Secure Data Dissemination Based On Merkle Hash Tree For Wireless Sensor Networks

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
ISSN : 2277-7881; IMPACT FACTOR - 2.735; IC VALUE:5.16

VOLUME 3, ISSUE 9(2), SEPTEMBER 2014
SECURE DATA DISSEMINATION BASED ON MERKLE HASH

TREE FOR WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
Udatha Hariprasad
K Riyazuddin
M.Tech Student
Department of Electronics &
Communication Engineering
Annamacharya Institute of
Technology and Sciences, Rajampet
Assistant Professor
Department of Electronics &
Communication Engineering
Annamacharya Institute of
Technology and Sciences, Rajampet
I. INTRODUCTION
Inside multi-hop Instant sensor sites (WSNs) happen to be

attracting great curiosity about many applications linked to monitoring
in addition to control associated with environmental as well as physical
circumstances, such as industry monitoring and military operations.
After a WSN will be deployed inside field, it can be necessary in order
to update the particular installed applications or stashed parameters
inside sensor nodes. This is achieved simply by dissemination services
which ensure new applications or parameter values for being
propagated during the entire WSN making sure that all nodes use a
consistent duplicate. Normally, a brand new program is on the order
associated with kilobytes though a parameter is simply few bytes
extended. Due to such a vast imbalance between their sizes, the look
considerations in their dissemination protocols will vary.
Code dissemination (also known as data dissemination as well as
reprogramming) protocols are created to correctly distribute extended
messages in to a network, empowering complete system
reprogramming.
On
the
other
hand,
data
breakthrough
and
dissemination protocols are used to deliver short emails, such as several

two-byte configuration parameters, in just a WSN. Common makes use
of this type of protocols incorporate injecting little programs,
266

commands, queries, in addition to configuration details. Recently,

several files discovery in addition to dissemination protocols happen to
be proposed. And this includes, Drip, DIP in addition to DHV are
renowned and included in Tiny OS distributions. However, to the best
of our knowledge, just about all existing files discovery in addition to
dissemination protocols only target reliable files transmission, but
provide no security procedure. Certainly, this is really a critical issue
which should be addressed. In any other case, adversaries might, for
example, distribute viral or phony data in order to cripple a new WSN
deployed inside battlefield.
In this kind of proposed system we initial investigate the
particular security difficulties in files discovery in addition to
dissemination process of WSNs and explain that the possible lack of
authentication on the disseminated files introduces a new vulnerability
for the update associated with arbitrary files in WSNs. We then create a
secure, light and portable, and Denial-of-Assistance (DoS)-resistant
files discovery in addition to dissemination protocol named Se-Drip for
WSNs, that is a secure extension of Spill. To gain DoS-attack resilience
and permit immediate verification of just about any received packets,
Se-Drip is based on a signed Merkle hash sapling. This way the bottom
station of your WSN must sign only the root of this kind of tree.
Furthermore, Se-Drip can easily tolerate the particular compromise
associated with some sensor nodes. For boosting the stability and
effectiveness, some extra mechanisms such as message unique puzzle
tactic are incorporated in the design associated with SeDrip. Most of us
also implement the recommended protocol inside networks associated
with MicaZ in addition to TelosB motes, respectively. Experimental
benefits demonstrate their high efficiency in practice. To the best of our
knowledge, that is also the 1st implemented secure data breakthrough
and dissemination protocol for WSNs.
267

II. PREVIOUS WORK
Among these protocols, Deluge is included in the Tiny OS

distributions. However, since the design of Deluge did not take security
into consideration, there have been several extensions to Deluge to
provide security protection for code dissemination. Among them, Seluge
enjoys both strong security and high efficiency. However, all these code
dissemination protocols are based on the centralized approach which
assumes the existence of a base station and only the base station has
the authority to reprogram sensor nodes. As shown in Figure below,
when the base station wants to disseminate a new code image, it
broadcasts the signed code image and each sensor node only accepts
code images signed by it. Unfortunately, there are WSNs having no
base station at all. Examples of such networks include a military WSN
in a battlefield to monitor enemy activity (e.g., troop movements), a
WSN deployed along an international border to monitor weapons
smuggling or human trafficking, and a WSN situated in a remote area
of a national park monitoring illegal activities (e.g., firearm discharge,
illicit crop cultivation). Having a base station in these WSNs introduces
a single point of failure and a very attractive attack target. Obviously,
the centralized approach is not applicable to such WSNs.
Trust Model
The network owner delegates his/her code dissemination privilege to
the network users who are willing to register. We assume the special
modules (e.g., authentication module for each new program image
proposed in this paper, the user access log module) reside in the boot
loader section of the program flash on each sensor node which cannot
be overwritten by anyone except the network owner. To achieve this
goal, some existing approaches can be employed such as hardwarebased approaches (e.g., security chips) and software based approaches
(e.g., program code analysis).
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Threat Model We assume that an adversary can launch both outsider

and insider attacks. In outsider attacks, the adversary does not control
any valid nodes in the WSN. The adversary may eavesdrop, copy or
replay the transmitted messages in the WSN. He/she may also inject
false messages or forge non-existing links in the network by launching
a wormhole attack.With insider attacks, the adversary can compromise
some users (or sensor nodes) and then inject forged code dissemination
packets, or exploit specific weakness of the secure protocol
architecture.[1]
Experience with wireless sensor network deployments across
application domains has shown that sensor node tasks typically change
over time, for instance, to vary sensed parameters, node duty cycles, or
support debugging. Such reprogramming is accomplished through
wireless communication using reprogrammable devices. The goal of
network reprogramming is to not only reprogram individual sensors
but to also ensure that all network sensors agree on the task to be
performed. Network reprogramming is typically implemented on top of
data dissemination protocols. For reprogramming, the data can be
configuration parameters, code capsules, or binary images. We will
refer to this data as a code item. A node must detect if there is a
different code item in the network, identify if it is newer, and update its
code with minimal reprogramming cost, in terms of convergence speed
and energy.
Early attempts tried to adapt epidemic algorithms to disseminate
code updates during specific reprogramming periods. But there is no
way for new nodes to discover past updates. If a node is not updated
during the reprogramming period, it will never get updated. To discover
if a node needs an update, a natural approach is to query or advertise
its information periodically.
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The network as a whole may transmit an excessive and unnecessary

number of query and advertisement messages. To address this problem,
Levis et al developed the Trickle protocol to allow nodes to suppress
unnecessary transmissions. In Trickle, a node periodically broadcasts
its versions but politely keeps quiet and increases the period if it hears
several messages containing the same information as it has. When a
difference is detected, the node resets the period to the lowest preset
interval. Trickle scales well with the number of nodes and has
successfully reduced the number of messages in the network.
Bit-level identification: Previous CCMPs have transmitted the
complete version number for a code item. We observe that it may not
always be necessary to do so. We treat the version number as a bit
array, with the versions of all the code items representing a two
dimensional bit array. DHV uses bit slicing to quickly zero in on the out
of date code segment, resulting in fewer bits transmitted in the
network.
Statelessness: Keeping state in the network, particularly with
mobility, is not scalable. DHV messages do not contain any state and
usually small in size. Preference of a large message over multiple small
messages: To reduce energy consumption, it is better to transmit as
much information possible in a single maximum length message rather
than transmit multiple small messages. Sensor nodes turn off the radio
when they are idle to conserve energy. Radio start-up and turn-off
times (300 microseconds) are much longer than the time used to
transmit one byte (30 microseconds). A long packet may affect the
collision rate and packet loss. However, that effect only becomes
noticeable under bursty data traffic conditions. [3]
This idea seems quite attractive at first. However, it has several
shortcomings. This work points to these shortcomings and proposes
methods to overcome them. Our description is based mostly on TESLA,
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although the improvements apply to the other schemes as well. We

sketch some of these points:
1. In TESLA the receiver has to buffer packets, until the sender
discloses the corresponding key, and until the receiver authenticates
the packets. This may delay delivering the information to the
application, may cause storage problems, and also generates
vulnerability to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks on the receiver (by
flooding it with bogus packets). We propose a method that allows
receivers to authenticate most packets immediately upon arrival, thus
reducing the need for buffering at the receiver side and in particular
reduces the susceptibility to this type of DoS attacks. This
improvement comes at the price of one extra hash per packet, plus
some buffering at the sender side. We believe that buffering at the
sender side is often more reasonable and acceptable than buffering at
the receiver side. In particular, it is not susceptible to this type of DoS
attacks. We also propose other methods to alleviate this type of DoS
attacks. These methods work even when the receiver buffers packets as
in TESLA.
2. When operating in an environment with heterogenous network
delay times for different receivers, TESLA authenticates each packet
using multiple keys, where the different keys have different disclosure
delay times. This results in larger overhead, both in processing time
and in bandwidth. We propose a method for achieving the same
functionality (i.e., different receivers can authenticate the packets at
different delays) with a more moderate increase in the overhead per
packet.
3. In TESLA the sender needs to perform authenticated time
synchronization individually with each receiver. This may not scale
well, especially in cases where many receivers wish to join the multicast
group and synchronize with the sender at the same time. This is so,
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since each synchronization involves a costly public-key operation. We

propose a method that uses only a single public-key operation per timeunit, regardless of the number of time synchronizations performed
during this time unit. This reduces the cost of synchronizing with a
receiver to practically the cost of setting up a simple, unauthenticated
connection.
We also explore time synchronization issues in greater depth and
describe direct and indirect time synchronization. For the former
method, the receiver synchronizes its time directly with the sender, in
the latter method both the sender and receiver synchronize their time
with a time synchronization server. For both cases, we give a detailed
analysis on how to choose the key disclosure delay, a crucial parameter
for TESLA.
TESLA assumes that all members have joined the group and have
synchronized with the sender before any transmission starts. In reality,
receivers may wish to join after the transmission has started;
furthermore, receivers may wish to receive the transmission
immediately, and perform the time synchronization only later. We
propose methods that enable both functionalities. That is, our methods
allow a receiver to join in on the fly to an ongoing session; they also
allow receivers to synchronize at a later time and authenticate packets
only then. [4]
III. PROPOSED SYSTEM
A. Initialization
Compared with the traditional approaches, elliptic curve

cryptography (ECC) is a better approach to public-key cryptography in
terms of key size, computational efficiency, and communication
efficiency. However, while ECC is feasible on resource-limited sensor
motes, heavily involving ECC-based authentication is still not practical.
SeDrip combines ECC public key algorithm and Merkle hash tree to
272

avoid frequent public key operations and achieve strong robustness

against various malicious attacks. Also, SeDrip inherits robustness to
packet loss from underlying Trickle algorithm, because Trickle uses
periodic retransmissions to ensure eventual delivery of the message to
every node in the network.
SeDrip consists of three phases: system initialization, packet preprocessing, and packet verification. The system initialization phase is
carried out before network deployment. In this phase, the base station
creates its public and private keys, and loads the public parameters on
each sensor node. Then, before disseminating data, the base station
executes the packet preprocessing phase in which packets and their
corresponding Merkle hash tree are constructed from data items.
Finally, in the packet verification phase, a node verifies each received
packet. If the result is positive, it updates the data according to the
received packet.
In SeDrip, we extend the 3-tuple (key, version, data) of Drip into a 4tuple (round, key, version, data) to represent a data item, where round
refers to which round of data dissemination this data item belongs to
(the higher the round, the newer the data dissemination), and the other
three elements bear the same meaning as existing protocols. Same as
the Drip implementation, key and version are 2 bytes and 4 bytes long,
respectively. For the round field, it can be just as short as 4 bits because
we can allow a wrap around in the number space to take place. This is
possible based on two characteristics of the dissemination process. First,
the configuration of a WSN is not expected to change frequently and
hence the dissemination rate would be low. Second, only a small
amount of data is disseminated in each round, so the time required to
complete one round of dissemination should be very short. As a result,
each sensor node would not experience any ambiguity in determining
which round number is the latest even if there is a wrap around in a
round number.
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B. Packet Pre-processing Phase
After system initialization, if the base station wants to disseminate n

data items: di = {round, keyi, versioni, datai}, i = 1, 2, . . ., n, it uses
the Merkle hash tree method to construct the packets of the respective
data as follows. Merkle hash tree is a tree of hashes, where the leaves in
the tree are hashes of the authentic packets Pi, i = 1, 2, . . ., n. Here the
hash function is calculated over packet header and data item di(=
{round, keyi, versioni, datai}). Nodes further up in the tree are the
hashes of their respective children. More exactly, the base station
computes ei = H(Pi)(i = 1, 2, 3, 4), and builds a binary tree by
computing internal nodes from adjacent children nodes. Each internal
node of the tree is the hash value of the two children nodes.
Subsequently, the base station constructs n packets based on this
Merkle hash tree. For packet Pi, it consists of the packet header, the
data item di and the values in its authentication path (i.e., the siblings
of the nodes in the path from Pi to the root) in the Merkle hash tree.
C. Packet Verification Phase
Upon receiving a packet (from any one-hop neighboring node or the

base station), each sensor node, say Si, first checks the key field of the
packet: If this is a signature packet P0, node Si runs the following
operations: If this is a new round (i.e., the round included in this packet
is newer than that of its stored < round, root >), node Si uses the
public key PK of the base station to run an ECDSA verify operation to
authenticate the received signature packet. If this verification passes,
node Si accepts the root of the Merkle hash tree and then updates its
stored < round, root > by the corresponding values in packet P0;
otherwise, node Si simply drops the signature packet P0. If node Si has
recently heard an identical signature packet (i.e., the round included in
this packet is same as that of its stored < round, root >), it increases
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the broadcast interval of this packet through the Trickle algorithm,

thereby limiting energy costs when a network is consistent.
If this is an old round (i.e., the round included in this packet is older
than that of its stored < round, root >. That is, the signature packet
distributed by its one-hop neighboring node is old), node Si broadcasts
its stored signature packet.
IV. RESULTS
The concept of this paper is implemented and different results are

shown below, the proposed paper is implemented in NS 2.34 on a Linux
Fedora 10. The propose papers concepts shows efficient results and has
been efficiently tested on different Datasets. The below figures shows
the real time results compared.
Fig. 1 Packet Delivery Fraction Vs Pause Time
Fig. 2 Packet Delivery Fraction Vs Pause Time
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Fig. 3 Average End to End Delay Vs Pause Time
Fig. 4 Average End to End Delay Vs Pause Time
Fig. 5 Routing Overhead Vs Pause Time
Fig. 6 Routing Overhead Vs Pause Time
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V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have now identified the particular security

vulnerabilities throughout data breakthrough and dissemination of
WSNs. We and then developed a lightweight method named Se-Drip to
allow efficient authentication on the disseminated information items by
enjoying efficient Merkle woods algorithm. Se-Drip was designed to
work from the computation, ram and electricity limits of inexpensive
sensor motes. In addition to analyzing the particular security of Se-Drip,
this paper has reported the particular evaluation link between Se-Drip
in the experimental multilevel of resource limited sensor nodes, which
demonstrate that Se-Drip can be efficient as well as feasible used.
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Secure Data Dissemination Based On Merkle Hash Tree For Wireless Sensor Networks

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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH

ISSN : 2277-7881; IMPACT FACTOR - 2.735; IC VALUE:5.16