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I
In December 2005, a woman named Colleen Nestler convinced a judge in
Santa Fe, New Mexico to put a temporary restraining order on the television
talk show host David Letterman that would require him to stay at least three
yards from her at all times. She blamed Letterman for mental cruelty and for
causing her sleep deprivation and bankruptcy over a 10-year period. As Nestler
explained in a somewhat disordered statement, she began sending him
thoughts of love when his show moved to CBS in 1993, and he responded
in code words & obvious indications through jestures [sic] and eye
expressions. At one point he even asked her to marry him in a promotional
spot saying, Marry me Oprah. Oprah had become my first of many code
names, she explained. As time passed, the code-vocabulary increased &
changed, but in the beginning things like C on baseball caps referred to me,
and specific messages through songs sung by his guests, were the beginnings
of what became an elaborate means of communication between he and
myself (Auslander, 2005). Lettermans exasperated attorneys responded that
he had never even met Nestler and had already had enough trouble from
stalker fans, including one who tried to kidnap his child.
This passing incident (the judge soon rescinded the order after widespread
derision) raises a number of questions about the communicative form of
broadcasting and its relation to everyday life. What would a restraining order
on an electronic proxy look like? What would three yards mean for someone
on air? Can we even use the term relationship for the one-sided bond
between fan and celebrity? What kind of communication system allows for
Media, Culture & Society 2010 SAGE Publications (Los Angeles, London, New
Delhi and Singapore), Vol. 32(1): 123140
[ISSN: 0163-4437 DOI: 10.1177/0163443709350101]
124
such a massive imbalance between two parties utter involvement and utter
ignorance? What does it mean to meet or know someone at all? Why does
Ms Nestlers notion of an elaborate means of communication with a TV
personality seem bizarre? Since it is not unusual for lovers to develop a
code-vocabulary of intimate terms or TV personalities to employ intimate,
chatty, one-on-one ways of speaking, what was the precise nature of her
mistake? How did it become normal for media personalities to simulate
interactive talk, but pathological for a member of the audience to hear their
words as a personal response? What is, in short, the implicit line between
madness and rationality that is encoded into the form of broadcast talk?
Ms Nestlers mistake was to ignore the contradiction between broadcastings
address (interpersonal) and distribution (mass). Though celebrities talk in
personal styles apparently addressed to one or a few, their performances
generate revenue according to statistical algorithms aimed at populations,
not individuals. Her affair with Letterman lacked a corrective cynicism or
knowingness about the nature of the television apparatus. In this article I
explore the peculiar ways that the practitioners and audiences of broadcasting
had to learn to think about impersonal and interpersonal address, pushing
media history into the rich and under-explored field of psychiatry. Foucault
gave us the maxims that each age gets the form of madness it deserves and
that every form of madness is a parody of the reigning form of reason.
Pathology reveals normality. In the same way, each format or technology of
communication implies its own disorders. Madness shines a bright light on
hidden assumptions about communication.
II
The classic name for audience engagement with media personalities, parasocial interaction, was coined over 50 years ago by two University of
Chicago sociology professors, Donald Horton and Richard Wohl, in a 1956
article. The seeming face-to-face relationship between spectator and
performer they called a para-social relationship, and para-social interaction
was the simulacrum of conversational give and take between the two roles.
Though they paid most attention to the psychology of fans, they were clear
that media performers actively put on interactive styles. Every attempt
possible is made [by broadcast institutions] to strengthen the illusion of
reciprocity and rapport in order to offset the inherent impersonality of the
media themselves (Horton and Wohl, 1956: 220). Media personalities spoke
dialogically to people they didnt see, hear, or know, and audiences became
friendly with spectral figures who entered their homes and lives.
Things went awry only when people failed to distinguish the two parallel
circuits. It is only when the para-social relationship becomes a substitute for
autonomous social participation, they warn, when it proceeds in absolute
125
126
127
but real ritual occasion (Dayan and Katz, 1992). In contrast to the Marxists,
Horton and Wohl see para-social interaction as (mostly) healthy; in contrast
to Durkheimians such as Dayan and Katz, they see it as (mostly) routine.
Determining the significance of the oddly monological dialogue at the
interface of broadcast media and their audiences has been one of the core
tasks of media theory since the 1930s and 1940s.
III
Though mediated communication is as old as writing, and mass
communication goes back to the dawn of civilization, weirdly addressed
messages have mushroomed since the late 19th century. Paddy Scannell is our
best guide to the uncanny communicative structure of modern broadcasting,
especially its effort to incorporate interpersonal genres of talk. The task of
broadcast programming was, he argues, to develop forms of talk that strive to
approximate the conditions of face-to-face chat. Radio separated the context
of speaking and the context of listening. Its historic problem was to create
forms of discourse that detain or entertain people who do not have to listen.
Radio was a set of sound-protocols designed for eavesdroppers. Since
overheard speech does not always make sense to those who are not parties to
the context, radio pioneers learned to design formats for virtual participation
by the absent. They created sociability through the ears and conversation
without interaction something historically reserved for madness or religious
experience. Despite their accumulated size as measured by ratings, radio
listeners were invited to feel themselves not as part of a vast public assembly
but as a small group of listeners at home. Broadcastings reach was vast, but
its voice was chummy. A mass audience did not mean an audience of masses.
Broadcasting institutions actively adopted styles and strategies of talk that
wooed audiences with bonhomie and chit-chat. Horton and Wohl (1956: 219)
provide a quotation from Dave Garroway:
Most talk on the radio in those days was formal and usually a little stiff. But I just
rambled along, saying whatever came into my mind. I was introspective. I tried to
pretend that I was chatting with a friend over a highball late in the evening. I
consciously tried to talk to the listener as an individual, to make each listener feel
that he knew me and I knew him. Strangers often stop me on the street today, call
me Dave and seem to feel that we are old friends who know all about each other.
128
weather do not interact with individuals. The sun shines on the just and the
unjust. Many things have this quality of generous and open impersonality, and
there is a certain moral lesson here, he notes, of love for the public world. A
for-someone structure, in contrast, targets specific people. Eyeglasses, passports, shoes, email accounts, or intimate talk typically belong to someone in
particular. Third, broadcasting is a communicative structure that mediates foranyone structures and for-someone structures. Its communicative form speaks
to people as individuals, but its scale of distribution is theoretically nationwide
or global. To listen to radio or watch television normally is to engage in an
interpretive process of being included and excluded at the same time.
Each one of us experiences what we read or hear or see as if it spoke to each one
of us personally. But that does not mean it spoke only to me. Each one of us knows
that just as it speaks to me it speaks to millions of others at the same time, now. We
do not treat what we read and see and hear every day as if it were a purely personal
matter. I do not internalize the output of the media as I might a well-loved song or
poem which I commit to heart in order to own it for my ownmost self. To the contrary. (Scannell, 2000: 1819)
Scannell does not exactly say how we know to perform this discount. If
broadcasters had to learn to speak into a studio microphone as if they were
speaking to one person, what was the parallel historical process by which
listeners and viewers learned to interpret what seemed personal as impersonal?
How did audiences learn the art of ignoring the appeals for individual engagement that come over the air? How were people socialized into accepting
non-reciprocity while being addressed conversationally via the mass media?
The would-be lovers of Letterman, Garroway, King or Berg all mistake the
ministrations of media performers as for-someone structures. Whether mad,
duped or normal, such people fail to discern broadcastings unique communicative form, hearing its you as singular rather than plural (perhaps modern
Englishs blurring of singular and plural forms in the second person pronoun
you abets the confusion). Or perhaps such audiences work too hard,
expecting broadcast talk to enable intimate (one-on-one) relations instead of
the sociable (threes company) relations that Scannell thinks are its norm.
Whatever the answer, his schema is clearly an implicitly normative device for
distinguishing rationality from insanity. How we take broadcast personae is a
measure of mental health. Broadcasting, despite all appearances, is not an
interpersonal medium.
IV
In her belief that she could send thoughts of love over the air to David
Letterman, Colleen Nestler picked up a dream that goes back to the dawn of
radio technology in the late 19th century. In the 1880s and 1890s, every major
129
130
Imagine two persons, one thousand or ten thousand miles apart, placed in communication electrically, in such a way that, without any spoken word, without soundingboard, key, or any bodily movement, the one receives instantly the thoughts of the
other, and instantly sends back his own thoughts. (Moffett, 1893)
Abandoning the faint but unreliable utopia of wireless thought communication, Bell tried to hook up brain-waves to wires. His plan was to outfit remote
partners with electrical helmets that would catch and send their thoughthaloes by wire. As it happened, nothing came of the plan: Bell found it easier
to put voices in communication electrically than thoughts. In the subsequent
success of telephony and failure of telepathy we learned something about the
difference between signals and significance. Signals can be packaged and
sent by media of transmission; significance cannot.
Though telepathy is still held by many as an ideal vision of what
communication could or should be, it received its decisive critique by the
pragmatist theologian Ernest William Hocking in 1912. First, without any
possibility of communicating with the person face to face we would never
be able to determine a thought-messages source. We would receive strong
but untraceable impressions from unidentified senders. Telepathy would
actually be less efficient than talking since any thought-message would need
a personal confirmation a voice, face or address to label it. Second, if
minds were so permeable, the first draft of every thought would fly out and
become audible in its raw state to anyone. Thoughts would lack any gestation
and public mind would be an inchoate brown noise. Thus Hocking praises the
obstacles to thought transmission. The resistance of Nature to the expression
of a thought is not the resistance of a wholly hostile medium; detention is a
spiritual condition for health and viability, not a physical condition solely
(Hocking, 1912: 2569). In a world without rest from the assault of others
thoughts, without checks to the contagion of communication, we would never
be able to tune out the pandemonium of other minds. (If it is bad to be captive
to someone elses choice of music or embarrassing when your stomach
rumbles, imagine the din of the collective unconscious!)
Writing in 1912, Hocking is current with the chief problems of wireless
telegraphy. His two critiques of telepathy involve the questions of station
identification and interference. This was also the year of the Titanic disaster
and the absurd bungling of radio messages around it. Wireless operators,
picking up a jumble of messages from various ships in the North Atlantic
without being able to determine their source, spliced them together into a
conflicting collage of news reports (Heyer, 1995). (We should note that collage
as an artistic practice a kind of visual analogue to the uprooted news of
wireless was also invented in 1912 by Braque and Picasso. Many avant-garde
artists in the period played on radio as a giant nuthouse [Gallo, 2005: 130]).
At least W.T. Stead, the radical journalist and spiritualist, was attentive enough
to send a mental wire of his demise from the sinking ship, which a correspondent
claimed to have received before the news was official (Luckhurst, 2002: 139).
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131
The Titanic disaster was the epitome of the etheric bedlam of the air-waves,
as contemporaries called it, a term nicely linking wireless transmission
with a classic trope of madness. So much for the ethereal angels of
perfect communication.
In response, the US Radio Act of 1912 sought to end the aerial confusion
by licensing stations, fixing wavelengths, designating call letters and requiring
clear station identification. The Act marked the end of the wireless imagination
of thought-transference and the start of disciplined airborne signals. It laid
the groundwork for the great normative division of labor in 20th-century
communications: person-to-person talk on secure channels and broadcast
dissemination on open ones, that is, telephony on wires and radio via wireless
(a division long since crumbling). Subsequent radio regulation in the US
would clarify two kinds of messages and channels: broadcasting to all and
common carriers for single recipients (Peters, 1994: 1249). Thus the state
backed the idea that messages intended for-anyone and for-someone
should be distinguished. Explicit by the time of the Communications Act of
1934 was the idea that the public sphere (media) should be criss-crossed by
many voices; implicit was the idea that the private sphere (mind) should
speak in a unified voice. (A diverse bourgeois public sphere called for a
coherent bourgeois subject.)
A plural public and a unitary self were for much of the 20th century the two
official options for rational agents, the norms of sane communication.
Deviations were pathologies: a single voice in media was totalitarian; many
voices in mind meant madness. A monopolized public was the danger of
fascism; a pluralized self was the danger of schizophrenia. In other words,
broadcasting was for impersonal discourse, and telephony for personal. The
dream of telepathy (as a kind of wireless telephony) crept to the cultural
sidelines and gradually faded like the term the ether for the airwaves. But it
lived on in psychiatry.
V
At the same time that physicists and psychical researchers were dreaming up
ways to send signals (and thoughts), psychiatric patients started to experience
telepathy as a pathological symptom. Emil Kraepelin, born the same year as
Freud (1856), was the great classifier of mental illness and was the first, in 1897,
to identify schizophrenia. He called it dementia praecox (premature dementia).
Eugen Bleuler gave the disease the name that stuck in 1908 and schizophrenia
has since had a tumultuous definitional history, with disorders of thought and
disorders of affect being the two main options. But schizophrenics have
always described their troubles in terms of the sensory dislocations of
electrical media. Kraepelins patients complained of telepathy as well as
perception of voices in their own bodies, and magical, magnetic, electrical,
physical, hypnotic forms of remote control [Fernwirkungen], which are sent
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132
133
self into the external world, where they may be experienced by all around. There
is usually a secondary delusional explanation for this phenomenon which may
invoke the use of telepathy, television, etc.
(The mad often use reason vigorously to support their madness.) Various
versions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM), the bible of
psychiatric categorization in the United States, list thought broadcasting as
a key indicator of schizophrenia, along with thought insertion, comment or
echo, passivity (i.e. remote control), etc. The list of first-rank symptoms is
based on the work of the influential German psychiatrist Kurt Schneider,
who helped to sharpen clinical definitions of schizophrenia by restricting it
to severe psychosis. Writing at mid century, in an era noisy with sound
technologies, his first-rank symptoms emphasized auditory hallucinations.
Thought broadcasting seems to have entered English-language psychiatry as
a happy mistranslation of his term Gedankenausbreitung (diffusion of
thoughts), which does not have the same media connotation in German.
Since patients are not always precise and psychiatrists are not always
interested in media metaphors, thought broadcasting is not always
consistently defined (Koehler, 1979). Usually it means that ones thoughts
are being sent abroad from a leaky brain like a broadcast transmission for
all to hear. (A closely related first-rank symptom is that of thoughts
becoming audible.) But it can also mean that actual radio and television
stations serve as occult dispersers of ones thoughts. As one patient reports
(Anonymous, 1996):
I believed I only had to think something and it would be transmitted over radio and
television. For example, I remember being scared of getting into a conversation
and argument with radio commentator Barry Farber in New York when I disagreed
with him; I felt as if my thoughts were being broadcast during the long pauses
between his sentences.
This patient took the para-social invitation seriously or figured out how to
pull off the Brechtian project of gaining access to the means of broadcasting.
He acted as if he stood in communicative parity with media celebrities.
Faces and voices, sounds and images flying invisibly through the air in an
overlapping jumble of channels modern electrical media have a psychotic
core (Hagen, 2001: 132). A 1990s case involved a Mr Simpson who had the
delusion that his apartment was the center of a large communication system
that involves all three major television networks, staffed by multiple people
and costing millions of dollars. His neighbors were actors, hidden cameras
monitored his actions, and aerial machines intruded upon his thoughts. When
he is watching TV, many of his minor actions (e.g. going to the bathroom) are
soon directly commented on by the announcer. His neighbors operated two
machines. One inserted harassing voices into his head many times each day,
suggesting what stocks to buy, for instance. The other was a dream machine
that put erotic dreams into his head (DSM-IV-TR Casebook, 2002: 102).
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134
VI
Celebrities engage in institutionally sanctioned forms of excess: money, sex,
drugs and styles of communication. Broadcast celebrities are ritually permitted
to carry on schizophrenic discourse. (The mentally ill, Goffman argued, lack
just this permission.) Celebrities are trained to monitor every single gesture
they make as if it were rife with potential significance, to address sound and
image machines in jumbled takes that can be edited later, and to speak to
absent strangers as if they were friends. If someone in my living room spoke
like David Letterman does on the air I would think they were crazy. As we
know from conversation analysis, everyday talk is exquisitely tailored to the
intricacies of local situations. But media personae fail to engage contextual
contingencies at a rate that would be considered psychotic if they did it in
person. Lettermans delivery is utterly blind to the ostensive circumstances of
its reception. It is automatic, undeviating, unresponsive and auto-involved.
135
VII
Since its emergence in the late 19th century, the concept of communication
has been shadowed by the specter of madness. In a sense madness is what
Amit Pinchevski (2005: 170) calls the corroborating contrary to
communication, and if one had to point to recurrent scenes in modern culture
of communication breakdown, schizophrenia would take first place. The
psychotics private world of symbolic (non)sense has long been regarded as
the epitome of blocked communication the hell of private meaning, as
opposed to the sanity that is in part defined by reference to a horizon of
intersubjective commonality. The original meaning of autism [Autismus] as
defined by Bleuler was the barricade of incommunicable meaning conjured
by the schizophrenic (Pinchevski, 2005). Just as telepathy presented a utopia
of sharing, autism presented a dystopia in which sharing was impossible. The
philosophers of the late 19th century called this latter condition solipsism, and
the electrical engineers called it failure to reach syntony (radio contact). It
was the counterpart to telepathy. The dialectical pair of schizophrenia and
autism has been in play ever since.
Cross-cultural study shows one thing specific to our conception of madness:
the notion of the private ownership of thoughts. A surprising number of
diagnostic criteria and symptoms for schizophrenia hold across cultures. One
study explores the translation of diagnostic concepts into Iban, a language
spoken by an agricultural people in Malaysian Borneo. Symptoms such as
136
auditory hallucinations readily transfer from European psychiatry into Iban oral
poetry. Thought disorders, in contrast, are understood as speech disorders by
the Iban: there is no cultural model of other beings knowing your unspoken
inner thoughts. There is a cultural model for disorders of the privacy of speech,
not thought (Barrett, 2004: 97). The body in Iban culture can be invaded by
foreign objects guided by magical spells, but not the mind by foreign thoughts
since the Iban lack our norm of mental privacy. An interview between
the ethnographer and a woman named Umang, who had suffered from
psychotic episodes, takes a rather comic turn when he probes her about
thought broadcasting:
Me:
Umang:
Me:
Umang:
Me:
Do people at large know your thoughts, even when you dont speak?
Yes, they know the thoughts that I have broadcast (put about).
Ah, how do they know if you dont talk?
Thats because I have told them previously.
Oh. You have told them previously. (Barrett, 2004: 979)
137
but that there is too much of it. A C on a baseball cap does not, alas, stand
for Colleen but for the Chicago Cubs. The delusional find it hard to leave
media as common carriers of extrapersonal significance. They imagine they
are celebrities, responsible for calculating the resonance of every little
gesture. Everything buzzes with meaning. Nothing is random: everything is
an event. The signs are all for-me. For the sane, in contrast, significant
events are rare. The stoic assumption that no message, even face-to-face, is
ever really for-me is a healthy ethical and interpretive principle indeed. How
grateful we can then be for those rare marvelous moments of connection!
Signs are inherently public. They are structures that carry something in
common to more than one consciousness (even if it is the same person later
in time). In the realm of signs, there is no such thing as a unique for-someone
structure. There may be dentures that only fit one person, but a sign that only
fits one person would not be a sign. Of course there are signs that only a few
can access, such as the obscure codes that lovers can develop and that fans
may think they share with stars. But the privacy here is pragmatic rather than
semantic, circumscribed usage rather than semiotic secrecy. The meaning is
not private; the access is. Even if you call my name and whisper something
known only to you and me, there is nothing in principle about the message
that could not be received by others. The address may be exclusive, but the
right to interpret meaning is open to whoever possesses the code. Meaning is
not mental.
VIII
Madness, especially schizophrenia, was once at the center of the intellectual
agenda. A wide range of mid-20th-century thinkers such as Gregory Bateson,
Bruno Bettelheim, Gilles Deleuze, Frantz Fanon, Michel Foucault, Erich
Fromm, Erving Goffman, Jrgen Habermas, Luce Irigaray, Jacques Lacan,
Harold Lasswell, John Lilly, Margaret Mead, Joost Meerloo, Jurgen Ruesch,
Harry Stack Sullivan and Paul Watzlawick followed Sigmund Freud and Karl
Jaspers in seeing psychopathology as the key to understanding modernity
and communication. The anti-psychiatry movement of the 1960s and the
general replacement of the talking cure with psychopharmacological
treatment in the past couple of decades have shifted intellectual fascination
largely away from schizophrenia.
So perhaps have changing practices of communication. The impossibility
of communication, a theme central to 20th-century philosophy, literature,
drama, sociology and experience, seems to be losing its pathos. This theme,
like that of schizophrenia, found in broadcasting its natural habitat. As analog
media retreat from our lives, the ghosts have fewer homes to dwell in. As we
network ourselves in searchable social utilities and carry around contact
devices on our persons, the fear of losing touch with others forever seems to
138
be withering away. (Except for death, which no one has yet learned how to
cheat.) Media programming and advertising are increasingly personalized.
The divide between interpersonal and mediated communication is blurring.
No longer is speaking into the air considered appropriate for broadcasting but
tragic (or comic) for interpersonal relationships. People now broadcast
themselves on YouTube and accumulate friends in social networking sites.
They walk around in public, talking animatedly to an invisible partner and
nobody thinks they are crazy. Anyone with a music player can simulate the
radiohead experience of having voices and sounds emanating from the center
of their skull. The new regime seems messier and more pragmatic; less
delusional but more socially stunted. Who needs telepathy when you have
texting? Or thought broadcasting when you have Twitter?
Perhaps it is a good thing that we are starting to bid farewell to ideas of
communication that make telepathy and solipsism the options for human
contact, and stigmatize or glamorize those whose thoughts and feelings do
not obey the rules. Telepathy haunted the dawn of broadcasting, and thought
broadcasting and similar delusions haunted its high noon. In the twilight of
broadcasting, when peer-to-peer and one-to-many practices are no longer
neatly divided between wired and wireless infrastructures, Minervas owl is
carrying off a concept of communication that has not, in the end, been very
helpful for dealing with the real madness of the world injustice, inequality
and violence though that concept once did its best to establish a public
space in which we could discuss these perennials. What was once mad or
uncanny is now routine: hearing disembodied voices and speaking to nobody
in particular. The old norm of unitary self and plural democracy personal
telephony and impersonal broadcasting might have it precisely backwards.
Sanity in the self might mean precisely the ability to entertain multiple
voices, just as a healthy democracy might mean the ability to settle on a
single outcome (such as a legitimate election). The task is to pluralize the
one and unify the many.
A final speculation in the twilight of broadcasting: in a world in which
peer-to-peer communications occur via mediated devices as freely as they do
via the flesh, we are facing new disorders of address. Our fate is less the
confusion of the broadcast and the personal than the blurring of the sociable
and the technical. In a digital age, large segments of our species carry out
much of their social lives by machine. Interactive, portable, keyboarded
devices are nudging out audiovisual genres as dominant modes of everyday
communication. Schizophrenias vocal-aural delusions fit with the radio,
television, and telephone, media that were saturated with nonverbal codes and
simulated sociability. Digital media, in contrast, favor data-processing and
logistical convenience over the staging of face-to-face interaction. The it
disease for new media, with their low-affect machine interfaces, appears to be
autism. But that is another story.
139
Acknowlegements
For commentary and criticism I would like to thank Jonah Bossewitch, Paul Frosh,
Rubn Gallo, Gina Giotta, Andriy Ischenko, Jin Kim, Ladi Kukoyi, Ben Peters, Amit
Pinchevski, Paddy Scannell, Bernhard Siegert, and Fred Turner, and audiences at
Iowa, Princeton, UC Santa Barbara, USC, and Columbia for comments on earlier versions. No one else is responsible for my opinions. This essay is for Paddy Scannell.
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