Você está na página 1de 66

Royal Dutch Shell

and its sustainability


troubles
Background report to the Erratum
of Shells Annual Report 2010

Milieudefensie Friends of the Earth Netherlands

Colophon

May 2011
This report is made on behalf of Milieudefensie
(Friends of the Earth Netherlands)
Author: Albert ten Kate, freelance researcher
corporate social responsibility
Pesthuislaan 61
1054 RH Amsterdam
phone: (+31)(0)20 489 29 88
mobile: (+31)(0)6 185 68 354
e-mail: atk@antenna.nl

This document has been produced with the financial assistance


of the European Union. The contents of this document are the sole responsibility
of Milieudefensie and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the
European Union.

Contents
Introduction

Methodology

Cases:
Case 1. Muddling through in Nigeria

1a) oil spills

1b) primitive gas flaring

1c) conflict and corruption

Case 2. Denial of Brazilian pesticide diseases

15

Case 3. Mining the Canadian tar sands

17

Case 4. The bitter taste of Brazils sugarcane

20

4a) sourcing sugarcane from occupiers of indigenous land

21

4b) bad labour conditions sugarcane harvesters

22

4c) massive monoculture land use

25

Case 5. Fracking unconventional gas

28

Case 6. Climate change, a business case?

33

Case 7. Interfering with politics

36

Case 8. Drilling plans Alaskas Arctic Ocean

39

Case 9. Sakhalin: the last 130 Western Gray Whales

41

Case 10. The risky Kashagan oil field

43

Case 11. A toxic legacy in Curaao

45

Case 12. Philippines: an oil depot amidst a crowd of people

48

Endnotes

50

Introduction

Measured in revenue, Royal Dutch Shell is one of the biggest companies in the world. According
to its annual report of 2010, its revenue amounted to USD 368 billion in 2010.
Shell produces oil and gas in 30 countries, spread over the world. Downstream, the company is
engaged in manufacturing, distribution and marketing of oil products and chemicals. It employed
an average of around 97,000 people in over 90 countries during 2010.
Shell encounters a wide range of sustainability issues throughout its operations: climate change,
the rights of indigenous people, the livelihood and well-being of nearby communities, health
problems, endangered species, working conditions, corruption, interfering with politics, all kinds
of pollution, increasing pressure on land for bio-fuels, biodiversity, safety, paying taxes etc.
This report comprises 12 sustainability cases on Royal Dutch Shell. Some cases relate to a specific
sustainability issue, for example the cases on climate change or interfering with politics. Other
cases reflect specific operations of the company in a certain geographical area, where one or
more sustainability issues are at stake.
This report provides the background information for another report: Erratum of Shells Annual
Report 2010. This shorter report can also be found on www.milieudefensie.nl/english/shellinnigeria
It was not possible to include all sustainability problems surrounding Shell, during the course
of writing this report. Shell is a huge company, limited information is publicly available, and for
this project there was limited time to explore cases more in-depth than through desk research.
Though not complete, this report however covers some of the main sustainability issues encountered by Shell.
Several people from NGOs that are involved with one of the 12 sustainability cases in this report,
offered suggestions and comments to parts of this report. Thank you all!
Special thanks go out to Evert Hassink of Friends of the Earth Netherlands for his suggestions and
comments on the whole bit.
Albert ten Kate
May 2011

Methodology
Selection of issues
In a quick scan, more than 20 sustainability cases with regard to Shells operations worldwide were
roughly assessed. Out of these issues, in cooperation with the initiators of this project, 12 issues
were chosen for further research. The selection was based on available information of the risks
that Shell may impact the environment, people and society negatively.

Research
The research on the 12 sustainability cases has been limited to desk research. The desk research
comprised:
- Screening of all website content Royal Dutch Shell (news releases, speeches, annual reports,
sustainability reports, Shell Venster magazine etc.).
- Screening of all the Wikileaks cables for content on Royal Dutch Shell via http://cablesearch.
org/
- Assessing the online library of news articles and leaked documents (over 25,000 articles and
documents) about Royal Dutch Shell via http://royaldutchshellplc.com (This is not a Shell website nor is it officially endorsed by or affiliated with Shell in any way).
- Use of web search engines to find information on each of the cases: NGO-reports, reports governmental institutions, newspaper articles, court documents, scientific papers etc. As much as
possible the original source of information was retrieved.
- Use of archives Friends of the Earth Netherlands.
- Use of databases to assess scientific articles.
- Contacting several NGOs that are involved with cases as described in the reports.
This report has not been reviewed by Shell before publication.

Case 1

Muddling through in Nigeria


Shell in Nigeria
In oil production, Nigeria is the most important country
for Shell. During the period 2006-2010, Nigeria accounted for about 16% of Shells worldwide production of oil
and liquid natural gas. During the year 2009, production
falls due to disrupting activities by militant groups in the
Niger Delta reached their peak for the time being. During the year 2010, production climbed back again, with
Nigeria accounting for almost 19% of Shells worldwide
production of oil and liquid natural gas.1
Nigerias share in the profits of Royal Dutch Shell has
been estimated at an annual average of USD 1.8 billion
over the period 20052009, representing 7.3% of Shells
total profit and 10.4% of its profits from upstream operations.2 Shells business in Nigeria seems to do well.
Shells Nigerian activities are divided among three companies. The largest is the Shell Petroleum Development
Company of Nigeria Ltd (SPDC). SPDC is also Nigerias
largest oil and gas joint venture. Most of its oil production
takes place onshore in the Niger Delta. Shell is the operator of SPDC and has a 30% stake in the joint venture.3
SPDC has been pumping oil for more than 50 years in the
Niger Delta. The other businesses of Shell in Nigeria refer
to liquefied natural gas (LNG) for export, and offshore
oil operations (among other the Bonga field). This case
focuses on Shells onshore activities in the Niger Delta.
This is the area where most environmental problems are
manifested (such as oil spills and gas flares) and where oil
production has caused severe conflicts.
The Niger Delta, resembling the South of Nigeria, is
made up of fertile wetlands. It is one of the most densely
populated regions of Africa. It has more than 30 million
inhabitants. Subsistence farming and fishing are the mainstay of the people. The number of communities hosting
oil / gas facilities in the Niger Delta is estimated at 1,500.4
The SPDC-activities in the Niger Delta, as operated by
Shell, are spread over some 30,000 square kilometres
(about three-quarters the size of the Netherlands) and
include a network of more than 6,000 kilometres of flowlines and pipelines, 86 oil fields, 1,000 producing wells,
68 flowstations, 10 gas plants and two major oil export
terminals at Bonny and Forcados.5

Nigeria is a poor en corrupt country. It ranks number 142


(out of 169 countries) in the Human Development Index
of the United Nations6 and number 134 (out of 178 countries) in the Corruption Perceptions Index.7 Over-reliance
on crude oil and gas (accounting for about 95 per cent of
foreign earnings and over 80 per cent of federal budget)
has weakened investment in other vibrant sectors of the
economy, including agriculture. The oil sector employs
just one per cent of the labour force. Many reports and
studies have reiterated that, despite its vast resources,
Nigeria ranks among the countries with the widest gap
between their poorest and richest citizens. Its 54.4 percent official poverty prevalence translates to about 70
million poor persons. Within the last decade the traditional challenges facing Nigeria mass poverty and unemployment, absence of transformation and prevalence of
high inequality have remained largely unchanged.8

Case 1a

Oil spills
Oil spills in the Niger Delta

Shells spill data

Oil spills from oil installations (pipelines, flowlines, wellheads, flowstations, storage tanks etc.) occur at a regular
basis in the Niger Delta, some ten times a week. According to the National Oil Spill Detection and Response
Agency (NOSDRA), oil companies reported 2,054 cases
of oil spill incidents (spills of more than one barrel)
between June 2006 and June 2010.9

Shell experiences some 150 to 200 oil spills each year12,


spread out over the Niger Delta and affecting several
communities.

Human suffering
Amnesty International has concluded that the oil companies in the Niger Delta are linked to violations of several
internationally recognized human rights as stipulated by
the United Nations. These rights comprise the right to
food, the right to work, the right to an adequate standard
of living, and the right to health and a healthy environment.10 Audrey Gaughran, Amnesty Internationals Head
of Business and Human Rights, describes the impacts of
oil spills on communities as follows: People living in the
Niger Delta have to drink, cook with and wash in polluted
water. They eat fish contaminated with oil and other toxins if they are lucky enough to be able to still find fish.
The land they farm on is being destroyed. After oil spills
the air they breathe smells of oil, gas and other pollutants. People complain of breathing problems and skin
lesions and yet neither the government nor the oil companies monitor the human impacts of oil pollution.11

Over the years, Shell has been using some other figures.
For example, during 2009 the company stated that some
85% of the volumes of oil spilled was caused by sabotage/theft.16 Sometimes Shell related this percentage to
2008, sometimes it would not specify the time period. It
was not until May 2010 that Shell in Nigeria revealed that
its updated data for the year 2008 showed that 48% of
the volume was caused by sabotage/theft.17

350.000

Oil spilled (barrels)

Figure: Development
of oil spill volumes
from Shell-installations in Nigeria, according to Shell

According to Shell, the volume of oil spilled from Shellinstallations in the Niger Delta has been increasing over
the years:
- In the period 1989-1994 (six years), SPDC recorded a
total of 37,000 barrels of oil spilled. Shell attributed
72% of this volume to ageing facilities and operational
failures, and 28% to sabotage.13
- Over the period 1999-2004 (six years), Shells spillage
totalled around 169,000 barrels. Shell attributed 63% of
this volume to sabotage/theft by third parties and 27%
to its own operational failures.14
- Over the period 2005-2010 (six years), the total spillage
amounted to 299,000 barrels. Shell claims that 72% of
the spillage was due to sabotage/theft by third parties.15

300.000
250.000
200.000

sabota
operat

150.000
100.000
50.000
0

1989 1994

1999 2004

2005 2010
Period (six years)
7

Probably due to ongoing public pressure, in 2011 Shell


has started to publicly register all the spills that have
occurred in the Niger Delta, including photographs and
the report by the Joint Investigation Team.18 The Joint
Investigation Team (JIT) is the team that visits the site,
after a leak occurs. The team comprises government
agencies, SPDC and representatives of impacted communities. It determines the spread, the volume and the
cause of the spill. During 2008 and 2009, SPDC spilled
more than 100,000 barrels of oil.19 During 2010 (27,580
barrels) and 2011 so far (around 6,000 barrels as of 28
April), the volume has decreased. This can partly be
explained by the amnesty given to militants in Bayelsa
State and Delta State in late 2009. Since then, explosions
of pipelines have decreased drastically.20

Oil spill data Shell challenged


In January 2011, Amnesty International and Friends of the
Earth International filed a complaint against Shell at the
Dutch and UK National Contact Points dealing with the
OECD Guidelines. They claim that Shells misleading and
incomplete reporting about oil spills in the Niger Delta
constitutes a breach of the OECD Guidelines, specifically Sections III (Disclosure) and VII (Consumer Interests)
as well as Section V (Environment). The complainants
state that the oil spill investigation system on which
Shell bases its data is totally lacking in independence.
Both organisations found that in many cases oil companies have significant influence on determining the official
cause of a spill. The complainants also allege that Shell,
in several communications, has used misleading figures
(70%, 85%, 90% and 98%) to attribute pollution and contamination to sabotage. According to Amnesty International and Friends of the Earth International, the implications of Shells repeated claims are both serious and
negative for the communities of the Niger Delta. Firstly,
when spills are classified as the result of sabotage Shell
has no liability or responsibility with respect to compensation for damage done to people or their livelihoods.
Secondly, these figures have tended to be used by Shell
to deflect attention away from legitimate criticism of its
own environmental and human rights impact in the Niger
Delta and as such to mislead key stakeholders including
consumers of Shells products and investors in the company.21
The OECD Guidelines are meant for multinational enterprises that are based in OECD member countries, accession candidate countries and enhanced engagement
countries, and/or with activities in these countries. The
United Kingdom and the Netherlands are OECD member
countries; Nigeria is not present in any of the country categories mentioned above.22 The OECD guidelines cover
standards on labour rights, human rights, the environ8

ment, consumer protection, and corruption.23 National


Contact Points (NCPs) handle the complaints from organizations and individuals concerning alleged violations
of the guidelines. At the end of mediation between the
bringer of a complaint and the defendant company, the
NCP may publish a final statement with its conclusion on
the alleged violation of the OECD Guidelines. It used to
take a few years before NCPs would come to a final statement. Recently, however, NCPs have promised to speed
up their process.

Pending court case in the Netherlands


In November 2008 and May 2009, four Nigerian citizens
and Friends of the Earth Netherlands/Nigeria filed a civil
lawsuit against Shell in a Dutch court. The plaintiffs in
the People of Nigeria versus Shell lawsuit accuse Shell
of negligence with regard to the prevention and proper clean-up of oil spills. The four Nigerians, farmers and
fishers, reside from the villages of Goi, Oruma and Ikot
Ada Udo in the Niger Delta. Oil from Shell-installations
has leaked onto their fields and into their fish ponds. The
plaintiffs want Shell to prevent any spills in the future and
to clean up the remainder of the pollution. They want to
fish and farm once again.24
It is the first time that a Dutch companys liability for pollution overseas is asserted in a Dutch court. The following Shell-companies were summoned: Royal Dutch Shell
plc (head quartered in the Netherlands); Shells subsidiary in Nigeria; the predecessors of Royal Dutch Shell
(Koninklijke Olie BV en Shell Transport and Trading). In
May 2009, Shell stated that its subsidiary in Nigeria is
a Nigerian company, and thus not required to appear
before a Dutch court. There was a court session on this
matter. In December 2009 and February 2010, the court
dismissed Shells arguments that the Dutch court would
not be authorised to rule on its Nigerian subsidiary. The
plaintiffs had overcome the first hurdle in this groundbreaking case.
Presently pending is the issue on Shells exhibition of
evidence papers. Much information in relation to the oil
spills that occurred near Goi, Oruma and Ikot Ada Udo
resides within Shell. Already in May 2008, the lawyer representing the farmers and Friends of the Earth had asked
Shell to disclose these evidence papers. Some papers
were handed over by Shell, and many papers were not.
Therefore, in March 2010 the lawyer asked the court to
force disclosure of the evidence papers by Shell. Shell
replied by saying that there are several formal reasons
why it cant or wont hand over the evidence papers, and
that it might appeal a decision by the court on this matter. On 19 May 2011, the court session will take place,
with a decision expected in summer 2011. Most probably at the beginning of 2012 the court will finally be able

to focus on the core issue: has Shell been negligent with


regard to the oil spills?25

Shells double standard


Asset integrity work is a term for improving the quality
of the pipelines, well-heads, flowlines, flowstations and
terminals to get the oil out of the ground and export it.
In 2007, the managing director of SPDC, Basil Omiyi,
was quite clear about the integrity of SPDCs assets: We
do (...) have a substantial backlog of asset integrity work
to reduce spills and flaring.26 There have been a few
attempts to get to know more about the (poor) status of
Shells assets to reduce spills, and its plans for improvement.
In 2004, questioned by the NGO Christian Aid, a Shell
Vice-President admitted that the overall picture of the
age and condition of SPDCs pipelines was incomplete.
He promised improvements in transparency.27 These
promises have not been met.
December 2007, Olav Ljosne, Shells former Regional
Director Communications Africa, replied to an e-mail
by U.S. professor Richard Steiner: The Asset Integrity
Reviews are internal Shell operating documents designed
to provide information on the state of our assets and
improvements that are necessary and are regarded as
strictly confidential and business sensitive.
Late 2010, Professor Steiner concluded in a report that
Shell Nigeria continues to operate well below internationally recognized standards to prevent and control pipeline
oil spills. It has not employed the best available technology and practices that it uses elsewhere in the world
a double standard. The author stated that, while the
injured environment in the Gulf of Mexico (due to the BP
Deepwater Horizon disaster in April-July 2010) stands to
receive substantial funding and government attention,
such environmental damage in the Niger Delta is left
largely unattended. Clearly this constitutes another double standard, the author proceeds, and far greater attention needs to be paid to the chronic long-term damage
from oil and gas operations in the Niger Delta.28

Case 1b

Primitive gas flaring


The gas flares of Nigeria
Below the surface, crude oil is often found mixed with
natural gas. The natural gas must be separated from the
oil during extraction. Technically the gas can easily be
captured and utilized. In Nigeria, however, the associated gas is primitively flared in the open air. Rushing for
oil exports in the 1960s and 1970s, Shell and the Nigerian government only built oil pipelines. They didnt care
about infrastructure to utilize the valuable natural gas:
just burn it. There are currently approximately 100 continuously burning gas flares in the Niger Delta and just
offshore, some of which have been burning since the
early 1960s.29
Based on satellite data, the World Bank estimates that
the amount of gas flared by Nigeria has reduced from
21.3 billion m3 in 2005 to 15.2 billion m3 in 2009, a
decrease by 29%. In 2010, Nigeria represented 11% of
global gas flares. Only one country flared more gas than
Nigeria: Russia.30 In 2009, Russia flared about three times
more gas than Nigeria. However, it produced about 4.5
times more oil than Nigeria. Per litre of oil produced,
Nigeria exceeded Russia in flaring gas.31
Mainly due to the flaring and venting of gas, the greenhouse gas emissions of crude oil production in Nigeria
are among the worlds highest.32 A recent study, at the
request of the European Commission, refers to two different studies that have calculated the emissions of Nigerian oil production. The first study puts the oil production emissions at 16.8 grams of CO2 per megajoule33, the
second one is quoted as putting the emissions at 21.1
grams.34 The study at the request of the European Commission, puts the most likely average emissions of conventional oil production for the European market at 4.8
grams of CO2 per megajoule. So, oil production in Nigeria is considered to cause 3.5 to 4.4 times more greenhouse gases than average conventional oil production.35
Greenhouse gases are not the only reported problems
with respect to gas flares:
- The United Nations Development Programme has
declared that gas flares destroy natural resources and
local livelihoods, alienate people from their land, and
adversely affect human development conditions.36
- In November 2005, a federal high court in Benin
ordered Shell to stop gas flaring near the village of
Iwherekan, after the community had applied for an
10

order enforcing or securing the enforcement of their


fundamental right to life and dignity of human person.
The judge ruled that gas flaring is a gross violation
of the constitutionally-guaranteed rights to life and
dignity, which include the right to a clean poison-free,
pollution-free healthy environment. Shell appealed
and the case is still pending.37
The Nigerian Gas Association (NGA) has estimated
that Nigeria has lost about USD 72 billion in revenues
(about USD 2.5 billion annually) in the period 19702006 period due to not selling, but burning the gas.38
In a report published in 2005, the Climate Justice Programme and Environmental Rights Action / Friends
of the Earth Nigeria have calculated the yearly health
impacts from gas flares in one of the Niger Delta states:
Bayelsa. The particulate matter and benzene emissions from gas flaring at the 17 onshore flowstations in
Bayelsa state would likely cause, each year, at least: 49
premature deaths, 4,960 respiratory illnesses among
children, 120,000 asthma attacks and 8 additional cases
of cancer.39 SPDC declares, however, that there is no
evidence to support the argument that flaring damages
the health of local communities.40
The federal government of Nigeria states that heat
stress and acid rain from gas flaring continue to
degrade the ecosystem.41
Local communities have reported numerous other
impacts of the gas flares, such as: the eyes may turn
red; there is never any darkness; corrugated roofs corrode more quickly; there is constant noise from the gas
flares; the walls of houses crack due to ground vibrations caused by the gas flares.

Shells Nigerian flares: mystifying messages


Estimating from what is stated in Shells Sustainability
report 2010, SPDC (government share 55%, Shell share
30%) must have released about 7 million tonnes of greenhouse gases (measured in CO2 equivalents) through gas
flaring during the year 2010.42 This is equivalent to the
annual greenhouse gas emissions of about 3 million cars
driven on roads in Europe.
Shell states that in the period 2002-2010 SPDCs flaring
has decreased by about 50%.43 The company mentions
two reasons for this:
- Since 2000, SPDC has spent over USD 3 billion on

installing associated gas gathering infrastructure at 32


flowstations. These projects reduced continuous flaring by more than 30%.44 This 30% result was already
achieved in 2005. There has been little progress from
2006 onwards.
- The rest of the decrease is a result of reduced production since 2006 in Nigeria45 and, to a lesser extent, the
installation of gas gathering equipment in 2010.46
In 2007, SPDC promised to shut down production from
any fields where there is no prospect of a solution for
gathering the associated gas by 2009.47 In May 2009,
SPDC stated that it would need to invest another USD
3 billion to gather some 85% of the total associated
gas produced in its operations.48 Wikileaks revealed a
statement in October 2009 by the Shell Executive Vice
President (EVP) for Shell Companies in Africa, Ms. Ann
Pickard. She stated that the SPDC-flares could be out by
2011. SPDC would have to spend USD 4 billion to do this,
but the Nigerian government would also have to fund its
part and that was a risk. Shell would shut in oil production
in fields where it is uneconomic to end gas flaring.49 In
2011, Shell stated that it still needed funding from partners to execute projects that would bring flaring down by
90%.50 In a letter dated 31 December 2008, the government directed SPDC and other oil companies to continue
with production (and therefore flaring) until instructed
otherwise.51 During this process of oil extraction the oil
fields will be running out of oil, making investments in
gas gathering infrastructure less economically attractive.
Thus, gas might be flared to the bitter end of oil operations.
In May 2010, SPDC announced that it was working on
a series of projects totalling investments of more than
USD 2 billion. The Managing Director of SPDC, Mutiu
Sunmonu, said: SPDC is pleased to be able to restart
work on delayed projects and begin new ones to further
reduce gas flaring in our operations to the lowest practical volume. Security and funding conditions permitting,
we have a real chance to progress our flaring reduction plans through these key projects.52 SPDC did not
provide for a time-line as to when the facilities would be
fully functioning, and how much associated gas would be
gathered. By mid January 2011, three additional associated gas gathering sites had been completed.53

other hand, the series of projects SPDC is working on at


present might decrease gas flaring to some extent.
Over the years, SPDC has been spreading mystifying
messages with regard to its flaring operations. The company has never shown a breakdown of flowstations where
gas is flared. It has also never publicised a detailed plan
to achieve a flare-out status. Like with oil spills, the company has never made a serious effort to get the facts
clear with regard to the damages communities in the
Niger Delta have suffered and still suffer.
Meanwhile, the Nigerian government may be busy with
some deadlines to end gas flares, as it has been since the
1980s. Experience shows that these efforts cant be taken
too seriously.56

As of this moment, it is not clear how the gas flare picture


of SPDC will evolve in the near future. In 2010, Shells
flaring rose by 32% compared to 2009. This was mainly
due to increased oil production in Nigeria and the start of
its oil production at the Majnoon field in Iraq.54 In 2010,
Shells oil production in Nigeria rose to 302,000 barrels
of oil per day, up from 231,000 barrels of oil per day in
2009.55
Whenever the security situation allows SPDC to produce
more oil, its gas flaring might increase again. On the
11

Case 1c

Conflict and corruption


Shell assesses its contribution to conflict
With regard to conflict in the Niger Delta, Shell often
profiles itself as one of the main victims. In July 2009, the
company wrote: We hope people recognise that the
employees and contractor staff of [SPDC]have to carry
out their work against a backdrop of crime, violence,
threats of kidnap and community actions.57 Indeed, the
Niger Delta is an extremely difficult environment for any
company to operate.
However, one could also assess how Shells activities
might contribute to conflict. In 2002 and 2003, Shell commissioned such research. The resulting report, released
in December 2003, was written by three external conflict resolution experts. The insights in the report drew
heavily on the experiences of more than 200 individuals
consulted during its preparation.58 Shell had declined to
publish the independent report, but it was leaked in June
2004. The report states that after operating in the Niger
Delta for over 50 years, SCIN [Shell company in Nigeria] is
an integral part of the regional conflict environment (.)
and the manner in which the SCIN operates and its staff
behave creates, feeds into, or exacerbates conflict.59

Examples of fuelling conflict


The report listed several examples of how oil companies
fuel underlying factors causing conflict in the Niger Delta:
- The role of the oil companies in fuelling corruption is
significant. Numerous examples can be found in how
companies seek to maintain their license to operate
through short-term cash payments, giving in to monetary demands following facility closures, exorbitant
homage payments, use of ghost workers, surveillance
contract implementation, contracting procedures,
employment processes, and kick-back schemes in community development projects.
- The role of the oil companies in fuelling perceived or
actual discrimination is largely related to unclear communications, poor transparency, the non-fulfilment of
obligations, as well as corporate arrogance.
- The role of the oil companies in fuelling inequitable
distribution of revenue and infrastructure is largely
related to the non-fulfilment of obligations.
- The role of the oil companies in fuelling social disintegration largely comprises the design of the benefit dis12

tribution process that allows groups to fight over access


to cash, jobs, contracts and power.
- It is important to note that accusations abound of
divide and rule tactics and an active role of oil company officials in fuelling specific communal conflicts.
Whereas this is likely to be the case where individuals or small groups of oil company staff are engaged
in criminal activities, there is no evidence to suggest a
company-wide conspiracy or manipulation of conflicts in the Niger Delta.
- The role of the oil companies in fuelling crime and
criminal cartels is largely related to corruption in the
contracting process and the payment of ransoms that
make crime lucrative.
- Beyond the impact of the oil industry on the economy (Dutch disease) oil companies do not directly
fuel youth unemployment. However, the interaction
between companies and youth groups who control
employment at a community level is important. Contracts that routinely contain inflated and imaginary elements, excessive numbers of workers and payment,
kick-backs, etc. serves to corrupt youth.60
The report was published in 2003, and it was meant to
assess how SCIN can contribute to conflict resolution and
sustainable peace in the Niger Delta. For this report, due
to lack of available information it is not examined to what
extent Shell has altered the practices described above
presently.

Co-opting militants
In 2006, it became clear that some of the militant leaders linked to the attacks on oil facilities in the Niger Delta
earn tens of thousands of dollars from contracts with
Shell. Leaders of the Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), involved with violent activities in Delta
State in 2003, later ran contracting companies working
with the oil majors. The payments included incident
free bonuses. Officials told the Financial Times that subcontracting work to local strongmen is one method some
oil companies have used to buy off militants threatening
attacks on oil facilities in the Delta.61 In September 2008,
the Shell Executive Vice President (EVP) for Shell Companies in Africa, Ms. Ann Pickard, said that Rivers State Governor Rotimi Amaechi lacked the connections among Rivers State militant leaders to successfully co-opt them as
the governors in Delta and Bayelsa states have done with

militants in their states.62 Co-opting militants seems to be


one of the tactics to (temporary) reduce conflict. However, it can also be seen as a measure that serves conflict
and corruption.

Corruption
On paper, Shells stance against corruption is clear. Its
Code of Conduct gives employees detailed instructions
on the behaviour Shells Business Principles require. With
regard to bribery and corruption the Code of Conduct
contains the following principles:
- Never offer, pay, make, seek or accept a personal payment, gift or favour in return for favourable treatment,
to influence a business outcome or to gain any business
advantage.
- Ensure people you work with understand bribery and
corruption is unacceptable.
- Tell Shell if you suspect or know of corruption in Shell
or in any party (company or individual) Shell does business with.63
Relevant staff must undergo specific training in areas
such as combating bribery and corruption. Shells global
helpline and supporting website allow staff and business
partners to report concerns confidentially. In 2009,165
violations of the Code of Conduct were reported (204 in
2008). As a result, Shell stated that it has ended its relationships with 126 staff and contractors (138 in 2008).64
Corruption is rife in the Niger Delta. On 27 January
2009, Shells regional executive vice president for Africa,
Ann Pickard, met with the U.S. ambassador in Nigeria in
Abuja, Nigeria. During the meeting, she stated that corruption in the Nigerian oil sector was worsening by the
day. Pickard said that Nigerian entities control the lifting
of many oil cargoes and there are some very interesting people lifting oil (People, she said that were not
even in the industry). As an example she said that oil buyers would pay Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
(NNPC) General Managing Director YarAdua, (Note: not
related to President YarAdua. End Note), Chief Economic
Advisor Yakubu, and the First Lady Turai YarAdua large
bribes, millions of dollars per tanker, to lift oil. Pickard
also said that a former associate of hers had told her that
he had been present when Attorney General Aondoakaa
had told a visitor that he would sign a document only if
the visitor paid USD 2 million immediately and another
USD 18 million the next day.65

Shell fined USD 58 million


The extent of Shells involvement and practices with
regard to corruption in the Niger Delta is not known.
Late 2010, Shell paid a total of USD 58 million to U.S. and

Nigerian authorities to head off the threat of legal action


for corruption. SNEPCO, a 100% Nigerian subsidiary of
Royal Dutch Shell, had paid approximately USD 2 million
in the period 2004-2006 to its subcontractors with the
knowledge that some or all of the money would be paid
as bribes to Nigerian customs officials to import materials and equipment into Nigeria in relation to the offshore
Bonga project. SNEPCO and the U.S. based Shell International Exploration and Production Inc. employees were
aware that as a result of the payment of the bribes, official Nigerian duties, taxes, and penalties were not paid
when the items were imported.
In November 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice and
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
announced that Shell had agreed to pay USD 48 million
to settle investigations on violation of the U.S. Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).66 The Deferred Prosecution Agreement Shell signed with the U.S. Department
of Justice (DOJ) still requires Shell to report to the DOJ,
promptly, any credible evidence of questionable or corrupt payments.67 Separately, Shell also agreed to pay
USD 10 million to the Nigerian authorities.68
Shell started an internal research in 2007, and found
that a small number of its employees knew or should
have known of the incorrect payments. These employees
have been subject to disciplinary sanctions or were fired,
according to the company.69

The Ibori case


In November 2007, it became publicly known that the
UK Metropolitan police was investigating alleged money
laundering by James Ibori, a former governor who ran the
oil-rich Delta state until May 2007. According to a witness
statement, the former governor had used banks in Britain
to stash GBP 20 million in stolen funds during 2005-06.
Since 2005 funds from Nigeria, intended for education
and engineering projects, [were] allegedly stolen by
James Ibori [and] have been laundered through the UK
banking system. Over three years, Shell, Chevron and
the Nigerian National Petroleum Company paid GBP 3.6
million into a Barclays account controlled by Ibori for renting out houseboats to foreign employees.70 Nuhu Ribadu,
chairman of Nigerias Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission (EFCC), which worked closely with the British
investigators, told the Financial Times that he was investigating huge payments made by Shell and Chevron to
MER Engineering over the hiring of the houseboats.
Shell admitted that MER was on its register of approved
contractors. It declined to elaborate on the amount and
type of work done by MER.71

13

A leaked report from the Nigerian Army Intelligence


Corps, dated November 2007, linked James Ibori also
to thousands of arms stolen from governmental storage
depots for onward transfer to Niger Delta militants from
the year 2000 to 2007.72
Mr. Ibori had close ties to Umaru YarAdua, the former
president of Nigeria. Mr. YarAdua sacked Nuhu Ribadu,
the head of the EFCC, after 170 charges were brought
against Mr. Ibori. In a very questionable Nigerian court
case, in December 2009, a judge dismissed all cases.73 A
Wikileaks cable sent from the UK embassy in London in
May 2009 stated that Attorney General Aondoakaa had
directly told the UK that the Nigerian Government would
not begin negotiations on a prisoners transfer agreement,
unless the UK would drop its case against James Ibori
and his associates.
Mr. Ibori denies all charges against him. He was arrested
in Dubai in May 2010 after the intervention of the global
police agency Interpol. Dubais highest court ruled in
December 2010 that he could be extradited to Britain to
face corruption charges. Mr. Iboris sister and his alleged
mistress are already convicted of money laundering and
sentenced to five years in UK prison in June 2010. Mr.
Iboris wife and his UK lawyer face similar charges.74

Shell and the murder of Ken Saro-Wiwa


Ken Saro-Wiwa (10 October 1941 10 November 1995)
was a well known Nigerian author and television producer. He was also president of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), an organization set up to
defend the environmental and human rights of the Ogoni
people in the Niger Delta. In January 1993, Saro-Wiwa
gathered 300,000 Ogoni to march peacefully to demand
a share in oil revenues and some form of political autonomy. MOSOP also asked the oil companies, especially
Shell, to begin environmental remediation and pay compensation for past damage. In May 1994, Mr. Saro-Wiwa,
who had been briefly imprisoned several times before,
was abducted from his home and jailed along with other
MOSOP leaders in connection with the murder of four
Ogoni leaders. Amnesty International adopted SaroWiwa, a staunch advocate of non-violence, as a prisoner
of conscience. Meanwhile, the Nigerian military took control of Ogoniland subjecting people to mass arrest, rape,
execution and the burning and looting of their villages. In
October 1995 a military tribunal tried and convicted SaroWiwa of murder. Governments and citizens organizations
worldwide condemned the trial as fraudulent, and urged
the Nigerian dictator Abacha to spare Saro-Wiwas life.
They also called upon Shell to intervene. On 10 November 1995 Saro-Wiwa and his eight co-defendants were
hanged.75
14

In 1996, the Center for Constitutional Rights and


EarthRights International and other human rights lawyers
sued Shell in U.S. court for their role in the repression
of the Ogoni and the executions of the Ogoni Nine.
The case Wiwa vs. Shell charged Shell with complicity
in human rights abuses against Ogoni people in Nigeria. Shell financed, armed, and otherwise colluded with
the Nigerian military forces that used deadly force and
conducted massive, brutal raids against the Ogoni, with
a motive of restarting oil operations on Ogoni territory.
Shell was also allegedly involved in a strategy that resulted in the executions of the nine Ogoni leaders. The plaintiffs in the case included surviving family members of the
murdered Ogoni leaders, Owens Wiwa (Ken Saro-Wiwas
brother) who was detained and tortured for his activities
on behalf of the Ogoni; and two other (relatives of) victims of violence by Nigerian troops. After thirteen years
of litigation, in June 2009 the case against Shell ended in
a USD 15.5 million settlement for the plaintiffs.76
The settlement meant that the testimonies by witnesses
were never made public. In December 2010, The Independent on Sunday gained exclusive access to witness
accounts that were to be used in evidence in the case
Wiwa vs Shell. One of the key witnesses due to testify
was Boniface Ejiogu, Lt-Col Okuntimos orderly in the
Internal Security Task Force, a coalition of army, navy and
police. Mr Ejiogu described how, just days before the
Ogoni elders were murdered, he drove with Lt-Col Okuntimo to Shells base in Port Harcourt, where seven large
bags of money were received. On another occasion, Mr
Ejiogu witnessed four bags being given by a Shell security official to Lt-Col Okuntimo at the officials house late
at night. Another witness, Raphael Kponee, also due to
testify, was a policeman working for Shell. On a different occasion, he saw three bags being loaded into Lt-Col
Okuntimos pick-up truck by his driver and another driver
in front of the security building at the Shell base.
Mr Ejiogu also offers compelling evidence as to who may
have murdered the four Ogoni elders at a meeting on 21
May 1994. Saro-Wiwa was due to speak but was turned
away by the military. Mr Ejiogu said he heard Lt-Col
Okuntimo tell his task force commander to waste them...
in the army you waste them is when you are shooting
rapidly. Within 24 hours Saro-Wiwa was arrested and
charged with the murders. A Shell spokesman replied to
the allegations: Allegations concerning Okuntimo and
Shell are not new. There is a lack of any credible evidence
in support of these allegations. Shell Petroleum Development Corporation and Shell at the time spoke out
frequently against violence and publicly condemned its
use.77

Case 2

Denial of Brazilian pesticide diseases


A Shell pesticide factory
For a decade or more, beginning in 1977, Shell produced organochlorine pesticides (aldrin, dieldrin, endrin
etc.) and other pesticides at a plant located near Paulnia, about 125 kilometres north-west of So Paulo, Brazil.
The plant covered approximately 40 hectares.78 Due to its
severe health impacts, by 1990 the use of aldrin and dieldrin was totally banned in the USA and Brazil.
After negotiations starting in 1993, in 1995 Shell sold
the Paulnia facility to the companies American Cyanimid
and BASF. A sales condition was that Shell would assume
legal responsibility for the pollution at the site. In 2000,
BASF took full ownership of the facility.79 In 2002, BASF
shut it down the facility after a ban by the Brazilian Ministry of Labour, in view of existing contamination and serious risks to human health.80

Pollution at the factory site


There have been many cases of pollution at the factory
site:
- Between 1998 and 1985 three leaks in a waste-water
storage tank were officially reported.
- Over the years, CETESB (So Paulo State Environmental Protection Agency) had issued three warnings that
the plants incinerator was not operating within acceptable standards.
- March 2001, the Justice Department listened to the
testimony of a former company employee, Antonio
de Marco Rasteiro. He confirmed the existence of four
clandestine landfills inside the plant area, and accused
Shell of dumping ashe from its incinerator and waste
from its manufacturing process in these landfills. He
also confirmed that Shells incinerator sold its services
to third parties, for example to DuPont. He also reported that drums with toxic wastes were buried in other
areas inside the plant.81

Pollution spreading across farmlands


Later, several studies of the area revealed that the contamination had moved into the groundwater under the
farms located between the plant and the Atibaia River.
For example, in February 2001, the Dutch environmen-

tal consulting company Haskoning/Iwaco, hired by Shell,


produced a technical report with soil and groundwater
analysis in nine sites located in the farms near the industrial site. Levels of contamination by dieldrin as high as
17 parts per billion (ppb) in soil and 0.47 ppb in water
were found. The water contamination levels were higher
than the levels allowed by Brazilian law (Administrative
Rules 36/1990 and 1469/2000 Ministry of Health Highest Permissible Level: 0,03 ppb of dieldrin). However, no
decontamination work had begun in the area. In February 2001, Shell admitted that it had contaminated the
groundwater and sections of the nearby community, and
was ordered by CETESB to begin a clean-up.82

Pollution creating severe health problems


Both aldrin and dieldrin are highly toxic to humans, the
target organs being the central nervous system and the
liver.83 A report at the request of the Paulnia local government, produced by August 2001, showed that 156 of
the 181 examined residents living near the factory had
some degree of contamination from metals or pesticides
which could result in various cancers, liver disorders,
or neurological problems. Shell dismissed the Paulnia
report, saying it used very low thresholds to measure
contamination compared with those recommended by
the World Health Organization. Shell also claimed its own
tests showed no human contamination. If there is proof
of contamination with the products that we handled
there, we will assume the responsibility immediately,
which is our policy worldwide, said Jose Cardoso, a Shell
manager in Brazil. But so far, there is no data indicating that.84 Maria Lucia Braz Pinheiro, vice president of
Shell-Quimica for Latin America, described the report as
another report with technical inconsistencies and lacking
a scientific base.85
In a doctoral dissertation approved in February 2005,
an analysis was made on the existing health data from a
group of 62 former Shell/Cyanamid/BASF workers. Three
cases of thyroid cancer were confirmed. The author concluded that the incidence of thyroid cancer among the
estimated 1,120 workers of Shell/Cyanamid/BASF was
166 times greater than the incidence in the male population of Campinas, a county within Sao Paulo state. The
chance of finding three cases of thyroid cancer out of a
random selection of 1,120 men living in Campinas would
15

be less than 1 out of 1,000,000.86


At the beginning of 2009, it became publicly known that
the Center for Excellence in Occupational Health (Cerest)
of Campinas had examined 69 former employees of Shell
/ Cyanamid / BASF. Ten malignant cases of cancer to the
prostate and thyroid were diagnosed. There was also a
case of myelodysplastic syndrome (MDS, formerly known
as preleukemia). There were 34 cardiovascular diseases,
of which 21 related to hypertensive heart diseases. There
were also an unspecified number of liver diseases. In 30
cases there was a prevalence of repetitive strain injury
(RSI). In total 56 ex-workers had serious problems with
reproductive organs and the urinary system, with prostate
disorders, changes in fertility and impotence.87

August 2010: Shell/BASF ordered to pay


severe fine
In 2007, the public prosecutor Ministrio Pblico do Trabalho (MPT) filed a case to ensure funds for health treatment of former employees, along with compensation for
damages. The Association of Workers Exposed to Chemical Substances (ATESQ) and another union of workers had
also filed a case against Shell and BASF. ATESQ was created by Antonio de Marco Rasteiro, a former employee
of the Shell/BASF plant in Paulnia. He worked there for
21 years. In his role as ATESQ Coordinator, Mr Rasteiro
has led the struggle of nearly a thousand former workers.
In November 2009, he won the International Health &
Safety Award of the American Public Health Association.88
In August 2010, a Brazilian court (Tribunal Regional do
Trabalho de Campinas) ruled that Shell and BASF should
assume responsibility for the medical treatment of all former employees of the Paulnia facility, and pay a total of
1.1 billion Brazilian Real (about EUR 490 million89) in connection with the More than 1,000 former employees of
the companies were covered by the court order, and also
the children of employees who were born during or after
services and independent contractors.90
Some extracts from the court ruling in August 2010:
- Workers were constantly exposed to harmful substances in water and air, without any use of protective
clothing. This exposure took place during and after
work, during breaks, in the vicinity of the site, as well
as through the use of water on site. Therefore, the simplistic explanation of Shell that the presence of harmful
substances in the bodies of the workers do not constitute evidence of intoxication is unacceptable
- (...) Although it is not certain that all employees will
develop diseases such as cancer, it is not excluded.
Certainly it has been determined that among the
employees exposed to the pollutants, cancer occurs
much more frequently than normal.
16

- (...) The most shocking is that the accused companies, especially Shell, were since 1970 fully aware of
the harmful effects of substances used by them. After
the production was banned in the U.S., Shell coolly
moved its plant to Paulnia. BASF also has not taken
precautionary measures: it was aware of the pollution
at the site, which was already raised and well known in
Paulnia. Nevertheless, BASF located itself in the same
place, in the full knowledge that this place was not
appropriate, with the result that its employees were
exposed to obvious risks.91

Shell and BASF appealing


Soon after the court order in August 2010, Shell and
BASF announced that they would appeal the decision.
We expect that the Brazilian courts at a higher level
will eventually establish that we were not responsible for
alleged health impacts and other claims, a Shell spokesman told press agency Reuters.92
Jennifer Moore-Braun, a spokeswoman for Basf told
press agency Bloomberg: We are of the opinion that
the environmental damage was caused by Shell, and we
will appeal the decision. Shell was quoted saying: We
are convinced there is no link between our operations
and injury to peoples health based on blood tests of
local residents, medical assessments of former workers
and expert medical opinions.93 In April 2011, the Tribunal Regional do Trabalho de Campinas denied an appeal
filed by Shell and BASF against the decision, and maintained the sentence. Shell and BASF may appeal the decision at the Superior Labour Court (TST) in Brasilia.94

Case 3

Mining the Canadian tar sands


Shells largest unconventional oil resource
Due to easy oil getting scarce, oil companies are investing in unconventional oil resources. In general, unconventional oil production has greater environmental impacts
than conventional oil production. The Canadian oil sands
(often called tar sands) are Shells largest unconventional
oil reserve. As of 31 December 2010, Canadian oil sands
amounted to 26% of Shells proven oil reserves.95 Oil
reserves refer to the oil production Shell has secured to
exploit in the future.
The oil sands are found in the Canadian province of
Alberta. In December 2010, the government of Alberta
listed 47 oil sands projects that are planned, underway, or
recently completed. The total investment costs for these
projects amounted to USD 85 billion.96

Typical mining
The extraction of oil from tar sands has many features
that are typical to industrial mining: dig up the earth; use
lots of energy and water; sell the product; create a huge
lake with toxic waste. At Shells main oil sands operations,
an oily tar mixed with sand, clay and water is dug up in
open-pit mines. Enormous trucks deliver these goods to a
place where warm water is added to separate sand from
the bitumen. After this process, the bitumen goes to an
upgrader. In this upgrader (that usually runs on natural
gas) the large heavy hydrocarbon molecules are cracked
into lighter molecules. The synthetic crude oil is then sold
to refineries to make gasoline; the remainder of the process is dumped in a tailings lake.97
Some oil sands in Alberta are buried too deep below the
surface for open-pit mining. In these cases, the oil will be
recovered by in-situ techniques. Mostly steam needs to
be injected into the deposit (thermal method), causing
hot bitumen to migrate towards producing wells.

Shells presence
Shells Athabasca Oil Sands Project (AOSP, Shell share
60%) presently comprises two open-pit mines (the Muskeg River mine and the Jackpine mine) and the Scotford
Upgrader. The present capacity was developed for a total

cost of USD 19 billion. The total resource base is estimated at 3.4 billion barrels, so at the same pace this project
could last for almost 40 years. AOSP has many more mining leases along the Athabasca river that may be utilised
for oil production in the future.
By mid 2011, oil production is expected to be 255,000
barrels per day.98 Due to efficiency and de-bottlenecking
operations the AOSP-production is assumed to increase
by another 85,000 barrels to 340,000 barrels a day within
the coming 7-10 years.99
Shell has several 100% positions in in-situ mining. Production in 2010 is estimated at 18,000 barrels a day, from its
Peace River and Cold Lake Orion assets. Shell is proposing to increase thermal bitumen production from its
Peace River leases by 80,000 barrels of bitumen per day,
through the Carmon Creek project.100 Investments of USD
3.5 billion are proposed for this project during the period
2011 2016.101 Shell estimates that the project has a 1.5
billion barrels resources potential. The company is also
assessing its Grosmont and Woodenhouse in-situ assets
including vast landholdings in west Athabasca.102

Greenhouse gas emissions of fuels from oil


sands
In a study at the request of the European Commission,
released February 2011, typical tar sand well-to-wheel
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions were found to be most
likely 23% worse than GHG emissions of typical conventional oil sources. For this study, many earlier studies on this subject were reviewed.103 Shell usually states
that fuels derived from oil sands mining have 5 to 15%
higher well-to-wheel (GHG) emissions, compared to fuels
derived from conventional oil and dependant on crude
type & source.104
It should be noted that the recent study at the request
of the European Commission refers to well-to-wheel
GHG emissions. Well-to-wheel emissions include the
emissions produced during crude oil extraction, processing, distribution, and combustion in an engine. For all
sources of crude oil, 70 to 80 percent of GHG emissions
occur at the combustion phase. Combustion emissions
do not vary for a given fuel among sources of crude oil.
Oil companies can influence well-to-tank emissions only,
17

which account for 20 to 30 percent of total life-cycle


GHG emissions.105
In the study at the request of the European Commission,
the most likely well-to-tank emissions from tar sands fuel
were put at 33.9 grams of CO2 per megajoule. These are
the emissions that can be influenced by Shell. The most
likely well-to-tank emissions for conventional oil were
put at 13.7 grams of CO2 per megajoule. So, the well-totank emissions of oil sands are almost 2.5 times higher
than the emissions for average fuel used in the European
Union.106

tion of aquatic life were exceeded for seven PPE (cadmium, copper, lead, mercury, nickel, silver, and zinc) in
melted snow and/or water collected near or downstream
of development. According to the authors, their findings
confirm the serious defects of the Regional Aquatic Monitoring Program (RAMP), which has not detected such patterns in the Athabasca river watershed. Based in part on
results from RAMP, the industry, government and related
agencies claim that human health and the environment
are not at risk from oil sands development and that sources of elements and polycyclic aromatic compounds (PAC)
in the Athabasca river and its tributaries are natural.113

CCS-project Quest

Concerns of the Canadian Aboriginals

Shells Athabasca Oil Sands Project (AOSP, Shell share


60%) is planning a carbon capture and storage (CCS)
project, called Quest, near to its Scotford Upgrader. The
total cost of the project is projected to be USD 1.35 billion. The province of Alberta (USD 745 million) and the
government of Canada (USD 120 million) are willing to
pay most of the costs.107 The plant is planned to be commissioned at the end of 2015.108
The CO2 will be permanently put under the ground
during an estimated 25 years at a depth of over 2,000
meters, in a saline formation, with a maximum of 1.2 millions tonnes of CO2 each year. In a recent report quantifying the GHG reduction benefits from the CCS-project,
the facilities were assumed to operate with 90% availability, capturing 1.08 million tonnes of CO2 annually.
The full lifecycle emissions of the CCS-project itself were
estimated to be between 0.16 to 0.24 million tonnes of
CO2, around 20% of the annual capture. Conclusively, the
project is estimated to reduce 0.84 to 0.92 million tonnes
of CO2 annually.109 AOSP emitted 3.7 million tonnes of
CO2-equivalents in 2009110, while its production stood at
78,000 barrels per day.111 Considering an already planned
440,000 barrels per day tonnes of production by AOSP
and in-situ by Shell before 2020, the CCS-project will only
partly compensate for the increasing emissions due to
deriving fuel from oil sands compared to fuels derived
from conventional oil.

First Nations is a term of ethnicity that refers to the


Aboriginal peoples in Canada who are neither Inuit nor
Mtis. In northern Alberta, Aboriginal communities rely
on the land, water and wildlife for hunting, fishing, trapping, gathering, harvesting, navigation and ceremonial,
recreational and domestic uses such as bathing, cooking and drinking. The communities are increasingly concerned about the negative impacts of the oil sands developments:
- Communities, especially those living downstream, have
expressed interest in effective and strong watershed
protection. In 2009, seven communities testified that
they had significant concerns about deteriorating water
quality or river flows in the Athabasca watershed. For
example, the Mikisew Cree First Nation has experienced an increased incidence of cancers found in the
population of Fort Chipewyan, located directly downstream from the most intensive oil sands development.
They fear that this may be due to water pollution from
oil sands development.
- The caribou is an important species to many Aboriginal groups, for cultural and spiritual reasons. In 2008,
Canadas Environment Ministry released a report showing that due to cumulative development activities, all
caribou herds in northeastern Alberta are now considered non-self-sustaining. The east side of the Athabasca River caribou herd, whose range includes much of
the current in situ oil sands development in Alberta, has
declined 71% since 1996.
Currently, oil sands mining operations are licensed to
divert 604 million cubic metres of water annually from the
Athabasca River Basin, which is equivalent to the needs
of a city of three million people. As production increases, oil sands companies have the ability to withdraw the
licensed amount. Although water use is often presented
as a percentage of average annual flows, the amount of
water used during low flow periods is of most concern,
especially since the water is not returned to the river system after use as it would be with municipal uses. In July
2010, the Mikisew Cree and Athabasca Chipewyan First

Pollution of Athabasca river


A study by the University of Alberta, released July 2010,
indicates that the oil sands industry could be the source
of substantially increasing pollution to the Athabasca river
and its tributaries via air and water pathways. In the period February June 2008, samples were taken at about a
hundred sites. The oil sands industry was found to release
13 elements considered priority pollutants (PPE) under
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agencys Clean Water
Act.112 Canadas or Albertas guidelines for the protec18

Nations said the proposed Government of Alberta framework to manage water withdrawals would not protect the
interests of these communities during low flow periods.
First Nations are concerned that water withdrawals from
the Athabasca River system reduces river flows, threatening fish populations during low flow periods, and the
health of the Peace-Athabasca Delta.114

19

Case 4

The bitter taste of Brazils sugarcane


Joint venture with Brazils largest sugar and
ethanol producer
On 25 August 2010, Royal Dutch Shell and the Brazilian
sugar and ethanol producer Cosan S.A. have signed binding agreements to form a joint venture in Brazil. The definite formation of the joint venture is expected to occur
in the first half of 2011. The name of the joint venture will
be Razen. Due to the size of its operations, Razen will
help sugarcane ethanol, a sustainable, clean and renewable source of energy, to consolidate itself worldwide and
strengthen Brazils position in the international biofuels
trading business, stated its appointed Chief Executive
Officer, Vasco Dias.115
Cosan is Brazils largest sugar and ethanol producer,
accounting for about 10 percent of Brazilian production.
Ethanol made from sugarcane has become the most popular fuel for cars in Brazil, surpassing gasoline. Cosan is
the worlds fourth largest ethanol producer and probably
the worlds largest ethanol producer from sugarcane.
The deal calls for Cosan to transfer its units for sugar and
ethanol production, fuel distribution and energy generation to the venture. Shell will contribute its retail fuel and
aviation fuel distribution business, and its participation
in the biomass technology companies Iogen Energy and
Codexis.
After state oil giant Petrobras, the proposed joint venture
competes with Ipiranga, a unit of Brazils Grupo Ultra, to
become the second-largest fuel retailer in Brazil. In the
fuel area, the joint venture will sell approximately 20 billion litres of fuels to the transportation and industry markets and to its network of over 4,500 retail sites.116
All Cosans 24 sugarcane producing mills are located in
the South-Central region of Brazil: 22 mills are located in
So Paulo state, one in Jata city (Gois state) and one in
Caarap city (Mato Grosso do Sul state).117
Brazils sugarcane plantations are located in the SouthCentral and North-eastern regions. These regions
account for 89% and 11% of Brazilian production, respectively. Within the South-central region most is grown within So Paulo state.118
Some of Cosans assets will not be included into the joint
venture: the lubricant businesses; the sugar logistics busi20

ness called Rumo Logistica; the land prospecting and


development business called Radar Propriedades Agricolas, the food retail brands Da Barra, Uniao and other
minor brands.119

Case 4a

Sourcing sugarcane from


occupiers of indigenous land
Since June 2009, Cosan owns a newly-built sugarcane
plant in Caarap, Mato Grosso do Sul state. Presently, the
plant has a capacity to crush 2.5 million tonnes of sugarcane a year.120 The former owner has expected that the
capacity will be over 6 million tonnes in 2017/2018.121 The
plant is included into the Shell-Cosan joint venture plans,
so soon it will be half owned by Shell.
To supply the Caarap plant, Cosan sources mostly from
new sugarcane plantations in the neighbourhood. One of
its known sourcing areas are the farmlands of the Santa
Claudina farm. This farm is located within the indigenous
territory Guyrarok of the Guarani-Kaiow Indians. The
federal public prosecutor in Mato Grosso do Sul stated
in May 2010 that Cosans purchase of raw materials from
indigenous areas demonstrates its lack of social and environmental criteria for selecting suppliers, and disrespect
for the second largest indigenous population of the country.122 The Santa Claudina farm is owned by a state representative of Mato Grosso do Sul, Z Teixeira.123 Cosan
has confirmed that one of its suppliers operates in the
region.124
According to satellite images of the Brazilian Institute
for Space Research (INPE), sugarcane plantations occupy
already half of the indigenous territory Guyrarok.125
Since there are 26 owners of farmland within Guyrarok126, there could be more suppliers to Cosan.

Guyrarok is just one of the indigenous territories within


the Central-South region of Mato Grosso do Sul, that has
experienced serious delays in being demarcated. Dozens
of Guarani-Kaiow groups are waiting for their right to
plots of land. Some 30,000 Guarani-Kaiow live in Mato
Grosso do Sul state. In the past they were pushed off
their land and into reservations. Today, these reservations are severely overcrowded. The communities subsist
mainly on government food aid. According to the federal
public prosecutor of Mato Grosso do Sul, Dr Marco Antonio Delfino de Almeida, the demography is comparable
to being imprisoned in spaces so small that social, economic and cultural life are impossible to sustain.130 In a
2009 report on Brazil, the UN Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of
indigenous people, mister James Anaya, wrote that Mato
Grosso do Sul has the highest rate of indigenous childrens death due to precarious conditions of health and
access to water and food, related to lack of lands.131
Sugarcane plantations are arising rapidly in Mato Grosso
do Sul. The state area cultivated for sugarcane harvest
amounted to 502,000 hectares during the 2010/11 season. For the 2005/06 season the figure stood at 160,000
hectares.132 Both Cosan and the Brazilian government
have identified the Central-South region of Mato Grosso
do Sul as one of the main areas for future growth.133 This
is the same area as where dozens of different GuaraniKaiow groups are claiming plots of land.

The indigenous territory Guyrarok, comprising over


11.000 hectares, was traditionally occupied by GuaraniKaiow Indians. According to the Brazilian constitution
and United Nations conventions the land is theirs.127 In
October 2009, the Brazilian Ministry of Justice produced
a directive as a step forward to final demarcation.128 The
next steps for the Ministry are the administrative demarcation of the area and the withdrawal of the current occupants of the area. A signature by the Brazilian President,
Ms Dilma Rousseff, is needed to make the demarcation
definite. Generally, however, the demarcation process
moves at a very slow pace. Moreover, the current occupants of the land are not likely to leave without resistance, be it in court or in the area itself.129 Violence by
land occupiers and discrimination against the GuaraniKaiow Indians are frequently performed in Mato Grosso
do Sul state.
21

Case 4b

Bad labour conditions sugarcane harvesters


Cosans short-lived inclusion into the dirty
list of slave labour
On 31 December 2009, Cosan had its name included into
the dirty list of slave labour published by the Ministry of Labour and Employment (Ministrio do Trabalho
e Emprego, henceforth MTE). The inspection resulting
in Cosans inclusion in the dirty list took place in June
2007, at the Junqueira processing plant in Igarapava, So
Paulo, when 42 workers were freed.
Right after MTEs announcement, the Brazilian Social and
Economic Development Bank (state agency, Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econmico e Social, BNDES)
and private company Walmart announced the cancellation of their business with Cosan. On 8 January 2010,
Cosans lawyers succeeded in withdrawing the name of
the company from the list, in a preliminary court order.
They sustained that the 42 workers caught in a situation
analogue to slavery had been hired by an outsourced
company and their situation was not known to Cosans
representatives. BNDES and Walmart soon resumed their
business with the company.134 In its sustainability report
2010, Cosan stated that during the two-and-halve years
before the inclusion to the dirty list, inspection reports
had not referred to forced or compulsory labour, but
rather to mere labour irregularities.135 At the end of 2010,
Cosan made an agreement with the prosecutor of the
federal government. In most cases, the prosecutor would
appeal preliminary court orders, such as the order of 8
January 2010. Part of the agreement, however, was that
the prosecutor would not appeal the court order. Opponents of the agreement stated that the prosecutor had
set a precedent. Other companies would now also try to
get excluded from the list through agreements with the
procecutor. The possibility to reach an agreement could
reduce the effectiveness of the dirty list, Brazils main
instrument to combat slave labour. Lus Incio Adams,
the head of the federal prosecutors office, stated that the
arguments of the opponents were legitimate, but that
the Cosan case was exceptional.136

Slave labour quite common in Brazils sugarcane industry


Situations of slave labour are quite common in Brazil.
Presently, about 4,000 workers per year are rescued. In
2009, the sugarcane industry was leader in number of
22

slave labourers freed by inspection groups. A total of


1,911 workers in 16 cases were rescued, 45% of the total
of 4,234 people freed during the whole year.137
A review by the Ministry of Labour and Employment
(MTE) shows that since the establishment of a Special
Mobile Inspection Group in 1995, almost 39,000 workers were rescued in Brazil from a situation analogous to
slavery. Between 1995 and 2002 there were almost 6,000
rescues, while between 2003 and 2010 there were almost
33,000 rescues. The review shows a significant increase in
numbers from 2003 when Brazil launched the first National Plan for Eradication of Slave Labour.138
As of March 2011, 211 companies were listed on the
dirty list of slave labour.139 It should, however, be noted
that Brazilian law defines forced labour or slave like or
degrading conditions more broadly than the International Labour Organization (ILO) of the United Nations.
Consequently, a company cited for violations of the Brazilian labour code is not necessarily guilty of employing
slave labour, but may in fact have fallen short in some
other area.
Sugarcane workers do not live where they work. Many
migrate from the North-east, the poorest region of Brazil,
to So Paulo State, the richest part of the country. Industry studies show that outsourced workers suffer worse
conditions than their direct hire counterparts. The worst
situations occur on small plantations that use out-sourced
labour. Apart from the working conditions, many sugarcane cutters risk losing their job. Most of the large producers are replacing sugarcane cutters with harvesting
machines, in order to improve efficiencies and to reduce
sugarcanes carbon footprint. With machines, the sugarcane fields no longer need to be burned to enable manual cutting. Mechanization destroys many of the cane-cutting jobs and leaves thousands unemployed.140

Recent example: the rescue of fourteen farm


workers
In July 2010, fourteen farm workers from Pernambuco
state were rescued. The cane cutters worked for the
Santa Lcia farm in Santa Cruz do Rio Pardo (So Paulo
state), a supplier to Cosan. The payments of wages were
delayed for more than 15 days and there was no drinking
water on work sites. In statements to the prosecutor, the
workers said they were cheated by the employer, since
they received half of the promised wages. Not satisfied

with the working conditions and housing, the cutters


stopped their activities of cutting sugarcane. Subsequently, the employer cut off the electricity and water within
the cottages. After days without pay and without being
able to work, workers reported the situation to the local
prosecutor in Bauru. When verifying the veracity of the
complaint, through interviews and records of the degrading conditions on the scene, the prosecutor proposed the
signing of a Terms of Adjustment of Conduct (TAC). The
agreement stated that the Saint Lcia group would terminate the employment contract of all migrants and pay the
workers their rightful salary. In addition, the company had
to pay BRL 300 to each worker for the transport to the
state of Pernambuco and BRL 264.50 for individual moral
damages. Cosan stated that it would examine the events
and examine the immediate disqualification of the supplier on its list of sugarcane suppliers.141

Cosans recent labour irregularities


At the peak of the crop year ending 31 March 2010,
Cosan had nearly 41 thousand employees. Of this total,
about 27 thousand employees were seasonal. More than
33 thousand employees work in the operations sector,
especially migrants working on manual sugarcane harvesting. According to Cosan, a manual harvest worker

effectively works 6 hours and 45 minutes a day and is


paid around EUR 250 a month.142
According to Cosan, in the 2010/2011 crop year, 100%
of harvest workers working on land owned or leased by
the company are Cosans own employees. In addition,
approximately 80% of cane purchasing operations with
third parties started to be performed by labour contracted directly by Cosan. Cosan states that by contracting
labour directly it minimizes the risk of non-compliance
with labour legislation, as the company has carried out
intensive work to reduce possible non-compliance in its
relationship with the workers. While the company seems
to take some supply chain responsibility with regard to
its sugarcane purchasing operations, in its sustainability report 2010 Cosan did not refer to any supply chain
responsibility with regard to the ethanol it purchases
directly from third parties.143
As the company is also a main trader of ethanol it doesnt
produce itself, the company should also publicly take
responsibility for this part of its supply chain.
The following labour rights issues with regard to operations by Cosan have been found by the government in
recent years:
- Production unit Da Barra, 2009: lack of records on
workers entrance and exit hours; work on Sundays

Table: present/forecast sugarcane crushing capacity, sugar production


and ethanol production; Brazil versus Razen.154
Brazil
2020/21
(11 years)

2010/11
Crushing capacity
(million tonnes)

Razen
% increase

After 5
years

2010/11

% increase

638

1,038

63%

62

100

61%

Production of sugar
(million tonnes)

38

45

18%

4.0

6.0

50%

Production of ethanol
(billion litres)

29

65.3

125%

2.2

5.0

127%

Table: present/forecast share of Razen within the entire sugarcane sector of Brazil155
Present
Razen

Brazil

After 5 years
% share

Razen

Brazil

% share

Crushing capacity
(million tonnes)

62

638

10%

100

820

12%

Production of sugar
(million tonnes)

4.0

38

11%

6.0

41

15%

Production of ethanol
(billion litres)

2.2

29

8%

5.0

46

11%

Trade in ethanol
(billion litres)

5.5

29

19%

13

46

28%

23

without a license; irregularities in Personal Protective


Equipment (IPEs); and dirty bathrooms;144
Production unit Diamante, 2009: six workers without
regular papers; no control on working hours; no time
off on Sundays and holidays; cutting seven sugarcane
streets instead of five; dirty bathrooms; irregular Labour
Health Certificate, lack of a plan to assist accident victims; irregular lodging facilities; outsourced transport
companies with no toilet or eating facilities;145
Production unit Benlcool. In June 2010, Cosan was
ordered to pay a fine of BRL 26,100, because it had
breached a Terms of Adjustment of Conduct (TAC). It
was found that workers for the Benlcool Plant were
subjected to work on Sundays and holidays, contrary to
the established TAC. The fine was ordered by the local
attorney of the Ministrio Pblico do Trabalho.146
Production unit Univalem. In July 2010, Cosan was
ordered to pay a fine of BRL 2,500,000, because it had
breached two clauses of a TAC signed in 2007. The
breaches happened at its unit in Valparaiso (Univalem
plant). The company had pledged to give at least 11
hours off time between two days of work, and not to
extend the normal working day beyond the legal limit.
However, according to inspectors, 65 employees were
found in an irregular situation with regard to granting
no rest between two days, while 32 workers were found
with excess journeys to and from work.147 Irregularities at the Univalem plant had been reported yearly
between 2005 and 2008.148
Production unit Serra. In 2009 Cosan had to pay BRL
200,000 due to irregularities in working conditions at
the Serra plant in the town of Ibat (So Paulo)149
During spot checks carried out during 2008 by the Ministry of labour and employment (Ministrio do Trabalho
e Emprego, MTE) and by the local prosecutor in So
Paulo (Ministrio Pblico do Trabalho, MPT) irregularities were found in 18 plants of Cosan in different counties. The prosecutor Mario Antonio Gomes stated: We
found the lack of drinking water in work areas, lack of
Personal Protective Equipment (IPEs), lack of a proper
place for meals, among others.150

24

Case 4c

Massive monoculture land use


Expected expansion Razen
Razen, the new joint venture between Shell and Cosan,
plans to rapidly expand its sugarcane production. In
March 2011, its growth aspirations for the coming five
years became known. Within five years, it expects to sell
more than a quarter of Brazils ethanol production.151 In
November 2010, the Brazilian association of sugarcane
producers UNICA has published the growth expectations
of the entire sugarcane sector in Brazil, eleven years from
now.152

ethanol is presently around 19%, more than double


its share in Brazilian ethanol production.153 The company currently produces 2.2 billion litres ethanol per
year, while it sells 5.5 billion litres to customers (retail,
industry, aviation). This trade in ethanol is expected to
increase to 13 billion litres within five years. By then
it will sell more than a quarter (28%) of Brazils ethanol production. Razen does not specify whether this
increase is expected in exports or activities within Brazil.

Farmland under management


In the tables below, the growth estimates of Razen and
the entire Brazilian sugarcane sector are put next to each
other. From the tables it shows that:
- Both Brazil and Razen expect a sharp increase in the
production of ethanol.
- Razen expects its crushing capacity (in order to produce ethanol and sugar) to increase by 61% within five
years, while Brazil expects to reach such an increase
level (63%) after eleven years only.
- While currently Razen has some 10% of the countrys
sugarcane crushing capacity, within five years Razens
share will be 12%.
- Razen has a larger share in Brazils sugar production
than its share in Brazils ethanol production.
- Razen also buys ethanol from other producers for resale. Its market share among Brazilian end sellers of

During the fiscal year ending 31 March 2010, Cosan had


700 thousand hectares of land (one-sixth the size of the
Netherlands) under management for sugarcane production. Roughly 45% of the land is leased to Cosan and
another 45% belongs to suppliers. The remaining 10%
comprise 50 thousand hectares owned by Radar and
leased to Cosan, and 25 thousand hectares owned by
Cosan.156
In August 2008, Cosan announced the creation of the
company Radar Propriedades Agrcolas S.A. (Radar).
Radar focuses on the identification and acquisition of
farms for subsequent lease and/or sale. Cosan has 18.9%
of the shares and the other investor 81.1%. COSAN also
has the first right to lease of land owned by Radar.157 The

Table: Areas under cultivation for sugarcane production in South-Central Brazil;


crop years 2005/2006 and 2010/2011; million hectares163
area under cultivation (million hectares)
Abbreviation

crop year
2010/2011

crop year
2005/2006

increase in
six years

% increase in
six years

SP

5.3

3.4

1.9

58%

MG

0.8

0.3

0.5

147%

Paran

PR

0.7

0.4

0.3

77%

Gois

GO

0.6

0.2

0.4

203%

Mato Grosso do Sul

MS

0.5

0.2

0.3

214%

Mato Grosso

MT

0.3

0.2

0.1

36%

Rio de Janeiro

RJ

0.1

0.0

0.1

Esprito Santo

ES

0.1

0.0

0.1

8.4

4.7

3.7

State
So Paulo
Minas Gerais

Total South-Central

80%

25

other investor is the U.S. Teachers Insurance and Annuity


Association (TIAA). TIAA is a pension fund for non-profit
and government institutions and their employees. For its
Radar-business it has created a Brazilian company called
Mansilla Participacoes Ltda. As of 31 December 2009, the
investments of Mansilla amounted to USD 383 million.158
Radar focuses on sugarcane, soy, corn and cotton. As of
October 2010, 55% of its acquired farmlands constituted sugarcane plantations in So Paulo state. Radar had
acquisitions in the pipeline worth USD 800 million and
totalling 340.000 hectares for the period 2011/2012.159

Where in Brazil does sugarcane grow?


Razens sugarcane producing mills are all located in the
South-Central region of Brazil; 22 mills are located in
So Paulo state, one in Jata city (Gois state) and one in
Caarap city (Mato Grosso do Sul state).160 The SouthCentral region accounts for 89% of Brazilian sugarcane
production.161 Over the past six years, sugarcane cultivation has expanded with 80% in the South-Central region.
The satellite project Canasat registers the areas that are
under sugarcane cultivation in the region.162 The following
table shows the main states where sugarcane is grown
and the expansion that has been going on.

Expectations growing land use


The government of Brazil expects that in 2017 the area
cultivated with sugarcane, will amount to 14.5 million
hectares.164 This is 3.5 times the surface of the Netherlands. The continuing expansion is expected to be mainly
located in South-Central Brazil.
In September 2009, the former president Luiz Incio Lula
da Silva presented the Sugarcane Agroecological Zoning
plan (ZAE Cana). This plan would prohibit the expansion of sugarcane production in the Amazon and Pantanal biomes, and in the Upper Paraguay River Basin. This
would not apply to industrial units already installed, the
cane produced for their supply, or their planned expansion. Neither would ZAE Cana be applied to units with
environmental licensing. As of yet, the government has
announced the plan, but there are no new enforcement
mechanisms.165
Brazils entire surface is estimated at 851.5 million hectares. The Amazon and Pantanal biomes, and the Upper
Paraguay River Basin measure up to 694.1 million hectares. This would leave 157.4 hectares where it is allowed
to grow sugarcane. Extra restrictions set by ZAE Cana,
such as water use and the exclusion of areas with slope
above 12%, would limit the placement of sugarcane
plantations to 7.5% of Brazilian land (64.7 million hectares). This area, considered suitable, is currently being
26

used for agricultural and livestock production.166 Already,


between the years 2000 and 2009, sugarcane expansion
has replaced pastures (73.9%), agriculture (24.2%), citrus
(1.4%) and forests (0.5%) in South-Central Brazil.167

A battle for agricultural grounds


The trouble in Brazil is that not only sugarcane is expanding rapidly. Between the years 2000 and 2008, the area
harvested for soy beans has increased 54% to 21.1 million
hectares and the area harvested for maize has increased
24% to 14.4 million hectares.168 In addition, the production of meat mainly cattle and poultry meat which also
needs land for grazing and other feed has increased
with 48% to 15.4 million tonnes between 2000 and
2008.169 Between the years 2000 and 2008, the export by
Brazil of soy beans, meat, and sugar has increased from
USD 5.6 billion to USD 33.2 billion.170
The trend of increasing production and export of soy,
meat, sugar and also ethanol is expected to continue.
The Brazilian ministry of Agriculture has estimated the
exports and production for the year 2019/2020 of the
most dynamic agricultural products, and compared these
with the exports and production for the year 2008/2009.
The following table shows the outcome. According to the
ministry, which assumes an unprecedented annual production growth of crops of 2.67% per hectare, this production could be met with an increase in crop area of 10
million hectares.171

Table: expected increase production and


export (both volume) of most dynamic
agricultural products of Brazil; 2019/2020
versus 2008/2009
Million
tonnes

% increase
production in
2019/20
compared to
2008/09

% increase
exports in
2019/20
compared to
2008/09

Beef

27

83

Soy (beans,
cake and
oil)

38

30

Chicken
meat

49

72

Sugar

48

52

Ethanol

127

223

Meat, soy and sugarcane: dangerous cocktail


The staggering increase of meat, soy and sugarcane
production may cause many social and environmental
impacts:
- Deforestation in the Amazon and Cerrado. Currently, in Brazil, soy is displacing cattle ranching, and
sugarcane is displacing both soy and cattle ranching,
creating a complex mix of drivers for deforestation. Soy
farming and cattle ranching are being pushed into the
forest frontiers.172 A recent study published in Environmental Science & Technology, shows that Brazilian beef
production is the major cause of deforestation in the
Amazon. An estimated 60-70 per cent of the deforested land is used for cattle ranching. According to the
study, beef from deforested areas constitutes about
six percent of Brazils total production. However, this
six percent causes about 25 times more carbon dioxide emissions than beef produced in the rest of Brazil.
The authors argue that increased production for export
has been the key driver of the pasture expansion and
deforestation in the Legal Amazon Region (LAR) of Brazil during the past decade, and that increased global
demand for soy meal and bioethanol from sugarcane
also drive the conversion of forest into pasture in the
LAR. Livestock farmers in the South who sell their land
to soya and cane farmers and move to the northern
region can multiply their pasture area: the average land
price is seven times lower than in the south and the
differential is increasing.173 During the international climate conference in Copenhagen late 2009, the former
president Luiz Incio Lula da Silva made the commitment to reduce the deforestation of the Amazon rainforest by 80% by the year 2020.174 According to Brazils
National Institute for Space Research (INPE), the Amazon deforestation has indeed decreased since the year
2005. However, during 2009/2010 the deforestation in
the LAR still amounted to a high 645,000 hectares.175
While most attention goes out to the Amazon, the
deforestation through expanding soy and, to a lesser
extent, sugarcane plantations in the Brazilian Cerrado is
also a matter of concern. Deforestation in the Cerrado
ran at around 1,420,000 hectares per year during the
period 2002-2008. Between 2008 and 2009, the deforestation amounted to 760,000 hectares.176 The Cerrado
occupies approximately 24% of Brazils territory. Its core
area covers ten
Brazilian states: Gois, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do
Sul, Tocantins, Maranho, Bahia, Piaui,
Minas Gerais, Sao Paulo and Parana.177
- High income and land inequality. In some situations,
agricultural expansion and industrialization has led to
the concentration of land and wealth in fewer hands,
resulted in dangerous working conditions, and been
accompanied by rural violence. While agriculture has

been developing, Brazil has maintained very high levels


of income inequality, with one of the worlds highest
Gini coefficients for income (0.55 in 2009) and one of
the worst Gini coefficients for land distribution (0.85 in
2006).178
- Reducing labour opportunities. Due to increased
mechanization, labour opportunities in agriculture are
decreasing.179 Mechanization in the sugarcane sector destroys many of the cane-cutting jobs and leaves
thousands unemployed.180
- Brazils agricultural development process has also generated large social costs in the form of deterioration of
water and air quality, increased use of toxic chemicals,
and changes in nutrient (biogeochemical) cycles.181

Greenhouse gas emissions ethanol


In February 2010, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) published the results of an extensive
research on the lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions of
renewable fuels for the U.S. market. The lifecycle analysis included all aspects of the fuel cycle, from feedstock
production to distribution to use, including emissions
from international land use changes (ILUC) resulting from
increased biofuel demand. According to EPA, it used the
best available models and incorporated many modifications to its proposed approach based on comments
from the public, a formal peer review, and developing
science.182 The average 2022 Brazilian sugarcane ethanol lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions were found to
be 61% lower than the greenhouse gas emissions of the
2005 petroleum gasoline baseline.183 The concept of ILUC
means that the use of fields for growing biofuel crops can
lead to increased greenhouse gases as new land will have
to be land cleared to grow food crops. According to the
Brussels-based NGO Transport & Environment, Shell is
lobbying against using ILUC factors in sustainability criteria for biofuels used within the European Union.184 In its
response of October 2010 to a consultation by the European Commission, Shell stated: Shell does not support
any proposal that attributes a quantity of GHG emissions
from ILUC.185 Instead of penalising certain biofuels, Shell
is opting for a system of carbon bonuses for low-ILUC
fuels. Then, for Shell is would also be easier to comply
with the EU fuel quality directive, which requires them to
cut the life-cycle emissions of their fuels by 6% by 2020.186

27

Case 5

Fracking unconventional gas


Unconventional gas and high-volume
fracking
Not only for oil, but also for gas Shell is resorting to
unconventional production methods. In December 2010,
Shell-CEO Peter Voser stated: In recent years, Shell has
increased investment in natural gas projects in countries like Qatar, Australia, Russia, the United States and
Canada, with a special focus on tight gas, shale gas and
coal-bed methane together these are known as unconventional gas. Were currently exploring the potential
for unconventional gas outside North America in countries like China and South Africa, as well as some European countries. The Shell-CEO proceeds: I know by
2012 Shell will be producing more gas than oil, and, I
know, when it comes to natural gas supplies, a revolution
is under way. () Shell is set for strong growth in tight
gas.187
Conventional natural gas is usually found trapped in the
pore space of rock types like sandstone in underground
geologic formations. Compared to unconventional gas,
conventional gas flows rather easily to drilled wells. For
unconventional gas, often high-volume fracking is used
as a technique to get the gas to the surface. Fracking (or
hydraulic fracturing) involves injection of water, mixed
with sand and chemicals to ease production of natural
gas and oil by breaking up rock formations. Fracking has
been done around the world for many years. However,
high-volume fracking is a rather new phenomenon and
causes much more environmental damage and health
risks. From this point of view, the revolution that is under
way according to Shell-CEO Peter Voser, may in fact be a
quite worrying revolution.
Tony Ingraffea, professor of Civil Engineering at the Cornell University in the U.S. State of New York, has conducted much research on fracking. During a radio interview in
February 2011, he asked himself the question: What is
high-volume fracking, compared to the traditional historical kind that no one seems to be complaining too much
about? His answer was: The difference is about a factor of hundred in just about everything, predominantly
the amount of fluids that are necessary to do the fracking [including the amount of chemicals; the professor
mentions this later in the interview], the amount of fluids
and other waste products produced from a high-volume
unconventional well thats fracked, the amount of truck
28

traffic, the amount of energy and power that needs to be


brought to a well. (.) Its not the issue of fracking, its
the entire system of developing gas from an unconventional resource.188

Shells positions in unconventional gas


Shell is rapidly expanding its positions in unconventional
gas (tight gas, shale gas and coal-bed methane). Below
its main present positions around the world are listed:
- North America. Shells North American tight gas
production amounted to some 140,000 barrels of oil
equivalent per day in 2009, an increase of 62% from
2008 levels. Shell expects that its production could
double from 2009 to 2015. Its activities in U.S. tight gas
began in 2001, with purchases in the Pinedale Anticline in Wyoming State. More recently, Shell secured
unconventional gas positions in the Haynesville play in
Texas/Louisiana State and in Western Canada (Groundbirch, Deep Basin, Foothills, Klappan). Its 2010 acquisitions are mainly in the Marcellus shale, the biggest
natural gas field in the United States, covering most of
Pennsylvania state and parts of New York, Ohio and the
Virginia states. Another 2010 acquisition was within the
Eagle Ford shale play, in South Texas.189
- South Africa. Shell wants to start shale gas exploration
activities within the Karoo eco-region in South Africa.
The exploration area would comprise 90,000 square
kilometres, more than two times the surface of the
Netherlands.190 Shell has applied for three exploration
areas, each comprising 30,000 kilometres. In each area
it wants to drill up to eight exploration wells. The formations in the Karoo that are believed to contain recoverable gas are located 1.5 to 4.5 kilometres below the
surface.191
- China. Shell and PetroChina operate Changbei, a tight
gas field in the Shaanxi Province of China. Commercial
production in Changbei began in March 2007, supplying 3 billion cubic metres of natural gas a year to Beijing and other cities in eastern China. Late 2007, Shell
took over a 55% equity interest in a coal-bed methane
venture in Shaanxi Province. In the Sichuan province,
Shell works together with PetroChina on developing
two tight/shale gas reservoirs of each 4,000 square
kilometres.192 Shell provides little information about the
environmental impacts of its Chinese operations.
- Australia. In August 2010, Shell and PetroChina (major-

ity owned by the state company CNPC, China National


Petroleum Corporation) completed their acquisition of
the Australian company Arrow Energy. The 50/50 joint
venture called CS CSG (Australia) Pty Ltd. now owns
coal seam gas assets in Queensland state, domestic
power businesses, and a site to build a liquefied natural
gas (LNG) plant for export markets. Coal-bed methane is natural gas contained in coal seams. The new
joint venture will be the operator of the coal seam gas
assets. The gas production assets are in the Surat and
Bowen basin. In the Surat basin, there is no fracking
done. In the Bowen basin, there might be.193
- Other. Shell also has unconventional gas positions in
Sweden, Germany, Ukraine and Brazil.194

Shell: nothing wrong with fracking and unconventional gas


In its communication, Shell makes no difference between
conventional and unconventional gas in terms of environmental and health risks. The company generally refers to
natural gas as being cleaner-burning than coal in power plants and as being a bridge to a low-carbon energy
future.195
On fracking, Shell states on its website: This is a safe
and proven technique according to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which is now carrying out
a new study into hydraulic fracturing and its potential
impact. Fracturing has been used by oil and gas companies for over 60 years.196 The company does not mention
that there are great differences between the traditional
fracking and the present high-volume fracking, that the
EPA has been presently accused of hiding some severe
impacts of fracking, and that the U.S. government has
not been able and/or willing to monitor the booming U.S.
shale gas business adequately.

Environmental and health risks caused by


unconventional gas extraction
In this section, the environmental and health risks of the
present high-volume fracking are considered more indepth.
1) Enormous water use
According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the volume of water needed for hydraulic fracturing
varies by site and type of formation. Fifty thousand to
350,000 gallons of water may be required to fracture one
well in a coal-bed formation, while two to five million gallons of water may be necessary to fracture one horizontal
well in a shale formation. A gallon stands for 3.78 litres.197

Shell stated in September 2010 that hydraulic fracturing


requires 1 to 5 million gallons of water per well and that
it re-uses some of the water. For its Groundbirch tight gas
operations in British Columbia (Canada) Shell claims to
use 5 to 8 million litres per well, sourced locally from the
Peace River, fresh water wells and some 20-40% recycled
from producing wells. As with most unconventional gas
operations presently going on, the Groundbirch operations have just been starting up. As of June 2010 Shell
had drilled 103 wells, with almost 3,000 wells yet to
come. Shells future aspiration is to use reclaimed water
from a waste treatment plant at Groundbirch, transported via pipelines so the present disposal by trucks can be
reduced.198
To explore the shale gas possibilities of the Karoo region
in South Africa, Shell states it may decide to hydraulically fracture vertical and horizontal exploration wells.
It expects to need up to 2.2 million litres of water for
hydraulic fracturing a vertical exploration well and up to 6
million litres for an exploratory horizontal well section.199
Whenever Shell is allowed to explore the Karoo region,
and it does find gas it could produce on an economically
basis, one wonders how Shell would cope with the enormous amounts of water needed in the semi-desert Karoo
region. Shell has not yet shared its thoughts about this.
2) Pollution of water resources
There are several ways in which water could be polluted
through high-volume fracking. With shale gas production, the two major pathways to water contamination are
activities at the surface and errors below ground:
- Once in the ground, a large portion of the fracturing
fluid may be trapped in the target formation. The rest,
however, comes back to the surface (flowback), combined with water produced from the formation itself.
Both flowback and produced water represent large
waste streams. If flowback and produced water are disposed of improperly, waste water may threaten public
and environmental health.
- Errors below ground can endanger water resources as
well. Improperly cased wells may contaminate penetrated aquifers. Potential shallow pockets of natural
gas in formations above the target layer may enter into
ground water.
- Trucks transporting water to the site for fracturing and
from the site for disposal may stress nearby stream
banks, contributing to erosion and adding sediment to
surface water.200
3) Greenhouse gas emissions
The three main greenhouse gases (GHGs) that are relevant to the petroleum and natural gas industry are methane (CH4), carbon dioxide (CO2), and nitrous oxide (N2O).
Methanes chemical lifetime in the atmosphere is approximately 12 years. Its relatively short atmospheric lifetime,
29

Experiences in Pennsylvania, United States


In February and March 2011, the New York Times published several articles about the pollution caused by drilling in Pennsylvania State, USA. During nine months the newspaper had
obtained more than 30,000 pages of documents from state and federal agencies/officials.
The shale gas business is booming in Pennsylvania, sitting atop the enormous reserve called
the Marcellus Shale. In 2010, drilling companies were issued roughly 3,300 Marcellus gas-well
permits in Pennsylvania, up from just 117 in 2007.201
The New York Times estimated that more than 1.3 billion gallons of wastewater was produced by Pennsylvania wells over the past three years. Based on the obtained documents, the
newspaper estimated that some 10 to 40 percent of the water sent down the well during
hydrofracking returns to the surface, carrying drilling chemicals, carcinogenic materials, corrosive salts and, at times, naturally occurring radioactive material. Most of the wastewater was
sent by trucks to treatment plants not equipped to remove many of the materials, and ended
up in rivers providing drinking water for millions of people. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency states that it is dangerous when radioactive wastewater contaminates drinking
water or enters the food chain through fish or farming. Once radium enters a persons body,
by eating, drinking or breathing, it can cause cancer and other health problems, many federal
studies show.202
The newspaper was able to map the wastewater released from 149 wells. The federal drinking water standards were exceeded for the carcinogenic benzene (41 wells), gross alpha
(128 wells, gross alpha is a type of radiation caused by emissions from uranium and radium),
uranium (4 wells), and radium (42 wells).203 At least 116 wells produced wastewater exceeding
the federal standards for radium or other radioactive materials in drinking water more than
100 times.

coupled with its potency as a greenhouse gas, makes


methane a candidate for mitigating global warming over
the near-term (25 years or so).204 Methane is about 33
and 105 times more powerful at warming the atmosphere
than carbon dioxide (CO2) by weight, for a 100-year and
20-year horizon respectively.205
New estimates U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Recently, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
has re-estimated the GHG emissions from the petroleum
and natural gas industry. Its earlier estimations were from
1996. At that stage methane emissions were not considered to be so powerful at warming the atmosphere.
In its new study, published in November 2010, the EPA
found that CH4-emissions had been significantly underestimated. In its new estimate, the U.S. petroleum and
natural gas industry emitted 317 million tonnes of greenhouse gases (measured in CO2 equivalents) in 2006. This
is a 57% increase compared to the outdated calculation
method. Of the total 317 million tonnes, the natural gas
industry accounted for 261 million tonnes CH4 (measured
in CO2 equivalents). The EPA had revised four emission
sources that were believed to be significantly underesti30

mated: well venting for liquids unloading; gas well venting during well completions; gas well venting during well
workovers; centrifugal compressor wet seal degassing
venting.206
The EPA also made a distinction between the GHG emissions of conventional gas wells and unconventional gas
wells. For unconventional wells, it estimated that the
emission factors for venting during well completions and
well workovers exceed emission factors of conventional
wells by a factor 200. It was assumed that all unconventional wells were completed with hydraulic fracturing of
tight sand, shale or coal bed methane formations. The
water that is returning to the surface is accompanied by
large quantities of methane. This is the main cause of the
greater methane emissions than conventional wells.207

Study Cornell University


In a study published in the journal Climatic Change, the
Cornell University in New York assesses the likely GHG
footprint of natural gas in comparison to coal.208 The

study builds, among other, upon the recent findings of


the EPA. The study acknowledges that natural gas produces less greenhouse gas emissions than coal when
burned. However, the authors also take into account the
GHG emissions that occur during the production of coal
and natural gas. This lifecycle approach of GHG emissions
from coal and natural gas presents a different picture. The
authors compare the lifecycle GHG emissions of shale
gas, conventional natural gas (both with low and high
estimates for methane emissions to the atmosphere), coal
from surface mines, coal from deep mines and diesel oil.
Largely based upon the recent EPA-study, the authors
estimate that 3.6% to 7.9% of the methane from shale
gas production escapes to the atmosphere through venting and leaks. This is 1.3 to 2.1 times more than from
conventional gas operations. The higher emissions from
shale gas occur when wells are hydraulically fractured as
methane escapes from flowback return fluids and during drill out following the fracturing.
Calculated on the basis of a 20-year horizon, the authors
conclude that the lifecycle GHG emissions of shale gas
are at least 20% greater than the lifecycle GHG emissions
of coal. For conventional natural gas, the emissions of
coal fall between the high and low estimate.
The 20-year approach by the authors reflects the need to
mitigate climate change in the near-term. As methane is
known to have a relative short lifetime in the atmosphere,
it especially causes climate change on a short-term. The
authors also calculated the lifecycle GHG emissions for
a 100-year horizon. Over the 100-year frame, the GHG
footprint is comparable to that for coal: the low-end
shale-gas emissions are 18% lower than deep-mined coal,
and the high-end shale-gas emissions are 15% greater
than surface-mined coal emissions.
As for Shell, it is not known how many GHG emissions it
releases in the air due to venting and leaking CH4. The
company promotes natural gas (including unconventional gas) as a replacement for coal. Natural gas is seen by
Shell as a bridge to a low-carbon energy future, something for the near-term. , However, for unconventional
gas the opposite seems true: the GHG emissions increase
compared to coal in the near-term.

South Africa: fracking in semi-desert Karoo


Farmers, scientists, NGOs, a Dutch princess, a business
tycoon, a long-distance swimmer, a Facebook account
with already 6,500 members as of 19 April 2011.209 Royal
Dutch Shell is facing strong opposition to its plans to get
an exploration license to seek shale gas in South Africas
semi-desert Karoo region.

The consulting firm Golder Associates, working on


behalf of Shell, drafted an Environmental Management
Plan (EMP) for three exploration areas, each comprising 30,000 kilometres. Until 5 April 2011, the public was
allowed to comment to these plans. The drilling of a
maximum of 24 wells was not expected to commence
before 2012. Golder stated in its conclusions to the EMPs
that there was no material evidence that a small number
of exploration wells could result in an unacceptable level
of environmental impact, and that therefore the determination of the resource potential of the Karoo shale
gas formations not should be prevented or delayed. As
long as the siting and management of the wells would be
controlled through a rigorous, scientific Environmental
Impact Assessment process, it would be unlikely that the
construction would result in unacceptable environmental
damage, the company continued.210
Scientists of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), under this administration and at the direction of
U.S. Congress, are currently undertaking a study on the
practice of hydraulic fracturing to better understand any
potential impacts on drinking water and groundwater.
The results of this study are not expected before late
2012.211 Golder stated that there was no need to wait
with handing over an exploration license, because Shells
application did not involve production. Before any licensing of a production well field is considered, the EPA-study
should however be considered, according to Golder.
Thousands of comments to the Environmental Management Plan (EMP) of Golder were submitted.212 The strong
public resistance against fracking the Karoo resulted in a
moratorium by the government on licenses in the Karoo
where fracking is proposed. On Wednesday 20 April
2011, the South African Cabinet endorsed the decision
by the Department of Minerals to invoke this moratorium.
The Department of Minerals will lead a multi disciplinary
team including the Departments of Trade & Industry, Science and Technology, amongst others, to fully research
the full implications of the proposed fracking. It was
stated that the Cabinet had made it very clear that clean
environment together with all the ecological aspects will
not be compromised.213
The opponents of the exploratory plans are however not
re-assured:
- Business tycoon Johann Rupert: We dont think the
legal framework was designed for this fracking method
and we are very, very scared about the irreversibility of
the ecological damage, should it occur.214
- Professor Doreen Atkinson of the Centre for Development Support at the University of Free State (UFS):
There is a prima facie case to put a hold on any decisions around fracking until studies have been done.
These studies may take at least 3 to 5 years. It would
31

also be prudent to first see the results of the American Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) which has
embarked on a study. Its results are only expected in
late 2012.215
Long-distance swimmer Lewis Gordon Pugh: Growing
up in Grahamstown I learnt how scarce water is in the
Karoo. Why on earth would we allow a foreign company to come and drill for gas in a vulnerable ecosystem?
Why would we risk contaminating our water supply? It
is morally wrong. It also makes poor economic sense.
We must look after our water for future generations.216
Dr Anthony Turton, a well-known trans-disciplinary
water scientist: In the absence of certainty, it is prudent to assume the worst and respond accordingly. In
the case of fracking, there are many unknowns technologically. At best it is chasing a highly marginal
resource. Invariably the costs exceed the benefits if one
takes potential environmental damage into consideration. But because the benefits are so few, if things go
wrong, there is not enough to pay for environmental
remediation.217
Geologist and palaeontologist Professor Bruce Rubidge
of the University of Witwatersrands Bernard Price Institute: The fact that companies like Shell are saying that
they will use sea- and brack- water for the fracking may
have unwelcome effects on the salinity of the groundwater. Also in the fracking process there will undoubtedly be some of this sea and brack water which has
been contaminated with chemicals and which will spill
out on the surface, as has happened in many recorded
cases in America. What will it do to the soil?
Ernest Pringle, president of Agri-Eastern Cape and a
farmer in the Karoo: I spent all my time trying to pump
up more groundwater to keep going. So we want to
know with certainty what the effects will be to the
underground water supply.218
Mark Botha, head of conservation at environmental
group WWF South Africa: Weve got some serious
concerns about fracking, it is as yet an unproven technology with unacceptable risks for fresh water abstraction and pollution.219
Derek Light, a lawyer representing a number of Karoo
land owners: We are very concerned about the environmental impact, especially because fracking is not
regulated in South Africa.220
Princess Irene of the Netherlands (this sister of the
queen owns land in the Karoo): There are other ways
to generate energy, for which we do not exploit nature
but cooperate with it. With wind or solar energy nothing gets polluted, nothing gets broken. More companies are recognizing that we are partners of nature.
Shell is stuck in its old patterns.221
At the beginning of April 2011, several scientists and
consultants responded to Shells application with an
extensive 104-page critical review.222

32

Even in the case that the fracking operations by Shell


could be performed without compromising a clean environment together with all the ecological aspects, there
is still the issue of where Shell would get the massive
amounts of water needed. The company has made a
commitment not to compete with the people of the
Karoo for their water needs.223 One of the options Shell
considers is to get water from sea.224 Shell has also stated
it is commuted to provide full compensation to any landowner with evidenced direct negative impact or loss on
their land as a result of its activities. This may however
seem less re-assuring than it looks like. How do farmers
prove that Shell has polluted their lands, what lengths
people have to go through to get their rights?

Case 6

Climate change, a business case?


Shells greenhouse gas emissions
In 2010, Shell emitted 75 million tonnes of greenhouse
gases (GHG)225, surpassing the emissions of countries like
Austria, Sweden and Switzerland.226 Shell reports GHG
emissions on a 100% basis for companies and joint ventures where it is the operator. Its 2010 emissions can be
broken down as follows:
- downstream (refining, retail, producing petrochemicals
etc.) 44
- upstream (extracting oil/gas, liquefying/regasifying
natural gas etc.) 28
- shipping 3.227
Shells emissions have been decreasing over the years. In
2010, its emissions were around 25% below its 1990 level
and 18% below its 2000 level. In the period 2000 2010,
the reduction was mainly caused by capturing (and no
longer flaring) gas that comes with oil production. Shell
does not provide for a further breakdown of its achievements in reducing GHG emissions.228

The coming years: increasing emissions


Shells GHG emissions are expected to climb to coming years, in line with increasing oil/gas production and
increasing unconventional oil/gas production. In 2012,
Shell expects to produce oil and gas totalling 3.5 million
barrels of oil equivalent a day. This is an increase of 11%,
compared to the 2009 level.229 In 2014, Shell expects to
produce 3.7 million barrels of oil equivalent, up 12% from
2010.230
In its Annual report 2010, Shell stated: In the future,
in order to help meet the worlds energy demand, we
expect more of our production to come from unconventional sources than at present. Energy intensity of production of oil and gas from unconventional sources can be
higher than that of production from conventional sources.
Therefore, in the long term, it is expected that both the
CO2 intensity of our production as well as our absolute
Upstream CO2 emissions, will increase as our business
grows, for example, from the expansion of oil sands
activities in Canada. Also our Pearl GTL project in Qatar is
expected to increase our CO2 emissions when production
begins.231

In May 2009 in a report by Oil Change International, PLATFORM, Friends of the Earth International and
Greenpeace UK Shell was found to be the worlds most
carbon intensive oil company. The company holds more
carbon in its resources, per barrel of future oil equivalent, than its competitors Chevron, ExxonMobil and BP.
According to the report the average carbon intensity of
oil and gas produced by Shell is set to rise dramatically,
increasing 85 per cent on the figure for 2008. This sharp
increase is caused by Shells move into tar sands, its reliance on liquefied natural gas (LNG), and its continued gas
flaring in Nigeria.232

Shells GHG emissions reporting complete?


It should be noted that not all of the fuel Shell sells to
its customers is accounted for in Shells bookkeeping of
GHG emissions. For example, in 2010 Shell bought a lot
of Russian oil from the biggest Russian oil producer Rosneft, as input for its refineries in Germany.233 During 2009,
Rosneft still flared some one-third of the gas that comes
with oil production.234 Thus, the emissions for producing
this oil are probably high. As Shell is not the operator for
the oil production, the emissions are not accounted for in
Shells bookkeeping of GHG emissions. In its communications, Shell doesnt mention any policy with regard to
responsible sourcing of oil from third parties.
Another incompleteness of Shell comprises the emissions
of methane (CH4). Methane emissions are mainly caused
by gas flaring and gas production. Shell reports its methane emissions in line with the Second Assessment Report
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), which has put methane emissions at being 21
times more powerful in warming the atmosphere than
CO2 on a 100-year horizon basis.235 Shells CH4 emissions
amounted to around 2.5 million tonnes CO2 equivalents
in 2009 and 2010. There are, however, some specifics
about methane Shell doesnt mention in its annual reports
and sustainability reports:
- Shell generally refers to natural gas as being cleaner-burning than coal in power plants and as being a
bridge to a low-carbon energy future, something for
the near-term. Methanes chemical lifetime in the atmosphere is approximately 12 years. Its relatively short
atmospheric lifetime, coupled with its potency as a
greenhouse gas, makes methane a candidate for miti33

gating global warming over the near-term (25 years


or so).236 Shells reporting on a 100-year horizon basis,
hides the fact that methane emissions are especially
causing climate change in the near-term.
- A study published in 2009 in Science magazine calculated methane to be about 33 and 105 times more
powerful at warming the atmosphere than carbon dioxide (CO2) by weight, for a 100-year and 20-year horizon
respectively.237 Thus, Shells accounting of methane
being 21 times worse than CO2 by weight over a 100year period, does not follow the latest scientific proceedings. According to these latest scientific proceedings, Shells methane emissions would be 57% greater
over a 100-year horizon and amount to around 4 million tonnes CO2 equivalents. Calculated on a 20-year
horizon, Shells emissions would even be 12.5 million
tonnes CO2 equivalents.
- Shell does not mention that methane emissions may
rise due to its increasing share of unconventional gas
in its gas portfolio. Recent studies by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Cornell University show that much more methane is leaked than
previously thought.238 This is especially the case for
unconventional gas production, which GHG emissions
might even surpass the ones for coal production. So far,
Shell has provided little information about the methane
emissions during its unconventional gas production.

Climate change: Shells business case


In 2002, Shells committee of managing directors considered that essentially the Groups business was not to
decarbonise but rather take advantage of opportunities
which had arisen as a result of the worlds desire to decarbonise. The committee argued that it was not unreasonable to expect that the Group could pursue decarbonisation as a good business case.239
In January 2011, the present Shell-CEO Peter Voser
advised policy makers to reduce CO2 emissions in four
ways: energy efficiency (homes, cars etc.); increased
use of natural gas; carbon capture and storage projects
(CCS); biofuels.240 Notably, these four areas are also part
of Shells business strategy. In its Annual report 2010,
Shell states: We are seeking cost-effective ways to manage CO2 and see potential business opportunities in
developing such solutions. Our main contributions to
reducing CO2 emissions are in four areas: supplying more
natural gas; supplying more biofuels; progressing carbon
capture and storage; and implementing energy efficiency
measures in our operations.241
A statement very much repeated by Shell is that worldwide energy demand will have doubled by 2050, compared to present levels.242 This statement implies that
34

Shell doesnt expect any government to tackle energy


use the coming forty years. For Shell, this statement is
a comfortable excuse to extract energy from climate
unfriendly sources. In January 2009, Shell-CEO Jeroen
van der Veer (now succeeded by Peter Voser) stated in an
interview with environmentalist George Monbiot: Less
oil sands in the future means more coal production in
the world, and coal is even more CO2-intensive than oil
sands, so we think it is perfect to be in oil sands.243 The
former CEO did not mention that oil sands and coal are
not interchangeable, because their end uses are different.
Oil sands end up in transport fuels, and coal ends up in
power generation.

Natural gas, CCS and biofuels


Presently, Shell is very much into promoting natural gas as
an important bridge to a low-carbon energy future.244
Shell advocates that there are abundant resources of gas
worldwide, and that the capital costs of building gas-fired
power plants are well under the costs of building coalfired plants, nuclear plants, and offshore wind projects.245
In its communications, Shell makes no difference between
the extraction of conventional gas and. In this report, the
environmental problems with regard to the extraction of
unconventional gas are highlighted in a separate chapter.
Another main feature of Shells climate portfolio is carbon capture and storage (CCS). CCS is a way to secure
Shells business case of supplying gas (power plants) and
oil (refineries) to the developed world, which has already
the largest CO2-footprint per capita. The idea behind
CCS is to store the CO2 emitted by main plants under the
ground. The technology, its risks and benefits, are still
being tested through pilot plants. The European Commission expects CCS commercial rollout in electricity generation and industrial applications to start after 2020.246
Storage is also expensive. Shell has lobbied extensively
to get financial support from the European Union for
CCS-projects. This lobby has been successful. One billion
Euros have been already given to CCS projects from the
EU Recovery Plan and further funding will be paid out
in the third phase of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
(ETS): 4 7 billion Euros.247 Among other, Greenpeace
has argued that: a) the CCS-technology uses between 10
and 40% of the energy produced by a power station, b)
even very low leakage rates could undermine any climate
mitigation efforts, and c) money spent on CCS will divert
investments away from sustainable solutions to climate
change.248
Biofuels do replace oil. Therefore, compared to gas and
CCS, biofuels are not so much a feature of Shells climate
portfolio that is clearly in line with its core business. However, governments have mandated a certain use of biofu-

els by oil companies. An example forms the Fuel Quality


Directive of the European Union.249 Shell has an obligation to fulfil governmental demands. Already, Shell is one
of the worlds largest distributor of transport biofuels. In
2010, it sold 9.6 billion litres of biofuels in petrol or diesel
blends.250 In August 2010, Shell signed binding agreements to form a joint venture in Brazil with Cosan, Brazils
largest sugar and ethanol producer. Shells most promising advanced biofuel is cellulosic ethanol. Shells external
review committee stated in Shells Sustainability report
2009 that it would welcome further information on Shells
management of the sustainability impacts within the supply chains of first-generation biofuels.251 In this report,
the social problems with regard to the new Shell ethanol
operations in Brazil are highlighted in a separate chapter.

Shell and the lower carbon long-term future


According to Shells energy scenarios, by 2050 biofuels,
wind, solar and other renewables could provide 30% of
the worlds energy.252 It expects biofuels to have a market
share of 7% to 9% of the worlds road transport fuel market in 2030.253
Except for biofuels, Shell does not have any major
involvement with renewable energy. The company is
also not involved with electric cars, though it has a small
interest in research for cars with hydrogen as energy carrier. Wind and solar energy are no longer part of Shells
investment portfolio, though it still has some wind farms
in the USA. In 2008, Shell pulled out of the London Array
project, aimed at building 341 turbines in the Thames
Estuary capable of generating 1,000 megawatts of power
enough to power a quarter of Londons homes. The
company had a 33% share in the project.254 In March
2009, Shell announced it would no longer invest in wind
and solar energy. Linda Cook, Shells executive director of gas and power, said: We are businessmen and
women. If there were renewables [which made money] we
would put money into it.255 In an October 2010 speech,
Shell-CEO Peter Voser even discouraged investments in
offshore wind power by the UK government: So perhaps
the country should consider diverting some investment
away from new offshore wind farms.256
So basically Shell is not investing in fundamentals like
wind and solar power needed to achieve a lower carbon
long-term future, and might even oppose such fundamentals that are not in its investment portfolio.

35

Case 7

Interfering with politics


Improper involvement?
Oil and politics have a lot to do with each other. The
home states of Royal Dutch Shell are the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. These countries might want
to secure their oil/gas imports and the economic benefits
of having an international oil company based within their
territory. These interests might overpower ethical interests, such as the protection of human rights in countries
hosting the oil company. Home states often might have
the same business interest than their oil companies.
Oil companies may lobby their home states, so these will
pay more attention to oil business possibilities. Oil companies may speak kindly of regimes that are in fact abusing human rights. Oil companies might keep their finger
on the pulses of home as well as host states, in order to
keep informed of the latest political developments.
One of the general policies prescribed by the OECD
Guidelines for multinational enterprises is that companies should abstain from any improper involvement in
local political activities. The OECD does not have a clear
definition of improper involvement. It states that companies might want to ask themselves whether their political
activities are transparent; whether they would feel comfortable if these activities were described in detail in the
media; and whether their activities are in the best interests of the host country.257
In this section some examples are given of cases which
could be, to some extent, seen as improper involvement
in politics by Shell and/or home states and Shell working together to ensure business. Most of the examples
became known through Wikileaks and through journalists/activists making use of the UK Freedom of Information Act.

1) Shells access to the Nigerian government


In October 2009, Shells Executive Vice President (EVP)
for Shell Companies in Africa, Ms Ann Pickard met with
the United States Ambassador to Nigeria. According to
the cable from the U.S Embassy in Nigeria, the Shell EVP
told the ambassador that the Government of Nigeria
had forgotten that Shell had seconded people to all the
relevant ministries and that Shell consequently had access
36

to everything that was being done in those ministries.258


Following the disclosure of this cable, Shell has stated
that the suggestion of infiltration by Shell in the Nigerian
government is far from the truth, and that this infiltration
would not be in line with Shells General Business Principles. According to Shell, it has a total of 11 staff seconded to the Nigerian government, mainly technical specialists. Shell stated that it is usual in the oil industry for
governments and businesses to keep close contact with
each other. The reasons for this would be the importance
of energy for society and the fact that governments often
directly or indirectly participate in oil and gas activities.259

2) Shells access to the Dutch and UK governments


From Wikileaks it also became more clear to what extent
the Dutch government and Shell are cooperating. There
is an ongoing program in which a Dutch diplomat works
at Shells headquarters in The Hague and a UK diplomat
works at Shells London offices. For example, in summer
2008, Mr Simon Smits, Director of Economic Cooperation at the Dutch ministry for Foreign Affairs, completed
a two-year secondment at Shell where he focused on
government relations in the companys hot zones.260 In
November 2008, the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations signed an agreement with Shell to
exchange senior managers. The exchange would take
the form of secondment of public sector managers with
Shell and vice versa. The posting would last one or two
years.261
After questions by parliamentarians, the Dutch ministers of Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs stated that
there is no conflict of interest related to the exchange
of personnel by Shell and the Dutch government. In the
oil and gas sector, more than in other sectors, the role of
foreign governments and state companies is dominant.
In this context, oil companies from the West rely on support from their own government to secure their position
abroad. The secondment of officials of the ministry of
Foreign Affairs at Shell should be seen from this perspective. According to the ministers, it could help to build
knowledge and get a better understanding of the sector.262

3) Shell drafts letters for the UK government to get Libya deal


In May 2005, Shell signed an agreement to start a joint
venture with the Libyan National Oil Corporation. The
joint venture would revamp and expand the existing liquified natural gas (LNG) Plant at Marsa el-Brega on the Libyan coast. It would also explore for gas and subsequently
develop five areas totalling 20,000 square kilometres
located in the heart of Libyas Sirte Basin. Shell was committed to invest USD 637 million in the first phase of the
joint venture.263
Already in March 2004, Malcolm Brinded, head of exploration and production at Shell, stated: We were in Libya
in the Fifties and we were in Libya in the Eighties for an
exploration programme, but for this one we came back
in 2001 and so this is the culmination of discussions over
that.264 International sanctions on Libya were lifted in
2003 and 2004.265 Thus, Shell had been fishing for contracts from Gaddafi a long time before international sanctions were lifted.
In April 2010, documents obtained by the UK newspaper
The Times revealed that the former UK prime minister
Tony Blair lobbied Colonel Muammar Gaddafi on behalf
of Shell. Shell had written a letter in draft form for Mr
Blair to write to Colonel Gaddafi. In May 2005, shortly
after Mr Blairs official letter was written, Shell secured
the deal.
Both letters were released after a lengthy Freedom of
Information process. The Cabinet Office of the UK government would release only a part of Mr Blairs official
letter. In its draft-letter, Shell tells the Prime Minister to
congratulate the Libyan leader on Revolution Day and
to comment on the remarkable year of progress for
Libya. In relation to its deal, the draft letter from Shell
said: Understand that all the terms of the agreement
have now been negotiated and approved ... now waiting
for [Libyan] Cabinet approval. The section on Shell in Mr
Blairs official letter sounded very similar to the draft: I
understand that the necessary technical discussions with
the relevant authorities in Libya have been completed
satisfactorily. All that is needed now are final decisions by
the [Libyan] General Peoples Committee to go ahead.
Shell declined to comment to The Times. The journalist
of The Times, David Robertson, later characterised Shells
draft-letter unusually informal or unusually forward in the
way that Shell thought it would be able to dictate British
foreign policy.266
In September 2009, The Times requested all communication between the UK Department for Business and the
following companies: BP, BG group and Shell (all oil and

gas companies), and defence company BAE Systems. A


limited number were released in December 2009. One
was an email from Shell to UK Trade & Investment dated
September 2004 complaining of slow progress with its
Libyan deal. Just months earlier Mr Blair and Colonel
Gaddafi had met in a tent outside Tripoli to end Libyas
diplomatic isolation.267

4) Shell and Dutch government lining up


against U.S. Iran sanctions
In January 2011, Wikileaks revealed that during 2009 the
Dutch government and Shell maintained the same position with regard to proposed U.S. legislation to impose
sanctions on oil companies producing oil/gas in Iran or
selling refined products to Iran. They thought this would
give Chinese and Russian companies access to Irans
hydrocarbon resources at the expense of U.S. and European competitors, among other Shell.268 Dutch parliamentarians asked the Dutch ministers of Foreign Affairs
and Economic Affairs to inform them on the extent to
which the Dutch foreign policy is tailored to the demands
of Shell, as seemed to be the case with regard to the
position on the U.S. Iran Sanctions Act. The ministers
answered that the Netherlands has, within the European
Union, always plead for severe sanctions against Iran.
However, the Netherlands had also always opposed the
extraterritorial impacts of U.S. sanctions, whenever these
are stricter than EU and/or UN measures. They would
always defend the business interests of Dutch companies
when these could be disproportionately affected.269

5) Invasion of Iraq: UK and Dutch governments understand Shells needs


In April 2011, it became publicly known that the exploitation of Iraqs oil reserves was discussed by UK government ministers and oil companies during months before
the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, in which the UK took a
leading role. Late 2002, at least five meetings were held
between civil servants, ministers, BP and Shell. The documents describing these meetings were released under
the Freedom of Information Act to oil campaigner Greg
Muttitt. It was a five-year struggle to get them, but they
provide evidence of what many of us suspected: that oil
was at the centre of the Blair governments thinking on
Iraq, he said.270
Minutes of a meeting with BP, Shell and BG (formerly British Gas) on 31 October 2002 read: Baroness Symons
[then the UK Trade Minister] agreed that it would be difficult to justify British companies losing out in Iraq in that
way if the UK had itself been a conspicuous supporter of
the US government throughout the crisis. After another
37

meeting in October 2002, the Foreign Offices Middle


East director at the time, Edward Chaplin, noted: Shell
and BP could not afford not to have a stake in [Iraq] for
the sake of their long-term future... We were determined
to get a fair slice of the action for UK companies in a
post-Saddam Iraq.
Shell has always denied that it has actually sought discussion with the UK government. In March 2003 it stated:
We have neither sought nor attended meetings with
officials in the UK Government on the subject of Iraq. The
subject has only come up during conversations during
normal meetings we attend from time to time with officials.271
To the UK government, Shell had always argued that
there should be a level playing field in the event of
post-war development of Iraqs oil fields.272 Shell had also
told the Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs that it would
welcome a lobby by the Netherlands for a level playing
field. There was concern at Shell that certain companies
would be favoured. In March 2003, the British ambassador Colin Budd told the Dutch top-official Rob Swartbol
that UK prime minister Tony Blair had addressed the concerns of Shell towards U.S. president Bush.273
In January 2010, the report of the independent inquiry
into the Dutch decision making in 2002/2003 towards
political support for the invasion of Iraq was published.
The report stated that trade or oil interests didnt seem
to have been part of discussions about Iraq in the Dutch
Cabinet.274 However, in March 2002 the former Dutch
minister of Foreign Affairs Jozias van Aartsen met with
the former U.S. Defence Minister Colin Powell and other
people in the Pentagon. There were also discussions
about a post-Saddam Iraq. Van Aartsen stated that Shell
had never asked him to mediate, but that he would have
been a lousy minister whenever he would not kept those
economic interests in mind.275
Both the Netherlands and the UK government were
among the very few European countries that were in
favour of U.S.-dominated military actions against the
Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. In the case of Iraq, Shell
doesnt seem to have interfered with Dutch and UK politics so much. The governments seemed to be already
aware of business possibilities of a post-Saddam Iraq.
Presently, Shell is already having a big role in increasing
Iraqs oil/gas output:
- December 2009, at an auction by the government, the
Majnoon oil field was awarded to a consortium of Shell
(45%), the Malaysian Petronas (30%) and Iraqs stateowned Missan Oil Company (25%). The proven reserve
of the Majnoon field is a whopping 12.6 billion barrels.
The deal intends a 20-year service and development
38

of the field. The project will require tens of billions of


dollars over the 20-year period. Shell and Petronas will
pay the investment, and after they have their money
back they will receive USD 1.39 per barrel. The consortium aims to increase production from 45,000 barrels
to 1.8 million barrels of oil per day within seven years.
Production from Majnoon involves the continuous flaring of natural gas produced with the oil. The flaring is
expected to rise as production increases.276
- November 2009, a consortium grouping ExxonMobil
and Royal Dutch Shell plc (15% share) won the right to
develop the 8.6 billion barrel West Qurna Stage 1 field.
Under the terms of the 20-year contract, the two companies aim to increase output from the current 280,000
barrels per day to 2.1 million barrels per day in seven
years. The companies will receive USD 1.9 for every
barrel they produce.277
- In September 2008, Shell signed a Heads of Agreement (HoA) with the Iraqi Ministry of Oil that sets out
the commercial principles to establish a joint venture
between Shell and the South Gas Company. Iraqs
South Gas Company would be the 51% majority shareholder in the joint venture, with Shell holding 44% and
Mitsubishi Corporation holding 5%. The joint venture
would gather, treat and process raw gas produced from
three fields within Basra and sell the processed natural gas (and associated products, such as condensate
and LPG) for use in the domestic and export markets.
As of March 2011, contract terms are still subject to
ongoing discussions with the Iraqi government.278 Iraqs
deal with Shell and Mitsubishi will cover the following
oil fields: Rumaila (being developed by BP and CNPC);
Zubair (being worked on by ENI, Occidental and
KOGAS); West Qurna (stage 1 in the hands of Exxon
and Shell, stage 2 in the hand of Lukoil and Statoil).279
Wikileaks revealed that at a Iraq petroleum conference,
held late 2008, participants expressed nearly unanimous concern about the HoA on southern gas between
Iraq and Shell. Though the Iraqis present were content
with the joint venture arrangement, others cited problems including a lack of transparency; the fact that HoA
precludes Iraq from talking to other international oil
companies about gas in the coming year, thereby creating a monopoly; the HoAs review of export options
when domestic concerns were a priority; and the fact
that the HoA dictates that the joint venture must sell
Iraqi gas domestically at international market rates.280
By the end of March 2011, Iraq and Shell were still discussing an obstacle about handling exports, so the USD
12 billion joint-venture deal is still not signed.281

Case 8

Drilling plans Alaskas Arctic Ocean


The Beaufort and Chukchi Seas on Alaskas Arctic coast
The marine environments of Americas portion of the Arctic Ocean the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas are among
the least understood in the world. This wide swath of icecovered ocean waters circulating between Canada and
Russia is home to one-fifth of the worlds polar bears,
as well as seals, migratory birds, bowhead whales, several
other types of whales, Pacific walrus and much more. The
Inupiat people who live on Alaskas North Slope call the
Arctic Ocean their garden. The bowhead whale is the
foundation for the Inupiat peoples subsistence culture.282

Threatened and endangered species


In November 2010, almost 485,000 square kilometres
along the north coast of Alaska were designated as critical habitat for the polar bear, as a result of a partial
settlement in an ongoing lawsuit brought by the Center
for Biological Diversity, the Natural Resources Defense
Council (NRDC) and Greenpeace against the U.S. federal
government. This designation under the Endangered
Species Act is intended to safeguard the habitat that is
vital to the polar bears survival and recovery. At the same
time, the federal government is considering whether to
allow oil companies, especially Shell, to drill for oil and
gas in the polar bears newly designated critical habitat in
the Chukchi and Beaufort seas off Alaska.283
The polar bear is listed as a threatened species under the
U.S. Endangered Species Act. The bowhead whales and
several other types of whales occurring in the Chukchi
and Beaufort seas are listed as endangered.284

Shell wants to drill


In 2008, Shell paid USD 2.1 billion for 275 leasing blocks
in the Chukchi sea. The company also has 137 leases in
the Beaufort sea, acquired in 2005. If viable reservoirs are
discovered through exploratory drilling, Shell would be
the main company producing gas and oil in the shallow
waters of Alaskas Arctic coast.285 According to a YouTubevideo on its plans, Shell wants to execute a safe, sustainable drilling program that benefits Alaska and the nation
with new jobs, new energy and new life for the TransAlaska pipeline.286 Shell wants to start drilling exploration
wells soon in both the Beaufort and Chukchi sea. After
the first exploration activities it will take up to ten years

before the production phase is started.287


It is estimated that production, mainly by Shell, in the
Beaufort and Chukchi Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)
could amount to almost 9 billion barrels of oil and 15 trillion cubic feet of gas through 2057.288

Shells incomplete oil spill preparedness


In November 2010, the NGO Pew Environment Group
published a technical report about oil spill prevention and
response in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas.289 According to this report, darkness, extreme weather and shifting
sea ice could delay efforts to stop an oil well blowout for
six months or more, trapping spewed oil in ice for up to
a decade. Shells spill response system was found to be
inadequate.290 The Pew Environment Group concluded
that at present, offshore oil and gas drilling in the Arctic
Ocean cannot be undertaken with any level of assurance
that the marine environment can be protected from a spill
or that industry can respond effectively. Based on the
reports technical analysis, the Pew Environment Group
documented several recommendations to reform the federal governments approval and oversight of Arctic Ocean
oil and gas activities.291
Shell submitted an Oil Discharge Prevention and Contingency Plan (C-plan) for the Chukchi sea to the relevant
federal agency MMS in May 2009. The MMS approved
the C-plan in December 2009.292 The plan was considered
sufficient to clean up a well blowout of 5,500 barrels per
day over 30 days. Shell finalized its plan in March 2010.293
The authors of the Pew report mention various arguments
why Shells plan is inadequate:
- The uncontrolled well flow may be significantly higher
than 5,500 barrels per day. Other North Slope wells
have had production rates in excess of 10,000 barrels
per day when first drilled.
- The two most recent well blowouts, the Montara platform blowout in the Timor Sea and the Deepwater
Horizon blowout in the Gulf of Mexico, involved explosions and fires that damaged the drilling structure. Shell
assumes that its Noble Discoverer drillship be undamaged by a well blowout, and could drill its own relief
well if a subsea blowout should occur. This is highly
unlikely.
- The Montara blowout took more than 70 days to con39

trol, in part because the first four attempts to drill a


relief well were unsuccessful. Thus, drilling the relief
well may take longer than 30 days.
- Shell assumes that it would contain or recover 90 percent of the oil offshore and another 5 percent nearshore. The much more moderate recovery estimates
from the Deepwater Horizon spill (20 percent contained
or recovered, 5 percent burned) make the 95 percent
assumption highly unrealistic.
- Shells blowout scenarios fall short of the regulatory
requirement to plan for a worst case discharge under
adverse weather conditions. Under this requirement,
adverse weather conditions means weather conditions found in the operating area that make it difficult
for response equipment and personnel to clean up
or remove spilled oil or hazardous substances. These
include, but are not limited to: fog, inhospitable water
and air temperatures, wind, sea ice, current, and sea
states.294 In the offshore Chukchi Sea, the combination
of wind, waves and dynamic sea ice can severely hamper or even preclude oil spill clean-up.
- A spill that occurs right before fall freeze-up (October
or November) might not allow enough time to drill a
relief well before sea ice conditions make it unsafe to
continue drilling. Under such a scenario, the well could
continue to blow out through the winter ice season
until well control could be attempted after the spring
thaw in May or June. Shell does include a response scenario nine days before freeze-up, but makes a number
of assumptions and concludes that at some point, the
ice will preclude further response and that it will track
the oil until spring. This is not an adequate response.
To the contrary of what Shell assumes, an oil spill occurring late in the drilling season could lead to oil trapped
under multiyear ice, remaining in the marine environment for many years.295

Government to re-assess spill risks


On 4 March 2011, the federal agency Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement
(BOEMRE, earlier MMS) determined that it would be
appropriate to update its spill risk assessment, and
include a very large oil spill analysis from an exploration well blowout in the Chukchi sea. BOEMRE has yet
to define the volume of such a spill. The agency had
received over 150,000 comments on a supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), which was opened for
public comments during late 2010.296 Due to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, many commenters requested an
analysis that takes into account the possibility of a blowout during exploration. The Environmental assessment
conducted by MMS on the Chukchi exploration plans had
ignored the risks from a blowout, stating, the probability
of a large spill occurring during exploration is insignificant
40

and, therefore, this [environmental assessment (EA)] does


not analyze the impacts of large spills from exploration
operations.297
BOEMRE anticipates that a final version of the supplemental EIS will be completed by October 2011, after a
public comment period. Exploration plans for the Chukchi
Sea may be submitted for the year 2012.298 The supplemental EIS was needed after Alaska Native and conservation groups had won a court case.
According to Leah Donahey, western Arctic and oceans
program director for the Alaska Wilderness League, a
plaintiff in the court case that is still pending, the initial
environmental study lacked information in hundreds of
areas. In a statement she said: BOEMRE must take into
account the fact that there is no known way to clean up
a spill in the Arctics icy, extreme conditions.299 Curtis
Smith, a spokesman for Shell Oil, stated: We already
took into account worst-case discharge when we built a
world-class Arctic oil spill response fleet for Alaska, so
its hard to imagine raising the bar even higher than we
already have in that arena.300

Shells incomplete air pollution permit


During the open water period from July to October 2011,
Shell wanted to send its Noble Discoverer drillship to drill
exploration wells in the Beaufort Sea.301 However, on 30
December 2010 the Environmental Appeals Board of the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ruled that
Shell had not provided enough information on air pollution. The permits for both Beaufort and Chukchi were
not in line with the U.S. Clean Air Act, and thus cancelled.
The Noble Discoverer and its associated fleet of support
ships, such as icebreakers and a supply ship, could not
run out. Alaska native and conservation groups had challenged the permits.302 The Environmental Appeals Board
received motions for modification and/or clarification
from Shell and the regional EPA-office that had earlier
issued the permits. On 10 February 2011, the Environmental Appeals Board rejected the requests from Shell.
Among other, the permits would not be reinstated and
new permits would have to be issued following applicable standards at the time of their issuance.303 Shell
now hopes to get the necessary permits in time to drill in
2012. Brendan Cummings, senior attorney for the Center
for Biological Diversity, one of the organisations that had
challenged the permits, stated: If Shell wants to be permitted fast, they need to submit a permit application that
actually complies with the law.304

Case 9

Sakhalin: the last 130 Western Gray Whales


The Sakhalin-2 project
According to its developers, the Sakhalin-2 project is the
worlds largest integrated oil and gas project. The capital
expenditure for this project amounted to USD 21.3 billion
from 2001 through 2009, while total costs exceeded USD
24 billion.305
The project is about extracting gas and oil offshore
Sakhalin Island, in the Russian Far East. The fields are
called Lunskoye (mostly gas) and Piltun-Astokhskoye
(mostly oil). The company Sakhalin Energy Investment
Company Ltd. (Sakhalin Energy) is the operator of the
project. Royal Dutch Shell is a partner and lead technical
adviser to the operator. Under the shareholding structure
of Sakhalin Energy, Gazprom holds 50% (plus one share),
Shell 27.5% (minus one share), Mitsui 12.5% and Mitsubishi 10%.306
The field development of the Sakhalin-2 project involved:
- two offshore platforms (Lunskoye-A and Piltun-Astokhskoye-B);
- an 800 kilometres onshore pipeline system to the south
of the island;
- offshore pipelines systems;
- an onshore processing facility;
- a liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant;
- offloading terminals for crude oil and LNG.307
At the end of 2010 the liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant
of Sakhalin Energy reached its full production capacity
of 9.6 million tonnes a year. Sakhalin Energy now has a
5% share in the worlds LNG market.308 The entire output is contracted under long-term arrangements (for 20
and more years). Around 65% of the Sakhalin LNG will
be supplied to customers in Japan. The rest is intended
for consumers in South Korea and North America.309 In
2009, Sakhalin Energy produced and offloaded over 5.5
million tonnes of oil and condensate. Oil produced from
the Molikpaq and the PA-B is blended with gas condensate from the Lunskoye field. The blend of crude is used
to produce petrol, kerosene, diesel fuel, and source
materials for the petrochemicals industry.310 Molikpaq
(Piltun-Astokhskoye-A) was the first offshore oil platform,
installed in 1998 during phase 1 of the Sakhalin 2 project.

Case: the Western gray whale is on the brink


of disappearing forever
The offshore gas and oil extraction by Sakhalin Energy
interferes with the feeding grounds of the Western gray
whale. Western gray whales feast throughout the summer and autumn in the waters off Sakhalin Island. The
estimated population size in 2009 was about 130 whales,
including only around 30 mature females. The population,
which is listed as critically endangered on the IUCN Red
List of Threatened SpeciesTM, could be driven to extinction by the mortality of just a small number of reproductive females.311
In 2006 the International Union for Conservation of
Nature (IUCN) created a panel of independent scientists
the Western Gray Whale Advisory Panel (WGWAP)
which provides scientific advice and recommendations
on the operational plans and mitigation measures by
Sakhalin Energy. On the first day of the 9th meeting of
the WGWAP (4-6 December 2010, Geneva, Switzerland)
Sakhalin Energy announced a plan to construct another
offshore oil and gas platform.312
The NGOs World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Pacific Environment, International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) and
Sakhalin Environment Watch strongly oppose the construction of a new platform and associated subsea pipeline. Subsequently, they also oppose the seismic survey
in preparation for this platform, which is announced by
Sakhalin Energy to take place during the summer of 2011.
The NGOs have urged the WGWAP to strongly recommend that Sakhalin Energy will not develop the extra
platform. To underpin their statement, the NGOs have
put forward several arguments:
- The acoustic pollution due to all platform-related activities near an area of high whale density might scare the
whales away from their feeding grounds.
- There are increasing risks that a vessel might strike a
whale.
- The risk of a Sakhalin-2 platform-related oil spill and/
or additional subsea pipeline accident risk increases by
50%.
- The marine ecosystem may get polluted through drilling.
- The Western gray whales are likely already stressed
from major seismic surveys which took place in 2010.
41

Assessment of the full range of impacts (including


impacts to feeding and reproduction) of the 2010 seismic surveys will not be possible until late 2011.
It is essential to, at first, evaluate the cumulative
impacts on the Western gray whales from the variety
of different off shore oil and gas activities off Sakhalin
Island.
There is no good reason why the seismic survey needs
to happen in 2011, as Sakhalin Energy has reiterated
that a decision whether or not to go ahead with building the new platform would not be taken for several
years.
Sakhalin Energy has already put out a tender for the
seismic survey and ruled out some design alternatives. The proposed route of the associated subsea
pipeline(s) have not been disclosed even in the most
cursory form. All this contradicts the repeated call for
information on company activities to be presented to
the WGWAP and observer organizations in a timely
manner.
The construction of a new platform fundamentally changes the full Sakhalin II project scope. Prior
WGWAP recommendations (which are required by
lenders) were based on an assumption that a total of
two platforms would be built. The same is true of prior
lender decisions, and Russian environmental regulatory decisions. Thus, Sakhalin Energys revelation brings
into question whether the WGWAP should review the
adequacy of prior recommendations.313

42

Case 10

The risky Kashagan oil field


A huge, expensive project

Endangered species

The Kashagan field is located in the Kazakhstan sector of the Caspian Sea and extends over a surface area
of approximately 75 kilometres by 45 kilometres. It is a
very large oil field. Some 11 billion barrels are considered
recoverable by the oil companies presently working on
it. The oil reservoir lies some 4.200 kilometres below the
shallow waters of the northern part of the Caspian Sea.314

The Kashagan oil field is located in the Northern part of


the Caspian Sea, within a nature reserve zone.321 The Caspian Seal and the giant Beluga sturgeon are the flagship
species of the area.322 In 2008, the International Union for
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) listed the Caspian Seal
as an endangered species. The seals occur throughout
the Caspian Sea, using the winter ice sheets as a surface
on which to give birth and nurse pups. Its population
has declined by 90 percent over the last 100 years due
to unsustainable levels of commercial hunting, habitat
degradation and pollution; it is still decreasing. Since
2005 the number of pups born has plummeted by a catastrophic 60 percent to just 6,000-7,000. A low survival
rate among pups has led researchers to fear there are
barely enough breeding females to keep the population
viable.323 The giant Beluga sturgeon is threatened due
to over-fishing and the loss of spawning grounds mainly
resulting from dam construction on the major rivers of the
Caspian.324 It is also listed as endangered by IUCN.325

The North Caspian Sea Production Sharing Agreement


(NCSPSA) is signed by Shell (16.81% stake), Eni (16.81%),
Total (16.81%), ExxonMobil (16.81%), KazMunaiGas
(16.81%), ConocoPhillips (8.4%) and Inpex (7.56%). Since
January 2009, the joint company North Caspian Operating Company B.V. (NCOC) is formally the operator of the
project.
Phase I of the project is estimated to cost USD 38 billion.315 Eni is responsible for the execution of the development of the first phase. Production during Kashagans
first phase is expected to be about 300,000 barrels per
day shortly after the launch at the end of 2012316, climbing via 370,000 barrels in 2014 to a maximum of 450,000
barrels a day during phase 1.317

Shell responsibilities
Shell and KazMunaiGas will be responsible for the production management after the start-up of phase 1.318 Shell
will also be responsible for the offshore development of
phase II of the project. The second phase could more
than double production to one million barrels per day. In
October 2010, Shell had reduced the cost estimate for
phase II from USD 68 billion to USD 50 billion.319 However, the Kazakh oil and gas minister Sauat Mynbayev
said late January 2011 that Kazakhstan will not approve
an existing proposal to develop the second phase of the
Kashagan oilfield due to huge costs: We are not about
to approve a phase that is inefficient from an economic
point of view.320 In July 2010, KazMunaiGas announced
that the second phase has been postponed until 20182019.

Extreme conditions, big risks


The shallow water depths (2-10 meters) and extreme
weather conditions (highs of 45 degrees Celsius in the
midst of summer, lows of minus 40 degrees Celsius in
winter), create a situation in which oil extraction and
transport is difficult and bears high risk of causing irreparable environmental devastation. Winter ice floes threaten to overrun the artificial islands constructed for extraction activities and the undersea pipelines that transport
the crude to shore. In 2005/2006, construction was forced
to stop for four months due to ice movement.326
Moreover, the fields reservoir is located at a subsea
depth of more than 4,000 metres with pressures reaching high levels of about 700-800 atmospheres. The reservoir fluid contains a high concentration of H2S (hydrogen sulphide). Combined with high temperatures, the
safe handling of crude production becomes extremely
difficult.327 Professor Muftakh Diarov, a member of the
National Academy of Sciences and working at the Atyrau
Institute of Oil and Gas, states: We have seen the Caspian Sea polluted with oil products five times over the
past few years, when Kashagan starts to be developed,
things may get far worse than that. The field is heavily
43

over-pressurised, temperatures are high, and the hydrogen sulphide content is very high. Diarov recalled an oil
blow-out at Tenghiz in the 1990s accompanied by a fire
that took more than 300 days to extinguish. It would
be impossible to contain such spills, and the Caspian Sea
might turn into a highly toxic puddle, he said. Other
Caspian nations, including Turkmenistan and Iran, would
lodge legal claims against Kazakhstan seeking huge compensation.328
A further complicating matter is what to do with the
associated gas, which includes the highly toxic hydrogen
sulphide. Most of this gas will be re-injected offshore to
improve oil recovery rates. According to some Russian
and Kazakh scientists, including Professor Diarov, the
combined extraction of oil under huge pressure and reinjection of gas under high pressure increases the potential for technogenic earthquakes.329 Phase I does not foresee to re-inject all the associated gas. Some will be sent
to the onshore processing facility where the hydrogen
sulphide is removed. The processed, or sweetened, gas
will be used for onshore and offshore power generation
and some will be marketed. Phase I will produce an average of 1.1 millions of tonnes of sulphur per year due to
the removal of the hydrogen sulphide. Although the joint
venture plans to market the sulphur that is produced,
it is recognised that sometimes sulphur will have to be
stored.330 The storage and processing constitute risks of
pollution, such as emissions of hydrogen sulphide to the
air. According to Shell, a childrens party balloon filled
with gas from the Kashagan field will, whenever the contents escape into a room of ten by ten meters, directly kill
the people in it.331

Lack of informing stakeholders


Despite repeated requests from local activists, oil companies including Shell have made little information available
with regard to their assessment of the severe risks of the
Kashagan project, and how they mitigate any adverse
social and environmental risks. A multi-stakeholder
approach, as often recommended as an important tool
with respect to corporate social responsibility, has not
been followed. The public has not even been involved in
the development of the projects Environmental Impact
Assessment.332

44

Case 11

A toxic legacy in Curaao


Curaao and its oil refinery
Curaao is an island in the southern Caribbean Sea, off
the Venezuelan coast. It is a constituent country of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands and has a land area of 444
square kilometres. As of January 2010, its population
amounted to around 142,000 people. Prior to 10 October 2010, when the Netherlands Antilles were dissolved,
Curaao was administered as the Island Territory of Curaao, one of five island territories of the former Netherlands Antilles.333
From 1918 until 1985, Shell owned and operated the Isla
oil refinery in Curaao. During this period, the refinery has
been one of the most important lifelines of Curaao. For
example, in the early fifties it employed more than 12,000
people out of the total island population of 110,000 people. The refinery generated the foreign exchange necessary to finance the imports the island could not produce
itself. 334 In the beginning of the eighties, Shell-companies
provided for 33% of the islands Gross National Product.
Apart from the refinery, Shell had a local sales company,
an oil storage/transshipment company, and a shipping
company on the island. Shell was very important to Curaao, and the government of Curaao treated Shell kindly.
In 1980, a former director of Shell declared towards a
reporter of the Dutch newspaper NRC: The Antillean
government? We were that government.335
Historically, the Isla refinery formed a link in the Shellchain of Venezuelan upstream oil production and North
American downstream activities. The nationalisation of
Shells oil production in Venezuela in 1975 and a change
in the U.S.-energy policy towards more independence,
left the refinery with supply and demand problems. With
the exception of 1979 through 1981, the refinery operated at substantial losses during the ten years before 1985.
In 1975, the refinery had 2,800 employees. In 1984, there
were still only 1,900 employees.336
The Isla-refinery, presently still operated, is located along
the Schottegat harbour, in the south of Curaao, near the
capital city Willemstad. The refinery and harbour are surrounded by residential areas.
In 1985, Shell sold its refinery and other companies/assets
in Curaao for the symbolic price of four Netherlands
Antillean guilders. The buyers were the legal entities
Netherlands Antilles and island territory Curaao.337 Sub-

sequently, Curaao leased the refinery and terminals to


the Venezuelan state-owned petroleum company PDVSA.
Since 1985 and ongoing, PDVSA operates the refinery.338

Yes, Shell created a mess


The agreement in 1985 between Shell and the Netherlands Antilles and Curaao stated that the buyers had to
abstain irrevocably and unconditionally from existing and
future claims for pollution or other environmental effects
exerted by Shells companies in the Netherlands Antilles.339 During 67 years of operation, Shell created a toxic
legacy in Curaao. The refining business has caused massive pollution to air, soil and water.
Several reports describe the pollution:
- The most known pollution comprises the asphalt lake.
During World War II, the Isla refinery produced a large
quantity of gasoline and aviation fuel for the Allied
forces. The market for these light oil products outperformed the market for heavy oil products. Thus, the
remainder of the heavy Venezuelan oil (an estimated 1.5 million tonnes of asphalt) was dumped in the
Buscabaai next to the refinery. Still, the lake is filled
with about one million tonnes of asphalt.340 According to Shell, during the period 1983-1985 a contractor
(Nareco) has scooped 0.5 million tonnes of asphalt for
use in the refinery on a financially sound basis for Shell
as well the contractor. The contract with the contractor
and the asphalt lake were included in the sale by Shell
of its Curaao assets in 1985. The estimate in 1985 was
that in the next ten years everything would be cleaned
up. The asphalt-sand mix at the bottom of the lake
would eventually be burned in an incinerator. After
Shell left, the clean-up/processing went on for a few
years, but was then stopped.341
- A chemical waste lake at the same location of the
asphalt lake, is another heritage from Shell. Especially
sulphuric acid used during lubricant manufacture was
dumped. Asphalt is also found at this lake because
since 1942 Shell also used it as a dump for asphalt.
The lake comprises about 34,000 tonnes of chemical
waste342 and is also referred to as the acid tar pond.343
- At the beginning of 1983, the Dutch governmental agency DCMR also looked at the air pollution and
stench caused by the Shell refinery. DCMR dedicated
its report to the inhabitants of the residential areas
45

downwind the refinery: Marchena, Wishi, Gasparitu and


Rosendaal. The agency wished that they may be freed
from the ever-present stench and soot.344 The amount
of residents living downwind of the refinery in 1997 was
estimated at almost 17,000345, figures for the period
before 1985 could not be found during the course of
writing this report.
According to the authors, the high sulphur dioxide
(SO2) concentrations in residential areas were due
to: 1) the processing of Venezuelan crude oil, which
has a high sulphur content, 2) the burning of residues emitted through low chimneys and 3) the burning of hydrogen sulfide in the gas flares at the refinery
site. The measured SO2-concentrations in residential
areas downwind the refinery were found to be four
times greater than accepted standards elsewhere in
the world, increasing respiratory diseases among the
people constantly breathing these concentrations. The
authors noted that during the period 1973-1978 the
air pollution was even worse. Through the building of
higher chimneys and the emittance of less SO2, the
concentrations had gone down since that period. The
completion of new chimneys during 1983 would further
decrease the SO2-concentrations.
The population downwind of the refinery experienced
soot as the biggest nuisance. A combination of soot
and SO2 has a greater impact on public health than the
two components separately, the authors wrote. Soot
was also emitted through the chimneys and the gas
flares. Stench was mainly caused by the discharge of
process water, leakages, and drain- and venting operations. In general, the authors attributed the environmental impact to a combination of outdated, poorly
maintained equipment and insufficient attention by the
operating personnel.346
- In 1992, the Dutch Ministry of Transport, Public Works
and Water Management advised the Curaao Ports
Authority about the pollution of the Schottegat harbour. The ministry stated that the refinery site was saturated with crude oil, petroleum products, impurities in
the crude oil, and substances used in the production
process. The groundwater was thought to be severely
polluted. Over large areas of the refinery site, a thick
scum of oil was assumed to be present on the groundwater. Cruising along the quays of the refinery, a continuous flow of oil from the ground could be seen seeping
through the quay structures, especially at the west-side
of the Schottegat harbour. The refinery site also comprises ditches and canals, through which oil was expected to seep out.347
- In 1983, the Dutch governmental agency DCMR conducted an environmental study with regard to the refinery. At the time of ownership change in 1985, also an
environmental audit has taken place. According to the
Dutch Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water
Management, it could be deduced from these reports
46

that there have been many direct discharges in the


Schottegat harbour. These were caused by a large number of oil spills, leaking tanks, and an outdated refinery lacking facilities considered normal in the Netherlands. The discharge of cooling water (about 3,500 m3
per hour) at the west of the Schottegat harbour caused
much pollution and stench. The sediment in the western part of the harbour was found to be severly polluted with oil. According to Dutch standards, the sediment sludge should be classified as chemical waste.348
- Near the Valentijn bay, Shell has contaminated around
four hectares of ground due to the dumping of barrels
filled with sulphur, catalyst and other toxic substances.
Similar waste was also dumped into sea at the south
side as well as north side of Curaao.349

Evaluating the sale, ten years after


In 1996, a documentary on the environmental legacy
from Shells operations in Curaao was shown on Dutch
television. Interviewed were: Ms. Maria Liberia Peters
(prime minister of the Netherlands Antilles during the
deal in 1985), Mr. Errol Cova (member for Curaao in the
negotiation team during 1985), Mr. Bart de Beer (director general affairs Shell Netherlands during 1996), Mr. R.
Gonesh (a former technical supervisor for Shell Curaao)
and Mr. Edgar Leito (a former environmental chief at Shell
Curaao).
The interviewees provide some insight in why the environmental legacy had been included to the deal between
Shell, The Netherlands Antilles and Curaao:
- Mr. Cova stated that, during the negotiations, Shell had
brought forward that the asphalt lake would be beneficial to Curaao. This was confirmed by others. The
discussions during the deal were never about cleaning
up pollution, it was about exploitation of the lake. Later
on, it turned out that the lake was too polluted, and
that it was not economically justified to process it.
- Ms. Peters stated that, during the negotiations, it was
thought that cheap fuel could be processed from the
lake, while at that time the island used expensive fuel
for water production. She also claimed that in 1985
Curaao didnt really have a choice to make. It could
have decided to take legal action against Shell. Then
it would have to close down the refinery and defy all
social and economic consequences. The other choice
was to keep the business going, so that the island
could diversify its economy, but obviously with the risk
that it might later end up with certain environmental
consequences. She also stated that, in order to submit
a claim against Shell, the island would have needed millions to hire expensive consultants to quantify the damage. Certainly with the perspective of refinery closure,
the country could not afford such expensive consultants.

- According to Mr. Gonesh, the people on the Curaao


side of the negotiation table had not kept any records.
Shell had however kept records, as a well-documented
and bright company. Shell knew what it had put in the
ground. It knew about the asphalt lake and the groundwater problems due to oil leaks. Mr. Gonesh took the
view that Shell had handled in a criminal way, by transferring the pollution to simpletons which did not have
the resources and know-how for a clean-up.
- Mr. De Beer stated that he could hardly imagine that
people from Curaao would feel cheated by the deal.
In fact, Curaao acquired the main economic engine
of the island for free. Curaao was very happy with the
results of the agreement, according to De Beer. The
Dutch government, which advised Curaao, was also
very happy with it. Mr. de Beer could not explain why
the acid tar lake, which he thought to be originating
from about the fifties, was not cleaned up earlier by
Shell. According to him, it was envisaged that an incinerator would be built, after processing the asphalt lake.
This incinerator could be used to burn the remains of
the asphalt lake (the tar sandy mix at the bottom of the
lake) and the acid tar.350

Shell to be held liable?


The government of Curaao is currently reconsidering the
future of the Isla refinery.351 As of April 2011, the refinery
is still causing severe air pollution. In December 2009,
the Dutch parliament adopted a resolution, ordering
an investigation on the possibilities to recover the costs
associated with the remediation of the damage from,
among other, Shell.352 In the same month, the parliament
of the Netherlands Antilles adopted a similar resolution,
stating that Shell should be held liable for the serious
damage caused to the earth and sea bed, groundwater,
seawater and inland waters of Curaao.353 In a civil case,
Shell could still be held liable for negligence at the cost
of the environment and the health of people.

47

Case 12

Philippines: an oil depot


amidst a crowd of people
Pandacan
Pandacan is a residential neighbourhood of the city of
Manila, Philippines. It has a population of about 84,000
people. Together with the oil companies Chevron Philippines and Petron, Shells subsidiary Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (from here: Shell) owns a massive oil
depot within Pandacan. The oil depot comprises about
36 hectares.354 According to Shell, the oil depot supplies
50% of the countrys total demand for fuel, 90% of lubricant requirements, and 25% of chemical needs nationwide, including strategic industries such as aviation and
shipping.355

Removal of the oil depot


For many years a large number of citizens have demanded that Shell should remove its oil depot from the neighbourhood of Pandacan, for health and safety reasons.
Already in November 2001, the city of Manila passed
ordinance number 8027 requiring Shell, Chevron and
Petron to relocate their oil depots outside of Manila city
limits. However, over the years Shell has been able to get
court orders and city ordinances overruled. In February
2011, the company reiterated its intention to stay in Pandacan.356

OECD complaint
On 15 May 2006, the Netherlands-based Milieudefensie (Friends of the Earth Netherlands) and Friends of the
Earth International, together with Philippines-based The
Fenceline Community For Human Safety and Environmental Protection, filed a complaint against Shell at the
Dutch National Contact Point for upholding the OECD
Guidelines for multinational enterprises. According to the
complainants, Shell had violated several sections of the
OECD Guidelines. The groups accused Shell of improper political involvement, insufficient communication with
local communities, and violation of health and safety standards in the period 2002-2006.357 In July 2009, the Dutch
NCP issued its final statement. Although the NCP con48

cluded that it could not find evidence for improper political involvement, it raised several areas of concern with
regard to Shells operations in Pandacan:
- The NCP strongly recommended Shell to expand its
community information program to other potentially
affected Pandacan communities, and not limit the program to the three communities immediately adjacent to
the oil depot.
- Community members were generally unaware of specific plans by Shell to mitigate hazards or respond to
emergencies, according to the NCP.
- Between 2003 and 2006, Shell implemented several
measures to enhance the health, safety, security and
environment of neighbouring communities.358 The NCP
took the view that Shell did not make the adjustments
as a matter of good practice, as recommended in the
OECD Guidelines. Instead, they were imposed by ordinances of the City Council. The NCP also noted that it
had not been able to check the health and safety situation before the adjustments were made.
- The Dutch agency DCMR, invited by the NCP, concluded after an assessment that the present operations
were in accordance with internationally accepted health
and safety criteria. Shell only allowed the NCP to view
the most general conclusions of the DCMR report. The
NCP concluded that the high standards for disclosure of environmental reporting, as encouraged by the
OECD Guidelines, had not been met in this specific
occasion.
- A newly designed oil depot with a concomitant amount
of traffic similar to the Pandacan site would be inconceivable in the Netherlands, according to the NCP.
- The NCP stated that Shell has not been able to avoid
the impression of having a secondary agenda in its contacts with the local chiefs, the Barangays. Under politicized circumstances community support may be perceived by opponents as bribery or undue involvement in local decision making.
- The NCP was surprised by (and regretted) Shells reluctance to share more information with its stakeholders.359

Press releases

Shell has stated that removing would induce extra costs,


which it would have to pass on to the market.

In a press release, Shell welcomed the final statement


of the NCP as a 100% victory. It claimed that the NCP
had stated that Shell was not involved in bribery or corruption, engaged appropriately with local politics, had
made efforts to engage the local community and that the
Dutch NCP had dismissed all allegations of the complainants.360 All these statements have never been made by
the NCP, thus the press release did not show any respect
for the findings of the NCP. The complainants issued a
more nuanced press release, and sharply criticized Shells
reluctance to fully engage in the NCP-process. Vladimir
Cabigao from the Philippine NGO Social Justice Society stated: Shell completely disrespects both the NCP
and its neighbours. They were obstructive all through the
process. Anne van Schaik of Friends of the Earth Netherlands stated: This case proves that voluntary OECD
Guidelines do not work. The NCP was powerless towards
the whims of a corporation like Shell.361 According to
Social Justice Society there was also deception committed by the oil companies, as they were telling people that
if they would be moved out, the fenceline communities
would also be moved out.

Moving out may still happen


In March 2007, the Philippine Supreme Court ordered
that ordinance number 8027 of November 2001 should
be implemented, and that, subsequently, Shell should
leave Pandacan. Shell appealed. In February 2008 the
Supreme Court reconfirmed its decision, adding that
Shell should come up with a relocation plan within 90
days.
In May 2009, however, the Manila City Council approved
a new Ordinance (7177). This ordinance repealed Ordinance 8027 and superseded the Supreme Court order.
The oil companies were allowed to continue operations
in Pandacan. The ordinance faced opposition from a
number of Pandacan and other Manila residents. Among
other, there were protests in front of the oil depot, a
march to city hall led by church groups and statements by
Catholic church leaders.362
Social Justice Society and former Manila Mayor Lito
Atienza had been standing against each other in Supreme
Court during 2007 and 2008. Now they jointly contest the
latest city Ordinance 7177 for being illegal and unconstitutional. Their petition is still pending resolution before
the Supreme Court.363 The oil companies have moved to
intervene, which was granted by the court. In the meantime, the oil company Petron has announced that it will
have relocated from Pandacan in the beginning of 2016.
49

Endnotes
1 Royal Dutch Shell plc, Financial and Operational Information
20052009, May 2010, <http://www.faoi.shell.com/2009/servicepages/downloads/files/all_shell_faoi_09.pdf>, page 65.
Royal Dutch Shell plc, Annual report and form 20-F for the
year ended December 31, 2010, 15 March 2011, <http://
www-static.shell.com/static/investor/downloads/financial_
information/reports/2010/2010_annual_report_20f_01.pdf>,
page 31
2 Profundo, report (in Dutch) Winsten uit Shells olie- en gaswinning in Nigeria, een onderzoeksrapport voor Zembla,
June 2010, <http://zembla.vara.nl/fileadmin/uploads/VARA/
be_users/documents/tv/pip/zembla/2010/Winsten_Shell_
Nigeria_Zembla_100611.pdf>
3 Shell operates Nigerias largest oil and gas joint venture, the
Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), on behalf
of the government-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (55%), Shell (30%), Total (10%) and Agip (5%). The
other two main businesses of Shell in Nigeria include the
100% Shell-owned Shell Nigeria Exploration & Production
Company (SNEPCo). SNEPCo is the operator and 55% owner
of the offshore deep-water Bonga field, and also owns part
of the offshore Erha field. The third main business comprises
Shells 25.6% interest in Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas Limited
(NLNG), which exports LNG around the world. Royal Dutch
Shell plc, Sustainability report 2009, May 2010, <http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2009/servicepages/welcome.html>,
page 22.
4 Niger Delta Development Commission, Niger Delta Regional
Development Master plan, Chapter 1, 2006, <http://www.
nddc.gov.ng/NDRMP%20Chapter%201.pdf>
5 Shell in Nigeria, briefing note Shell interests in Nigeria, April
2011, <http://www-static.shell.com/static/nga/downloads/
pdfs/briefing_notes/shell_interests.pdf>
6 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human
Development Index (HDI) 2010 Rankings, 4 November
2010, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics>
7 Transparency International, 2010 Corruption Perceptions
Index (CPI), 26 October 2010, <http://www.transparency.org/
policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results> The index
score is on a scale from 0 (perceived to be highly corrupt) to
10 (perceived to have low levels of corruption). Nigeria scores
2.4 points.
8 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human
Development Report Nigeria. 2008 2009, Achieving growth
with equity, November 2009, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/
reports/national/africa/nigeria/name,14593,en.html>
9 The Federal Republic of Nigeria, USD 500,000,000 6.75 per
cent. Notes due 2021, 26 January 2011, <http://www.rns-pdf.
londonstockexchange.com/rns/1261A_1-2011-1-26.pdf>

50

10 Amnesty International, report Petroleum, Pollution and Poverty in the Niger Delta, June 2009, <http://www.amnesty.
org/en/library/asset/AFR44/017/2009/en/e2415061-da5c44f8-a73c-a7a4766ee21d/afr440172009en.pdf>
11 Amnesty International, press release Nigeria: Amnesty International says pollution has created human rights tragedy in
the Niger Delta, 30 June 2009, <http://www.amnesty.org/
en/for-media/press-releases/nigeria-amnesty-internationalsays-pollution-has-created-human-rights-tr>.
12 Shell in Nigeria, briefing note Environmental Performance
oil spills, April 2011, <http://www-static.shell.com/static/
nga/downloads/pdfs/briefing_notes/env_perf_oilspills.pdf>
13 Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC),
brochure Nigeria brief, the environment, May 1995, not
available on the internet.
14 Professor Richard Steiner, Anchorage, Alaska USA, report on
behalf of Friends of the Earth Netherlands Double standard, Shell practices in Nigeria compared with international
standards to prevent and control pipeline oil spills and the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, November 2010, <http://www.
milieudefensie.nl/publicaties/downloads/20101109%20rapport%20Double%20Standard.pdf>, Appendix A. A barrel is
equal to 159 litres.
15 Professor Richard Steiner, Anchorage, Alaska USA, report on
behalf of Friends of the Earth Netherlands Double standard, Shell practices in Nigeria compared with international
standards to prevent and control pipeline oil spills and the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, November 2010, <http://www.
milieudefensie.nl/publicaties/downloads/20101109%20rapport%20Double%20Standard.pdf>, Appendix A.
Shell in Nigeria, briefing note Environmental Performance
oil spills, April 2011, <http://www-static.shell.com/static/
nga/downloads/pdfs/briefing_notes/env_perf_oilspills.pdf>
16 Shell, Doing business in Nigeria: challenges and questions,
Session Transcript, 23 July 2009, <http://www.shelldialogues.com/sites/default/files/NigeriatranscriptV2_0.pdf>,
page 10.
BBC News, Shell should end Nigeria abuse, 30 June 2009,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8126353.stm>
Shell in Nigeria, briefing note Environmental performance,
managing oil spills, May 2009, not available on the internet.
17 Shell in Nigeria, briefing note Environmental Performance
oil spills, May 2010, not available on the internet.
18 Shell Nigeria, Oil spills in the Niger Delta Monthly Data,
<http://www.shell.com.ng/home/content/nga/environment_
society/respecting_the_environment/oil_spills/monthly_data.
html>
19 Shell in Nigeria, briefing note Environmental performance,
managing oil spills, May 2009, not available on the internet.
Shell in Nigeria, briefing note Environmental Performance
oil spills, May 2010, not available on the internet.
20 Shell in Nigeria, briefing note Environmental Performance
oil spills, April 2011, <http://www-static.shell.com/static/
nga/downloads/pdfs/briefing_notes/env_perf_oilspills.pdf>
Shell Nigeria, Oil spills in the Niger Delta Monthly Data,
<http://www.shell.com.ng/home/content/nga/environment_
society/respecting_the_environment/oil_spills/monthly_data.
html>

21 Amnesty International and Friends of the Earth International,


Complaint to the UK and Dutch National Contact Points
under the Specific Instance Procedure of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 25 January 2011, <http://
oecdwatch.org/cases/Case_197>
22 OECD, Member countries, accession candidate countries,
enhanced engagement countries, <http://www.oecd.org/
countrieslist/0,3351,en_33873108_33844430_1_1_1_1_1,00.
html> as viewed on 15 March 2011.
23 OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,
2008, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf>
24 Friends of the Earth Netherlands, Documents on the Shell
legal case, <http://www.milieudefensie.nl/wat-wij-doen/themas/internationaal/projecten/shell/olielekkages/documentson-the-shell-legal-case>
25 Friends of the Earth Netherlands, Documents on the Shell
legal case, <http://www.milieudefensie.nl/wat-wij-doen/themas/internationaal/projecten/shell/olielekkages/documentson-the-shell-legal-case>
26 Royal Dutch Shell, Shell Sustainability Report 2006, <http://
www.shell.com/static/envirosoc-en/downloads/sustainability_
reports/shell_sustain_report_2006.pdf>, page 33.
27 Christian Aid, report Behind the mask, The real face of corporate social responsibility, January 2004, <http://www.
scribd.com/doc/38236692/Behind-the-Mask>, page 30.
28 Professor Richard Steiner, Anchorage, Alaska USA, report on
behalf of Friends of the Earth Netherlands Double standard, Shell practices in Nigeria compared with international
standards to prevent and control pipeline oil spills and the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, November 2010, <http://www.
milieudefensie.nl/publicaties/downloads/20101109%20rapport%20Double%20Standard.pdf>, page 35.
29 Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth Nigeria,
factsheet harmful gas flaring in Nigeria, November 2008.
<http://www.foe.org/pdf/GasFlaringNigeria_FS.pdf>
30 The World Bank, Global Gas Flaring Reduction, Estimated
Flared Volumes from Satellite Data, <http://web.worldbank.
org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTOGMC/EXTGGFR/0,,co
ntentMDK:22137498~menuPK:3077311~pagePK:64168445~
piPK:64168309~theSitePK:578069,00.html> as viewed on 15
February 2011 (2005-2009) and 22 April 2011 (2006-2010).
31 The World Bank, Global Gas Flaring Reduction, Estimated
Flared Volumes from Satellite Data, 2005-2009, updated 15
February 2011, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTOGMC/EXTGGFR/0,,contentMDK:2213749
8~menuPK:3077311~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~the
SitePK:578069,00.html>
U.S. Energy Information Administration, Top World Oil Producers, 2009, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/countries/>
32 It should be noted that, according to the study at the request
of the European Commission, oil production from Canadian
tar sands is even worse than Nigerian oil. For oil sands, the
well-to-tank emissions the climate emissions that can be
influenced by oil companies are almost 2.5 times higher
than the average fuel used in the European Union. For Nigerian oil, the emissions are around two times higher than the
average fuel used in the European Union. Source: Adam

R. Brandt, Department of Energy Resources Engineering,


Stanford University, USA, Upstream greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions from Canadian oil sands as a feedstock for European refineries, 18 January 2011, <https://circabc.europa.
eu/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/db806977-6418-44db-a46420267139b34d/Brandt_Oil_Sands_GHGs_Final.pdf>, pages
37 and 40.
33 Jacobs Consultancy and Life Cycle Associates LLC, prepared
for the Alberta Energy Research Institute, report Life Cycle
Assessment Comparison of North American and Imported Crudes, July 2009, <http://www.albertainnovates.ca/
media/15753/life%20cycle%20analysis%20jacobs%20final%20
report.pdf>, page 206. It should be noted that the calculation
is based on gas flaring levels in Nigeria in 2004: 23 billion m3
gas versus 2,332,000 barrels oil production per day.
34 Calculations are based on Nigerian flaring levels in the early
2000s. National Energy Technology Laboratory, An evaluation of the extraction, transport and refining of imported
crude oils and the impact on life cycle greenhouse gas emissions, 27 March 2009, <http://www.netl.doe.gov/energyanalyses/pubs/PetrRefGHGEmiss_ImportSourceSpecific1.
pdf>
Adam R. Brandt, Department of Energy Resources Engineering, Stanford University, USA, Upstream greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions from Canadian oil sands as a feedstock
for European refineries, 18 January 2011, <https://circabc.
europa.eu/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/db806977-641844db-a464-20267139b34d/Brandt_Oil_Sands_GHGs_Final.
pdf>, page 37 (107.3 grams of CO2 per megajoule, versus
87.1 grammes).
35 Adam R. Brandt, Department of Energy Resources Engineering, Stanford University, USA, Upstream greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions from Canadian oil sands as a feedstock for
European refineries, 18 January 2011, <https://circabc.europa.eu/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/db806977-6418-44dba464-20267139b34d/Brandt_Oil_Sands_GHGs_Final.pdf>,
page 37 (107.3 grams of CO2 per megajoule, versus 87.1
grammes).
36 United Nations Development Programme, Niger Delta
human development report, 2006, <http://web.ng.undp.
org/reports/nigeria_hdr_report.pdf>, page 11.
37 Federal High Court, Benin judicial division, Suit no. FDC/B/
CS/53/05, Mr Jonah Gbemre (for himself and as representing Iwherekan Community in Delta State, Nigeria) versus Shell
Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd., Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation and the Attorney General of the Federation, 14 November 2005, <http://www.
climatelaw.org/cases/case-documents/nigeria/ni-shell-nov05judgment.pdf>
38 Vanguard, Nigeria loses USD 150 bn to gas flare in 36 yrs,
15 July 2008, statistics released by the President of the Nigerian Gas Association (NGA), <http://www.energy-pedia.com/
article.aspx?articleid=130140>
39 Climate Justice Programme and Environmental Rights Action
/ Friends of the Earth Nigeria, report Gas flaring in Nigeria:
a human rights, environmental and economic monstrosity,
June 2005, <http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/country/nigeria/cases/case-documents/nigeria/gas-flaring-in-nigeria.pdf>

51

40 Shell in Nigeria, briefing note Gas flaring, April 2011,


<http://www-static.shell.com/static/nga/downloads/pdfs/
briefing_notes/gas_flaring.pdf>
41 The Federal Republic of Nigeria, USD 500,000,000 6.75 per
cent. Notes due 2021, 26 January 2011, <http://www.rnspdf.londonstockexchange.com/rns/1261A_1-2011-1-26.pdf>
42 Royal Dutch Shell plc, Sustainability report 2010, 14 April
2011, <http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2010/servicepages/welcome.html>, page 29.
43 Royal Dutch Shell plc, Sustainability report 2010, 14 April
2011, <http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2010/servicepages/welcome.html>, page 19.
44 Royal Dutch Shell plc, Sustainability report 2009, May 2010,
<http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2009/servicepages/welcome.html>, pages 22 and 23.
45 Royal Dutch Shell plc, Sustainability Report 2008, May
2009, <http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2008/servicepages/downloads/files/entire_shell_ssr_08.pdf>, page 29.
46 Shell Companies in Nigeria, briefing note Gas flaring, April
2011, <http://www-static.shell.com/static/nga/downloads/
pdfs/briefing_notes/gas_flaring.pdf>
47 Shell Nigeria, Shell Nigeria Annual Report 2006, 2007,
<http://narcosphere.narconews.com/userfiles/70/2006_shell_
nigeria_report.pdf>
48 Shell Companies in Nigeria, briefing note Harnessing Nigerias gas, May 2009, no more available on the internet.
49 U.S. Embassy Abuja, Nigeria, cable Shell MD discusses the
status of the proposed petroleum industry bill, 20 October
2009, <http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/10/09ABUJA1907.
html>
50 Royal Dutch Shell plc, Sustainability report 2010, 14 April
2011, <http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2010/servicepages/welcome.html>, page 19.
51 Shell Companies in Nigeria, briefing note Gas flaring, April
2011, <http://www-static.shell.com/static/nga/downloads/
pdfs/briefing_notes/gas_flaring.pdf>

2010, <http://www.iucnael.org/index.php?searchword=Nig
eria&ordering=&searchphrase=all&Itemid=6&option=com_
search&lang=en>
Paul Samual Tamuno, LLM Oil & Gas Law, University of Aberbeen: Assistant Lecturer, Rivers State University of Science
and Technology, Port Harcourt, Nigeria, Legal response to
Gas Flaring in Developed and Developing Countries, a comparative analysis of Nigeria, United Kingdom and Norway,
November 2010, <http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/gateway/index.php?category=44>
57 Shell, response to AI report Petroleum, Pollution and Poverty in the Niger Delta, 8 July 2009, <http://www.businesshumanrights.org/Documents/ShellNigeria>
58 WAC Global Services, working paper for SPDC Peace and
security in the Niger Delta, Conflict Expert Group baseline
report, December 2003, <http://www.shellnews.net/2007/
shell_wac_report_2004.pdf>
59 WAC Global Services, working paper for SPDC Peace and
security in the Niger Delta, Conflict Expert Group baseline
report, December 2003, <http://www.shellnews.net/2007/
shell_wac_report_2004.pdf>
60 WAC Global Services, working paper for SPDC Peace and
security in the Niger Delta, Conflict Expert Group baseline
report, December 2003, <http://www.shellnews.net/2007/
shell_wac_report_2004.pdf>
61 Financial Times, Shell gives Nigerian work to militants companies, 27 April 2006, <http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/0237da00-d58a-11da-93bc-0000779e2340.
html#axzz1FYFlSOtt>
Africa Confidential, Stealing, fighting, seeking power, 17
March 2006, <http://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/1728/No-Title>
62 U.S. Embassy Abuja, Nigeria, cable Nigeria: Shell claims
production unaffected by recent attacks; comments on
growing violence in the delta, 19 September 2008,
<http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/09/08LAGOS368.html>

52 Shell Nigeria, news release SPDC Announces Gas Flaring


Reduction Projects, 19 May 2010, <http://www.shell.com.
ng/home/content/nga/aboutshell/media_centre/news_and_
media_releases/2010/flaring_reduction.html>

63 Royal Dutch Shell plc, Code of conduct; Helping you live


by our Core Values and our General Business Principles,
2010, <http://www-static.shell.com/static/aboutshell/downloads/who_we_are/code_of_conduct/code_of_conduct_english_2010.pdf>

53 Shell Companies in Nigeria, briefing note Gas flaring, April


2011, <http://www-static.shell.com/static/nga/downloads/
pdfs/briefing_notes/gas_flaring.pdf>

64 Royal Dutch Shell plc, Sustainability report 2009, May 2010,


<http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2009/servicepages/welcome.html>, page 6.

54 Royal Dutch Shell plc, Sustainability report 2010, 14 April


2011, <http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2010/servicepages/welcome.html>, page 29.

65 U.S. Embassy Abuja, Nigeria, cable Nigeria: Shell


briefs ambassador on oil gas issues, 20 February 2009,
<http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/02/09ABUJA259.html>

55 Royal Dutch Shell plc, Financial and Operational Information


20052009, May 2010, <http://www.faoi.shell.com/2009/servicepages/downloads/files/all_shell_faoi_09.pdf>, page 65.
Royal Dutch Shell plc, Annual report and form 20-F for the
year ended December 31, 2010, 
15 March 2011,
<http://www-static.shell.com/static/investor/downloads/financial_information/reports/2010/2010_annual_report_20f_01.
pdf>, page 31

66 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, press


release Oil Services Companies and a Freight Forwarding
Company Agree to Resolve Foreign Bribery Investigations
and to Pay More Than $156 Million in Criminal Penalties,
4 November 2010, <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/
November/10-crm-1251.html>

56 Olubayo Oluduro, PhD candidate, University of Ghent, Belgium, Bureaucratic Rhetoric of Climate Change in Nigeria:
International Aspiration versus Local Realities, 7 December

52

67 Royal Dutch Shell plc, Annual report and form 20-F for the
year ended December 31, 2010, 15 March 2011, <http://
www-static.shell.com/static/investor/downloads/financial_
information/reports/2010/2010_annual_report_20f_01.pdf>,
page 15.

68 Royal Dutch Shell plc, Sustainability report 2010, 14 April


2011, page 7, <http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2010/servicepages/welcome.html>
69 Shell Nederland B.V., magazine Shell Venster Geglobaliseerde boetes, January/February 2011, <http://www-static.
shell.com/static/nld/downloads/venster_2011/venster_jan_
feb.pdf>
70 The Sunday Times, Governor hid stolen GBP20m in UK
banks, 18 November 2007, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/
tol/news/uk/article2890961.ece>
71 Financial Times, Chevron and Shell payments to Nigeriaowned company probed, 17 November 2007, <http://www.
ft.com/cms/s/0/191175a0-94b1-11dc-9aaf-0000779fd2ac.
html?nclick_check=1#axzz1CqK7UALQ>
72 Nigerian Army Intelligence Corps, Investigation report into
the theft and sale of arms to Niger Delta gunrunner by an
officer and some soldiers of the 1 base ordnance depot Kaduna, November 2007, <http://www.saharareporters.com/
sites/default/files/uploads/Azazi.pdf>
73 The Telegraph, Nigerian politician faces extradition to Britain
on money laundering charges, 14 May 2010, <http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/7720634/Nigerian-politician-faces-extradition-to-Britainon-money-laundering-charges.html>
Sahara Reporters, Text of Justice Marcel Awokulehins
$5 million-dollar Kangaroo ruling that discharged Ibori
of 170-count charges of corruption, stealing and abuse of
office, 17 December 2009, <http://www.saharareporters.
com/report/text-justice-marcel-awokulehins-5-million-dollarkangaroo-ruling-discharged-ibori-170-count-c>
74 The Telegraph, WikiLeaks cables: Nigeria pressured UK to
drop charges against politician, 4 February 2011, <http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8303381/
WikiLeaks-cables-Nigeria-pressured-UK-to-drop-chargesagainst-politician.html>
U.S. Embassy London, UK, cable Nigeria: an on-going UK
priority, May 2009, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
wikileaks-files/london-wikileaks/8305255/NIGERIA-AN-ONGOING-UK-PRIORITY.html>
75 The Goldman Environmental Prize, 2005 recipient Ken SaroWiwa, <http://www.goldmanprize.org/node/160>
76 Center for Constitutional Rights and EarthRights International. The case against Shell, <http://wiwavshell.org>
EarthRights International, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch/Shell,
<http://www.earthrights.org/legal/wiwa-v-royal-dutchshell>
as viewed on 8 April 2011.
77 The Independent on Sunday, Andy Rowell and Eveline Lubbers Ken Saro-Wiwa was framed, secret evidence shows,
5 December 2010, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/africa/ken-sarowiwa-was-framed-secret-evidenceshows-2151577.html>
Scribd, Deposition of Boniface Ejiogu, May 2004, <http://
www.scribd.com/doc/44608946/Wiwa-Versus-Shell-Deposition-Highlights>
78 Greenpeace Brazil, report contamination in Paulnia by
aldrin, dieldrin, endrin and other toxic chemicals produced
and disposed of by Shell Chemicals of Brazil, 24 April 2001,
<http://archive.greenpeace.org/toxics/reports/shellreport.
pdf>

79 Friends of the Earth (FOE); Advocates for Environmental


Human Rights; Coletivo Alternative Verde; Community Inpower Development Association; Concerned Citizens of Norco;
Environmental Rights Action (FOE Nigeria); Global Community Monitor; GroundWork (FOE South Africa); Humane Care
Foundation Curaao; Louisiana Bucket Brigade; Niger-Delta
Project for the Environment, Human Rights and Development; Pacific Environment Watch; Sakhalin Environment
Watch; Shell to Sea; South Durban Community Environmental
Alliance; and United Front to Oust Oil Depots, report Lessons Not Learned, The Other Shell Report 2004, June 2005,
<www.foe.co.uk/resource/reports/lessons_not_learned.pdf>
80 Procuradoria Regional do Trabalho 15a Regio, imprensa
noticias Shell e Basf so condenadas ao pagamento de
indenizaes que ultrapassam RUSD 1 bilho; empresas
devem pagar tratamento de sade de ex-trabalhadores, 19
August 2010, <http://www.prt15.mpt.gov.br/site/noticias.
php?>
81 Greenpeace Brazil, report contamination in Paulnia by
aldrin, dieldrin, endrin and other toxic chemicals produced
and disposed of by Shell Chemicals of Brazil, 24 April 2001,
<http://archive.greenpeace.org/toxics/reports/shellreport.
pdf>
82 Greenpeace Brazil, report contamination in Paulnia by
aldrin, dieldrin, endrin and other toxic chemicals produced
and disposed of by Shell Chemicals of Brazil, 24 April 2001,
<http://archive.greenpeace.org/toxics/reports/shellreport.
pdf>
83 World Health Organization, Chemical hazards in drinkingwater aldrin and dieldrin, 2003, <http://www.who.int/
water_sanitation_health/dwq/chemicals/aldrindieldrin/en/>
84 Environmental Health Fund, Book Riding The Dragon, Royal
Dutch Shell & The Fossil Fire, author Jack Doyle, 2002,
<http://gcmonitor.org/section.php?id=19>
85 Reuters, Shell called negligent in Brazil toxic waste case,
8 November 2001, <http://www.theglobalreport.org/
issues/148/environment.html>
86 June Maria Passos Rezende, Tese de Doutorado apresentada Ps-Graduao da Faculdade de Cincias Mdicas da Universidade Estadual de Campinas para obteno do ttulo de Doutor em Sade Coletiva, rea de Epidemiologia, Caso Shell/Cyanamid/BASF: epidemiologia
e informao para o resgate de uma precauo negada,
approved 23 February 2005, <http://cutter.unicamp.br/
document/?code=vtls000366157>
87 Instituto Observatrio Social, Justia obriga Shell e Basf a
pagar plano de sade vitalcio para trabalhadores expostos
contamina 14 January 2009, <http://www.observatoriosocial.org.br/portal/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=
3500&Itemid=112>
88 American Public Health Association, Occupational Health
& Safety Section, Annual Awards Luncheon, 10 November
2009, <http://www.apha.org/NR/rdonlyres/5C95520C-56654F05-8EED-8E3CC0C586D4/0/AwardsProgram2009.pdf>
American Public Health Association, News Release, 23
October 2009, <http://www.defendingscience.org/upload/
OHS-Awardee-News-Release-FINAL-2009.pdf>

53

89 Exchange rate at 19 August 2010: one Brazilian real


is 0,44601 Euro, <http://www.exchange-rates.org/
HistoricalRates/E/BRL/8-19-2010>
90 Procuradoria Regional do Trabalho 15a Regio, imprensa
noticias Shell e Basf so condenadas ao pagamento de
indenizaes que ultrapassam BRL 1 bilho; empresas devem
pagar tratamento de sade de ex-trabalhadores, 19 August
2010, <http://www.prt15.mpt.gov.br/site/noticias.php?mat_
id=10362>
91 Procuradoria Regional do Trabalho 15a Regio, imprensa
noticias Shell e Basf so condenadas ao pagamento de
indenizaes que ultrapassam RUSD 1 bilho; empresas
devem pagar tratamento de sade de ex-trabalhadores, 19
August 2010, <http://www.prt15.mpt.gov.br/site/noticias.
php?mat_id=10362>
92 Reuters, Shell and BASF to appeal ruling on pollution in Brazil, 22 August 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE67L0WY20100822>
93 Bloomberg, Shell, Basf Ordered to Pay USD 354 Million in
Brazil Plant Contamination Case, 20 August 2010, <http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-20/shell-basf-orderedto-pay-354-million-in-brazil-plant-contamination-case.html>
94 Procuradoria Regional do Trabalho 15a Regio, imprensa
noticias Tribunal mantm condenao de Shell e Basf ao
pagamento de BRL 1 bilho; custeio de tratamento de sade
continua obrigatrio, 4 April 2011, <http://www.prt15.gov.
br/site/noticias.php?mat_id=11011>
95 Royal Dutch Shell plc, Annual report and form 20-F for the
year ended December 31, 2010, 15 March 2011, <http://
www-static.shell.com/static/investor/downloads/financial_
information/reports/2010/2010_annual_report_20f_01.pdf>,
page 141
96 Government of Alberta, Inventory of Major Alberta Projects, December 2010, <http://www.alberta-canada.com/
documents/SP_MajorAlbertaProjects.pdf>, page 3.
Exchange rate at 31 December 2010: one Canadian
USD is USD 1.002, <http://www.exchange-rates.org/
HistoricalRates/A/CAD/12-31-2010>
97 Royal Dutch Shell, Shell and the Canadian oil sands, 2009
factbook, <http://www-static.shell.com/static/can-en/downloads/aboutshell/aosp/unique_resource/shell_oil_sands_factbook.pdf>
98 Royal Dutch Shell, Shell oil sands expansion now on-stream,
15 September 2010, <http://www.shell.com/home/content/
investor/news_and_library/2010_media_releases/oil_sands_
expansion_on-stream_15092010.html>
Shell, Oil Sands Performance Report, Muskeg River Mine &
Scotford Upgrader, November 2010, <http://www-static.shell.
com/static/can-en/downloads/aboutshell/our_business/oil_
sands/oil_sands_performance_report.pdf>
99 Royal Dutch Shell, presentation Marvin Odum, Director
Upstream Americas, Upstream Americas: Profitable growth
in Shell Heartland, 28 September 2010, <http://www-static.
shell.com/static/investor/downloads/presentations/2010/na_
visit/marvin_odum_na_visit_transcript_28092010.pdf>
Royal Dutch Shell plc, North America investor visit, presentation John Abbott, executive vice president heavy oil, Heavy
oil in Shell, 30 September 2010, <http://www-static.shell.

54

com/static/investor/downloads/presentations/2010/na_visit/
john_abbott_na_visit_presentation_30092010.pdf>
100 Royal Dutch Shell, presentation Marvin Odum, Director
Upstream Americas, Upstream Americas: Profitable growth
in Shell Heartland, 28 September 2010, <http://www-static.shell.com/static/investor/downloads/presentations/2010/
na_visit/marvin_odum_na_visit_transcript_28092010.pdf>
Shell Canada, Peace River In Situ Expansion Carmon Creek
Project, public disclosure, November 2009, <http://wwwstatic.shell.com/static/can-en/downloads/aboutshell/our_
business/e_and_p/carmon_creek_disclosure_nov_09.pdf>
101 Government of Alberta, Inventory of Major Alberta Projects, December 2010, <http://www.alberta-canada.com/
documents/SP_MajorAlbertaProjects.pdf>
102 Royal Dutch Shell, presentation Marvin Odum, Director
Upstream Americas, Upstream Americas: Profitable growth
in Shell Heartland, 28 September 2010, <http://www-static.shell.com/static/investor/downloads/presentations/2010/
na_visit/marvin_odum_na_visit_transcript_28092010.pdf>
Royal Dutch Shell plc, North America investor visit, presentation John Abbott, executive vice president heavy oil,
Heavy oil in Shell, 30 September 2010, <http://www-static.shell.com/static/investor/downloads/presentations/2010/
na_visit/john_abbott_na_visit_presentation_30092010.pdf>
103 Adam R. Brandt, Department of Energy Resources Engineering, Stanford University, USA, Upstream greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions from Canadian oil sands as a feedstock for European refineries, page 37, 18 January 2011,
<https://circabc.europa.eu/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/
db806977-6418-44db-a464-20267139b34d/Brandt_Oil_
Sands_GHGs_Final.pdf> (107.3 grammes of carbon dioxide
(CO2) per megajoule of energy versus 87.1 grammes).
104 Royal Dutch Shell plc, North America investor visit, presentation John Abbott, executive vice president heavy oil,
Heavy oil in Shell, 30 September 2010, <http://www-static.shell.com/static/investor/downloads/presentations/2010/
na_visit/john_abbott_na_visit_presentation_30092010.pdf>
105 Royal Dutch Shell, Report on Royal Dutch Shell plc & oil
sands, March 2010, <http://www-static.shell.com/static/
investor/downloads/news_and_library/report_royaldutchshell_oil_sands_march2010.pdf>
IHS Cambridge Energy Research Associates (IHS CERA),
Report Oil Sands, Greenhouse Gases, and US Oil Supply:
Getting the Numbers Right, September 2010, <https://
www.cera.com/aspx/cda/client/knowledgeArea/serviceDescription.aspx?KID=238>
106 Adam R. Brandt, Department of Energy Resources Engineering, Stanford University, USA, Upstream greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions from Canadian oil sands as a feedstock
for European refineries, 18 January 2011, <https://circabc.
europa.eu/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/db806977-641844db-a464-20267139b34d/Brandt_Oil_Sands_GHGs_Final.
pdf>, page 37 (107.3 grammes of carbon dioxide (CO2) per
megajoule of energy versus 87.1 grammes).
107 Government of Alberta, Alberta moves to forefront in
carbon capture and storage, 8 October 2009, <http://
www.alberta.ca/acn/200910/270703512366B-9522-07D43AD4E71EE1B8F5A7.html>

108 Royal Dutch Shell plc, North America investor visit, presentation John Abbott, executive vice president heavy oil,
Heavy oil in Shell, 30 September 2010, <http://www-static.shell.com/static/investor/downloads/presentations/2010/
na_visit/john_abbott_na_visit_presentation_30092010.pdf>
109 Blue Source Canada ULC, Quantifying the GHG Reduction
Benefits from the Quest Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)
Project, November 2010, <http://www-static.shell.com/
static/can-en/downloads/aboutshell/our_business/oil_sands/
quest/12_quest_vol_1_appx_k_ghg_reduction_benefits.
pdf>
110 Royal Dutch Shell plc, North America investor visit, presentation John Abbott, executive vice president heavy oil,
Heavy oil in Shell, 30 September 2010, <http://www-static.shell.com/static/investor/downloads/presentations/2010/
na_visit/john_abbott_na_visit_presentation_30092010.pdf>
111 Royal Dutch Shell, Report on Royal Dutch Shell plc & oil
sands, March 2010, <http://www-static.shell.com/static/
investor/downloads/news_and_library/report_royaldutchshell_oil_sands_march2010.pdf>
112 Sb, As, Be, Cd, Cr, Cu, Pb, Hg, Ni, Se, Ag, Tl, and Zn. United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Priority pollutants, <http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/
methods/pollutants.cfm>
113 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America, Erin N. Kelly, David W. Schindler,
Peter V. Hodson, Jeffrey W. Short, Roseanna Radmanovich,
and Charlene C. Nielsen, Oil sands development contributes elements toxic at low concentrations to the Athabasca
River and its tributaries, 2 July 2010, <http://www.pnas.
org/content/107/37/16178>
114 Pembina Institute, Briefing Note Canadian Aboriginal Concerns With Oil Sands, A compilation of key issues, resolutions and legal activities, September 2010, <http://pubs.
pembina.org/reports/briefingnoteosfntoursep10.pdf>
115 Cosan, Cosan and Shell announce Razen, 14 February 2011, <http://www.cosan.com.br/cosan/web/index_
en.html>
116 Shell and Cosan, press release Shell and Cosan sign joint
venture, 25 August 2010, <http://www.cosan.com.br/
cosan2009/web/arquivos/Press%20release%20ingles.pdf>
Cosan, Cosan and Shell announce Razen, 14 February 2011, <http://www.cosan.com.br/cosan/web/index_
en.html>
Thomson Reuters, Cosan and Shell Joint Venture
Conference Call (English), 25 August 2010, <http://
www.alacrastore.com/research/thomson-streeteventsCOSAN_S_A_INDUSTRIA_E_COMERICO_Cosan_and_
Shell_Joint_Venture_Conference_Call_English-T3325526>
Cosan, Annual report 2010, September 2010, <http://
www.cosan.com.br/cosan2009/web/arquivos/PDF_Cosan_
RA_ING%5B1%5D.pdf>
Royal Dutch Shell, Presentation Evandro Gueiros to socially
responsible shareholders on the proposed Shell and Cosan
Downstream & Biofuels JV in Brazil, 9 November 2010,
<http://www-static.shell.com/static/investor/downloads/presentations/2010/cosan_evandro_gueiros_09112010.pdf>
117 Shell and Cosan, press release Shell and Cosan sign joint
venture, 25 August 2010, <http://www.cosan.com.br/

cosan2009/web/arquivos/Press%20release%20ingles.pdf>
Cosan, news, 23 February 2011, <http://www.mzcenter.
com.br/Arquivos/345521.pdf>
Reuters, UPDATE 1-Cosan to buy Zanin cane mill for USD
224.7 mln, 7 January 2011, <http://af.reuters.com/article/
energyOilNews/idAFN0722878820110107?pageNumber=2
&virtualBrandChannel=0&sp=true>
118 UNICA, Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association, book
From Alcohol to Ethanol: a Winning Trajectory, November
2010, <http://english.unica.com.br/multimedia/>
119 Shell and Cosan, press release Shell and Cosan sign joint
venture, 25 August 2010, <http://www.cosan.com.br/
cosan2009/web/arquivos/Press%20release%20ingles.pdf>
120 Cosan, Annual report 2010, September 2010, <http://
www.cosan.com.br/cosan2009/web/arquivos/PDF_Cosan_
RA_ING%5B1%5D.pdf>
121 NovAmrica, Sustainability Report 2008, August 2008,
<http://www.novamerica.com.br/institucionalen/shared/
docs/Sustainability_report_2008.pdf>, page 49.
122 Federal Prosecutor in Mato Grosso do Sul, Note of clarification, 18 May 2010,
<http://www.prms.mpf.gov.br/servicos/
sala-de-imprensa/noticias/2010/05/nota-deesclarecimento/?searchterm=Cosan>
123 Projeto Excelncias Transparncia Brasil, Jos Roberto
Teixeira, <http://www.excelencias.org.br/@candidato.
php?id=9320&cs=12>
124 Cosan, Sustainability report 2010, 23 September 2010,
<http://www.cosan.com.br/cosan2009/web/arquivos/
Cosan_Sustainability_Report_2010_English.pdf>, page 77.
125 Canasat Project, sugarcane maps, <http://150.163.3.3/
canasat/mapa/>
126 Deputado Z Teixeira of Mato Grosso do Sul, Polmica sobre demarcao expe procurador a duras crticas, 13 May 2010, <http://www.zeteixeira.com/site/
noticias/?id=821&>
127 Survival International, report to the UN Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (UN CERD) Violations
of the rights of the Guarani of Mato Grosso do Sul state,
Brazil, March 2010, <http://assets.survival-international.
org/documents/207/Guarani_report_English_MARCH.pdf>
128 Brazil, Ministrio da Justia, Fundao Nacional do ndio
(Funai) , Portaria N 3.219, 7 October 2009, <http://www.
funai.gov.br/licitacao/2010/anexos/Guyraroka_portaria.pdf>
129 Conselho Indigenista Missionrio (CIMI), Newsletter 884:
Limits of one Guarani-Kaiow area published, 9 October
2009, <http://www.cimi.org.br/?system=news&action=read
&id=4197&eid=275>
130 Amnesty International, report We know our rights and we
will fight for them indigenous rights in Brazil the GuaraniKaiow, November 2010, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/
library/info/AMR19/014/2010/en>
131 United Nations, Human Rights Council, special Rapporteur
on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, James Anaya, Report on the
situation of human rights of indigenous peoples in Brazil,
19 August 2009, <http://unsr.jamesanaya.org/docs/countries/2009_report_brazil_en.pdf>

55

132 Canasat Project, rea de Cana Safra e Reforma na Regio


Centro-Sul, <http://150.163.3.3/canasat/eng/tabelas.php>
The Canasat project provides information about the spatial
distribution of cultivated sugarcane area in Central-South
States of Brazil using remote sensing satellite images. The
project is an initiative of the National Institute for Space
Research (INPE), and, among other, the sugarcane producer
association Unica.
133 Cosan, Investor and Analyst Presentation Renewable
Energy for a Better World, 26 August 2008, <http://www.
cosan.com.br/cosan2009/web/arquivos/Cosan_Apresentacao_APIMEC_20080826_en.pdf>, page 16.
Ministrio da Agricultura, Pecuria e Abastecimento,
Zoneamento Agroecolgico da Cana de Acar, 2009,
<http://www.cnps.embrapa.br/zoneamento_cana_de_
acucar/1BR_ZAE_Cana.pdf>
134 NGO Reprter Brasil, Brazil of Biofuels Impacts of Crops
on Land, Environment and Society Sugarcane 2009, January 2010, <http://www.reporterbrasil.org.br/documentos/
brazil_of_biofuels_v6.pdf>
135 Cosan, Sustainability report 2010, 23 September 2010,
<http://www.cosan.com.br/cosan2009/web/arquivos/
Cosan_Sustainability_Report_2010_English.pdf>
136 Folha.com, article Acordo mina programa de combate a
trabalho escravo, 28 February 2011, <http://www1.folha.
uol.com.br/poder/881861-acordo-mina-programa-de-combate-a-trabalho-escravo.shtml>
Blog do Leonardo Sakamoto, among other coordinator
of the NGO Reprter Brasil Acordo mina programa de
combate a trabalho escravo, 28 February 2011, <http://
blogdosakamoto.uol.com.br/2011/02/28/acordo-mina-programa-de-combate-a-trabalho-escravo/>
137 NGO Reprter Brasil, Brazil of Biofuels Impacts of Crops
on Land, Environment and Society Sugarcane 2009, January 2010, <http://www.reporterbrasil.org.br/documentos/
brazil_of_biofuels_v6.pdf>
138 Ministrio do Trabalho e Emprego, Trinta e oito mil trabalhadores escravos resgatados, 3 January 2011, <http://
www.mte.gov.br/sgcnoticia.asp?IdConteudoNoticia=7561&
PalavraChave=escravo>
139 Ministrio do Trabalho e Emprego, Portaria do MTE cria
cadastro de empresas e pessoas autuadas por explorao
do trabalho escravo, <http://portal.mte.gov.br/trab_escravo/portaria-do-mte-cria-cadastro-de-empresas-e-pessoasautuadas-por-exploracao-do-trabalho-escravo.htm> as
viewed on 14 March 2011.
140 U.S. Consulate So Paulo, Brazil, cable Sugar, ethanol, charges of slavery, and tip strategy in Brazil, 8 August 2008, <http://213.251.145.96/
cable/2008/08/08SAOPAULO432.html>
141 Agncia BOM DIA, MPT flagra condies degradantes de
trabalho, 26 July 2010, <http://www.redebomdia.com.br/
Noticias/Dia-a-dia/26002/MPT+flagra+condicoes+degradan
tes+de+trabalho>
142 Cosan, Sustainability report 2010, 23 September 2010,
<http://www.cosan.com.br/cosan2009/web/arquivos/
Cosan_Sustainability_Report_2010_English.pdf> Cosan
states that the wage threshold stands at BRL 529.00 to BRL

56

582.00, depending on the region. This relates to EUR 237


respectively EUR 261. Exchange rate at 1 September 2010:
one Brazilian real is EUR 0,44850, <http://www.exchangerates.org/HistoricalRates/E/BRL/9-01-2010>
143 Cosan, Sustainability report 2010, 23 September 2010,
<http://www.cosan.com.br/cosan2009/web/arquivos/
Cosan_Sustainability_Report_2010_English.pdf>
144 NGO Reprter Brasil, Brazil of Biofuels Impacts of Crops
on Land, Environment and Society Sugarcane 2009, January 2010, <http://www.reporterbrasil.org.br/documentos/
brazil_of_biofuels_v6.pdf>
145 NGO Reprter Brasil, Brazil of Biofuels Impacts of Crops
on Land, Environment and Society Sugarcane 2009, January 2010, <http://www.reporterbrasil.org.br/documentos/
brazil_of_biofuels_v6.pdf>
146 Ministrio Pblico do Trabalho em Campinas, Por descumprimento de acordo, grupo COSAN far doao de BRL 26
mil para entidades de Araatuba, 18 June 2010, <http://
www.pgt.mpt.gov.br/noticias/noticias-das-prts/por-descumprimento-de-acordo-grupo-cosan-fara-doacao-de-26-milpara-entidades-de-aracatuba.html>
147 Ministrio Pblico do Trabalho em Campinas, COSAN doa
BRL 2,5 milhes para entidades da regio de Araatuba por
descumprir acordo, 5 July 2010, <http://www.pgt.mpt.gov.
br/noticias/noticias-das-prts/cosan-doa-25-milhoes-paraentidades-da-regiao-de-aracatuba-por-descumprir-acordo.
html>
148 NGO Reprter Brasil, Cosan viola acordos trabalhistas
e aceita desembolsar BRL 3,4 milhes, 3 August 2010,
<http://www.reporterbrasil.org.br/agrocombustiveis/exibe.
php?id=137>
149 NGO Reprter Brasil, Cosan viola acordos trabalhistas
e aceita desembolsar BRL 3,4 milhes, 3 August 2010,
<http://www.reporterbrasil.org.br/agrocombustiveis/exibe.
php?id=137>
150 NGO Reprter Brasil, Cosan viola acordos trabalhistas
e aceita desembolsar BRL 3,4 milhes, 3 August 2010,
<http://www.reporterbrasil.org.br/agrocombustiveis/exibe.
php?id=137>
151 Cosan, Vasco Dias, CEO Razen, presentation Synergies of
the JV with Shell, 2 March 2011, <http://www.cosan.com.
br/cosan2009/web/arquivos/2011_03_02-Sinergias_Shell_
vf_ingles.pdf>
152 UNICA, Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association, book
From Alcohol to Ethanol: a Winning Trajectory, November
2010, <http://english.unica.com.br/multimedia/>
153 Cosan, Vasco Dias, CEO Razen, presentation Synergies of
the JV with Shell, 2 March 2011, <http://www.cosan.com.
br/cosan2009/web/arquivos/2011_03_02-Sinergias_Shell_
vf_ingles.pdf>
154 UNICA, Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association, book
From Alcohol to Ethanol: a Winning Trajectory, November
2010, <http://english.unica.com.br/multimedia/>
Cosan, Vasco Dias, CEO Razen, presentation Synergies of
the JV with Shell, 2 March 2011, <http://www.cosan.com.
br/cosan2009/web/arquivos/2011_03_02-Sinergias_Shell_
vf_ingles.pdf>

155 UNICA, Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association, book


From Alcohol to Ethanol: a Winning Trajectory, November
2010, <http://english.unica.com.br/multimedia/>
Cosan, Vasco Dias, CEO Razen, presentation Synergies of
the JV with Shell, 2 March 2011, <http://www.cosan.com.
br/cosan2009/web/arquivos/2011_03_02-Sinergias_Shell_
vf_ingles.pdf>
156 Cosan, Sustainability Report 2010, 23 September 2010,
<http://www.cosan.com.br/cosan2009/web/arquivos/
Cosan_Sustainability_Report_2010_English.pdf>, page 27
and 33
157 Cosan, press release Comunicado ao Mercado, 28 August
2008, <http://www.acionista.com.br/home/cosan/280808_
constituicao_subsidiaria.pdf>
Ministerio da Fazenda, Brazil, Ato de concentracao no.
08012.009447/2008-82, Cosan S.A. Industria e comercio e
Mansilla Participacoes Ltda., 25 september 2008, <http://
www.cade.gov.br/temp/t111201114054332.pdf>
158 Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America, Audited Statutory Basis Financial Statements as of
December 31, 2009 and 2008 and for the three years ended
December 31, 2009, 12 April 2010, <http://www.tiaa-cref.
org/ucm/groups/content/@ap_ucm_p_tcp/documents/document/tiaa01007823.pdf>
159 Cosan, presentation Ricardo Mussa (Radar) at Cosan Day,
New York, 26 October 2010, <http://www.mzweb.com.br/
cosan2009/web/arquivos/Cosan_Radar_Propriedades_Agricolas_20101209_en.pdf>
160 Shell and Cosan, press release Shell and Cosan sign joint
venture, 25 August 2010, <http://www.cosan.com.br/
cosan2009/web/arquivos/Press%20release%20ingles.pdf>
Cosan, news, 23 February 2011, <http://www.mzcenter.
com.br/Arquivos/345521.pdf>
Reuters, UPDATE 1-Cosan to buy Zanin cane mill for USD
224.7 mln, 7 January 2011, <http://af.reuters.com/article/
energyOilNews/idAFN0722878820110107?pageNumber=2
&virtualBrandChannel=0&sp=true>
161 UNICA, Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association, book
From Alcohol to Ethanol: a Winning Trajectory, November
2010, <http://english.unica.com.br/multimedia/>
162 Canasat Project, sugarcane tables, <http://www.dsr.inpe.
br/laf/canasat/tabelas.html>
163 Canasat Project, sugarcane tables, <http://www.dsr.inpe.
br/laf/canasat/tabelas.html>
164 Government of Brazil, Sugarcane Agroecological Zoning:
To Expand Production, Preserve Life and Ensure a Future,
September 2009, <http://www.unica.com.br/download.
asp?mmdCode=8A1CFBDE-9A8B-4419-8986-47A8B8F8DEA6>
165 NGO Reprter Brasil, Brazil of Biofuels Impacts of Crops
on Land, Environment and Society Sugarcane 2009, January 2010, <http://www.reporterbrasil.org.br/documentos/
brazil_of_biofuels_v6.pdf>
166 Government of Brazil, Sugarcane Agroecological Zoning:
To Expand Production, Preserve Life and Ensure a Future,
September 2009, <http://www.unica.com.br/download.
asp?mmdCode=8A1CFBDE-9A8B-4419-8986-47A8B8F8DEA6>

167 Institute for International Trade Negotiations (ICONE), Sao


Paulo, Brazil, email to the European Commission, Consultation on Indirect Land Use Change Impacts of Biofuels,
comments by Institute for International Trade Negotiations
(ICONE), 31 October 2010, <http://www.iconebrasil.org.
br/arquivos/noticia/2135.pdf>, page 23.
168 FAO Stat, Crops, <http://faostat.fao.org/site/567/DesktopDefault.aspx?PageID=567#ancor> as viewed on 23
March 2011.
169 FAO Stat, Livestock Primary, <http://faostat.fao.org/
site/569/default.aspx#ancor> as viewed on 23 March 2011.
170 FAO Stat, TradeSTAT, Crops and livestock products, <http://faostat.fao.org/site/535/DesktopDefault.
aspx?PageID=535#ancor> as viewed on 23 March 2011.
Categories: Total Meat + (Total); Soy beans; Sugar Raw Centrifugal; Soybean oil; Sugar Refined.
171 Ministrio da Agricultura, Pecuria e Abastecimento
(MAPA), Projees do Agronegcio. Brasil, 2009/10 a
2019/20, March 2010, <http://www.cifeijao.com.br/downloads/projecoes_agronegocio.pdf>
172 Friends of the Earth Europe, From forest to fork, How cattle, soy and sugar are destroying Brazils forests and damaging the climate, December 2010, <www.foeeurope.org/
agriculture/FromForestToFork.pdf>
173 Environmental Science & Technology, Christel Cederberg,
U. Martin Persson, Kristian Neovius, Sverker Molander,
and Roland Clift, article Including Carbon Emissions from
Deforestation in the Carbon Footprint of Brazilian Beef,
31 January 2011, <http://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/
es103240z>
174 Brazilian government, Transcript of President Lulas address
in Copenhagen, 17 December 2009, <http://www.cop15brazil.gov.br/en-US/?page=noticias/pres-lula-speech>
175 National Institute for Space Research (INPE), Amazon
deforestation has been decreased 14% INPE estimates
6,451 km2 for 2009/2010 periods, 1 December 2010,
<http://www.inpe.br/ingles/news/news_dest154.php>
176 Brasil Ministrio do Meio Ambiente (MMA), MMA divulga
queda no desmatamento nos biomas Amaznia e Cerrado, 6 April 2011, <http://www.mma.gov.br/sitio/index.
php?ido=ascom.noticiaMMA&codigo=6602>
177 Brasil Ministrio do Meio Ambiente (MMA), Plano de Ao
para Preveno e Controle do Desmatamento e das Queimadas no Cerrado, September 2010, <http://www.mma.
gov.br/estruturas/182/_arquivos/ppcerrado_15set_impressao_sem_crditos_182.pdf>
178 Agricultural Systems, Martinelli, L.A., et al, Sugar and ethanol production as a rural development strategy in Brazil: Evidence from the state of So Paulo. January 2011, <http://
iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/23132/AS_Martinelli,_Garrett,_Ferraz,_Naylor_-_Sugar_cane_and_development_-_Agricultural_Systems_-_2011.pdf>
179 Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, Land and power
in Brazil, March 2011, <http://iatp.typepad.com/thinkforward/2011/03/land-and-power-in-brazil.html>

57

180 U.S. Consulate So Paulo, Brazil, cable Sugar, ethanol, charges of slavery, and tip strategy in Brazil, 8 August 2008, <http://213.251.145.96/
cable/2008/08/08SAOPAULO432.html>

191 Golder associates, Proposed South Western Karoo


Basin Gas Exploration Project by Shell Exploration Company B.V., <http://www.golder.com/af/en/modules.
php?name=Pages&sp_id=1236>

181 Agricultural Systems, Martinelli, L.A., et al, Sugar and ethanol production as a rural development strategy in Brazil: Evidence from the state of So Paulo. January 2011, <http://
iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/23132/AS_Martinelli,_Garrett,_Ferraz,_Naylor_-_Sugar_cane_and_development_-_Agricultural_Systems_-_2011.pdf>

192 Shell China, Shell and China National Petroleum Corp.


announce natural gas cooperation, 23 March 2010,
<http://www.shell.com.cn/home/content/chn-en/aboutshell/
media_centre/news_and_media_releases/archive/2010/natural_gas_cooperation.html>
Shell China, Shell joins China coalbed methane project,
27 December 2007, <http://www.shell.com.cn/home/content/chn-en/aboutshell/media_centre/news_and_media_
releases/archive/2007/ep_coalbed_methane_jv_20071227.
html>

182 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, regulatory


announcement EPA Lifecycle Analysis of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from Renewable Fuels, February 2010, <http://
www.epa.gov/oms/renewablefuels/420f10006.pdf>
183 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, report Renewable
Fuel Standard Program (RFS2) Regulatory Impact Analysis, February 2010, page 477, <http://www.epa.gov/oms/
renewablefuels/420r10006.pdf>
184 Transport & Environment, Commission delays action that
will determine best biofuels, 11 February 2011, <http://
www.transportenvironment.org/Printer/News/2011/2/Commission-delays-action-that-will-determine-best-biofuels/>
185 European Commission, Public consultation indirect land use
change and biofuels Contributions from Registered Organisations, Shell, <http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/
consultations/2010_10_31_iluc_and_biofuels_en.htm>
186 ENDS Europe, EU executive postpones action on ILUC
impacts, 6 January 2011, <http://www.endseurope.com/
index.cfm?go=25318>
187 Financial Times, Shells Peter Voser answers your questions Part Two, 17 December 2010, <http://blogs.ft.com/
energy-source/2010/12/17/shells-peter-voser-answers-yourquestions-part-two/>
188 Science Cabaret on Air, radio interview To Frack or Not to
Frack? Guest: Tony Ingraffea, 5 February 2011, <http://
sciencecabaret.podomatic.com/player/web/2011-0207T09_48_38-08_00>
189 Royal Dutch Shell plc, Royal Dutch Shell plc acquires new
positions in US tight gas, 28 May 2010, <http://www.
shell.com/home/content/media/news_and_media_releases/archive/2010/shell_acquires_new_positions_us_tight_
gas_28052010.html>
Shell USA, Wyoming Pinedale Anticline Project Area
(PAPA), <http://www.shell.us/home/content/usa/aboutshell/projects_locations/wyoming/>
Royal Dutch Shell plc, Shell to sell gas fields in South
Texas to OXY USA, Inc., 10 December 2010, <http://
www.shell.com/home/content/media/news_and_media_
releases/archive/2010/shell_to_sell_gas_fields_south_texas_09122010.html>
Royal Dutch Shell plc, New growth for Shell in Upstream
Americas, 28 September 2010, <http://www.shell.
com/home/content/media/news_and_media_releases/
archive/2010/new_growth_upstream_americas_28092010.
html>
190 The surface of the Netherlands, including inland water,
amounts to 41,528 square kilometres.

58

193 Royal Dutch Shell plc, Shell and PetroChina complete


Arrow Energy acquisition, 23 Augustus 2010, <http://www.
shell.com/home/content/media/news_and_media_releases/
archive/2010/arrow_acquisition_complete_240810.html>
Arrow, Acquisition Scheme booklet, 7 June 2010, <http://
www.arrowenergy.com.au/content/Document/Acquisition%20Scheme%20Booklet.pdf>
Royal Dutch Shell plc, Agreement reached to acquire
Arrow Energy Limited, 21 March 2010, <http://www.shell.
com/home/content/media/news_and_media_releases/
archive/2010/agreement_arrow_energy_limited_22032010.
html>
194 Royal Dutch Shell, Tapping into tightly trapped gas, map
with Shells global tight gas positions, <http://www-static.
shell.com/static/innovation/downloads/innovation/world_
map_with_legend.pdf>
195 Royal Dutch Shell, Tapping into tightly trapped gas,
<http://www.shell.com/home/content/innovation/meeting_
demand/gas/tightly_trapped_gas/>, viewed on 10 March
2011.
Royal Dutch Shell plc, Sustainability report 2009, May
2010, <http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2009/servicepages/welcome.html>
Shell Nederland B.V., magazine Shell Venster, backpage,
Lets Go, advertisement, March/April 2011, <http://wwwstatic.shell.com/static/nld/downloads/venster_2011/venster_march_april.pdf>
196 Royal Dutch Shell, Tapping into tightly trapped gas,
<http://www.shell.com/home/content/innovation/meeting_
demand/gas/tightly_trapped_gas/> as viewed on 10 March
2011.
197 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Factsheet Hydraulic fracturing research study, June 2010, <http://www.epa.
gov/safewater/uic/pdfs/hfresearchstudyfs.pdf>
1 gallon [US, liquid] = 3.78541178 litres. Source: <http://
wiki.answers.com/Q/How_many_liters_equal_one_gallon>
198 Royal Dutch Shell plc, presentation by Russ Ford, Executive Vice President Onshore Gas Americas North America
investor visit, North America tight gas update, 29 September 2010, <http://www-static.shell.com/static/investor/
downloads/presentations/2010/na_visit/russ_ford_na_visit_
presentation_29092010.pdf>
Royal Dutch Shell plc, presentation by Manuel Willemse,
development manager Groundbirch, North America investor visit, Groundbirch presentation, 11 June 2010, <http://

www-static.shell.com/static/investor/downloads/presentations/2010/na_visit/manual_willemse_na_visit_presentation_29092010.pdf>
199 Golder associates, Proposed South Western Karoo Basin
Gas Exploration Project by Shell Exploration Company B.V.,
draft environmental management plans, <http://www.golder.com/af/en/modules.php?name=Pages&sp_id=1236>
200 WorldWatch Institute, Emily Grubert and Saya Kitasei, briefing paper How Energy Choices Affect Fresh Water Supplies: A Comparison of U.S. Coal and Natural Gas, November 2010, <http://www.worldwatch.org/system/files/NGSEIBriefingPaper2.pdf>
201 New York Times, topic Drilling Down, <http://topics.
nytimes.com/top/news/us/series/drilling_down/index.html>,
as viewed on 8 March 2011.
202 New York Times, Regulation Lax as Gas Wells Tainted
Water Hits Rivers, 26 February 2011, <http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/02/27/us/27gas.html?pagewanted=1&ref=drillin
gdown>
203 New York Times, Toxic Contamination From Natural Gas
Wells, 26 February 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/02/27/us/natural-gas-map.html?ref=us>
204 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Methane, <http://
www.epa.gov/methane/scientific.html>
205 Science Magazine, article by Drew T. Shindell, Greg Faluvegi, Dorothy M. Koch, Gavin A. Schmidt, Nadine Unger,
Susanne E. Bauer, NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies and Columbia University, New York, Improved Attribution of Climate Forcing to Emissions, 30 October 2009.
206 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Greenhouse gas
emissions reporting from the petroleum and natural gas
industry, background technical support document, November 2010, <http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/
downloads10/Subpart-W_TSD.pdf>, pages 6 to 10 and
appendix B.
207 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Greenhouse gas
emissions reporting from the petroleum and natural gas
industry, background technical support document, November 2010, <http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/
downloads10/Subpart-W_TSD.pdf>, pages 6 to 10 and
appendix B.
208 Climatic Change journal, Robert W. Howarth, Renee Santoro, Anthony Ingraffea (all Cornell University), Methane
and the greenhouse-gas footprint of natural gas from shale
formations, a letter, 13 March 2011, <http://www.springerlink.com/content/e384226wr4160653/fulltext.pdf>

212 Golder associates, Proposed South Western Karoo Basin


Gas Exploration Project by Shell Exploration Company B.V.,
comment and response report, <http://www.golder.com/
af/en/modules.php?name=Pages&sp_id=1236>
213 Republic of South Africa, Statement on the Cabinet meeting held on 20 April 2011, 21 April 2011, <http://www.gcis.
gov.za/newsroom/releases/cabstate/2011/110421.htm>
214 Moneyweb, Special Report Podcast: Johann Rupert
chairman, Remgro, 2 February 2011, <http://www.moneyweb.co.za/mw/view/mw/en/page299360?oid=527741&sn=
2009+Detail>
215 Karoo Space Magazine, Fracking worries scientists, 16
February 2011, <http://www.karoospace.co.za/karoo-spacemagazine/talking-point/101-fracking>
216 Karoo Space Magazine, Fracking worries scientists, 16
February 2011, <http://www.karoospace.co.za/karoo-spacemagazine/talking-point/101-fracking>
217 Karoo Space Magazine, Fracking the Karoo? People say
No, 31 January 2011, <http://www.karoospace.co.za/
karoo-space-magazine/talking-point/101-fracking>
218 Karoo Space Magazine, Fracking worries scientists, 16
February 2011, <http://www.karoospace.co.za/karoo-spacemagazine/talking-point/100-fracking-the-karoo-the-peoplesay-no>
219 Reuters, South Africa farmers oppose Shells shale gas
plans, 3 February 2011, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/02/03/safrica-shell-idUKLDE7111TW20110203>
220 Reuters, South Africa farmers oppose Shells shale gas
plans, 3 February 2011, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/02/03/safrica-shell-idUKLDE7111TW20110203>
221 NRC Handelsblad, article (in Dutch) Shell zit nog in het
oude stramien, 10 February 2011, <http://archief.nrc.nl/
index.php/2011/Februari/10/Economie/15/%27Shell+zit+no
g+in++het+oude+stramien%27/check=Y>
222 Havemann Inc, compiled by Dr L Havemann, Prof J Glazewksi and Ms Susan Brownlie, A critical review of the application for a Karoo gas exploration right by Shell Exploration
Company B.V., 5 April 2011, <http://royaldutchshellplc.
com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Karoo4.pdf>
223 Golder associates, Proposed South Western Karoo Basin
Gas Exploration Project by Shell Exploration Company B.V.,
comment and response report, <http://www.golder.com/
af/en/modules.php?> as viewed on 10 March 2011.

209 Facebook, chase SHELL OIL out of the


Karoo!, <http://www.facebook.com/home.
php?sk=group_185633661460206> as viewed on 19 April
2011.

224 Dutch ministers for Foreign Affairs and Economic affairs,


Agriculture and Innovation, answers to questions from the
parliamentarians Dikkers and Timmermans betrokkenheid
Shell bij gasboring in Karoo, Zuid-Afrika, 8 March 2011,
<http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/
kamerstukken/2011/03/08/antwoorden-kamervragenbetrokkenheid-shell-bij-gasboring-zuid-afrika.html>

210 Golder associates, Proposed South Western Karoo Basin


Gas Exploration Project by Shell Exploration Company B.V.,
conclusions of the EMPs, <http://www.golder.com/af/en/
modules.php?name=Pages&sp_id=1236>

225 The measurement is in CO2-equivalents. Royal Dutch Shell


plc, Sustainability report 2010, 14 April 2011, <http://
sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2010/servicepages/welcome.
html>

211 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Hydraulic


Fracturing, <http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/
class2/hydraulicfracturing/index.cfm>

226 United Nations Statistics Division, Environmental Indicators; GHGs, July 2010, <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/environment/air_greenhouse_emissions.htm>

59

227 Royal Dutch Shell plc, GHG emissions, <http://www.shell.


com/home/content/environment_society/environment/climate_change/greenhouse_gas_emissions> as viewed on 15
April 2011
228 Royal Dutch Shell plc, Sustainability report 2010, 14 April
2011, <http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2010/servicepages/welcome.html>
Royal Dutch Shell plc, Sustainability report 2009, May
2010, <http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2009/servicepages/welcome.html>
229 Royal Dutch Shell plc, Sustainability report 2009, May
2010, <http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2009/servicepages/welcome.html>
230 Royal Dutch Shell plc, Sustainability report 2010, 14 April
2011, <http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2010/servicepages/welcome.html>
231 Royal Dutch Shell plc, Annual report and form 20-F for the
year ended December 31, 2010, March 2011, <http://www.
shell.com/home/content/investor/news_and_library/2011_
media_releases/2010_annual_report_20f_15032011.html>
232 Oil Change International, Friends of the Earth (International,
Europe, U.S. and The Netherlands), PLATFORM, and Greenpeace UK, Shells Big Dirty Secret: Insight into the worlds
most carbon intensive oil company and the legacy of CEO
Jeroen van der Veer, June 2009, <http://priceofoil.org/
wp-content/uploads/2011/01/OCIShellsBigDirtySecret0609.
pdf>
233 Reuters, Med Crude-Urals digests Shell tender win, freight
jump, 1 December 2010, <http://af.reuters.com/article/
energyOilNews/idAFLDE6B022V20101201>
Reuters, REFILE-Shell wins Rosnefts Urals, first ever Druzhba tender, 27 October 2010, <http://www.reuters.
com/article/2010/10/27/rosneft-druzhba-tender-idUSLDE69Q1Z620101027>
Automated Trader, CORRECT: Rosneft Awards Urals Tenders To Shell, Gunvor, Statoil, 9 September 2010, <http://
www.automatedtrader.net/real-time-dow-jones/15666/correct-rosneft-awards-urals-tenders-to-shell-gunvor-statoil>

Climatic Change journal, Robert W. Howarth, Renee Santoro, Anthony Ingraffea (all Cornell University), Methane
and the greenhouse-gas footprint of natural gas from shale
formations, a letter, 13 March 2011, <http://www.springerlink.com/content/e384226wr4160653/fulltext.pdf>
239 Shell, Minutes meeting of the Committee of Managing
Directors, London, 22/23 July 2002.
240 Bloomberg, Shell Chief Executive Says Clock is Ticking
to Mitigate Climate Change, 17 January 2011, <http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-17/climate-changedemands-action-now-shell-s-chief-executive-says.html>
241 Royal Dutch Shell plc, Annual report and form 20-F
for the year ended December 31, 2010, March 2011,
page 50, <http://www.shell.com/home/content/investor/
news_and_library/2011_media_releases/2010_annual_
report_20f_15032011.html>
242 Royal Dutch Shell plc, Sustainability report 2009, May
2010, <http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2009/servicepages/welcome.html>
243 Guardian, video George Monbiot meets ... Jeroen van de
Veer, 6 January 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/video/2009/jan/06/george-monbiot-jeroen-van-deveer>
244 Shell, response to the 2010 Carbon Disclosure Project,
September 2010, <http://www-static.shell.com/static/environment_society/downloads/environment/climate_change/
cdp_september_2010.pdf>
245 Peter Voser, Chief Executive Officer, Royal Dutch Shell
plc, Speech at the Oil & Money Conference in London,
UK, Natural gas: key to green energy future, 12 October 2010, <http://www.ordons.com/opinion/op-edcontributors/7744-peter-voser-natural-gas-is-a-key-to-greenenergy-future.html>

234 Rosneft, Sustainability report 2009, <http://www.rosneft.


com/attach/0/10/92/rn_report_2009.pdf>

246 European Commission, Communication to the European


Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Energy
infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond a Blueprint
for an integrated European energy network, 17 November 2010, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=SPLIT_COM:2010:0677%2801%29:FIN:EN:PDF>

235 Royal Dutch Shell, Carbon Disclosure 2010 Response,


September 2010, <https://www.cdproject.net/
Sites/2010/12/16012/Investor%20CDP%202010/Pages/DisclosureView.aspx>

247 Corporate Europe Observatory / Spinwatch, report EU Billions to keep burning fossil fuels, December 2010, <www.
corporateeurope.org/system/files/files/article/CCS.lobbying.
pdf>

236 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Methane, <http://


www.epa.gov/methane/scientific.html>

248 Greenpeace, False Hope, why carbon capture and storage


wont save the climate, May 2008, <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/planet-2/
report/2008/5/false-hope-executive-summary.pdf>

237 Science Magazine, article by Drew T. Shindell, Greg Faluvegi, Dorothy M. Koch, Gavin A. Schmidt, Nadine Unger,
Susanne E. Bauer, NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies and Columbia University, New York, Improved Attribution of Climate Forcing to Emissions, 30 October 2009.
238 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Greenhouse gas
emissions reporting from the petroleum and natural gas
industry, background technical support document, November 2010, <http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/
downloads10/Subpart-W_TSD.pdf>, pages 6 to 10 and
appendix B.

60

249 Official Journal of the European Union, Fuel Quality Directive, 5 June 2009, <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0088:0113:EN:PDF> In
this directive oil companies, the suppliers of fuel, are targeted to reduce their well-to-wheel emissions. A 6% reduction
per liter should be obtained through the use of biofuels,
alternative fuels, and reductions in flaring and venting at
production sites. Subject to a review, it should comprise a
further 2% reduction obtained through the use of environmentally friendly carbon capture and storage technologies

and electric vehicles and an additional further 2% reduction


obtained through the purchase of credits under the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol.
250 Royal Dutch Shell plc, Sustainability report 2010, 14 April
2011, <http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2010/servicepages/welcome.html>
251 Royal Dutch Shell plc, Sustainability report 2009, May
2010, <http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2009/servicepages/welcome.html>
252 Royal Dutch Shell plc, Sustainability report 2009, May
2010, <http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2009/servicepages/welcome.html>
253 Peter Voser, Chief Executive Officer, Royal Dutch Shell plc,
Speech at the Oil & Money Conference in London, UK,
Natural gas: key to green energy future, 12 October
2010, <http://www.shell.com/home/content/media/speeches_and_webcasts/2010/voser_london_12102010.html>
254 Financial Times, Shell pulls out of key wind power project,
30 April 2008, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e2a5b99c-16ea11dd-bbfc-0000779fd2ac.html#ixzz1DkiVwxGQ>
255 Guardian, Shell dumps wind, solar and hydro power in
favour of biofuels 17 March 2009, <http://www.guardian.
co.uk/business/2009/mar/17/royaldutchshell-energy>
256 Peter Voser, Chief Executive Officer, Royal Dutch Shell
plc, Speech at the Oil & Money Conference in London,
UK, Natural gas: key to green energy future, 12 October 2010, <http://www.ordons.com/opinion/op-edcontributors/7744-peter-voser-natural-gas-is-a-key-to-greenenergy-future.html>
257 OECD, Glossary of statistical terms, 23 July 2007, <http://
stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=7250>
258 U.S. Embassy Abuja, Nigeria, cable Shell MD discusses the status of the proposed petroleum industry bill, 20 October 2009, <http://213.251.145.96/
cable/2009/10/09ABUJA1907.html>
259 Shell Nederland B.V., letter to the Dutch parliamentary committee on Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation, 21
January 2011, <http://www.voeks.nl/docs/brief%20RT%20
MVO.PDF>
260 U.S. Embassy The Hague, Netherlands, cable Netherlands: Shell discusses business in Iran, 2 January 2009,
<http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/01/09THEHAGUE2.
html>
261 Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, press
release (in Dutch) Shell en rijksoverheid gaan managers uitwisselen, 18 November 2008, <http://www.rijksoverheid.
nl/documenten-en-publicaties/persberichten/2008/11/19/
shell-en-rijksoverheid-gaan-managers-uitwisselen.html>
262 Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs (Mr Rosenthal) and the
minister of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation (Mr
Verhagen), answers to questions from parliamentarians (in
Dutch) vragen over buitenlandse beleid dat is afgestemd
op Shell, 7 February 2011, <www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2011/02/08/
antwoorden-shell/antwoorden-shell.pdf>

263 Enterpreneur, APS Review Gas Market Trends, Libya the


Shell Deal, 16 July 2007, <http://www.entrepreneur.com/
tradejournals/article/166414696.html>
264 The Independent, Shell first off blocks in race to cash in on
UKs new friendship, 26 March 2004, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/shell-first-off-blocks-inrace-to-cash-in-on-uks-new-friendship-567680.html>
265 BBC News, EU lifts weapons embargo on Libya, 11 October 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3732514.stm>
CNN, U.N. votes to lift Libya sanctions, 12 September
2003, <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/09/12/
libya.france/>
CNN, U.S. lifts most sanctions against Libya, 23 April
2004, <http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/africa/04/23/
us.libya.sanctions/>
266 VPRO, documentary (in Dutch) Onze dierbare dictators,
21 March 2011, <http://beta.uitzendinggemist.nl/afleveringen/10816900>
267 The Times, article Shell drafted letter Tony Blair sent to
Gaddafi while Prime Minister, 27 April 2010, <http://
business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/natural_resources/article7108957.ece#cid=OTCRSS&attr=797084>
268 U.S. Embassy The Hague, Netherlands, cable Netherlands: scene setter for special envoy Morningstars visit
to the Hague, 2 October 2009, <http://213.251.145.96/
cable/2009/10/09THEHAGUE596.html>
269 Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs (Mr Rosenthal) and the
minister of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation (Mr
Verhagen), answers to questions from parliamentarians (in
Dutch) vragen over buitenlandse beleid dat is afgestemd
op Shell, 7 February 2011, <www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2011/02/08/
antwoorden-shell/antwoorden-shell.pdf>
270 Spinwatch, Exclusive: How Blair and BP Lied Over Iraqi
Oil, 18 April 2011, <http://www.spinwatch.org/-articlesby-category-mainmenu-8/51-iraq/5431-exclusive-how-blairand-bp-lied-over-iraqi-oil>
271 The Independent, Secret memos expose link between oil
firms and invasion of Iraq, 19 April 2011, <http://www.
independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/secret-memos-exposelink-between-oil-firms-and-invasion-of-iraq-2269610.html>
272 BBC News, Oil firms discuss Iraqi stake, 12 March 2003,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2842315.stm>
273 Commission Davids (in Dutch), Report independent commission of Inquiry on Iraq, 12 January 2010, <http://www.
rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/irak/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2010/01/12/rapport-commissie-davids.html>
274 Commission Davids (in Dutch), Report independent commission of Inquiry on Iraq, 12 January 2010, <http://www.
rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/irak/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2010/01/12/rapport-commissie-davids.html>
275 NRC Handelsblad, Oliebelang speelt rol in politiek, 22
February 2003, <http://vorige.nrc.nl/geslotendossiers/
irak/achtergrond_analyse/article1610226.ece/Oliebelang_
speelt_rol_in_politiek?service=Print>

61

276 Royal Dutch Shell plc, Iraq and Shell consortium sign the
Majnoon Oilfield contract, 17 January 2010,
<http://www.shell.com/home/content/media/news_and_
media_releases/archive/2010/majnoon_contract_17012010.
html>
Wikipedia, Majnoon oil field, <http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Majnoon_oil_field> as viewed on 20 April 2011.
Magazine Shell Venster, article Olie uit het Hof van Eden,
November/December 2010, <http://www-static.shell.com/
static/nld/downloads/venster_2010/venster_nov_dec_2010.
pdf>
Royal Dutch Shell plc, Sustainability report 2010, 14 April
2011, <http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2010/servicepages/welcome.html>
277 Associated Press, Exxon, Dutch Shell Win Iraq Oil Contract, 5 November 2009, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/11/05/business/main5533028.shtml>
278 Royal Dutch Shell plc, Annual report and form 20-F for the
year ended December 31, 2010, March 2011, <http://www.
shell.com/home/content/investor/news_and_library/2011_
media_releases/2010_annual_report_20f_15032011.html>
279 Reuters, Final draft for $12 bln deal to be completed in 10
days, 26 November 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/26/iraq-oil-shell-idUKLDE6AP0S620101126?typ
e=companyNews>
280 U.S. Embassy London, cable Iraq petroleum conference
2008: dialogue, cautious optimism on opportunities in Iraqs
oil sector, 19 December 2008, <http://cablesearch.org/
cable/view.php?id=08LONDON3186&hl=Royal+Dutch+She
ll>
281 Wall Street Journal, Iraq, Shell Resolve Last Obstacle To
$12 Bln Gas Deal -Official, 29 March 2011, <http://online.
wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20110329-708771.html>
282 Alaska Wilderness League, National Oil Spill Commission
Recommendations on the Arctic Ocean, January 2011,
<http://www.alaskawild.org/wp-content/files/Fact_Sheets/
OilSpillCommArcticOceanFS_Jan11.pdf>
283 Center for Biological Diversity, Greenpeace, Natural
Resources Defense Council, 187,000 Square Miles Designated as Polar Bear Critical Habitat in Alaska, 24 November 2010, <http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_
releases/2010/polar-bear-11-24-2010.html>
U.S. federal government, Department of the Interiors (DOI),
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Endangered and Threatened
Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical Habitat for the
Polar Bear in the United States, 7 December 2010, <http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-12-07/pdf/2010-29925.
pdf#page=1>
284 U.S. federal government, Department of the Interiors (DOI),
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Species reports, listings and
occurrences for Alaska, <http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/
pub/stateListingAndOccurrenceIndividual.jsp?state=AK&s8
fid=112761032792&s8fid=112762573902> as viewed on 12
March 2011
285 Shell Alaska, Pete Slaiby, Vice President, Shell Beaufort and
Chukchi Sea Program Update, January 2011, <http://www.
aoga.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/7.-Slaiby-Offshore.
pdf>

62

286 Shell, video Shell Arctic Exploration Program: The Next


Chapter in Alaskas Oil and Gas History, November 2010,
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DciyZ05SExw&feature
=channel>
287 Shell in Alaska, Development and production, <http://
www.shell.us/home/content/usa/aboutshell/projects_locations/alaska/development_production/>
288 Northern Economics, Inc. and Institute of Social and Economic Research, prepared for Shell Exploration & Production, Potential National-Level Benefits of Alaska OCS
Development, February 2011, <http://www.northerneconomics.com/pdfs/ShellOCS/National%20Effects%20
Report%20FINAL.pdf>
289 Nuka Research and Planning Group and Pearson Consulting (preparation), U.S. Arctic Program of Pew Environment
Group (commissioning), report Oil spill prevention and
response in the U.S. Arctic Ocean: Unexamined Risks, Unacceptable Consequences, November 2010, <http://www.
pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/
Protecting_ocean_life/PEW-1010_ARTIC_Report.pdf>
290 Pew Charitable Trusts, press release New Report Finds
Oversight Lacking for Oil Drilling in U.S. Arctic Ocean, 10
November 2010, <http://www.pewtrusts.org/news_room_
detail.aspx?id=61744>
291 Pew Environment Group, report Oil Spill Prevention and
Response in the U.S. Arctic Ocean, policy recommendations, 10 November 2010, <http://www.pewtrusts.org/
uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Protecting_
ocean_life/PEW-1010_ARTIC_Policy_Recs.pdf>
292 U.S. federal government, Department of the Interiors (DOI),
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and
Enforcement (BOEMRE, earlier MMS), Shell Gulf of Mexico
Inc. Chukchi Sea Project, <http://alaska.boemre.gov/ref/
ProjectHistory/2009_Chukchi_Shell/Chukchi_2009.HTM>
293 Shell U.S., Chukchi Sea Regional Exploration Oil Discharge
Prevention and Contingency Plan, March 2010, <http://
www-static.shell.com/static/usa/downloads/2010/alaska/
plan_chukchi_sea_c-plan_2010_final.pdf>
294 U.S. federal government, General Printing Office, Code of
Federal Regulations, part 254 oil-spill response requirements for facilities located seaward of the coast line, 1 July
2009, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2009-title30vol2/xml/CFR-2009-title30-vol2-part254.xml>, 254.26(d)
and 254.6. Adverse weather conditions do not refer to
conditions such as a hurricane, under which it would be dangerous or impossible to respond to a spill.
295 Nuka Research and Planning Group and Pearson Consulting (preparation), U.S. Arctic Program of Pew Environment
Group (commissioning), report Oil spill prevention and
response in the U.S. Arctic Ocean: Unexamined Risks, Unacceptable Consequences, November 2010, <http://www.
pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/
Protecting_ocean_life/PEW-1010_ARTIC_Report.pdf>
296 U.S. federal government, Department of the Interiors (DOI),
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and
Enforcement (BOEMRE, earlier MMS), Chukchi Sea Lease
Sale 193, <http://alaska.boemre.gov/cproject/Chukchi193/
Chukchiindex.htm>

297 U.S. federal government, Department of the Interiors (DOI),


Minerals Management Service (MMS), Environmental
Assessment Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc. 2010 Exploration Drilling Program Burger, Crackerjack, and SW Shoebill Prospects
Chukchi Sea Outer Continental Shelf, Alaska, December
2009, <http://alaska.boemre.gov/ref/EIS%20EA/2009_
Chukchi_2010EA/2009_EA2010_Chukchi_EP.pdf>
298 Federal Defendants, Status Report Pursuant to Courts
Order of September 2, 2010 [Dkt. #171], Native Village of
Point Hope, et al. v. Salazar, et al., No. 1:08-cv-00004-RRB,
4 March 2011, <http://www.eenews.net/assets/2011/03/07/
document_gw_01.pdf>
New York Times, Interior to Assess Effects of Possible
Arctic Oil Spill, 7 March 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/
gwire/2011/03/07/07greenwire-interior-to-assess-effects-ofpossible-arctic-51349.html>
299 Alaska Wilderness League, press release BOEMRE to consider large oil spill impact in Arctics Chukchi Sea, 4 March
2011, <http://www.alaskawild.org/wp-content/files/Press_
Releases/2011-3-4_ChukchiSpillImpact.pdf>
300 Anchorage Daily news, article from the Associated Press
Spill analysis planned for offshore leases, 5 March 2011,
<http://www.adn.com/2011/03/05/1739038/spill-analysisplanned-for-offshore.html#ixzz1GNc2R5UB>
301 Shell Alaska, Pete Slaiby, Vice President, Shell Beaufort and
Chukchi Sea Program Update, January 2011, <http://www.
aoga.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/7.-Slaiby-Offshore.
pdf>
302 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental
Appeals Board, in Re Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc. & in Re
Shell Offshore, Inc. (Frontier Discovery Drilling Unit), OCS
Appeal Nos. 10-01 through 10-04, 30 December 2010,
<http://yosemite.epa.gov/oa/EAB_Web_Docket.nsf/Published%20Decisions%20By%20Citation/41B37138DABA
5A54852578090072B80A/USD File/Denying%20and%20
Remanding....pdf>
303 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental
Appeals Board, in Re Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc. & in Re
Shell Offshore, Inc. (Frontier Discovery Drilling Unit), order
on motions for reconsideration and/or clarification, 10 February 2011, <http://yosemite.epa.gov/oa/EAB_Web_Docket.nsf/Recent~Additions/C3B20D5A2F97CB42852578330
073DF25/$File/Order%20on%20Motions%20Reconsideration...98.pdf>
304 Reuters, Shell loses Alaska air-quality permit appeal,
11 February 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/12/oil-shell-idUSN1114246920110212>
305 Bloomberg, Gazprom, Shell Sakhalin Gas Venture Reports
Unexpected Profit on Shipments, 16 July 2010, <http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-16/gazprom-shellsakhalin-gas-venture-reports-unexpected-profit-on-shipments.html>
306 Website Sakhalin Energy, <http://www.sakhalinenergy.ru>
307 Sakhalin Energy, Explore Sakhalin-2 Project, <http://www.
sakhalinenergy.ru/en/project.asp?p=explore_phase2>

Royal Dutch Shell, Sustainability report 2009, <http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2009/servicepages/downloads/


files/all_shell_sr09.pdf>
309 Gazprom in questions and answers, <http://eng.gazpromquestions.ru/?id=7>
310 Sakhalin Energy, Annual review 2009, page 19, <http://
www.sakhalinenergy.ru/en/documents/Sakhalin_Energy_2009_Eng.pdf>
311 International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN),
factsheet Western gray whale, <http://cmsdata.iucn.org/
downloads/western_gray_whale_fact_sheet.pdf>
312 IUCN, New oil platform off Sakhalin whale scientists
will have a say, 7 January 2011, <http://www.iucn.org/
wgwap/?6753/New-oil-platform-off-Sakhalin--whale-scientists-will-have-a-say>
313 WWF, Pacific Environment, International Fund for Animal
Welfare, Sakhalin Environment Watch, NGO Statement on
proposed construction of new Sakhalin II oil & gas platform
off Sakhalin Island (Southern Piltun), January 2011, <http://
assets.panda.org/downloads/ngo_statement_on_construction_of_new_oil_platform_on_piltun_final.pdf>
314 North Caspian Operating Company B.V., 2009 Annual Activity report, <www.ncoc.kz/en/docs/annual_
report_2009_en.pdf>
315 Reuters, Kashagan development cost rises by USD 7 blnKasMunaiGas, 7 October 2009, <http://www.reuters.
com/article/2009/10/07/kazakhstan-kashagan-costidUKL758464220091007>
316 Silk Road Intelligencer, Kashagan to begin commercial production in 2012 Mynbayev, 7 December 2010, <http://
silkroadintelligencer.com/2010/12/07/kashagan-to-begincommercial-production-in-2012-mynbayev/>
317 Eni, Eni in the world, Kazakhstan, <http://www.eni.com/
en_IT/eni-world/eni-world.shtml>
318 North Caspian Operating Company B.V., website Roles
and responsibilities, <http://www.ncoc.kz/en/ncoc/role_
and_responsibility.aspx>
319 The Telegraph, Shell slashes USD 18bn from Kashagan
costs, 25 October 2010, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
finance/newsbysector/epic/rdsb/8084057/Shell-slashes18bn-from-Kashagan-costs.html>
320 Reuters, Kazakhstan eyes lower costs for Kashagan
expansion, 31 January 2011, <http://www.reuters.
com/article/2011/01/31/kazakhstan-kashagan-idUSLDE70U1E420110131>
321 Protectedplanet.net, Northern Part Of Caspian Sea State
Natural Protected Zone, <http://protectedplanet.net/sites/
Northern_Part_Of_Caspian_Sea_State_Natural_Protected_
Zone>
322 Caspian Environment Programme (CEP), An Introduction to
the Caspian Sea and the Caspian Environment Programme,
2005, <http://www.caspianenvironment.org/newsite/PublicPromotional-Items.htm>

308 Sakhalin Energy, Message from the Chief Executive Officer,


Andrey Galaev, <http://www.sakhalinenergy.ru/en/aboutus.asp?p=aboutsakhalin>

63

323 IUCN Red List of Threatened Species. Version 2010.4,


Hrknen, T. 2008, Pusa caspica, 2010, <www.iucnredlist.
org>
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN),
Photo Gallery & Case Studies, <http://www.iucn.org/
about/work/programmes/species/red_list/2008_threatened_
species_photo_gallery___case_studies/>
324 Caspian Environment Programme (CEP), An Introduction to
the Caspian Sea and the Caspian Environment Programme,
2005, <http://www.caspianenvironment.org/newsite/PublicPromotional-Items.htm>
325 IUCN Red List of Threatened Species. Version 2010.4,
Sturgeon Specialist Group 1996. Huso huso (Caspian Sea
stock), 2010, <www.iucnredlist.org>
326 BankTrack, Kashagan oil project Kazakhstan, <http://
www.banktrack.org/show/dodgydeals/kashagan_oil_project>
327 Institut Franais des Relations Internationales (Ifri), The
Kashagan Field: A Test Case for Kazakhstans Governance of
Its Oil and Gas Sector, October 2008, <http://www.ifri.org/
files/Energie/Kashaganbis.pdf>
328 Central Asia Online, Kashagan oil field development could
harm health of Caspian Sea, 24 May 2010, <http://centralasiaonline.com/cocoon/caii/xhtml/en_GB/features/caii/features/main/2010/05/24/feature-02>
329 Friends of the Earth Europe, Friends of the Earth France,
CEE Bankwatch, Campaign for the Reform of the World
Bank Italy, report Kashagan oil field development,
December 2007, <http://www.foeeurope.org/publications/2007/KashaganReport.pdf>, page 7.
330 North Caspian Operating Company B.V., website H2S and
sulphur management, <http://www.ncoc.kz/en/kashagan/
h2s.aspx>
331 Magazine Shell Venster, article Kashagan-olieveld: lastige
reus, November/December 2009, <http://www-static.shell.
com/static/nld/downloads/venster_2009/shell_venster_nov_
dec_09.pdf>
332 BankTrack, Kashagan oil project Kazakhstan, <http://
www.banktrack.org/show/dodgydeals/kashagan_oil_project>
333 CIA, CIA World Fact Book, Curaao, last updated 23
March 2011, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/cc.html>
334 Hans de Boer, prepared for The Governmental Fact Finding
Committee on the Issue of Shell Curaao N.V.-oilrefinery,
Curaao with or without its oilrefinery, a socio-economic
analysis, April 1985.
335 Onze Wereld, article Rudie Kagie Curaao in de greep van
Shell, July 1981.
336 Hans de Boer, prepared for The Governmental Fact Finding
Committee on the Issue of Shell Curaao N.V.-oilrefinery,
Curaao with or without its oilrefinery, a socio-economic
analysis, April 1985.
337 Shell Curaao N.V., Shell Nederlandse Antillen Verkoopmaatschappij N.V. (SNAV), N.V. Curaaose Scheepvaart
Maatschappij (CSM), Curaao Oil Terminal N.V. (COT),
rechtspersoon de Nederlandse Antillen, rechtsper-

64

soon het Eilandgebied Curaao, Overeenkomst betreffende verkoop van Shell Curaaos raffinaderij, SNAVs
verkoopbedrijf, CSMs sleepbedrijf, COTs overslagbedrijf,
1 October 1985.
338 Refineria di Korsou N.V., history, <http://www.refineriadikorsou.com/main/history1.aspx> as viewed on 31 March
2011.
339 Shell Curaao N.V., Shell Nederlandse Antillen Verkoopmaatschappij N.V. (SNAV), N.V. Curaaose Scheepvaart
Maatschappij (CSM), Curaao Oil Terminal N.V. (COT),
rechtspersoon de Nederlandse Antillen, rechtspersoon het Eilandgebied Curaao, Overeenkomst betreffende verkoop van Shell Curaaos raffinaderij, SNAVs
verkoopbedrijf, CSMs sleepbedrijf, COTs overslagbedrijf,
1 October 1985.
340 investCuracao, project opportunities, asphalt lake,
<http://www.investcuracao.com/02c02.html> as viewed on
20 April 2011.
341 Shell Persdienst, letter Overdracht Shell Raffinaderij op
Curaao in 1985, November 1999.
342 investCuracao, project opportunities, asphalt lake,
<http://www.investcuracao.com/02c02.html> as viewed on
20 April 2011.
343 Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, Problematiek vervuild havenslib haven Willemstad Curaao, Oktober 1991
/ Januari 1992, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/45419000/
Problematiek-vervuild-havenslib-haven-Willemstad-Curacaoadvies-inzake-de-aanpak-van-de-problematiek>
344 DCMR (Dienst Centraal Milieubeheer Rijnmond), on behalf
of the government of the Island Territory of Curaao, report
(in Dutch) Milieuonderzoek Shell Curaao, situatiebeschrijving en aanbevelingen ter vermindering van de milieuoverlast, Maart 1983.
345 Tebodin B.V. and Tauw B.V., report on behalf of the Environmental Service of Curaao Environmental Study Downwind
of Schottegat, April 2001.
346 DCMR (Dienst Centraal Milieubeheer Rijnmond), on behalf
of the government of the Island Territory of Curaao, report
(in Dutch) Milieuonderzoek Shell Curaao, situatiebeschrijving en aanbevelingen ter vermindering van de milieuoverlast, Maart 1983.
347 Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, Problematiek vervuild havenslib haven Willemstad Curaao, Oktober 1991
/ Januari 1992, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/45419000/
Problematiek-vervuild-havenslib-haven-Willemstad-Curacaoadvies-inzake-de-aanpak-van-de-problematiek>
348 Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, Problematiek vervuild havenslib haven Willemstad Curaao, Oktober 1991
/ Januari 1992, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/45419000/
Problematiek-vervuild-havenslib-haven-Willemstad-Curacaoadvies-inzake-de-aanpak-van-de-problematiek>
349 Antilliaans Dagblad, opinion article by Jules Eisden, chairman of Fundashon na Vanguardia di Rekursonan di Krsou
(Fuvareko) Olie en gas, het motief, 11 August 2010.
350 VPRO TV, documentary (in Dutch) Gedane zaken, 1996,
<http://www.youtube.com/user/gachitu>

351 Minister President Gerrit Schotte van Curaao, brief aan


de Nederlandse minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en
Koninkrijksrelaties Piet Hein Donner Isla raffinaderij, 31
January 2011, <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/
dossier/32500-IV/blg-99348?resultIndex=23&sorttype=1&s
ortorder=4>
352 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, behandeling van
het wetsvoorstel Vaststelling van de begrotingsstaat van
Koninkrijksrelaties (IV) voor het jaar 2010, motie-Van Gent
c.s., nr. 17 (32123-IV), December 2009, <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/handelingen/TK/2009-2010/34/htk-20092010-34-3271?resultIndex=1&sorttype=1&sortord
er=4> and <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/dossier/32470/kst-32123-IV-17.html>

archive/2009/shell-violates-oecd-guidelines-in-the-philippines>
362 Dutch NCP, Final statement of the Dutch NCP on the
Complaint (dated 15 May 2006) on the violations of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC), pursuant to the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 14 July
2009, <http://oecdwatch.org/cases/Case_93>
363 abs-cbnNEWS.com, Petron to leave Pandacan oil depot by
2016, 28 January 2011, <http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/
nation/metro-manila/01/28/11/petron-leave-pandacan-oildepot-2016>

353 Amigoe, Staten unaniem achter motie tegen Shell, 19


December 2009.
354 The Fenceline Community For Human Safety and Environmental Protection, Milieudefensie (Friends of the Earth
Netherlands) and Friends of the Earth International, Complaint on the violations of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC), pursuant to the OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises, 15 May 2006, <http://oecdwatch.org/
cases/Case_93>
abs-cbnNEWS.com, Petron to leave Pandacan oil depot by
2016, 28 January 2011, <http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/
nation/metro-manila/01/28/11/petron-leave-pandacan-oildepot-2016>
355 Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, advertisement in Philippine newspaper Pandacan Oil Depot Issue, April 2009.
356 Philippine Daily Inquirer, Shell to stay in Pandacan depot
despite proposed Manila Bay hub, 9 February 2011,
<http://business.inquirer.net/money/breakingnews/
view/20110209-319401/Shell-to-stay-in-Pandacan-depotdespite-proposed-Manila-Bay-hub>
357 The Fenceline Community For Human Safety and Environmental Protection, Milieudefensie (Friends of the Earth
Netherlands) and Friends of the Earth International, Complaint on the violations of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC), pursuant to the OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises, 15 May 2006, <http://oecdwatch.org/
cases/Case_93>
358 Shell, Pandacan Scale Down Project, 2006, <http://wwwstatic.shell.com/static/phl/downloads/society_environment/
pandacan_scale_down_project.pdf>
359 Dutch NCP, Final statement of the Dutch NCP on the
Complaint (dated 15 May 2006) on the violations of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC), pursuant to the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 14 July
2009, <http://oecdwatch.org/cases/Case_93>
360 Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC), OECD
experts confirm safety of Shell facilities at Pandacan Oil
Depot, Manila, 2 September 2009, <http://www.shell.com.
ph/home/content/phl/aboutshell/media_centre/news_and_
media_releases/archive/2009/oecd_confirm_safety.html>
361 Social Justice Society, Milieudefensie (Friends of the Earth
Netherlands) and Friends of the Earth International, press
release Shell violates OECD Guidelines in the Philippines, 31 August 2009, <http://www.foei.org/en/media/

65

Milieudefensie Friends of the Earth Netherlands


Postbus 19199
1000 GD Amsterdam
servicelijn: 020 6262 620
service@milieudefensie.nl
www.milieudefensie.nl

68