Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
L-29910
SANCHEZ, J.:
Key targets in plaintiff's complaint for the restoration of the original
measurement 8 meters wide of the dead end of Lapu-Lapu
Street are: (1) Resolution No. 132, Series of 1961, authorizing the
lease by the City of Baguio (hereinafter referred to as the City) to
Shell Company of the Philippines, Limited (Shell, for short) of Lot 25
of the Baguio Market Subdivision and a portion of Lapu-Lapu Street
abutting said lot; and (2) Resolution No. 215, Series of 1961,
amending the first mentioned resolution by authorizing the vacation
of the leased portion of Lapu-Lapu Street and the conversion of the
remainder by the side thereof into an alley of 5 meters wide (4
meters in actual use). Plaintiff wants these resolutions stricken down
as invalid. The court below ruled in the negative. This appeal is the
offshoot.
The facts are as follows:
On April 30, 1957, Antonio Favis bought a parcel of land of about
1,000 square meters Lot 2-E-3-B-3-B-2 of the subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-2179 from the Assumption Convent, Inc. Said lot is
bounded on the southwest by Lot 2-E-3-B-3-B-1 (proposed road),
owned by Assumption Convent, Inc. and part of subdivision plan
Psd-2179.
Simultaneous with the sale, Assumption donated to the City "for
road purposes" the lot indicated in its subdivision plan as the
proposed road Lot 2-E-3-B-3-B-1 aforesaid. This donated road is
used by Favis as his means of egress and ingress from his residence
to a public street called Lapu-Lapu Street.
Lapu-Lapu Street is actually Lot 27 in the amendatory plan (Bcs-56Amd 2, Residence Section "B") And is a portion of a big tract of land
registered in the name of the City, known as Baguio Market
Subdivision, for all of which the City holds Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 2209. branches out to various parts of the market
subdivision. From its intersecting point with Dagohoy Street and
1
going northward, Lapu-Lapu Street is eight (8) meters wide; it
abruptly ends as it meets portions of two lots the donated road
aforementioned and the lot owned by Olmina Fernandez (Lot 2-E-3B-1-A, Bsd-26963). Fernandez' lot is fenced, with buildings; and
there is a sharp depression of at least 2 meters at the precise point it
meets Lapu-Lapu Street. Ocular inspection conducted by the trial
court disclosed that at the exact connecting point of Lapu-Lapu
Street and the donated road (which leads to appellant's land), the
road opening is only 2.5 meters wide.
Lot 25 of the Baguio Market Subdivision is northernmost in said
subdivision and contains an area of approximately 400 square
meters. Immediately next to it, to the north, is the lot of Olmina
Fernandez aforesaid. As far back as June, 1947, the City, by virtue of
and
Also a parcel of land containing an area of 100 sq. m. more
or less, marked as "Lot B" on Sketch Plan...
Lot 25 (Lot A), it is to be noted, is the same lot leased to Shell way
back in June, 1947 and the lease of Lot B is merely an addition
thereto. This additional area taken from Lapu-Lapu Street is five (5)
meters wide and twenty (20) meters long and abuts Lot 25.
About three weeks later, the City, thru its Mayor entered into a
2
formal contract of lease with Shell.
Shell filed an application with the Office of the City Engineer of
Baguio for a building permit for the construction of a new and bigger
gasoline station on the leased premises. Said office, in a letter to the
City Council thru the City Mayor dated June 30, 1961, noted that the
leased "[1] to 'B' which consists of 100 square meters is exactly
within the road right-of-way of Lapu-Lapu Street," is for public use,
and may not be leased.
On July 5, 1961, appellant Antonio C. Favis lodged a letter-protest
against the additional lease made in favor of Shell. He claimed that it
would diminish the width of Lapu-Lapu Street to five meters only;
that it would destroy the symmetry of the said street thus making it
look very ugly; and that the City was bereft of authority to lease any
portion of its public streets in favor of anyone.
Apparently to obviate any and all objections to the lease of the
additional area to Shell, the City Council of Baguio, on July 19, 1961,
passed Resolution No. 215, amending Resolution No. 132, Series of
1961, by converting that "portion of Lapu-Lapu Street lying
southeast from Lot B of the sketch plan prepared March 10, 1961 by
Private Land Surveyor Perfecto B. Espiritu, beginning at this portion's
intersection with Dagohoy Street, into an alley 5.00 meters wide (4
m. now in actual use); declaring for this purpose, that said Lot B shall
not be a part of this alley."
On November 29, 1961, Favis commenced suit for the annulment of
the lease contract with damages in the Court of First Instance of
3
Baguio. He prayed that (1) defendants be ordered to stop, remove
and/or demolish whatever constructions had been introduced at the
additional leased area on Lapu-Lapu Street; (2) the building permit
and contract of lease entered into by and between the defendants
be cancelled and revoked for being null and void; and (3) defendants
be directed to pay, jointly and severally, actual, compensatory,
corrective and consequential damages totalling P50,000, attorneys'
fees in the sum of P2,000, and the costs.
After hearing, the lower court, on May 21, 1962, rendered judgment
uphelding the two questioned resolutions and dismissing the
complaint, with costs.
We first address ourselves to the preliminary questions raised in the
appeal.lawphi1.nt
1. Amongst these is appellant's charge that the resolutions directing
the partial closing of Lapu-Lapu Street and the lease thereof are
invalid. Because, so appellant avers, those resolutions contravene
the City Charter. He relies on subsection (L) of Section 2553 of the
Revised Administrative Code. It provides that the powers granted to
the City including the power to close streets shall be carried
"into effect by ordinance."
This objection is directed at form, not at substance. It has been held
that "even where the statute or municipal charter requires the
municipality to act by ordinance, if a resolution is passed in the
manner and with the statutory formality required in the enactment
of an ordinance, it will be binding and effective as an
4
ordinance." Such resolution may operate regardless of the name by
5
which it is called.
Resolutions No. 132 and 215, Series of 1961, were unanimously
approved with all the councilors present and voting, carried the seal
of the city council, were signed by the City Vice-Mayor, the Presiding
Officer, approved by the City Mayor, and attested by the City
Secretary. With the presumption of validity of the resolution and the
other presumption that official duty has been regularly performed,
the embattled resolutions are just as good as ordinances and have
the same force.
2. Appellant cites lack of advertisement or direct notice to owners of
contiguous properties whose rights might be affected, as another
ground to show invalidity of the resolutions. The pertinent provision
of the charter reads, thus: .
... to carry into effect by ordinance the powers
hereinbefore granted in this subsection, but no ordinance
shall provide for more than one project of any of the kinds
named herein, nor create more than one district,
assessment, and fund necessary and appropriate therefor,
and in each and every such ordinance provision shall be
made for notice to any and all persons interested, giving
them and each of them not less than two weeks from and
after the date of depositing a notice in the post-office at
Baguio in a securely sealed postpaid wrapper addressed to
each person affected thereby and assessed thereunder at
his last known place of residence, or at Baguio if no place
of residence is known, or to an agent who may be or may
have been appointed by such person in writing, in which to
appear and file objection to either the work itself, the
method or manner of assessment, the time or times and
method of payment therefor, or to all thereof and such
other and further objection or objections as may seem to
any such person or persons reasonable and proper in the
premises: such notice shall set forth the nature of the
proposed improvement, the estimated cost therefor, the
total amount of the assessment to be levied therefor, and
the amount to be levied upon each parcel of the property
or possession of the addressee; any and every such
appearance and objection shall be made and heard only
before the city council, and council may, at any such
First to the governing principle: "The general rule is that one whose
property does not abut on the closed section of a street has no right
to compensation for the closing or vacation of the street, if he still
has reasonable access to the general system of streets. The
circumstances in some cases may be such as to give a right to
damages to a property owner, even though his property does not
abut on the closed section. But to warrant recovery in any such case
the property owner must show that the situation is such that he has
sustained special damages differing in from those sustained by kind,
16
and not merely in degree, the public generally."
In the case at bar, no private right of appellant has been invaded. No
special damage or damages he will incur by reason of the closing of
a portion of Lapu-Lapu Street at its dead-end. His property does not
abut that street. In fact, the court has found that the remaining
portion of Lapu-Lapu Street, which actually is 4 meters in width, is
sufficient for the needs of appellant and that the leased portion
subject of this suit "was not necessary for public use."
Furthermore, it is physically impossible to connect Lapu-Lapu Street
in its entire width 8 meters with the area donated to the City
or Assumption Convent, for the reason that the only outlet between
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Will the lease and/or mortgage of a portion of a realty acquired
through free patent constitute sufficient ground for the nullification
of such land grant? Should such property revert to the State once it
is invaded by the sea and thus becomes foreshore land?
The Case
These are the two questions raised in the petition before us assailing
1
the Court of Appeals' Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 02667
promulgated on June 13, 1991 which answered the said questions in
2
3
the negative. Respondent Court's dismissed petitioner's appeal
4
and affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Calauag, Quezon, dated December 28, 1983 in Civil Case No. C-608.
In turn, the Regional Trial Court's decision dismissed petitioner's
complaint for cancellation of the Torrens Certificate of Title of
Respondent Morato and for reversion of the parcel of land subject
thereof of the public domain.
The Facts
The Issues
Petitioner alleges that the following errors were committed by
7
Respondent Court:
I
Respondent court erred in holding that the
patent granted and certificate of title issued to
Respondent Morato cannot be cancelled and
annulled since the certificate of title becomes
indefeasible after one year from the issuance of
the title.
II
Respondent Court erred in holding that the
questioned land is part of a disposable public
land and not a foreshore land.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
First Issue: Indefeasibility of a Free Patent Title
In resolving the first issue against petitioner, Respondent Court
8
held:
. . . As ruled in Heirs of Gregorio Tengco vs. Heirs
of Jose Alivalas, 168 SCRA 198. ". . . The rule is
well-settled that an original certificate of title
issued on the strength of a homestead patent
partakes of the nature of a certificate of title
issued in a judicial proceeding, as long as the
land disposed of is really part of the disposable
land of the public domain, and becomes
indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the
expiration of one year from the date of
promulgation of the order of the Director of
Lands for the issuance of the patent. (Republic v.
Heirs of Carle, 105 Phil. 1227 (1959); Ingaran v.
Ramelo, 107 Phil. 498 (1960); Lopez v. Padilla,
(G.R. No. L-27559, May 18, 1972, 45 SCRA 44). A
homestead patent, one registered under the
Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible
as a Torrens Title. (Pamintuan v. San Agustin, 43
Phil. 558 (1982); El Hogar Filipino v. Olviga, 60
Phil. 17 (1934); Duran v. Oliva, 113 Phil. 144
The City of Paraaque (the City) opposed the application for land
registration, stating that it needed the property for its flood control
program; that the property was within the legal easement of 20
meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the property
was not covered by the legal easement, title to the property could
not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the
property was an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted
3
from accretion.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.
G.R. No. 160453
On May 10, 2000, the RTC granted the application for land
registration, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants, ARCADIO
IVAN A. SANTOS, III and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., both Filipinos and
of legal age, as the TRUE and ABSOLUTE OWNERS of the land being
applied for which is situated in the Barangay of San Dionisio, City of
Paraaque with an area of one thousand forty five (1045) square
meters more or less and covered by Subdivision Plan Csd-00-000343,
being a portion of Lot 4998, Cad. 299, Case 4, Paraaque Cadastre,
LRC Rec. No. and orders the registration of Lot 4998-B in their names
with the following technical description, to wit:
xxxx
Once this Decision became (sic) final and executory, let the
corresponding Order for the Issuance of the Decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
appealed.
Ruling of the CA
In its appeal, the Republic ascribed the following errors to the
5
RTC, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SOUGHT
TO BE REGISTERED IS AN ACCRETION TO THE ADJOINING PROPERTY
OWNED BY APPELLEES DESPITE THE ADMISSION OF APPELLEE
ARCADIO C. SANTOS JR. THAT THE SAID PROPERTY WAS NOT
FORMED AS A RESULT OF THE GRADUAL FILLING UP OF SOIL
THROUGH THE CURRENT OF THE RIVER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND
REGISTRATION DESPITE APPELLEES FAILURE TO FORMALLY OFFER
IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT
PARCEL OF LAND IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLEES HAD
SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THEIR CONTINUOUS, OPEN, PUBLIC AND
ADVERSE OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR A PERIOD
OF MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.
I
RESPONDENTS CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AN
ACCRETION TO THEIR ADJOINING LAND THAT WOULD ENTITLE
THEM TO REGISTER IT UNDER ARTICLE 457 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE
IS CONTRADICTED BY THEIR OWN EVIDENCE.
II
ASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED WAS
"PREVIOUSLY A PART OF THE PARAAQUE RIVER WHICH BECAME
AN ORCHARD AFTER IT DRIED UP," THE REGISTRATION OF SAID
PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE ALTERNATIVELY
JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 461 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
RULING THAT THE FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO FORMALLY OFFER
IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS FATAL TO THEIR
APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.
IV
THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE
CONTINUOUSLY, OPENLY, PUBLICLY AND ADVERSELY OCCUPIED THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE.
To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code was
applicable herein; and whether or not respondents could claim the
property by virtue of acquisitive prescription pursuant to Section
14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree).
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
I.
The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code to
respondents benefit
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters."
In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced as follows:
Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did not yet
exist when the original title of Lot 4 was issued in their mothers
name in 1920, and that Lot 4998-B came about only thereafter as
the land formed between Lot 4 and the Paraaque River, the
unavoidable conclusion should then be that soil and sediments had
meanwhile been deposited near Lot 4 by the current of the
Paraaque River, resulting in the formation of Lot 4998-B.
that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the
18
State. It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B,
continue to belong to the
II
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
xxxx
Under Section 14(1), then, applicants for confirmation of imperfect
title must prove the following, namely: (a) that the land forms part
of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona
fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June
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12, 1945.
The Republic assails the findings by the lower courts that
respondents "took possession of the same property continuously,
22
openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years."
Although it is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court,
especially when affirmed by the CA, are accorded the highest degree
of respect, and generally will not be disturbed on appeal, with such
23
findings being binding and conclusive on the Court, the Court has
consistently recognized exceptions to this rule, including the
following, to wit: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) when there is grave
abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the
issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of
both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are
contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by respondent;
and (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
24
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures; and that the inference made
by the RTC and the CA was manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible. Hence, the Court should now review the findings.
In finding that respondents had been in continuous, open, public
and adverse possession of the land for more than 30 years, the RTC
declared:
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicant
became the owners thereof, they took possession of the same
property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than
thirty years because their predecessor in interest are the adjoining
owners of the subject parcel of land along the river banks.
Furthermore, the fact that the applicant paid its realty taxes, had it
surveyed per subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was
duly approved by the Land Management Services and the fact that
Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC Chief, Surveys Division Land
Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject property is
not a portion of the Paraaque River and that it does not fall nor
overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application.
The RTC apparently reckoned respondents period of supposed
possession to be "more than thirty years" from the fact that "their
predecessors in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject
parcel of land." Yet, its decision nowhere indicated what acts
the right of accession under Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of
1889 and/or Article 461 of the Civil Code, the same must fail.
Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man
and not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription, the adverse possession which may be the basis of a
grant of title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to
alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. It is only after
the Government has declared the land to be alienable and
disposable agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and
exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an
imperfect title.
A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from
a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. As such,
under Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan
Creek, including its natural bed, is property of the public domain
which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription. And, absent any declaration by the government, that a
portion of the creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its
inalienable character.
xxxx
Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the
present Civil Code took effect, the subject land would clearly not
belong to petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest since under the
aforementioned provision of Article 461, "river beds which are
abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters
ipso facto belong to the owners of the land occupied by the new
course," and the owners of the adjoining lots have the right to
acquire them only after paying their value.
And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present
Civil Code are applicable only when "river beds are abandoned
through the natural change in the course of the waters." It is
uncontroverted, however, that, as found by both the Bureau of
Lands and the DENR Regional Executive Director, the subject land
became dry as a result of the construction an irrigation canal by the
National Irrigation Administration. Thus, in Ronquillo v. Court of
Appeals, this Court held:
The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for
interpretation. Article 370 applies only if there is a natural change in
the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to manmade or artificial accretions nor to accretions to lands that adjoin
canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems. Considering our
earlier finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was
actually caused by the active intervention of man, it follows that
Article 370 does not apply to the case at bar and, hence, the Del
Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.
The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered
as forming part of the land of the public domain which cannot be
subject to acquisition by private ownership. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has
been a change in the course of a river, not where the river simply
dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not even alleged that the
Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such a situation,
commentators are of the opinion that the dry river bed remains
property of public dominion. (Bold emphases supplied)
SO ORDERED.
G. R. No. 185124
The Facts
NIA is a government-owned-and-controlled corporation created
under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3601 on 22 June 1963. It is primarily
responsible for irrigation development and management in the
country. Its charter was amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) 552
on 11 September 1974 and P.D. 1702 on 17 July 1980. To carry out
its purpose, NIA was specifically authorized under P.D. 552 to
1
exercise the power of eminent domain.
NIA needed some parcels of land for the purpose of constructing the
Malitubog-Marigadao Irrigation Project. On 08 September 1994, it
filed with the RTC of Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint for the
expropriation of a portion of three (3) parcels of land covering a
2
total of 14,497.91 square meters. The case was docketed as Special
Civil Case No. 61 and was assigned to RTC-Branch 22. The affected
parcels of land were the following:
1) Lot No. 3080 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-61963 and registered under the Rural Bank of
Kabacan
2) Lot No. 455 covered by TCT No. T-74516 and
registered under the names of RG May, Ronald and
Rolando, all surnamed Lao
3) Lot No. 3039 registered under the name of Littie Sarah
3
Agdeppa
13
The report, however, stated that the committee members could not
agree on the market value of the subject properties and
recommended the appointment of new independent commissioners
14
to replace the ones coming from the parties only. On 22 October
15
1996, the RTC issued an Order revoking the appointments of Atty.
Agdeppa and Engr. Mabang as members of the committee and, in
their stead, appointed Renato Sambrano, Assistant Provincial
Assessor of the Province of Cotabato; and Jack Tumacmol, Division
16
Chief of the Land Bank of the PhilippinesKidapawan Branch.
On 25 November 1996, the new committee submitted its
Commissioners Report to the lower court. The committee had
agreed that the fair market value of the land to be expropriated
should be P 65 per square meter based on the zonal valuation of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). As regards the improvement on
the properties, the report recommended the following
compensation:
a. P 200 for each gmelina tree that are more than four (4)
years old
b. P 150 for each gmelina tree that are more than one (1)
year old
c. P 164 for each coco tree
17
The records show that the trial court dutifully followed the
procedure under Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure when
it formed a committee that was tasked to determine the just
compensation for the expropriated properties. The first set of
committee members made an ocular inspection of the properties,
subject of the expropriation. They also determined the exact areas
affected, as well as the kinds and the number of improvements on
34
the properties. When the members were unable to agree on the
valuation of the land and the improvements thereon, the trial court
selected another batch of disinterested members to carry out the
task of determining the value of the land and the improvements.
The new committee members even made a second ocular inspection
of the expropriated areas. They also obtained data from the BIR to
determine the zonal valuation of the expropriated properties,
interviewed the adjacent property owners, and considered other
factors such as distance from the highway and the nearby town
35
center. Further, the committee members also considered
Provincial Ordinance No. 173, which was promulgated by the
Province of Cotabato on 15 June 1999, and which provide for the
value of the properties and the improvements for taxation
36
purposes.
We can readily deduce from these established facts that the
committee members endeavored a rigorous process to determine
the just compensation to be awarded to the owners of the
expropriated properties. We cannot, as petitioner would want us to,
oversimplify the process undertaken by the committee in arriving at
its recommendations, because these were not based on mere
conjectures and unreliable data.
37
xxx
xxx
of irrigation projects. That NIA will make use of the excavated soil is
of no moment and is of no concern to the landowner who has been
paid the fair market value of his land. As pointed out by the OSG, the
law does not limit the use of the expropriated land to the surface
area only. Further, NIA, now being the owner of the expropriated
property, has the right to enjoy and make use of the property in
accordance with its mandate and objectives as provided by law. To
sanction the payment of the excavated soil is to allow the
landowners to recover more than the value of the land at the time
when it was taken, which is the true measure of the damages, or just
compensation, and would discourage the construction of important
44
public improvements.
the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public
use or purpose if entry has already been made.
Hence, the appellate court erred in affirming the trial courts Order
to award payment of just compensation to the defendantsintervenors. There is doubt as to the real owner of Lot No. 3080.
Despite the fact that the lot was covered by TCT No. T-61963 and
was registered under its name, the Rural Bank of Kabacan
manifested that the owner of the lot was no longer the bank, but
the defendants-intervenors; however, it presented no proof as to
the conveyance thereof. In this regard, we deem it proper to
remand this case to the trial court for the reception of evidence to
establish the present owner of Lot No. 3080 who will be entitled to
receive the payment of just compensation.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court, which had awarded the
payment of just compensation intended for Lot No. 3080
registered in the name of the Rural Bank of Kabacan to the
defendants-intervenors on the basis of the non-participation of the
rural bank in the proceedings and the latters subsequent
Manifestation that it was no longer the owner of that lot. The
appellate court erred on this matter.
SO ORDERED.
On May 17, 1983, the trial court issued an Order which granted
petitioners Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession and authorized
the petitioner to take immediate possession of the Subject Property.
The court ruled:
Premises considered, the Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession dated May 10, 1982, filed by plaintiff is hereby granted.
Plaintiff is hereby allowed to take immediate possession, control and
disposition of the properties known as Lot Nos. 3497-CC and 349712
DD x x x.
13
On May 15, 2003, petitioner filed its Answer, arguing that Javellana
could no longer bring an action for recovery since the Subject
Property was already taken for public use. Rather, private
respondent could only demand for the payment of just
compensation. Petitioner also maintained that the legality or
illegality of petitioners possession of the property should be
determined in the eminent domain case and not in a separate action
for recovery of possession.
Both parties jointly moved to consolidate the expropriation case
(Civil Case No. 14052) and the case for recovery of possession (Civil
18
Case No. 03-27571), which motion was granted by the trial court in
19
an Order dated August 26, 2003. On November 14, 2003, a
commission was created to determine the just compensation due to
20
Javellana.
On November 20, 2003, private respondent filed a
Motion/Manifestation dated November 19, 2003 claiming that
before a commission is created, the trial court should first order the
condemnation of the property, in accordance with the Rules of
Court. Javellana likewise insisted that the fair market value of the
Subject Property should be reckoned from the date when the court
orders the condemnation of the property, and not the date of actual
taking, since petitioners possession of the property was
21
questionable. Before petitioner could file its Comment, the RTC
22
issued an Order dated November 21, 2003 denying the Motion.
Undeterred, Javellana filed on November 25, 2003, an Omnibus
Motion to Declare Null and Void the Order of May 17, 1983 and
to Require Plaintiff to Deposit 10% or P254,000.00. Javellana claimed
that the amount is equivalent to the 10% of the fair market value of
the Subject Property, as determined by the Iloilo City Appraisal
Committee in 2001, at the time when the parties were trying to
23
negotiate a settlement.
First Assailed Order
On December 12, 2003, the RTC issued the First Assailed Order,
which nullified the Order dated May 17, 1983 (concerning the
issuance of a writ of possession over the Subject Property). The trial
court ruled:
x x x the Order dated May 17, 1983 is hereby declared null and void
and the plaintiff [is] hereby ordered to immediately deposit with the
PNB the 10% of the just compensation after the Commission shall
have rendered its report and have determined the value of the
property not at the time it was condemned but at the time the
24
complaint was filed in court. (Emphasis ours)
Second Assailed Order
25
1981 - at the
time the
complaint was
filed
P110.00/s
qm
P79,860.
00
1981 at the
time the
complaint was
filed
P686.81/s
qm
P498,625
.22
2002
P3,500.00
/sqm
P2,541,0
00.00
2004
P4,200.00
/sqm
PhP3,049
,200.00
Petitioner is before us claiming that (1) the trial court gravely abused
its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
overturning the Order dated May 17, 1983, which was already a final
order; and (2) just compensation for the expropriation should be
based on the Subject Propertys fair market value either at the time
of taking or filing of the complaint.
Private Respondents Arguments
This is true inasmuch as there was no deposit at the PNB and their
taking was illegal.
The plaintiff thru [sic] Atty. Laurea alleged that this Court had a
change of heart and issued an Amended Order with the same
wordings as the order of December 12, 2003 but this time stated not
at the time it was condemned but at the time the order was
issued. Naturally, this Court in the interest of justice, can amend its
order because there was no deposit by plaintiff.
The jurisprudence cited by plaintiff that the just compensation must
be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint is true if
there was a deposit. Because there was none the filing was not in
accordance with law, hence, must be at the time the order was
issued.
The allegation of defendant thru [sic] counsel that the orders
attacked by plaintiff thru [sic] counsel saying it has become final and
executory are interlocutory orders subject to the control of the
Judge until final judgment is correct. Furthermore, it is in the
29
interes[t] of justice to correct errors.
In the meantime, on April 15, 2004, the Commission submitted its
Report, providing the following estimates of value, but without
30
making a proper recommendation:
Reckoning
Point
Value per
square
meter
Fair
Market
Value
Basis
31
Javellana did not bother to file an appeal from the May 17, 1983
Order which granted petitioners Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Possession and which authorized petitioner to take immediate
possession of the Subject Property. Thus, it has become final, and
the petitioners right to expropriate the property for a public use is
no longer subject to review. On the first question, therefore, we rule
that the trial court gravely erred in nullifying the May 17, 1983
Order.
For more than twenty (20) years, the MIAA occupied the subject lot
without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and without the
MIAA exerting efforts to ascertain ownership of the lot and
negotiating with any of the owners of the property. To our
mind, these are wanton and irresponsible acts which should be
suppressed and corrected. Hence, the award of exemplary
44
damages and attorneys fees is in order. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 32 in Civil Case No. 14052 and Civil
Case No. 03-27571 dated December 12, 2003, June 15, 2004, and
March 9, 2005 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 32 is DIRECTED to
immediately determine the just compensation due to private
respondent Elpidio T. Javellana based on the fair market value of the
Subject Property at the time Civil Case No. 14052 was filed, or on
September 18, 1981 with interest at the legal rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the time of filing until full payment is made.
The City of Iloilo is ORDERED to pay private respondent the amount
of P200,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173520
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the July 10, 2006
4
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 85396
5
which affirmed the June 28, 2004 Partial Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2, Balanga City in an eminent domain
6
case, ordering petitioner National Power Corporation ( Napocor) to
pay respondents spouses Rodolfo Zabala and Lilia Baylon (spouses
Zabala) just compensation ofP-150.00 per square meter for the
6,820-square meter portion of the spouses' property which was
traversed by transmission lines of Napocor under its 230 KV LimayHermosa Permanent Transmission Lines Project.
Factual Antecedents
The facts of this case as found by the CA and adopted by Napocor
are as follows:
On October 27, 1994, plaintiff-appellant National Power Corporation
("Napocor" x x x) filed a complaint for Eminent Domain against
defendants-appellees Sps. R. Zabala & L. Baylon, Tomas Aguirre,
Generosa de Leon and Leonor Calub ("Spouses Zabala", "Aguirre"
"de Leon", and "Calub," respectively x x x) before the Regional Trial
Court, Balanga City, Bataan alleging that: defendants-appellees
Spouses Zabala and Baylon, Aguirre, de Leon, and Calub own parcels
of land located in Balanga City, Bataan; it urgently needed an
easement of right of way over the affected areas for its 230 KV
Limay-Hermosa Transmission Line[s]; the said parcels of land have
neither been applied nor expropriated for any public use, and were
selected in a manner compatible with the greatest public good and
the least private injury; it repeatedly negotiated with the
defendants-appellees for the acquisition of right of way easement
over the said parcels of land but failed to reach an agreement with
the latter; it has the right to take or enter upon the possession of the
subject properties pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 42, which
repealed Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court upon the filing of
the expropriation complaint before the proper court or at anytime
thereafter, after due notice to defendants-appellees, and upon
deposit with the Philippine National Bank of the amount equal to
the assessed value of the subject properties for taxation purposes
which is to be held by said bank subject to the orders and final
disposition of the court; and it is willing to deposit the provisional
value representing the said assessed value of the affected portions
of the subject property x x x. It prayed for the issuance of a writ of
possession authorizing it to enter and take possession of the subject
property, to demolish all the improvements x x x thereon, and to
commence with the construction of the transmission lines project on
the subject properties, and to appoint not more than three (3)
commissioners to ascertain and report the just compensation for the
said easement of right of way.
tension wires would endanger the life and limb of the inhabitants
within the area, and decrease the value of their subject property;
the complaint does not show that the installation of the proposed
transmission wires on their property is the most direct, practical and
least burdensome means to achieve public good; the assessed value
of P1,636.89 stated in Tax Declaration No. 1646 is insufficient
because it has been revised and cancelled by Tax Declaration No.
11052 which shows a higher assessment value for the said property;
and plaintiff-appellant Napocor did not exert earnest efforts toward
the direct purchase of the needed portion of their property before
filing a complaint before the lower court.
On March 4, 1996 and March 7, 1996 plaintiff-appellant Napocor
and defendants-appellees Spouses Zabala filed their respective PreTrial Briefs.
On December 4, 1997, the Commissioners submitted their
Report/Recommendation fixing the just compensation for the use of
defendants-appellees Spouses Zabalas property as easement of
right of way at P150.00 per square meter without considering the
consequential damages.
Plaintiff-appellant Napocor prayed in its Comment to the
commissioners report, that the report be recommitted to the
commissioners for the modification of the report and the
substantiation of the same with reliable and competent
documentary evidence based on the value of the property at the
time of its taking. On their part, defendants-appellees Spouses
Zabala prayed, in the Comments, for the fixing of the just
compensation at P250.00 per square meter.
On February 25, 1998, the lower court recommitted the report to
the Commissioners for further report on the points raised by the
parties.
On August 20, 2003, the Commissioners submitted their Final Report
7
fixing the just compensation at P500.00 per square meter.
xxxx
On January 11, 1995, defendant-appellee Spouses Zabala moved to
dismiss the complaint averring that: the Balanga City proper is
already crowded and x x x needs additional space to meet the
housing requirements of the growing population; the only direction
the city proper could expand is the side where their subject property
is located; they incurred a considerable expense in the preparatory
development of the subject property into a subdivision to serve the
interest and well being of the growing population of Balanga; the
said growing need for housing and said preparatory development
would necessarily increase the value of the said property; the just
compensation would be higher if the proposed transmission lins of
plaintiff-appellant Napocor is installed or made to pass or traverse
through their property rather than through the parcels of land
farther from the existing city proper and away from their property
which was tapped to meet the expansion requirements of the
Balanga City proper; the transfer of the proposed transmission lines
from their property to a farther location is more economical and less
expensive to plaintiff-appellant Napocor and it would better serve
the interest of the people of Balanga because said location is less
developed, not needed for the expansion requirements of Balanga
City proper, the lots that would be traversed command a lower price
and less compensation would be paid by plaintiff-appellant Napocor;
the traversing of the transmission lines through their property would
impact negatively on the housing expansion in Balanga, the high
10
21
33
Under Section 8, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the trial court may
accept or reject, whether in whole or in part, the commissioners
report which is merely advisory and recommendatory in character. It
may also recommit the report or set aside the same and appoint
new commissioners. In the case before us, however, in spite of the
insufficient and flawed reports of the Commissioners and Napocors
objections thereto, the RTC eventually adopted the same. It
shrugged off Napocors protestations and limited itself to the
reports submitted by the Commissioners. It neither considered nor
required the submission of additional evidence to support the
recommended P150.00 per square meter just compensation. Ergo,
insofar as just compensation is concerned, we cannot sustain the
RTCs Partial Decision for want of documentary support.1wphi1
Lastly, it should be borne in mind that just compensation should be
computed based on the fair value of the subject property at the time
of its taking or the filing of the complaint, whichever came
34
first. Since in this case the filing of the eminent domain case came
ahead of the taking, just compensation should be based on the fair
market value of spouses Zabalas property at the time of the filing of
Napocors Complaint on October 27, 1994 or thereabouts.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. This case
is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Balanga City for
the proper determination of just compensation.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161107
a tall concrete perimeter fence built some thirty (30) years ago.
Abutting the fence along the West Drive are buildings, facilities, and
3
other improvements.
The petitioners are the officials of the City Government of Marikina.
On September 30, 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina
4
City enacted Ordinance No. 192, entitled "Regulating the
Construction of Fences and Walls in the Municipality of Marikina." In
5
6
1995 and 1998, Ordinance Nos. 217 and 200 were enacted to
amend Sections 7 and 5, respectively. Ordinance No. 192, as
amended, is reproduced hereunder, as follows:
ORDINANCE No. 192
Series of 1994
ORDINANCE REGULATING THE CONSTRUCTION OF FENCES AND
WALLS IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF MARIKINA
WHEREAS, under Section 447.2 of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991 empowers the
Sangguniang Bayan as the local legislative body of the municipality
to "x x x Prescribe reasonable limits and restraints on the use of
property within the jurisdiction of the municipality, x x x";
WHEREAS the effort of the municipality to accelerate its economic
and physical development, coupled with urbanization and
modernization, makes imperative the adoption of an ordinance
which shall embody up-to-date and modern technical design in the
construction of fences of residential, commercial and industrial
buildings;
WHEREAS, Presidential Decree No. 1096, otherwise known as the
National Building Code of the Philippines, does not adequately
provide technical guidelines for the construction of fences, in terms
of design, construction, and criteria;
WHEREAS, the adoption of such technical standards shall provide
more efficient and effective enforcement of laws on public safety
and security;
WHEREAS, it has occurred in not just a few occasions that high
fences or walls did not actually discourage but, in fact, even
protected burglars, robbers, and other lawless elements from the
view of outsiders once they have gained ingress into these walls,
hence, fences not necessarily providing security, but becomes itself
a "security problem";
WHEREAS, to discourage, suppress or prevent the concealment of
prohibited or unlawful acts earlier enumerated, and as guardian of
the people of Marikina, the municipal government seeks to enact
and implement rules and ordinances to protect and promote the
health, safety and morals of its constituents;
WHEREAS, consistent too, with the "Clean and Green Program" of
the government, lowering of fences and walls shall encourage
people to plant more trees and ornamental plants in their yards, and
when visible, such trees and ornamental plants are expected to
create an aura of a clean, green and beautiful environment for
Marikeos;
WHEREAS, high fences are unsightly that, in the past, people planted
on sidewalks to "beautify" the faade of their residences but,
however, become hazards and obstructions to pedestrians;
WHEREAS, high and solid walls as fences are considered "unneighborly" preventing community members to easily communicate
and socialize and deemed to create "boxed-in" mentality among the
populace;
WHEREAS, to gather as wide-range of opinions and comments on
this proposal, and as a requirement of the Local Government Code
of 1991 (R.A. 7160), the Sangguniang Bayan of Marikina invited
presidents or officers of homeowners associations, and commercial
and industrial establishments in Marikina to two public hearings
held on July 28, 1994 and August 25, 1994;
WHEREAS, the rationale and mechanics of the proposed ordinance
were fully presented to the attendees and no vehement objection
was presented to the municipal government;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE SANGGUINANG BAYAN
OF MARIKINA IN SESSION DULY ASSEMBLED:
Section 1. Coverage: This Ordinance regulates the construction of all
fences, walls and gates on lots classified or used for residential,
commercial, industrial, or special purposes.
Section 2. Definition of Terms:
a. Front Yard refers to the area of the lot fronting a
street, alley or public thoroughfare.
b. Back Yard the part of the lot at the rear of the
structure constructed therein.
c. Open fence type of fence which allows a view of "thrusee" of the inner yard and the improvements therein.
(Examples: wrought iron, wooden lattice, cyclone wire)
d. Front gate refers to the gate which serves as a passage
of persons or vehicles fronting a street, alley, or public
thoroughfare.
Section 3. The standard height of fences or walls allowed under this
ordinance are as follows:
(1) Fences on the front yard shall be no more than one
(1) meter in height. Fences in excess of one (1) meter shall
be of an open fence type, at least eighty percent (80%)
see-thru; and
(2) Fences on the side and back yard shall be in
accordance with the provisions of P.D. 1096 otherwise
known as the National Building Code.
Section 4. No fence of any kind shall be allowed in areas specifically
reserved or classified as parks.
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five (5)
meter parking area allowance located between the front monument
16
The ultimate question before the Court is whether Sections 3.1 and
5 of Ordinance No. 192 are valid exercises of police power by the
City Government of Marikina.
"Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make
statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
21
people." The State, through the legislature, has delegated the
exercise of police power to local government units, as agencies of
the State. This delegation of police power is embodied in Section
22
16 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), known
23
as the General Welfare Clause, which has two branches. "The first,
known as the general legislative power, authorizes the municipal
council to enact ordinances and make regulations not repugnant to
law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. The
second, known as the police power proper, authorizes the
municipality to enact ordinances as may be necessary and proper for
the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order,
comfort, and convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants,
24
and for the protection of their property."
25
SO ORDERED.
18
Aggrieved by the decision of the CA, the petitioners are now before
this Court presenting the following
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT CITY ORDINANCE NO.
192, SERIES OF 1994 IS NOT A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE
POWER;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE AFOREMENTIONED
ORDINANCE IS AN EXERCISE OF THE CITY OF THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CITY VIOLATED
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE IN IMPLEMENTING ORDINANCE
NO. 192, SERIES OF 1994; AND
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ABOVE-MENTIONED
ORDINANCE CANNOT BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE
19
APPLICATION.
In this case, the petitioners admit that Section 5 of the assailed
ordinance, pertaining to the five-meter setback requirement is, as
20
held by the lower courts, invalid. Nonetheless, the petitioners
argue that such invalidity was subsequently cured by Zoning
Ordinance No. 303, series of 2000. They also contend that Section 3,
relating to the 80% see-thru fence requirement, must be complied
with, as it remains to be valid.
xxx
xxx
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five (5)
meter parking area allowance located between the front monument
line and the building line of commercial and industrial
establishments and educational and religious institutions.
The respondents, thus, sought to prohibit the petitioners from
requiring them to (1) demolish their existing concrete wall, (2) build
a fence (in excess of one meter) which must be 80% see-thru, and
(3) build the said fence six meters back in order to provide a parking
area.
Setback Requirement
The Court first turns its attention to Section 5 which requires the
five-meter setback of the fence to provide for a parking area. The
petitioners initially argued that the ownership of the parking area to
be created would remain with the respondents as it would primarily
be for the use of its students and faculty, and that its use by the
public on non-school days would only be incidental. In their Reply,
however, the petitioners admitted that Section 5 was, in fact, invalid
31
for being repugnant to the Constitution.
The Court agrees with the latter position.
The Court joins the CA in finding that the real intent of the setback
requirement was to make the parking space free for use by the
public, considering that it would no longer be for the exclusive use
of the respondents as it would also be available for use by the
general public. Section 9 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, a
provision on eminent domain, provides that private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation.
The petitioners cannot justify the setback by arguing that the
ownership of the property will continue to remain with the
respondents. It is a settled rule that neither the acquisition of title
nor the total destruction of value is essential to taking. In fact, it is
usually in cases where the title remains with the private owner that
The petitioners argue that while Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 may
be invalid, Section 3.1 limiting the height of fences to one meter and
requiring fences in excess of one meter to be at least 80% see-thru,
should remain valid and enforceable against the respondents.
No Retroactivity
Ordinance No. 217 amended Section 7 of Ordinance No. 192 by
including the regulation of educational institutions which was
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 177933
METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner,
vs.
JUSTICE EMILIO A. GANCAYCO (Retired), Respondent,
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the
1
Rules of Court assailing the Decision promulgated on 18 July 2006
2
and the Resolution dated 10 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 84648.
The Facts
In the early 1950s, retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel
3
of land located at 746 Epifanio delos Santos Avenue (EDSA), Quezon
City with an area of 375 square meters and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT114558.
On 27 March 1956, the Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No.
2904, entitled "An Ordinance Requiring the Construction of Arcades,
for Commercial Buildings to be Constructed in Zones Designated as
Business Zones in the Zoning Plan of Quezon City, and Providing
4
Penalties in Violation Thereof."
An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first floor
projecting over the sidewalk beyond the first storey wall used as
5
protection for pedestrians against rain or sun.
11
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The MMDA thereafter appealed from the Decision of the trial court.
On 18 July 2006, the Court of Appeals (CA) partly granted the
16
appeal. The CA upheld the validity of Ordinance No. 2904 and
lifted the injunction against the enforcement and implementation of
the ordinance. In so doing, it held that the ordinance was a valid
exercise of the right of the local government unit to promote the
general welfare of its constituents pursuant to its police powers. The
CA also ruled that the ordinance established a valid classification of
property owners with regard to the construction of arcades in their
respective properties depending on the location. The CA further
stated that there was no taking of private property, since the owner
still enjoyed the beneficial ownership of the property, to wit:
The MMDA and the City Government of Quezon City both claim that
Justice Gancayco was estopped from challenging the ordinance,
because, in 1965, he asked for an exemption from the application of
the ordinance. According to them, Justice Gancayco thereby
recognized the power of the city government to regulate the
construction of buildings.
To recall, Justice Gancayco questioned the constitutionality of the
ordinance on two grounds: (1) whether the ordinance "takes"
private property without due process of law and just compensation;
and (2) whether the ordinance violates the equal protection of rights
because it allowed exemptions from its application.
On the first ground, we find that Justice Gancayco may still question
the constitutionality of the ordinance to determine whether or not
the ordinance constitutes a "taking" of private property without due
process of law and just compensation. It was only in 2003 when he
was allegedly deprived of his property when the MMDA demolished
a portion of the building. Because he was granted an exemption in
1966, there was no "taking" yet to speak of.
Moreover, in Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. Court of
21
Appeals, we held:
It is therefore decisively clear that estoppel cannot apply in this case.
The fact that petitioner acquiesced in the special conditions imposed
by the City Mayor in subject business permit does not preclude it
from challenging the said imposition, which is ultra vires or beyond
the ambit of authority of respondent City Mayor. Ultra vires acts or
acts which are clearly beyond the scope of one's authority are null
and void and cannot be given any effect. The doctrine of estoppel
cannot operate to give effect to an act which is otherwise null and
void or ultra vires. (Emphasis supplied.)
22
Corollarily, the policy of the Building Code, which was passed after
the Quezon City Ordinance, supports the purpose for the enactment
of Ordinance No. 2904. The Building Code states:
MMDA acted on its own and should be held solely liable for the
destruction of the portion of Justice Gancaycos building.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84648 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST
DEVELOPMENT), petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA
ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA,
BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented
by their father JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988
CRUZ, J.:
The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that
may be found in the bowels of the earth even if the land where the
1
discovery is made be private. In the cases at bar, which have been
consolidated because they pose a common issue, this doctrine was
not correctly applied.
These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of
land filed on February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf
and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo.
The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided
into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the
application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his
children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in
2
1964.
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated,
Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of
Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines,
3
through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that
they had acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio
claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the
Liberation. She testified she was born in the land, which was
4
possessed by her parents under claim of ownership. Alberto said
he received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto, who
declared that the land was planted by Jaime and his predecessors-ininterest to bananas, avocado, nangka and camote, and was enclosed
with a barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67
years old at the time, who recalled the earlier possession of the land
5
by Alberto's father. Balbalio presented her tax declaration in 1956
6
and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964, Alberto his tax
declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts from that year to
7
1964.
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim
covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the
successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in
September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the
date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and
exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced
by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its
geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and
8
its payment of taxes on the land.
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9
were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by
Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on
January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio.
These claims were purchased from these locators on November 2,
1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and
exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual
assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its
9
payment of annual taxes thereon.
The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with
Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 which provided that:
SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public
lands in the philippine Islands both surveyed and
unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free and
open to exploration, occupation and purchase
and the land in which they are found to
occupation and purchase by the citizens of the
United States, or of said islands.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection,
arguing that the land sought to be registered was covered by the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated
February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not
10
subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants
had failed to prove their claim of possession and ownership of the
11
land sought to be registered. The applicants appealed to the
respondent court, * which reversed the trial court and recognized
the claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and
12
Atok respecting their mining claims. In other words, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land
while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet
and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.
Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their
superior right of ownership. The Republic has filed its own petition
for review and reiterates its argument that neither the private
respondents nor the two mining companies have any valid claim to
the land because it is not alienable and registerable.
It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and
included in the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not
impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time.
The Court of Appeals correctly declared that:
There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June
Bug mineral claims of Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma" mineral
claims of Atok. The June Bug mineral claim of plaintiff Benguet was
one of the 16 mining claims of James E. Kelly, American and mining
locator. He filed his declaration of the location of the June Bug
mineral and the same was recorded in the Mining Recorder's Office
on October 14, 1909. All of the Kelly claims ha subsequently been
acquired by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's evidence is that
it had made improvements on the June Bug mineral claim
consisting of mine tunnels prior to 1935. It had submitted the
required affidavit of annual assessment. After World War II,
Benguet introduced improvements on mineral claim June Bug, and
also conducted geological mappings, geological sampling and
trench side cuts. In 1948, Benguet redeclared the "June Bug" for
taxation and had religiously paid the taxes.
The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of
Harrison registered in 1931, and which Atok representatives
acquired. Portions of Lots 1 to 5 and all of Lots 6 to 9 are within the
Emma and Fredia mineral claims of Atok Big Wedge Mining
Company.
The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma
mineral claims of Atok having been perfected prior to the approval
of the Constitution of the Philippines of 1935, they were removed
from the public domain and had become private properties of
Benguet and Atok.
It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under
consideration was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the
Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and
according to the laws existing at that time, as construed and
applied by this court in McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil.
749), a valid location of a mining claim segregated the area from
the public domain. Said the court in that case: The moment the
locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located,
and perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the
United States Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to
the possession and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the
lands had become mineral lands and they were exempted from
lands that could be granted to any other person. The reservations
of public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral
perfected locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is
made upon public lands afterwards included in a reservation, such
inclusion or reservation does not affect the validity of the former
location. By such location and perfection, the land located is
segregated from the public domain even as against the
Government. (Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337; Van Mess v.
Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc. 546).
"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to
segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the
locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a
patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions
prescribed by law. Where there is a valid location of a mining claim,
the area becomes segregated from the public domain and the
property of the locator." (St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana
Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650; 655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322.) "When a
location of a mining claim is perfected it has the effect of a grant by
with the operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest
he destroy the crops above. How deep can the farmer, and how high
can the miner, go without encroaching on each other's rights?
Where is the dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface
rights?
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that
the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The
classification must be categorical; the land must be either
completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as
already observed, the land which was originally classified as forest
land ceased to be so and became mineral and completely mineral
20
once the mining claims were perfected. As long as mining
operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did
not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so,
because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those
who were unlawfully occupying the surface.
What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act
No. 137, providing as follows:
Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and
minerals belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development or
utilization, shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations, or associations,
at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
lease or concession at the time of the
inauguration of government established under
the Constitution.
SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the
use of land for agricultural, industrial,
commercial, residential, or for any purpose other
than mining does not include the ownership of,
nor the right to extract or utilize, the minerals
which may be found on or under the surface.
once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which
it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the
State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its
sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land
and may not be used by any private party, including the registered
owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining
operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such
owner, he is of course entitled to just compensation under the
21
Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.
Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the
property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims
which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935
prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except
agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its
adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to
the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor
could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining
companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30,
1976, is SET ASIDE and that of the trial court dated March 11, 1969,
is REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 158687
12
hired as foreman in 1983 and that the latter and his family stayed in
the second house.
Tonsing Binay-an corroborated the testimony of Suyam as regards
the two houses constructed by petitioner and added that petitioner
was the manager of Salamander Enterprises and had a concession
permit from the Bureau of Mines to haul gravel and sand.
Petitioner testified that he is a lawyer-businessman formerly
engaged in trucking business, hauling sand and gravel, and operated
14
under the name Salamander Enterprises. He narrated that while he
was passing Kennon Road, he discovered that a portion of the Bued
River, Camp 3, Tuba Benguet, can be a potential source of supplies
for his business. Though the area was steep and deep, he scouted a
place where he can construct a road from Kennon Road to the Bued
River. In the course of cleaning the area, his workers noticed that
the place had been tilled. A certain Castillo Binay-an appeared
informing him that he was the occupant of the site of the proposed
private road. After agreeing on the consideration, the former
15
executed a Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim over the land in his
favor.
Thereafter, the Office of the Highway District Engineer of Baguio,
Ministry of Public Highways (now Department of Public Works and
Highways [DPWH]) issued a permit in favor of petitioner to extract
16
construction materials at Camp 3, Tuba, Benguet, which was
followed by the issuance on 1 October 1981 of Commercial Permit
No. 147 by the Office of the Mines Regional Officer, Mineral Region
17
No. 1, Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (Bureau of Mines). The
Commercial Permit, which was renewable every year, was last
18
renewed in 1987.
Based on the Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim executed by Castillo
Binay-an, petitioner was able to apply for, and was issued, a tax
declaration over the land covering one hectare. Tax Declaration No.
19
9540 dated 12 September 1983 was issued to petitioner describing
the land bounded on the North by Bued River, on the South by
Kennon Road, on the East by Kennon Road, and on the West by a
Creek. With the revision of the fair market value and assessed value
of lands, Tax Declaration No. 94-004-00327 dated 12 November
20
1994 was issued to him. From 1983 up to 1998, petitioner has
been regularly paying real property taxes over the land.
Petitioner disclosed that in 1983, William Banuca applied for, and
21
was accepted, as foreman. Due to the nature of his job, Banuca
was permitted to stay in the second house beside the private
22
road. Banuca now lives permanently in said house after petitioner
gave it to him. Petitioner revealed that the houses his former
laborers constructed were awarded to them as a kind gesture to
them. As to the land he occupied along the Kennon Road where the
first house was erected, he claims that same still belongs to him.
This house, which his laborers and drivers used as a resting area,
was cannibalized and leveled, and the land over which it once stood
was taken possession by respondents who are now building their
house thereon.
Gloria Banuca testified for respondents. She disclosed that it was
she who invited respondents to come and reside at Riverside, Camp
3, Tuba, Benguet. She said she knew petitioner to be engaged in the
sand and gravel business in Tuba, Benguet, from 1981 to 1985, and
that the latter stopped in 1985 and never returned to haul sand and
gravel at the Bued River. She claimed she never saw petitioner
introduce any improvements on the land he claimed he bought from
Castillo Binay-an, and that it was she and the other residents who
introduced the existing improvements.
She narrated that in 1983, she planted fruit-bearing trees in the area
where respondents were constructing their house which is located
along the Kennon Roads road-right-of-way, fronting petitioners
property. After the earthquake of 1990, the private road
constructed by petitioner became impassable and it was she who
hired the equipment used to clear the same. She even leveled the
area where respondents were building their home. Based on the
ocular inspection, she said this area is within the 15-meter radius
from the center of the road. This area, she claims, was sold to her by
the Spouses Jularbal. However, the agreement between them shows
that what was sold to her were the improvements near her house
which was 40 meters down from Kennon Road and the
23
improvements along Kennon Road.
Agustin Domingo next testified for respondents. He testified that in
1986, upon the invitation of Gloria Banuca, he transferred his
residence to sitio Riverside because of its proximity to his place of
work. He stayed there for good and even buried his father near his
house. He said that in 1990, the private road constructed by
petitioner was covered by boulders, soil and rocks, and it was Mrs.
Banuca who initiated the clearing of the road. Finally, he declared
that since 1986, he never saw petitioner introduce any improvement
in the area.
Respondent Juanito Valenciano revealed that he is the cousin of
Gloria Banuca. He narrated that in 1984, he went to Riverside to see
the latter whose husband, William Banuca, was working as foreman
of petitioner. At that time, the lot under litigation was still a hill. It
was Gloria Banuca who leveled the hill and told him to construct his
house there. Finding the place to be an ideal place to build his
house, he paid the Banucas P10,000.00 for the improvements.
He explained that before he started building his house, he sought
the permission of the Benguet District Engineer, DPWH, which the
24
latter granted. In August 1998, he received a notice to stop and
desist from continuing the construction of a permanent one-storey
house made of hollow blocks and cement since the condition was
only to utilize light materials. Thereafter, a letter dated 22 January
1999 was sent to him informing him that the temporary permit
issued to him for the improvement/utilization of a portion of the
national road along Kennon Road had been revoked for nonsubmission of the waiver as required by the Office of the District
Engineer and his non-compliance with the condition that no
permanent structures are to be constructed within the road-right-ofway. He, however, denied receiving said letter.
Juan de Vera, a retired DPWH foreman, testified last for the
respondents. He claimed he witnessed the execution of the
25
document regarding the sale by Adriano Jularbal to Gloria Banuca
of improvements found near the house of the latter in the amount
of P1,000.00.
The MCTC found that what is being contested is the possession of a
portion of the road-right-of way of Kennon Road which is located in
front of a parcel of land that petitioner bought by way of Deed of
Waiver and Quitclaim from Castillo Binay-an. It held that petitioner
had prior material possession over the subject land. It ruled that the
destruction of his house built thereon by the earthquake in 1990,
and later cannibalized without being reconstructed was not
tantamount to abandonment of the site by the petitioner because it
26
27
house upon learning of the same and the subsequent filing of the
instant case are clear indicia of non-abandonment; otherwise, he
could have just allowed the latter to continue with the construction.
Moreover, the fact that the house petitioner built was destroyed by
the earthquake in 1990, was never rebuilt nor repaired and that
same was leveled to the ground by Gloria Banuca do not signify
abandonment. Although his house was damaged by the earthquake,
Gloria Banuca, the person who supposedly demolished said house,
had no right to do the same. Her act of removing the house and
depriving petitioner of possession of the land was an act of forcible
entry. The entry of respondents in 1998 was likewise an act of
forcible entry.
The next question is: Was the action filed the correct one and was it
timely filed?
Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the
action as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case are
42
the allegations in the complaint. In actions for forcible entry, the
law tells us that two allegations are mandatory for the municipal
court to acquire jurisdiction: First, the plaintiff must allege prior
physical possession of the property. Second, he must also allege that
he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for
43
in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. To effect the ejectment
of an occupant or deforciant on the land, the complaint should
embody such a statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within
the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show
enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to
44
parol evidence.
A look at the Amended Complaint filed by petitioner clearly shows a
case for forcible entry. Petitioner alleged therein that he has been in
possession of the subject land for the last nineteen years and that
respondents, in the first week of August 1998, without his
permission and consent, entered the land by means of force,
strategy and stealth and started the construction of a building
thereon; and upon being informed thereof, he requested them to
stop their construction but respondents refused to vacate the land
forcing him to file the instant case to recover possession thereof.
The Court of Appeals pronounced that petitioner cannot interpose
an action for forcible entry against respondents and that the same
should have been filed against Gloria Banuca. It added that the right
to file against the latter had already lapsed because more than a
year had passed by from the time she wrestled possession of the
property from the petitioner.
We find such pronouncement to be flawed. An action of forcible
entry and detainer may be maintained only against one in
possession at the commencement of the action, and not against one
45
46
who does not in fact hold the land. Under Section 1, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court, the action may be filed against persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving possession or any person
claiming under them. Considering that respondents are the ones in
present actual possession and are depriving petitioner of the
possession of the land in question, it is proper that they be the ones
to be named defendants in the case. The fact that Gloria Banuca was
supposedly the one who first committed forcible entry when she
allegedly demolished the house of petitioner does not make her the
proper party to be sued because she is no longer in possession or
control of the land in controversy.
As regards the timeliness of the filing of the case for forcible entry,
we find that same was filed within the one-year prescriptive period.
We have ruled that where forcible entry was made clandestinely,
the one-year prescriptive period should be counted from the time
the person deprived of possession demanded that the deforciant
desist from such dispossession when the former learned
47
thereof. As alleged by petitioner in the Amended Complaint, he
was deprived of his possession over the land by force, strategy and
stealth. Considering that one of the means employed was stealth
because the intrusion was done by respondents without his
knowledge and consent, the one-year period should be counted
from the time he made the demand to respondents to vacate the
land upon learning of such dispossession. The record shows that
upon being informed that respondents were constructing a building
in the subject land sometime in the first week of August 1998,
petitioner immediately protested and advised the former to stop;
but to no avail. The one-year period within which to file the forcible
entry case had not yet expired when the ejectment suit was filed on
18 August 1998 with the MCTC.
Despite the foregoing findings, this Court finds that the MCTC and
the RTC, as well as the Court of Appeals, to be in error when they
respectively declared that petitioner and respondents to be entitled
to the possession of the land in dispute. The parties should not be
permitted to take possession of the land, much more, claim
ownership thereof as said lot is part of the public dominion.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is
hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Nonetheless, there being a finding that
the subject property is a part of the public dominion, of which
neither party is entitled to own nor possess, the decisions of the
Court of Appeals dated 20 August 2002, the Regional Trial Court of
La Trinidad, Benguet, dated 23 January 2002, and the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Tuba-Sablan, Tuba, Benguet, dated 20
November 2000 are SET ASIDE. Respondents Juanito and Amalia
Valenciano are ordered to remove their structure on the subject
land within sixty (60) days from receipt of this decision, and to
vacate and deliver the physical possession thereof to the Office of
the District Engineer, Benguet Engineering District, Department of
Public Works and Highways.
SO ORDERED.