Serafin Tijam, et al. vs. Magdaleno Sibonghanoy, et al. G.R. No. L-21603.

April 15,
1968
TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY (23 SCRA 29)
FACTS: Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from Sibongahanoy.
Defendants filed a counter bond with Manila
Surety and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs, a writ of
execution was issued against the defendant. Defendants moved for writ of execution
against surety which was granted. Surety moved to quash the writ but was denied,
appealed to CA without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction.
CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of
1948 a month before the filing of the petition for recovery. Act placed original
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for demands not exceeding
2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier decision and referred the case to
SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any
inferior court is in issue.
ISSUE: WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI
Cebu for the first time upon appeal.YES
RATIO: SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this
plea after almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the
question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time - A party may be estopped or barred
from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of
estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches,
in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier - Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a
cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser
to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable practice" of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable,
and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
: Other merits on the appeal : The surety insists that the lower court should have
granted its motion to quash the writ of execution because the same was issued
without the summary hearing - Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on in
the formal manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is,
rather, a procedure by which a question is resolved "with dispatch, with the least
possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings"
(Ibid, p. 790). What is essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to
appear and is given an opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to interpose
a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties - In the case
at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the
date when the same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's
counsel was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request
that the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet
he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety
cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.
The orders appealed from are affirmed.

Russel vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738; GR No. 119347, March 17, 1999
Posted by Pius Morados on November 28, 2011
(Civil Procedures Jurisdiction; Civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation)
Facts: Petitioners discovered a public document, which is a declaration of heirs and
deed of confirmation of a previous oral agreement, of partition, affecting the land
executed by and among the respondents whereby respondents divided the property
among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who are entitled thereto as legal
heirs also.
Petitioners filed a complaint, denominated DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND
PARTITION against defendants with the RTC claiming that the document was false
and perjurious as the private respondents were not the only heirs and that no oral
partition of the property whatsoever had been made between the heirs. The
complaint prayed that the document be declared null and void and an order be
issued to partition the land among all the heirs.

Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the total assessed value of the subject land
is P5,000.00 which under section 33 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by
R.A. No. 7691, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC.
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the RTC has
jurisdiction over the case since the action is one which is incapable of pecuniary
estimation within the contemplation of Section 19(l) of B.P. 129, as amended.
Issue: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the nature of the civil case.
Held: Yes. The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is one incapable of
pecuniary estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of said court.
In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, the Supreme Court ruled that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable
of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a
sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend
on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than
the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to,
or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial
Courts).
The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the
document in question. While the complaint also prays for the partition of the
property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of nullity
of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff
is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.

G.R. No. 123215 February 2, 1999

NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON, ARSENIO J. MAGPALE, and JOSE MA. P. JACINTO,
respondents.
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, which
dismissed the special civil action for certiorari filed by petitioner National Steel
Corporation (NSC) to set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch LVII, City
of Makati. In the said order, the trial court denied the motion of petitioner NSC to
dismiss the complaint for recovery of personal property which private respondent
Jose P. Jacinto had filed.
The facts are as follows:
Private respondent Jacinto was the former owner of record of 100 shares of stock of
the Manila Golf and Country Club (MGCC) now owned by and registered in the name
of petitioner NSC. On February 9, 1990, he filed a complaint 2 against the NSC,
alleging that in or about 1970, for valuable considerations, Manila Golf and Country
Club, Inc. (MGCCI) issued a Stock Certificate to plaintiff representing 100 shares of
MGCCI. From about 1972 up to the early part of February 1986, plaintiff was abroad
and could not return to the Philippines for reasons beyond his control. When plaintiff
returned to the philippines in 1986, he discovered that Stock Certificate No. 1361 had
been cancelled and a replacement Stock Certiftcate had been issued in the name of
NSC.
Petitioner NSC then filed its answer, after which trial was held. It thereafter filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint against it on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. That
the failure of plaintiff to pay the correct filing fees on February 13, 1990 meant that
this court did not acquire jurisdiction over plaintiffs action.

Under the ruling of Sun Insurance, and as explained below, the plaintiff cannot now
pay the deficiency in the filing fees because it is already "beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period."
The trial court denied petitioner's motion in an order, dated April 6, 1994. Hence, the
latter brought a special civil action for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, but its
petition was dismissed on September 11, 1995.
The principal relief, or prayer in private respondent's complaint is specific, for the
"NSC to execute a deed of assignment re-transferring unto plaintiff the MGCCI
certificate . . . in replacement of stock certificate No. 1861 . . . .
Issue:
whether or not
Held:
Petitioner NSC correctly argues that the action in this case is for the recovery of
property rather than for specific performance and, hence, the docket fee should be
based on the value of the property sought to be recovered.
It is similar to an action in which petitioner seeks the execution of a deed of sale of a
parcel of land in his favor. Such action has been held to be for the recovery of the real
property and nor for specific performance since his primary objective is to regain the
ownership and possession of the parcel of land. In Ruiz v. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., it
was held: that the primary objective and nature of the action is to recover the parcel
of land itself because to execute in favor of appellant the conveyance requested
there is need to make a finding that he is the owner of the land which in the last
analysis resolves itself into an issue of ownership.
Similarly, if as in this case, plaintiff herein private respondent Jacinto, seeks the
execution in his favor of a deed of assignment of shares of stock, it follows that the
action is for recovery of personal property, the main purpose of which is to regain the
ownership and possession of the said shares of stock.
Accordingly, as petetioner NSC contends private respondent Jacinto should pay
docket fees based on the value of the shares of stock and the amount of damages he
seeks to recover. Under Rule 141, 7(a) of the Rules of Court as it stood at the time of
the filing of the complaint against petitioner, docket fees for ordinary civil actions
should be based on the total sum claimed, exclusive of interest, or the stated value of
the property in litigation.
Thus, the docket fees should be computed on the basis on the value of the property
and the amount of related damages claimed, exclusive of interes. The Court acquires
jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by
the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the time of the filing
of the pleading, as of the time of full payment of the fees within such reasonable time
as the court may grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in the meantime.
It does not follow, however, that the trial court should have dismissed the complaint
for failure of private respondent to pay the correct amount of docket fees. Although
the payment of the proper docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, the trial court
may allow the plaintif in an action to pay the same within a reasonable time before
the expiration of the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. If the plaintiff
fails to comply with this requirement, the defendant should timely raise the issue of
jurisdiction or else he would be considered in estoppel. In the latter case, the balance
between the appropriate docket fees and the amount actually paid by the plaintiff will
be considered a lien on any award he may obtain in his favor. Thus, in Pantranco
North Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held:
The petitioner raised the issue regarding jurisdiction for the first time in its Brief filed
with the public respondent in the CA. After vigorously participating in all stages of the
case before the trial court's authority authority in order to ask for affirmative relief,
the petitioner is effectively barred by estoppel from challenging the trial court's
jurisdiction. Although the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings as the same is conferred by law, it is nonetheless settled that a party
may be barred from raising it on ground of laches or estoppel. The deficiency in the
payment of the docket fees must, however, be considered a lien on the judgment
which must be remitted to the clerk of court of the court a quo upon the execution of
the judgment.
In the case at bar, petitioner NSC filed in 1990 a motion to dismiss but did not raise
this point. Instead it based his motion on prescription. Upon the denial by the trial

court of its motion to dismiss, it filed an answer, submitted its pre-trial brief, and
participated in the proceedings before the trial court. It was only in 1993 more
than three years after filing its motion to dismiss that petitioner NSC again filed a
motion to dismiss the action on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Clearly, petitioner is
estopped from raising this issue. Indeed, while the lack of jurisdiction of a court may
be raised at any stage of an action, nevertheless, the party raising such question
may be estopped if he has actively taken part in the very proceedings which he
questions and he only objects to the court's jurisdiction because the judgment or the
order subsequently rendered is adversed to him.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated September 11, 1995, is
AFFIRMED. The deficiency in the payment of the docket fees shall be a lien on any
judgment may be rendered in favor of private respondent Jose P. Jacinto.

G.R. No. 117439 February 25, 1999

CONRADO COLARINA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE NILO MALANYAON, RTC-Br. 32, Pili, Camarines Sur; ASSET
PRIVATIZATION TRUST; COMMITITEE ON PRIVATIZATION; DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM and BICOL AGRO-INDUSTRIAL PRODUCERS COOPERATIVE, respondents.
Facts:
when an action involves real property the legal fees for the filing thereof shall be
assessed on the basis of its value.
Conrado Colarina alleges that he was the owner of several parcels of land which were
placed under the compulsory coverage of RA No. 6657 otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) 1988 under which the land owner is
given the option to choose the mode of payment for his land. Since petitioner had not
yet been accordingly compensated he therefore sought to exchange his land with the
physical assets of the government.
Petitioner was particularly interested in the assets of the Bicol Sugar Development
Corporation (BISUDECO) which was foreclosed by the Philippine National Bank and
turned over to the Assets Privatization Trust (APT) for disposition to interested buyers.
Thus he informed the APT, the Committee on Privatization (COP) and the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of his desire to be paid with BISUDECO assets.
Nevertheless, the APT published and offered the BISUDECO assets for sale at public
auction.
On 22 June 1992 petitioner submitted a bid of P270,000,000.00 plus 3% of the gross
sales for the next five (5) years. He stated in his bid that the entire amount would be
paid for with his lands that were taken and placed by the DAR under the operation of
RA No. 6657. He also prayed that he be exempted from putting up the required cash
deposit equivalent to ten percent (10%) of his bid. It was denied.
A closer look at the allegations of the amended Complaint together with the prayer
sought to be attained in the case, shows that petitioner is actually demanding
payment for his sequestered 6,340 hectares placed under the Agrarian Reform Law
with the BISUDECO properties bidded on June 22, 1992. In the process, petitioner
necessarily had to ask for the annulment or the invalidity of the sale, award and
grant of the same BISUDECO properties in favor of the Bicol Agro Industrial
Producers, Inc.
Conclusively, the lower court did not err or commit a mistake in assessing plaintiff
with additional filing fee computed at plaintiffs bid price of P270,000,000,00
submitted at the public auction sale on June 22, 1992, since the case is not one which
is beyond pecuniary estimation but rather a simple collection case where value of the
subject property or amount of demand is pecuniarily discernible. 3
On 7 September 1994 the motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the instant
petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Held:
The Amended Complaint filed by petitioner readily shows that his primary and

ultimate intention is to recover the BISUDECO assets as payment for his landholdings
which were put under the coverage of the CARL. This is quite evident from his
allegations
11. That in clear and willful disregard and violation of R.A. No. 7181, Section 1,
paragraph 2 hereto, and in full disregard of the plaintiff's right afforded to him by R.A.
6657, defendant COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION, informed the plaintiff last October
22, 1992, that it has already approved the sale of the BISUDECO assets to defendant
BICOL AGRO INDUSTRIAL PRODUCERS COOPERATIVE (BAPCI), the latter being the
alleged only bidder and offered during the public bidding, which conclusion and
action of the COP, is clearly and patently false, fabricated and baseless, as plaintiff
has already submitted his written bid last June 22, 1992.
12. That the alleged grants, approval, award and sale made by the COP of the
BISUDECO assets to the BAPCI, for a total amount of P160,000.000.00 as compared
to the plaintiff's bid of P270,000,000.00 is not only fishy, disadvantageous, but also
prejudicial to the interest and benefits of government.
13. That the BAPCI is now claiming as owner of the BISUDECO assets, and is
intending to take actual, physical and material possession of the same, cannot be
stopped, unless so ordered by the court through a restraining order and after due
notice and hearing by way of writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction . . . .
15. That plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, for the enforcement and
protection of his right to the option he has chosen and for compensation of his
agricultural lands taken over by the DAR, under R.A No. 6657.
16. That the intended taking over of the BISUDECO assets by the BAPCI shall clearly
prejudice the right of the plaintiff and shall create injustice on the (sic) part, unless
stopped . . . .
Thus he prays for the nullification of the sale, award and grant by APT of the
BISUDECO assets to the BAPCI, and prays the trial court to order the APT, the COP
and the DAR to "grant, approve, effect and materialize" the swapping of his land with
the BISUDECO assets pursuant to RA No. 6657. Consequently, petitioner was not
merely seeking the annulment of the sale of the BISUDECO assets to respondent
BAPCI to rectify what he terms as a "fishy, disadvantageous . . . . prejudicial" sale, but
was really asking the court to declare him as the winning bidder and ultimately give
him possession and ownership of the BISUDECO assets which he himself pegged at
P270,000,000.00. Hence, this case is one which is really not beyond pecuniary
estimation but rather a simple collection case where the value of the subject property
or amount demanded is pecuniarily determinable.
Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, much less gravely, when it refused
to dismiss the complaint filed by petitioner, directing him instead to complete
payment of the required docket fees. If the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglemenatry period. While the payment of docket fees, like other procedural rules,
may have been liberally construed in certain cases if only to secure a just and speedy
disposition of every action and proceeding, it should not be ignored or belittled lest it
scathes and prejudices the other party's substantive rights. The payment of the
docket fee in the proper amount should be followed subject only to certain exceptions
which should be strictly construed.
The Court of Appeals was also correct when it ruled that certiorari was not the proper
remedy since an appeal would still be available should the trial court ultimately
dismiss the civil case. For, before certiorari could lie, all the remedies available in the
trial court should have first been exhausted. Accordingly, we find no reason to
reverse the Decision sought to be reviewed as it is in accord with the facts and the
law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The 22 July 1994
Decision of respondent Court of Appeals sustaining the 10 May 1993 Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Br. 32, in Civil Case No. P-1865, is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

De Leon vs Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 94; GR No. 104796, March 6, 1998
Posted by Pius Morados on November 29, 2011
(Civil Procedure Jurisdiction, Civil action not capable of pecuniary estimation, Docket
Fees)

Facts: Private respondents filed in the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for annulment
or rescission of a contract of sale of two parcels of land against petitioners. Private
respondents paid the docket fee of a flat rate of P400.00 as provided in Rule 141, par
7 (b)(1) of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction by the trial court by reason of private respondents non-payment of the
correct amount of docket fees. Petitioners argue that an action for annulment or
rescission of a contract of sale of real property is a real action and, therefore, the
amount of the docket fees to be paid by private respondent should be based either
on the assessed value of the property, subject matter of the action, or its estimated
value as alleged in the complaint, pursuant to the last paragraph of par 7(b) of Rule
141, as amended.
On the other hand, private respondents counter that an action for annulment or
rescission of a contract of sale of real property is incapable of pecuniary estimation
and, so, the docket fees should be the fixed amount of P400.00 in Rule 141, par 7(b)
(1).
The trial court denied petitioners motion to dismiss but required private respondents
to pay the amount of docket fees based on the estimated value of the parcels of land
in litigation as stated in the complaint.
The Court of Appeals held that an action for rescission or annulment of contract is
not susceptible of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, the docket fees should not be
based on the value of the real property, subject matter of the contract sought to be
annulled or rescinded
Issue: WON in assessing the docket fees to be paid for the filing of an action for
annulment or rescission of a contract of sale, the value of the real property, should be
used as basis.
Held: No. The action for annulment or rescission is considered as one which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation.
A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an
action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this
Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action
or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a
sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of,
the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the
contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a
judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases
where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.

[G.R. No. 104796. March 6, 1998

SPOUSES ROSALINA S. DE LEON and ALEJANDRO L. DE LEON, Petitioners, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, GLICERIO MA. ELAYDA II, FEDERICO ELAYDA and DANILO ELAYDA,
Respondents.
Facts:
The trial court held the fees should be based on the value of the property, but the
Court of Appeals reversed and held that the flat rate should be charged. Hence this
petition for review on certiorari.
On August 8, 1991, private respondents filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City a complaint for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of two (2) parcels of
land against petitioners. Upon the filing of the complaint, the clerk of court required
private respondents to pay docket and legal fees in the total amount of P610.00.
On September 26, 1991, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by reason of
private respondents nonpayment of the correct amount of docket fees. Petitioners
contended that in addition to the fees already paid based on the claim for
P100,000.00 for attorneys fees, private respondents should have paid docket fees in

the amount of P21,640.00, based on the alleged value of the two (2) parcels of land
subject matter of the contract of sale sought to be annulled.
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. - (a) For filing an action or a permissive
counter-claim or money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing
with leave of court a third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint in
intervention, and for all clerical services in the same, if the total-sum claimed,
exclusive of interest, or the stated value of the property in litigation, is:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Not more than P20,000.00 .............P120.00

More than P20,000.00 but less than P 40,000.00 ......................... 150.00
P40,000.00 or more but less than P 60,000.00 ......................... 200.00
P60,000.00 or more but less than P 80,000.00 ... ...................... 250.00
P80,000.00 or more but less than P 100,000.00 ........................... 400.00
P100,000.00 or more but less than P 150,000.00 ........................... 600.00
For each P1,000.00 in excess of P 150,000.00 ............................. 5.00

(b) For filing:

1. Actions where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated .............
P400.00
2. Special civil actions except judicial foreclosure of mortgage which shall be
governed by paragraph (a) above .... 400.00
3. All other actions not involving property........................... 400.00
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated
value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing
the fees .
Issues:
The question for decision is whether in assessing the docket fees to be paid for the
filing of an action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale, the value of the
real property, subject matter of the contract, should be used as basis,
whether the action should be considered as one which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation and therefore the fee charged should be a flat rate of P400.00 as provided
in Rule 141, 7(b)(1) of the Rules of Court.
Held:
A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an
action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this
Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action
or remedy sought.
If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable
of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the
courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where
the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or
where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal
relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract
(specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or
to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable
exclusively by courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly that the
second class cases, besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into
other factors which the law has deemed to be more within the competence of courts
of first instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time that the first
organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of the
Philippine Commission of June 11, 1901).
Actions for specific performance of contracts have been expressly pronounced to be
exclusively cognizable by courts of first instance. And no cogent reason appears, and
none is here advanced by the parties, why an action for rescission (or resolution)
should be differently treated, a rescission being a counterpart, so to speak, of specific
performance. In both cases, the court would certainly have to undertake an
investigation into facts that would justify one act or the other. No award for damages
may be had in an action for rescission without first conducting an inquiry into matters
which would justify the setting aside of a contract, in the same manner that courts of
first instance would have to make findings of fact and law in actions not capable of
pecuniary estimation expressly held to be so by this Court, arising from issues like
those raised in Arroz v. Alojado, et al., L-22153, March 31, 1967 (the legality or

illegality of the conveyance sought for and the determination of the validity of the
money deposit made); De Ursua v. Pelayo, L-13285, April 18, 1950 (validity of a
judgment); Bunayog v. Tunas, L-12707, December 23, 1959 (validity of a mortgage);
Baito v. Sarmiento, L-13105, August 25, 1960 (the relations of the parties, the right to
support created by the relation, etc., in actions for support); De Rivera, et al. v. Halili,
L-15159, September 30, 1963 (the validity or nullity of documents upon which claims
are predicated). Issues of the same nature may be raised by a party against whom an
action for rescission has been brought, or by the plaintiff himself. It is, therefore,
difficult to see why a prayer for damages in an action for rescission should be taken
as the basis for concluding such action as one capable of pecuniary estimation a
prayer which must be included in the main action if plaintiff is to be compensated for
what he may have suffered as a result of the breach committed by defendant, and
not later on precluded from recovering damages by the rule against splitting a cause
of action and discouraging multiplicity of suits.
an action for rescission of contract is one which cannot be estimated and therefore
the docket fee for its filing should be the flat amount of P200.00 as then fixed in the
former Rule 141, 5(10).
Thus, although eventually the result may be the recovery of land, it is the nature of
the action as one for rescission of contract which is controlling. The Court of
Appeals correctly applied these cases to the present one. As it said:
We would like to add the observations that since the action of petitioners [private
respondents] against private respondents [petitioners] is solely for annulment or
rescission which is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation, the action should not be
confused and equated with the value of the property subject of the transaction; that
by the very nature of the case, the allegations, and specific prayer in the complaint,
sans any prayer for recovery of money and/or value of the transaction, or for actual
or compensatory damages, the assessment and collection of the legal fees should
not be intertwined with the merits of the case and/or what may be its end result; and
that to sustain private respondents [petitioners] position on what the respondent
court may decide after all, then the assessment should be deferred and finally
assessed only after the court had finally decided the case, which cannot be done
because the rules require that filing fees should be based on what is alleged and
prayed for in the face of the complaint and paid upon the filing of the complaint.
WHEREFORE , the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.