity to a total of 4,400
MW,251 or nearly 50 percent of Denmark's total power needs.252 This increase will include 400 MW of new offshore generation on existing wind farms, Horns Rev
and Nysted, and at least 400 MW of offshore generation in new wind farms. 2 5 3 The Danish government's commitment to renewable energy, wind power, and, in
particular, offshore wind power, fits into the European Union's broad pro-renewable energy goals. Specifically, the EU aims to generate 21 percent of its electricity
from renewable energy sources by 2010 as part of its efforts to combat climate change and to reduce its dependence on coal, oil, and natural gas.254 A number of
other EU countries also have strong offshore wind programs.25 Although Denmark has traditionally been touted as the leader in offshore wind production, the United
Kingdom recently overtook it with a total offshore generation capacity of 590 MW.256
State CP: 1ar: Federal jurisdiction

(--) the counterplan cant solve at allExtend our Schroder evidence
A) Federal jurisdiction is necessary to build more than 5 miles off the coastyou also
need the federal government for site approval and permittingif they FIAT the
counterplan does these things thats utopian and destroys our lit base for answers
you should reject those parts of the counterplan.
B) The federal government has the necessary expertise to solvethe Minerals
Management Service has experience in managing offshore resourcesthe states have
none of this.
(--) Feds are keyonly ones with access to the Outer Continental Shelf:
rwg)
III CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR OFFSHORE WIND Both state and federal governments share control over offshore wind project
siting approval and permitting. Geography
determines the jurisdiction of each: state governments control their

respective Coastal Zones, from the 92 baseline of their shores out three nautical miles, and the federal government
controls the Outer Continental Shelf beyond that. 9 3 Offshore wind turbines are typically located on the
Outer Continental Shelf; 9 4 thus, the federal government sites and permits this component of an
offshore wind project.95 To get the electricity to consumers on land, however, offshore wind projects must necessarily include
transmission lines from the turbines, through state waters and onto land. State governments control the siting and permitting of these
transmission lines. 9 6
(--) Stronger federal intervention is necessary for offshore wind power:

rwg)
On the other hand, there
are broader, positive effects of offshore wind power development- such as energy
security improvement and environmental benefits like climate change mitigation-that imply a need for
stronger federal intervention to balance appropriately the costs and benefits of offshore wind.116 The
CZMA attempts to provide a formal structure for such balancing, but it ultimately leaves the states with too much power,
and the federal government and offshore wind farm proponents with no formal federal encouragement or support.
(--) Federal government required for offshore windmultiple federal obligations must
be met:
Andrew Campbell, 2013 (Houston Law Review, Winter 2013, COMMENT: YOU DON'T NEED
A WEATHERMAN TO KNOW WHICH WAY THE WIND BLOWS?*: AN ARGUMENT FOR OFFSHORE
WIND DEVELOPMENT IN THE GULF OF MEXICO** Accessed 7/21/2014, rwg)
In addition to the two major requirements, other federal
statutes put potential obligations on offshore wind

developers. n51 For instance, the USACE, under the Clean Water Act (CWA), may require permits for
activities that may lead to the "discharge of dredged or fill material" into any "navigable waters." n52 The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) states that water resource projects, such as dams and levees, may require a Section 404 permit over
waters of the United [*908] States. n53 Also,
the USACE must ensure that the offshore wind entrepreneurs are in
compliance with another federal environmental statute, the Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act of 1972. n54
(--) US support is key to investors:

Timothy H. Powell (J.D. Boston University School of Law) 2012 (Boston University Law
Review, December, 2012, REVISITING FEDERALISM CONCERNS IN THE OFFSHORE WIND
ENERGY INDUSTRY IN LIGHT OF CONTINUED LOCAL OPPOSITION TO THE CAPE WIND PROJECT,
Lexis/Nexis, Accessed 7/21/2014, rwg)
n3. Tom Moroney & Jim Efstathiou Jr., Obama Wind Farm Goals Threatened by Indian Rites, Kennedy's Parting Wish, Bloomberg (Apr. 14, 2010,
9:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601130&sid=aYGGAST 8uKmc (quoting Jack Clarke, Massachusetts Audubon Society
public policy director: "Everyone
is waiting for Cape Wind to break the ice. There would be few investors
willing to put themselves at risk if it didn't look like the U.S. was committed to renewable offshore
energy.").
(--) States cant solvemost wind projects would be five miles offshore:
Most proposed offshore wind projects, including Cape Wind, would be located more than five miles
offshore, in federal waters. n26 Thus, the electricity-generating component of most offshore wind
projects, the wind turbines themselves, are subject to federal jurisdiction. State governments nevertheless play a role
[*2029]
in the approval process of offshore wind projects under the CZMA for two reasons. First, electricity generated by such projects must be
transmitted to land through cables on the seabed, which necessarily travel through the state's coastal zone. States therefore can exert control over
the permitting process for the transmission-cable component of an offshore wind project by providing for such a process in their CZMPs. Second,
the CZMA provides a mechanism for states to extend their role beyond the coastal zones through the process of federal consistency review. n27
Pursuant to federal consistency review, "each Federal agency activity within or outside the coastal zone that affects any land or water use or
natural resource of the coastal zone shall be carried out in a manner which is consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the enforceable
policies of approved State management programs." n28 Under federal consistency review requirements, applications for a required federal license
or permit to conduct an activity in or outside the coastal zone must include "a certification that the proposed activity complies with the
enforceable policies of the state's approved program." n29 A state then has the opportunity to review the application, and either concur or object
to the applicant's certification. n30 In this manner, the CZMA seeks to encourage state involvement in the management of coastal resources even
outside each state's coastal zone. n31 The Secretary of Commerce, however, ultimately controls final approval of any such federal license or
permit, and may overrule a state's objection by finding that "the activity is consistent with the objectives of [the CZMA] or is otherwise necessary
in the interest of national security." n32
(--) Federal government has the power to overrule the states on issues of offshore
wind powerCounterplan solves zero of the case:
The Cape Wind story demonstrates that the siting of offshore wind projects leads to a unique
interplay between federal and state interests. The Cape Wind turbines will be located entirely in federal
waters, but electricity transmission cables will run under state waters and lands to connect to the local
[*2025]
power grid. n4 The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) provides the primary mechanism for balancing
federal and state interests in U.S. coastal resources. n5 Under the regime set up by the CZMA, states are given broad
discretion to create their own Coastal Zone Management Plans (CZMPs) regulating the use of resources within state waters, defined as those
waters within three miles of the shoreline. n6 The federal government retains regulatory and permitting authority over all federal waters beyond
three miles of the shoreline; however, the mechanism of federal consistency review extends state power further, beyond their coastal zones, by
allowing states to review and sometimes overrule federal actions and permits in federal waters when the activity affects the state's coastal zone.
n7 Nevertheless,
the federal government retains ultimate permitting authority; the U.S. Secretary of
Commerce can overrule a state's protest by finding that a permit is consistent with the objectives of the
CZMA or otherwise in the interest of national security. n8
(--) Federal leadership keyMMS has expertise:

rwg)
D. Implications for Other Types of Offshore Development and the Potential for Mutual Benefits Despite offshore wind power's lack of success,
offshore production of conventional fuels has been very successful in the United States. In the two decades preceding 2003, almost 25 percent
of the nation's natural gas production and almost 30 percent of its oil production came from offshore. 2 8 1 Conventional offshore production is
environmentally risky, however, and requires extensive environmental permitting from a variety of agencies. 2 8 2 Indeed, offshore drilling has
been subject to substantial, ongoing controversy, related especially to the environmental damage it causes. 28 Similarly, importing liquefied
natural gas via ship and pipeline through coastal states into the United States has raised environmental as well as safety concerns. 2 8 4
Nonetheless, this industry is also expected to increase as the nation's demand for natural gas increases and its supplies diminish. 2 8 5 The
proposed revision to the CZMA should not impact the regulation and development of these conventional resources as it refers explicitly to
offshore renewable energy development. The
existing oil and gas industry, however, 286 will likely have a role in the
development of offshore wind energy. These industries and related industries, for example, the submarine cable
industry and the offshore maintenance industry, have experience in siting, building, operating, and maintaining
offshore structures.287 Indeed, Congress recognized this in granting MMS, the agency that has
traditionally overseen offshore oil and gas development, permitting authority over offshore renewable energy
facilities, including offshore wind facilities. 2 8 8 Offshore wind power development may be able to learn and profit from this existing
knowledge base, and the possibility exists for combined offshore oil or gas and renewable projects.
Permutation Extensions
(--) Extend our perm to do bothit combines the effectiveness of incentives with
state flexibility
(--) Federal incentives key to offshore wind power:
rwg)
CONCLUSION A revised CZMA would provide a promising solution to the problems that offshore wind energy and other offshore renewable
energy sources have faced in the United States. Specifically, offshore wind power development has faced repeated failures due to the mismatch
between local costs and national benefits, and the absence of a regulatory framework to reconcile them. While it may come too late to make a
difference for Cape Wind, a new CZMA could still ensure success for offshore wind power in other locations around the United States. Still, to
be truly effective, revising the CZMA needs to be just one step in a broader offshore wind or renewable energy program. While a new CZMA
would address problems related to offshore wind farm siting, this is just one barrier that offshore wind power development needs to overcome.
For example, as
with all renewable energy sources, the importance of positive federal government policies
and incentives, such as the production tax credits mentioned previously, are key to offshore wind
power's success. Under the Obama administration, which seems especially receptive to renewable energy promotion, the United States
has the exciting opportunity to make great strides with offshore wind power development and renewable energy overall. Indeed, although
Congress has struggled, it continues to debate various climate change legislative proposals, many of which relate closely to renewable energy
promotion.290 President Obama also continues to stress the 291 importance of renewable energy to the future of the United States. Denmark
exemplifies how successful offshore wind power development can be under the influence of a government with a positive outlook on
renewable energy production that pervades multiple agencies and programs in the government.292 Indeed, President Obama has
acknowledged Denmark and its successes in his efforts to promote offshore wind power.293 Furthermore, an overarching pro- renewable
policy could instigate the development of various renewable technologies-including offshore wind power, which has seen substantial success in
not only Denmark, but in other EU countries.294 Even without firm policies in place and no projects yet built, offshore wind project proposals
are sprouting up across the United States. As of the end of 2008, eleven projects had been proposed in New Jersey, Rhode Island, Delaware,
New York, Georgia, Texas, Ohio, and Maine; combined, these projects represent a total of 2,075 MW of capacity.295 MMS has granted or is 296
expected to grant federal approval to most of these projects. Eleven more projects were in earlier stages of development at the end of 2008. 29
Despite these promising signs, all these projects stand to face the same obstacles as the Cape Wind project as long as the current regulatory
framework remains in effect. With revisions to the CZMA, Congress can help make sure these projects move forward, and pave the way for
more in the future.
(--) Perm Experts say federal support and state-level framework are vital
Sims 13 (Douglass Sims, Center for Market Innovation from Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), 2-2014, Fulfilling
the Promise of U.S. Offshore Wind, NRDC, http://www.nrdc.org/business/files/offshore-wind-investment.pdf, mgsk-sd)
Federal incentives in the form of tax credits and accelerated depreciation are a vital part of creating these conditions, and the recent extension of these benefits
by Congress is welcome news.7 But federal support, while necessary, has so far not been sufficient. For
investment to flow to the offshore wind sector, states also must implement policies that ensure that projects have: (1)
certainty that they will receive sufficient revenues for the energy, capacity, and other attributes they generate, and (2) sufficient access to affordable debt capital
at a time when the capacity of private sector banks to fund large projects is limited. The good news is that the emerging, state-led U.S. offshore wind
policy model contains the building blocks to satisfy these conditions. The United States has a successful track record of deploying massive amounts of capital into
onshore wind, cultivated by supportive policies like state renewable portfolio standards and federal tax credits. But we can learn from Germany, which, up until recently, had difficulty
attracting offshore wind investment relative to neighbors like Denmark, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. Frustrated by the lack of completed projects, yet convinced of the potential of
offshore wind, Germany tweaked its initially unsuccessful offshore wind investment policies in the recent past and investment started to flow. The United States can do the same. Germany
successfully addressed the revenue problem by revising its rules to ensure that any qualifying offshore wind project is entitled to a long-term tariff that is sufficient to attract investment, but it
did so in a way that also ensures that the public (ratepayers and taxpayers) get maximum value for their money. Germany also reduced the cost and increased the availability of debt capital by
creating an innovative program whereby a public bank will match the debt provided by private banks, ensuring that projects will go forward and lowering the overall financing costs. Why
should we feel confident that this strategy will work in the United States? States routinely benefit from the experience of other states and countries that have faced similar challenges about
what does and does not work in attracting investment to new sectors, such as the offshore wind sector. While it is true that every policy must be adapted to local conditions, it is also true that
investors do not substantively change their investment requirements when they invest in a new jurisdiction. On the contrary, investors look for places to make investments that have policy
conditions that are as close as possible to those where they have successfully invested in the past. So, whatever the differences in form among different countries or states, successful offshore
wind policies must be similar in function to attract similar types and levels of private investment. The polices that Germany put in place to unlock offshore wind are instructive to U.S. states
because they are designed to attractand are attractingthe same investors that the states want to attract: commercial banks and project developers. It is these investors that finance, build,
own and/ or operate power plants in coastal states, so policies must be designed to fit requirements of this market while minimizing impacts on ratepayers. The German story is not a fairy tale,
however. After perfecting its investment policies to stimulate an unprecedented level of domestic offshore wind financing in 2011, major failures in transmission policy resulted in a lackluster
2012. This paper focuses on the German policy successes and the lessons they present for the United States and also briefly examines the very unsuccessful German approach to transmission
as a cautionary tale that should not be replicated in the United States. In sum, the United States can quickly tap into this unparalleled resource if we take the lead by: (1) ensuring revenue
certainty through strategically refining the innovative Offshore Wind Renewable Energy Certificate (OREC) programs, such as those adopted in New Jersey, and under consideration in
federal
policy such as the investment tax credit and accelerated depreciation also play a vital role. However, a solid state-level framework that
supports financing is a necessary condition to truly launch the sector.
Maryland, and (2) leveraging the resources of commercial banks to make available sufficient levels of low-cost debt available through co-lending programs. Supportive
(--) The status quo has too much state control which prevents federal solutions to
wind power:
rwg)
A.
The Coastal Zone Management Act: Attempting to Reconcile Local Interests with National Priorities The overarching goal of the
CZMA is "to preserve, protect, develop, and where possible, to restore or enhance, the resources of the Nation's coastal zone for
this and succeeding generations."I 1 7 The CZMA mentions the development of energy facilities in the Coastal Zone, but its language
is vague, and generally requires only that states undertake "adequate consideration of the national interest" in siting energy
facilities, and "give consideration" to any applicable national or interstate energy plan or program. 1 1 8 The CZMA also mentions
energy with regard to funding for development: "The
national objective of attaining a greater degree of

energy self-sufficiency would be advanced by providing Federal financial assistance to meet
state and local needs resulting from new or expanded energy activity in or affecting the coastal
zone."I19 However, the CZMA does not mention offshore wind energy or renewable energy at all. Although the CZMA
acknowledges the "national interest in the effective management, beneficial use, protection, and development of the coastal
zone,"l20 it allows states substantial discretion over their coastal zone management through CZMPs, which the Secretary of
Commerce oversees.1 2 1 As noted previously, the Submerged Lands Act defines state coastal zones as three miles from the
shoreline.1 2 2 The CZMA mechanism of federal consistency review extends state power further, past their coastal zones, by
allowing states to review and sometimes overrule federal actions and permits in federal waters.' 2 3 Before the CZMA was
promulgated, the coastal zone had long been subject to decentralized management.1 2 4 The CZMA continues this tradition with its
own approach to federalism, explicitly encouraging cooperation between local, state, and federal levels of government in their
management of coastal resources.125 Specifically, under the CZMA, each state makes its own CZMP. 126 The CZMA provides a
variety of policy considerations for states to incorporate into their management programs. Prioritizing construction of certain
facilities, specifically energy facilities, in states' coastal zones is one of several listed considerations.' 2 7 Others include protecting
natural resources; minimizing the loss of life and property to flooding and sea level rise; improving coastal water quality; allowing
public recreational access to the coast; restoring urban waterfronts and preserving coastal features; coordinating and simplifying
governmental management procedures for coastal resources; consulting and coordinating with federal agencies; giving timely and
effective notice for public and local participation in governmental decision making; comprehensive planning for marine resource
preservation; and studying sea level rise and land subsidence.128 The Secretary of Commerce examines states' CZMPs, making sure
they are in accordance with the CZMA's policy considerations and other mandates, and any other federal regulations. 129in
particular, the CZMA requires that states adequately consider the national interest in "siting of facilities such as energy facilities
which are of greater than local significance. In the case of energy facilities, the Secretary shall find that the State has given
consideration to any applicable national or interstate energy plan or program."' 3 0 Once approved by the Secretary of Commerce,
however, state CZMPs are subject to very little federal constraint under the CZMA, leaving states with nearly complete discretion
within their coastal zones. State control is expanded by federal consistency review, 1 3 1 a mechanism unique to the CZMA.
Consistency review allows a state to review a federal agency activity or permit within or outside of the coastal zone for compatibility
with the state's CZMP when the activity or permit affects the state's coastal zone.1 3 2 Under this mechanism, the federal agency
must submit a "consistency determination" (for an activity) or "consistency certification" (for a permit) to the state before moving
forward with the project.1 3 3 For federal permits, which would be more relevant to offshore renewable development than federal
actions, the state then has the opportunity to concur with or object to the agency's certification.1 3 4 "No license or permit shall be
granted by the Federal agency until the state . . . has concurred with the applicant's certification."' 3 5 Thus, a coastal state's control
extends beyond its own coastal zone into federal waters, as it has the ability to review-and potentially block-any project that affects
their coastal zone. In the end, however, the Secretary of Commerce-by her own initiative or in response to an appeal-can overrule
the state's protest by finding that a permit is consistent with the objectives of the CZMA or otherwise in the interest of national
security.1 3 6 Since the passage of the CZMA in 1972 until March 2010, states had filed 141 appeals with the Secretary protesting
federal permits affecting their coastal zones.' 3 7 States settled their issues with the federal government in 64 instances, or 45
percent of these cases.' 3 8 The Secretary dismissed or overrode state appeals in 32 instances, or 23 percent of these cases.' 3 9 Of
the remaining 45 appeals that the Secretary considered for their substance, the Secretary overrode the state's objection in 14 cases,
or 31 percent of the time, and accepted the state's objection in 30 cases, or 67 percent of the time.1 4 0 Only 19 of the 45 appeals
related to energy facilities, but all of these related to oil or natural gas projects; the Secretary overrode these appeals about half of
the time.141 Although states do not choose to use their federal consistency review power over federal permits frequently, as these
numbers show, it is nonetheless a powerful tool that extends their power beyond their coastal zones. Ultimately, the
CZMA,
with its focus on decentralized, state control over coastal-zone management, leaves the federal
government and offshore wind proponents with minimal recourse in their struggle to develop
offshore wind projects. The CZMA allows states near-complete control over their coastal zones through their CZMPs, with
almost no role for the federal government in promoting offshore wind energy (or any kind of renewable energy). Because
electricity transmission lines must necessarily run through states' coastal zones to reach
consumers, states therefore have significant control over offshore wind projects. Through federal
consistency review, their direct control can even extend into federal waters; though states have not often employed this process,
the Secretary of Commerce has seemed willing to give them some deference when they do. Given
a policy of such strong

local control, and the absence of a firm federal mandate for offshore wind power development,
local interests have been able to stall both federal and state permitting processes, often through
litigation. Proponents of offshore wind have little federal support, and no guaranteed source of state support, on which to rely.
Cape Wind presents a compelling and frustrating illustration of this problem.
Privates Counterplan Answers

(--) FIAT Abuse
A) Infinite Regressionthe neg can fiat any number of private actorsBill Gates CP,
Walmart CP, etc. Unfair for the AFF because we cant predict all the private actors.
B) No rational decision maker can choose between the federal government and
privateshurts logical decision-making skills
C) Its object FIATPrivates wont invest nowthat is the heart of the AFF
advantages.
D) Counter-interpretation: incentivizing private funding is finenot private action
reason to reject the counterplan.
(--) Perm: do both--Federal regulatory revision is necessary to solve the case
privates can invest all they want, but states and local governments will shut them
down without the plan:
rwg)
Despite the aforementioned challenges, offshore wind remains important to the United States' energy future. Its many benefits make it an ideal
choice to meet some of the country's growing electricity demand, especially as the United States begins to realize the severity of the threats
from both climate change and its dependence on foreign fuels. 8 9 In addition to the environmental and economic benefits that offshore and
onshore wind power provides, the proximity of offshore wind to U.S. electricity demand and the resulting lower transmission costs are crucial. 9
0 The many benefits of offshore wind outweigh its primarily local environmental and aesthetic costs, most of which can be minimized with
careful planning and community relations. In spite of these compelling drivers, a
primary obstacle to offshore wind power
development is the lack of a regulatory framework with which to reconcile the local costs with the regional and national
benefits. 9 1 The current regulatory framework is described in the next Part. Until the federal government puts a revised
framework in place, such as the revised CZMA proposed in Part V, states and local groups fixated on immediate, local
costs will retain the ability to stall and even block offshore wind power development. Without federal
regulatory revision, offshore wind will not realize its full promise.
(--)Government support necessary for tech to help with the cost of offshore wind
projects:
rwg)
In addition, opponents frequently cite offshore wind power's environmental costs. These costs are site specific and can involve harm to plants
and animals, and their habitats. 8 2 This harm includes impacts on birds, which can involve disruption of migratory patterns, destruction of
habitat, and bird deaths from collision with the turbine blades. 8 3 However, these adverse impacts are generally less dramatic than those
associated with fossil fuel extraction and generation, and in a well-chosen site they can be negligible. 8 4 A recent, exhaustive study of the
environmental impact of major offshore wind farms in Denmark concluded that "offshore wind farms, if placed right, can be engineered and
operated without significant damage to the marine environment and vulnerable species.,, 8 5 A final concern is that offshore wind
farms
are more expensive to build, and more difficult to install and maintain, than onshore wind farms. 8 6 The cost of an offshore wind
project is estimated to be at least 50 percent greater than the onshore equivalent. 8 7 Short-
and long-term technical

improvements could help to lower offshore wind costs, however, and government assistance may help
them occur more quickly.
(--) Government backing and support key to offshore wind energy production:
[*682] Other countries, such as Denmark (which was the first in the world to develop a commercial offshore wind farm and currently has the
greatest amount of installed offshore capacity) and Germany (which has long supported renewable energy by means of a highly favorable feedin tariff) have implemented similarly aggressive policy measures and objectives to help stimulate offshore wind development, and both have
approved moderate to large-scale projects for construction in the immediate future. Not surprisingly, this increased government
backing and support has inspired greater private sector confidence in the offshore wind industry, thus
allowing many of the challenges that are currently preventing its growth to gradually be overcome.
(--) Government subsidies necessary for renewable energy:

Andrew Campbell, 2013 (Houston Law Review, Winter 2013, COMMENT: YOU DON'T NEED
A WEATHERMAN TO KNOW WHICH WAY THE WIND BLOWS?*: AN ARGUMENT FOR OFFSHORE
WIND DEVELOPMENT IN THE GULF OF MEXICO** Accessed 7/21/2014, rwg)
After years of fossil fuel dominance, the world has had enough. n1 From the United States' perspective, foreign oil dependence has threatened
national security n2 and caused innumerable environmental disasters. n3 Renewable energy has the potential to provide clean and possibly
unlimited energy to those who harness the power of the sun or wind. n4 Unfortunately,
renewable energy production is

expensive and inefficient compared to oil and gas, and renewable energy companies often rely on
government subsidies to make the projects viable. n5
Onshore Wind Counterplan Answers

(--)Extend our Thaler evidencewind speeds over water are stronger and more
consistent than over landproviding a solvency deficit to the counterplan.
(--) Permute: Do BothDoubles the solvency for warming.
(--) Offshore wind power solves better than onshore:
rwg)
Furthermore, wind power does not involve any of the additional environmental costs associated with nuclear power or fuel extraction for
traditional electricity generation, such as coal mining and natural gas extraction.67 Wind power generation also does not require the water
necessary to cool traditional coal, gas, and nuclear generation units.68 Moreover, offshore wind
power has certain attributes

that give it added benefits compared to onshore wind. Wind tends to be stronger and more consistent
offshore-both benefits when it comes to wind power generation. 6 9 70 This is largely due to reduced wind shear and
roughness on the open ocean. Wind shear and roughness refer to effects of the landscape surrounding turbines on the quality of wind and thus
the amount of electricity produced. While
long grass, trees, and buildings will slow wind down significantly, water
is generally very smooth and has much less of an effect on wind speeds. 7 2 In addition, because offshore
wind projects face fewer barriers-both natural and manmade-to their expansion, offshore developers
can take advantage of economies of scale and build larger wind farms that generate more electricity. 7 3
Importantly, offshore wind also could overcome the problems that onshore wind faces regarding the
distance between wind power generation and electricity demand. That is, although the United States has
considerable onshore wind resources in certain areas, mostly in the middle of the country, they are
frequently distant from areas with high electricity demand, mostly on 74 the coasts, resulting in transmission
problems. By contrast, offshore resources are near coastal electricity demand centers. 7 5 In fact, twenty-eight
of the contiguous forty-eight states have coastal boundaries, and these same states use 78 percent of the United States' electricity. 7 6 Thus,
offshore wind power generation can effectively serve major U.S. demand centers and avoid many of the
transmission costs faced by remote onshore generation. 7 7 If shallow water offshore potential (less than about 100 feet in
depth) is met on the nation's coasts, twenty-six of the twenty-eight coastal states would have sufficient wind resources to meet at least 20
percent of their electricity needs, and many states would have enough to meet their total electricity demand. B. Costs of Offshore Wind
Whereas many of the benefits of offshore wind power are national or even global, the costs are almost entirely local. The downsides to
offshore wind that drive most of the opposition to offshore wind power are visual and environmental. Opponents to offshore wind projects
complain about their negative aesthetic impacts on the landscape and on local property values. 7 9 They also make related complaints about
negative impacts on coastal recreational activities and tourism. However, studies have failed to show statistically significant negative aesthetic
or property-value impacts, despite showing continued expectations of such impacts.
(--) Offshore wind is better than onshore wind3 reasons:

In the race to find viable forms of renewable energy, offshore wind energy presents an attractive option that has been implemented with some
success in Europe but remains in the early stages of development in the United States. Offshore
wind's appeal stems from the fact that it
uses essentially the same technology as onshore wind power, which is already considerably developed and widely deployed
around the world, but with some notable advantages. For instance, unlike their onshore counterparts, offshore wind farms
generally enjoy stronger and more constant breezes that can generate greater amounts of electricity than
is available with onshore wind farms. In addition, since offshore wind turbines are not subject to the same constraints
in terms of space, transport of components for assembly, and aesthetics as those onshore, they tend to be
larger and more efficient. Another major advantage is that electricity generated by offshore wind is
transmitted directly to the coast, where most large population centers are located, and thus does not
have to be carried indirectly across long distances from remote areas, as is often the case with onshore wind.
Onshore Wind Doesnt Solve 1ar

(--) View the counterplan through the lens of optimalityany risk it doesnt solve the
case means you should vote to solve extinction.
(--) Extend our Thaler evidencewind blows faster offshore which means more
energy is producedbetter solving warming and other advantages.
(--) Extend our Schroeder evidencethere are multiple advantages to offshore wind:
A) Wind is stronger and more consistent offshoreproducing better electricity.
B) Long grass and trees slow down onshore windmaking it less effective
C) There are less barriers to building at seaallowing a better economy of scale
(--) Offshore wind produces more electricity:
Wind power, as a renewable source of energy, produces no emissions and is an excellent alternative in environmental terms to conventional
electricity production based on fuels such as oil, coal or natural gas. At present, the
vast majority of wind power is generated

from onshore wind farms. However, their growth is limited by the lack of inexpensive land near major
population centers and the visual pollution caused by large wind turbines. Comparing with onshore wind power,
offshore winds tend to flow at higher speeds than onshore winds, thus it allows turbines to produce more
electricity. Estimates predict a huge increase in wind energy development over the next 20 years. Much of this development will be
offshore wind energy. This implies that great investment will be done in offshore wind farms over the next decades. For this reason, offshore
wind farms promise to become an important source of energy in the near future. In this study, history, current status, investment cost,
employment, industry and installation of offshore wind energy in Europe are investigated in detail, and also compared to its onshore
counterpart.
(--) Multiple advantages to offshore wind compared to onshore wind:

Offshore wind turbines are less obtrusive than turbines on land, as their apparent size and noise can be mitigated by distance.
Because water has less surface roughness than land (especially deeper water), the average wind speed is
usually considerably higher over open water. Capacity factors are considerably higher than for onshore and nearshore
locations which allow offshore turbines to use shorter towers, making them less visible. In addition, installing wind turbines
offshore has several advantages over onshore development. Onshore, difficulties in transporting large
components and opposition due to various siting issues, such as visual and noise impacts, can limit the number of
acceptable locations for wind farms. Offshore locations can take advantage of the high capacity of marine shipping and handling
equipment, which far exceeds the lifting requirements for multi-megawatt wind turbines. On land, larger wind farms tend to be
in somewhat remote areas, so electricity must be transmitted over long power lines to cities. Offshore
wind farms can be closer to coastal cities and require relatively shorter transmission lines, yet they are far
enough away to reduce visual and noise impacts [7]
(--) Offshore wind has multiple advantages to onshore wind:

There are many advantages of offshore wind energy, compared to its onshore counterpart. Offshore wind
power is more complex and costly to install and maintain but also has several key advantages. Winds are typically stronger and
more stable at sea, resulting in significantly higher production per unit installed. Wind turbines can also be bigger
than on land because it is easier to transport very large turbine components by sea. Installing wind turbines suf- ficiently far from the shore can
nearly eliminate the issues of visual impact and noise. This makes it possible to use different designs for the turbines, improving their efficiency.
This also makes huge areas available for the installation of large wind farms. As
transportation and erection are made at sea,

there is virtually no limit on the size of the turbines that can be installed, as opposed to limits imposed
by road restrictions onshore. Also, offshore wind farms can be installed close to major urban centers,
requiring shorter transmission lines to bring this clean energy to these high energy cost markets [9] .
Advantages of offshore wind power can be summarized as [10] : availability of large continuous areas,
suitable for major projects, elimination of the issues of visual impact and noise, higher wind speeds,
which generally increase with distance from the shore, less turbulence, which allows the turbines to harvest the
energy more effectively and reduces the fatigue loads on the turbine, lower wind-shear, thus allowing the use of
shorter towers.
Offshore wind turbines will produce more energy than onshore turbines:
rwg)
The actual electricity output of a wind turbine is reflected in its capacity factor, or the percentage of its maximum output or capacity that a
turbine actually produces in a year. Wind turbines typically have capacity factors of 20 to 40 percent. 3 8 Thus, the turbine that could
theoretically generate an annual maximum of 15,768 MWh would actually generate somewhere between 3,153 and 6,307 MWh annually.
Although the United States only has wind turbines on land, offshore wind turbines have the potential to
be larger and to produce more energy than onshore turbines. The Zond Z-750, a typical onshore wind turbine used in
projects during the late 1990s, has a 208-foot tower, blades that span 79 feet, and a rotor diameter of 164 feet. 3 9 True to its name, the Z-750
can generate 750 kW at its peak output. 4 0 This falls in the middle of the range in capacity for onshore, utility-scale turbines, which range from
100 KW to several MW.41 As of 2007, the average size for an onshore wind turbine was 1.65 MW. 4 2 Offshore wind turbines can get
significantly larger and more powerful, typically ranging from 2.0 to 3.6 MW, with a 260-foot tower and a rotor diameter of approximately 295
to 350 feet. Turbines with capacities as large as 5 MW have been installed offshore,44 and in 2008, a wind developer purchased an offshore
turbine with an impressive 7.5 MW capacity. 4 5 Turbines are typically grouped together to form larger wind farms. 4 6
Turbines as efficient as those in the ocean cant be built on land

Oceana 10(Untapped Wealth: Offshore Wind Can Deliver Cleaner, More Affordable Energy and More
Jobs Than Offshore Oil http://oceana.org/sites/default/files/Offshore_Wind_Report.pd, Oceana is the
largest international ocean conservation and advocacy organization. Oceana works to protect and
restore the worlds oceans through targeted policy campaigns.Oceana bases its policy campaign goals
on science to achieve concrete and measurable results through targeted campaigns that combine policy,
advocacy, science, law, media, and public pressure to prevent collapse of fish populations, marine
mammals and other sea life caused by industrial fishing and pollution. Campaigns are designed to
produce clear, identifiable policy changes within a 35 year timeframe. September 2010. AED)
offshore winds are stronger and steadier than onshore winds; thus, more electricity is generated
and offshore wind energy is more consistent (less variable) than onshore wind farms.8 All of these
factors could expedite a transition to a clean energy economy, while at the same time reducing
electricity costs. Additionally, offshore winds are stronger and steadier than onshore winds; thus, more electricity is generated and offshore wind energy is more consistent (less variable) than onshore wind
Additionally,
farms.8 All of these factors could expedite a transition to a clean energy economy, while at the same time reducing electricity costs. Offshore wind offers more than just clean electricity. It also can be a major source of jobs.
Manufacturing, installing, operating, and maintaining offshore wind farms can provide thousands of local jobs in coastal states. These include positions that require unique engineering, manufacturing and maritime expertise. For
example, offshore wind production requires oceanographic and ecological expertise. Experts in these fields would be needed to collect and analyze data on areas of interest to offshore wind developers. New or retrofitted heavy
manufacturing facilities would need to be built in the United States to supply offshore turbines. Installing offshore turbines also would require maritime expertise and ships, similar to those needed by the offshore oil and natural
gas industry. Specialized undersea cables would be needed to transmit electricity from the farm to the shore. Manufacturing and installation needs in each of these areas these would create additional jobs. As a result, a variety of
Due to their size,

offshore wind turbines (which currently tend to be much larger than onshore turbines) must be built in
coastal areas so that they can be shipped out to sea. Offshore turbines are too large to transport by
train or tractor trailer. Several European ports have been revitalized due to increased investments in
offshore wind in Europe9 and similar benefits could be achieved in the United States if the U.S. begins to
invest in this growing industry.
long-term jobs would be created by offshore wind energy development, including electricians, meteorologists, welders, and operators among other general maintenance laborers.
NEPA Counterplan Answers

NEPA counterplan leads to long delays and blocks offshore wind solvency:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2148122, Accessed 7/27/2014, rwg)
Undoubtedly, NEPA is the most onerous statute for offshore wind developers, requiring detailed
environmental review of major *f+ederal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.159 NEPA also
created the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) which has the power to promulgate regulations for the implementation of NEPA.160 The
CEQ regulations define major as significant,161 and federal action to include any federal licensing or permitting process (e.g., section 10
permits under the Rivers and Harbors Act) and therefore encompass the vast majority, if not all, offshore wind projects.162 Not surprisingly,
the broad scope of the Actand the potential for time-consuming litigation163makes NEPA a crucial component of any successful offshore
wind development.164 The NEPA process generally begins with a determination as to whether a categorical exclusion applies.165 If a
categorical exclusion applies, further NEPA review is not required;166 if a categorical exclusion does not apply, the project developer must
conduct an environmental assessment (EA) that discusses the need for the proposal, alternatives, and environmental impacts.167 Any project
other than a small-scale pilot will likely require an EA, which generally requires a year or more to complete and be approved.168 A consulting
agencyBOEM in the case of offshore windthen reviews the EA.169 If the consulting agency determines that the proposed action will not
significantly affect the environment, the agency issues a finding of no significant impact (FONSI).170 However, if the consulting agency
determines, based on the EA, that the project will significantly affect the environment, an environmental impact statement (EIS)usually taking
three to four years to completeis required.171 Broadly, an EIS must detail: (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any
adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the
relationship between local short-term uses of mans environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v)
any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.172 The lengthy
NEPA process imposes a significant time and financial burden, as demonstrated by the Cape Wind project. In 2001, Cape
Wind Associates first submitted its proposal to develop the Cape Wind project in federal waters off the coast of Massachusetts.173 An EIS was
required, and the final Record of Decision on the EIS was not issued, nor was the commercial lease issued by BOEM, until 2010.174
Throughout this process, citizen groups opposing the project initiated numerous court challenges based
on alleged NEPA violations and other grounds, further augmenting an already time-consuming and
costly process.175
NEPA increases costs & delays:

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2148122, Accessed 7/27/2014, rwg
If oil shale, tar sands, natural gas, and cell and transmission towers are important enough to warrant greater federal control to expedite their
development, then so too is legislation to amend NEPA and the OCSLA to provide clear federal policy encouraging the development of offshore
wind energy projects, both generally and by streamlining and standardizing the permitting and licensing processes.250 Under
NEPA and
the OCSLA, projects are killed through delays in the BOEM and other permitting or leasing regimes, or at
least their costs are significantly increased.251 NEPA and the OCSLA should be amended to impose agency consultation and
review deadlines. There must be binding time limits for each step of the NEPA and BOEM processesfor example, the Department of Energy
(DOE), the Corps, or other lead agency must turn around the draft EA or EIS within a specific number of days, or else waive amendments or
revisions. Likewise, consulting agencies must be required to submit any comments within a specified number of days, or be precluded from
commenting.252 Precedent for such waivers exists in the CZMA.
AT: Cars Counterplan

Expansion of renewable energy must come from the power sector:
Taber D. Allison, Terry L. Root, and Peter C. Frumhoff 2014 (American Wind Wildlife Institute,
Stanford University, Union of Concerned Scientists,
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-014-1127-y/fulltext.html, Accessed 7/27/2014,
rwg)
Limiting the magnitude of warming to ~2 C will require swift and deep reductions in heat-trapping
emissions. Assuming comparable actions by other nations, the U.S. would have a carbon budget equivalent to emitting no more than ~170200 Gigatons of carbon dioxide between 2012 and 2050, a level consistent with the goal of reducing U. S. emissions by 83 % below 2005 levels
by mid-century (NRC, 2010). A
large proportion of these reductions will come from the power sector, and
meeting this emissions goal will require extensive expansion of renewable energy (Fawcett et al. 2009;
Clemmer et al. 2013). Staying within the U.S. carbon budget, for example, will require expansion of land-based
wind energy from 60 GW in 2012 to 330440 GW in 2050, and offshore wind expansion from zero currently to 25100 GW;
estimates for solar energy in 2050 range from 160260 GW for photovoltaic and 2080 GW for concentrated solar (Clemmer et al. 2013).
K Blocks
Aff Framework Shell
2AC
A. Interpretation:
Debate is about deciding if the resolution is right or wrong; since the affirmative can
only win by proving its right through endorsement and defense of a topical example, the
negative can only win if it proves a competitive policy option is preferable to the plan.
B. Reasons to prefer:
1. Aff choice the affirmative is obligated to speak first and also has the burden to prove
the status quo should be changed so it gets to pick the framework. If the negative
prefers a different framework, they must present it in the 1NC or else comply by ours
because deferring to later speeches hurts the 2AC and 1AR and eliminates the 1AC.
1. Predictable limits the resolution is objective and decides who gets to say what. The
burden of rejoinder mandates that they disprove the desirability of our topical plan.
Alternatives or discursive charges that lie outside topic literature discourage clash and
disadvantage the aff.
2. Topic education prefer it to general education because annual changes ensure deep
knowledge through focused research. Policy comparison is most real-world and
switching sides fosters full expression of resolution arguments.
C. Its a voter
Debate is a game so fair parameters is biggest voter. Rules and competition insulate
debate from questions of personal conviction so that we can compare options relevant
to the resolution. Presenting arguments in the wrong forum is a reason to reject the
team for skewing equity of time and competition.
Anthro
2AC
1. The impact is inevitable and only the aff solves extinction
2. Alt cant solve wont be adopted
De-Shalit, 2000. (Professor of Political Theory at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Associate Fellow at the Oxford Centre for
Environment, Ethics, and Society, Mansfield College, Oxford University. The Environment: Between Theory and Practice, p. 49-50, Avner,
Questia.)
One may ask: so what? Does it matter that Deep Ecology uses the term 'environment' differently from science? My answer is: it may not
matter, as long as we recognize that this is indeed the case, that Deep
Ecology is a political (or psychological) theory

whose goals do not always seek to reform our attitudes about the environment, but rather seek to
replace politics by a non-political system. If, however, Deep Ecology claims to respect the environment and treat it 'as it is', then this
claim may be deceptive because environmental attitudes become a means of changing the 'system'. Their
theory, then, is not

about the moral grounds for respecting the environment, but about non-environmental goals. 19
If we understand this, it is clear at least why Deep Ecology has rarely, if at all, served as a rationale for
environmental policies. The general public, including activists, may have sensed that, when they
want to justify recycling or the treatment of sewage, talks about the new psyche will not do. The
deeper problem, I fear, is that, since Deep Ecology is rather dominant in environmental philosophy, many people in the general public
conclude that 'this is environmental philosophy' and therefore that 'arguments taken from environmental philosophy in general will not
suffice in real cases'.
3. Perm: do both. We must be human-centered to be probably biocentricignoring

human needs is still a mismanagement of ecology turns the K.
Schmidtz 2K (David Schmidtz, Philosophy, University of Arizona, Environmental Ethics, 2000, p. 379-408)
Like economic reasoning, ecological reasoning is reasoning about equilibria and perturbations that keep systems from converging on
equilibria. Like economic reasoning, ecological reasoning is reasoning about competition and unintended consequences, and the internal
logic of systems, a logic that dictates how a system responds to attempts to manipulate it. Environmental activism and regulation do not
automatically improve the environment. It is a truism in ecology, as in economics, that
well-intentioned interventions do
not necessarily translate into good results. Ecology (human and nonhuman) is complicated, our knowledge is limited,
and environmentalists are themselves only human. Intervention that works with the systems logic rather than against it can have good
consequences. Even in a centrally planned economy, the shape taken by the economy mainly is a function not of the central plan but of
how people respond to it, and people respond to central plans in ways that best serve their purposes, not the central planners.
Therefore, even a dictator is in no position simply to decide how things are going to go. Ecologists understand that this same point
applies in their own discipline. They understand that an ecologys internal logic limits the directions in which it can be taken by would-be
ecological engineers. Within environmental philosophy, most of us have come around to something like Aldo Leopolds view of humans
As Bryan Norton notes, the contrast between anthropocentrism

and biocentrism obscures the fact that we increasingly need to be nature-centered to be properly
human-centered; we need to focus on "saving the ecological systems that are the context of
human cultural and economic activities." [22] If we do not tend to what is good for nature, we will not be tending to
as plain citizens of the biotic community.[21]
what is good for people either. As Gary Varner recently put it, on purely anthropocentric grounds we have reason to think
on purely biocentric grounds, we

have reason to think anthropocentrically. We need to be human-centered to be properly naturecentered, for if we do not tend to what is good for people, we will not be tending to what is good
for nature either. From a biocentric perspective, preservationists sometimes are not anthropocentric enough. They sometimes
biocentrically.[23] I completely agree. What I wish to add is that the converse is also true:
advocate policies and regulations with no concern for values and priorities that differ from their own. Even from a purely biocentric
perspective, such slights are illegitimate.
Policy makers who ignore human values and human priorities that
differ from their own will, in effect, be committed to mismanaging the ecology of which those
ignored values and priorities are an integral part.
4. Perm: Do the plan and the alternative. Solves the link to the K because we can do
the plan while also challenging the humanist assumption of sovereignty over nature.
Zimmerman 91 (Michael E., Heideggerean Scholar Tulane Univ. Deep Ecology, Ecoactivism, and Human Evolution published in
ReVision Winter 1991 13.3. PDF accessed July 6, 2008 p. 123-127)
Deep ecologists such as Arne Naess affirm the uniqueness of humankind and its potential for contributing to the Self-realization of all
beings. Naess (1984) discusses humanity's
potentialities for evolving into a species whose unique capacity

involves appreciating the wonder of creation: It may sound paradoxical, but with a more lofty
image of maturity in humans, the appeal to serve deep, specifically human interests is in full
harmony with the norms of deep ecology. But this is evident only if we are careful to make our terminology clear. This
terminology is today far from common, but it may have an illuminating impact. It proclaims that essentially there is at present a sorry
underestimation of the potentialities of the human species. Our
species is not destined to be the scourge [or cancer

earth. If it is bound to be anything, perhaps it is to be the conscious joyful appreciator of this
planet as an even greater whole of its immense richness. This may be its "evolutionary potential"
M.E.Z.] of the
or an ineradicable part of it. (p. 8) Insofar as Naess speaks of the "evolutionary potential" of humanity to become appreciators of the
planet, he has something in common with the evolutionary views of Murray Bookchin. Bookchin (1990) argues even more emphatically
(than Naess) that humanity's evolutionary
potential includes the capacity for intervening in natural

processes, even to the point of shaping aspects of evolution on Earth. Clearly, there is room for
negotiation and compromise in the hitherto somewhat unsavory debate between deep ecologists
and social ecologists in that both hold to some version of a "progressive" and "evolutionary"
view of humankind. Deep ecologists cannot reasonably hope for a move toward nondualistic,
nonanthropocentric attitudes without simultaneously affirming the notion that humankind has the
capacity for evolution to a more mature stage of consciousness. Social ecologists are quite right in pointing out
the dangers involved in rejecting out of hand the whole of modernity, especially its emancipatory political dimensions.
Bataille
2AC
1. Framework we can weigh the effects of the plan and the negative gets the status
quo or competitive policy option; best for fairness because there are an infinite
number of philosophical ideas we have to research, and education because its key to
learning about the actual topic.
2. Aff impacts come first colonialism is the root cause to their suffering impacts
through a hellish state of existence that justifies atrocities such as murder, rape, and
racism.
3. Perm, do the plan and all non-competitive parts of the alternative.
4. This argument is absurd if we constantly consume, well eventually run out
resources arent infinite.
5. The alt goes too far turns solvency
Shaviro, 90 (Steven, PhD from Yale, professor at Wayne State University, former professor at University of Washington, Passion and
Excess, The Florida State University Press, pg. 40-41, Tashma)
The extremism
of Benjamin's and Batailles formulations makes it difficult to see how they can be applied to concrete
situations of social struggle. It is easy to point out the absurdity of Acphales projects of voluntary self-sacrifice
and communal ecstasy. But this is an "absurdity on which Bataille himself was the Hrst to insist. Absurdity, for Bataille, is not the negative
condition it is regarded as by telcological thinkers and existentialists. It is an affirmation that opposes the capitalist logic ofputring all productive
forces to work. *Lhomme+ est libre de ressembler E1 tout ce qui nest pas lui dans lùnivers. ll peut carter la pense que cest lui ou Dieu qui
empche le reste des choses dtre absurde *(Man) is free to resemble everything that is not himself in the universe. He can set aside the
problem, then, is not how to give

meaning and force to otherwise absurd and inefficacious acts. It is rather how to prevent sacrifice and expenditure from
becoming (as is the case in fascism) new grounds of power or signification. \
thought that it is he or God who keeps the rest of things from being absurd]" (OC, 1:445; VE, 180). The
6. The alternative eternally dooms humanity makes endless catastrophe inevitable
Shaviro, 90 (Steven, PhD from Yale, professor at Wayne State University, former professor at University of Washington, Passion and
Excess, The Florida State University Press, pg. 37-39, Tashma)
Yet if the intensity of Batailles involvement is clear, the details of its expression are not. Does the passage
which I have just quoted function as description or as exhortation? On what sort of threshold are we standing, and what is the nature of the
"void which lies beyond it? At such a point, what kind of "alternative is at stake? What further disaster could be entailed by a
retreat? And is it even possible to retreat? Since the foundations have already crumbled, is not a fall inevitable? But what sort of courage is
available in such a situation? What kind of "conquest" is it which is no longer played out according to the dialectic of master and slave, with the
risk of heroic death as ultimate stake? What experience of time is realized by this leap into die void? The only way to answer such questions
may be to alter the way in which they are posed. For the peculiar effect of Batailles
work is that it offers no satisfying

conclusions, no points of repose. Not even the satisfaction of absolute destruction. His obsessive meditations concern
a.nd participate ina catastrophe all the more obscure and unsettling in that it refuses apocalyptic closure. "Ce qui seul demeure est lagitation
circulairequi ne spuise pas dans lèxtase et recommence ai partir delle *What alone remains is circular agitationwhich does not exhaust
itself in ecstasy and begins again from it+" (OC, 5:130; IE, lll). The "yertiginous fall takes place in a bottomless void, and consequently never
hits bottom. The privileged act of sacrifice serves no end, leads
to no appeasement. And despite Batailles frequent sexual
stereotyping and invocations of virility, his "interior
experience" does not culminate in any display of phallic mastery.

Pure loss, expenditure without recompense, it issues only in an absurd compulsion to repeat, to approach the
threshold of disaster again and again. The summit" of ecstasy cannot be extricated from a concomitant "decline": "De mme
que le S0mKIlCt nest a la fin que linacecssible, le dclin des labord est Pinvitable *Iust as the summit is finally only the inaccessible, so the
decline, from the very first, is inevitable+ (OC, 6:57). The exuberant
pointless dissipation of the energies they invoke.
violence of Batailles texts is matched only by the
Baudrillard
2AC
We do, in fact, know the difference between simulation and reality- the media plays a
healthy role in the public sphere.
March 95 (James Marsh, Professor of Philosophy, Fordham University, Critique and Action of Liberation, 292-293)
Such an account, however, is as one-sided or perhaps even more one-sided than that of naive modernism. We note a
residual idealism that does not take into account socioeconomic realities already pointed out such as the corporate nature of media, their role,
in achieving and legitimating profit, and their function of manufacturing consent. In such a postmodernist account is a
reduction of
everything to image or symbol that misses the relationship of these to realities such as corporations
seeking profit, impoverished workers in these corporations, or peasants in Third-World countries trying to conduct elections.
Postmodernism does not adequately distinguish here between a reduction of reality to image and a
mediation of reality by image. A media idealism exists rooted in the influence of structuralism and poststructuralism and doing
insufficient justice to concrete human experience, judgment, and free interaction in the world. It is also paradoxical
or contradictory to say it really is true that nothing is really true, that everything is illusory or imaginary.
Postmodernism makes judgments that implicitly deny the reduction of reality to image. For example, Poster and Baudrillard do want to say that
we really are in a new age that is informational and postindustrial. Again, to say that everything is imploded into media images is akin logically
to the Cartesian claim that everything is or might be a dream. What happens is that dream or image is absolutized or generalized to the point
that its original meaning lying in its contrast to natural, human, and social reality is lost. We
can discuss Disneyland as

reprehensible because we know the difference between Disneyland and the larger, enveloping reality of
Southern California and the United States. We can note also that postmodernism misses the reality of the accumulation-legitimation
tension in late capitalism in general and in communicative media in particular. This tension takes different forms in different times. In the
United States in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, social, economic, and political reality
occasionally manifested itself in the

media in such a way that the electorate responded critically to corporate and political policies. Coverage of the
Vietnam War, for example, did help turn people against the war. In the 1980s, by contrast, the emphasis shifted more toward accumulation in
the decade dominated by the "great communicator." Even here, however, the majority remained opposed to Reagan's policies while voting for
Reagan. Human and social reality, while being influenced by and represented by the media, transcended them and remained resistant to them.
To the extent that postmodernists are critical of the role media play, we can ask the question about the normative adequacy of such a critique.
Why, in the absence of normative conceptions of rationality and freedom, should media dominance be taken as bad rather
than good? Also, the most relevant contrasting, normatively structured alternative to the media is that of the "public sphere," in which the
imperatives of free, democratic, nonmanipulable communicative action are institutionalized. Such a public sphere has been present in western
democracies since the nineteenth century but has suffered erosion in the twentieth century as capitalism has more and more taken over the
media and commercialized them. Even now the
public sphere remains normatively binding and really operative

through institutionalizing the ideals of free, full, public expression and discussion; ideal, legal requirements taking such
forms as public service programs, public broadcasting, and provision for alternative media; and social movements acting and discoursing in and
outside of universities in print, in demonstrations and forms of resistance, and on media such as movies, television, and radio.
Baudrillard is wrong about hyper-reality. We are very aware of differences between

real life and media images. Just imagine how horrified you would be if you were
watching a horror movie and found out that the actors were really being killed.
Zizek 2000 (Slavoj Zizek, University of Ljubljana, March/April, The Cyberspace Real, http://www.egs.edu/faculty/slavojzizek/articles/the-cyberspace-real/)
Are the pessimistic cultural criticists (from Jean Baudrillard to Paul Virilio) justified in their claim that
cyberspace ultimately generates a kind of proto-psychotic immersion into an imaginary universe of
hallucinations, unconstrained by any symbolic Law or by any impossibility of some Real? If not, how are we to
detect in cyberspace the contours of the other two dimensions of the Lacanian triad ISR, the Symbolic and the Real? As to the symbolic
dimension, the solution seems easy it suffices to focus on the notion of authorship that fits the emerging domain of cyberspace narratives,
that of the "procedural authorship": the author (say, of the interactive immersive environment in which we actively participate by role-playing)
no longer writes detailed story-line, s/he merely provides the basic set of rules (the coordinates of the fictional universe in which we immerse
ourselves, the limited set of actions we are allowed to accomplish within this virtual space, etc.), which serves as the basis for the interactor's
active engagement (intervention, improvisation). This notion of "procedural authorship" demonstrates the need for a kind of equivalent to the
Lacanian "big Other": in order for the interactor to become engaged in cyberspace, s/he has to operate within a minimal set of externally
imposed accepted symbolic rules/coordinates. Without these rules, the subject/interactor would effectively become immersed in a psychotic
experience of an universe in which "we do whatever we want" and are, paradoxically, for that very reason deprived of our freedom, caught in a
demoniac compulsion. It is thus crucial to establish the rules that engage us, that led us in our immersion into the cyberspace, while allowing us
to maintain the distance towards the enacted universe. The point is not simply to maintain "the right measure" between the two extremes
(total psychotic immersion versus non-engaged external distance towards the artificial universe of the cyber-fiction): distance is rather a
positive condition of immersion. If
we are to surrender to the enticements of the virtual environment, we have to

"mark the border," to rely on a set of marks which clearly designate that we are dealing with a fiction, in
the same way in which, in order to let ourselves go and enjoy a violent war movie, we somehow have to
know that what we are seeing is a staged fiction, not real-life killing (imagine our horrible surprise if,
while watching a war scene, we would suddenly see that we are watching a snuff, that the actor
engaged in face-to-face combat is effectively cutting the throat of his "enemy"). Against the theorists
who fear that cyberspace involves the regression to a kind of psychotic incestuous immersion, one
should thus discern in today's often clumsy and ambiguous improvisations about "cyberspace rules"
precisely the effort to establish clearly the contours of a new space of symbolic fictions in which we fully
participate in the mode disavowal, i.e. being aware that "this is not real life."
Baudrillards simulation argument plays into the hands of power. His Gulf War
example is proof of the authoritarian results of his argument-the Real is still being
constructed but the Pentagon is doing it.
Rectenwald 03 (Michael Rectenwald, President of Citizens for Legitimate Government, March 11, Gulf War II: The New Real,
http://legitgov.org/mike_essay_the_new_real4_031103.html)
In his book Stimulations (1983), Jean
Baudrillard introduced the notion of a new social order based on simulacra

without originals. Malls, neighborhoods, amusement parks, even the political left and right-simulations
of originals that no longer exist, imitations without real models. Baudrillard engaged academics and
enraged Marxists and other social realists, when he later announced, with seeming blitheness, that the first
Gulf War 'wasn't real.' 'Tell that to the estimated 15,000 Iraqi civilians killed in the war, or the estimated 100,000 dying in its aftermath,
or the Gulf War veterans, suffering from Gulf War Syndrome.' But despite the critics of postmodernism's dissolution of
the 'real', there is something to what Baudrillard claimed: the first victim of the video war, the
simulation, the reportage censored by Israel, was the notion of 'reality.' 'The real' suffered a mortal blow. The video
representation of the Gulf War became the war itself, supplanting any kernel of reality with simulation. So that film could finally announce:
"Welcome to the desert of the real!"-deserted because no one sees it, the desert of the real because for all practical purposes, it doesn't exist.
It appears from the previews we are receiving regarding the media coverage of Gulf War II, that the real, now dead, is to be declared alive-andwell, dressed up, camouflaged, and paraded around by the Pentagon itself: a remediation of the real. The
media becomes the proxy

purveyor of newsreels- the new real being supplied by the Pentagon. Reporters are to be fully approved
instruments of death, pointing only at acceptable targets, with a simulated vision not unlike the video
version of the jet fighters and scopic filters of the combatants (on one side). The notion of 'bias' is decimated in the very
act of killing- in media res- military perspectivalism serves as a placebo. Any remaining memory of "real" differing perspectives is thereby
satisfied, if not obliterated in advance; perspectivalism becomes a multiplication of staged effects. Like cable television with its endless
splintering of sameness into a reputed 'variet', the multiple 'perspectives of gunmen will supplant all other standpoints. Independent
reporters, the Pentagon now reputedly warns, will be fired upon. "Death to Realism!" was the perhaps more apropos
cry in that other, more ironic cyber film, eXistenZ. Thus, it appears that Baudrillard was only partly right. The real is
indeed under fire, but like the repressed in Freud's version of the psyche, it threatens to return.
Likewise, measures must be taken against it. The Pentagon promises to take such measures. Slavoj Zizek
suggested that 9-11 threated to shatter "the borderline which today separates the digitized First World from the Third World 'desert of the
Real,'" yielding, with its crashing of the stimulation, an "awareness that we live in an insulated artificial universe which generates the notion
that some ominous agent is threatening us all the time with total destruction." This awareness may be too painful for the denizens of the
Matrix. Gulf War II (whose 'moralistic/poetic' name is still being debated by the Pentagon) is an attempt to reconstruct that Matrix, to reinscribe the borderline, to reclaim the real and reissue it as military rations. The real is parceled out. The
media asks us
incredulously: "Do you think that the Pentagon (or Powell, or Bush, or Rumsfeld) would actually lie to
the American people?" We cannot answer, simply, "yes." Not only are they lying, they are actually
producing the new real.
Baudrillards politics are deeply conformist. Playing with the pieces of hyper-reality
shuts down real alternatives.
Donahue 01 (Brian Donahue, Department of English at Gonzaga University, Marxism, Postmodernism, Zizek, Postmodern Culture,
12.2, Project Muse)
According to Zizek, theorists of
postmodern society who make much of the usurpation of the Real by the
simulacrum either long nostalgically for the lost distinction between them or announce the final overcoming of the
"metaphysical obsession with authentic Being," or both (he mentions Paul Virilio and Gianni Vattimo, and we might add Baudrillard
to the list). In either case they "miss the distinction between simulacrum and appearance": What gets lost in
today's plague of simulations is not the firm, true, nonsimulated Real, but appearance itself. To put in Lacanian terms: the simulacrum is
imaginary (illusion), while appearance is symbolic (fiction); when the specific dimension of symbolic appearance starts to disintegrate,
imaginary and real become more and more indistinguishable... And, in sociopolitical terms, this domain of appearance (that is, symbolic fiction)
is none other than that of politics.... The old conservative motto of keeping up appearances thus today obtains a new twist: ...[it] stands for the
effort to save the properly political space. ("Leftists" 995-96) Making the same argument about a slightly different version of this problem, Zizek
writes that the
standard reading of "outbursts of 'irrational' violence" in the postmodern "society of the

spectacle" is that "our perception of reality is mediated by aestheticized media manipulations to such an
extent that it is no longer possible for us to distinguish reality from its media image" (Metastases 75). Violent
outbursts in this context are thus seen as "desperate attempts to draw a distinction between fiction and reality... [and] to dispel the cobweb of
the aestheticized pseudo-reality" (75). Again with reference to the Lacanian triad of Imaginaly-Symbolic-Real, Zizek argues that this analysis is
"right for the wrong reasons": What
is missing from it is the crucial distinction between imaginary order and
symbolic fiction. The problem of contemporary media resides not in their enticing us to confound fiction with reality but, rather, in their
"hyperrealist" character by means of which they saturate the void that keeps open the space for symbolic fiction. A society of
proliferating, promiscuous images is thus not overly fictionalized but is, on the contrary, not
"fictionalized" enough in the sense that the basis for making valid statements, the structure guaranteeing intersubjective
communication, the order permitting shared narratives and, to use Jameson's term, "cognitive mapping"11--in short, the realm of the
Symbolic--is short-circuited by an incessant flow of images, which solicit not analysis and the powers of
thought by rather nothing more than blank, unreflective enjoyment. The kind of subjectivity that
corresponds to this hyperreal, spectacularized society without a stable Symbolic order is what Zizek calls
in Looking Awry the "pathological narcissist" (102). That is, following the predominance of the "'autonomous' individual of the
Protestant ethic" and the "heteronomous 'organization man;" who finds satisfaction through "the feeling of loyalty to the group"--the two
models of subjectivity corresponding to previous stages of capitalist society--today's media-spectacle-consumer society is marked by the rise of
the "pathological narcissist," a subjective structure that breaks with the "underlying frame of the ego-ideal common to the first two forms"
(102). The first two forms involved inverted versions of each other: one either strove to remain true to oneself (that is, to a "paternal egoideal") or looked at oneself "through the eyes of the group," which functioned as an "externalized" ego-ideal, and sought "to merit its love and
esteem" (102). With the stage of the "pathological narcissist," however, the ego-ideal itself is dissolved: Instead of the integration of a symbolic
law, we have a multitude of rules to follow--rules of accommodation telling us "how to succeed." The
narcissistic subject knows

only the "rules of the (social) game" enabling him to manipulate others; social relations constitute for
him a playing field in which he assumes "roles," not proper symbolic mandatesl he stays clear of any
kind of binding commitment that would imply a proper symbolic identification. He is a radical conformist
who paradoxically experiences himself as an outlaw. (102)
The impact is extinction; the refusal to engage in traditional politics is an abdication of

social responsibility that makes all social crises inevitable.
Boggs 97 (Carl, National University, Los Angeles, Theory and Society, The great retreat: Decline of the public sphere in late twentiethcentury America, December, Volume 26, Number 6,
http://www.springerlink.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/content/m7254768m63h16ro/fulltext.pdf)
The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas and challenges. Many
ideological
currents scrutinized here- localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, post-modernism, Deep Ecology- intersect with and
reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins in popular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the
1990s. Despite their different outlooks and trajectories, they all
share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of

struggles to combat and overcome alienation. The false sense of empowerment that comes with such
mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a
depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire
worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved- perhaps even
unrecognized- only to fester more ominously in the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty,
urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside
the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the
widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or sidestep these global
realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing
sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of
common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions. 74 In the meantime, the
fate of the
world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more
compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue
to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly
means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow
disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from
it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can
in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites- an already familiar dynamic in many lesser-developed countries. The
fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that
have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of
disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise- or it
might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the
embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society. 75
Baudrillards alternative is politically paralyzing.

Wolin 06 (The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism, Richard Wolin,
Professor of History and Comparative Literature at the Graduate Center, City University)
In the epitome of postmodern political fatalism, the only strategy Baudrillard has to recommend is
"death" solely by aping the information society's own lifelessness and inertia- a practice he refers to as
"crystal revenge" does one stand a chance, argues Baudrillard, of escaping its enervating clutches. Thus,
according to Baudrillard, the implosions of media society portend the collapse of the emancipatory
project in general. His verdict on the impossibility of progressive historical change reiterates one of the
commonplaces of reactionary rhetoric: the so-called futility thesis, according to which attempts to transform society are
condemned a priori to failure. The nihilistic implications of Baudrillard's approach have been confirmed by the
unmitigated schadenfreude with which he responded to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. In his view the
assault represented a justified response to the challenge of American global hegemony. Although terrorist groups based in the Middle East may
have been nominally responsible for executing the attacks, in truth it was an act that fulfilled the longings and aspirations of people all over the
world. As Baudrillard observes, "haven't we dreamt of this event, hasn't the entire world, without exception, dreamt of it; no one could not
dream of the destruction of a power that had become hegemonic to such a point...In essence, it was [the terrorists] who committed the deed,
but it we who wished for it.
Baudrillard concedes the alt can never solve- no means of creating political change.
Kellner 03 (Douglas, George Kneller Chair in the Philosophy of Education at UCLA, "Jean Baudrillard," The Blackwell companion to major
contemporary social theorists, p. 315)
Baudrillard's focus is on the "logic of social differentiation" whereby individuals distinguish themselves
and attain social prestige and standing through purchase and use of consumer goods. He argues that the
entire system of production produces a system of needs that is rationalized, homogenized, reification,
domination, and exploitation produced by capitalism. At this stage, it appeared that his critique came from the standard
neo-Marxian vantage point, which assumes that capitalism is blameworthy because it is homogenizing, controlling, and dominating social life,
while robbing individuals of their freedom, creativity, time, and human potentialities. On
the other hand, he could not point to

any revolutionary forces and in particular did not discuss the situation and potential of the working class
as an active agent of change in the consumer society. Indeed, Baudrillard has no theory of the subject as
an active agent of social change whatsoever (thus perhaps following the structuralist and poststructuralist critique of the
subject popular at the time). Nor does he have a theory of class or group revolt, or any theory of political
organization, struggle, or strategy.
Baudrillard is too nihilistic to apply to politics

Butterfield 02 Bradley Butterfield , Assistant Professor of English at University of Wisconsin at La Crosse, "The Baudrillardian Symbolic,
9/11, and the War of Good and Evil" Postmodern Culture, volume 13
From Princess Diana to 9/11, Jean
Baudrillard has been the prophet of the postmodern media spectacle, the
hyperreal event. In the 1970s and 80s, our collective fascination with things like car crashes, dead celebrities, terrorists and hostages was
a major theme in Baudrillard's work on the symbolic and symbolic exchange, and in his post-9/11 "L'Esprit du Terrorisme," he has taken it upon
himself to decipher terrorism's symbolic message. He does so in the wake of such scathing critiques as Douglas Kellner's Jean Baudrillard:
From Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond (1989), which attacked
Baudrillard's theory as "an imaginary construct

which tries to seduce the world to become as theory wants it to be, to follow the scenario scripted in
the theory" (178). Did Baudrillard seduce 9/11 into being--is he terrorism's theoretical guru?--or did he
merely anticipate and describe in advance the event's profound seductiveness? To Kellner and other critics, Baudrillard's theory of
postmodernity is a political as well as an intellectual failure: Losing critical energy and growing
apathetic himself, he ascribes apathy and inertia to the universe. Imploding into entropy, Baudrillard
attributes implosion and entropy to the experience of (post) modernity. (180) To be sure, Baudrillard's scripts and
scenarios have always been concerned with the implosion of the global capitalist system. But while Baudrillard's tone at the end of "L'Esprit du
Terrorisme" can certainly be called apathetic--"there is no solution to this extreme situation--certainly not war"--he does not suggest that there
are no forces in the universe capable of mounting at least a challenge to the system and its sponsors (18).
Baudrillards alternative fails to confront real world politics

Best and Kellner, 98 Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, Department of Philosophy at University of Texas-El Paso, 1998 Postmodern
Politics and the Battle for the Future http://www2.cddc.vt.edu/illuminations/kell28.htm
In the aftermath of the 1960s, novel and conflicting conceptions of postmodern politics emerged. Postmodern politics thus take a variety of
forms and would include the anti-politics of Baudrillard and
his followers, who exhibit a cynical, despairing rejection

of the belief in emancipatory social transformation, as well as a variety of efforts to create a new or
reconstructed politics. On the extreme and apolitical position of a Baudrillard, we are stranded at the
end of history, paralyzed and frozen, as the masses collapse into inertia and indifference, and
simulacra and technology triumph over agency. Thus, from Baudrillard's perspective, all we can do is
"accommodate ourselves to the time left to us."
Biopower
2AC
Even if they are right that our policy is biopolitical, the fact that it is carried out by a
democratic state makes it profoundly different.
Dickinson 4
*Edward Ross Dickinson, Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley, 2004 Biopolitics, Fascism,
Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About Modernity, Central European History, vol. 37,
no. 1, 148 BC]
In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of
the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable. Both are instances of the disciplinary society and
of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more
authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is
certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become
superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics
of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but
also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the
fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the
psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is
always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which
the regime of rights does not successfully produce health, such a system can and historically does
create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and
constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist
Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and
participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this
pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to
have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a logic or
imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow
pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of
legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90 Of course it is not yet clear
whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized
by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of
people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of
power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of liberty, just as much as they are
productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, totalitarianism cannot be the
sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social
engineering.
Biopower is not genocidal when it is deployed by a government which also respects

rights.
Dickinson 4 [Edward Ross Dickinson, Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley, 2004
Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About Modernity, Central
European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 148 BC]
At its simplest, this view of the politics of expertise and professionalization is certainly plausible.
Historically speaking, however, the further conjecture that this micropolitical dynamic creates
authoritarian, totalitarian, or homicidal potentials at the level of the state does not seem very
tenable. Historically, it appears that the greatest advocates of political democracy in Germany left
liberals and Social Democrats have been also the greatest advocates of every kind of biopolitical
social engineering, from public health and welfare programs through social insurance to city planning
and, yes, even eugenics.102 The state they built has intervened in social relations to an (until recently)
ever-growing degree; professionalization has run ever more rampant in Western societies; the
production of scientistic and technocratic expert knowledge has proceeded at an ever more frenetic
pace. And yet, from the perspective of the first years of the millennium, the second half of the
twentieth century appears to be the great age of democracy in precisely those societies where these
processes have been most in evidence. What is more, the interventionist state has steadily expanded
both the rights and the resources of virtually every citizen including those who were stigmatized and
persecuted as biologically defective under National Socialism. Perhaps these processes have created an
ever more restrictive iron cage of rationality in European societies. But if so, it seems clear that there
is no necessary correlation between rationalization and authoritarian politics; the opposite seems in
fact to be at least equally true.
Biopower is a description of our erait is neither inherently good, nor bad. Our
specific context is more important than their sweeping generalization.
Dickinson 4 [Edward Ross Dickinson, Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley, 2004
Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About Modernity, Central
European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 148 BC]
This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian (and Peukertian) theory. Democratic
welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states;
these systems are not opposites, in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the
same thing. But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept power should not be
read as a universal stifling night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political
and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively the same. Power is a set of social relations,
in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And
discourse is, as Foucault argued, tactically polyvalent. Discursive elements (like the various elements
of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like
totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure,
but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create multiple
modernities, modern societies with quite radically differing potentials.91
The purpose of biopower is to improve the health, longevity and happiness of

everyone
Mika Ojakangas, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, Finland, May 2005, Foucault Studies, No. 2,
p. 18-19
To say that biopower stands outside the law does not yet mean that it outside state power. On the contrary, as we
have already noted and as Foucault himself has shown, it was precisely the modern sovereign state that first
started to use biopolitical methods extensively for the care of individuals and populations. Undoubtedly, the
original purpose of these methods was to increase state power, but its aim has also been, from the beginning,
the welfare of the individual and of the entire population, the improvement of their condition, the increase of
their wealth, their longevity, health and even happiness71 happiness of all and everyone (omnes et
singulatim): The sole purpose of the police, one of the first institutional loci of the nascent biopower, is to lead
man to the utmost happiness to be enjoyed in this life, wrote De Lamare in Treaty on the Police at the beginning of
the eighteenth century.72 According to Foucault, one should not, however, concentrate only on the modern state in
looking for the origin of biopower. One should examine also the religious tradition of the West, especially the
Judeo-Christian idea of a shepherd as a political leader of his people.73
Theyll win ZERO percent of their impact the massacres that their over-hyped impact
evidence cites are NOT because of biopolitics biopower prevents those massacres.
p. 20-21
According to Foucault, it is that transformation which constitutes the background of what he calls governmentality,
that is to say, bio-political rationality within the modern state.78 It explains why political power that is at work
within the modern state as a legal framework of unity is, from the beginning of a states existence, accompanied by a
power that can be called pastoral. Its role is not to threaten lives but to ensure, sustain, and improve them, the
lives of each and every one.79 Its means are not law and violence but care, the care for individual life.80
It is precisely care, the Christian power of love (agape), as the opposite of all violence that is at issue in bio-power.
This is not to say, however, that bio-power would be nothing but love and care. Bio-power is love and care only to
the same extent that the law, according to Benjamin, is violence, namely, by its origin.81 Admittedly, in the era of
bio-politics, as Foucault writes, even massacres have become vital.82 This is the case, however, because violence
is hidden in the foundation of bio-politics, as Agamben believes. Although the twentieth century thanatopolitics
is the reverse of bio-politics,83 it should not be understood, according to Foucault, as the effect, the result,
or the logical consequence of bio-political rationality.84 Rather, it should be understood, as he suggests, as an
outcome of the demonic combination of the sovereign power and bio-power, of the city-citizen game and the
shepherd-flock game85 or as I would like to put it, of patria potestas (fathers unconditional power of life and
death over his son) and cura materna (mothers unconditional duty to take care of her children). Although
massacres can be carried out in the name of care, they do not follow from the logic of bio-power for which
death is the object of taboo.86 They follow from the logic of sovereign power, which legitimates killing by
whatever arguments it chooses, be it God, Nature, or life.
Biopower actually makes the creation of bare life impossible bare life is the opposite
form of life that biopolitics necessitates
p. 13-14
Moreover, life as the object and the subject of bio-power given that life is everywhere, it becomes everywhere is
in no way bare, but is as the synthetic notion of life implies, the multiplicity of the forms of life, from the
nutritive life to the intellectual life, from the biological levels of life to the political existence of man.43 Instead of
bare life, the life of bio-power is a plenitude of life, as Foucault puts it.44 Agamben is certainly right in saying
that the production of bare life is, and has been since Aristotle, a main strategy of the sovereign power to establish
itself to the same degree that sovereignty has been the main fiction of juridico-institutional thinking from Jean
Bodin to Carl Schmitt. The sovereign power is, indeed, based on bare life because it is capable of confronting life
merely when stripped off and isolated from all forms of life, when the entire existence of a man is reduced to a bare
life and exposed to an unconditional threat of death. Life is undoubtedly sacred for the sovereign power in the sense
that Agamben defines it. It can be taken away without a homicide being committed. In the case of bio-power,
however, this does not hold true. In order to function properly, bio-power cannot reduce life to the level of bare
life, because bare life is life that can only be taken away or allowed to persist which also makes
understandable the vast critique of sovereignty in the era of bio-power. Bio-power needs a notion of life that
corresponds to its aims. What then is the aim of bio-power? Its aim is not to produce bare life but, as Foucault
emphasizes, to multiply life,45 to produce extra-life.46 Bio-power needs, in other words, a notion of life
which enables it to accomplish this task. The modern synthetic notion of life endows it with such a notion. It
enables bio-power to invest life through and through, to optimize forces, aptitudes, and life in general without
at the same time making them more difficult to govern. 47
Theres no impact to biopower and their insistence on constant references to it is a

scare tactic that deters actual alternatives to biopower
Paolo Virno, philosopher, former Professor of philosophy of language, semiotics, and the ethics of
communication at the University of Calabria, June 2002, online: http://www.generationonline.org/p/fpvirno2.htm
Agamben is a problem. Agamben is a thinker of great value but also, in my opinion, a thinker with no political
vocation. Then, when Agamben speaks of the biopolitical he has the tendency to transform it into an ontological
category with value already since the archaic Roman right. And, in this, in my opinion, he is very wrong-headed.
The problem is, I believe, that the biopolitical is only an effect derived from the concept of labor-power. When
there is a commodity that is called labor-power it is already implicitly government over life. Agamben says, on the
other hand, that labor-power is only one of the aspects of the biopolitical; I say the contrary: over all because
labor power is a paradoxical commodity, because it is not a real commodity like a book or a bottle of water, but
rather is simply the potential to produce. As soon as this potential is transformed into a commodity, then, it is
necessary to govern the living body that maintains this potential, that contains this potential. Toni (Negri) and
Michael (Hardt), on the other hand, use biopolitics in a historically determined sense, basing it on Foucault, but
Foucault spoke in few pages of the biopolitical - in relation to the birth of liberalism - that Foucault is not a
sufficient base for founding a discourse over the biopolitical and my apprehension, my fear, is that the biopolitical
can be transformed into a word that hides, covers problems instead of being an instrument for confronting
them. A fetish word, an "open doors" word, a word with an exclamation point, a word that carries the risk of
blocking critical thought instead of helping it. Then, my fear is of fetish words in politics because it seems like
the cries of a child that is afraid of the dark..., the child that says "mama, mama!", "biopolitics, biopolitics!".
I don't negate that there can be a serious content in the term, however I see that the use of the term biopolitics
sometimes is a consolatory use, like the cry of a child, when what serves us are, in all cases, instruments of
work and not propaganda words.
Butler
2AC
Turn: Butler's ivory tower alternative of parody ensures continued oppression and
ignores the opportunity to use law as a liberatory vehicle.
Nussbaum 99 (Martha, Prof., Law & Ethics, Univ. of Chicago, The New Republic, "The Professor of Prody,"
22 February)
What precisely does Butler offer when she counsels subversion? She tells us to engage in parodic
performances, but she warns us that the dream of escaping altogether from the oppressive
structures is just a dream: it is within the oppressive structures that we must find little spaces for
resistance, and this resistance cannot hope to change the overall situation. And here lies a dangerous
quietism. If Butler means only to warn us against the dangers of fantasizing an idiocy world in which sex raises
no serious problems, she is wise to do so. Yet frequently she goes much further. She suggests that the
institutional structures that ensure the marginalization of lesbians and gay men in our society, and the continued
inequality of women will never be changed in a deep way; and so our best hope is to thumb our noses at them,
and to find pockets of personal freedom within them. "Called by an injurious name, I come into social being, and
because I have a certain inevitable attachment to my existence, because a certain narcissism takes hold of any
form that confers existence, I am led to embrace the terms that injure me because they constitute me socially." In
other words: I cannot escape the humiliating structures without ceasing to be, so the best I can do is mock, and
use the language of subordination stingingly. In Butler, resistance is always imagined as personal,
more or less private, involving no unironic, organized public action for legal or institutional
change. Isn't this like saying to a slave that the institution of slavery will never change, but
you can find ways of mocking it and subverting it, finding your personal freedom within these acts of
carefully limited defiance? Yet it is a fact that the institution of slavery can be changed, and was
changed- but not by people who look a Butler-like view of the possibilities. It was changed
because people did not rest content with parodic performance: they demanded, and to some
extent they got, social upheaval. It is also a fact that the institutional structures that shape
women's lives have changed. The law of rape, still defective, had at least improved; the law
of sexual harassment exists, where it did not exist before; marriage is no longer regarded as giving
monarchical control over women's bodies. These things were changed by feminists who would not
take parodic performance as their answer, who thought that power, where bad, should,
and would, yield before justice. Butler not only eschews such a hope, she takes pleasure in its
impossibility. She finds it exciting to contemplate the alleged immovability of power, and to envisage the ritual
subversions of the slave who is convinced that she must remain such. She tells us- this is the central thesis of The
Psychic Life of Power- that we all criticize the power structures that oppress us, and can this find sexual pleasure
only within their confines. It seems to be for that reason that she prefers the sexy acts of parodic subversion to
any lasting material or institutional change. Real change would so uproot our psyches that it would make sexual
satisfaction impossible. Our libidos are the creation of the bad enslaving forces, and thus necessarily
sadomasochistic in structure. Well, parodic performance is not so bad when you are a powerful
secured academic in a liberal university. But here is where Butler's focus on the symbolic ,
her proud neglect of the material side of life, becomes a fatal darkness. For women who are hungry,
illiterate, disenfranchised, beaten, raped, it is not sexy or liberating to reenact, however
parodically, the conditions of hunger, illiteracy, disenfranchisement, beating, and rape. Such women
prefer food, schools, votes, and the integrity of their bodies. I see no reason to believe that they
long sado-masochistically for a return to the bad state. If some individuals cannot live without the sexiness of
domination, that seems sad, but it is not really our business. But when a major theorist tells women in
desperate conditions that life offers them only bondage, she purveys a cruel lie, and a lie
that flatters evil by giving it much more power than it actually has.
Cap
2AC
1. Perm do the plan and reject in all other instances; either the alt cant overcome this
one link in which case its not strong enough to overcome the squo or it does solve,
meaning the plan isnt a crucial link
2. Capitalism isnt the root cause of anything
Dandeker 2 (Christopher, Department of War Studies, Kings College, Effects of War on Society)
Despite the fact that industrial capitalism has produced two world wars, as Aron (1954) and more recently Michael Mann (1984) have
argued, there is no 'special relationship1 between capitalism and militarismor the tendency to waronly
one of historical indifference. All the pre-dispositions of 'capitalist states' to use warfare calculatively as a means of resolving their
disputes with other states predate the formation of capitalism as an economic system. Of course, it could be argued that capitalism
merely changes the form of militarism. That is to say, pre-capitalist patterns of militarism were
still expressions of class relations and modern capitalism has just increased the destructive power of the industrialised
means of war available to the state. But this argument will not do. Socialist societies in their use of industrialised power show
that the technological potential for war is transferable and can be reproduced under non-capitalist
conditions. Furthermore, the military activities of socialist states cannot be explained in terms of a defensive war against capitalism
or even an aggressive one. as national and geopolitical power motives are arguably just as significant in the determination of state
behaviour. Furthermore, imperial expansion not only predates capitalism but it is also difficult to reduce the causes of wars then and
now to the interests of dominant economic classes (Mann 1984:25-46).
3. Perm do both: we can work within the system to break down capitalism
Monthly Review, March 90, Vol. 41, No. 10, p. 38
No institution is or ever has been a seamless monolith. Although the inherent mechanism of
American capitalism is as you describe it, oriented solely to profit without regard to social
consequences, this does not preclude significant portions of that very system from joining forces
with the worldwide effort for the salvation of civilization, perhaps even to the extent of furnishing
the margin of success for that very effort.
4. Cap inevitable and sustainable, solutions can be offered for pollution, financial
instability, health problems and inequality
Rogoff 11 (Kenneth Rogoff, Professor of Economics at Harvard, 12/2/2011, Is Modern Capitalism Sustainable?, http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/is-modern-capitalism-sustainable-)
In principle, none
of capitalisms problems is insurmountable, and economists have offered a variety

of market-based solutions. A high global price for carbon would induce firms and individuals to
internalize the cost of their polluting activities. Tax systems can be designed to provide a greater
measure of redistribution of income without necessarily involving crippling distortions, by minimizing non-transparent tax
expenditures and keeping marginal rates low. Effective pricing of health care, including the pricing of waiting times, could
encourage a better balance between equality and efficiency. Financial systems could be better
regulated, with stricter attention to excessive accumulations of debt. Comments: Will capitalism be a victim of its own success in
producing massive wealth? For now, as fashionable as the topic of capitalisms demise might be, the possibility seems
remote. Nevertheless, as pollution, financial instability, health problems, and inequality continue to
grow, and as political systems remain paralyzed, capitalisms future might not seem so secure in
a few decades as it seems now.
5. Alt fails capitalism is too ingrained in society for the alt to cause everyone to
reject it
6. Transition wars resulting from the collapse of capitalism cause extinction.
Harris 2 (Lee, Atlanta writer, policy review, the intellectual origins of America-bashing,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3458371.html)
This is the immiserization thesis of Marx. And it is central to revolutionary Marxism, since if capitalism produces no widespread misery, then it
also produces no fatal internal contradiction: If everyone is getting better off through capitalism, who will dream of struggling to overthrow it?
Only genuine misery on the part of the workers would be sufficient to overturn the whole apparatus of the capitalist state, simply because, as
Marx insisted, the
capitalist class could not be realistically expected to relinquish control of the state
apparatus and, with it, the monopoly of force. In this, Marx was absolutely correct. No capitalist society has ever
willingly liquidated itself, and it is utopian to think that any ever will . Therefore, in order to achieve the goal of
socialism, nothing short of a complete revolution would do; and this means, in point of fact, a full-fledged civil
war not just within one society, but across the globe. Without this catastrophic upheaval, capitalism would remain completely in
control of the social order and all socialist schemes would be reduced to pipe dreams.
7. The alternative to capitalism leads to extinction

Ebeling 93 (Richard M. Ebeling, March 93, vice president of academic affairs for The Future of Freedom Foundation, THE FAILURE OF
SOCIALISM, www.fff.org/freedom/0393b.asp)
Socialism's failure in the former Soviet Union and in the other socialist countries stands as a clear and unquestionable
warning as to which path any rational and sane people should never follow again. Government
planning brought poverty and ruin. The idea of collectivist class and ethnic group-rights produced
tens of millions of deaths and a legacy of civil war and conflict. And nationalized social services generated
social decay and political privilege and corruption.
8. The K cedes the political

9. Capitalism solves war interdependency, democracy and constructive competition
Griswold 05 (Daniel, director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at Cato, Peace on earth? Try free trade among men,
http://www.freetrade.org/node/282)
As one little-noticed headline on an Associated Press story recently reported, "War declining worldwide, studies say." According
to the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the number of armed conflicts around the world
has been in decline for the past half century. In just the past 15 years, ongoing conflicts have dropped
from 33 to 18, with all of them now civil conflicts within countries. As 2005 draws to an end, no two nations in the
world are at war with each other. The death toll from war has also been falling. According to the AP story, "The number killed in battle has
fallen to its lowest point in the post-World War II period, dipping below 20,000 a year by one measure. Peacemaking missions, meanwhile, are
growing in number." Those estimates are down sharply from annual tolls ranging from 40,000 to 100,000 in the 1990s, and from a peak of
700,000 in 1951 during the Korean War. Many causes lie behind the good news -- the end of the Cold War and the spread of democracy, among
them -- but expanding
trade and globalization appear to be playing a major role. Far from stoking a "World on Fire,"
commercial ties between nations have had a dampening
as one misguided American author has argued, growing
effect on armed conflict and war, for three main reasons. First, trade and globalization have
reinforced the trend toward democracy, and democracies don't pick fights with each other. Freedom to
trade nurtures democracy by expanding the middle class in globalizing countries and equipping people with tools of communication such as cell
phones, satellite TV, and the Internet. With trade comes more travel, more contact with people in other countries, and more exposure to new
ideas. Thanks in part to globalization, almost two thirds of the world's countries today are democracies -- a record high. Second,
as
national economies become more integrated with each other, those nations have more to lose should
war break out. War in a globalized world not only means human casualties and bigger government,
but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. In short, globalization has
dramatically raised the economic cost of war. Third, globalization allows nations to acquire wealth through
production and trade rather than conquest of territory and resources. Increasingly, wealth is
measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital.
10. Their link is incorrect Cuba can be subject to globalization without succumbing to
neoliberalism. Even if industry investment increased, anti-neoliberal resistance would
not be doomed.
Shreve, Executive Articles Editor at the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 2012 [Heather, .D. Candidate, 2012, Indiana University
Maurer School of Law, Harmonization, But Not Homogenization:
The Case for Cuban Autonomy in Globalizing Economic Reforms, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Volume 19, Issue 1, Winter 2012]
Globalization in today's world no longer requires homogenization; Cuba does not need to either adopt a
neoliberal or Maoist version of economics to globalize. Instead, it can remain Marxist-Leninist while
entering into the global economy. Just as neoliberal policies are not the [End Page 386] only concept of globalization, as seen in
China, so too Chinese Maoism is not the only alternative form of globalization. The fundamental differences between China and Cuba are vast
for example, the focus of the Cuban reform differs from that of the Chinese,131 the decision by Cuban officials to shun Chinese "market
socialism"132 in favor of limited Communist reforms,133 and the histories and cultures of the two countries differ.134 Cuba
presents a
different story of globalizationone of a nation, rather than making an ideological change without
regard to outside circumstances, instead shifting policies out of necessity and the need to survive in a
changed world. Moreover, Cuba's story of globalization is one of a nation attempting to limit negative effects of globalization. Cuba,
while symbolically isolated for the last sixty years, was not immune from globalizationthe country's
resistance wreaked havoc upon the economic and social growth of the nation. Instead, Cuba, as a global actor, reconfigures
itself to retain power in its new model of global engagement. And yet, Cuba's decision to gradually
reform economic policies is not made in isolation; while Ral Castro certainly makes the decisions, many of these decisions
have already been made for Cuba by a globalized world. Upon review, Cuba will retain its ideological goals without
completely compromising or adhering to the other forms of governancethis is what globalization means, the
permeation of even the most historically uncompromising country and the harmonization of certain key ideas and practices embraced by the
rest of the world. Moreover, it shows that globalization does not stop with market-based or neoliberal governance; instead, as Deng Xiaoping
stated, "[The] [m]arket can also serve socialism."135 Although Cuba certainly will stop [End Page 387] short of embracing market
socialism, it is engaging economic globalization as a global actor.136 The state can carve out niches for globalization; however, the question
remains how Cuba and other states can limit the undesirable aspects of globalizationhere, the neoliberal partswhile benefitting from the
harmonization of globalization.
Coercion
2AC
1. Framework we can weigh the effects of the plan and the negative gets the status
quo or competitive policy option; best for fairness because there are an infinite
number of philosophical ideas we have to research, and education because its key to
learning about the actual topic.
2. Aff impacts come first extinction outweighs every impact.
3. No impact -- coercion isnt inherently bad.
Glaeser, 7the Fred and Eleanor Glimp Professor of Economics at Harvard University (Edward, Coercive Regulation and the Balance of
Freedom, Cato Unbound, 5/11/7, http://www.cato-unbound.org/2007/05/11/edward-glaeser/coercive-regulation-and-the-balance-offreedom/)//EM
**David Klein is a Cato Institute Adjunct Scholar and Professor of Economics at George Mason University
But, as
Klein notes, just because something is coercive, doesnt mean that it is wrong. The coercive
power of the state is useful when it protects our lives and property from outside harm. If we think that statesponsored redistribution is desirable, then we are willing to accept more coercion to help the less fortunate. We also rely on statesponsored coercion regularly when writing private contracts. The ability of creditors to collect depends on
the power of the state to coerce borrowers
4. No link they have no evidence that the plan takes coercive action their evidence
just generalizes economic engagement.
5. Perm, do the plan and all non-competitive parts of the alternative.
6. Their moral tunnel vision is complicit with the evil they criticize
Issac 2 (Professor of Political Science at Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life,
PhD from Yale (Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, Ends, Means, and Politics, p. Proquest)
As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It
is assumed that U.S. military intervention is

an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a
response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but
rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality
and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done
to respond to the violen ce of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are
likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended
and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague
and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international
law can work effectively to address the problem at hand campus left offers no such account. To do so would
require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility . Here what matters is
not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core
of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in
large part, involves contests over the

distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to
the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To
say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to
morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding
concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a
kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not
ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause
with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail
impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of
their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not
simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the
standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In
categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with
any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is
about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most
significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the
lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important,
always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and
historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who
are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.
D&G
2AC
The 1AC is a slow experiment; even if it fails to liberate us, it is better than the
negatives fast rejection and overdose, which leads to collapse and death
Gilles
Deleuze, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Paris; and Felix Guattari, psychoanalyst, 1987, A Thousand Plateaus,
pp. 160-161h
You have to keep enough of the organism for it to reform each dawn; and you have to keep
small supplies of signifiance and subjectification, if only to turn them against their own
systems when the circumstances demand it, when things, persons, even situations, force you to;
and you have to keep small rations of subjectivity in sufficient quantity to enable you to respond to the dominant reality. Mimic
the strata. You dont reach the BwO, and its plane of consistency, by wildly destratifying. That
is why we
encountered the paradox of those emptied and dreary bodies at the very beginning: they
had emptied themselves of their organs instead of looking for the point at which they
could patiently and momentarily dismantle the organization of the organs we call the
organism. There are, in fact, several ways of botching the BwO: either one fails to produce it, or one
produces it more or less, but nothing is produced on it, intensities do not pass or are blocked. This is because the BwO is always
swinging between the surfaces that stratify it and the plane that sets it free. If
you free it with too violent an

action, if you blow apart the strata without taking precautions, then instead of drawing the
plane you will be killed, plunged into a black hole, or even dragged toward catastrophe.
Staying stratifiedorganized, signified, subjectedis not the worst that can happen; the
worst that can happen is if you throw the strata into demented or suicidal collapse, which
brings them back down on us heavier than ever. This is how it should be done: Lodge
yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous
place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight,
experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of
intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times. It is through a
meticulous relation with the strata that one succeeds in freeing lines of flight, causing
conjugated flows to pass and escape and bringing forth continuous intensities for a BwO.
Connect, conjugate, continue: a whole diagram, as opposed to still signifying and subjective programs. We are in a social
formation; first see how it is stratified for us and in us and at the place where we are; then descend from the strata to the
deeper assemblage within which we are held; gently tip the assemblage, making it pass over to the side of the plane of
consistency. It is only there that the BwO reveals itself for what it is: connection of desires, conjunction of flows, continuum of
intensities. You have constructed your own little machine, ready when needed to be plugged into other collective machines.
Castaneda describes a long process of experimentation (it makes little difference whether it is with peyote or other things): let
us recall for the moment how the Indian forces him first to find a place, already a difficult operation, then to find allies, and
then gradually to give up interpretation, to construct flow by flow and segment by segment lines of experimentation, becominganimal, becoming-molecular, etc. For the BwO is all of that: necessarily a Place, necessarily a Plane, necessarily a Collectivity
(assembling elements, things, plants, animals, tools, people, powers, and fragments of all of these; for it is not my body
without organs, instead the me (moi) is on it, or what remains of me, unalterable and changing in form, crossing thresholds).
In practice their alternative will further tyrannical control and genocide

Richard
Barbrook, coordinator of the Hypermedia Research Centre at the University of Westminster, 8/27/1998,
http://amsterdam.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9808/msg00091.html, accessed 3/3/03

Deleuze and Guattari enthusiastically joined this attack against the concept of historical progress. For them, the
'deterritorialisation' of urban society was the solution to the contradiction between participatory democracy and revolutionary
elitism haunting the New Left. If the centralised city could be broken down into 'molecular rhizomes', direct democracy and the
gift economy would reappear as people formed themselves into small nomadic bands. According to Deleuze and Guattari,
anarcho-communism was not the 'end of history': the material result of a long epoch of social development. On the contrary,
the liberation of desire from semiotic oppression was a perpetual promise: an ethical stance which could be equally lived by
nomads in ancient times or social movements in the present. With enough intensity of effort, anyone could overcome their
hierarchical brainwashing to become a fully-liberated individual: the holy fool.<21> Yet, as the experience of Frequence Libre
proved, this rhetoric
of unlimited freedom contained a deep desire for ideological control by

the New Left vanguard. While the nomadic fantasies of A Thousand Plateaus were being composed, one
revolutionary movement actually did carry out Deleuze and Guattari's dream of destroying the city. Led
by a vanguard of Paris-educated intellectuals, the Khmer Rouge overthrew an oppressive
regime installed by the Americans. Rejecting the 'grand narrative' of economic progress, Pol Pot and
his organisation instead tried to construct a rural utopia. However, when the economy subsequently
imploded, the regime embarked on ever more ferocious purges until the country was rescued by an
invasion by neighbouring Vietnam. Deleuze and Guattari had claimed that the destruction of the city
would create direct democracy and libidinal ecstasy. Instead, the application of such antimodernism in practice resulted in tyranny and genocide. The 'line of flight' from Stalin had led to Pol
Pot.
Deleuze and Guattari's belief in transformation through freedom from dialectical

opposition fails the figures and institutions which could create this freedom are
reappropriated by contemporary oppositional politics, foreclosing exits from the
existing political system
Mann, Prof of English at Pomona, 95 (Paul, Stupid Undergrounds, PostModern Culture 5:3, Project MUSE)
Intellectual economics guarantees that even the most powerful and challenging work
cannot protect itself from the order of fashion. Becoming-fashion, becoming-commodity, becoming-ruin.
Such instant, indeed retroactive ruins, are the virtual landscape of the stupid underground. The exits and lines of
flight pursued by Deleuze and Guattari are being shut down and rerouted by the very
people who would take them most seriously. By now, any given work from the stupid underground's critical
apparatus is liable to be tricked out with smooth spaces, war-machines, n - 1s, planes of consistency, plateaus and
deterritorializations, strewn about like tattoos on the stupid body without organs. The
nomad is already
succumbing to the rousseauism and orientalism that were always invested in his figure;
whatever Deleuze and Guattari intended for him, he is reduced to being a romantic outlaw,
to a position opposite the State, in the sort of dialectical operation Deleuze most despised.
And the rhizome is becoming just another stupid subterranean figure. It is perhaps true
that Deleuze and Guattari did not adequately protect their thought from this dialectical
reconfiguration (one is reminded of Breton's indictment against Rimbaud for not having prevented, in advance, Claudel's
recuperation of him as a proper Catholic), but no vigilance would have sufficed in any case. The work of
Deleuze and Guattari is evidence that, in real time, virtual models and maps close off the
very exits they indicate. The problem is in part that rhizomes, lines of flight, smooth
spaces, BwOs, etc., are at one and the same time theoretical-political devices of the
highest critical order and merely fantasmatic, delirious, narcissistic models for writing, and
thus perhaps an instance of the all-too-proper blurring of the distinction between criticism
and fantasy. In Deleuze-speak, the stupid underground would be mapped not as a margin surrounding a fixed point, not as
a fixed site determined strictly by its relation or opposition to some more or less hegemonic formation, but as an intensive, n-
dimensional intersection of rhizomatic plateaus. Nomadology and rhizomatics conceive such a "space" (if one only had the
proverbial nickel for every time that word is used as a critical metaphor, without the slightest reflection on what might be
involved in rendering the conceptual in spatial terms) as a liquid, colloidal suspension, often retrievable by one or another
techno-metaphorical zoning (e.g., "cyberspace"). What is at stake, however, is not only the topological verisimilitude of the
model but the fantastic possibility of nonlinear passage, of multiple simultaneous accesses and exits, of infinite fractal lines
occupying finite social space. In the strictest sense, stupid philosophy. Nomad thought is prosthetic, the experience of virtual
exhilaration in modalities already mapped and dominated by nomad, rhizomatic capital (the political philosophy of the stupid
underground: capital is more radical than any of its critiques, but one can always pretend otherwise). It is this very fantasy, this
very narcissistic wish to see oneself projected past the frontier into new spaces, that abandons one to this economy, that seals
these spaces within an order of critical fantasy that has long since been overdeveloped, entirely reterritorialized in advance. To
pursue nomadology or rhizomatics as such is already to have lost the game. Nothing is more crucial to philosophy than escaping
the dialectic and no project is more hopeless; the stupid-critical underground is the curved space in which this opposition turns
back on itself. It is not yet time to abandon work that so deeply challenges our intellectual habits as does that of Deleuze and
Guattari, and yet, before it has even been comprehended, in the very process of its comprehension, its fate seems secure. One
pursues it and knows that the pursuit will prove futile; that every application of these new topologies will only serve to render
them more pointless. The stupid optimism of every work that takes up these figures is, by itself, the means of that futility and
that immanent obsolescence. One must pursue it still.
Deleuzian Perspectivism collapses into neoconservative support for the status quo
because it doesnt provide a solid point of criticism of oppression
Zerzan no date *John, primitivist, The catastrophe of postmodernism, the Athenaeum Reading Room, www.evansexperimentalism.freewebspace.com/zerzan01.htm, acc 1-15-05]
The dilemma of postmodernism is this: how can the status and validity of its theoretical approaches be ascertained if
neither truth nor foundations for knowledge are admitted? If we remove the possibility of rational foundations or
standards, on what basis can we operate? How can we understand what the society is that we oppose, let alone
come to share such an understanding? Foucault's insistence on a Nietzschean
perspectivism translates
into the irreducible pluralism of interpretation. He relativized knowledge and truth only insofar as
these notions attach to thought-systems other than his own, however. When pressed on this point, Foucault
admitted to being incapable of rationally justifying his own opinions. Thus
the liberal Habermas claims

that postmodern thinkers like Foucault, Deleuze, and Lyotard are `neoconservative'
for offering no consistent argumentation to move in one social direction rather
than another. The pm embrace of relativism (or `pluralism') also means there is nothing to
prevent the perspective of one social tendency from including a claim for the right
to dominate another, in the absence of the possibility of determining standards.
D & G exclude women

Alice
Jardine, Professor of Romance Languages and Literatures at Harvard University, 1984,
http://substance.arts.uwo.ca/44/04jard44.html, accessed 2/21/03

Why then do D + G privilege the word woman? First, as they explain through a series of unanalyzed stereotypes, because it is
"sexuality itself" which is
the ultimate, uncontrollable becoming, when it can manage to escape

immediate Oedipalization. ("Sexuality passes through the becoming-woman of /the/ man and the becoming-animal
of the human" [MP, p. 341].) But also because, as "introductory power," "Woman" is both the closest to
the category of "Man" as majority, and yet she remains a distinct minority. D + G explain that the
notions of majority and minority here should not be opposed in any purely quantitative way: "Let us suppose that the constant
or standard is Manany white-male-adult-city-dweller-speaking a standard language-European-heterosexual (the Ulysses of
Joyce or of Ezra Pound). It is obvious that "the Man" has the majority, even if he is less numerous than the mosquitoes, children,
Blacks, peasants, homosexuals . . . etc." (MP, p. 133). The problem is not to gain, or accede to, the majority, but to become a
minority; and this is particularly crucial for women if they desire to remain radical, creative, without simply becoming (a) Man:
The only becoming is a minority one. Women, regardless of their number, are a minority, definable as a state or sub-set; but
they only create by rendering possible a becoming, of which they do not have the ownership, into which they themselves must
enter, a becoming-woman which concerns all of mankind, men and women included. (MP, p. 134) The woman who does not
enter into the "becoming woman" remains a Man, remains "molar," just like men: Woman as a molar entity must become
woman, so that man as well may become one or is then able to become one. It is certainly indispensable that women engage in
molar politics, in terms of a conquest which they conduct from their organization, from their own history, from their own
subjectivity: "We as women . . ." then appears as the subject of the enunciation. But it is dangerous to fall back upon such a
subject, which cannot function without drying up a spring or stopping a flood. The Song of life is often struck up by the driest
women, animated by resentment, by the desire for power and by cold mothering.... (MP, p. 339) That is, woman (with her
obligatory connotations: "transparent force, innocence, speed," [MP, p. 354] is what Man (both men and women: "virility,
gravity," [MP, p. 354]) must become. There must be no "becoming man" because he is always already a majority. "In a certain
way, it's always 'man' who is the subject of a becoming.... A woman has to become woman, but in a becoming-woman of all of
mankind" (MP, p. 357). That is, Man
is always the subject of any becoming, even if "he" is a woman.

A woman who is not a "woman-become" is a Manand a subject to that extent and to that
extent only. Woman is never a subject but a limita border of and for Manthe "becoming
woman" is l'avenir de l'homme tout entierthe future of all Mankind. For D + G, She is what the
entire world must become if Man men and womenis truly to disappear. But to the extent that
women must "become woman" first (in order for men, in D + G's words, to "follow her
example"), might that not mean that she must also be the first to disappear? Is it not possible that the
process of "becoming woman" is but a new variation of an old allegory for the process of
women becoming obsolete? There would remain only her simulacrum: a female figure caught in a
whirling sea of male configurations. A silent, mutable, head-less, desire-less, spatial surface
necessary only for His metamorphosis? Physicists say: Holes are not the absence of particles, but particles going
faster than light. Flying anuses, rapid vaginas, there is no castration. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Mille Plateaux Most
important theorists have a repertory of exemplary fictions, fictions that they call upon frequently to interact with their specific
theories in creative if predictable ways. Between the scene of Lacanian psychoanalysis and that of Lol V. Stein's ravishing, for
example, the privileged rapport is one of repetition: for Lacan, Marguerite Duras understood and repeated his teachings
without him.19 Or, between the invagination of Derrida's ecriture and that of the narrator in Maurice Blanchot's L'Arret de
mort, what is privileged is the process of mime: for Derrida, Blanchot understood his writings with him, inseparably. 20 D + G's
exemplary fiction writers include Lewis Carroll, Franz Kafka, Pierre Klossowski, and Michel Tournierto mention only a few.
What all of these writers' texts share with those of D + G is the surface quality of their figures: the privileged modality of
relationship between the configurations of Deleuzian becoming and those of fiction is allegory. This is made most clear through
Deleuze's essay on Tournier's 1967 novel, Vendredi, ou les limbes du Pacifique. 21 There it is no longer a question of whether
Duras's Lol, as hysterical body, is or is not a subject of narrative; of whether Blanchot's J. and N., as organs of a hysterical text,
are or are not simply new angles for modernity. For here it is a question of Speranza, a true Body-without-Organs: a woman
who is not a woman but a female figure (an island), a space to be unfolded, molded, into new configurations for the
metamorphosis of Man. In t, we first stumble across Robinson just after he has been shipwrecked on his island. Finding himself
completely alone, the Only and perhaps Last Man on this island, he first succumbs to depression, evasion, infantile panic
leaving himself exposed, helpless. For Deleuze, this signals Man's first steps outside of intersubjectivity: "What happens when
others are lacking in the structure of the world? There only reigns the brutal opposition of the sun and the earth, of an
insupportable light and an obscure abyss . . ." (LS, p. 355). To avoid loss of self, however, this twentieth-century Robinson first
tries the old solutions. He creates for himself a task: he spends months, perhaps years, perhaps even decadesthe length of
time does not matterbuilding a new boat-structure in which he might escape. But once the vessel is completed, it is too large,
too heavy, and too cumbersome for him to push to the sea towards freedom. Robinson succumbs, once again, to the deepest
depressionand, indeed, abjection: He kept eating, his nose to the ground, unspeakable things. He went underneath himself
and rarely missed rolling in the soft warmth of his own excrement.... He moved about less and less, and his brief movements
always brought him back to the wallow. There he kept losing his body and delivering himself of its weight in the hot and humid
surroundings of the mud, while the noxious emanations of the stagnating waters clouded his mind. (VLP, p. 38) Haunted by his
lost sister (the one who died young), his mother (sometimes cold but always self-sacrificing), his wife (left behind in old
England), Robinson-the-Man has a brush with what the Man calls insanity. And so, as a Man, Robinson decides that he must
henceforth master both himself and the island if he is to survive. He sets about building a kingdom: he creates a calendar; he
invents a way to write; he builds a house, cultivates the land. He names the island Speranza and realizes that now, in time and
mastery, she is his slave. Woman is, therefore, no longer absent from Man's adventures, even though he remains outside of
inter-subjectivity: Besides, it seemed to him, when looking a certain way at the map of the island which he had sketched
approximately, that it could represent the profile of a headless female body, a woman, yes, seated with her legs folded under
her, in a posture within which it would have been impossible to sort out what there was of submission, of fear, or of simple
abandonment. This idea crossed his mind, then it left him. It would come back. (VLP, p. 46)22 In spite of various humiliations,
depressions, and disappointments, Robinson continues his mastery over Speranza. A decisive step is the introduction of time
into this one-Man kingdom with a kind of primitive clock. In the "future," Robinson succumbs to his former states of abjection
within the space of Speranza only when that clock of progress stops. Slowly, however, and in spite of his frenzied, productive
activity, Robinson realizes that his relationship with "himself" is changing. His "self," in fact, can no longer exist in a world
without the Other. Robinson is ready to lose his Self, his Manhood: "Who I? The question is far from being pointless. It isn't even
insoluble. Because if it's not him, it must be Speranza. There is from here on a flying I which will sometimes alight on the man,
sometimes on the island, and which makes of me, in turn, one or the other" (VLP, pp. 88-89).
A2 Life is Carbon
The aff is wrong the humaan body isnt limited to carbon, but is siliconic in the
mechanic way it emerges from intersubjective flows like communication and capital,
indicating meaning to life beyond the matter that composes us
Beddoes no date Diane J., Material gadget, Breeding Demons: A critical enquiry into the relationship between Kant and Deleuze
with specific reference to women, Transmat, www.cinestatic.com/trans-mat/Beddoes/BD7s4.htm, acc 1-15-05]
Deleuze notes that biologists
have often questioned why life is effected through carbon,

rather than through silicon, and goes on to say that la vie des machines modernes passe par le silicium
(the life of modern machines runs through silicon).[377] This is where becoming-women
moves, where money released from capital moves, where life becomes non-organic,
nature becomes a thinking machine, infinities of tiny demons leap, effecting a co-ordinated
and fluid movement, eroding the statues of power, the historical . Becoming-woman moves
towards becoming-imperceptible, but women do not dissolve or disappear in that movement: it is rather than life
itself becomes mobile, because it is not longer in the womb nor arranged in the
organisms which emerge from them, but instead becomes a movement, a cycle
that turns on its hinges. Humans are no longer the privileged class, but the surrogate reproductive
machinery of a machinic phylum which is passing across into a different base, in a movement which effects the
conjunction of teleology and mechanism, and transforming the nature of intelligence.
Human identity is more than carbon- its coded by communication flows, that
recognition is necessary to resist capitalist alienation
Brassier 2001 [Ray, Doctoral candidate at University of Warwick, Alien Theory: The Decline of Materialism in the Name of Matter,
Doctoral Thesis, April, www.cinestatic.com/trans-mat/Brassier/ALIENTHEORY.pdf, acc 1-14-05//uwyo]
Yet it is a failure which transcendental
scepticism may yet help circumvent through the

Alien-subjects unilateralising force-(of)-thought; an intrinsically sceptical force
which constitutes an instance of a priori cognitive resistance to those epistemic
norms and informational codes via which a triumphant World-Capitalism
maintains the structural isomorphy between material power and informational
force, thereby ensuring its quasitranscendental dominion over all cognitive experience. A transcendental
scepticism agrees with eliminative naturalism: human beings are simply carbonbased
information processing machines. But it also recognises the necessity of crosspollinating that assessment born of evolutionary reductionism with
transcendental insight; an insight which consists in radicalising and generalising Marxs
identification of the material infrastructure as the ultimate determinant for the
ideological superstructure315: World-Capitalism is now the global megamachine
determining a priori the cognitive parameters within which the
phenomenological micromachinery of organically individuated sapience operates.
By acknowledging the fact that political intervention can no longer afford to ignore this insight; by
recognising that empirical agency alone is incapable of circumventing capitals all-
encompassing universality as World- Capitalism, transcendental scepticism

constitutes an instance of a priori political resistance.
A2 Death Doesnt Destroy Being

First, even if death doesnt kill being, it does annihilate consciousnesses that are
composed of precise combinations of energy and matter, meaning that death
extinguishes thought processes that people are attached to, meaning that forced
death is violent and undesirable
Second, this ignores the role of communication in creating human identity. Were
more than the matter of our parts, but create meaning through communicative
processes, something destroyed by death
Third, carbon atoms arent the key component of life, complex information processing
is, meaning that death causes annihilation of consciousness
Tipler 94 [Frank J., Professor of Mathematical Physics at Tulane University, The Physics of Immortality: Modern Cosmology, God and the
Resurrection of the Dead, New York: Doubleday, 1994, 124-5//uwyo-ajl]
IN ORDER TO INVESTIGATE WHETHER LIFE can continue to exist forever, I shall need to define "life" in physics
language. I claim that a "living being" is any entity which codes information (in the physics sense of this word) with
the information coded being preserved by natural selection. Thus "life"
is a form of information
processing, and the human mind-and the human soul-is a very complex computer
program. Specifically, a "person" is defined to be a computer program which can pass the Turing test, which was
discussed in Chapter II. This definition of "life" is quite different from what the average person-and the average
biologist-would think of as "life." In
the traditional definition, life is a complex process based

on the chemistry of the carbon atom. However, even supporters of the traditional
definition admit that the key words are "complex process" and not "carbon atom."
Although the entities everyone agrees are "alive" happen to be based on carbon chemistry, there is no reason
to believe that analogous processes cannot be based on other systems. In fact, the
British biochemist A. G. Cairns-Smith! has suggested that the first living beings--':our ultim:ate ancestorswere based on metallic crystals, not carbon. If this is true, then if we insist that living beings must be
based on carbon chemistry, we would be forced to conclude that our ultimate ancestors were not alive. In CairnsSmith's theory, our ultimate ancestors were self-replicating patterns of defects in the metallic crystals. Over time,
the pattern persisted, but was transferred to another substrate: carbon molecules.
What is important is not the substrate but the pattern, and the pattern is another
name for information. But life of course is not a static pattern. Rather, it is a dynamic pattern that
persists overtime. It is thus a process. But not all processes are alive. The key feature of the "living" patterns is that
their persistence is due to a feedback with their environment: the information

coded in the pattern continually varies, but the variation is constrained to a narrow range by this
feedback. Thus life is, as I stated, information preserved by natural selection.
Fourth, even if there are other possibilities after death, the identities that were
attached to will be extinguished because consciousness comes from information
processing that requires particular sequences of quantum states to occur.
The Bekenstein Bound follows from the basic postulates of quantum theory combined with the further assumptions
that (1) the system is bounded in energy, and (2) the system is bounded, or localized, in space.
A rigorous proof of the Bekenstein Bound would require quantum field theory, but it is easy to describe in outline
why quantum
mechanics leads to such a bound on the information coded in a

bounded region. In essence, the Bekenstein Bound is a manifestation of the uncertainty principle. Recall that
the uncertainty principle tells us that there is a limit to the precision with which we can measure the momentum of a
particle and its position. More precisely, the uncertainty principle says that the location of a point in phase space-a
concept I defined in Chapter III-cannot be defined more closely thal1 Planck's constant h. Since
a system's
state is defined by where it is located in phase space, this means that the number
of possible states is less than or equal to the size of the phase space region the
system could be in, divided by the size of the minimum phase space size, Planck's
constant. (I've given a mathematical expression of this argument in the Appendix for Scientists.) This state counting
procedure, based on there being an absolute minimum size h to a phase space interval, is an absolutely essential
method of quantum statistical mechanics. We have already used it in Chapter III to prove the almost periodicity of a
bounded quantum system.
It is confirmed by the thousands of experiments which have

been based on this counting method.9 In high energy particle physics, any calculation of the "cross
section" requires counting the possible number of particle initial and final states, and the above state counting
method is used.lO The cross section, which is the measure of how many particles scatter in a particular direction
when they collide in particle accelerators, is the basic quantity tested in particle physics. The Bekenstein Bound on
the number of possible states is thus confirmed by the correctness of the calculated cross sections. In summary, the
Bekenstein Bound on the total information that can be coded in a region is an

absolute solid conclusion of modern physics, a result as solid as the Rock of Gibraltar. One can
also use the Bekenstein Bound to deduce an upper bound to the rate of
information processing. The time for light to cross a sphere of a given diameter is equal to the diameter of
the sphere divided by the speed of light. Since a state inside the sphere cannot completely
change until a signal has time to travel trom one side to the other, the rate of
information processing is bounded above by the above Bekenstein Bound divided by this time interval.
Putting in the numbers (details in the Appendix for Scientists), we calculate that the rate of state change is less than
or equal to 4 X 1051 bits per second, multiplied by the mass of the system in kilograms. That is, the rate of
information processing possible for a system depends only on the mass of the system, not on its spatial size or on
any other variable. So a human being of mass 100 kilograms cannot change state more rapidly than about 4 X 1053
times per second. This number is of course enormous-and in fact a human will probably change state much, much
more slowly than this-but it's finite.
A2 Life is Meaningless Because the Sun Will Go Out

First, theres no warrant for why the death of our planet in billions of years makes life
that exist now meaningless. Each individuals creates contingent value for their life
through communication as demonstrated by the Habermas evidence and to force
death upon them because of an event in the unfathomable future is repugnant
Second, humanity will adapt to the destruction of its habitat by inevitably progressing
to a type III civilization
Kaku 95 [Michio, Prof. of theoretical physics at the City College, NY, Hyperspace: A Scientific Odyssey Through Parallel Universes, Time
Warps, and the 10th Dimension. New York: Ancor Books, March, 281//uwyo-ajl]
Taking the larger view of the development of civilization, Dyson also believes that, at
the current rate of

development, we may attain Type I status within a few centuries. He does not believe that
making the transition between various types of civilizations will be very difficult. He estimates that the
difference in size and power separating the various types of civilizations is roughly
a factor of 10 billion. Although this may seem like a large number, a civilization growing at the
sluggish rate of 1 percent per year can expect to make the transition between the
various civilizations within 2,500 years. Thus it is almost guaranteed that a
civilization can steadily progress toward Type III status.
Third, this outweighs all other arguments because 20th century genocide demonstrates
the sheer horror of exterminating life
I shall obtain a hold on this future reality by focusing attention on the physics relevant to the existence and behavior
of life in the far future. I shall provide a physical foundation for eschatology-the study of the ultimate future--by
making the physical assumption that the universe must be capable of sustaining life indefinitely; that is, for infinite
time as experienced by life existing in the physical universe. All physical scientists should take this assumption
seriously because we have to have some theory for the future of the physical universe--since it unquestionably
exists-and this is the most beautiful physical postulate: that total
death is not inevitable. All other

theories of the future necessarily postulate the ultimate extinction of everything
we could possibly care about. I once visited a Nazi death camp; there I was reinforced in my
conviction that there is nothing uglier than extermination. We physicists know that a
beautiful postulate is more likely to be correct than an ugly one. Why not adopt this Postulate of Eternal Life, at least
as a working hypothesis? I shall show in Chapter n that
the universe is in fact capable of

sustaining life at least another million trillion years. Specifically, I shall demonstrate that it is
technically feasible for life to expand out from the Earth and engulf the entire
universe, and that life must do so if it is to survive.
Derrida
2AC
Derridean deconstruction prevents political strategizing
Crawford, Prof of Humanities and Comparative Lit @ U of Minnesota, 90 (Claudia, Nietzsche as Postmodernist?, Ed. Clayton Koelb, P.
197)
No doubt, other prominent postmodernists beside Jameson might be described at cultural critics. Derrida, for instance, in his efforts to
deconstruct some of the privileged concepts of the Western philosophical tradition, is often described as cultural liberator, who aims to free
our worldview from the dominant, often oppressive values that our tradition has taught us. The
liberation that Derrida heralds,

not directly linked to any practical proposals for either political, social, or existential change.
Indeed, Derrida's deconstruction (not to mention de Man's) has often been criticized for its politically
noncommittal character. And the theoretical negativism involved in strategy of "deconstructing" the systems of others does seem
satisfied with itself, not implicitly directed toward specific positive alternatives. For that matter, if one of deconstruction's
theoretical underpinnings is the view that any philosophical system is in principle deconstructible, it is
hard to see how the movement could consistently defend a particular practical strategy for change.
however, is
There is zero means to actualize their alternative Derrida deconstructs himself to

death
Eagleton, Professor of Cultural Theory at the University of Manchester, 99 (Terry, Marxism without Marxism, in Ghostly Demarcations:
A Symposium on Jacques Derridas Specters of Marx, edited by Michael Sprinker)
There is an exasperating kind of believer who holds what he does until he meets someone else who holds the same. At this
point, confronted with the bugbear of an òrthodoxy', he starts nervously to retract, or at least to qualify. There is more than a
touch of this adolescent perversity in Derrida, who like many a postmodernist appears
to feel (it is a matter of

sensibility rather than reasoned conviction) that the dominant is ipso facto demonic and the marginal
precious per se. One condition of the unthinking postmodern equation of the marginal with the creative,
apart from a convenient obliviousness to such marginal groups as Fascists, is the rolling back of political
movements which are at once mass and oppositional. The mark of a genuine radical is a hearty desire to
stop having to be so obdurately oppositional, a sentiment one can hardly imagine as dear to the heart of a deconstructionist. If
one takes the point of James Joyce's retort to an invitation to return to a newly independent Irish republic - `So as to be its first
critic?' - one also registers the self-indulgence. Derrida has now taken Marxism on board, or at least dragged it halfway up the
gangplank, because he is properly enraged by liberal-capitalist complacency; but there is also something unavoidably
opportunist about his political pact, which wants to exploit Marxism as critique, dissent, conveniently belabouring instrument,
but is far less willing to engage with its positivity. What he wants, in effect, is a Marxism without Marxism,
which is to say a Marxism on his own coolly appropriative terms. `We would be tempted to distinguish this spirit of the Marxist
critique ... at once from Marxism as ontology, philosophical or metaphysical system, as "dialectical materialism", from Marxism
as historical materialism or method, and from Marxism incorporated in the apparatuses of party, State, or workers'
International.' It would not be difficult to translate this into the tones of a (suitably caricatured) liberal Anglicanism: we must
distinguish the spirit of Christianity from such metaphysical baggage as the existence of God, the divinity of Christ, organized
religion, the doctrine of the resurrection, the superstition of the Eucharist and the rest. Or: one would wish to distinguish the
spirit of deconstruction from the dreary intellectual paraphernalia of `writing', `difference', `trace', organized journals and
conventions, formal reading groups, movements to install the teaching of philosophy in French schools and so on. It is entirely
possible to approve of the spirit of the Huns, with all its admirable robustness, while deploring what they actually got up to. If
Derrida thinks, as he appears to do, that there can be any effective socialism without
organization, apparatuses and reasonably well-formulated doctrines and programmes, then he is merely the
victim of some academicist fantasy which he has somehow mistaken for an enlightened anti-Stalinism. (He has, in
fact, no materialist or historical analysis of Stalinism whatsoever, as opposed to an ethical rejection of it, unlike many more
orthodox currents of Marxism.) The truth is that he
is hardly concerned with an effective socialism at all.
Deconstruction, with its preoccupation with slippage, failure, aporia, incoherence, not-quiteness, its suspicion of the
achieved, integral or controlling, is a kind of intellectual equivalent of a vaguely leftish commitment
to the underdog, and like all such commitments is nonplussed when those it speaks up for come to power.
Poststructuralism dislikes success, a stance which allows it some superbly illuminating insights into the pretensions of
monolithic literary texts or ideological self-identities and leaves it a mite wrong-footed in the face of the African National
Congress. Derrida's
indifference to almost all of the actual historical or theoretical manifestations of

Marxism is a kind of empty transcendence - a typically deconstructie trumping of some alternative position
which leaves one's own case invulnerable only in proportion to its contentlessness. Much the same can be said of his curiously
empty, formalistic messianism, which voids this rich theological tradition of its content and retains its ghostly impulse only,
somewhat akin to the Kafka who (as Walter Benjamin remarks) is left with nothing but the transmissible forms of a tradition
which has dwindled to nothing. The
critical, negative passion of his politics in this book is one which

ought rightly to embarrass every academic radical for whom deconstruction is a sexy form of
common-or-garden scepticism, or yet another way of keeping the literary canon alive by plodding through it yet again,
this time with a scalpel in hand. Instead of singing the advent of the ideal of liberal democracy and of the capitalist market in the
euphoria of the end of history, instead of celebrating the ènd of ideologies' and the end of the great emancipatory discourses,
let us never neglect this obvious macroscopic fact, made up of innumerable singular sites of suffering: no degree of progress
allows one to ignore that never before, in absolute figures, have so many men, women, and children been subjugated, starved,
or exterminated on the earth. This is not the kind of thing that is likely to go down well in Ithaca or Irvine, where they learnt
long ago that ideology had ended and the great emancipatory discourses run thankfully aground. And
what does
Derrida counterpose, in the very next paragraph, to the dire condition he so magnificently denounces? A
`New International', one `without status, without title, and without name ... without party, without country, without
national community ...' And, of course, as one gathers elsewhere in the book, without organization, without ontology,
without method, without apparatus. It is the ultimate poststructuralist fantasy: an opposition without
anything as distastefully systemic or drably òrthodox' as an opposition, a dissent beyond all formulable
discourse, a promise which would betray itself in the act of fulfilment, a perpetual excited openness to
the Messiah who had better not let us down by doing anything as determinate as coming. Spectres of Marxism
indeed. 85-87
Their call for democracy to come is counter-productive their change is just

reformism. They end up crushing the revolution that solves better
Lewis, member of the International Socialist Organization & Spanish Professor at the University of Iowa, 99 (Thomas, The Politics of
Hauntology in Derridas Specters of Marx, in Ghostly Demarcations: A Symposium on Jacques Derridas Specters of Marx, edited by Michael
Sprinker)
New forms of struggle and especially new agents of social change, it is claimed, must either be found or
theorized into existence. Hence, the perceived need arises for something on the order of
Derrida's New International `without common belonging to a class'. I argued above that the contemporary working
class includes both `blue collar' and `white collar' workers, and that the internationalization of capitalism has created a growing
international working class. I thereby sought to contest the claim that the working class is increasingly smaller and irrelevant as
a social force. I also indicated that divisions among the working class along lines of gender, race, nationality and sexual
orientation have traditionally been the object of intense activity and theoretical discussion within Marxism. While recognizing
the formidable obstacles encountered, I emphasized that it
is possible to overcome such divisions through

common struggle. Finally, I argued that only the working class - that is, individuals who may embody a number
of specific identities but who act collectively on the basis of their shared interests as workers - possesses the structural
capacity both to bring down capitalism and to create socialism. On this view, it is both theoretically and politically
necessary to affirm the working class as the primary agent of social transformation. Derrida's SM provides a stinging indictment
of the contemporary world system, as well as a serious critique of recently published apologies for capitalism. As I have
endeavored to show, however, SM also presents
an elaborate case for reform socialism over and
against revolutionary socialism. This case is based on what, in a friendly spirit, might be termed a `misreading' of
the Russian Revolution. Moreover, the main tenet of the case is the repudiation of the notion that
the working class remains central to the project of winning socialism. Among the more astounding
dimensions of SM, therefore, surely must figure the social contexts in which the book appears. Derrida suggests a
reformist road to socialism precisely at the end of a period in which the political and moral
hollowness of traditional social democracy could not be in greater evidence. Socialist parties all
over Western Europe, but particularly in France, Spain, Italy and Germany, have failed to preserve - much less extend - the gains
for workers once embodied in the so-called `welfare state' (Anderson and Camiller 1994; Ross and Jensen 1994; Camiller 1994;
Abse 1994; and Padgett and Paterson 1994). These same Socialist parties have not just collaborated with but in numerous
instances have actually initiated the attacks on workers, immigrants and the poor. As if all that were not enough, European
social democracy has signally failed to organize an effective movement from below against the resurgence of Fascism and neoFascism. Everything that can be said in criticism of Europe's Socialist parties equally applies to the Democratic Party in the us. An
openly capitalist party, the us Democratic Party advertises itself as the friend of workers and minorities, relying on its image as a
`lesser evil' to secure electoral victories. Throughout the Reagan-Bush years, however, Democraticcontrolled congresses signally
failed to challenge the basic premises and policies of Reaganism. Even today, when faced with a cynically selfstyled `Republican
Revolution', disagreements between Republicans and Democrats concern only how fast and how deep to cut social programs. If
Republicans demand $270 billion in Medicare cuts, for example, Democrats respond by demanding $145 billion. The logic and
necessity of slashing social programs are never questioned .24 Similarly, the Democrats collude with Republicans on issues of
racism and immigration. Clinton, as much as any Republican, has contributed to the false stereotyping of the recipients of public
assistance as African-American `welfare queens'. And, while many Democrats are on record as deploring Proposition 187 as a
legal measure, nearly all Democrats concede to Republicans that an immigration `problem' exists. Thus, the Clinton
administration has recently beefed up the number of border cops and ordered harsher treatment of undocumented workers.
No doubt Derrida's proposal for a New
International represents in part a call to return to the values of
àuthentic' reform socialism. In the us, Derrida's proposal represents a call to return to genuinely `progressive' values.
The bankruptcy of European social democracy, as well as the vicissitudes of the American Democratic Party, does indeed create
political openings in which the socialist Left can and must seek to rebuild. Yet two points remain, each suggesting that
attempts to revive reform socialism waste energies. First, the European Socialist parties which eventually
found themselves authoring and imposing austerity measures on workers and minorities started out long ago with sterling anticapitalist principles. Good intentions are not enough in this regard, however, since politics and the economy are separated in
capitalist society, and the latter wields greater clout. Second, transformed by the discipline demanded by international
capitalism, these nominally `socialist' parties occupy several of the very governments against which workers are presently
demonstrating in large numbers. Reform socialism has little to offer workers today . Callinicos has cogently
summarized the current crisis in Europe in this way: à major recession which has highlighted longer term weaknesses of
European capitalism; a withdrawal of popular support from the mainstream political parties; and the resort to forms of political
and social action which, consciously or unconsciously, tend to escape the limits of liberal bourgeois politics' (1994, 9). Soon after
the publication of SM in France, for example, the country was rocked by militant strikes and demonstrations lasting almost nine
months between fall 1993 and summer 1994: Air France workers; 1,000,000 French citizens marching against plans to privatize
sectors of education; fishing workers; farmers; hundreds of thousands of French workers marching several times against
unemployment and austerity decrees; tens of thousands of students marching, building barricades and burning fires in protest
against tuition hikes and the uncertain, potentially dismal future they face. Even as the recession seemed to be coming to an
end in Europe, the anger of French workers and students exploded again in fall 1995 - this time with sufficient force to sustain a
three-week strike in the public sector. Importantly, in the Air France strike, the anti-privatization campaign in education, the
fight against changes in the universities and the recent public sector strike, real concessions were wrested from the state. None
of this renewed workers' activity, nor the fact that victories can be claimed, provides strong support for SMs assertions that
barricades and working-class militancy are out of fashion. In the us, too, polls show today that Americans are more skeptical
about their government and its political parties than at any time in memory. A wave of militant demonstrations followed the
1994 congressional elections that gave Gingrich and the `Contract With America' a majority in the Senate and House of
Representatives. Massive marches on Washington in support of gay rights, women's rights and civil rights have also taken place
since the 1994 elections. The number of strikes, moreover, as well as the number of production hours lost and workers
participating in strikes, increased significantly in 1994. And no one who spent any time during the early 90s in Decatur, Illinois or
Detroit, Michigan can have any doubts about the willingness of us workers to fight back. Both areas - which include the struggle
of locked-out Staley Workers in Decatur and striking newspaper workers in Detroit - have been accurately referred to as `war
zones'. The violence routinely used by state and local cops has been fiercely answered by the militancy and stamina of workers
and their families. In
every part of the globe political developments during recent years have
been characterized by their speed and volatility. It is important, however, to emphasize the still uneven and
ambiguous character of the emerging challenge to the existing order: Ìt has begun to liberate forces - in the
shape of renewed workers' resistance to capitalist attacks - which could unleash another
upturn in the European [and us, my insertion] class struggle. But it has also given an opening to elements of barbarous
reaction that had been confined to the political margins since 1945' (Callinicos 1994, 37). Nothing guarantees the growth of the
Left as a result of the major struggles that look likely to occur over the next few years. The
same political vacuum

which creates opportunities for the Left is also creating, at least at this juncture,
opportunities for the Right: Às yet there is no clear cut direction to events that would mark a decisive shift either to
the right or to the left. But the dynamic evolution of the crisis since 1989 gives no reason for thinking that the situation will
remain so open' (Callinicos 1994, 36-7). In time, events will show whether their future directionality owes more to the
subjective agency of the Left in this period - or to the Right. That is why the question of socialist organization stands at the
forefront of debate among the Left today. Derrida's SM, with its call for a New International, should be discussed as a serious
contribution to this debate. Nevertheless, SM's 'hauntological politics' must be firmly rejected as incapable of answering the
demands of our time. `The time is out of joint': Derrida repeatedly works this line from Hamlet in order to suggest that socialist
revolution is impossible because of the meta physical limitations of Marxism .25 Our present time may indeed be òut of joint',
but it is not so because of bad metaphysics. Greater
instabilities in an already crisis-prone system,

deepening anger among the world's exploited and oppressed, and sharper divisions both
within and among national and international ruling classes - these developments make our
time one in which classical Marxism and its tradition of revolution from below have much
more to offer than hauntology does in the international struggle for a democratic socialist
society. 157-161
Development
2AC
Development discourse is necessary to solve for the environment only by embracing
the discourse can we enact policies.
Sneddon et al, Environmental Studies Program and Department of Geography @ Dartmouth and Energy
and Resources Group @ UC Berkeley, 05
(Chris, Richard B. Howarth, Richard B. Norgaard, 8 August 2005, Sustainable development in a postBrundtland world,
http://web.env.auckland.ac.nz/courses/geog320/resources/pdf/sustainability/Sneddon_et-al_2006.pdf,
RJ)
Not yet two decades after the publication of Our Common Future, the worlds political and
environmental landscape has changed significantly. Nonetheless, we argue that the concept and
practice of sustainable development (SD)as guiding institutional principle, as concrete policy goal,
and as focus of political struggleremains salient in confronting the multiple challenges of this new
global order. Yet how SD is conceptualized and practiced hinges crucially on: the willingness of
scholars and practitioners to embrace a plurality of epistemological and normative perspectives on
sustainability; the multiple interpretations and practices associated with the evolving concept of
bdevelopmentQ; and efforts to open up a continuum of local-to global public spaces to debate and
enact a politics of sustainability. Embracing pluralism provides a way out of the ideological and
epistemological straightjackets that deter more cohesive and politically effective interpretations of
SD. Using pluralism as a starting point for the analysis and normative construction of sustainable
development, we pay particular attention to how an amalgam of ideas from recent work in ecological
economics, political ecology and the development as freedom literature might advance the SD debate
beyond its post-Brundtland quagmire. Enhanced levels of ecological degradation, vast inequalities in
economic opportunities both within and across societies, and a fractured set of institutional
arrangements for global environmental governance all represent seemingly insurmountable obstacles
to a move towards sustainability. While these obstacles are significant, we suggest how they might be
overcome through a reinvigorated set of notions and practices associated with sustainable
development, one that explicitly examines the linkages between sustainability policies and sustainability
politics.
Sustainable development is a necessary way to reform institutions to enact ecofriendly policies we indict your authors.
RJ)
Conversely, critics of the mainstream position advocate more radical societal changes, and have
comprehensively and incisively deconstructed SDs basic contradictions (e.g., Redclift, 1987; J. OConnor,
1994) and its power-laden, problematic assumptions (e.g., Escobar, 1995). However, they have left little
more than ashes in its place. We can agree with Escobar, that the bBrundtland Report, and much of the
sustainable development discourse, is a tale that a disenchanted (modern) world tells itself about its
sad condition (Escobar, 1996, pp. 5354). At the same time, we argue as well for a resurrection of SD
into a more conceptually potent and politically effective set of ideas and practices that comprise an
empowering tale. We advocate a middle and pragmatic path, one that takes seriously calls for radical
changes in our ideas and institutions dealing with sustainable development, while also holding out the
possibility that genuine reform of current institutions may be possible. Partial reform may pre-empt
necessary radical change, but it may also make it easier in the future7 . Our first intervention is to
declare a truce among the epistemological and methodological schisms that separate the defenders of
sustainable development from critics of the concept. For its advocatesidentified most closely with
development practitioners situated in a variety of United Nations offices (e.g., Untied Nations
Development Program), government agencies (e.g., ministries and departments of natural resources
and environment), and corporate boardrooms (e.g., the Business Council for Sustainable Development)
sustainable development as laid out by the WCED (broadly) remains the most tenable principle of
collective action for resolving the twin crises of environment and development. For many academics
particularly those associated with ecological economics and related fields (see So derbaum, 2000; Daly
and Farley, 2004)sustainable development offers an attractive, perhaps the only, alternative to
conventional growth-oriented development think ing. However, for some of its socio-cultural critics
(e.g., Escobar, 1995; Sachs, 1999; Fernando, 2003), mainstream SD is a ruse, yet another attempt to
discount the aspirations and needs of marginalized populations across the planet in the name of green
development. Other critics, while broadly sympathetic towards its goals, point out SDs fundamental
lack of attention to the powerful political and economic structures of the international system that
constrain and shape even the most well-intentioned policies (e.g., Redclift, 1987, 1997) 8 . For critics
grounded in the ecological sciences (e.g., Frazier, 1997; Dawe and Ryan, 2003), SD is unforgivably
anthropocentric and thus unable to dissolve the false barriers between the human sphere of economic
and social activities and the ecological sphere that sustains these activities9 . These divisions reflect
more than simply different value positions and attendant political goals. Proponents of a mainstream
version of SD tend to see knowledge production (epistemology) and research design (methodology) in
very specific terms. At the risk of caricature, this position demonstrates tendencies towards
individualism, economism and technological optimism in assessing how knowledge about the social
world is brought into being (Faber et al., 2002; Robinson, 2004). SD advocates also place a great deal of
faith in quantitative representations of complex human-environment relations, in part because of a
desire to present generalizable knowledge to policy makers. Conversely, critics of SD are for the most
part social constructivist in perspective, arguing that knowledge of the world always represents a series
of mediations among human social relations and individual identities (see Robinson, 2004, pp. 379380;
Demeritt, 2002). Critics are also more apt to stress the historical contingency of development processes,
and undertake qualitative studies grounded in a case study methodology. Perhaps most importantly,
while advocates of a conventional SD continue to perceive the policy process as a genuine pathway
towards reform, critics have largely given up on state-dominated institutions as a means of change.
Despite these substantial differences in perspective, our intimation is that both advocates and critics
would agree that a socially just and ecologically sustainable world, or even an approximation, would be
a desirable end.
Our project of revitalizing sustainability would be the reconstruction of development

discourse you kritik your alternative wont solve for our unique project of
reconstruction which would solve for the First/Third duality.
RJ)
As we have argued, a salient way to confront the dynamism and complexity of the current era of
global environmental governance is to adopt pluralistic and transdisciplinary approaches (e.g.,
ecological economics, political ecology, development-as-freedom) to the analysis of sustainability
dilemmas. However, analysis of sustainable development is simply not enough. We contend that the
radical critique of contemporary human-environment relations inherent within notions of
sustainability (visible if one cares to look) needs to be resuscitated and rescued from those proponents
of SD who use it to advance a development agenda that is demonstrably unsustainable12. Likewise, it
needs to be saved from its most vociferous critics who have left little but ashes in the wake of their
deconstructions. We thus seek to retrieve the ideals of sustainable development (equity within and
across generations, places and social groups; ecological integrity; and human well-being and quality of
life) via a reconstructive exercise in which actually existing environmental governance institutions are
evaluated and reformed based on their supporting norms13. This is both a conceptual and a political
goal. Yet so much has been written of SD and sustainability, andechoing Brundtlandso many
innumerable calls for enhanced bpolitical willQ to achieve SD aims have been made, what more can
possibly be said? A revitalized SDbuilt around the pluralistic conception of sustainability research
highlighted above would be attentive to the political, cultural, technological, ecological and economic
contexts of the array of localglobal human communities, but also cognizant of more abstract and
universal notions of justice and equity. It would break down false dichotomies such as those
constructed between first and thirdQworlds. It would also help dissolve the decidedly unhelpful chisms
within the breformistQ and bradicalQ camps of SD analysis (see Torgerson, 1995), which have
contributed to a sense of paralysis and impotence on the part of socially concerned scholars of
sustainability. A first step towards realizing these aims, and towards strengthening sustainable
development as a social movement, emphasizes the processes through which social and political
changes occur, and these processes hinge crucially on notions of citizenship, participation and
democracy (see Fischer, 2000).
Development is good better living conditions for the South prove

Simon, University of London Development Geography Professor and Director of the
Centre for Developing Areas research, 97
(David, 6/12/97, Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography, Devlopment
Reconsidered: New Directions in Development Thinking, p. 185-186,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/490357.pdf?acceptTC=true , accessed 7/10/13,
IC)
In assessing the shortcomings or failures of devel-opment initiatives, postmodernists and some postcolonial critics
downplay or ignore the compelling evidence from around the globe that the dominant aspirations of
poor people and their governments remain concerned (albeit for structurally different reasons) with meeting basic
needs, enhancing their living standards and emulating advanced industrial countries in some variant of
classic modernization strategies. Similarly, the very tangible achievements of many 'development' programmesalbeit to dif-fering extents and at different rates in rural and ur-ban areas and in almost all countries of the South- in terms of
wider access to potable water and increasing literacy rates, average nutritional levels and life
expectancy, for example, are often overlooked or ignored. A glance at any recent issue of the Human Development
Report (UNDP, annual) or even the World Development Report (World Bank, annual), confirms the general trend
over the last twenty to thirty years in states of virtually all ideological orientations. The principal exceptions are
those countries-many of them previously seeking to implement some form of radical social-ist
programme-where widespread or long civil wars have destroyed physical and social infrastruc-ture
and disrupted social programmes. These con-flicts were often spawned or fanned by superpower rivalry during the Cold War;
examples include An- gola, Mozambique and Sudan, El Salvador, Grena- da and Nicaragua, and Afghanistan and Cambodia. A more recent and
worrying trend towards falling school enrolments (especially at secondary level), literacy levels and access to health care facilitieshas emerged
since the early 1980s in countries where previously high proportions of state expenditure on education, health and other social services have
been severely cut and user charges introduced in terms of structural adjustment and economic recovery programmes. Two of the most clearcut examples are Tanzania and Zimbabwe, as even the World Bank now readily acknowledges in its advocacy of greater attention to the
social dimensions of adjustment (e.g. Cornia et al., 1992; Woodward, 1992; Simon et al., 1995; Husain and Faruqee, 1996; UNDP, annual).
No alternative to development discourse still dont even know who the agents
implementing development are, and the negs theory strips Latino/as of agency.
Everett, Professor of Sociology and International Studies at Portland State University,
97
(Margaret Everett, July 1997, The Ghost in the Machine: Agency in "Poststructural"
Critiques of Development, pp. 137-138, accessed 7/7/13, http://www.jst
or.org/stable/pdfplus/3317673.pdf, ST)
Recent works in anthropology and other social sciences have advanced the important task of
unraveling development practice and malpractice from Bretton Woods to present-day interventions
including "Women In Development," "Sustainable Development," and "Participatory Planning."'
These critics describe development as a powerful discourse, or as a "regime of representation," which
imposes itself on Third World peoples. This discourse facilitates not only the governance and control
of the "Third World" by "the West," but also imposes a hegemonic view of reality which defines non-
western peoples as underdeveloped. The consequence of this discourse for those who are its target,
critics say, is the perpetuation and expansion of global inequalities, and the "disqualification of nonWestern knowledge systems" (Escobar 1995a: 13). In other words, development, as both an idea and a
set of practices, has become so pervasive and so powerful, that it is increasingly difficult to imagine
alternatives that are outside of the development framework. Such critiques have shown the ways in
which the development community shapes perceptions of Third World peoples while systematically
failing to meet most of its own stated objectives. Yet these critiques lack, to varying degrees, a
meaningful sense of agency or process. We still know very little about who the practitioners of
development are, and how policies are shaped by struggles and conflicts within and between
institutions. For some, resistance on the part of development's subjects is a way out of the development
"nightmare." Yet, in-depth discussions of how target groups have resisted and reshaped development
programs to date are lacking in such critiques. In fact, arguments of poststructural or postmodem
critics of development share many of the weaknesses of those of their Marxist predecessors, in that
they tend to portray "subject peoples" as incapable (or nearly so) of autonomous intellectual thought
(reminiscent of the "false consciousness" concerns of some Marxists), and especially in that they tend
to ignore the important role of local and national elite groups in importing and redefining "western"
development strategies.2 A look at the uses of sustainable development and ecology claims in Bogota
suggests that local actors (planners, environmentalists, politicians, neighborhood residents, activists) are
conscious participants in the development encounter. While the poststructuralist critique of the
teleological Marxist analyses of development in the 1970s is a useful step in recognizing the unintended
consequences of development, I do not agree with the view of development as a "subject-less" process.
This decentered approach to development (most notable in the works of Ferguson 1990 and Escobar
1995a, discussed below) is based on the assertion that events unfold not by the will of knowing
subjects, but rather "behind the backs of or against the wills of even the most powerful actors"
(Ferguson 1990: 18). Though many of development's effects may indeed be unintended by the actors
involved, I do not see this as a justification for leaving agency out of accounts of development. In the
eastern hills overlooking Bogota's downtown and posh residential areas, "informal" or "marginalized"
settlements face a series of development projects, couched in the language of environmental
sustainability and participatory planning, which local elite groups hope will result in the eradication of
slums or "sub-normal barrios" in their backyards.4 While elites import and adapt the sustainable
development discourse in an effort to win foreign funding and disguise political and economic interests,
the resistance of residents of the eastern barrios to these and other projects has limited the ability of
elites, both inside and outside of government, to implement their projects. Moreover, residents rarely
buy into the vision of reality presented by developers, planners, and politicians.
Discourse
2AC
First, no link they cant prove that our rhetoric was articulated with the intent of
marginalization
Second, label politics misidentify the cause of prejudice in aggressivity, so the new
symbol fills in the same roll.
Appropriations of old labels reconceive their meaning
Zizek 97 [Slavoj, Moving away from the darkness, The Plague of Fantasies, New York: Verso, 1997, 111-2//uwyo-ajl]
In his formidable Fear in the Occident,7 Jean Delumeau draws attention to the unerring succession of atutudes in a medieval
city infested by plague: first, people ignore it and behave as if nothing terrible is really going on; then they withdraw into
privacy, avoiding contact with each other; then they start to resort to religious fervour, staging processions, confessing their
sins, and so on; then they say to themselves 'What the hell, let's enjoy it while it lasts!', and indulge passionately in orgies of sex,
eating, drinking and dancing; finally, they return to life as usual, and again behave as if nothing terrible is going on. However,
this second 'life as usual' does not occupy the same structural role as the first: it is, as it were, located on the other side of the
Moebius band, since it no longtt signals the desperate attempt to ignore the reality of plague, but, rather its exact opposite:
resigned acceptance of it . . . . Does
not the same go for the gradual replacement of (sexually,

racially...) aggressive with more 'correct' expressions, like the chain nigger - Negro - black - African
American or crippled - disabled - bodily challenged? This replacement functions as a
metaphorical substitution which potentially proliferate and enhances the very (racist, etc.)
effect it tries to banish, adding insult to injury. In analogy to Delumeau, one should therefore claim that
the only way actually to abolish the hatred-effect is, paradoxically, to create the
circumstances in which one can return to the first link in the chain and use it in a nonaggressive way -like following the patterns of 'life as usual' the second time in the case of plague. That is to say: as long
as the expression 'crippled' contains a surplus, an indelible mark, of aggressivity this
surplus will not only be more or less automatically transferred on to any of its 'correct'
metaphorical substitutes, it will even be enhanced by dint of this substitution. The strategy
of returning to the first link, of course, is risky; however, the moment it is fully accepted by
the group targeted by it, it definitely can work. When radical African-Americans call each other 'niggers', it is
wrong to dismiss this strategy as a mere ironic identification with the aggressor; rather, the point is that it functions as an
autonomous act of dismissing the aggressive sting.
This has two implications:

It moots all of their offense because the meaning of a label is reconceptualized and
reinscribed
It flips their turn, proliferating the oppression that it tries to solve
Third, speaking errors are inevitable and good because they provide a locus for
constant criticism, something the neg by itself precludes
Alcoff 92 *Linda, Prof. of Feminist Studies at the University of Syracuse, The Problem of Speaking for Others, Cultural Critique, Winter
91-2, 22//uwyo]
But surely it
is both morally and politically objectionable to structure ones actions around the
desire to avoid criticism, especially if this outweighs other questions of effectivity. In some cases perhaps the
motivation is not so much to avoid criticism as to avoid errors, and the person believes that the only way to avoid errors is to
avoid all speaking for others. However, errors are
unavoidable in the theoretical inquiry as well as

political struggle, and moreover they often make contributions. The desire to find an
absolute means to avoid making errors comes perhaps not from a desire to advance
collective goals but a desire for personal mastery, to establish a privileged discursive
position wherein one cannot be undermined or challenged and thus is master of the situation. From such a position
ones own location and positionality would not require constant interrogation and critial
reflection; one would not have to constantly engage in this emotionally troublesome
endeavor and would be immune from the interrogation of others. Such a desire of mastery
and immunity must be resisted.
Fourth, the criticism assumes stable speech acts, preventing us from taking back
hurtful words and collapsing into a juridical model of stable subjectivity that kills
activism
Butler, Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature, UC Berkeley, Performativity and Performance, Ed. Parker and Sedgwick,
1995, p. 204
Judith
That words wound seems incontestably true, and that hateful, racist, misogynist,
homophobic speech should be vehemently countered seems incontrovertibly right. But does
understanding from where speech derives its power to wound alter our conception of what it might mean to counter that
wounding power? Do
we accept the notion that injurious speech is attributable to a singular

subject and act? If we accept such a juridical constraint on thought - the grammatical
requirements of accountability - as a point of departure, what is lost from the political
analysis of injury when the discourse of politics becomes fully reduced to juridical
requirements?? Indeed, when political discourse is collapsed into juridical discourse, the
meaning of political opposition runs the risk of being reduced to the act of prosecution. How
is the analysis of the discursive historicity of power unwittingly restricted when the subject is presumed as the point of
departure for such an analysis? A clearly theological construction, the postulation of the subject as the causal origin of the
performative act is understood to generate that which it names; indeed, this divinely empowered subject is one for whom the
name itself is generative.
Fifth, language doesnt have a determinate effect words are empty absent context,
meaning our rhetoric can be read in a heterodox manner to challenge violence
Sixth, perm, do plan and the alternative. Representational violence doesnt preclude
the need for concrete action.
Richard
Rorty, Professor of Humanities, University of Virginia, Truth, Politics, and Postmodernism, Spinoza Lectures, 1997, p. 51-2
This distinction between the theoretical and the practical point of view is often drawn by Derrida, another writer who enjoys
demonstrating that something very important meaning, for example, or justice, or friendship is both necessary and
impossible. When asked about the implications of these paradoxical fact, Derrida usually replies that the
paradox
doesn't matter when it comes to practice. More generally, a lot of the writers who are labeled
`post-modernist; and who talk a lot about impossibility, turn out to be good experimentalist social
democrats when it comes to actual political activity. I suspect, for example, that Gray, Zizek, Derrida and I,
if we found ourselves citizens of the same country, would all be voting for the same candidates, and supporting the same
reforms. Post-modernist philosophers have gotten a bad name because of their paradox-mongering habits, and their constant
use of terms like ìmpossible; `self-contradictory' and ùnrepresentable'. They have helped create a cult of inscrutability, one
which defines itself by opposition to the Enlightenment search for transparency - and more generally, to the `metaphysics of
presence; the idea that intellectual progress aims at getting things clearly illuminated, sharply delimited, wholly visible.
I am
all for getting rid of the metaphysics of presence, but I think that the rhetoric of impossibility and
unrepresentability is counterproductive overdramatization. It is one thing to say that we need to get rid
of the metaphor of things being accurately represented, once and for all, as a result of being bathed in the light of reason. This
metaphor has created a lot of headaches for philosophers, and we would be better off without it. But that does not show that
we are suddenly surrounded by unrepresentables; it just shows that `more accurate representation' was never a fruitful way to
describe intellectual progress. Even
if we agree that we shall never have what Derrida calls "a full
presence beyond the reach of play"; our sense of the possibilities open to humanity will
not have changed. We have learned nothing about the limits of human hope from metaphysics, or from the philosophy
of history, or from psychoanalysis. All that we have learned from `post-modern' philosophy is that we may need a different gloss
on the notion of `progress' than the rationalistic gloss which the Enlightenment offered. We
have been given no

reason to abandon the belief that a lot of progress has been made by carrying out the
Enlightenment's political program. Since Darwin we have come to suspect that whether such progress is made will
be largely a matter of luck. But we have been given no reason to stop hoping to get lucky.
Seventh, critiques of speech produces a reactionary politics in which change is focused

on language directly trading off with efforts to reform the socioeconomic root causes
of injustice
Brown, Professor Political Science UC Berkeley, 2K1
(Wendy, Politics Out of History, pg. 35-37)
Speech codes kill critique, Henry Louis Gates remarked in a 1993 essay on hate speech.14 Although Gates was referring to
what happens when hate
speech regulations, and the debates about them, usurp the discursive
space in which one might have offered a substantive political response to bigoted epithets, his
point also applies to prohibitions against questioning from within selected political practices or institutions. But turning
political questions into moralistic onesas speech codes of any sort donot only prohibits certain
questions and mandates certain genuflections, it also expresses a profound hostility toward political life insofar as it seeks to preempt argument with a legislated and enforced
truth. And the realization of that patently undemocratic desire can only and always convert emancipatory aspirations into
reactionary ones. Indeed, it insulates those aspirations from questioning at the very moment that Weberian forces of rationalization and bureaucratization are quite likely to be domesticating them from another direction. Here we greet a persistent
political paradox: the moralistic defense of critical practices, or of any besieged identity, weakens what it strives to fortify
precisely by sequestering those practices from the kind of critical inquiry out of which they were born. Thus Gates might have
said, Speech codes, born of social critique, kill critique. And, we might add, contemporary identity-based
institutions, born of social critique, invariably become conservative as they are forced to
essentialize the identity and naturalize the boundaries of what they once grasped as a contingent
effect of historically specific social powers. But moralistic reproaches to certain kinds of
speech or argument kill critique not only by displacing it with arguments about abstract rights versus identity-bound
injuries, but also by configuring political injustice and political righteousness as a problem of remarks,
attitude, and speech rather than as a matter of historical, political-economic, and cultural formations
of power. Rather than offering analytically substantive accounts of the forces of injustice or injury, they condemn the
manifestation of these forces in particular remarks or events. There is, in the inclination to ban (formally or informally) certain
utterances and to mandate others, a politics of rhetoric and gesture that itself symptomizes despair over effecting change at
more significant levels. As vast quantities of left and liberal attention go to determining what socially marked individuals say,
how they are represented, and how many of each kind appear in certain institutions or are appointed to various commissions,
the sources that generate racism, poverty, violence against women, and other elements of social injustice
remain relatively unarticulated and unaddressed. We are lost as how to address those sources; but rather than examine
this loss or disorientation, rather than bear the humiliation of our impotence, we posture as if we were still fighting the big and
good fight in our clamor over words and names. Dont mourn, moralize.
Eighth, rejecting discourse does nothing and leaves attitudes unchanged.

Kelly, 12/98 Peace Review
One might ask, in "listening" to violent language and to the people who use it, whether we are actually condoning such
When I listen to a person who, for example,

uses sexist language, I am not lending my approval to sexist language. Instead, what I am
saying is that the person behind the language, and my desire to make a connection with
that person, are more important than the sexist language. If I refuse to listen to the person
who uses sexist language, then I might prevent one particular case where sexist language is
used. But I do nothing to overcome the person's sexist attitudes. She will continue to use sexist
language. This is far from the case. To listen is not to pass judgment.
language long after I am out of sight. But if I give her a voice, if I show her respect, if I try to take her seriously as a person, then
In the future pershapes she will be more apt to take what I say about sexism seriously. If she knows that sexist language
bothers me, then perhaps she will be less likely to use it around me.
Eurocentrism
2AC
Permutation do both an approach will facilitates policy action is key to reconceptualize power. The alt alone ensures cooption, vote aff to use the masters tools
to take down the shed
Park, University of Oklahoma and Wilkins, University of Texas, 5
(Jane, Univ. of Oklahoma, Karin, Univ of Texas @ Austin, Global Media Journal, Re-orienting the
Orientalist Gaze, http://lass.purduecal.edu/cca/gmj/sp05/gmj-sp05-park-wilkins.htm, accessed 7/6/13,
IGM)
By implication, the north/south and west/east divisions conventionally understood as the way to
organize national settings within a global system are now less relevant. A dominant geometry of
development (Shah & Wilkins, 2004), divides countries along political (communism in east vs.
democracy in west), economic (industrialized north vs. agricultural south), cultural (modern vs.
traditional), and hierarchical (first =west; second =east, and third=south) lines. However, the validity of
these regional distinctions should be questioned. This model has been critiqued for its ethnocentric
and arrogant vision, collapsing diverse communities with a wide range of cultural histories into
monolithic groups. More often than not, the interests of domestic elites in poorer countries are
identical to the interests of the elite in the wealthier countries. These categorizations, such as
West/East, are problematic, given rapidly shifting political-economic contexts involving changing
patterns of political and economic dominance among national actors, the strengthening of regional
institutions and identities, the globalization of economic and communication systems, and the
privatization of industries (Hagopian, 2000; Schuurman, 2000). New global categorizations may need to
focus on access to resources, whether economic, political, social or cultural, within and across
geopolitical territories. Inequity in terms of access to resources then becomes the overarching concern
(Schuurman, 2000). Although we need to foreground tangible issues related to basic human needs, the
broader concern with access to resources addresses the intangible as well, touching on social, cultural,
political and spiritual resources (Steeves, 2002). Access to resources builds from ones position within a
socio-political network. This vision offers a more nuanced framework of power, in which networks
offer the possibility for some to reach certain goals, such as employment, education, media
production, policy making, and more. Power is not only activated within state and corporate
institutions, but also within social groups, though these networks tightly intersect. While issues of
territory are still relevant, particularly when clearly many groups, such as Palestinians, are struggling for
a sovereignty rooted in place, and nation-states are still critical actors in the global sphere (Morris &
Waisbord, 2001), we need to rethink relationships of power as partly connected with spatial
arrangements (Escobar, 2000; Escobar et al., 2002), and not just in terms of place. And when we do
consider place, we may need to attend to the critical role of regional actors and not just the US.
Permutation do both action is a prerequisite to change. Exclusively criticizing a

problem obscures the effects of imperialism
Lander, Central University of Venezuela Professor, 2k
(Edgardo, Sociologist, Venezuelan, professor at the Central University of Venezuela and a Fellow of the
Transnational Institute, 2000, Nepantla: Views from South, Volume 1, Issue 3, Eurocentrism and
Colonialism in Latin American Social Thought, pp. 519-523,
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/nepantla/summary/v001/1.3lander.html, Accessed 7/5/13, JB)
The main currents in postmodernism have not been able to escape from the limits of a grand Western,
Eurocentric narrative. The recognition of the colonial experience is essentially absent. 4 According to
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1994,66),Some of the most radical criticisms coming out of the West
today is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as
Subject....Although the history of 524 Nepantla Europe as subject is narrativized by the law, political
economy and ideology of the West, this concealed Subject pretends it has no geo-political
determinations. Exploring Foucaults and Gilles Deleuzes contributions, she concludes that their
findings are drastically limited by ignoring the epistemic violence of imperialism, as well as the
international division of labor. Spivak argues that once the version of a self-contained Western world is
assumed, its production by the imperialist project is ignored (86). Through these visions, the crisis of
European historyassumed as universalbecomes the crisis of all history. The crisis of the
metanarratives of the philosophy of history, of the certainty of its laws, becomes the crisis of the
future as such. The crisis of the subjects of that history turns into the dissolution of all subjects. The
disenchantment of a Marxist generation that experienced in its own flesh the political and
theoretical collapse of Marxism and socialism and lived through the existential trauma of the
recognition of the gulag evolves into universal skepticism and the end of collective projects and
politics. This justifies a cool attitude of noninvolvement, where all ethical indignation in the face of
injustice is absent. In reaction to structuralism, economism, and determinism, the discursive processes
and the construction of meanings are unilaterally emphasized. Economic relations and all notions of
exploitation disappear from the cognitive map. The crisis of the political and epistemological
totalizing models leads to a withdrawal toward the partial and local, rendering the role of
centralized political, military, and economic powers opaque. The Gulf War thus becomes no more
than a grand show, a televised superproduction.
For these perspectives, the crisis is not of modernity as such, but of one of its constitutive dimensions:
historical reason (Quijano 1990). Its other dimension, instrumental reason (scientific and technological
development, limitless progress, and the universal logic of the market),finds neither criticism nor
resistance. History continues to exist only in a limited sense: the underdeveloped countries still have
some way to go before reaching the finish line where the winners of the great universal competition
toward progress await them. It seems a matter of little importance that the majority of the worlds
inhabitants may never reach that goal, due to the fact that the consumer patterns and the levels of
material well-being of the central countries are possible only as a consequence of an absolutely
lopsided use of the resources and the planets carrying capacity.
Theory alone cant solve an understanding of the role of IR in creating change is key
to effective criticism
Matin, committee member of Centre for Advanced International Theory, 12 (Kamran,
European Journal of International Relations 2013 19: 353
Redeeming the universal: Postcolonialism and the inner life of Eurocentrism,
http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/19/2/353 pg. 355, date accessed 7/7/13 IGM)
My core argument is that there is a fundamental tension between theory and method in
postcolonialism that prevents the translation of its critique of Eurocentrism into an alternative nonethnocentric social theory. For on the one hand, postcolonialism declares macro-theoretical
agnosticism toward the social in general, which is manifest in its categorical rejection of, or deep
skepticism toward, the concept of the universal identified with Eurocentric anticipation and violent
pursuit of global socio-cultural homogeneity. On the other hand, postcolonialism comprehends colonial
socialities in terms of their interactive constitution through a method whose strategic site of operation
is specifically the intersocietal or the international. But the idea of the international logically requires
a general conception of the social in general whose historical referent bursts the empirical bounds
of any notion of the social in the singular, whether society, culture, or civilization. This is for the simple
reason that the idea of the international encompasses, or rather ought to encompass, the
interconnected multiplicity of the social as an ontological property. This mutually constitutive relation
between the social and the international escapes any theory that is strategically anchored in only one
of these two dimensions of social reality. The apparent theoretical incommensurability of classical IR
and social and political theories is a testimony to this claim (Waltz, 1979; Wight, 1966). A unified
theoretical comprehension of the social and the international must, I therefore contend, be central
to any attempt at supplanting Eurocentrism. This requires an explicit theoretical incorporation of
the universal. But a conception of the universal that is fundamentally rethought away from being an
immanent self-transcendence of the particular, and re-comprehended as a radical amenability to,
and constitutiveness of, alterity (Cheah, 2008; cf. Chernilo, 2006). IR with its paradigmatic focus on the
condition and consequences of political multiplicity is arguably a, if not the most, fertile intellectual
ground for pursuing such a theoretical project. That this intellectual potential has not been realized
has a great deal to do with the supra-social and non-historical conception of the international by
main stream IR theory; a problem that recent historical sociological scholarship in IR has thrown in to
sharp relief (e.g. Lawson, 2006; Rosenberg, 1994; Teschke, 2003). But a historical sociological IR in
and of itself cannot succeed in exorcizing IRs Eurocentric spirit. The historicization of international
relations has to be dialectically complemented with the internationalization of the social, that is, the
theoretical articulation of the constitutive impact of the interactive coexistence of multiple societies on
internal processes of social change (Matin, 2007). The idea of uneven and combined development
(Trotsky, 1985), I argue, contains the organic integration of these two intellectual moves involving an
interactive and heterogeneous notion of the universal. It is therefore imbued with a radical
potential for generating a positive non-ethnocentric international social theory.
European thought is the crux and root of Western and modern philosophy- no
solvency access for the alt
Wallerstein, is an American sociologist, historical social scientist, and world-systems
analyst, 97
(Immanuel, an American sociologist, historical social scientist, and world-systems analyst. His bimonthly
commentaries on world affairs are syndicated, 1997, Binghamton.edu "Eurocentrism and its Avatars:
The Dilemmas of Social Science," http://www2.binghamton.edu/fbc/archive/iweuroc.htm, Accessed:
7/6/13, LPS.)
(2) Universalism. Universalism is the view that there exist scientific truths that are valid across all of
time and space. European thought of the last few centuries has been strongly universalist for the most
part. This was the era of the cultural triumph of science as a knowledge activity. Science displaced
philosophy as the prestige mode of knowledge and the arbiter of social discourse. The science of
which we are talking is Newtonian-Cartesian science. Its premises were that the world was governed by
determinist laws taking the form of linear equilibria processes, and that, by stating such laws as
universal reversible equations, we only needed knowledge in addition of some set of initial conditions to
permit us to predict its state at any future or past time. What this meant for social knowledge seemed
clear. Social scientists might discover the universal processes that explain human behavior, and
whatever hypotheses they could verify were thought to hold across time and space, or should be stated
in ways such that they hold true across time and space. The persona of the scholar was irrelevant, since
scholars were operating as value-neutral analysts. And the locus of the empirical evidence could be
essentially ignored, provided the data were handled correctly, since the processes were thought to be
constant. The consequences were not too different, however, in the case of those scholars whose
approach was more historical and idiographic, as long as one assumed the existence of an underlying
model of historical development. All stage theories (whether of Comte or Spencer or Marx, to choose
only a few names from a long list) were primarily theorizations of what has been called the Whig
interpretation of history, the presumption that the present is the best time ever and that the past led
inevitably to the present. And even very empiricist historical writing, however much it proclaimed
abhorrence of theorizing, tended nonetheless to reflect subconsciously an underlying stage theory.
Whether in the ahistorical time-reversible form of the nomothetic social scientists or the diachronic
stage theory form of the historians, European social science was resolutely universalist in asserting
that whatever it was that happened in Europe in the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries represented a
pattern that was applicable everywhere, either because it was a progressive achievement of mankind
which was irreversible or because it represented the fulfillment of humanity's basic needs via the
removal of artificial obstacles to this realization. What you saw now in Europe was not only good but the
face of the future everywhere. Universalizing theories have always come under attack on the grounds
that the particular situation in a particular time and place did not seem to fit the model. There have also
always been scholars who argued that universal generalizations were intrinsically impossible. But in the
last thirty years a third kind of attack has been made against the universalizing theories of modern social
science. It has been argued that these allegedly universal theories are not in fact universal, but rather a
presentation of the Western historical pattern as though it were universal. Joseph Needham quite some
time ago designated as the "fundamental error of Eurocentrism ...the tacit postulate that modern
science and technology, which in fact took root in Renaissance Europe, is universal and that it follows
that all that is European is" (cited in Abdel-Malek, 1981: 89).
Social science thus has been accused of being Eurocentric insofar as it was particularistic. More than
Eurocentric, it was said to be highly parochial. This hurt to the quick, since modern social science prided
itself specifically on having risen above the parochial. To the degree that this charge seemed reasonable,
it was far more telling than merely asserting that the universal propositions had not yet been
formulated in a way that could account for every case.
K links to itself- critiques of Eurocentrism fail- they are reproduced from a Eurocentric
form of thought means theres no way to solve
Wallerstein, is an American sociologist, historical social scientist, and world-systems
analyst, 97
(Immanuel, an American sociologist, historical social scientist, and world-systems analyst. His bimonthly
commentaries on world affairs are syndicated, 1997, Binghamton.edu "Eurocentrism and its Avatars:
The Dilemmas of Social Science," http://www2.binghamton.edu/fbc/archive/iweuroc.htm, Accessed:
7/6/13, LPS.)
The multiple forms of Eurocentrism and the multiple forms of the critique of Eurocentrism do not
necessarily add up to a coherent picture. What we might do is try to assess the central debate.
Institutionalized social science started as an activity in Europe, as we have noted. It has been charged
with painting a false picture of social reality by misreading, grossly exaggerating, and/or distorting the
historical role of Europe, particularly its historical role in the modern world. The critics fundamentally
make, however, three different (and somewhat contradictory) kinds of claims. The first is that
whatever it is that Europe did, other civilizations were also in the process of doing it, up to the moment
that Europe used its geopoliticaL power to interrupt the process in other parts of the world. The second
is that whatever Europe did is nothing more than a continuation of what others had already been doing
for a long time, with the Europeans temporarily coming to the foreground. The third is that whatever
Europe did has been analyzed incorrectly and subjected to inappropriate extrapolations, which have had
dangerous consequences for both science and the political world. The first two arguments, widely
offered, seem to me to suffer from what I would term "anti-Eurocentric Eurocentrism." The third
argument seems to me to be undoubtedly correct, and deserves our full attention. What kind of curious
animal could "anti-Eurocentric Eurocentrism" be? Let us take each of these arguments in turn. There
have been throughout the twentieth century persons who have argued that, within the framework of
say Chinese, or Indian, or Arab-Muslim "civilization," there existed both the cultural foundations and the
socio-historical pattern of development that would have led to the emergence of full-fledged modern
capitalism, or indeed was in the process of leading in that direction. In the case of Japan, the argument
is often even stronger, asserting that modern capitalism did develop there, separately but temporally
coincident with its development in Europe. The heart of most of these arguments is a stage theory of
development (frequently its Marxist variant), from which it logically followed that different parts of the
world were all on parallel roads to modernity or capitalism. This form of argument presumed both the
distinctiveness and social autonomy of the various civilizational regions of the world on the one hand
and their common subordination to an overarching pattern on the other. Since almost all the various
arguments of this kind are specific to a given cultural zone and its historical development, it would be a
massive exercise to discuss the historical plausibility of the case of each civilizational zone under
discussion. I do not propose to do so here. What I would point out is one logical limitation to this line
of argument whatever the region under discussion, and one general intellectual consequence. The
logical limitAtion is very obvious. Even if it is true that various other parts of the world were going down
the road to modernity/capitalism, perhaps were even far along this road, this still leaves us with the
problem of accounting for the fact that it was the West, or Europe, that reached there first, and was
consequently able to "conquer the world." At this point, we are back to the question as origin- ally
posed, why modernity/capitalism in the West? Of course, today there are some who are denying that
Europe in a deep sense did conquer the world on the grounds that there has| always been resistance,
but this seems to me to be stretching our reading of reality. There was after all real colonial conquest
that covered a large portion of the globe. There are after all rea military indicators of European strength.
No doubt there were always multiple forms of resistance, both active and passive, but if the resistance
were truly so formidable, there would be nothing for us to discuss today. If we insist too much on nonEuropean agency as a theme, we end up whitewashing all of Europe's sins, or at least most of them. This
seems to me not what the critics were intending. In any case, however temporary we deem Europe's
domination to be, we still need to explain it. Most of the critics pursuing this line of argument are more
interested in explaining how Europe interrupted an indigenous process in their part of the world than
in| explaining how it was that Europe was able to do this. Even more to the point, by attempting to
diminish Europe's credit for this deed, this presumed "achievement," they reinforce the theme that it
was an achievement. The theory makes Europe into an "evil hero" - no doubt evil, but also no doubt a
hero in the dramatic sense of the term, for it was Europe that made the final spurt in the race and
crossed the finish line first. And worse still, there is the implication, not too far beneath the surface,
that, given half a chance, Chinese, or Indians, or Arabs not only could have, but would have, done the
same - that is, launch modernity/capitalism, conquer the world, exploit resources and people, and play
themselves the role of evil hero. This view of modern history seems to be very Eurocentric in its antiEurocentrism, because it accepts the significance (that is, the value) of the European "achievement"
in precisely the terms that Europe has defined it, and merely asserts that others could have done it
too, or were doing it too. For some possibly accidental reason, Europe got a temporary edge on the
others and interfered with their development forcibly. The assertion that we others could have been
Europeans too seems to me a very feeble way of opposing Eurocentrism, and actually reinforces the
worst consequences of Eurocentric thought for social knowledge. The second line of opposition to
Eurocentric analyses is that which denies that there is anything really new in what Europe did. This line
of argument starts by pointing out that, as of the late Middle Ages, and indeed for a long time before
that, western Europe was a marginal (peripheral) area of the Eurasian continent, whose historical role
and cultural achievements were below the level of various other parts of the world (such as the Arab
world or China). This is undoubtedly true, at least as a first-level generalization. A quick jump is then
made to situating modern Europe within the construction of an ecumene or world structure that has
been in creation for several thousand years (see various authors in Sanderson, 1995). This is not
implausible, but the systemic meaningfulness of this ecumene has yet to be established, in my view. We
then come to the third element in the sequence. It is said to follow from the prior marginality of western
Europe and the millennial construction of a Eurasian world ecumene that whatever happened in
western Europe was nothing special and simply one more variant in the historical construction of a
singular system. This latter argument seems to me conceptually and historically very wrong. I do not
intend however to reargue this case (see Wallerstein, 1992a). I wish merely to underline the ways in
which this is anti-Eurocentric Eurocentrism. Logically, it requires arguing that capitalism is nothing new,
and indeed some of those who argue the continuity of the development of the Eurasian ecumene have
explicitly taken this position. Unlike the position of those who are arguing that a given other civilization
was also en route to capitalism when Europe interfered with this process, the argument here is that we
were all of us doing this together, and that there was no real development towards capitalism because
the whole world (or at least the whole Eurasian ecumene) was always capitalist in some sense. Let me
point out first of all that this is the classic position of the liberal economists. This is not really different
from Adam Smith arguing that there exists a "propensity [in human nature] to truck, barter, and
exchange one thing for another" (1937, 13). It eliminates essential differences between different
historical systems. If the Chinese, the Egyptians, and the Western Europeans have all been doing the
same thing historically, in what sense are they different civilizations, or different historical systems? (per
contra, see Amin 1991). In eliminating credit to Europe, is there any credit left to anyone except to panhumanity? But again worst of all, by appropriating what modern Europe did for the balance-sheet of
the Eurasian ecumene, we are accepting the essential ideological argument of Eurocentrism, that
modernity (or capitalism) is miraculous, and wonderful, and merely addding that everyone has always
been doing it in one way or another. By denying European credit, we deny European blame. What is so
terrible about Europe's "conquest of the world" if it is nothing but the latest part of the ongoing march
of the ecumene? Far from being a form of argument that is critical of Europe, it implies applause that
Europe, having been a "marginal" part of the ecumene, at last learned the wisdom of the others (and
elders) and applied it successfully. And the unspoken clincher follows inevitably. If the Eurasian
ecumene has been following a single thread for thousands of years, and the capitalist world-system is
nothing new, then what possible argument is there that would indicate that this thread will not continue
forever, or at least for an indefinitely long time? If capitalism did not begin in the sixteenth (or the
eighteenth) century, it is surely not about to end in the twenty-first. Personally, I simply do not believe
this, and I have made the case in several recent writings (Wallerstein, 1995; Hopkins & Wallerstein,
1996). My main point, however, here, is that this line of argument is in no way anti-Eurocentric, since it
accepts the basic set of values that have been put forward by Europe in its period of world dominance,
and thereby in fact denies and/or undermines competing value systems that were, or are, in honor in
other parts of the world.
Eurocentric Framing is inevitable human nature

Zahrai, Ethics Journalist, 8
(Koorosh Zahrai, March 18, 2008, Control Structures Review, Eurocentrism: The basis of our society,
culture, and source of our problem coexisting with nature,
http://controlstructures.spheerix.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19:eurocentris
m-the-basis-of-our-society-culture-and-source-of-our-problem-coexisting-with-nature&catid=5:digitalculture&Itemid=6, accessed July 6, 2013, EK)
The Eurocentric worldview permeates every aspect of our lives, as we are all products of the system
of the United States. Whether at home or abroad, in our relationships with each other and nature,
each of us participates in and replicates these notions of Western society and culture, as we are all
indoctrinated through the education system and communal socialization. Creating new living
experiences and narratives free of these constraining and altered states of being begins with liberation
of our selves, minds, and actions and becoming harmonious in our relations with nature and each other.
More positive present and future experiences will shape our paths so that we can all join together to
work on attaining a more meaningful relationship with our surroundings.
Unthinking Eurocentrism focusses on Eurocentrism and multiculturalism in popular culture. It is written
in the passionate belief that an awareness of the intellectually debilitating effects of the Eurocentric
legacy is indispensable for comprehending not only contemporary media representations but even
contemporary subjectivities. Endemic in present-day thought and education, Eurocentrism is
naturalized as "common sense." Philosophy and literature are assumed to be European philosophy and
literature. The "best that is thought and written" is assumed to have been thought and written by
Europeans. (By Europeans, we refer not only to Europe per se but also to the "neo-Europeans" of the
Americas, Australia, and elsewhere.) History is assumed to be European history, everything else being
reduced to what historian Hugh Trevor-Roper (in 1965!) patronizingly called the "unrewarding gyrations
of barbarous tribes in picturesque but irrelevant corners of the globe."1 Standard core courses in
universities stress the history of "Western" civilization, with the more liberal universities insisting on
token study of "other" civilizations. And even "Western" civilization is usually taught without reference
to the central role of European colonialism within capitalist modernity. So embedded is Eurocentrism in
everyday life, so pervasive, that it often goes unnoticed. The residual traces of centuries of axiomatic
European domination inform the general culture, the everyday language, and the media, engendering
a fictitious sense of the innate superiority of European-derived cultures and peoples.
Failed States
2AC
Perm Solves we can problematize the failed states framework while not abandoning
it.
Call 10, Assistant Professor in the International Peace and Conflict Resolution program, and a Senior
Fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace) 10 (Beyond the failed state: Toward conceptual alternatives,
European Journal of
International Relations XX(X) 124
Rather than recognizing state fragility and reacting in a formulaic manner, the key challenge for
analysis and action is how to best balance competing interests with the conditions on the ground to
fill the right gaps. Of course, national populations and their representatives should be the protagonists
in deliberations about the most sustainable institutions and strategies to address security, legitimacy,
and capacity gaps. Yet too often international actors are in unique positions of determining which
actors will be at the table, and whose voices will prevail. Furthermore, powerful Western states tend
to see failing or fragile states through the lens of their interests. They treat strategically important
fragile states different from those that neither possess important natural resources nor pose a serious
threat like mass destruction. Thus when dealing with opponents like North Korea or Iran, powerful
Western states will tend to privilege their legitimacy gaps over their capacity or security gaps.
Conversely, when addressing allied countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Saudi Arabia, the West
will tend to privilege assisting a state with its capacity gap over acknowledging any need to mediate
with internal enemies (the security gap) or to confront internal legitimacy shortfalls. Recognizing
these tendencies can help identify flawed policies and anticipate their consequences. Sound judgment
in approaching weak, war-torn, or autocratic states is essential. Good policy requires knowing how and
when to balance the need to reassure former enemies against the need for improved capacity, the need
to foster legitimate rule with short-term security concerns or long-term capacity requirements. At a
minimum, I hope to dislodge policy from a one-dimensional and overaggregated analytic framework.
At a maximum, balancing the imperatives of responding to these three gaps may be the crux of
formulating policies that can meet short-term and long-term objectives.
The use of failed states rhetoric is better than alternatives because it creates a
rhetorical limitation on intervention this turns the impact to the K.
Kaufman 8 Kaufmann Greg, former USAF Colonel, 2008 "Stability Operations and State Building:
Continuities and Contingencies"
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=879
Malinowski argued that there were six minimal requirements for an institution: charters, personnel,
norms, material apparatus, activities and function(s) (see Figure 1.). Charters provide the socio-cultural
and moral legitimacy for an institution (i.e., the social and cultural warrants). The personnel and norms
of a chartered institution define what is now referred to as the organizational culture of the
institution.76 The material apparatus (artifacts) and the activities (observed actions), the informal
culture of organizations, contain the lived and living reality of their operation.77 Finally, we have the
function of the chartered institution which is, to use Malinowskis words, . . . the integral result of
organized activities.78 In the 21st century, we rarely speak in the terms used between World Wars I
and II (e.g., of direct and indirect rule). Rather, we tend to speak of failing or failed states, and use a
political rhetoric, at the general policy level, that is more often couched in terms of human rights, selfdetermination, and humanitarian concerns.79 National interest concerns, such as access to and
control over natural resources, basing rights, trade access, etc., are often used in the current rhetoric
with highly negative connotations, and even self-defense arguments are questioned.80 This
rhetorical shift has had a major impact on mission warrants (see Section II) which are no longer in
terms of direct or indirect rule but, frequently, in terms of temporary co-rule or crisis
intervention; the analogy is no longer to parents but to midwives and social workers.81 This
shift, in turn, has produced significant limitations in both time and potential actions on what social
and cultural engineering can take place.
Failed states thesis matches empirical realities and understanding the impact of failed
states is key to policymaking.
Newman 9 EDWARD NEWMAN, Senior Lecturer in International Relations and former Deputy Head of
the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham. He is also
an International Associate at the Center for Peace and Human Security, Institut d'tudes Politiques de
Paris. Newman was previously Director of Studies on Conflict and Security in the Peace and Governance
Programme of the United Nations University in Tokyo.[1] He is the editor-in-chief of the journal Civil
Wars, Failed States and International Order: Constructing a Post-Westphalian World, Contemporary
Security Policy, Vol.30, No.3 (December 2009), pp.421443
This suggests that international conflict and security in the 21st century in terms of empirical
patterns, and how these are studied and addressed in policy terms reflect a broader
transformation to a post-Westphalian world. This is conceived of as a world where notions of
inviolable and equal state sovereignty never actually a reality but often respected as a norm are
breaking down; where states are no longer the sole or even the most important actors in many areas
of international politics; where states cannot be assumed to be viable or autonomous agents; where
insecurity and conflict is primarily characterized by civil war, insurgency and state failure, rather
than inter-state war; where the distinction between domestic and international politics is irreversibly
blurred in terms of causes and impacts; where the nature of, and responses to, security challenges
hold implications for norms of state sovereignty and territorial integrity; and where solidarist norms
related to governance and human rights are slowly and selectively transcending absolute norms
of sovereignty and non-interference.
Rejecting the failed state category is epistemologically bankrupt it ignores the

realities of armed conflict within failing states.
Newman 9 EDWARD NEWMAN, Senior Lecturer in International Relations and former Deputy Head of
the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham. He is also
an International Associate at the Center for Peace and Human Security, Institut d'tudes Politiques de
Paris. Newman was previously Director of Studies on Conflict and Security in the Peace and Governance
Programme of the United Nations University in Tokyo.[1] He is the editor-in-chief of the journal Civil
Wars, Failed States and International Order: Constructing a Post-Westphalian World, Contemporary
Security Policy, Vol.30, No.3 (December 2009), pp.421443
The empirical debate on failed states and their significance whether their security implications
constitute a post-Westphalian reality is inconclusive, and it certainly cannot be resolved here. The
debate is characterized by different definitions and indicators of failed states, and the security impacts
vary and are anecdotal. A range of different empirical rankings feature the same approximately 40
states as weak, in varying degrees, and displaying some or all of the pathologies associated with this
condition. They are also generally dependent upon international aid and assistance. A far smaller
number of states approach the condition of failed. Nevertheless, this number of weak and
potentially failed states is significant enough in itself to represent a challenge to the Westphalian
ontology or rather, to indicate that the Westphalian model is not and perhaps never was
representative of the reality of security and insecurity for much of the world. They defy the idea of an
international system of two hundred or so autonomous, viable states in control of their territory and
borders, and they defy the idea of the entirety of the world being divided amongst and covered by
sovereign authorities. Mainstream international relations theories and approaches to international
security premised upon these conventional assumptions are therefore clearly missing a significant
amount of the reality of the world. Weak or failed states may not necessarily represent a viable
category in themselves, given their enormous diversity and the analytical imprecision of the
concept. Yet the fact that a significant number of states do not live up to the Westphalian model
even if there is not a satisfactory definition of this excluded other is surely a challenge to the
Westphalian construction. Irrespective of whether this is new, the construction of the legalist
Westphalian model is fundamentally under challenge. In terms of the experience of insecurity and
armed violence in the late 20th and early 21st century, again there appears to be a post-Westphalian
reality. The absolute numbers of civil wars and situations of generalized violence in collapsing states
is, and has generally been, much higher than conventional inter-state wars. The number of people
killed or forcibly displaced by civil wars since the end of the Second World War has dwarfed those
victimized in inter-state wars. Of course, this does not in itself undermine the Westphalian model of
international security, or mainstream IR approaches that are preoccupied with inter-state security and
insecurity. As the neorealists would argue, they are not aiming to describe everything about the
international system, just the most important aspects.38 Yet surely the reality of armed conflict
predominantly inside (failing) states rather than between states is a challenge to the Westphalian
model, even if die-hard neorealists can skirt around this.
Fear of Death
2AC
1. No link their evidence is descriptive of people who are obsessed with death in the
past and not advocacy of policies that actually prevent future violence, like the 1AC
2. Not competitive the 1AC doesnt argue, on face, that death is a bad thing. They
assumed that for themselves, which proves that fear of death is inevitable
3. Good fear of death is distinct from irrational fear it allows us to reduce

danger, live ethically, and prepare for a peaceful death on our own terms
Gyatso 2003 [Geshe Kelsang, fully accomplished meditation master, internationally renowned spiritual teacher who can show us from
his experience how to begin our spiritual paths, author, Fear of Death, Tharpa Publications, www.tharpa.com/background/fear-of-death.htm,
acc 10-26-04//uwyo-ajl]
Generally, our fear of death is an unhealthy and unrealistic fear-we don't want to die, so we ignore the
subject, deny it, or get morbidly obsessed by it and think that life is meaningless. However, right now we cannot do anything
about dying, so there is no point fearing death itself. What kind of fear is useful?
A healthy fear of death would be

the fear of dying unprepared, as this is a fear we can do something about, a danger we can
avert. If we have this realistic fear, this sense of danger, we are encouraged to prepare for a
peaceful and successful death and are also inspired to make the most of our very precious
human life instead of wasting it. This "sense of danger" inspires us to make preparations so
that we are no longer in the danger we are in now, for example by practicing moral
discipline, purifying our negative karma, and accumulating as much merit, or good karma, as possible. We put on a seat belt
out of a sense of danger of the unseen dangers of traffic on the road, and that seat belt protects us from going through the
windshield. We can do nothing about other traffic, but we can do something about whether or not we go through the
windscreen if someone crashes into us. Similarly, we
can do nothing about the fact of death, but we can

seize control over how we prepare for death and how we die. Eventually, through Tantric spiritual
practice, we can even attain a deathless body.
4. Every affirmative ethical stance requires a repressed element of negation,

meaning that every affirmation of life occurs against the background of fear of
death.
Zizek '99 [Slavoj, Senior Researcher at Institute for Social Studies, Ljubliana and Badass, The Ticklish Subject: the absent centre of political
ontology, New York: Verso, 1999, 153-4//uwyo-ajl]
It would therefore be tempting to risk a Badiouian-Pauline reading of the end of psychoanalysis, determining it as a
New Beginning, a symbolic 'rebirth' - the radical restructuring of the analysand's subjectivity in such a way that the
vicious cycle of the superego is suspended, left behind. Does not Lacan himself provide a number of hints that the
end of analysis opens up the domain of Love beyond Law, using the very Pauline terms to which Badiou refers?
Nevertheless, Lacan's way is not that of St Paul or Badiou: psychoanalysis is not 'psychosynthesis'; it does
not already posit a 'new harmony', a new Truth-Event; it - as it were - merely wipes the
slate clean for one. However, this 'merely' should be put in quotation marks, because it is Lacan's contention
that, in this negative gesture of 'wiping the slate clean', something (a void) is confronted
which is already 'sutured' with the arrival of a new Truth-Event. For Lacan, negativity, a
negative gesture of withdrawal, precedes any positive gesture of enthusiastic
identifiction with a Cause: negativity functions as the condition of (im)possibility of
the enthusiastic identification - that is to say, it lays the ground, opens up space for it,
but is simultaneously obfuscated by it and undermines it. For this reason, Lacan implicitly changes the
balance between Death and Resurrection in favour of Death: what 'Death' stands for at its most radical is not
merely the passing of earthly life, but the 'night of the world', the self-withdrawal, the absolute contraction
of subjectivity, the severing of its links with 'reality' - this is the 'wiping the slate
clean' that opens up the domain of the symbolic New Beginning, of the emergence of the
'New Harmony' sustained by a newly emerged Master-Signifier. Here, Lacan parts company with St Paul and Badiou:
God not only is but always-already was dead - that is to say, after Freud, one cannot directly have faith in a TruthEvent; every such Event ultimately remains
a semblance obfuscating a preceding Void
whose Freudian name is death drive. So Lacan differs from Badiou in the determination of the exact
status of this domain beyond the rule of the Law. That is to say: like Lacan, Badiou delineates the contours of a
domain beyond the Order of Being, beyond the politics of service des biens, beyond the 'morbid' super ego
connection between Law and its transgressive desire. For Lacan, however, the Freudian topic of the death drive
cannot be accounted for in the terms of this connection: the
'death drive' is not the outcome of the

morbid confusion of Life and Death caused by the intervention of the symbolic Law.
For Lacan, the uncanny domain beyond the Order of Being is what he calls the domain
'between the two deaths', the pre-ontologicalf domain of monstrous spectral
apparitions, the domain that is 'immortal', yet not in the Badiouian sense of the immortality of participating in
Truth, but in the sense of what Lacan calls lamella, of the monstrous 'undead' object-libido.18
5. Fear of death motivates heroic protection of others, allowing us to transcend our

isolation towards a liberatory ethics of love and justice for the oppressed
Greenspan 4 *Miriam, Psychotherapist who understands the Chakras, Excerpt, Healing through the Dark Emotions: The Wisdom of
Grief, Fear, and Despair, May 11, 2004, www.spiritualityhealth.com/newsh/excerpts/bookreview/excp_5513.html, Acc 10-26-04//uwyo]
"Fear
is a very powerful emotion. When you feel fear in your body, it's helpful to relate to it as an energy that can
be mobilized for life. It may feel like a constriction in your chest, throat, or abdomen. Breathe through it without
judgment and allow yourself to feel it as a very strong force. If you pray for help, you can begin to expand this
energy we call 'fear' and use it for healing and transformation. "In this regard, we can take our model
from the heroes of Flight 93 who. realizing that they were bound for death, stormed the plane
and brought it down without hitting a civilian target. One cannot even imagine being able
to do this without fear. Fear for the lives of others was the energy that mobilized them to
do something meaningful with their last moments of life. Some of these people said good-bye to their
husbands and wives and wished them happiness before they left this earth. They had found some peace in their last
moments, peace in the midst of turbulence. And they found it through their last wish, which they heroically
put into action: to help others live. "Perhaps there is nothing that can redeem the dead but our own actions for
the good. This is a time to find out what we want to do for the world and do it. And, as every trauma survivor knows, this is
the way to make meaning out of pain, perhaps the most effective way: to draw something good out
of evil. The heroes of September 11 point us to the choice we each have: to help create a state of
global peace and justice that we, like they, will not see before we die. It is in giving ourselves
to this vision, out of love for this world that we inhabit together, that we stand a chance of
transcending the human proclivity to damage life. And that we honor those we have
brought into this world and who must inherit it. . . . "Our only protection is in our interconnectedness.
This has always been the message of the dark emotions when they are experienced most deeply and widely. Grief is not just
"my" grief; it is the grief of every motherless child, every witness to horror in the world. Despair is not just "my" despair; it is
everyone's despair about life in the twentyfirst century. Fear
is not just 'my' fear; it is everyone's fear of

anthrax, of nuclear war, of truck bombs, of airplane hijackings, of things falling apart, blowing up, sickening
and dying. "If fear is only telling you to save your own skin, there's not much hope for us. But the fact is that in
conscious fear, there is a potentially revolutionary power of compassion and connection
that can be mobilized en masse. This is the power of fear. Our collective fear, which is intelligent, is telling us now:
Find new ways to keep this global village safe. Find new forms of international cooperation
that will root out evil in ways that don't create more victims and more evil. Leap out of the
confines of national egos. Learn the ways of peace. Find a ceremony of safety so that not just you and I but
all of us can live together without fear."
6. Denial of fear causes powerlessness that maintains the paranoiac postures of

nationalism, nuclearism, and state violence fear of destruction motivates us to
overcome those divisions
Gleisner 83 [John, consultant psychiatrist at the North Western Regional Health Authority in Greater Manchester, active in the Medical
Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons, The enemy within, new internationalist 121, March, www.newint.org/issue121/enemy.htm, acc 10-2604//uwyo]
The noted sociologist and psychologist Gregory Bateson drew an analogy between nuclear deterrence and drug addiction: the
fix (new weapon) gives a sense of wellbeing that gradually fades only to require a bigger fix. What the two also have in
common is a powerful dose of denial. Denial
of the danger of nuclear war underlies government

thinking on defense. The publics denial may be less strong, but they are hampered in their
understanding by a pervading sense of powerlessness, which in turn leads to more denial:
nuclear war may well happen. But not to me. Our thinking cannot change without
combatting denial and projection the mechanisms of the psychological war machine.
Logical argument in the face of paranoia is as ineffective as with a person in the grips of a psychotic
episode. Emotion is whats needed emotion directed appropriately. Fear of nuclear war
and its effects are legitimate and appropriate and can lead to reappraisal of the old fear
the Russian threat. Another method of penetrating denial is to look for the absurdity in the whole upside-down logic of the old
them-us thought structure. Confronting
denial and projection can be painful, disorienting and can

leave one feeling powerless. But another new belief network is gaining ground. The peace
movement is at last building another way of thinking that can sway governments as
countless people are daring to reject the old them-us psychology. But the question is: can we
develop this new way of thinking in time to avert catastrophe?
7. Fear of death is necessary to prevent genocide and extinction

Beres, PhD at Princeton, 96 (Louis Rene, No Fear, No Trembling Israel, Death and the Meaning of Anxiety,
www.freeman.org/m_online/feb96/beresn.htm)
Fear of death, the ultimate source of anxiety, is essential to human survival. This is true not only for
individuals, but also for states. Without such fear, states will exhibit an incapacity to
confront nonbeing that can hasten their disappearance. So it is today with the State of Israel. Israel
suffers acutely from insufficient existential dread. Refusing to tremble before the growing prospect of collective disintegration a forseeable prospect connected with both genocide and war - this state is now unable to take the necessary steps toward
collective survival. What is more, because death is the one fact of life which is not relative but absolute, Israel's blithe
unawareness of its national mortality deprives its still living days of essential absoluteness and growth. For states, just as for
individuals, confronting
death can give the most positive reality to life itself. In this respect, a
cultivated awareness of nonbeing is central to each state's pattern of potentialities as well as to its very existence. When a
state chooses to block off such an awareness, a choice currently made by the State of Israel, it loses,
possibly forever, the altogether critical benefits of "anxiety." There is, of course, a distinctly ironic resonance to this
argument. Anxiety, after all, is generally taken as a negative, as a liability that cripples rather than enhances life. But anxiety is
not something we "have." It is something we (states and individuals) "are." It is true, to be sure, that anxiety, at the onset of
psychosis, can lead individuals to experience literally the threat of self-dissolution, but this is, by definition, not a problem for
states. Anxiety stems from the awareness that existence can actually be destroyed, that one can
actually become nothing. An ontological characteristic, it has been commonly called Angst, a word related to anguish (which
comes from the Latin angustus, "narrow," which in turn comes from angere, "to choke.") Herein lies the relevant idea of birth
trauma as the prototype of all anxiety, as "pain in narrows" through the "choking" straits of birth. Kierkegaard identified anxiety
as "the dizziness of freedom," adding: "Anxiety
is the reality of freedom as a potentiality before this

freedom has materialized." This brings us back to Israel. Both individuals and states may surrender
freedom in the hope of ridding themselves of an unbearable anxiety. Regarding states, such
surrender can lead to a rampant and delirious collectivism which stamps out all political opposition. It can also lead to a
national self-delusion which augments enemy power and hastens catastrophic war. For the
Jewish State, a lack of pertinent anxiety, of the positive aspect of Angst, has already led its people to what is likely an
irreversible rendezvous with extinction.
Feminism
2AC
1) Perm do Both
2) Perm Solves we can include interests of women in policy making
Lovenduski 5 (Joni, University of London http://www.cambridge.org/asia/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521852227&ss=exc) jjv
Since the last quarter of the twentieth century there has been a proliferation of (state) agencies
established to promote womens status and rights, often called womens policy agencies. WPAs are
sometimes termed state feminist. State feminism is a contested term. To some it is an oxymoron. It has been variously defined as
the activities of feminists or femocrats in government and administration (Hernes 1987; Sawer 1990), institutionalised feminism in public
agencies (Eisenstein 1990; Outshoorn 1994), and the capacity of the state to contribute to the fulfilment of a feminist agenda (Sawer 1990;
Stetson 1987). In
this book we define state feminism as the advocacy of womens movement demands
inside the state. The establishment of WPAs changed the setting in which the womens movement and other feminists could advance
their aims, as they offered, in principle, the possibility to influence the agenda and to further feminist goals through public policies from inside
the state apparatus. WPAs could increase womens access to the state by furthering womens participation in political decision-making, and by
inserting feminist goals into public policy. Thus WPAs may enhance the political representation of women. WPAs vary considerably in their
capacity, resources and effectiveness, raising questions about the circumstances under which they are most likely to enhance womens political
representation. To
understand them we need to consider in detail the part they play in processes of
incorporating womens interests (substantive representation) into policy-making, a requirement that is
particularly important when the decisions are about political representation itself.
3) If the alt is enough to garner political change as per their Beland 9, then it can
overcome the lack of gender analysis in the 1AC - OR its not strong enough to
overcome sexist knowledge production so it cant possibly solve their harms. This
means there are no impacts to any links that they may win
4) NO LINK: the assumption that language shapes reality is empirically flawed they
must support their claim by proving that we meant to be derogatory
Roskoski & Peabody, Florida State, 91
(Matthew and Joe, 1991, A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language "Arguments,
http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques, Date Accessed:
7/8, JS)
Initially, it is important to note that the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis does not intrinsically deserve
presumption, although many authors assume its validity without empirical support. The reason it does
not deserve presumption is that "on a priori grounds one can contest it by asking how, if we are unable
to organize our thinking beyond the limits set by our native language, we could ever become aware of
those limits" (Robins 101). Au explains that "because it has received so little convincing support, the
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has stimulated little research" (Au 1984 156). However, many critical scholars
take the hypothesis for granted because it is a necessary but uninteresting precondition for the claims
they really want to defend. Khosroshahi explains: However, the empirical tests of the hypothesis of
linguistic relativity have yielded more equivocal results. But independently of its empirical status,
Whorf's view is quite widely held. In fact, many social movements have attempted reforms of language
and have thus taken Whorf's thesis for granted. (Khosroshahi 505).
One reason for the hypothesis being taken for granted is that on first glance it seems intuitively valid to some. However,
after research is
conducted it becomes clear that this intuition is no longer true. Rosch notes that the hypothesis "not only
does not appear to be empirically true in any major respect, but it no longer even seems profoundly and
ineffably true" (Rosch 276). The implication for language "arguments" is clear: a debater must do more than simply read cards from
feminist or critical scholars that say language creates reality. Instead, the debater must support this claim with empirical
studies or other forms of scientifically valid research. Mere intuition is not enough, and it is our belief
that valid empirical studies do not support the hypothesis. After assessing the studies up to and including 1989, Takano
claimed that the hypothesis "has no empirical support" (Takano 142). Further, Miller & McNeill claim that "nearly all" of
the studies performed on the Whorfian hypothesis "are best regarded as efforts to substantiate the weak version of the hypothesis" (Miller &
McNeill 734). We additionally will offer four reasons the hypothesis is not valid. The first reason is that it
is impossible to generate
empirical validation for the hypothesis. Because the hypothesis is so metaphysical and because it relies so
heavily on intuition it is difficult if not impossible to operationalize. Rosch asserts that "profound and ineffable
truths are not, in that form, subject to scientific investigation" (Rosch 259). We concur for two reasons. The first is that
the hypothesis is phrased as a philosophical first principle and hence would not have an objective
referent. The second is there would be intrinsic problems in any such test. The independent variable would be the
language used by the subject. The dependent variable would be the subject's subjective reality. The
problem is that the dependent variable can only be measured through selfreporting, which - naturally entails the use of language. Hence, it is impossible to separate the dependent and independent variables. In other words, we have
no way of knowing if the effects on "reality" are actual or merely artifacts of the language being used as
a measuring tool.
5) IMPACT TURN: the alt is built on false universals about the feminine which destroys
its emancipatory potential they cant solve K or the aff
Stearn and Zalewski 9 (Maria, researcher @ Gotberh University and Marysia, director centre for gender
studies @ Univ of Aberdeen,
Feminist fatigue(s): reflections on feminism and familiar fables of militarization Review of International Studies 35.3)
In this section we clarify what we mean by the problem of sexgender and how it transpires in the context of feminist narratives within IR which we will exemplify
below with a recounting of a familiar feminist reading of militarisation. To re-iterate, the primary reason for investigating this is that we suspect part
of the
reason for the aura of disillusionment around feminism especially as a critical theoretical resource is connected to the
sense that feminist stories repeat the very grammars that initially incited them as narratives in
resistance. To explain; one might argue that there has been a normative feminist failure to adequately construct
secure foundations for legitimate and authoritative knowledge claims upon which to garner effective
and permanent gender change, particularly in regard to women. But for poststructural scholars this failure is not
surprising as the emancipatory visions of feminism inevitably emerged as illusory given the attachments to
foundationalist and positivistic understandings of subjects, power and agency. If, as poststructuralism has shown us, we cannot through language decide the
meaning of woman, or of femininity, or of feminism, or produce foundational information about it or her;42 that subjects are effects rather than origins of
institutional practices and discourses;43 that power produces subjects in effects;44 or that authentic and authoritative agency are illusory then the sure
foundations for the knowledge that feminist scholars are conventionally required to produce even hope to produce are unattainable. Moreover, post-colonial
feminisms have vividly shown how representations
of woman or women which masquerade as universal are,

instead, universalising and inevitably produced through hierarchical and intersecting power relations.45 In
sum; the poststructural suggestion is that feminist representations of women do not correspond to some underlying
truth of what woman is or can be; rather feminism produces the subject of woman which it then subsequently comes to represent.46 The
implications of this familiar conundrum are far-reaching as the demands of feminism in the context of the
knowledge/political project of the gender industry are exposed as implicated in the re-production of the
very power from which escape is sought. In short, feminism emerges as complicit in violent reproductions
of subjects and knowledges/practices. How does this recognisable puzzle (recognisable within feminist theory) play out in relation to the issues
we are investigating in this article? As noted above, the broad example we choose to focus on to explain our claims is militarisation; partly chosen as both authors
have participated in pedagogic, policy and published work in this generic area, and partly because this is an area in which the demand for operationalisable gender
knowledge is ever-increasing. Our suggestion is that the
increasing requirement47 for knowledge for the gender industry about

gender and militarisation re-animates the sexgender paradox which persistently haunts attempts to
translate what we know into useful knowledge for redressing (and preventing) conflict, or simply into hopeful
scenarios for our students.
6) ALT FAILS: Over-determination of patriarchy decreases the relevance of the alt and
even proves it a NEGATIVE form of knowledge production for us in the round. The aff
strengthens the state which is necessary to increase the interest of womens
representation
Rhode 94 (Deborah L., Law Prof-Stanford, Changing Images of the State: Feminism and the State, CHANGING IMAGES OF THE STATE:
FEMINISM AND THE STATE, Harvard Law Review) LL
In many left feminist accounts, the state is a patriarchal institution in the sense that it reflects and institutionalizes
male dominance. Men control positions of official power and men's interests determine how that power is exercised. According to Catharine
MacKinnon, the state's invocation of neutrality and objectivity ensures that, "[t]hose who have freedoms like equality, liberty, privacy and
speech socially keep them legally, free of governmental intrusion." n15 In this view, "the state protects male power [by] appearing to prohibit
its excesses when necessary to its normalization." n16 So, for example, to the extent that abortion functions "to facilitate male sexual access to
women, access to abortion will be controlled by 'a man or The Man.'" n17 Other theorists similarly present women as a class and elaborate the
ways in which even state policies ostensibly designed to assist women have institutionalized their subordination. n18 So, for example, welfare
programs stigmatize female recipients without providing the support that would enable them to alter their disadvantaged status. n19 In
patriarchal accounts, the choice for many women is between dependence [*1185] on an intrusive and insensitive bureaucracy, or dependence
on a controlling or abusive man. n20 Either situation involves sleeping with the enemy. As Virginia Woolf noted, these public and private
spheres of subordination are similarly structured and "inseparably connected; . . . the tyrannies and servilities of the one are the tyrannies and
servilities of the other." n21 This account is also problematic on many levels. To treat women as a class obscures other characteristics, such as
race and economic status, that can be equally powerful in ordering social relations. Women are not "uniformly oppressed." n22 Nor are they
exclusively victims. Patriarchy cannot account adequately for the mutual dependencies and complex power dynamics that characterize malefemale relations. Neither can the state be understood solely as an instrument of men's interests. As a threshold matter, what constitutes those
interests is not self-evident, as MacKinnon's own illustrations suggest. If, for example, policies liberalizing abortion serve male objectives by
enhancing access to female sexuality, policies curtailing abortion presumably also serve male objectives by reducing female autonomy. n23 In
effect, patriarchal frameworks verge on tautology. Almost any gender-related policy can be seen as either directly serving
men's immediate interests, or as compromising short-term concerns in the service of broader, long-term goals, such as "normalizing" the
system and stabilizing power relations. A
framework that can characterize all state interventions as directly or

indirectly patriarchal offers little practical guidance in challenging the conditions it condemns. And if women
are not a homogenous group with unitary concerns, surely the same is true of men. Moreover, if the state is best understood as a
network of institutions with complex, sometimes competing agendas, then the patriarchal model of
single-minded instrumentalism seems highly implausible. It is difficult to dismiss all the anti-discrimination initiatives of
the last quarter century as purely counter-revolutionary strategies. And it is precisely these initiatives, with their appeal to
"male" norms of "objectivity and the impersonality of procedure, that [have created] [*1186] leverage for the
representation of women's interests." n24 Cross-cultural research also suggests that the status of women
is positively correlated with a strong state, which is scarcely the relationship that patriarchal frameworks
imply. n25 While the "tyrannies" of public and private dependence are plainly related, many feminists challenge the claim that they are the
same. As Carole Pateman notes, women do not "live with the state and are better able to make collective struggle against institutions than
individuals." n26 To advance that struggle, feminists
need more concrete and contextual accounts of state

institutions than patriarchal frameworks have supplied. Lumping together police, welfare workers, and Pentagon officials
as agents of a unitary patriarchal structure does more to obscure than to advance analysis. What seems necessary is a contextual approach that
can account for greater complexities in women's relationships with governing institutions. Yet despite their limitations, patriarchal
theories underscore an insight that generally informs feminist theorizing. As Part II reflects, governmental
institutions are implicated in the most fundamental structures of sex-based inequality and in the strategies necessary to address it.
7) The alt cant solve the aff- transforming gender relations does not disrupt the war
machine. Solving the affirmative is a precondition for the alt. Patriarchy also doesnt
cause war
Goldstein 1 (Joshua, Intl Rel Prof @ American U, 2001, War and Gender, p. 412 JGC)
First, peace
activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars
and activists support the approach, if you want peace, work for justice. Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war one can
work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the
peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this
book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism,
imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars outbreaks and
outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.9 So,if you want peace, work for peace.
Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis,
from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may
be the most important way to reverse womens oppression. The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and
moral grounding, yet, in light of this books evidence, the
emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be

empirically inadequate. "men of Africa" as a group?) are seen as a group precisely because they are generally dependent and oppressed, the analysis
of specific historical differences becomes impossible, because reality is always apparently structured by divisionstwo mutually
exclusive and jointly exhaustive groups, the victims and the oppressors. Here the sociological is substituted for the
biological in order, however, to create the samea unity of women. Thus, it is not the descriptive potential of gender difference,
but the privileged positioning and explanatory potential of gender difference as the origin of oppression that I question. In using "women of Africa" (as an
already constituted group of oppressed peoples ) as a category of analysis, Cutrufelli denies any historical specificity to the
location of women as subordinate, powerful, marginal, central, or otherwise, vis-a-vis particular social and power
networks. Women are taken as a unified "Powerless" group prior to the analysis in question. Thus, it is then merely a matter of
specifying the context after the fact. "Women" are now placed in the context of the family, or in the workplace, or within religious networks, almost as if these
systems existed outside the relations of women with other women, and women with men. The
problem with this analytic strategy is that

it assumes men and women are already constituted as sexual-political subjects prior to their entry into
the arena of social relations. Only if we subscribe to this assumption is it possible to undertake analysis which looks at the "effects" of kinship
structures, colonialism, organization of labor, etc., on women, who are already defined as a group apparently because of shared dependencies, but ultimately
because of their gender. But women are produced through these very relations as well as being implicated in forming these relations. As Michelle Rosaldo states: " .
. . woman's place in human social life is not in any direct sense a product of the things she does (or even less, a function of what, biologically, she is) but the meaning
her activities acquire through concrete social interactions."" That women mother in a variety of societies is not as significant as the value attached to mothering in
these societies. The distinction between the act of mothering and the status attached to it is a very important oneone that needs to be made and analyzed
contextually.
8) Framing gender as an ontologically superior explanation of history is incorrect and

relies on the same totalizing assumptions they criticize
Jarvis 0 (Darryl, Studies Government and International Relations at U. of Sydney, International Relations
and the Challenge of Postmodernism, Feminist revisions of international relations, p. 162-3)
Critical research agendas of this type, however, are not found easily in International Relations. Critics of feminist perspectives run
the risk of denouncement as either a misogynist malcontent or an androcentric keeper of the gate. At work in
much of this discourse is an unstated political correctness, where the historical marginalization of women
bestows intellectual autonomy, excluding those outside the identity group from legitimate participation in its
discourse. Only
feminist women can do real, legitimate, feminist theory since, in the mantra of identity politics, discourse
must emanate from a positional (personal) ontology. Those sensitive or sympathetic to the identity politics of
particular groups are, of course, welcome to lend support and encouragement, but only on terms delineated by the
groups themselves. In this way, they enjoy an uncontested sovereign hegemony over their own selfidentification, insuring the group discourse is self constituted and that its parameters, operative methodology, and
standards of argument, appraisal, and evidentiary provisions are self defined. Thus, for example, when Sylvester calls for a "homesteading" of IR she does
so "by [a] repetitive feminist insistence that we be included on our terms" (my emphasis). Rather than an invitation to engage in dialogue, this is an
ultimatum that a sovereign intellectual space be provided and insulated from critics who question the
merits of identity-based political discourse. Instead, Sylvester calls upon International Relations to "share space, respect, and trust in a reformed endeavor," but one otherwise proscribed as committed to demonstrating not only "that the secure homes constructed by IR's many debaters are
chimerical," but, as a consequence, to ending International Relations and remaking it along lines grounded in feminist postmodernism.93 Such stipulative provisions
might be likened to a form of negotiated sovereign territoriality where, as part of the settlement for the historically aggrieved, border incursions are to be allowed
but may not be met with resistance or reciprocity. Demands
for entry to the discipline are thus predicated on conditions that

insure two sets of rules, cocooning postmodern feminist spaces from systematic analyses while
"respecting" this discourse as it hastens about the project of deconstructing International Relations as a "male space." Sylvester's impassioned plea for
tolerance and "emphatic cooperation" is thus confined to like-minded individuals, those who do not challenge feminist epistemologies but accept them as a
necessary means of reinventing the discipline as a discourse between postmodern identitiesthe most important of which is gender.94 Intolerance or misogyny
thus become the ironic epithets attached to those who question the wisdom of this reinvention or the merits of the return of identity in international theory.'"'
Most strategic of all, however, demands for entry to the discipline and calls for intellectual spaces betray a self-imposed, politically motivated marginality. After all,
where are such calls issued from other than the discipline and the intellectualand well establishedspaces of feminist International Relations? Much like the
strategies employed by male dissidents, then, feminist postmodernists too deflect as illegitimate any criticism that derives from skeptics whose vantage points are
labeled privileged. And privilege is variously interpreted historically, especially along lines of race, color, and sex where the denotations white and male, to name
but two, serve as generational mediums to assess the injustices of past histories. White
males, for example, become generic signifiers for

historical oppression, indicating an ontologicallv privileged group by which the historical experiences of
the "other" can then be reclaimed in the context of their related oppression, exploitation, AND exclusion. Legitimacy,
in this context, can then be claimed in terms of one's group identity and the extent to which the history of that particular group has been
silenced. In this same way, self-identification or self-situation establishes ones credentials, allowing
admittance to the group and legitimating the authoritative vantage point from which one speaks and
writes. Thus, for example, Jan Jindy Pettman includes among the introductory pages to her most recent book, Worlding Women, a section titled A (personal)
politics of location, in which her identity as a woman, a feminist, and an academic, makes apparent her particular (marginal) identities and group loyalties.96
Similarly, Christine Sylvester, in the introduction to her book, insists, It is important to provide a context for ones work in the often-denied politics of the
personal. Accordingly, self-declaration reveals to the reader that she is a feminist, went to a Catholic girls school where she was schooled to develop your brains
and confess something called sins to always male forever priests, and that these provide some pieces to her dynamic objectivity.97 Like territorial markers, selfidentification permits entry to intellectual spaces whose sovereign authority is policed as much by marginal subjectivies as they allege of the oppressors who
police the discourse of realism, or who are said to walk the corridors of the discipline insuring the replication of patriarchy, hierarchical agendas, and
malestream theory. If Sylvesters version of feminist postmodernism is projected as tolerant, perspectivist, and encompassing of a multiplicity of approaches, in
reality it is as selective, exclusionary, and dismissive of alternative perspectives as mainstream approaches are accused of being. Skillful theoretical moves of this
nature underscore the adroitness of postmodern feminist theory at emasculating many of its logical inconsistencies. In arguing for a feminist postmodernism, for
example, Sylvester employs a double theoretical move that, on the one hand, invokes a kind of epistemological deconstructive anarchy cum relativism in an attempt
to decenter or make insecure fixed research gazes, identities, and concepts (men, women, security, and nation-state), while on the other hand turning to the lived
experiences of women as if ontologically given and assuming their experiences to be authentic, real, substantive, and authoritative interpretations of the realities of
international relations. Women at the peace camps of Greenham Common or in the cooperatives of Harare, represent, for Sylvester, the real coal face of
international politics, their experiences and strategies the real politics of relations international. But why should we take the experiences of these women to be
ontologically superior or more insightful than the experiences of other women or other men? As Sylvester admits elsewhere, Experience is at once always
already an interpretation and in need of interpretation. Why, then are experience-based modes of knowledge more insightful than knowledges derived through
other modes of inquiry?98 Such espistemologies are surely crudely positivistic in their singular reliance on osmotic perception of the facts as they impact upon the
personal. If, as Sylvester writes, sceptical inlining draws on substantive everydayness as a time and site of knowledge, much as does everyday feminist theorizing,
and if, as she further notes, it understands experienceas mobile, indeterminate, hyphenated, *and+ homeless, why should this knowledge be valued as anything
other than fleeting subjective perceptions of multiple environmental stimuli whose meaning is beyond explanation other than as a personal narrative?99 Is this
what Sylvester means when she calls for a re-visioning and a repainting of the canvases of IR, that we dissipate knowledge into an infinitesimal number of
disparate sites, all equally valid, and let loose with a mlange of visceral perceptions; stories of how each of us perceive we experience international politics? If this
is the case, then Sylvesters version of feminist postmodernity does not advance our understanding of international politics, leaving untheorized and unexplained
the causes of international relations. Personal narratives do not constitute theoretical discourse, nor indeed an explanation of the systemic factors that procure
international events, process, or the actions of certain actors. We might also extend a contextualist lens to analyze Sylvesters formulations, much as she insists her
epistemogical approach does. Sylvester, for example, is adamant that we can not really know who women are, since to do so would be to invoke an essentialist
concept, concealing the diversity inherent in this category. Women dont really exist in Sylvesters estimation since there are black women, white women,
Hispanic, disabled, lesbian, poor, rich, middle class, and illiterate women, to name but a few. The point, for Sylvester, is that to speak of women is to do violence
to the diversity encapsulated in this category and, in its own way, to silence those women who remain unnamed. Well and good. Yet this same analytical respect for
diversity seems lost with men. Politics and international relations become the places of men. But which men? All men? Or just white men, or rich, educated, elite,
upper class, hetero-sexual men? To
speak of political places as the places of men ignores the fact that most men, in
fact the overwhelming majority of men, are not in these political places at all, are not decision makers,
elite, affluent, or powerful. Much as with Sylvesters categories, there are poor, lower class, illiterate, gay,
black, and white men, many of whom suffer the vestiges of hunger, poverty, despair, and
disenfranchisement just as much as women. So why invoke the category men in such essentialist and
ubiquitous ways while cognizant only of the diversity of in the category women. These are double
standards, not erudite theoretical formulations, betraying, dare one say, sexism toward men by invoking male
gender generalizations and crude caricatures. Problems of this nature, however, are really manifestations of
a deeper, underlying ailment endemic to discourses derived from identity politics. At base, the most elemental
question for identity discourse, as Zalewski and Enloe note, is Who am I?100 The personal becomes the political, evolving a discourse where self-identification,
but also ones identification by others, presupposes multiple identities that are fleeting, overlapping, and changing at any particular moment in time or place. We
have multiple identities, argues V. Spike Peterson, e.g., Canadian, homemaker, Jewish, Hispanic, socialist.101 And these identities
are variously depicted as transient, polymorphic, interactive, discursive, and never fixed. As Richard Brown notes,
Identity is given neither institutionally nor biologically. It evolves as one orders continuities on ones conception of oneself.102 Yet, if we accept
this, the analytical utility of identity
politics seems problematic at best. Which identity, for example, do we

choose from the many that any one subject might display affinity for? Are we to assume that all identities
are of equal importance or that some are more important than others? How do we know which of these
identities might be transient and less consequential to ones sense of self and, in turn, politically significant
to understanding international politics? Why, for example, should we place gender identity ontologically prior
to class, sexual orientation, ethnic origin, ideological perspective, or national identity?103 As Zalewski and Enloe ask,
Why do we consider states to be a major referent? Why not men? Or women?104 But by the same token, why not dogs, shipping magnates, movie stars, or trade
regimes? Why is gender more constitutive of global politics than, say, class, or an identity as a cancer survivor, laborer, or social worker? Most of all, why
is
gender essentialized in feminist discourse, reified into the most preeminent of all identities as the
primary lens through which international relations must be viewed? Perhaps, for example, people understand
difference in the context of identities outside of gender. As Jane Martin notes, How do we know that differencedoes not turn on
being fat or religious or in an abusive relationship?105 The point, perhaps flippantly made, is that identity is such a nebulous concept, its
meaning so obtuse and so inherently subjective, that it is near meaningless as a conduit for
understanding global politics if only because it can mean anything to anybody.
Foucault
2AC
First, plan is necessary for the alternative because it challenges a more violent form of
unilateral biopower. This creates a double bind: either the end result of the alt is plan
and theres no link differential or it does the status quo and doesnt solve
Second, perm do both-advocacy is the first temporary expression of the critique
alternative. Reform is necessary to engage the public sphere
Foucault, French Sociologist, 1988 (Michel, On Criticism in Michel Foucault: Politics Philosophy Culture Interviews and
other writings 1977- 1984)
We must escape from the dilemma of being either for or

against. After all, it is possible to face up to a government and remain standing. To work with a
government implies neither subjection nor total acceptance. One may work with it and yet
be restive. I even believe that the two things go together. D.E. After Michel Foucault the critic, are we now going to see Michel Foucault the reformist? After all, the reproach was often made
D.E. You mean it will be possible to work with this government? FOUCAULT:
that the criticism made by intellectuals leads to nothing. FOUCAULT First Ill answer the point about that leads to nothing. There are hundreds and thousands of people who have worked for the
emergence of a number of problems that are now on the agenda. To say that this work produced nothing is quite wrong. Do you think that twenty years ago people were considering the problems of the
relationship between mental illness and psychological normality, the problem of prison, the problem of medical power, the problem of the relationship between the sexes, and so on, as they are doing
today? Furthermore, there are no reforms as such. Reforms are not produced in the air, independently of those who carry them out. One cannot not take account of those who will have the job of
carrying out this transformation. And, then, above all, I believe that an opposition can be made between critique and transformation, ideal critique and real transformation. A critique is not a matter
of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices that we accept
rest. We must free ourselves from the sacrilization of the social as the only reality and stop regarding as superfluous something so essential in human life and in human relations as thought. Thought exists
independently of systems and structures of discourse. It is something that is often hidden, but which always animates everyday behavior. There is always a little thought even in the most stupid institutions;
Criticism is a matter of flushing out that thought and trying to change

it: to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident will no longer be accepted as such.
Practicing criticism is a matter of making facile gestures difficult. In these circumstances, criticism (and radical criticism) is
there is always thought even in silent habits.
absolutely indispensable for any transformation. A transformation that remains within the same mode of thought, a transformation that is only a way of adjusting the same thought more closely to the
as soon as one can no longer think things as one

formerly thought them, transformation becomes both very urgent, very difficult, and quite possible. It is not therefore a question of
reality of things can merely be a superficial transformation. On the other hand,
there being a time for criticism and a time for transformation, nor people who do the criticism and others who do the transforming, those who are enclosed in an inaccessible radicalism and those who are
the work of deep transformation can only be carried out in a

free atmosphere, one constantly agitated by a permanent criticism. D.E. But do you think the intellectual must have a
programmatic role in this transformation? FOUCAULT A reform is never only the result of a process in which there is
conflict, confrontation, struggle, resistance To say to oneself at the outset: what reform will I be able to carry out? That is not, I believe, an aim for the intellectual to pursue. His role, since he
forced to make the necessary concessions to reality. In fact I think
works specifically in the realm of thought, is to see how far the liberation of thought can make those transformations urgent enough for people to want to carry them out and difficult enough to carry out
It is a question of making conflicts more visible, of making them more

essential than mere confrontations of interests or mere institutional immobility. Out of these conflicts, these
confrontations, a new power relation must emerge, whose first, temporary expression will be a
reform. If at the base there has not been the work of thought upon itself and if, in fact, modes of thought, that is to say modes of action, have not been altered, whatever the project for reform, we
for them to be profoundly rooted in reality.
know that it will be swamped, digested by modes of behavior and institutions that will always be the same.
Third, no link plan doesnt exercise power over the people of Cuba.
Fourth, no impact Foucault doesnt say that biopower is necessarily bad, but that its
dangerous. Plan is an insanitation of power creating its own resistance, challenging
violence.
Fifth, demands on the state are more effective than radical rejection Their
alternatives fear of cooption paralyzes political praxis Only through the demands of
the plan can we change the system
Zizek, Senior Researcher @ Libjulian, Slovenia, 98

The dialectical tension between the vulnerability and invulnerability of the system also enables us to denounce the ultimate racist and/or sexist trick, that of 'two birds in
the bush instead of a bird in hand": when women demand dimple equality, quasi -"feminists" often pretend to offer them "much more" (the role of the warm and wise
"conscience of society/'elevated above the vulgar everyday competition and struggle for domination...)- the only proper answer to this offer, of course. Is "no, thanks!
Better is the enemy of the good! We do not want more, just equality!" Here, at least, the last lines in Now Voyager ("why reach for the moon. When we. Can have the
stars?") Are wrong. It is homologous with the Native American who wants to become integrated into the predominant "white" society, and a politically correct progressive
liberal endeavors to convince him that he is thereby renouncing his very unique prerogative, the authentic native culture and tradition- no thanks, simple equality is
A modest demand of the excluded group for the full

participation at the society's universal rights is much more threatening for the system than the
apparently much more "radical" rejection of the predominant social values" and the assertion of the
enough, I also wouldn't mind my part of consumerist alienation! ...
superiority of one's own culture. For a true feminist, Otto Weininger's assertion that, although women are "ontologically false." lacking the proper ethical stature, they
should be acknowledged the same rights as men in public life, is infinitely more acceptable than the false elevation of' women that makes them 'too good" for the banality
is not that every opposition, every attemot at subversion is

automatically "co-opted." On the contrary, the very fear of being co-opted that makes us
search for more and more radical, "pure" attitudes, is the supreme strategy of suspension or
marginalization. The point is rather that true subversion is not always where it seems to be sometimes. A small distance is much
more explosive for the system that an ineffective radical rejection. In religion. A small heresy can
be more threatening than an outright atheism or passage to another religion; for a hardline
Stalinist, a Trotskyite is infinitely more threatening than a bourgeois liberal or social
democrat. As Le Carre put it, one true revisionist in the Central Committees is worth more than
thousand dissidents outside it. It was easy to dismiss Gorbachev for aiming only at
improving the system, making it more efficient - he nonetheless set in motion its
disintegration. So one should also bear in mind the obverse of the inherent transgression: one is tempted to paraphrase Freuds claim from the Ego and the Id
that man is not only much more immoral than he believes, but also much more moral than he knows - the system is not only infinitely more resistant and
invulnerable than it may appear (it can co-opt apparently subversive strategies, they can serve as its support), it is also infinitely more vulnerable
(a small revision etc. Can have large unforeseen catastrophic consequences).
of men's rights. Finally, the point about inherent transgression
Sixth, Foucauldian critique denies agency by ignoring any social justice or useful
human action
Cook 92 (Anthony Cook, Associate Professor at Georgetown Law, NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW, Spring, 1992)
Unless we are to be trapped in this Foucaultian moment of postmodern insularity, we must resist the temptation to sever description from explanation. Instead, our objective should be to explain what we
values should act as magnets that link our

particularized struggles to other struggles and more global critiques of power . In other words, we
must not, as Foucault seems all too willing to do, forsake the possibility of more universal narratives that, while tempered
by postmodern insights, attempt to say and do something about the oppressive world in which we live. Second,
describe in light of a vision embracing values that we make explicit in struggle. These
Foucault's emphasis on the techniques and discourses of knowledge that constitute the
human subject often diminishes, if not abrogates, the role of human agency. Agency is of tremendous
importance in any theory of oppression, because individuals are not simply constituted by systems of
knowledge but also constitute hegemonic and counter-hegemonic systems of knowledge as
well. Critical theory must pay attention to the ways in which oppressed people not only are victimized by
ideologies of oppression but the ways they craft from these ideologies and discourses counterhegemonic weapons of liberation.
Seventh, no alternative Foucauldian power is so all encompassing that no break

from co-optation is possible.
Eighth, Foucault misunderstands power- liberal society is substantively different from
internment
Walzer, Professor of Social Sciences at the Institute for Advanced Studies & Former Professor at Harvard, 1983 (Michael,
The Politics of Michel Foucault, Dissent, Fall)
For it
is Foucault's claim, and I think he is partly right, that the discipline of a prison, say, represents a
continuation and intensification of what goes on in more ordinary places-and wouldn't be possible
if it didn't. So we all live to a time schedule, get up to an alarm, work to a rigid routine, live in the eye of
authority, are periodically subject to examination and inspection. No one is entirely free from
these new forms of social control. It has to be added, however, that subjection to these
new forms is not the same thing as being in prison: Foucault tends systematically to
underestimate the difference, and this criticism, which I shall want to develop, goes to the heart of
his politics.
Ninth, their totalizing criticism of power prevents reformwe must use the state for
incremental ends.
Faubian 94 (James D. Faubian, professor of anthro @ Rice University, Michel Foucault: Power, Essential Works of
Foucault 1954-1984 Volume 3, 1994, p. xxxi-xxxii)
Foucault wanted, then, to move both the descriptive and prescriptive functions of political analysis away from
the juridico-discursive language of legitimation. To try to put the matter as simply as possible: he does not
think that all power is evil or all government unacceptable, but does think that theorems claiming to
confer legitimacy on power or government are fictions; in a lecture of 1979, he expresses sympathy with the view
of earlier political skeptics that civil society is a bluff and the social contract a fairy tale. This does not mean that
the subject matter of political philosophy is evacuated, for doctrines of legitimation have been and may still act as
political forces in history. But his analytic quarrel with legitimation theory is that it can divert us from considering
the terms in which modern government confers rationality, and thus possible acceptability, on its activity and
practice. This is the main reason why he argues political analysis is still immature, having still not cut off the kings
head.1o The deployment and application of law is, for Foucault, like everything else, not good or evil in
itself, capable of acting in the framework of liberalism as an instrument for economizing and
moderating the interventions of governmental power, necessary as an indispensable

restraint on power in some contexts, uses, and guises; it is to be resisted as an encroaching
menace in others. In his governmentality lectures, Foucault investigates the evolution, from the era of the
police states through the development of parliamentary liberal government, of the ambiguous and dangerous
hybridization of law with a rationality of security and with new theories of social solidarity and social defense. This
historical analysis and diagnosis informs Foucaults commentary on the civil liberties politics of seventies France,
with its distinctive contemporary recrudescence of raison detat and the police state. But at the same time, in a
way we tend not to think of as typically French, he dryly mocked and debunked the excesses of what he called
state phobiathe image of the contemporary state as an agency of essential evil and limitless despotism. The
state, he said, does not have a unitary essence or indeed the importance commonly ascribed to it: what
are important to study are the multiple governmental practices that are exercised through its institutions and
elsewhere. (In a lecture describing the seventeenth-century theory of raison detat, Foucault characterized it as a
doctrine of the permanent coup detata piquant choice of phrase, because it had been the title of a polemical
book written against de Gaulle by Francois Mitterrand. We know that Foucault did not share the view, common in
the French Left, of de Gaulles government as an antidemocratic putsch with crypto-fascistic tendencies. The
Left, he also suggested, should expect to win elected power not by demonizing the state (never a
very convincing platform for a socialist party) but by showing it possessed its own conception of
how to govern.
Gender IR
2AC
1. Framework Our interpretation is that the negative must defend a competitive
policy options or the status quo. Fairness is checked by predictability of the resolution
as a starting point. This is key to any productive debate.
2. Their sole focus on feminist epistemology fails only our interpretation allows
education about the system. One speech act doesnt cause securitization its an
ongoing process
Ghughunishvili 10
Securitization of Migration in the United States after 9/11: Constructing Muslims and Arabs as Enemies
Submitted to Central European University Department of International Relations European Studies In
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Supervisor: Professor Paul Roe
http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2010/ghughunishvili_irina.pdf
As provided by the Copenhagen School securitization theory is comprised by speech act, acceptance of the
audience and facilitating conditions or other non-securitizing actors contribute to a successful securitization. The causality or a oneway relationship between the speech act, the audience and securitizing actor, where politicians use the
speech act first to justify exceptional measures, has been criticized by scholars, such as Balzacq. According to him, the
one-directional relationship between the three factors, or some of them, is not the best approach. To fully grasp the dynamics, it
will be more beneficial to rather than looking for a one-directional relationship between some or all of
the three factors highlighted, it could be profitable to focus on the degree of congruence between them.
26 Among other aspects of the Copenhagen Schools theoretical framework, which he criticizes, the thesis will rely on the criticism of the lack of
context and the rejection of a one-way causal relationship between the audience and the actor. The
process of threat
construction, according to him, can be clearer if external context, which stands independently from use
of language, can be considered. 27 Balzacq opts for more context-oriented approach when it comes down to securitization through
the speech act, where a single speech does not create the discourse, but it is created through a long process,
where context is vital. 28 He indicates: In reality, the speech act itself, i.e. literally a single security
articulation at a particular point in time, will at best only very rarely explain the entire social process that
follows from it. In most cases a security scholar will rather be confronted with a process of articulations
creating sequentially a threat text which turns sequentially into a securitization. 29 This type of approach seems
more plausible in an empirical study, as it is more likely that a single speech will not be able to securitize an issue,
but it is a lengthy process, where a the audience speaks the same language as the securitizing actors and
can relate to their speeches
3. Case Outweighs
a. Human rights violations and colonialism outweigh the patriarchal impacts. C/E impacts from the
1AC.
4. No Root Cause to gender in IR war controls the impacts

Goldstein 1Professor of International Relations at American University, 2001 (Joshua S., War and Gender: How
Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa, pp.411-412)
First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace
scholars and activists support the approach, if you want peace, work for justice. Then if one believes that sexism
contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace.
This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the
assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as
strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or
any other single cause, although all of these influences wars outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and
sustained these and other injustices. So, if you want peace, work for peace. Indeed, if you want justice
(gener and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis from
types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that
changes in attitudes toward war and the military may be the most important way to reverse womens
oppression/ The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies and
moral grounding, yet, in light of this books evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to
be empirically inadequate.
5. Perm Do Both either links are inevitable or ALT is good enough to overcome the
residual links.
6. Alt Cant Solve
A. Feminist international relations create new hierarchies of oppressionthey place
feminine based identities as the oppressed class separated from any masculine action
Jones, 96. Ph d in poly sci and professor of international studies at the Center for Research and Teaching in
Economics (CIDE) in Mexico City, 1996
[Adam, Does Gender Make the World Go Round? Feminist Critiques of International Relations, Review of
International Studies 22:4, http://adamjones.freeservers.com/does.htm, 7/12/07]
I have suggested that the most important, and surely a lasting, contribution of feminist critiques has been to
add a gender dimension to analyses of international relations. Few scholars will be able, in future, to analyze
international divisions of labour, or peace movements, or (pace Enloe) the activities of international diplomats,
without attending to feminist perspectives on all these phenomena. But feminists' success in exploring the
gender variable remains, at this point, mixed. And until feminist frameworks are expanded and to some extent
reworked, it is hard to see how a persuasive theory or account of the gendering of international relations
can be constructed. Feminist attempts to incorporate a gender variable into IR analysis are constrained
by the basic feminist methodology and all feminists' normative commitments. A genuinely "feminist
approach" by definition "must take women's lives as the epistemological starting point."(53) And a
defining element of feminist approaches, as noted earlier, is a social project aimed at ameliorating women's
structured lack of privilege and emancipating them as a gender-class. The result is a de facto equating of
gender primarily with females/femininity. It is, in its way, a new logocentrism, whereby (elite) male
actions and (hegemonic) masculinity are drawn into the narrative mainly as independent variables
explaining [421] "gender" oppression. Even those works that have adopted the most inclusive approach to
gender, such as Peterson and Runyan's Global Gender Issues, betray this leaning. Peterson and Runyan do
acknowledge that "our attention to gender ... tends to underplay the considerable differences among men and
among women," and note that "it is not only females but males as well who suffer from rigid gender roles."(54) For
the most part in their analysis, though, "gender issues" are presented as coequal with women's issues. The plight
of embodied women is front and centre throughout, while the attention paid to the male/masculine
realm amounts to little more than lip-service.
B. Their alternative has little potential for radical changeit is easily coopted by the
right in order to keep women subordinate
Whitworth, Assistant Professor of Political Science York University, 1994 (Sandra, Feminism and International
Relations, Towards a Political Economy of Gender in Interstate and Non- Governmental Institutions, page 20)
Even when not concerned with mothering as such, much of the politics that emerge from radical
feminism within IR depend upon a 're-thinking' from the perspective of women. What is left
unexplained is how simply thinking differently will alter the material realities of relations of
domination between men and women.46 Structural (patriarchal) relations are acknowledged,
but not analysed in radical feminism's reliance on the experiences, behaviours and perceptions of 'women'. As
Sandra Harding notes, the essential and universal 'man', long the focus of feminist critiques, has
merely been replaced here with the essential and universal 'woman'.47 And indeed, that notion
of 'woman' not only ignores important differences amongst women, but it also reproduces
exactly the stereotypical vision of women and men, masculine and feminine, that has been
produced under patriarchy.48 Those women who do not fit the mould - who, for example, take up arms in
military struggle - are quickly dismissed as expressing 'negative' or 'inauthentic' feminine values (the same
accusation is more rarely made against men).49 In this way, it comes as no surprise when mainstream IR
theorists such as Robert Keohane happily embrace the tenets of radical feminism.50 It requires
little in the way of re-thinking or movement from accepted and comfortable assumptions and
stereotypes. Radical feminists find themselves defending the same account of women as
nurturing, pacifist, submissive mothers as do men under patriarchy, anti-feminists and the New
Right. As some writers suggest, this in itself should give feminists pause to reconsider this position.51
Habeas Corpus
2AC
First, perm do both
You can acknowledge that habeas violations elsewhere are bad and still grant it to
enemy combatants.
Second, criticizing representations doesnt preclude the need for concrete action
Richard
Rorty, Professor of Humanities, University of Virginia, Truth, Politics, and Postmodernism, Spinoza Lectures, 1997, p. 51-2
This distinction between the theoretical and the practical point of view is often drawn by Derrida, another writer who enjoys
demonstrating that something very important meaning, for example, or justice, or friendship is both necessary and
impossible. When asked about the implications of these paradoxical fact, Derrida usually replies that the
paradox
doesn't matter when it comes to practice. More generally, a lot of the writers who are labeled
`post-modernist; and who talk a lot about impossibility, turn out to be good experimentalist social
democrats when it comes to actual political activity. I suspect, for example, that Gray, Zizek, Derrida and I,
if we found ourselves citizens of the same country, would all be voting for the same candidates, and supporting the same
reforms. Post-modernist philosophers have gotten a bad name because of their paradox-mongering habits, and their constant
use of terms like ìmpossible; `self-contradictory' and ùnrepresentable'. They have helped create a cult of inscrutability, one
which defines itself by opposition to the Enlightenment search for transparency - and more generally, to the `metaphysics of
presence; the idea that intellectual progress aims at getting things clearly illuminated, sharply delimited, wholly visible. I
am
all for getting rid of the metaphysics of presence, but I think that the rhetoric of impossibility and
unrepresentability is counterproductive overdramatization. It is one thing to say that we need to get rid
of the metaphor of things being accurately represented, once and for all, as a result of being bathed in the light of reason. This
metaphor has created a lot of headaches for philosophers, and we would be better off without it. But that does not show that
we are suddenly surrounded by unrepresentables; it just shows that `more accurate representation' was never a fruitful way to
describe intellectual progress. Even
if we agree that we shall never have what Derrida calls "a full
presence beyond the reach of play"; our sense of the possibilities open to humanity will
not have changed. We have learned nothing about the limits of human hope from metaphysics, or from the philosophy
of history, or from psychoanalysis. All that we have learned from `post-modern' philosophy is that we may need a different gloss
on the notion of `progress' than the rationalistic gloss which the Enlightenment offered. We
have been given no

reason to abandon the belief that a lot of progress has been made by carrying out the
Enlightenment's political program. Since Darwin we have come to suspect that whether such progress is made will
be largely a matter of luck. But we have been given no reason to stop hoping to get lucky.
Third, specific solvency trumps - plan solves worse injustice to the people of Cuba.
Fourth, their link ev is terrible it just says there are two kinds of habeas without
showing why we use one or the other or giving a reason that thats bad
Fifth, appropriating the other violently seizes the right to speak for selfish ends
Routledge 96
[Antipode]
The issue of representation is a vexed one which has received much attention within the social sciences. For
example, in discussing the academic strategy of polyphony, Crang (1992) raises issues
of how the
voices of others are (re)presented; the extent to which these voices are interwoven
with persona of narrator the degree of authorial power regarding who initiates
research, who decides on textual arrangements, and who decides which voices are heard; and
the power relations involved in the cultural capital conferred by specialist knowledge. Moreover, Harrison (quoted in
McLaren 1995 240) argues that polyphony
can end up being aform of romantic

ventroloquism creating the magical notion of the Others coming to voice. These
questions have important political implications for research which must be negotiated according to the specific
circumstances of a particular project. It is
all too easy for academics to claim solidarity with

the oppressed and act as relays for their voices within social scientific discourse. This raises the danger
of an uncritical alignment with resisters on the assumption that they know all there
is to know without the intervention of intellectuals; and hence an academics role becomes that of helping
them seize the right to speak.
Sixth, the status quo is worse combatants have no rights. Plan at least gives them to
some people
Seventh, their bright ev indicts the alternative action is the only remedy to
indifference. Plan is key to taking a side and doing something
Eighth, turn- upholding legal principles proves the laws fraudulence and holds it
accountable
Vclav
Havel, playwright, political prisoner, and president elect of Czechoslovakia, 1986 (Living in Truth, p. 137-38)
A persistent and never-ending appeal
to the laws not just to the laws concerning human rights, but to all laws
does not mean at all that those who do so have succumbed to the illusion that in our system the
law is anything other than what it is. They are well aware of the role it plays. But precisely because they know
how desperately the system depends on it on the noble version of the law, that is they also know how enormously
significant such appeals are. Because the system cannot do without the law, because it is hopelessly tied down by the necessity
of pretending the laws are observed, it is compelled to react in some way to such appeals. Demanding that the laws
be
upheld is thus an act of living within the truth that threatens the whole mendacious
structure at its point of maximum mendacity. Over and over again, such appeals make the purely
ritualistic nature of the law clear to society and to those who inhabit its power structures.
They draw attention to its real material substance and thus, indirectly, compel all those who take refuge
behind the law to affirm and make credible this agency of excuses, this means of communication, this
reinforcement of the social arteries outside of which their will could not be made to circulate through society. They are
compelled to do so for the sake of their own consciences, for the impression they make on outsiders, to maintain themselves in
power (as part of the systems own mechanism of self-preservation and its principles of cohesion), or simply out of fear that
they will be reproached for being clumsy in handling the ritual. They have no other choice: because they cannot discard the
rules of their own game, they can only attend more carefully to those rules. Not to react to challenges means to undermine
To assume that the laws are a mere

facade, that they have no validity and that therefore it is pointless to appeal to them would mean to go on
reinforcing those aspects of the law that create the facade and the ritual. It would mean
confirming the law as an aspect of the world of appearances and enabling those who exploit it to rest easy
with the cheapest (and therefore the most mendacious) form of their excuse. I have frequently witnessed
their own excuse and lose control of their mutual communications system.
policemen, prosecutors or judges if they were dealing with an experienced Chartist or a courageous lawyer, and if they were
exposed to public attention (as individuals with a name, no longer protected by the anonymity of the apparatus) suddenly
and anxiously begin to take particular care that no cracks appear in the ritual. This does not alter the fact that a despotic power
is hiding behind that ritual, but the
very existence of the officials anxiety necessarily regulates,

limits and slows down the operation of that despotism.
Ninth, this isnt offense, its a bad argument there will always be injustice that plan
doesnt solve. Using that to vote neg justifies doing nothing, creating nihilism
Tenth, the alternative opts for inaction in the face of domination- only policy
discussions can reorient intellectuals towards fighting injustice
Said (University Professor, Columbia University) 94*Edward W., The Intellectuals and the War, The Politics of Dispossession: The
Struggle for Palestinian Self-Determination, 1969-1994, New York: Vintage, p. 316-19]
HARLOW: What are the political, intellectual, and cultural imperatives for combating this agenda? In 1967 Chomsky wrote the
essay Responsibility of Intellectuals. What would be the main component of such an essay today? SAID: One would have to
pretty much scuttle all the jaw-shattering jargonistic
postmodernisms that now dot the landscape. They are worse

than useless. They are neither capable of understanding and analyzing the power structure of
this country nor are they capable of understanding the particular aesthetic merit of an
individual work of art. Whether you call it deconstruction or postmodernism or poststructuralism or post-anything,
they all represent a sort of spectacle of giving back tickets that the entrance and saying, were really out of it. We want to check
into our private resort and be left alone. [317] Reengagement with
intellectual processes has very little

to do with being politically correct, or citing fashionable names, or striking acceptable poses, but rather
having to do with a return in a way to a kind of old-fashioned historical, literary, and above all,
intellectual scholarship based upon the premise that human beings, men and women, make their
own history. And just as things are made, they can be unmade and re-re-remade. That sense of intellectual and political
and citizenry empowerment is what I think the intellectual class needs. Theres only one way to anchor oneself, and that is by
affiliation with a cause, with a political movement. There has to be some identification, not with the powers that be, with the
Secretary of State or the great leading philosopher of the time or sage; there
has to be an affiliation with
matters involving justice, principle, truth, conviction. Those dont occur in a laboratory or a library. For the
American intellectual, that simply means, at bottom, in a globalized environment, that there is today one
superpower, and the relationship between the United States and the rest of the world,
based upon profit and power, has to be altered from an imperial one to one of coexistence
among human communities that can make and remake their own histories together. This
seems to me to be the number-one priority---theres nothing else. An American has a particular
role. If youre an anthropologist in America, its not the same thing as being an anthropologist in India or France; its a
qualitatively different thing. HARLOW: Were both professors in English departments, despite the fact that the humanities
have been quite irresponsible, unanswerable SAID: Not the humanities. The professors of humanities. HARLOW: Well, OK,
the professors, but there is this question SAID: I take the general view that, for all its inequity, for all its glaring faults and
follies, the university in this society remains a relatively utopian place, a place of great privilege. There
needs to be
some sense of the university as a place in which these issues are not, because it is that kind
of place, trivialized. Universities cannot afford to become just a platform for a certain kind
of narcissistic specialization and jargon. What you need is a regard for the product of the
human mind. And thats why Ive been very dispirited, I must tell you, but aspects of the great Western canon debate,
which really suggest that the oppressed of the world, in wishing to be heard, in wishing their work to be recognized, really wish
to do dirt on everything else. Thats not the spirit of resistance. We come *318+ back to Aime Cesaires line, There is room for all
that at the rendezvous of victory. Its not that some have to be pushed off and demeaned and denigrated. The question is not
whether we should read more black literature or less literature by white men. The issue is excellence---we need everything, as
much as possible, for understanding the human adventure in its fullest, without resorting to enormous abstractions and
generalizations, without replacing Euro-centrism with other varieties of ethnocentrism, or say, Islamo-centrism or Afro-centrism
or gyno-centrism. Is it a game of substitutions? Thats where intellectuals have to clarify themselves. HARLOW: I agree, but at
least within certain university contexts there have been lately two major issues: the Gulf War and multiculturalism. I have not
seen any linkage between the two. SAID: The epistemology and the ethic of specialization have been accepted by all. If youre
a literature professor, thats what you talk about. And if youre an education specialist, thats what you talk about. The whole
idea of being in the university means not only respect for what others do, but respect for what you do. And the sense that they
all are part of a community. The main point is that we ascribe a utopian function to the intellectual. Even inside the university,
the prevalence of norms based upon domination and coercion is so strong because the idea of authority is so strong---whether
its authority derived from the nation-state, from religion, from the ethnos, from tradition---is so powerful that its gone
relatively unchallenged, even in the very disciplines and studies that we are engaged in. Part of intellectual work is
understanding how authority is formed. Like everything else, authority is not God-given. Its secular. And
if you can
understand that, they your work is conducted in such a way as to be able to provide
alternatives to authoritative and coercive norms that dominate so much of our intellectual
life, our national and political life, and our international life above all. HARLOW: What can
alternative publications do to interrupt that particular way of presenting authority? SAID: One is to remind readers that there
are always other ways of looking at the issue---whatever it happens to be---than those that are officially credentialed. Second,
one of the things that one needs to do in intellectual enterprises is to---Whitehead says somewhere---always try to write about
an author keeping in mind what he or she might say of what youre writing. To adapt from that: some sense in which your
constituency might be getting signals about what youre doing. The agenda isnt set only by you; its set by others. You cant
represent the others, but you can take them into account by soliciting their attention. Let such a publication be a place in which
its pages that which is occluded or suppressed or has disappeared from the consciousness of the West, of the intellectual, can
be allowed to appear. Third, some awareness of the methodological issues involved, and the gathering of information, the
production of scholarship, the relationship between scholarship and knowledge. The great virtue of these journals is that they
are not guided by professional norms. Nobody is going to get tenure out of writing for these journals. And nobody is trying to
advance in a career by what he or she does there. So that means therefore that one can stand back and look at these things and
take questions having to do with how people know things. In other words, a certain emphasis on novelty is important and
somewhat lacking. You dont want to feel too virtuous in what you are doing: that Im the only person doing this, therefore, I
must continue doing it. Wit is not such a bad thing.
Man
2AC
First, Man is in reference to human kind - AND - Only distinctions such as "wo", "wer"
and "wif" defined difference in the word - Turns the K
Etymonline.com No Date (http://www.etymonlin...searchmode=none. JCook.)
man (n.) O.E. man, mann "human being, person (male or female); brave man, hero; servant, vassal," from
P.Gmc. *manwaz (cf. O.S., Swed., Du., O.H.G. man, Ger.Mann, O.N. mar, Dan. mand, Goth. manna "man"), from PIE root*man-(1) "man" (cf.
Skt. manuh, Avestan manu-, O.C.S. mozi, Rus. muzh "man, male"). Plural men (Ger. Mnner) shows effects of i-mutation. Sometimes connected
to root *men- "to think" (see mind), which would make the ground sense ofman "one who has intelligence," but not all linguists accept this.
'human being' is a secularized divine name" from

Mannus [cf. Tacitus, "Germania," chap. 2], "believed to be the progenitor of the human race." So I am as
he that seythe, `Come hyddr John, my man.' [1473] Sense of "adult male" is late (c.1000); O.E. used wer and
wif to distinguish the sexes, but wer began to disappear late 13c. and was replaced by
man. Universal sense of the word remains in mankind and manslaughter. Similarly, Latin had homo "human
Liberman, for instance, writes, "Most probably man
being" and vir "adult male human being," but they merged in V.L., with homo extended to both senses. A like evolution took place in Slavic
languages, and in some of them the word has narrowed to mean "husband." PIE had two stems: *uiHro"freeman" (cf. Skt. vira-, Lith. vyras, L.
vir, O.Ir. fer, Goth. wair) and *hner "man," a title more of honor than *uiHro (cf. Skt. nar-, Armenian ayr, Welsh ner, Gk. aner). MAN TRAP. A
woman's commodity. ["Dictionary of Buckish Slang, University Wit, and Pickpocket Eloquence," London, 1811]
Second, Double Bind - Either the etymological origins of the word determine its
meaning, in which case you're factually wrong, or the intentions of the speaker
determine its meaning, in which case we've got terminal defense.
Third, Dont let them say that the unconscious cultural assumptions behind the word
are sexist Three reasons
1. They havent said this yet and our 2AC strategy was dependent on 1NC arguments
Dont let them skew our strategy
2. Its impossible to prove or get any real evidence for this argument.
3. Turn By asserting our unconscious cultural assumptions and desires are
patriarchal, they turn patriarchy into a super powerful monolith that can't be
destroyed.
4) PERM: Do both
Perm solves policy can shape discourse because New York proves the plan is the
net benefit to the perm.
Grynbaum 7 (Michael, Staff writer NYT, August 7,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/07/nyregion/07bword.html?pagewanted=print, 6/20/2011, JL)
The New York City Council, which drew national headlines when it passed a symbolic citywide ban
earlier this year on the use of the so-called n-word, has turned its linguistic (and legislative) lance toward
a different slur: bitch. The term is hateful and deeply sexist, said Councilwoman Darlene Mealy of
Brooklyn, who has introduced a measure against the word, saying it creates a paradigm of shame and
indignity for all women. But conversations over the last week indicate that the b-word (as it is
referred to in the legislation) enjoys a surprisingly strong currency and even some defenders
among many New Yorkers. And Ms. Mealy admitted that the citys political ruling class can be guilty of
its use. As she circulated her proposal, she said, even council members are saying that they use it to
their wives. The measure, which 19 of the 51 council members have signed onto, was prompted in part
by the frequent use of the word in hip-hop music. Ten rappers were cited in the legislation, along with
an excerpt from an 1811 dictionary that defined the word as A she dog, or doggess; the most offensive
appellation that can be given to an English woman. While the bill also bans the slang word ho, the bword appears to have acquired more shades of meaning among various groups, ranging from a term of
camaraderie to, in a gerund form, an expression of emphatic approval.
Ms. Mealy acknowledged that the measure was unenforceable, but she argued that it would carry
symbolic power against the pejorative uses of the word. Even so, a number of New Yorkers said they
were taken aback by the idea of prohibiting a term that they not only use, but do so with relish and
affection. Half my conversation would be gone, said Michael Musto, the Village Voice columnist,
whom a reporter encountered on his bicycle on Sunday night on the corner of Seventh Avenue South
and Christopher Street. Mr. Musto, widely known for his coverage of celebrity gossip, dismissed the idea
as absurd. On the downtown club scene, he said, munching on an apple, the two terms are often used
as terms of endearment. We divest any negative implication from the word and toss it around with
love. Darris James, 31, an architect from Brooklyn who was outside the Duplex, a piano bar in the West
Village, on Sunday night was similarly opposed. Hell, if I cant say bitch, I wouldnt be able to call half
my friends. They may not have been the kinds of reaction that Ms. Mealy, a Detroit-born former transit
worker serving her first term, was expecting. They buried the n-word, but what about the other words
that really affect women, such as b, and ho? Thats a vile attack on our womanhood, Ms. Mealy said
in a telephone interview. In listening to my other colleagues, that they say that to their wives or their
friends, we have gotten really complacent with it.
5) And discourse doesnt shape realitytranslation proves its the other way around.
Michelle Fram-Cohen, freelance translator and interpreter between Hebrew and English that has published articles on literature,
translation theory, and philosophy, 1985 (Reality, Language, Translation: What Makes Translation Possible, Paper presented at the
American Translators Association Conference, Available Online at
http://enlightenment.supersaturated.com/essays/text/michelleframcohen//possibilityoftranslation.html, Accessed 07-31-2010)
The idea that language is created inside one's mind independently of outside experience eliminates the
possibility that the external world is the common source of all languages. But a common source of all
languages underlies any attempt to explain the possibility of translation. Chomsky suggests that the common basis
of all languages is universal phonetics and semantics, with the result that "certain objects of human thoughts and mentality are essentially
invariable across languages." (13) To the best of my knowledge Chomsky did not develop this idea in the direction of explaining the possibility
of translation. In contrast, linguist Eugene Nida insists that outside experience is the common basis of all languages when he writes that "each
language is different from all other languages in the ways in which the sets of verbal symbol classify the various elements of experience." (14)
Nida did not provide the philosophical basis of the view that the external world is the common source of all languages. Such a basis can be
found in the philosophy of Objectivism, originated by Ayn Rand. Objectivism, as its name implies, upholds the objectivity of reality. This means
that reality
is independent of consciousness, consciousness being the means of perceiving reality, not of

creating it. Rand defines language as "a code of visual-auditory symbols that denote concepts." (15) These symbols are the written or
spoken words of any language. Concepts are defined as the "mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing
characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted." (16) This means that
concepts are abstractions of units

perceived in reality. Since words denote concepts, words are the symbols of such abstractions; words
are the means of representing concepts in a language. Since reality provides the data from which we abstract and form
concepts, reality is the source of all words--and of all languages. The very existence of translation
demonstrates this fact. If there was no objective reality, there could be no similar concepts expressed in
different verbal symbols. There could be no similarity between the content of different languages, and
so, no translation. Translation is the transfer of conceptual knowledge from one language into another.
It is the transfer of one set of symbols denoting concepts into another set of symbols denoting the same concepts. This process is possible
because concepts have specific referents in reality. Even
if a certain word and the concept it designates exist in one

language but not in another, the referent this word and concept stand for nevertheless exists in reality,
and can be referred to in translation by a descriptive phrase or neologism. Language is a means
describing reality, and as such can and should expand to include newly discovered or innovated objects in reality. The revival of
the ancient Hebrew language in the late 19th Century demonstrated the dependence of language on outward
reality. Those who wanted to use Hebrew had to innovate an enormous number of words in order to
describe the new objects that did not confront the ancient Hebrew speakers. On the other hand, those
objects that existed 2000 years ago could be referred to by the same words. Ancient Hebrew could not
by itself provide a sufficient image of modern reality for modern users.
Marxism
2AC
Marxist notions of capital domination ignore the fluid non-centered nature of power
relations and allow it to continue unchallenged
Cotter 01 (Jennifer Cotter, staffwriter, Eclipsing Exploitation: Transnational Feminism, Sex Work, and the State, THE RED CRITIQUE,
Spring 2001, www.redcritique.org/spring2001/spring_2001.htm)
According to Kaplan and Grewal, "there
is no space outside of [existing] power configurations," and no

"binary" position from which to overthrow them, and thus feminism must "negotiate" with the existing
structures of violence and power ("Transnational" 356). Such a view, of course, is itself based on the rather reactionary notion
of power that Foucault has spelled out in his History of Sexuality, Vol. 1. For Foucault, power is autonomous from any "general
system of domination" such as capitalism "exerted by one group over another" (92). Power relations have their own "immanent
logic" that is "not . . . the effect of another instance that 'explains' them" (94-95). This is, to be clear, in direct contrast to
the orthodox Marxist understanding that "power" derives from the private ownership and
control of the means of production and is thus, at its basis, the capacity to command over the
surplus-labor of others. By contrast, Foucault claims, "relations of power are not in superstructural
positions" to production (94). Instead, power is a "multiplicity of force relations" that "comes
from everywhere" (93). Moreover, there is no material basis for revolutionary struggle "instead,
there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case" (96). Power cannot be
overthrown because "there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and
ruled at the root of power relations" (94). That is, power is not concentrated in the hands of a
few rather, it is diffuse, traverses all social sites, and is available to appropriation by all.
Presupposed impartiality of labor arbitration expedites biopolitical control

Moore 93 (Robert Moore, Jr., St. Josephs University, Law, Normativity, and the Level Playing Field, Foucault and the Critique of
Institutions. 1993)
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), established by the Wagner Act, had been in existence only a few years when its
operation was suspended with the advent of World War 11, and labor policy in the United States came under the administration
of the National War Labor Board (NWLB). Immensely influential in setting a national postwar pattern, the
NWLB came
"to regard an appropriate grievance procedure, with its terminal point in an impartial
umpire, as indispensable to the establishment of justice within the industrial community. So
universal became the adoption of this system that its deployment seemed a natural and inevitable evolution Of a mature
system of industrial relations.' 1 3 As discussed below, this
inevitability was assumed by the postwar

Supreme Court as well, and it forms the basis for the so-called quid pro quo doctrine,
whereby the right to strike during the term of a contract is presumed to be canceled by the
existence of an arbitration clause. The 'impartial umpire 11 would use expert knowledge to
"balance' the interests of both parties. As the Supreme Court wrote in 1960: The labor arbitrator performs
functions which are not normal to the courts, the considerations which help him fashion judgements may indeed be foreign to
the competence of courts. . ~ . The parties expect that his judgement of a particular grievance will reflect not only what the
contract says but, insofar as the collective bargaining agreement permits, such factors as the effect upon productivity of i
particular result, It', consequence to the morale of the shop, his judgement whether tensions will be heightened or diminished.
For the parties' objective in using the arbitration process is primarily to further their common goal of uninterrupted production
under the agreement, to make the agreement serve their specialized needs. The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the
same experience and competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly
informed."Thus the
arbitrator is both expert and judge, called upon to "balance" the competing
claims of labor and management in a neutral arena, relying on social scientific claims as well
as authority that flows from the contract. The general result of this "balancing" procedure is
often the narrow interpretation of the statutory and procedural rights of workers and the
broad interpretation of contractual rights implicitly or explicitly reserved to management.As

much as any other single rule in contemporary American labor law, the quid pro quo doctrine that grew out of the
arbitration system encouraged during World War 11 has had the effect of channeling most forms of
shopfloor conflict into the bureaucratic machinery of the grievance procedure. For example, prior
to the implied collective bargaining agreement clause remillikeng that disputes be submitted to a "neutral umpire," workers
may have simply elected to stop production, occupy the plant, and not leave until the dispute was settled. Or, as illustrated in
the Boy's Market case discussed below, workers may have decided to strike instead of arbitrate." The quid
pro quo
doctrine effectively precluded such actions and required that all grievances be pursued
exclusively through the arbitration process. Failure to work within the framework of the
arbitration system meant a clear-cut violation of the terms of the contract, and the courts
moved quickly to punish those not abiding by contractual provisions.
Perm do both- socialism must embrace the causes of other oppressions if it is to ever
be successful
Foster 05 (John Bellamy Foster, University of Oregon, The Renewing of Socialism: An Introduction, THE MONTHLY REVIEW v. 57 n. 3,
July-August 2005. Available from the World Wide Web at: http://www.monthlyreview.org/0705jbf.htm)
Socialism cannot survive unless it transcends not only class divisions that divide off those
who run the society from those that are compelled to work mainly on their behalf, but also
all other major forms of oppression that cripple human potential and prevent democratic,
social alliances. If any lesson was learned from the experiences of twentieth-century
attempts to create socialism it is that class struggle must be inseparable from the struggles
against gender, race, and national oppressionsand against other forms of domination such
as those directed against gays or against those politically designated as the disabled.
Socialism also cannot make any real headway unless it is ecological in the sense of promoting
a sustainable relation to the environment, since any other approach threatens the well-being and even survival
of the human species, along with all other species with which we share the earth. The various forms of non-class
domination are so endemic to capitalist society, so much a part of its strategy of divide and
conquer, that no progress can be made in overcoming class oppression without also
fightingsometimes even in advance of the class strugglethese other social divisions. If
the political emancipation of bourgeois society constituted one of the bases upon which a
wider human emancipation could be built, a major obstacle to the latter has been the fact
that political emancipationthe realm of so-called inalienable human rightshas remained
incomplete under capitalism. That obstacle must in all cases be overcome as a necessary part
of the struggle for a socialist society.
Neoliberalism
2AC
Neoliberalism doesnt exist, it isnt real, the U.S. isnt neoliberalist, and the U.S. wont
enforce neoliberalism in Cuba or Latin America
Altman 05 (Daniel Altman was formerly Director of Thought Leadership at Dalberg Global Development Advisors. He was a global
economics columnist of the International Herald Tribune. He had been one members of the editorial board of The New York Times, he was also
on the staff of The Economist. Outside of journalism, he served as an economic advisor to the British government in 2003 and 2004. He
currently teaches economics as an adjunct professor at the New York University Stern School of Business and serves as Chief Economist of Big
Think, 07/16/05, Neoliberalism? It doesn't exist, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/15/business/worldbusiness/15ihtwbmarket16.html?_r=0)
Not long ago, Patrick Bond, an author and professor at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa, was sitting on an airplane, working on a
presentation he was soon to make at Oxford. For one particular slide, he spent several minutes rearranging pictures of American troops' flagdraped caskets aboard a cargo plane and of the World Bank president, Paul Wolfowitz, dressed as an astronaut. Never mind that this was a
- to opponents of "neoliberalism" like Bond, the supposed

evils of free markets and expansionist foreign policy are one and the same. With globalization having
somewhat rehabilitated its image, opponents of free markets have settled on a new bugbear,
neoliberalism. As with globalization, the word's interpretation is rather flexible. But to its enemies,
neoliberalism apparently refers to an American-born urge to create unrestrained markets for
everything, everywhere, even if it means overthrowing a government. The problem is, the real
neoliberals don't seem to exist. The U.S. government does not want open markets everywhere, nor do
its main economic competitors. If they did, the poor countries so avidly defended by the antineoliberals might be in much better shape. The world's wealthy countries simply aren't serious about
free markets across borders, and sometimes they struggle to create them on their own turf. One can
presentation about water commodification in South Africa
forgive poor countries for being fooled, at least initially. When President Bill Clinton signed the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which
eliminated tariffs for dozens of African countries' exports, it certainly seemed like the United States was opening its markets wide. The Andean
Trade Preference Act and the proposed Central America Free Trade Agreement looked like more steps in that direction. For its part, the
European Union has stuck to a range of special trade deals for its former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific while promising free
trade agreements to its Mediterranean neighbors. Japan, the laggard, continues to impose heavy tariffs, especially on rice. But tariffs and
quotas are just two weapons in a country's protectionist arsenal. Other barriers, like overly strict sanitary standards and country-of-origin
rules, continue to keep poor countries' exports off American and European shelves. Corporate lobbyists also clamp the cuffs on specific
products. Just ask a farmer in Mexico why avocados sell for pennies there but for dollars north of the U.S. border. Or ask a British wine
merchant why California red wines cost three times as much in London as they do in New York. In addition, subsidies for Western farmers give
them a competitive advantage that has nothing to do with their fundamental ability to produce. At the recent Group of 8 summit meeting in
After the
global textile trade agreement expired this year, supposedly ending tariffs and quotas after a 10-year
phase-out, the United States and EU sought new restrictions almost instantly. Many markets for
services delivered from inside the wealthy countries also remain tightly closed. In Europe and Japan,
the government still plays a role in important industries like energy and transport. And even among
themselves, the wealthy countries can't agree whether to allow each other to compete in markets for
air travel, insurance and other services. When was the last time you took an Air France plane from
New York to Chicago? In other words, opponents of free trade under the banner of neoliberalism
must be dreaming - they've never seen free trade in real life, and neither has anyone else. What
seems to irk campaigners against globalization or a supposed neoliberalism is the idea that rich
people are going to get richer at the expense of poor people. Yet this is not what free markets do.
Scotland, the rich countries agreed to end these subsidies, but they wouldn't say when. Even if they did, it might not matter.
When big companies find cheaper labor or raw materials outside their wealthy homes, they may make a profit in the short term. But when their
competitors - a feature of free markets - do the same, then the savings are passed on to consumers as lower prices. And it's not as though the
poorer people who sold that labor and those raw materials did so unwillingly; though the working conditions and bargaining power of poor
people employed by big foreign companies may be subpar, their only alternatives often are subsistence farming or no work at all. Meanwhile,
the restriction of markets is responsible for keeping plenty of people poor, be they fruit farmers in Africa or the long-term unemployed in
Western Europe. That is why demands for access to wealthy countries' export markets have crept their way into the vocabulary of the
antipoverty lobbies. Yet strangely, the parties that claim to represent the poor in rich countries tirelessly defend the cumbersome labor
regulations that prevent the young and the marginalized from finding work.
In short, the world is much further from free

trade then either leftist protesters or glad-handing politicians would have you believe. If the invasion
of Iraq by the United States and its allies is, as some anti-neoliberals complain, merely aimed at
securing cheap oil, then it fits perfectly with these other jingoist policies. Calling this package of
economic and political initiatives neoliberal doesn't make sense, though. It's not new, and it's not
liberal. Paleomercantilist, anyone?
The Cuban embargo is an enforcement of neoliberal policies by the U.S. government

upon Cuba in an attempt to restructure the economic system in Cuba, and must be
rejected in order to stop the neoliberalist march
Harrison 10 (Faye V. Harrison, Professor of Anthropology and African American Studies at the University of Florida-Gainesville, Ph. D
from Stanford University, 11/30/10, Global Apartheid, Foreign Policy, and Human Rights,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10999940290105309)
Although structural adjustment is a specific policy of the IMF working in

the term also refers to a general development
orientation and policy climate driven by neoliberal assumptions about economic growth and change.
In other words, structural adjustment can also serve as metonym for the restructuring and
realignments that define present-day globalization.43 Hence, in the case of Cuba, although the IMF, World Bank,
WTO, and USAID do not directly intervene in the Cuban economy, neoliberal policiesthe most coercive and punitive
being the U.S. embargohave indeed reshaped the nation during its so-called Special Period since the end of USSR and
Eastern bloc economic support, and they have undermined its revolutionary achievements in ensuring rights to
employment, education, and health services. This has occurred even though, when the embargo
began in the early 1960s, the politico-economic climate in the U.S. and the world was Keynesian
rather than neoliberal. Nonetheless, for the past two decades, this punitive policy has been enforced
within a politico-economic matrix of neoliberal globalization. In the wake of the disintegration of the USSR and the
The Cuban Embargo and Racially Sexualized Bodies
conjunction with the World Bank, USAID, and other institutions,
demise of the Eastern Bloc, the Cuban government undertook an internal readjustment and rationalization, to sustain its economy and
meet basic subsistence needs. These changes allowed for greater economic diversification, a partial process of privatization, foreign
investment, and dollarization. 44 The effects of these drastic changesCubas own structural adjust-menton everyday life have been
considerable.
The Cuban embargo is an extension of U.S. colonial policies from 1934 and is one of
the most symbolic policies of U.S. imperial control in the Americas. It is one of the
most neoliberal U.S. policies in existence
Edmonds 12 (Kevin Edmonds is a former NACLA research associate and a current PhD student at the
University of Toronto, where he is studying the impact of neoliberalism on the St. Lucian banana trade,
11/15/12, Despite Global Opposition, United States Votes to Continue Cuban Embargo,
https://nacla.org/blog/2012/11/15/despite-global-opposition-united-states-votes-continue-cubanembargo)
in 1934 under President Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy, U.S.
companies already dominated the Cuban economy, which owned 60% of rural properties, 90% of
Cuban mines and mineral exports, and 80% of the utilities and railroads. The United States also
backed business-friendly strongmen which ensured that the neo-colonial status quo would continue.
Students of American history would be right to recognize that a similar pattern of foreign economic
control sparked their very own revolution in 1776. In many ways, the ongoing Cuban embargo is one
While the Platt Amendment was scrapped
of the most symbolic policies of U.S. imperial control in the Americas. That said, the impact is much
more than merely symbolic for the Cuban people, as according to Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez, the
embargo is an act of aggression and a permanent danger to the stability of the nation. While the Cuban
embargo was ultimately created to isolate Cuba economically and politically, the routine imposition of harsher conditions has failed to bring
down the Castro government. In 1992, President George H. Bush signed the Cuban Democracy Act (also known as the Torricelli Act) into law,
which forbids subsidiaries of U.S. companies from trading with Cuba, U.S. nationals from traveling to Cuba and remittances being sent to the
country. The Cuban Democracy Act also attempts to limit the amount of interaction the international community has with Cuba by imposing
sanctions on any country that provides assistance to Cuba, including ending U.S. assistance for those countries and by disqualifying them from
benefiting from any programme of reduction or forgiveness of debt owed to the USA. It was widely assumed that after the fall of the Soviet
Union it would only be a matter of time before Castro fell as well.
The Cuban embargos sole purpose is as a tool of neoliberalism, the U.S. has used it to
try and change Cuban society, we must reject the embargo to prevent Cuba from
succumbing to the neoliberalist agenda
Simpson 98 (Victor L. Simpson, reporting for the Associated Press, 01/25/98, Pope Scolds Capitalism in Cuba,
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1998/Pope-Scolds-Capitalism-in-Cuba/id-fae4d494260ec4d413756e537702c397)
HAVANA (AP) _ This communist
island is not exactly on the verge of a free-market explosion, but there was
Pope John Paul II, warning against ``capitalist neoliberalism'' and ``blind market forces.'' The pope _
best-known as a critic of communism, but long wary of unfettered capitalism _ chose his final Mass in Cuba on
Sunday to issue one of his harshest attacks yet on Western market economies and their influence
worldwide. President Fidel Castro, who views the pope as sympathetic to the Cuban revolution's socialist agenda, sat in the front row,
just 20 yards from the papal altar. Since arriving in Cuba, John Paul has prodded the Cuban government on its human
rights record, but has also cautioned Cubans against Western lifestyles and consumer tastes, and
issued a series of attacks on the 36-year U.S. economic embargo and on Western aid policies. ``From
its centers of power, such neoliberalism often places unbearable burdens upon less-favored
countries,'' the pope said to ringing applause. ``Hence, at times, unsustainable economic programs are
imposed on nations as a condition for further assistance.'' The pope lamented that a small number
of countries were growing `èxceedingly rich at the cost of the increasing impoverishment of a great
number of other countries.'' While Cuba has made a limited opening to private enterprise over the past five years, permitting
about 160,000 self-employed workers, Castro has kept a tight leash on all private economic activity. Since the early days of his papacy, John
Paul has warned against what he has called ``savage'' capitalism and has lately expressed worry about
what globalization means to developing countries. He also has been prodding Western countries to
help ease the debts of poor nations. John Paul's attacks on the U.S. embargo have come as no
surprise _ he fiercely opposes such methods on the grounds that they punish only the poorest. President
Clinton said this past week that Washington would maintain the embargo, and it was up to Castro to open Cuban society before the U.S. will
change its stance. Clinton acknowledged that the issue divided the United States from most other countries and said `ònly time will tell
whether they were right or we were.'' In welcoming the pope Wednesday, Castro said the pontiff's calls for an equitable distribution of wealth
were ``so similar to what we preach.''
The embargo is a punishment placed upon Cuba for rejecting the neoliberalist system,
and we must remove the embargo to allow alternative systems to develop without
hindrance
Mottas and Tsakiri 11 (Nicolas Mottas is a graduate of Political Science and Diplomatic Studies from the University of
Westminster & Diplomatic Academy of London, a MA candidate in Conflict Resolution and Mediation from Tel Aviv University and a freelance
article writer, Myrsini Tsakiri is the founder and administrator of the blog "Sierra Maestra", 04/30/11, U.S. embargo on Cuba: A 50 years-old
crime, http://miami.indymedia.org/news/2011/04/22205.php)
the supporters of the embargo continue

blaming the Castro administration and its supposed "anti-americanism". However, it was the Fidel Castro-led
This small nation poses not even the smallest threat for the United States, yet
revolution which ended a long-period of oppression and disastrous misrule in the 1950s. For almost five decades now, despite the various
wobbles in the global capitalist system, Cuba experiences political and economic stability. The
country manages its own national

resources without the interference of american companies which were sqeezing Cuba's national
wealth during Fulgencio Batista's years. Despite its inefficiences, the Castro government proved all
these years that a nation is capable of being self-efficient even in a capitalist, profit-addicted
international economic environment. Even under the blockade, the Cuban administration has shown a
remarkabe endurance, both politically and economically. Everybody can understand that the
resistance of Havana is quite unpleasant for all those who design and promote the greedy modern
neoliberalism. The embargo plays the role of a "continuous punishment"; travel restrictions, ban on
subsidiary trade, humanitarian aid blockade, denial of accessing medical supplies and equipment.
According to a 1997 report by the American Association for World Health "the U.S. embargo of Cuba has dramatically hearmed the health and
nutrition of large numbers of ordinary Cuban citizens". The same report assumes that "the U.S. embargo has caused a significant rise in
suffering-and even deaths-in Cuba" while the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act (U.S. Congress) had contributed significantly to the increase of the
number of unmet medical needs patients going without essential drugs. On that we should add the restriction of access over medical
equipment and water treatment chemicals. Against these mounting obstacles, the Cuban government successfully managed to maintain high
levels of budgetary support to the health care system, thus avoiding an uncpreceded humanitarian disaster for the island. The current U.S.
President moves one step forward and two steps back on the issue. He decides to ease the travel restrictions for Cuban-Americans and, on the
same time, extends the blockade for one more year because it is "in the national interests of the United States". However,
it was Mr.
Obama himself who, in 2004, had called the embargo policy a "failure". "I think it's time for us to end
the embargo with Cuba" It's time for us to acknowledge that that particular policy has failed", he had
stated during a speech at Southern Illinois University. Quite a hypocrisy for such a popular President. The Helms-Burton Act of 1996 which
strengthens the embargo refers to "a peaceful transition to a representative democracy and market economy in Cuba".
It is clear that
the Cubans are being punished all these years for not submitting to the actual existing capitalist
system -- they "pay the price" for their "audacity" to confront colonialism and capitalism during the
Cold War period. The symbolism is apparent: How can a communist state exists just 90 miles south of
Florida? Fifty years since it was enacted, the embargo against Cuba consists a form of modern
apartheid and colonization effort in the 21st century. It is in the hands of the international
community, along with the support of the progressive American people, to put an end to this crime
against the Cuban nation.
Nietzsche
2AC
1. Weigh the aff impacts against the k, otherwise they can steal aff ground by making
anything a priori and that kills plan focus education, which is the singular purpose of
debate.
2. Policy making comes first A. Make them disprove our specific internal links. Their epistemological censorship
chokes debate - it allows them to dismiss entire fields of study and discourages critical
thinking.]
B. Ontology doesnt even come into play on this kritik. It has nothing to do with
defining being or relation to others; its more a critique of how we view suffering.
3. Non unique - the implications of the kritik have existed and their impacts havent
happened - zero probability of their impact.
4. Perm do both
5. Perm do plan and all non competitive parts of the alternative. Even Nietzsche
advocates a combination of the political with the alternative - only the perm allows
true freedom and stops a trend towards self-annihilation, political degeneration, and
universal chaos.
Hatab 2 - Lawrence J. Hatab Prospects For A Democratic Agon: Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24, 2002
132-147
It is a mistake, however, to read Nietzsche in simple terms as being against institutions and the rule of law on behalf of self-creation. First of all,
even Nietzsche's early celebration of the Dionysian should not be taken as an anti- or extra-political gesture. In BT 21, Nietzsche insists
that the Apollonian has coequal status with the Dionysian, and the former is specifically connected with the
political order, which is needed to temper the Dionysian impulse toward "ecstatic brooding" and "orgiastic selfannihilation." Those who read Nietzsche as resisting "normalization" and "discipline" (this includes most postmodern
readings and Appel's as well 13 ), are not on very firm ground either. For one thing, Nietzschean creative freedom is
selective and most people should be ruled by normative orders, because universal unrestricted freedom would
cause havoc. 14 Moreover, even selective creative freedom is not an abandonment of order and constraint.
Creativity breaks free of existing structures, but only to establish new ones. Shaping new forms requires
formative powers prepared by disciplined skills and activated by refined instruments of production. Accordingly,
creativity is a kind of "dancing in chains" (WS 140). 15 Creative freedom, then, is not an abandonment of constraint, but a
disruption of structure that still needs structure to prepare and execute departures from the norm. Those who take
Nietzsche to be diagnosing social institutions as descendants of slave morality should take note of GM II,11, where Nietzsche offers some
interesting reflections on justice and law. He indicates that the global economy of nature is surely not a function of justice; yet workable
conceptions of justice and injustice are established by the historical force of human law. Nietzsche does not indict such forces as slavish
infirmities. Legal arrangements are "exceptional conditions" that modulate natural forces of power in [End Page 136] social directions, and that
are not an elimination of conflict but an instrument in channeling the continuing conflict of different power complexes. Surprisingly, Nietzsche
attributes the historical emergence of law not to reactive resentment but to active, worldly forces that check and redirect the "senseless raging
of revenge," and that are able to reconfigure offenses as more "impersonal" violations of legal provisions rather than sheer personal injuries.
Here Nietzsche analyzes the law in a way analogous to his account of the Greek agon and its healthy sublimation of natural impulses for
destruction. A legal system is a life-promoting cultural force that refashions natural energies in less savage and
more productive directions. Finally, those who read Nietzsche as an anti-institutional transgressor and creator
should heed TI ("Skirmishes of an Untimely Man," 39), where Nietzsche clearly diagnoses a repudiation of institutions as
a form of decadence. Because of our modern faith in a foundational individual freedom, we no longer have the
instincts for forming and sustaining the traditions and modes of authority that healthy institutions require. The
whole of the West no longer possesses the instincts out of which institutions grow, out of which a future grows: perhaps nothing antagonizes
its "modern spirit" so much. One lives for the day, one lives very fast, one lives very irresponsibly: precisely this is called "freedom." That
which makes an institution an institution is despised, hated, repudiated: one fears the danger of a new slavery
the moment the word "authority" is even spoken out loud. That is how far decadence has advanced in the
value-instincts of our politicians, of our political parties: instinctively they prefer what disintegrates, what
hastens the end. In the light of these remarks, a Nietzschean emphasis on power and agonistics offers significant advantages for political
philosophy. In some respects we are freed from the modern project of "justifying" the force of social institutions because of a stipulated
freedom from constraint in the "state of nature." With a primal conception of power(s), we can retrieve an Aristotelian take on social
institutions as fitting and productive of human existence. Forces of law need not be seen as alien to the self, but as modulations of a ubiquitous
array of forces within which human beings can locate relative spheres of freedom. And an agonistic conception of political activity
need not be taken as a corruption or degradation of an idealized order of political principles or social virtues. Our
own tradition of the separation of powers and an adversarial legal system can be taken as a baseline conception of the nature, function, and
proper operation of government offices and judicial practice. The founders of the Constitution inherited from Montesquieu
the idea that a division of powers is the best check on tyranny. In other words, tyranny is avoided not by some
project of harmony, but by multiplying the number of power sites in a government and affirming their
competition through mutual self-assertion [End Page 137] and mistrust. 16 Our common law tradition is agonistic in
both conception and practice. Most procedural rules are built around the idea of coequal competition in open court before a jury who
will decide the outcome, where the judge in most respects plays the role of an impartial referee. And the presumption of innocence is
fundamentally meant to contest the government's power to prosecute and punish. 17 I think that both notions of separation of
powers and legal adversarialism are compatible with Nietzsche's analysis of the law noted previouslythat a
legal order is not a means of preventing struggle, but "a means in the struggle between power-complexes" (GM
II,11).
6. Perm do the plan and do the alternative in all other instances - either the alt can
overcome the residual link and the perm solves, or it cant and the alt is doomed to
failure - intrinsic perms justified when the kritik links to the squo in general.
7. Perm do the alternative - severance justified when kritik links to squo.
8. No brink - theres no reason our plan uniquely does anything to cause their inflated
impacts - they dont have any internal link stories.
9. Dont let them claim the entirety of their impacts because they can only garner
impacts based off of this supposed instance of it.
10. They cant solve - this one instance wont spill over to create any broader change
11. Their alternative of inaction and their portrayal of suffering as inevitable cause
political paralysis where there are no steps in the right direction; rejecting the neg is
key to agency
Dunmire 5 - Patricia L. Dunmire, Associate Professor in the English Department at Kent State University 2005 (Preempting the future:
rhetoric and ideology of the future in political discourse, Discourse & Society, Volume 16, Issue 4, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions
via SAGE Journals Online, p. 507-508)
In Becomings: Explorations in Memory, Time and Futures Elizabeth Grosz (1999) posits that 'to know the future is to deny it as
future, to place it as given, as past' (p. 6). I find this statement compelling because it articulates what is at stake in
dominant political discourses and the futures they project. By reminding us of the opposition between 'knowing'
and 'futurity' Grosz reminds us of the intrinsic potentiality of the future and the political importance of
understanding the future not as the inevitable progression of the past and present but as a real site of change
and possibility. Moreover, Grosz contends that claims to knowledge of the future produced through dominant political
discourses need to be understood in terms of their ideological function of denying our agency with respect to
the future while, at the same time, implicating us in futures not of our making . That is, political discourses in
which the future is represented as already known, as pre-determined, can function to 'paralyze political action'
by undermining the future as a conceptual space for imagining and working for political and social change [end
page 507] (Levitas, 1993). As Grosz (1999) explains, such determinism 'annihilates any future uncontained in the past and
present' (p. 4). An important task for critical discourse analysis is to reclaim the agency and potentialities that the
future offers for social and political transformation. This task should focus in part on demonstrating the
linguistic and discursive means by which the future is claimed and appropriated by dominant groups and
institutions. In addition, analyses should work to disrupt and challenge these dominant futures with
representations and conceptions of 'antithetical futureswaiting for syntactic articulation' and material
realization' (Hebdige, 1993: 275).18 In short, we need to reclaim the future 'as a virtual space blank, colourless,
shapeless, a space to be made over, a space where everything is still to be won' (Hebdige, 1993: 278).
12. Utopian fiat bad - it kills real world education through utopian solutions and kills
ground by allowing the neg to wish away lifes problems - voter.
13. Vague alts bad - there is no clear explanation of what their alternative actually
does - that kills education because we dont learn about internal link chains, and it
kills aff ground by allowing new extrapolations in the neg block about the alternative voter.
Orientalism
2AC
De-orientalism silences the Other
Levinson, 13-- Professor and Chair, Comparative Literature, Undergraduate Advisor and Co-Director PLC (Philosophy, Literature and
the Theory of Criticism) (Brett, Orientalism and Identity in Latin America, The University of Arizona Press, 2013, The Death of the Critique of
Eurocentrism pg 21)//IK
And de-orientalism knows this: that the Others have always broken through silence, even if their voices,
sighs, and screams (of joy and pain) have rarely been heard. De--orientalism is well aware that the
metaphor of the "formerly silent native" (Culture and Imperialism 212) is just a metaphor and not
literally true. Why, then, must the de-orientalist deploy this metaphor of silence? What is de-orientalism
trying to sneak onto the postcolonial scene when it posits the Other's unrecognized speech and noise as
nonspeech and nonnoise? Simple logic dictates that the de-orientalist metaphor of silence reflects a
desire for precisely the Others silence. In fact only this silence can guarantee of speech is that it will
disrupt silence. (First, of course, the silence has to be supposed.) Therefore when de-orientalism speaks
out against this silence, which it itself imposes through metaphor, it a priori emancipates both itself and
the Other from suppression and oppression, from the enforced silence. De-orientalism most definitely
opens the way for the Others insurgent speech, but it is just as true that the Others silence open the
way for de-orientalisms claims. This is why de-orientalism desires the Others silence before it desires
the Others speech, why it grounds that speech on imaginary or metaphorical silence, on a fantasy or
blantant misreading. It wants the Other to speak. But first it wants the Other to be silent so that deorientalism itself can speak more securely, so that its critique is assured to be radical, known to be
Other, guaranteed to upset the imposition of silence. In short, the colonizer and the decolonizer are
unaware of their common desire for the Others silence (or death). Matters are of course complicated.
The colonizer wants the Others death and silence but also his labor, his life. No doubt the Orientalists
imposition of babble upon the Others speech is geared to communicate this double desire: for an
irrational, thus animal-like, and exploitable life. But insofar as the colonizer truly desires the Others
silence by simulating violence through rhetoric, through a poetics. It silences the Other through a turn of
phrase. It kills the Others voice in order to bring back that voice, to redeem it through poetry, through
trope.
Neg attempts at de-orientalizing only result in renewed orientalism ontologizes the

Other and cultural differences
Levinson, 13-- Professor and Chair, Comparative Literature, Undergraduate Advisor and Co-Director PLC (Philosophy, Literature and the
Theory of Criticism) (Brett, Orientalism and Identity in Latin America, The University of Arizona Press, 2013, The Death of the Critique of
Eurocentrism pg 21)
Orientalism is a term that Edward Said excavates and retools in books Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism. He labels Orientalist Western
discourse that, by constructing and imagining the non-Western; world in prejudicial or violent modes, generates and affirms Western
hegemony.
Orientalism deals with the way a particular First World, Western subject, in its
representations of peoples and sites of the Third World, establishes itself as the universal subject. The
critique of Orientalism, which I shall call de-orientalism (not to be confused with Occidentalism or the reversal of
Orientalism), tries to
dismantle this Orientalist discourse. It veils the misconceptions and biases that
Orientalisim itself both and conceals. De-orientalism also attempts to restore the wronged or violated
discourses. For it Orientalism abjects other worlds, it only makes sense that the critique of
Orientalisrn would attempt to recover that excluded domain, to recuperate a subjectivity of
difference. One cannot be at all sure, however, that this critical response to Orientalism actually
avoids participating in the very discourse that it contests, especially when one considers the project in
terms of its overall teleology. Before pursuing this last point, a word on this studys use of the term Other is necessary. Saids
critique of Orientalism does not intend to define the Third World Other. Rather Said demonstrates how vertain cultures and races have been
Othered. Orientalism is
not about the devaluation of the Other, as many seem to believe; it is about
Othering as devaluation. Indeed non-Western sites are abjected the moment they are Othered. Saids Third World Other is not an
ontological but an existential category. It emerges when, in a particular historical, cultural, or political situation, a Western discourse objectifies
the foreign or the unfamiliar. In this structure, any person, group, class, or site can potentially occupy the place of the Other or that of the
Same. Therefore much Latin American scholarship that seems faithful to Saids project actually betrays it (although it must be noted that Said
too at times betrays his own undertaking). This
scholarship assumes Latin America to be A priori Other, reveals

how this Otherness has been violated, and then tries to recover that alterity. It presupposes an authentic Other
who preexists an inauthentic Othering, whereas Saids critique succeeds insofar as it does not make such presuppositions. This (perhaps
inevitable) slippage in Latin American and postcolonial studies between the ontological and the cultural, the essential and the existentialbetween a reading that posits Third World inhabitants as Other (an ontological statement) and one that studies the way that, at a specific
historical moment, particular discourses and peoples have fabricated this Otherness (a cultural statement)-is of course of enormous interest.
However, critics striving to expose the radical aspects of Saids work should not forget that the Saidian Other is not a given but a construct: a
product of the West, racism, metaphysics, and global Capi-tal. Thus when I implement the word Other in this study, l am referring to those
figures who have been named and posited as Other by Western discourses, not to peoples or sites supposed to be really (ontologically) Other.
At the same time, my analysis is attentive to de-orientalism's (and Said's) tendency to slide from the
cultural to the ontological, for this is precisely my point: Latin American de-orientalism repeats
Orientalism rather than critiquing it, because it ontologizes alterity and cultural difference.
De-orientalism recreates the same representational truths it criticizes, flips the k

Levinson, 13-- Professor and Chair, Comparative Literature, Undergraduate Advisor and Co-Director PLC (Philosophy, Literature and
the Theory of Criticism) (Brett, Orientalism and Identity in Latin America, The University of Arizona Press, 2013, The Death of the Critique of
Eurocentrism pg 21)
This all explains how the
de-orientalist, when faced with the erased documents, the repression or silence of the Other, can nonetheless
Other's visions by catching them
in the rearview mirror of the Eurocentric Same that he or she critiques. He or she then draws a metaphysical line
put forth theses about the Other's perspective as truth. The de-orientalist comprehends the
between the false mirror itself (the Same, discourse, Orientalism) and the intuited (rather than manifest) lost Other that the mirror reflects:
truth, or silence as truth. In brief, the de-orientalist Other, supposedly a construct, is Other precisely because it transcends construction. It is
not the Other at all, then, but the eidos. The structure of de-orientalism is that of truth because, as in Platonism, it separates an off-stage
"Other-than representation domain from a visible, on stage, field of representation. The fact that de-orientalism stands today as one of the
most truthful and accurate means by which to analyze imperialism is therefore not surprising. But
nor is it surprising that the

critique, when it tackles the unavoidable second project, the analysis of the Other of imperialism,
necessarily falls back into the paradigms it seeks to undo. Indeed due to his or her investment in truth,
the de-orientalist does not dismantle but restages Orientalism by turning the question of Otherness into
a reflection of or upon the Sante. De-orientalism is too true to be good because it ignores the collusion
of Western metaphysics and Western politics. It refuses to acknowledge that the political discourse that
critiques the West (de-orienialism) is identical to the epistemological discourse (of truth) that grounds the
West, since both discourses are founded on the same critique of representation.
Saids method is flawed

Ning 97(Wang Ning, Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Peking University, Orientalism
versus Occidentalism?, Project Muse)
As quite a few Eastern and Western scholars have already noticed, however, the
"Orient" and "Orientalism" constructed by

Said have their inevitable limitations, which lie chiefly in their geographical, cultural, and literary aspects.
It is these limitations that provide us Third World scholars and critics with a theoretical basis on which to
question and reconsider his Orientalism. First, we should point out its geographical limitation, which is
restricted by his family background, as well as his scope of knowledge and learning. As is well known, the
"Orient," geographically speaking, covers at least the wide areas of Asia, Africa, and Australia, but in Said's book, the boundary line stops at the
Near East and Middle East.
Such regions as Southeast Asia and such important Oriental countries as China,
India, and Japan are seldom touched upon; they pose a serious limitation to his theory although he has added
certain corrective analyses in his new book Culture and Imperialism. Second, his "Orient" or "Orientalism" also has its
ideological and cultural limitations. As far as its ideological and cultural significance is concerned, the "Western" idea or
culture that we usually deal with in effect refers to the ideology or cultural concepts based on the
bourgeois value standard prevailing in Western Europe and North America, while those contrary to
them are normally regarded as the "Oriental" concepts. It is on the basis of this striking difference in ideology and culture
that the East and the West were in a state of opposition during the cold-war period after World War II; with the end of the cold war, East-West
relations have entered a post-cold war period, during which, according to Samuel Huntington, "The great divisions among humankind and the
dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of
global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations.
The clash of civilizations will dominate global
politics." 6 Among Oriental cultures, the "most prominent form of this cooperation is the Confucian-Islamic connection that has emerged to
challenge Western interests, values and power" (45). Huntington has here correctly grasped the two origins of Oriental
cultures, the Arab countries and China, which have, especially the latter, been overlooked by Said. Moreover, due to the
limitations of other geographical and ideological factors, Said's Orientalism, in the sense of Oriental studies,
naturally leads to his limitation in comparative literature studies: the texts he discusses are mostly from
the English or english -speaking world rather than from the non-English-speaking or other Third-World countries, while
comparative literature is not only cross-national and interdisciplinary but also cross-cultural and cross-linguistic. In this way, the
limitations of his research as well as that of all the postcolonial academic [End Page 61] studies are
obviously discernible. It is true that to conduct comparative literature studies from the postcolonial perspective could break through
the boundary line of geography and disciplines, but cannot break through the boundary line of languages, which is the very problem that we
Oriental scholars of comparative literature and cultural studies must solve in our research.
Saids concept of orientalism leads to orientalism

Landow 02(George P. Landow, Professor of English and Art History, Brown University, March 18 2002,
Edward W. Said's Orientalism, http://www.postcolonialweb.org/poldiscourse/said/orient14.html,PS)
Drawing upon the methods of feminist criticism of the 1970s, Said's Orientalism did much to create the field of postcolonial studies by teaching
us to "read for the gap," placing texts in broad political contexts. Despite its obviously valid points about weaknesses of Euro-American thought,
its appeal for Western intellectuals, and its liberating effect on intellectuals from former countries that were colonized, this seminal book has
some major flaws: Though enormously effective as a polemic, Orientalism
is very shoddy as scholarship, and yet it

presents itself as a corrective to flawed scholarship. The book completely neglects China, Japan, and
South East Asia, and it has very little to say about India. Although purporting to be a study of how the
West treats all of the East, the book focuses almost entirely upon the Middle East. Its generalizations
about "the Orient" therefore repeat the very Orientalism it attacks in other texts! It is bizarrely forgiving of
French Orientalist writers like Nerval and Flaubert. Orientalism is an orientalist text several times over, and in two ways
commits the major errors involved with the idea of the Other: First, it assumes that such projection and its harmful political
consequences are something that only the West does to the East rather than something all societies do
to one another. (I am surely not the only teacher who has had heard Asian-American students returning from their parent's country of
origin exclaim, "Everything Said says the West does to the East, the East does to the West!") Because Orientalism is apparently
based on very little knowledge of the history of European and Non-European imperialism, it treats
Western colonialism as unique. This point, like the previous one, makes perfect sense if one takes Said's pioneering book largely as a
political polemic, for in that case such omissions might be forgivable. One expects more from criticism and scholarship,
particularly politically motivated criticism and scholarship. Although greatly influenced by feminist
criticism and theory, Orientalism almost completely neglects gender matters. Although emphasizing the way the
West sexualizes the East, it also tends to repeat the pattern, and, moreover, its generally favorable treatment of French orientalization suggests
a great insensitivity to such issues, For many scholars, one
of Orientalism's most offensive claims was its dramatic

assertion that no European or American scholar could "know" the Orient and that, moreover, all
scholarly attempts to do so (except Said's own) always constituted acts of oppression. In a single dramatic
move, which had great appeal for many, Said committed the greatest single scholarly sin: he silenced others by
preventing them from taking part in the debate. According to Said, if someone knew Persian or Tamil
grammar, the history of Islam or Hinduism, or the societies of Saudi Arabia, Eygpt, or Bangladesh, he or she already belonged to
the devil's party. They were corrupted by what Said defined as Orientalism. For Said, who studied literature at
Princeton and Harvard, this proved a very convenient tactic, since he knew very little about these alien fields. Indeed, one of the bitterest
charges directed at him was that in
his own Orientalist ignorance of the actual Middle East, Said himself in effect
suppressed important work by Egyptian and Arabic scholars! Whatever liberatory or other benefits Orientalism might
have offered upon its appearance, it has harmed literary studies and literary students. By focusing exclusively on the political valences of
literary texts, it has very little to offer those also interested their literary or aesthetic dimensions. Even those with little interest in such nonpolitical themes have been harmed by the school of thought Orientalism
has fostered: its political argument, which first

enriched familiar texts, impoverishes when it leads to a neglect of literary and rhetorical technique. (Note:
Said does not himself argue against acquiring such skills, but those who follow him often do.) Even if all these charges were true (and I believe
they are), Said's Orientalism remains a major work. Why do you think this is the case? How is the book larger than the local conditions in which
it was produced? Why do the book's strengths, rather than its weaknesses, appear far more important to a scholar working in, say, Morocco,
Singapore, or India?
Statism
2AC
Turning away from the state prevents mobilization for good causes.
Goble 98 (Paul, Publisher of RFE/RL, THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEPOLITICIZATION, Radio Free Europe, October 12, 1998,
http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1998/10/981012I.html(opt,mozilla,unix,english,,new), accessed July 07)
First, as
people turn away from the state as the source of support, they inevitably care less about what the
state does and are less willing to take action to assert their views. That means that neither the state
nor the opposition can mobilize them to take action for or against anything. As a result, the
opposition cannot easily get large numbers of people to demonstrate even if the opposition is taking
positions that polls suggest most people agree with. And the government cannot draw on popular
support even when it may be doing things that the people have said they want. That means that the size of
demonstrations for or against anything or anyone are an increasingly poor indicator of what the people want or do not want the state to do.
Second, precisely because people are focusing on their private lives and taking responsibility for them, they are likely to become increasingly
upset when the state attempts to intervene in their lives even for the most benign purposes, particularly if it does so in an ineffective manner.
Such attitudes, widespread in many countries and important in limiting the power of state institutions, nonetheless pose a particular danger to
countries making the transition from communism to democracy. While those views help promote the dismantling of the old state, they also
virtually preclude the emergence of a new and efficient one. As a result, these countries are often likely to find themselves without the
effective state institutions that modern societies and economies require if they are to be well regulated. And third, countries with
depoliticized populations are especially at risk when they face a crisis. The governments cannot count
on support because people no longer expect the governments to be able to deliver.
The state is necessary to check the free market.

Kamiya 97 (Gary, Executive Editor, Smashing the State, Salon.com, The Brainwave Project, January 20, 1997,
http://www.salon.com/jan97/state2970120.html)
Perhaps the most depressing thing about libertarianism is its almost unconscious aversion to the notion that in a representative democracy, we
are the government. Of course, our democracy is plagued with big-money corruption and a thousand other problems, but when a significant
percentage of people begin to think of government as "them," democracy itself is in trouble. There is a discomforting family resemblance
The libertarian insistence on seeing government as a malevolent or at

best obstructionist external force fails to acknowledge its organic, changing nature. Government does, of course, set
policy and attempt to dictate the course of events, but much of what it does is respond to, and referee, conflicts in society.
Far from being a reified Other, government exists precisely to grapple -- through the instrument of law -- with issues that
individuals cannot resolve by themselves. The libertarian failure to recognize the flexibility of law gives a
scholastic, how-many-angels-can-dance-on-the-head-of-a-pin quality to many of its arguments. When
property rights clash with environmental rights, for example, who adjudicates? Government does, through
between libertarianism and the militia movement.
law: No libertarian solution would produce a different framework. Government will not resolve those problems to the liking of all interested
parties -- but neither would any other process. We
have big government in large part because we live in an enormously

complex society -- because we have big problems. Libertarians are fond of saying the regulatory welfare state is
somehow a continuation of despotic power -- as if there were a historical thread running between the
Sun King and Sweden's social democracy. This tendentious view, verging on paranoia, is not only
ahistorical, it ignores the role modern governments play in moderating corporate power.
Collapse of the nation-state causes extinction.

Rubin, 08. 1/9/, Dani, Earth Editor for PEJ News. Beyond Post-Apocalyptic Eco-Anarchism,
http://www.pej.org/html/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=7133&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0.
Unlike twenty-five years ago, increasingly, people
are adopting the anarcho-apocalyptic, civilization-must-fall-to-
save-the-world attitude. It is a fairly clean and tight worldview, zealously bulletproof, and it scares me. I want the natural world, the
greater community of life beyond our species, with all its beautiful and terrifying manifestations, and its vibrant landscapes to survive intact I
think about this a lot. A
quick collapse of global civilization, will almost certainly lead to greater explosive
damage to the biosphere, than a mediated slower meltdown. When one envisions the collapse of
global society, one is not discussing the demise of an ancient Greek city-state, or even the
abandonment of an empire like the Mayans. The end of our global civilization would not only result in
the death of six billion humans, just wiping natures slate clean. We also have something like 5,000 nuclear
facilities spread across the planets surface. And this is just one obvious and straightforward fact
cutting across new radical arguments in favor of a quick fall. We have inserted ourselves into the web of life on planet
Earth, into its interstitial fibers, over the last 500 years. We are now a big part of the worlds dynamic biological equation set its checks and
balances. If
we get a fever and fall into social chaos, even just considering our non-nuclear toys laying about, the damage
will be profound. It will be much more devastating than our new visionaries of post-apocalyptic paradise
have prophesized. If one expands upon current examples of social chaos that we already see, like Afghanistan or Darfur, extrapolating
them across the globe, encompassing Europe, Asia, North and South America, and elsewhere, then one can easily imagine desperate outcomes
where nature is sacrificed wholesale in vain attempts to rescue human life. The outcomes would be beyond ugly; they would be horrific and
enduring. That is why I cannot accept this new wave of puritanical anarcho-apocalyptic theology. The
end-point of a quick collapse

is quite likely to resemble the landscape of Mars, or even perhaps the Moon. I love life. I do not want the Earth
turned barren. I think that those who are dreaming of a world returned to its wilderness state are lovely, naive romantics dangerous ones.
Imagine 100 Chernobyls spewing indelible death. Imagine
a landscape over-run with desperate and starving

humans, wiping out one ecosystem after another. Imagine endless tribal wars where there are no
restraints on the use of chemical and biological weapons. Imagine a failing industrial infrastructure seeping massive
quantities of deadly toxins into the air, water and soil. This is not a picture of primitive liberation, of happy postcivilized life working the organic farm on Salt Spring Island.
Theory Blocks
2AC Long Condo

Condo is bad and a voting issue:
A. Time/Strategy SkewThey could read 10 conditional counterplans in the 1NC and
kick out of all but the one with the least offense in the block. Justifies new 1AR and
2AR extrapolations.
B. Moving targetWe dont know what the issues in the debate will be until the 2NR
so any offense we put on the counterplan is time wastedJustifies severance and
intrinsicnessthus, Perm-do the CP.
C. Counter-interpretation they should read their K/CP dispositionally; allows
strategic aff straight turning and solves all their offense
D. Not reciprocalJustifies the aff kicking case and reading a new one in the 2AC and
making perms as advocacies. Its the only way to generate stable offense.
E. Pre-round conditionality solves all of their offense they got their education
researching pre round and determined the best advocacy.
2AC Short Condo

Conditionality is a reason to reject the teamit promotes sophistry over argument
development and strategy skew puts the aff at a permanent disadvantage
dispositionality gives us some strategic control.
1AR Short Condo

Conditionality is a reason to reject the team
Prevents reflection and revision at the end of the debate because not every argument
is resolved. Learning how to perfect an advocacy is key to creating one that can gather
a coalition and create change
Keeps debaters from learning how to sort through information and determine which
is the most important because there is no way to know which advocacy the neg will go
for
Proving the aff is a bad idea doesnt mean there shouldnt be limits on how thats
accomplished. And effective information processing outweighs- its a prerequisite to
broad scrutiny
Education O/W Fairness

Education outweighs fairness
a) Its why were in debate; if there were no education there would be no reason
to do debate.
b) Unfairness is inevitable youre never against a team whos exactly as good as
you with a judge whos completely unbiased structural conditions mean that
education should be the primary concern.
Fairness O/W Education

Fairness outweighs education
a) Prerequisite to education without fairness, we wont actually learn about
anything because we wont have in-depth, clash-filled debates.
b) Skills without fairness we never get better at debate and improve this is key
to getting the skills that we take with us outside of debate
Topic-Specific Education O/W Critical Thinking

Topic-specific education outweighs critical thinking
a) Our only shot this year is the only chance we have to learn about
transportation infrastructure; we dont get the same research experience
outside of debate.
b) Critical thinking is inevitable continuing in debate means that youll have to
develop those skills anyways.
Critical Thinking O/W Topic-Specific Education

Critical thinking outweighs topic-specific education
a) Portability its the only useful thing we carry outside of debate we need to
constantly develop these skills.
b) Topic-specific education is inevitable camp, pre-season research, and
tournaments all mean we learn about the resolution.
Breadth O/W Depth

Breadth outweighs depth in-depth education is inevitable because 95% of the time
theres only one plan per round theres only so much we can learn about each plan,
meaning that theres only a risk that learning about more is good
Depth O/W Breadth

Depth outweighs breadth if theres an extremely wide variety of cases theres no
way to research all of them, but a small amount of cases means we research each indepth a majority of our education comes from research rather than debating, which
means that research burden should be the lens for evaluating education
T O/W Theory
T outweighs theory
a) Predictability theres no way to prepare for cases that arent topical without
topicality they could run anything. They were abusive first.
b) Education narrowing the possible affirmatives to specific cases allows for in
depth education about the topic instead of learning tons of things but not
focusing on them.
c) Jurisdiction the judge shouldnt hear cases not having to do with the
resolution and non-topical cases are outside of jurisdiction.
d) Turns their impacts if they were topical we wouldnt be running abusive
positions.
Theory O/W T
Theory outweighs topicality because it is the ONLY real in-round abuse this abuse
causes us to undercover multiple positions including topicality which the negative
block can then explode for 8 or 13 minutes proving the strategy and time skew caused
by their abusive advocacies. In-round abuse should always come before their potential
abuse claims on topicality because its the only objective standard for weighing abuse.
Potential Abuse Is A Voter

Potential abuse is a voting issue
a) In-round abuse is arbitrary you can claim abuse off of anything in round
only potential abuse allows for a better standard because we provide
worldviews, not just random examples
b) Precedent not voting on potential abuse allows for arguments to become norisk options and the other side never loses on theory only a risk that
punishing them will discourage them
Potential Abuse Isnt A Voter

Potential abuse isnt a voting issue
a) Arbitrary they can literally say anything we did or could have done abused them in
the round its akin to the neg saying that the aff should lose because they could have
read an untopical plan
b) No precedent at worst we dont run ________ anymore they cant solve for other
debaters or other judges
c) Infinitely regressive claiming potential abuse allows the negative team to extrapolate a new
story of what the affirmative team could do every round. This allows them to spin random
stories off every single portion of our case making it unfair for the affirmative to defend.
d) In-round abuse is a better standard it actually measures whether an argument hurts

the quality of debate or not
Err Aff On Theory

1. Block vs 1AR we cant answer everything in the 13 minute block in our 5 minute 1AR
give us leeway
2. We have the burden of T were restrained in argument choice, they arent
3. They choose the focus of the debate even if we have the 1AC, the 1NC determines what
the debate is ultimately about erring aff on theory allows for some reciprocity
Err Neg On Theory

1. First and last speech and infinite prep they choose the focus of the debate and we cant
respond to anything they say in the 2AR, meaning they can effectively get away with murder
2. Empirics 60% aff wins and inherent aff bias means neg should get some leeway.
3. Fiat kills our ground half of our political process arguments go away because of fiat or
normal means arguments we should at least have theory

Offshore Wind 2AC Blocks

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Offshore wind 2AC Blocks

billion in damage to three US states6

technology also serves one purpose.

Controlling disasters key to save millions of lives

Replaces Sea Wall Need

pay for themselves from the sale of

Silent Threats and Long-Term Policy Planning

Cities as Investments for the Nation

startling costs and consequences of the impact of Hurricane Katrina on this

2AC Inherency: A/T #1 Not Inherent *1/1+

2AC Harms Economy: A/T #1 Doesnt Solve Growth *1/1+

2AC Harms Economy: A/T #2 US Not Key *1/1+

2AC Harms Economy: A/T #3 No Impact *1/1+

3. Economic decline causes financial crises in unstable regions causes war

2AC Harms Climate: A/T #1 Doesnt Solve Climate *1/1+

2. The plan solves climate change

2AC Harms Climate: A/T #2 No Impact *1/1+

2AC Solvency: A/T #1 Incentives Fail *1/1+

2. Counter-interpretation its means belong OR associated with

belonging to or relating to something that has already been mentioned

The dog hurt its paw.

Their house has its own swimming pool.

Prefer our interpretation

b. checks back limits US still has to own the land.

3. No topical affs under development no one advocates US doing the developing

4. Their definition is bad POSSESSIVE refers to a way of defining a pronoun NOT as

6. Counter-interpretation Development includes USE OF OCEAN SPACE means the

2. Aim of Ocean Engineering Committee

8. Counter-interp increase means to make greater if there is no current USFG

9. Reasonability checks good is good enough

1ar T its overview

B. Their limits impact is made up for 2 reasons

Ext Counter-Interp of Development

Ext We Meet already funded

February 2009, Congress

(--) US provides massive support for wind power now:

AT: Bird Disad

(--) Birds will be harmed more by warming than the plan:

(--) The risk to birds is virtually nonexistent

Ohio, wind by Kathiann M. Kowalski. Bookmark the permalink.

(--) Wind industry will decrease bird deaths:

(--) Wind turbines kill very few birds:

biggest threats are to bald eagle and

(--) Studies prove: offshore wind doesnt hurt species:

AT: Electricity Prices DA

(--) Turn: the plan decreases electricity costs:

U.S. [*219] population lives in coastal states," n11 placing

Average Price of Electricity Climbs to All-Time Record

editor in chief of CNSNews.com, Average Price of Electricity Climbs to All-Time

BLS. In June, it was slightly below that level, at 209.144.

(--) Electricity prices at all-time high

a look at your electrical bill. You are probably

(--) US electricity prices high now

power has maintained a steady

the wind blows constantly off the coasts, removing the

(--) Scientists have studied and prevented intermittency

AT: Politics Disad

(--) The plan would be popular with the public:

a lack of space onshore, attractive policy incentives, and increased public

(--) The plan would be a win for Obama:

AT: Spending Disad

AT: Wind Requires Fossil Fuels

(--) Wind alternative energy requires no fossil fuels

States Counterplan Answers