1

1.) DAISIE T. DAVID, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR, respondents, G.R.
No. 111180 November 16, 1995
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in
Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four children, all grown-up. After a while,
the relationship between petitioner and private respondent developed into an intimate one, as a result of which
a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two more children,
both girls, namely Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.
The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's house
at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal wife.
After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted
by his legal family.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family
to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled
Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year.
On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
After hearing, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58 at Angeles City, rendered a decision, giving the rightful
custody of the minor Christopher J. T. David is hereby given to the natural mother, the herein petitioner Daisie
T. David;
And ordering respindent to give a temporary support of P3,000.00 a month to the subject minor Christopher J.
T. David, Christine David and Cathy Mae David.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision.
Daisie in turn filed this petition for review of the appellate court's decision.
HELD: In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father,
private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's mother. As such,
pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, the
herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. 2 Since,
admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is
entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give
support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise."
Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her
children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her own since they were
born. Petitioner is a market vendor earning from P2,000 to P3,000 per month in 1993 when the RTC decision
was rendered. She augments her income by working as secretary at the Computer System Specialist, Inc.
earning a monthly income of P4,500.00. She has an arrangement with her employer so that she can personally
attend to her children. She works up to 8:00 o'clock in the evening to make up for time lost during the day.
That she receives help from her parents and sister for the support of the three children is not a point against
her. Cooperation, compassion, love and concern for every member of the family are characteristics of the
close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it what it is.
Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private respondent promises if the child
lives with him. It is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to support her
children according to her means.
The Regional Trial Court ordered private respondent to give temporary support to petitioner in the amount of
P3,000.00 a month, pending the filing of an action for support, after finding that private respondent did not
give any support to his three children by Daisie, except the meager amount of P500.00 a week which he
stopped giving them on June 23, 1992. He is a rich man who professes love for his children. In fact he filed a
motion for the execution of the decision of the Court of Appeals, alleging that he had observed his son "to be

physically weak and pale because of malnutrition and deprivation of the luxury and amenities he was
accustomed to when in the former custody of the respondent." He prayed that he be given the custody of the
child so that he can provide him with the "proper care and education."
Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support in this case is
justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed willingness to support the minor child. The order
for payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of custody of the child. Under Art. 204
of the Family Code, a person obliged to give support can fulfill his obligation either by paying the allowance
fixed by the court or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who is entitled to support
unless, in the latter case, there is "a moral or legal obstacle thereto."
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at least at
the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the child
is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will have to be upheld because the child
categorically expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must
respect the "choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not
been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if private respondent
loves his child, he should not condition the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to him
(private respondent).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and private respondent is ORDERED to
deliver the minor Christopher J. T. David to the custody of his mother, the herein petitioner, and to give him
temporary support in the amount of P3,000.00, pending the fixing of the amount of support in an appropriate
action.
2.) IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR, EDWIN VILLA Y MENDOZA. LUIS
E. SANTOS, JR. and EDIPOLA V. SANTOS, petitioners-appellants, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee., G.R. No. L-22523, September 29, 1967
The above-named spouses filed the petition before the court a quo on January 8, 1963, praying that the
minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, be declared their (petitioner's) son by adoption. Evidence was
presented that the order setting the case for hearing has been duly published, Exhibit A. There having been no
opposition registered to the petition, the petitioners were permitted to adduce their evidence.
It was established that the petitioners are both 32 years of age, Filipinos, residing in the City of Manila.
They were married in 1957 and have maintained a conjugal home of their own. They do not have a child of
their own blood. Neither spouse has any legitimate, legitimated, illegitimate, acknowledged natural child, or
natural child by legal fiction, nor has any one of them been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, is a child of Francisco Villa and Florencia Mendoza who are the
common parents of the petitioner-wife Edipola Villa Santos and the minor. Luis E. Santos, Jr., is a lawyer,
with business interests in a textile development enterprise and the IBA electric plant, and is the general
manager of Medry Inc. and the secretary-treasurer of Bearen Enterprises. His income is approximately
P600.00 a month. His co-petitioner-wife, is a nurse by profession, with an average monthly earning of about
P300.00.
It was also shown that Edwin Villa y Mendoza was born on May 22, 1958, Exhibit C. He was a sickly
child since birth. Due to the child's impairing health his parents entrusted him to the petitioners who reared
and brought him up for the years thereafter, and as a result, there developed between the petitioners and the
child, a deep and profound love for each other. The natural parents of the minor testified that they have
voluntarily given their consent to the adoption of their son by the petitioners, and submitted their written
consent and conformity to the adoption, and that they fully understand the legal consequences of the adoption
of their child by the petitioners.
The trial court dismissed the petition reasoning thus:
A critical consideration in this case is the fact that the parents of the minor to be adopted are
also the parents of the petitioner-wife. The minor, therefore, is the latter's legitimate brother.
In this proceeding, the adoption will result in an incongruous situation where the minor Edwin
Villa, a legitimate brother of the petitioner-wife, will also be her son. In the opinion of the court, that
incongruity not neutralized by other circumstances absent herein, should prevent the adoption.
The petitioners moved to reconsider the decision but the same was denied. Hence, this appeal.

HELD: The issue before Us is, whether or not an elder sister may adopt a younger brother.
We are not aware of any provision in the law, and none has been pointed to Us by the Office of the
Solicitor General who argues for the State in this case, that relatives, by blood or by affinity, are prohibited
from adopting one another. The only objection raised is the alleged "incongruity" that will result in the
relation of the petitioner-wife and the adopted, in the circumstance that the adopted who is the legitimate
brother of the adopter, will also be her son by adoption.
Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those persons who may not adopt, and it has been shown that
petitioners-appellants herein are not among those prohibited from adopting. Article 339 of the same code
names those who cannot be adopted, and the minor child whose adoption is under consideration, is not one of
those excluded by the law. Article 338, on the other hand, allows the adoption of a natural child by the natural
father or mother, of other illegitimate children by their father or mother, and of a step-child by the step-father
or stepmother. This last article is, of course, necessary to remove all doubts that adoption is not prohibited
even in these cases where there already exist a relationship of parent and child between them by nature. To
say that adoption should not be allowed when the adopter and the adopted are related to each other, except in
these cases enumerated in Article 338, is to preclude adoption among relatives no matter how far removed or
in whatever degree that relationship might be, which in our opinion is not the policy of the law. The interest
and welfare of the child to be adopted should be of paramount consideration. Adoption statutes, being humane
and salutary, and designed to provide homes, care and education for unfortunate children, should be construed
so as to encourage the adoption of such children by person who can properly rear and educate them.
With respect to the objection that the adoption in this particular case will result in a dual relationship
between the parties, that the adopted brother will also be the son of the adopting elder sister, that fact alone
should not prevent the adoption. One is by nature, while the other is by fiction of law. The relationship
established by the adoption is limited to the adopting parents and does not extend to their other relatives,
except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the
ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have after
the adoption except that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are
the children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter (Tolentino, Civil Code, Vol. I, 1960 Ed.,
p. 652, citing 1 Oyuelos 284; Perez, Gonzales and Castan; 4-11 Enneccerus, Kipp & Wolff 177; Muoz P.
104). So even considered in relation to the rules on succession which are in pari materia, the adoption under
consideration would not be objectionable on the ground alone of the resulting relationship between the
adopter and the adopted. Similar dual relationships also result under our law on marriage when persons who
are already related, by blood or by affinity, marry each other. But as long as the relationship is not within the
degrees prohibited by law, such marriages are allowed notwithstanding the resulting dual relationship. And as
We do not find any provision in the law that expressly prohibits adoption among relatives, they ought not to
be prevented.
For all the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is set aside, and the petition for the
adoption of the subject minor, granted.

3.) In the matter of the adoption of the minor MARCIAL ELEUTARIO RESABA. LUIS SANTOSYIGO and LIGIA MIGUEL DE SANTOS-YIGO, petitioners-appellees vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant, G.R. No. L-6294, June 28, 1954
On June 24, 1952, a petition was filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga by Luis Santos-Yigo and
his wife for the adoption of a minor named Marcial Eleuterio Resaba. It is alleged that the legitimate parents
of said minor have given their consent to the adoption in a document which was duly signed by them on
March 20, 1950, and that since then petitioners had reared and cared for the minor as if he were their own. It
is likewise alleged that petitioners are financially and morally able to bring up and educate the minor.
The court granted the petition holding that, while petitioners have two legitimate children of their own, yet
said children were born after the agreement for adoption was executed by petitioners and the parents of the
minor. The court found that said agreement was executed before the new Civil Code went into effect and
while the petition may not be granted under this new Code, it may be sanctioned under the old because it
contains no provision which prohibits adoption in the form and manner agreed upon by the parties. From this
decision, the Solicitor General took the present appeal alleging that the lower court erred in granting the
petition to adopt in violation of the provisions of paragraph 1, article 335, new Civil Code.
HELD: There is merit in the contention that the petition should not be granted in view of the prohibition
contained in article 335, paragraph 1, of the new Civil Code. This article provides that persons who have

legitimate children cannot adopt, and there is no doubt about its application because the petition was filed on
June 24, 1952 and at that time petitioners had two legitimate children, one a boy born on November 12, 1950
and the other, a girl born on April 13, 1952. This case therefore comes squarely within the prohibition. This
prohibition is founded on sound moral grounds. The purpose of adoption is to afford to persons who have no
child of their own the consolation of having one by creating, through legal fiction, the relation of paternity
and filiation where none exists by blood relationship. This purpose reject the idea of adoption by persons who
have children of their own, for, otherwise, conflicts, friction, and differences may arise resulting from the
infiltration of foreign element into a family which already counts with children upon whom the parents can
shower their paternal love and affection (2 Manresa, 6th ed., 108-109). This moral consideration must have
influenced the framers of the new Civil Code when they reiterated therein this salutary provision.
But it is contended, this prohibition in the new Civil Code cannot have application to the present case
because, to do so , as it is now attempted, would impair the acquired right of petitioners over the adopted
child in violation of the transitory provisions of article 2252 of said Code. It is pointed out that petitioners
reared and took care of the child, since February 24, 1950, and on March 20, 1950 they and the parents of the
child executed the adoption agreement in accordance with the Rules of Court, and since these rules do not
forbid adoption to persons who have legitimate children, that agreement shall be given full effect in the
manner as any contract which is not contrary to law, morals and public order.
We find no merit in this contention. While the adoption agreement was executed at the time when the law
applicable to adoption is Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that rule does not prohibit persons who have
legitimate children from adopting, we cannot agree to the proposition that such agreement has the effect of
establishing the relation of paternity and filiation by fiction of law without the sanction of court. The reason is
simple. Rule 100 has taken the place of Chapter XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure (sections 765-772,
inclusive), which in turn replaced the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code on adoption. (Articles 173-180.)
As was stated in one case, said chapter of the Code of Civil Procedure "appears to be a complete enactment
on the subject of adoption, and may thus be regarded as the expression of the whole law thereof. So viewed,
that chapter must be deemed to have repealed the provisions of the Civil Code on the matter." (In re adoption
of Emiliano Guzman, 73 Phil., 51.) Now, said rule expressly provides that a person desiring to adopt a minor
shall present a petition to the court of first instance of the province where he resides (section 1). This means
that the only valid adoption in this jurisdiction is that one made through court, or in pursuance of the
procedure laid down by the rule, which shows that the agreement under consideration can not have the effect
of adoption as now pretended by petitioners.
Some members of the Court have advanced the opinion that, notwithstanding the enactment of the Code of
Civil Procedure or the adoption of the present Rules of Court concerning adoption, those provisions of the
Spanish Civil Code that are substantive in nature cannot be considered as having been impliedly repealed,
such as the one providing that a person who has a legitimate child is prohibited to adopt (article 74). But the
majority is of the opinion that the repeal is complete as declared by this Court in the case of In re adoption of
Emiliano Guzman, supra. At any rate, this matter is not now of any consequence considering the fact that
when the adoption agreement was executed the petitioners had not yet any legitimate child. Their children
where born subsequent to that agreement.
We are sympathetic to the plea of equity of counsel considering the fact that petitioners had taken custody of
the child and had reared and educated him as their own much prior to the approval of the new Civil Code and
that all this was done with the consent of the natural parents to promote the welfare and happiness of the
child, but the inexonerable mandate of the law forbids us from adopting a different course of action. Our duty
is to interpret and apply the law as we see it in accordance with sound rules of statutory construction.
The order appealed from is set aside.

4.)
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
petitioner
vs.
HONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 69, Iba, Zambales and SPOUSES ALVIN A. CLOUSE and
EVELYN A. CLOUSE, respondents, G.R. No. 94147 June 8, 1994
On February 21, 1990, a verified petition was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales by
private respondents spouses Clouse seeking to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother
of private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse.
The principal evidence disclose that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the United
States of America. He married Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On August 19, 1988,

Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United States of America in Guam. They are physically, mentally,
morally, and financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor.
Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been
under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother,
Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate
her son.
Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the Home and Child Study, favorably
recommended the granting of the petition for adoption.
Finding that private respondents have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law
and that the adoption will redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor, respondent judge rendered a
decision on June 20, 1990, granting the adoption.
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed to us for relief, contending:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF
ALVIN AND EVELYN CLOUSE, BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO ADOPT
UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.
HELD: We rule for petitioner.
Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code of the
Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not
qualified to adopt, viz.:
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse;
or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with
his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children
in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by
law.
There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph
Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former
Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second place, Solomon
Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place,
when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on
February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino
citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988.
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of
Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother.
Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185
which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together
with Article 184.
The historical evolution of this provision is clear. Presidential Decree 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare
Code), provides that husband and wife "may" jointly adopt. Executive Order No. 91 issued on December 17,
1986 amended said provision of P.D. 603. It demands that both husband and wife "shall" jointly adopt if one
of them is an alien. It was so crafted to protect Filipino children who are put up for adoption. The Family
Code reiterated the rule by requiring that husband and wife "must" jointly adopt, except in the cases
mentioned before. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. As the
child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt
jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
In a distinctly similar case, we held:
As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603, had thus made it
mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law was
silent when both spouses were of the same nationality.
The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185 thereof expresses the
necessity for a joint adoption by the spouses except in only two instances
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate
child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of
the other.
It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code, on the parental authority, can aptly
find governance.
Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the legitimate child
of the other, jointly parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with
this Code.
Article 185 is all too clear and categorical and there is no room for its interpretation. There is only room for
application.
We are not unaware that the modern trend is to encourage adoption and every reasonable intendment should
be sustained to promote that objective. Adoption is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the
child and enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life. It is not the bureaucratic technicalities
but the interest of the child that should be the principal criterion in adoption cases. Executive Order 209
likewise upholds that the interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be the paramount
consideration. These considerations notwithstanding, the records of the case do not evince any fact as would
justify us in allowing the adoption of the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, by private respondents who are
aliens.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the lower court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No costs.

5.) LEOUEL SANTOS, SR., petitioner-appellant, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES
LEOPOLDO and OFELIA BEDIA, respondents-appellees, G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995
In this petition for review, we are asked to overturn the decision of the Court of Appeals granting custody of
six-year old Leouel Santos, Jr. to his maternal grandparents and not to his father, Santos, Sr. What is sought is
a decision which should definitively settle the matter of the care, custody and control of the boy.
Happily, unlike King Solomon, we need not merely rely on a "wise and understanding heart," for there is
man's law to guide us and that is, the Family Code.
The antecedent facts giving rise to the case at bench are as follows:

Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were married in Iloilo
City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987.
From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in the care and
custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of the latter's parents, the
respondent spouses Bedia. The latter alleged that they paid for all the hospital bills, as well as the subsequent
support of the boy because petitioner could not afford to do so.
The boy's mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United States in May 1988 to work. Petitioner alleged that
he is not aware of her whereabouts and his efforts to locate her in the United States proved futile. Private
respondents claim that although abroad, their daughter Julia had been sending financial support to them for
her son.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where three-year
old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner
abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.,"
before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent.
After hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day awarding custody of the
child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.
HELD: The issue to be resolved here boils down to who should properly be awarded custody of the minor
Leouel Santos, Jr.
The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority. Parental authority or
patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and
protection of their unemancipated children to the extent required by the latter' s needs. It is a mass of rights
and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the children's physical preservation and
development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards
parental authority, "there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but
a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor."
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases
authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of
parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan
institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a
document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to
keep them in their custody and company. The child's welfare is always the paramount consideration in all
questions concerning his care and custody.
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In
case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only
in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the
surviving grandparent. The situation obtaining in the case at bench is one where the mother of the minor
Santos, Jr., is working in the United States while the father, petitioner Santos, Sr., is present. Not only are they
physically apart but are also emotionally separated. There has been no decree of legal separation and
petitioner's attempt to obtain an annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of his
wife has failed.
Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award custody of his minor son
to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214 of the Family Code, substitute
parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when both parents are dead, absent or unsuitable.
Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not been successfully shown by private respondents.

The Court of Appeals held that although there is no evidence to show that petitioner (Santos Sr.) is "depraved,
a habitual drunkard or poor, he may nevertheless be considered, as he is in fact so considered, to be unsuitable
to be allowed to have custody of minor Leouel Santos Jr."
The respondent appellate court, in affirming the trial court's order of October 8, 1990, adopted as its own the
latter's observations, to wit:
From the evidence adduced, this Court is of the opinion that it is to be (sic) best interest of the
minor Leouel Santos, Jr. that he be placed under the care, custody, and control of his maternal
grandparents the petitioners herein. The petitioners have amply demonstrated their love and
devotion to their grandson while the natural father, respondent herein, has shown little
interest in his welfare as reflected by his conduct in the past. Moreover the fact that
petitioners are well-off financially, should be carefully considered in awarding to them the
custody of the minor herein, lest the breaking of such ties with his maternal grandparents
might deprive the boy of an eventual college education and other material advantages
(Consaul vs. Consaul, 63 N.Y.S. 688). Respondent had never given any previous financial
support to his son, while, upon the other hand, the latter receives so much bounty from his
maternal grandparents and his mother as well, who is now gainfully employed in the United
States. Moreover, the fact that respondent, as a military personnel who has to shuttle from one
assignment to another, and, in these troubled times, may have pressing and compelling
military duties which may prevent him from attending to his son at times when the latter
needs him most, militates strongly against said respondent. Additionally, the child is sickly
and asthmatic and needs the loving and tender care of those who can provide for it.
We find the aforementioned considerations insufficient to defeat petitioner's parental authority and the
concomitant right to have custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since he has not been shown
to be an unsuitable and unfit parent. Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy,
notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents. The latter's wealth is not a
deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no position to
support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide financial support for his minor son from birth up to
over three years when he took the boy from his in-laws without permission, should not be sufficient reason to
strip him of his permanent right to the child's custody. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable
and merits only the severest criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable
decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to
rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son. It
would also give the father a chance to prove his love for his son and for the son to experience the warmth and
support which a father can give.
His being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in uniform who are
assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are still the natural guardians of their
children. It is not just to deprive our soldiers of authority, care and custody over their children merely because
of the normal consequences of their duties and assignments, such as temporary separation from their families.
Petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though unjustifiable, is
likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.
Private respondents' attachment to the young boy whom they have reared for the past three years is
understandable. Still and all, the law considers the natural love of a parent to outweigh that of the
grandparents, such that only when the parent present is shown to be unfit or unsuitable may the grandparents
exercise substitute parental authority, a fact which has not been proven here.
The strong bonds of love and affection possessed by private respondents as grandparents should not be seen
as incompatible with petitioner' right to custody over the child as a father. Moreover, who is to say whether
the petitioner's financial standing may improve in the future?
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 30,
1992 as well as its Resolution dated November 13, 1992 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Custody
over the minor Leouel Santos Jr. is awarded to his legitimate father, herein petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr.