Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
- versus -
- versus -
- versus -
- versus -
THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, through its Chairman,
SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his
capacity as Executive Secretary,
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR.,
in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Budget and
Management, and HON. ROBERTO
B. TAN, in his capacity as Treasurer
of the Philippines,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
ATTY. ROMULO B.
MACALINTAL,
- versus -
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR.,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
LUIS BAROK BIRAOGO,
Petitioner,
- versus -
THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR.,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
JACINTO V. PARAS,
Petitioner,
- versus -
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM,
PHILIPPINES, INC.,
Respondents-Intervenor.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled An Act Providing
for the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other
Purposes was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of
August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years
thereafter, to coincide with the countrys regular national and local elections. The
law as well granted the President the power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs)
for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013
elections shall have qualified and assumed office.
Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already
spawned petitions against their validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No.
2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this Court. These petitions multiplied
after RA No. 10153 was passed.
Factual Antecedents
The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution,
mandated the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
the Cordilleras. Section 15 states:
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic
and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of
this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
original organic act, and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM RA No. 9140[1] - on June
22, 2001. This law reset the first regular elections originally scheduled under RA
No. 9054, toNovember 26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No.
9054 to not later than August 15, 2001.
RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001.
The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to join ARMM on the same date.
RA No. 9333[2] was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM
regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3
years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not
ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have
been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these
elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional
offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting
the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local
elections of the country.
RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House Bill
(HB) No. 4146, seeking the postponement of the ARMM elections scheduled
on August 8, 2011. On March 22, 2011, the House of Representatives passed HB
No. 4146, with one hundred ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor.
After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own version, Senate
Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756), on June 6, 2011. Thirteen (13) Senators voted
favorably for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House of Representative concurred
with the Senate amendments, and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No.
10153 into law.
As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a petition
filed with this Court G.R. No. 196271[3] - assailing the constitutionality of both
HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and challenging the validity of RA No. 9333 as
well for non-compliance with the constitutional plebiscite requirement. Thereafter,
petitioner Basari Mapupuno inG.R. No. 196305 filed another petition[4] also
assailing the validity of RA No. 9333.
With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its
preparations for the ARMM elections. The law gave rise as well to the filing of the
following petitions against its constitutionality:
a) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[5] filed by Rep. Edcel Lagman as a
member of the House of Representatives against Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his
capacity as the Executive Secretary) and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R.
No. 197221;
b) Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition[6] filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal
as a taxpayer against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197282;
c) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction and Preliminary
Injunction[7] filed by Louis Barok Biraogo against the COMELEC and
Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., docketed as G.R. No. 197392;
and
d) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus[8] filed by Jacinto Paras as a member
of the House of Representatives against Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa,
Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197454.
Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Cana as
registered voters from the ARMM, with the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas
ng Bayan (a political party with candidates in the ARMM regional elections
scheduled for August 8, 2011), also filed a Petition for Prohibition and
Mandamus[9] against the COMELEC, docketed asG.R. No. 197280, to assail the
constitutionality of RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153.
Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights Forum
Philippines, Inc. and Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement filed their own Motion for
Leave to Admit their Motion for Intervention and Comment-in-Intervention
dated July 18, 2011. On July 26, 2011, the Court granted the motion. In the same
Resolution, the Court ordered the consolidation of all the petitions relating to the
constitutionality of HB No. 4146, SB No. 2756, RA No. 9333, and RA No. 10153.
From the parties submissions, the following issues were recognized and
argued by the parties in the oral arguments of August 9 and 16, 2011:
I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of
elections
We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented above.
OUR RULING
and
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective
officials, done among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve
winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of
all future elections whether national or local to once every three years.[12] This
intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional
Commission deliberations.[13]
These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting
the second Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.
This Court was not left behind in recognizing the synchronization of the
national and local elections as a constitutional mandate. In Osmea v. Commission
on Elections,[14]we explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that
the terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the
local officials, the President and the Vice-President have been synchronized to
end on the same hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections
that the term of synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase holding
simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure
on the same day or occasion. This common termination date will synchronize
future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives
and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized
with the election for President and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is
likewise evident from the x x x records of the proceedings in the Constitutional
Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]
The exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills
immediate enactment.
The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[19] explained the effect of
the Presidents certification of necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of
printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in
Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become
a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been
printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
xxx
That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the requirement of
three readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed
with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill
defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the
Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third
readings in the House of Representatives on the same day [May 14, 1968] after
the bill had been certified by the President as urgent.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate
enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections.[20] Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted
both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate
readings requirement.
On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the immediate
enactment of these bills since there was no public calamity or emergency that had
to be met, again we hark back to our ruling in Tolentino:
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus or declaration of martial law Art. VII, Section 18, or the existence of a
national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the
President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basic
rights of individuals may be of hazard. But the factual basis of presidential
certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural
requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of
Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Congress passed RA No. 9333,[31] which further reset the date of the ARMM
regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat
the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and
distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this intent
when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment
prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.
III. B. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA No.
9054 the character of an irrepealable law
Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA
No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1,
Article XVII of RA No. 9054[32] has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the
character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution
demands.
Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a majority of
each House shall constitute a quorum to do business. In other words, as long as
majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are present,
these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold
session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws
or approve acts.
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no
less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of
the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly,
this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the
passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend,
revise or repeal the laws it had passed. The Courts pronouncement in City of
Davao v. GSIS[33] on this subject best explains the basis and reason for the
unconstitutionality:
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a
legislative body to have the ability to bind the actions of future legislative body,
considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they
do the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes
desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to forestall future
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that The creation of
the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by the majority of the
votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose. With
these wordings as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only
amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the
creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the
Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require
ratification through a plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are those
that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional government; (b) the regions
judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal, family, and property law
jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the legislative powers constitutionally
conceded to the regional government under Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution.[36]
The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the matters that
the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to provide for in the Organic Act.
Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority votes and the plebiscite
requirements are valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as a
substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require compliance with
these requirements.
IV. The synchronization issue
As we discussed above, synchronization of national and local elections is a
constitutional mandate that Congress must provide for and this synchronization
must include the ARMM elections. On this point, an existing law in fact already
exists RA No. 7166 as the forerunner of the current RA No. 10153. RA No.
7166 already provides for the synchronization of local elections with the national
and congressional elections. Thus, what RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter
for
local
governments
(with
the
exception
ofbarangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections where the terms are not
constitutionally provided) and is technically a reiteration of what is already
reflected in the law, given that regional elections are in reality local elections by
express constitutional recognition.[37]
To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile the
schedule of the ARMMs regular elections (which should have been held in
August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and
local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).
During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to
Congress in order to resolve this problem. These options are: (1) to allow the
elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity,
pursuant to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office;[38] (2) to hold special elections in the
ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; or (3) to authorize the President to appoint
OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office.
As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below, Congress, in choosing
to grant the President the power to appoint OICs, chose the correct option and
passed RA No. 10153 as a completely valid law.
V.
in the evident purpose which was in view and the circumstances and historical
events which led to the enactment of the particular provision as a part of organic
law.[43]
The constitutional provisions on autonomy specifically, Sections 15 to 21
of Article X of the Constitution constitute express limitations on legislative
power as they define autonomy, its requirements and its parameters, thus limiting
what is otherwise the unlimited power of Congress to legislate on the governance
of the autonomous region.
Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case are the limitations
posed by the prescribed basic structure of government i.e., that the government
must have an executive department and a legislative assembly, both of which must
be elective and representative of the constituent political units; national
government, too, must not encroach on the legislative powers granted under
Section 20, Article X. Conversely and as expressly reflected in Section 17, Article
X, all powers and functions not granted by this Constitution or by law to the
autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.
The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should likewise serve as a
standard that Congress must observe in dealing with legislation touching on the
affairs of the autonomous regions. The terms of these sections leave no doubt on
what the Constitution intends the idea of self-rule or self-government, in
particular, the power to legislate on a wide array of social, economic and
administrative matters. But equally clear under these provisions are the
permeating principles of national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the
Republic, as expressed in the above-quoted Section 17 and in Section 15.[44] In
other words, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand,
reject the notion of imperium et imperio[45] in the relationship between the national
and the regional governments.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of
national and local elections are recognized and established constitutional mandates,
with one being as compelling as the other. If their compelling force differs at all,
the goal or objective in sight in a manner that does not do violence to the
Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms. Under these limitations, the choice
of measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.
To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall serve as the
guideposts and markers in our discussion of the options available to Congress to
address the problems brought about by the synchronization of the ARMM
elections, properly understood as interim measures that Congress had to
provide. The proper understanding of the options as interim measures assume
prime materiality as it is under these terms that the passage of RA No. 10153
should be measured, i.e., given the constitutional objective of synchronization
that cannot legally be faulted, did Congress gravely abuse its discretion or violate
the Constitution when it addressed through RA No. 10153 the concomitant
problems that the adjustment of elections necessarily brought with it?
B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional
We rule out the first option holdover for those who were elected in
executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as
an option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and
bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot
extend their term through a holdover. As this Court put in Osmea v.
COMELEC:[52]
It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by
providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified
where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term
and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin,
there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even
though the successors fail to qualify within the time.
In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as follows:
Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely to the President
and Vice-President, states:
xxxx
Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for
President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.
[Emphasis ours]
Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel the
COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal basis likewise exists to rule that the
newly elected ARMM officials shall hold office only until the ARMM officials
elected in the synchronized elections shall have assumed office.
In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective
officials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the term of office of elective
officials, which can be exercised only in the case of barangay officials,[67] is
specifically given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as
shown when the Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining the
least votes,[68] and extended the terms of the President and the Vice-President[69] in
order to synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this same power. The
settled rule is that terms fixed by the Constitution cannot be changed by mere
statute.[70] More particularly, not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has
the authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for less, or
more, than the constitutionally mandated three years[71] as this tinkering would
directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be
extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an
expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself
commands. This is what will happen a term of less than two years if a call
for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the
result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of those officials to be
elected in the ARMM elections instead of acting on their term (where the term
means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right and
fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another,
while the tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds
the office).[72] As with the fixing of the elective term, neither Congress nor
the Court has any legal basis to shorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials.
They would commit an unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their discretion if
they do so.
E. The Presidents Power to Appoint OICs
The above considerations leave only Congress chosen interim measure
RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can
appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public
ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the
rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested
in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law
vest in the President alone.[74]
shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials, is the choice of the
Presidents power to appoint for a fixed and specific period as an interim
measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution an
unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to make?
Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other
situations or where the power of appointment would extend beyond the adjustment
period for synchronization would be to foster a government that is not democratic
and republican. For then, the peoples right to choose the leaders to govern them
may be said to besystemically withdrawn to the point of fostering an undemocratic
regime. This is the grant that would frontally breach the elective and
representative governance requirement of Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution.
But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited circumstances
contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the period is fixed and, more importantly,
the terms of governance both under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and
RA No. 9054 will not systemically be touched nor affected at all. To repeat what
has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged and continuously,
with full effect in accordance with the Constitution, save only for the interim and
temporary measures that synchronization of elections requires.
Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily disrupt
the election process in a local community, the ARMM, as well as the communitys
choice of leaders, but this will take place under a situation of necessity and as an
interim measure in the manner that interim measures have been adopted and used
in the creation of local government units[76] and the adjustments of sub-provinces
to the status of provinces.[77] These measures, too, are used in light of the wider
national demand for the synchronization of elections (considered vis--vis the
regional interests involved). The adoption of these measures, in other words, is no
different from the exercise by Congress of the inherent police power of the State,
where one of the essential tests is the reasonableness of the interim measure taken
in light of the given circumstances.
Furthermore, the representative character of the chosen leaders need not
necessarily be affected by the appointment of OICs as this requirement is really a
function of the appointment process; only the elective aspect shall be supplanted
by the appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly seeks to
address concerns arising from the appointments by providing, under Sections 3, 4
and 5 of the assailed law, concrete terms in the Appointment of OIC, the Manner
and Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications.
Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 viewed in its
proper context is a law that is not violative of the Constitution (specifically, its
autonomy provisions), and one that is reasonable as well under the circumstances.
VI. Other Constitutional Concerns
Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during the oral arguments
that upholding the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 would set a dangerous
precedent of giving the President the power to cancel elections anywhere in the
country, thus allowing him to replace elective officials with OICs.
This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-the-board cancellation
of elections is a matter for Congress, not for the President, to address. It is a power
that falls within the powers of Congress in the exercise of its legislative
powers. Even Congress, as discussed above, is limited in what it can legislatively
undertake with respect to elections.
If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it was for a
very specific and limited purpose the synchronization of elections. It was a
temporary means to a lasting end the synchronization of elections. Thus, RA No.
10153 and the support that the Court gives this legislation are likewise clear and
specific, and cannot be transferred or applied to any other cause for the
cancellation of elections. Any other localized cancellation of elections and call for
special elections can occur only in accordance with the power already delegated by
Congress to the COMELEC, as above discussed.
Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials cannot continue to act in
a holdover capacity upon the expiration of their terms, and this Court cannot
compel the COMELEC to conduct special elections, the Court now has to deal
with the dilemma of a vacuum in governance in the ARMM.
To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should not be forgotten
that a period of 21 months or close to 2 years intervenes from the time that the
incumbent ARMM elective officials terms expired and the time the new ARMM
elective officials begin their terms in 2013. As the lessons of our Mindanao history
past and current teach us, many developments, some of them critical and
adverse, can transpire in the countrys Muslim areas in this span of time in the way
they transpired in the past.[78] Thus, it would be reckless to assume that the
presence of an acting ARMM Governor, an acting Vice-Governor and a fully
functioning Regional Legislative Assembly can be done away with even
temporarily. To our mind, the appointment of OICs under the present
circumstances is an absolute necessity.
Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to
undertake the functions of the elective members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark back to our earlier
pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:[79]
It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make temporary
appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may
occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive
positions. However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local
Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we see no cogent
reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly
applied in the present case. The respondents contend that the provincial board is
the correct appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the
President who has supervision over local governments as provided by law and the
members of the board who are junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem
ruling in favor of the President, until the law provides otherwise.
A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under
the law for it deprives the constituents of their right of representation and
governance in their own local government.
In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their
chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of
governmental affairs is, to that extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will
be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the people
of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.[80](Emphasis ours.)
operate within the larger framework of the State and is still subject to the national
policies set by the national government, save only for those specific areas reserved
by the Constitution for regional autonomous determination. As reflected during the
constitutional deliberations of the provisions on autonomous regions:
Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a complete separation from the
central government, but rather an efficient working relationship between the
autonomous region and the central government. We see this as an effective
partnership, not a separation.
Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy is not really thought of as
complete independence.
Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of self-government within the
larger political framework of the nation.[84] [Emphasis supplied.]
Conclusion
Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate
the synchronization of national and local elections when it enacted RA No.
10153. This Court cannot question the manner by which Congress undertook this
task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation.[87] As judges, we can only interpret and apply the law
and, despite our doubts about its wisdom, cannot repeal or amend it.[88]
Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which Congress should
address what is essentially a legislative problem. It is not within the Courts power
to enlarge or abridge laws; otherwise, the Court will be guilty of usurping the
exclusive prerogative of Congress.[89] The petitioners, in asking this Court to
compel COMELEC to hold special elections despite its lack of authority to do so,
are essentially asking us to venture into the realm of judicial legislation, which is
abhorrent to one of the most basic principles of a republican and democratic
government the separation of powers.
The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because Congress acted with
grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA No. 10153. Grave abuse of discretion is
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of the law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.[90]
We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its
constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within due
constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary
adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused
of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty. We thus find
no reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave abuse of discretion.
On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can only
reiterate the established rule that every statute is presumed valid.[91] Congress, thus,
has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality of its acts, and the party
challenging the validity of a statute has the onerous task of rebutting this
presumption.[92] Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be
resolved in favor of its constitutionality.[93] As this Court declared in Garcia v.
Executive Secretary:[94]
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and
to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a
clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This
presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon
each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The
theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines,
a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally enacted.[95] [Emphasis ours.]
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1]
Entitled An act fixing the date of the plebiscite for the approval of the amendments to Republic Act No. 6734
and setting the date of the regular elections for elective officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao on
the last Monday of November 2001, amending for the purpose Republic Act No. 9054, entitled An Act to
Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, amending for the
purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as
amended, and for other purposes.
[2]
Entitled An Act amending fixing the Date or Regular elections for Elective Officials of the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao pursuant to Republic Act No. 9054, entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic
Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, amending for the purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled
An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as amended
[3]
Filed by petitioners Datu Michael Abas Kida, in his personal capacity, and in representation of Maguindanao
Federation of Autonomous Irrigators Association, Inc., Hadji Muhmina Usman, John Anthony L. Lim, Jamilon T.
Odin, Asrin Timbol Jaiyari, Mujib M. Kalang, Alih Al-Saidi J. Sapi-e, Kessar Damsie Abdil, and Bassam Aluh
Saupi.
[4]
Petition for Prohibition with Very Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order dated April 11, 2011 was filed against Sixto Brillantes, as Chairperson of COMELEC,
to challenge the effectivity of RA No. 9333 for not having been submitted to a plebiscite. Since RA No. 9333 is
inoperative, any other law seeking to amend it is also null and void.
[5]
With Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writs of Preliminary Prohibitive and
Mandatory Injunction dated June 30, 2011.
[6]
With Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction dated July 1, 2011.
[7]
With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order dated July 12, 2011.
[8]
With Injunction and Preliminary Injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order dated July 11, 2011.
[9]
With Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and the Issuance of Writs of Preliminary Injunction, Both
Prohibitory and Mandatory dated July 1, 2011.
[10]
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on
the second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with
the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal
councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local officials first elected under this
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for
six years and the remaining twelve for three years.
xxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 election
is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1992. [emphasis ours]
[11]
To illustrate, while Section 8, Article X of the Constitution fixes the term of office of elective local officials at
three years, under the above-quoted provisions, the terms of the incumbent local officials who were elected in
January 1988, which should have expired on February 2, 1991, were fixed to expire at noon of June 30, 1992. In the
same vein, the terms of the incumbent President and Vice President who were elected in February 1986 were
extended to noon of June 30, 1992. On the other hand, in order to synchronize the elections of the Senators, who
have six-year terms, the twelve Senators who obtained the lowest votes during the 1992 elections were made to
serve only half the time of their terms.
[12]
Joaquin Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary (1996 ed.), p.
1199, citing Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. V, p. 429-4.
[13]
MR. MAAMBONG. For purposes of identification, I will now read a section which we will temporarily indicate
as Section 14. It reads: THE SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE
LOCAL OFFICIALS ELECTED IN THE FIRST ELECTION SHALL SERVE FOR FIVE YEARS, TO EXPIRE
AT NOON OF JUNE 1992.
This was presented by Commissioner Davide, so may we ask that Commissioner Davide be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Before going to the proposed amendment, I would only state that in view of the action taken by the
Commission on Section 2 earlier, I am formulating a new proposal. It will read as follows: THE SENATORS,
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS FIRST ELECTED
UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION SHALL SERVE UNTIL NOON OF JUNE 30, 1992.
I proposed this because of the proposed section of the Article on Transitory Provisions giving a term to the
incumbent President and Vice-President until 1992. Necessarily then, since the term provided by the Commission for
Members of the Lower House and for local officials is three years, if there will be an election in 1987, the next
election for said officers will be in 1990, and it would be very close to 1992. We could never attain, subsequently,
any synchronization of election which is once every three years.
So under my proposal we will be able to begin actual synchronization in 1992, and consequently, we should not
have a local election or an election for Members of the Lower House in 1990 for them to be able to complete their
term of three years each. And if we also stagger the Senate, upon the first election it will result in an election in 1993
for the Senate alone, and there will be an election for 12 Senators in 1990. But for the remaining 12 who will be
elected in 1987, if their term is for six years, their election will be in 1993. So, consequently we will have elections in
1990, in 1992 and in 1993. The later election will be limited to only 12 Senators and of course to local officials and
the Members of the Lower House. But, definitely, thereafter we can never have an election once every three years,
therefore defeating the very purpose of the Commission when we adopted the term of six years for the President and
another six years for the Senators with the possibility of staggering with 12 to serve for six years and 12 for three
years insofar as the first Senators are concerned. And so my proposal is the only way to effect the first
synchronized election which would mean, necessarily, a bonus of two years to the Members of the Lower
House and a bonus of two years to the local elective officials.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). What does the committee say?
MR. DE CASTRO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). Commissioner de Castro is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
During the discussion on the legislative and the synchronization of elections, I was the one who proposed that in
order to synchronize the elections every three years, which the body approved the first national and local officials
to be elected in 1987 shall continue in office for five years, the same thing the Honorable Davide is now proposing.
That means they will all serve until 1992, assuming that the term of the President will be for six years and continue
beginning in 1986. So from 1992, we will again have national, local and presidential elections. This time, in 1992,
the President shall have a term until 1998 and the first twelve Senators will serve until 1998, while the next 12
shall serve until 1995, and then the local officials elected in 1992 will serve until 1995. From then on, we shall
have an election every three years.
So, I will say that the proposition of Commissioner Davide is in order, if we have to synchronize our elections every
three years which was already approved by the body.
Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. GUINGONA. What will be synchronized, therefore, is the election of the incumbent President and VicePresident in 1992.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. GUINGONA. Not the reverse. Will the committee not synchronize the election of the Senators and local
officials with the election of the President?
MR. DAVIDE. It works both ways, Mr. Presiding Officer. The attempt here is on the assumption that the provision
of the Transitory Provisions on the term of the incumbent President and Vice-President would really end in 1992.
This has been established by the following exchange during the Constitutional Commission debates:
FR. BERNAS. So, the questions I have raised so far with respect to this organic act are: What segment of the
population will participate in the plebiscite? In what capacity would the legislature be acting when it passes this?
Will it be a constituent assembly or merely a legislative body? What is the nature, therefore, of this organic act in
relation to ordinary statutes and the Constitution? Finally, if we are going to amend this organic act, what process
will be followed?
MR. NOLLEDO. May I answer that, please, in the light of what is now appearing in our report.
First, only the people who are residing in the units composing the region should be allowed to participate in the
plebiscite. Second, the organic act has the character of a charter passed by Congress, not as a constituent assembly,
but as an ordinary legislature and, therefore, the organic act will still be subject to amendments in the ordinary
legislative process as now constituted, unless the Gentleman has another purpose.
FR. BERNAS. But with plebiscite again. [Emphasis ours.];
III Record of the Constitutional Commission, pp.182-183; August 11, 1986.
[36]
Section 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws,
the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the
region.
[37]
See discussions at pp. 14-15.
[38]
Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials. (1) Terms of Office. The terms of office of the
Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and members of the Regional Assembly shall be for a period of three
(3) years, which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of September next following the day of the election and shall
end at noon of the same date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbent elective officials of the autonomous region
shall continue in effect until their successors are elected and qualified. [emphasis ours]
[39]
Fernando, The Philippine Constitution, pp. 175-176 (1974).
[40]
Id. at 177; citing the concurring opinion of Justice Jose P. Laurel in Schneckenburger v. Moran, 63 Phil. 249, 266
(1936).
[41]
Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 212 (1946).
[42]
Ople v. Torres, et al., 354 Phil. 948 (1998); see concurring opinion of Justice Jose P. Laurel in Schneckenburger
v. Moran, supra note 40, at 266.
[43]
State ex rel. Green v. Collison, 39 Del 245, cited in Defensor-Santiago, Constitutional Law, Vol. 1 (2000 ed.)
[44]
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of
provinces, cities and municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
[45]
An empire within an empire.
[46]
Bernas, Joaquin, Constitutional Structure and Powers of Government Notes and Cases Part I, 2005 ed., p. 1249.
[47]
Such as the addition of sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives (paragraph 2, Section 5, of
Article VI of the Constitution), and the validation of the power of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government to issue sequestration, freeze orders, and the provisional takeover orders of ill-gotten business
enterprises, embodied in Section 26 of the Transitory Provisions.
[48]
RA No. 9495 which created the Province of Quezon del Sur Province was rejected by the voters of Quezon
Province in the plebiscite of November 13, 2008.
[49]
RA No. 9355.
[50]
Section 50, RA No. 9355 and Section 52 of RA No. 9495.
[51]
Section 462, RA No. 7160.
[52]
Supra note 14.
[53]
In Mutuc v. Commission on Elections [146 Phil. 798 (1970)] the Court held that, "The three departments
of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is [sic] entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience
to [the Constitutions]commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. 146 Phil. 798 (1970).
[54]
In J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration [No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413,
423], the Court, speaking through former Chief Justice Enrique, stated: As the Constitution is not primarily a
lawyers document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the peoples
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to
alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are cases where the
need for construction is reduced to a minimum.
[55]
Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District, G.R. No. 166471, March 22, 2011.
[56]
Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005, citing Bernas, Joaquin, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY (1996 ed.) 768.
[57]
481 Phil. 661 (2004).
[58]
G.R. No. 161984, February 21, 2007, 516 SCRA 403.
[59]
G.R. No. 152295, July 9, 2011.
[60]
Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials. (1) Terms of Office. The terms of office of the
Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly shall be for a
period of three (3) years, which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of September next following the day of the
election and shall end at noon of the same date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbent elective officials of the
autonomous region shall continue in effect until their successors are elected and qualified.
[61]
Guekeko v. Santos, 76 Phil. 237 (1946).
[62]
Lozano v. Nograles, G.R. 187883, June 16, 2009, 589 SCRA 356.
[63]
Ututalum v. Commission on Elections, No. L-25349, December 3, 1965, 15 SCRA 465.
[64]
See CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 1.
[65]
See CONSTITUTION, Article IX (C), Section 2(1).
[66]
Balagtas Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159268, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA
654, 663, citing Lapid v. CA, G.R. No. 142261, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 738, quoting Morales v. Subido, G.R.
No. 29658, November 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 150.
[67]
CONSTITUTION, Article X, Section 8.
[68]
Article XVIII, Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local officials first
elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for
six years and the remaining twelve for three years.
[69]
Article XVIII, Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the
February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1992.
[70]
Cruz, Carlo. The Law of Public Officers, 2007 edition, p. 285, citing Mechem, Section 387.
[71]
Ponencia, p. 21.
[72]
See Topacio Nueno v. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12, 21-22 (1946); Alba, etc. v. Evangelista, etc., et al., 100 Phil. 683, 694
(1957); Aparri v. Court of Appeals, No. L-30057, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 231.
[73]
Hon. Luis Mario M. General, Commissioner, National Police Commission v. Hon. Alejandro S. Urro, et al., G.R.
No. 191560, March 29, 2011, citing Sarmiento III v. Mison, No. L-79974, December 17, 1987, 156 SCRA 549.
[74]
Sarmiento III v. Mison, supra.
[75]
If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, 451 Phil. 812 (2003).
[76]
Supra notes 47 and 48.
[77]
Supra note 50.
[78]
The after-effects of the Maguindanao massacre where the Ampatuans stand charged, the insurrection by the
MILF and its various factions, and the on-going peace negotiations, among others, are immediately past and present
events that the nation has to vigilant about.
[79]
274 Phil. 523 (1991).
[80]
Id. at 532.
[81]
Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 783.
[82]
As noted under footnote 37.
[83]
118 Phil. 1468 (1963).
[84]
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. III, August 11, 1986, p. 179.
[85]
[88]
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Santos, 343 Phil. 411, 427 (1997) citing Pangilinan v. Maglaya, 225 SCRA
511 (1993).
[89]
Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque, G.R. Nos. 162335 and 162605, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 468,
581.
[90]
Ligeralde v. Patalinghug, G.R. No. 168796, April 15, 2010, 618 SCRA 315.
[91]
Heirs of Juancho Ardona, etc., et al. v. Hon. Reyes, etc., et al., 210 Phil. 187, 207 (1983); Peralta v. Commission
on Elections, Nos. L-47771, L-47803, L-47816, L-47767, L-47791 and L-47827, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA
30; Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operations Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, No. L-24693, July 31,
1967, 20 SCRA 849.
[92]
See Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290 (2001); Heirs of Juancho Ardona, etc., et al. v. Hon. Reyes, etc., et
al., supra; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, supra.
[93]
Heirs of Juancho Ardona, etc., et al. v. Hon. Reyes, etc., et al., supra; Peralta v. Commission on
Elections, supra.
[94]
G.R. No. 100883, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 516.
[95]
Id. at 523.
BRION, J.:
I. THE FACTS
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were
enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM
and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the
ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday
of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA
No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and
on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held
on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted
certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA
No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the
regular national and local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed
the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM
elections]?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section
26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No.
10153 in toto.]
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national
and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional
Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to
attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the
provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second
Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called regional elections, should be included
among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording and structure
of the Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization
of elections, including the ARMM elections.
2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days
requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws
they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the
President certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the Presidents certification of necessity in the following
manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can
become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its
final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents
certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate
readings requirement.
3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional
[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order
to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve
synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to
remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume
office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those
elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint
OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections
assume office.]
3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the
incumbent ARMM officials
We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the threeyear term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. xxx.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by
Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the
new term. This view like the extension of the elective term is constitutionally infirm because
Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively
extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done
indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively
appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by
Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the
President. Hence, holdover whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that
Congress could not have undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory
basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the
rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent
to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of
suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this
provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in
the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation, except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion results.
3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has no
authority to order special elections.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections may
be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and
local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or
officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in
the details in the execution of that power.
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August
2011 elections and setting another date May 13, 2011 for regional elections synchronized with
the presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a
policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an
adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary
by ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot
make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be
sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being
unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests on
very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the
decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its
legislative powers.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through
a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3)
years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen a term of less than two years
if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at
the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is valid.
The above considerations leave only Congress chosen interim measure RA No. 10153
and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization
period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law as the only measure that Congress can
make. This choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or
qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These
are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls;
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.
Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under
the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive
and legislative officials to be elective and representative of the constituent political units. This
requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the
appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more
apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law
that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however,
does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of
structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to appoint officers-in-charge for
the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials
duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. This power is far
different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption
to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact,
provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the
meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read in the manner it was written and
based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and
simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.
[Read a more detailed discussion and summary of this case, please click here.]