Leadership Communication

Module 2
Communication
Module 2: Communication
FLOW CHART
Content Flow at A Glance
Subject/topic/activity
Introduction to the basics of
communication.
Activity on hearing and
listening.
Activity on seeing and
looking.
Game Pitfalls of
Communication.
Game Whose Perception
Counts?
Game State It Clearly.
Exercise on Preparing
Messages for prevention of
HIV/AIDS.
Material for reading,
preparing handouts and
facilitating session 2.6.
Material for reading and
making posters.
Objective
To introduce the peer educator to
the basic concept and important
principles of communication.
To know the difference between
hearing and listening.
To know the difference between
seeing and looking.
To demonstrate the importance
of verbal and non-verbal
communication.
To demonstrate that recent
events influence the way in
which we see things.
To demonstrate that it is easy for
even simple messages to be
misinterpreted by the receiver.
To know about effective message
formulation.
Page No.
2-2 to 2-6
To help the peer educator in the

facilitation of the session.
2-16 to
2-17
To help the peer educator in

building his/her understanding
of communication.
2-18
2-1
2-7 to 2-8
2-9
2-10 to
2-11
2-12
2-13 to
2-14
2-15
Module 2
Communication
The eyes of men converse as much as their tongues, with the advantage that the
ocular dialect needs no dictionary, but is understood the world over.
Ralph Waldo Emerson
I Introduction
he word communication originates from the word "communis, which means

common. Communication, therefore, is an act by which a person shares
knowledge, feelings, ideas and information, in ways such that each gains a
common understanding of the meaning, intent and use of the message.
Sociologists, educationists and psychologists have defined communication according
to the disciplines to which they belong. Some definitions are given below:
It is a process by which two or more people exchange ideas, facts, feelings or
impressions in ways that each gains a common understanding of the
message. In essence, it is the act of getting a sender and a receiver tuned
together for a particular message or series of message.
Leagans
It is a process by which information, decisions and directions pass through a
social system, and the ways in which knowledge, opinions and attitudes are
formed or modified.
Loomis and Beegle
Communication is the force by which an individual communicator transmits
stimuli to modify the behaviour of other individuals.
Howland
II How Communication Takes Place
ommunication can occur without words. Our four senses, audio, visual,
touch and smell, communicate. The ring of the alarm tells us its time to wake
up, the eyes gaze at the window and check for the time of day or weather,
the touch of the wind on our skin tells us if it is hot or cold and the smell from the
kitchen tells us what is cooking. When a message is sent from a source to a receiver, a
specific mental or physical response (communication) occurs.
Communication is a two-way process. It has a transmitter and a receiver. Therefore,
it is essential for facts to be transmitted in such a manner that the meaning intended
2-2
is conveyed and the receiver understands the use of the message. It becomes a twoway process.
There are many different types and methods of communication. For example, in
India, people fold their hands in greeting. In Japan, people bow from the waist. In
Pakistan, people touch their forehead with the right hand. Simple gestures are an
effective means of communication. An effective and culturally sensitive
communicator is able to read feelings and reactions through these gestures.
Communication is a process. It is the process of transmitting meaning between
individuals. Early human beings communicated through symbols and gestures.
Later, the spoken word, in the form of language, was used for communication. As
technology developed, written words and media were used, in addition to symbols,
gestures and the spoken word.
Research shows that, on average, a person spends about 70 per cent of his/her active
time communicating speaking, reading, gesturing, writing, listening and watching.
Communication can be defined as a process of meaningful interaction whereby a
person not only sends but also receives and understands a message. Communication
always has a purpose.
III Types of Communication
ommunication can be categorized into four different types, depending on the

nature of the interaction.
Intrapersonal communication
is a type of communication whereby a person

interacts with himself/herself. This type of
communication is intrinsic or reflective.
Interpersonal communication
is a type of communication where there is oneto-one interaction or interaction among a small

group. This is the most commonly
used/practiced from of communication.
Intergroup communication
is a type of communication where interaction

between different groups takes place.
is a type of communication where a large body
(millions of people) of people is addressed.
Mass communication
IV Verbal and Non-Verbal Communication
ommunication can be verbal and non-verbal. In verbal communication, we

use words/language in the written or spoken form. Non-verbal
communication is often given secondary importance, but it is much more
important than verbal communication. It includes a series of gestures, such as facial
expressions, signs, body movements, eye contact, tone of voice, and sounds. In
2-3
normal interpersonal communication 5-10 per cent of total communication is verbal

while 90-95 per cent is non-verbal. People can receive valuable information through
non-verbal cues such as:
Body language
Eye contact
Facial expression
Head nodding or shaking
Playing with objects
Making sounds
Signs
Touch
Taste
Silence
V Barriers to Communication
here are many barriers to communication. These barriers can stall or distort
communication, therefore, attention must be paid to overcome these barriers.
Communication barriers can be classified into three main groups:
Judgmental attitude may be reflected through excessive analysis, bossiness, namecalling, ridiculing, making value-based comments and judgments, moralizing or
ignoring. This is often the single most powerful barrier in communicating with
young people on the subject of HIV/AIDS and related subjects, such as sexual
health, reproductive health, STIs and drug use
Know it all attitude may be reflected through advising, moralizing, ordering,
patronizing, threatening or lecturing. This form of behaviour often inhibits people
from sharing their concerns and experiences. When communicating with youth, this
kind of behaviour/communication should be avoided.
Unconcerned attitude may be reflected through voicing platitudes, diverting the
issue, using excessive logic, offhanded assurances, half-listening, not making eye
contact or being flippant. In communicating with people on sensitive topics, such as
HIV/AIDS, care must be taken to avoid such behaviour and actions. Concern,
empathy and confidentiality are valued components of communication on sensitive
subjects.
VI Listening
istening is the highest form of communication. When they consider

communication, people tend to think more of speaking and less of listening. We
rarely receive any training on how to listen but reading, writing and speaking
are taught in abundance.
Always remember that the responsibility for ensuring that the listener gets the
message lies with the sender. To introduce new material to an audience we must tap
into known material. The new material should be linked to what they already know
or have experienced.
2-4
There are 5 main forms of listening

Ignoring listening occurs when the listener is not attentive to the message, as s/he
is otherwise preoccupied and unwilling to receive a message.
Pretending listening occurs when the speaker is in a higher position and the
listener cannot ignore him/her. S/he pretends to listen, even when the message is
boring or irrelevant.
Selective listening occurs when the listener picks up only those parts of the message
that in terest him/her and ignores the rest of the message.
Attentive listening occurs when the listener not only listens and is able to answer
questions, but also understands the significance of the message.
Empathic listening occurs when the listener does not necessarily agree with the
speaker, but deeply understands that person emotionally and intellectually. This is
the highest form of listening and is often referred to as being in someones shoes.
VII Barriers to Receiving Messages
uman beings can rece ive messages subject to certain limitations. These
limitations are called filters. Anything below or above the range of these
filters is usually left out:
Physical filters The inherent structure of our senses limits our capacity to perceive.
For example, we can only see certain colours from a spectrum of colours. We can
only hear between certain frequencies 20Hz to 20,000 Hz. All frequencies higher or
lower are filtered out.
Psychological filters enable people to look/view the same things differently. Our
attributes, expectations, past experiences, and knowledge influence what we perceive
and how we perceive it. These perceptions change during the course of life and
greatly influence the way we communicate.
VIII Seven Steps to Effective Messages
Know your target audience who are they, what do they need, how can you
reach them?
Set clear objectives what do you expect from the message, how will you
measure it, when will it happen?
Work for approval your audience should chose your message over the
others that are also coming its way
Be strategic use words, images and sounds that are acceptable to your
audience, because your main purpose is to make them listen.
Work for acceptance is your message credible, do people believe your
message and the communicator, who and what will people believe?
Work for recall the message should remain with the audience, make it
catchy, make it funny, repeat if necessary, use different types of media
2-5
Review and re-plan are you reaching the intended audience, are you
achieving the objectives, do you need to change, do you need a new message?
IX Distortions in Effective Communication
ommunication can be blocked or result in undesired impacts. This may

happen because of many reasons that are known as distortions. D istortions
can occur because of the following:
A very long transmission chain (message is passed from one person to
another and goes through a long chain of receivers and senders).
A very long message.
A complicated and poorly organized message.
Non-availability of feedback at appropriate time.
The sender and the receiver have different mindsets.
Inappropriate use of media and medium (i.e., method and language).
Lack of common perceptions between the sender and the receiver.
Hurried and uninsured transmission (you send the message without checking
if it has actually reached the intended person).
X Reducing Distortions
istortions can ruin a communication, especially if you are communicating

with people on an issue as sensitive as HIV/AIDS. Communication on
HIV/AIDS usually involves dealing with young people or groups that are
marginalized. It also involves serious issues of trust and confidentiality, as it relates
to peoples personal and intimate behaviours. You could reduce these distortions and
increase the effectiveness of your communication by:
Communicating with small groups and being direct.
Using language easily understood and spoken by the target group.
Increasing the similarities between the sender and the receiver.
Keeping the message short and clear.
Putting yourself in the receivers shoes.
Using multiple ways of communicating verbal, written, audio or visual.
Keeping confidences and listening.
2-6
Session 2.1
Hearing and Listening
Expected Outcomes
Participants will know the difference between hearing and listening.
Participants will become more aware of themselves, while listening to others.
Objective
Listening
To know the difference between hearing and listening.
Materials
10-15 lines of written script on any topic.
Time
30 minutes.
Process
Invite the participants to sit in a circle.

Ask for volunteers. Take the volunteers out of the room, and instruct
them to make noise while the script is being read out. These noises, for
example, tapping a pen on the floor a few times or knocking on the
wall, (should be loud enough for everyone to hear but not
overwhelming enough to attract the complete attention of the
participants) should be made once or twice.
Explain to the participants that you will read out a small text. and they
should try to remember as much as they can of the text.
After the reading, ask the participants to tell you all that they heard.
Allow 7-8 minutes for this activity. Then, invite the participants to
listen to the same text being read out for a second time.
This time they should have an objective when listening to the text.
Complete the reading, and ask the participants to report on the stated
objective.
During the first round of reading, most participants will probably be
able to tell you bits and pieces of the text you read.
Listening to the second round of reading with an objective will result
in accurate responses from a large number of participants.
Ask the participants:
Why do they think this happened?
Some participants will tell you that this was because, the second time,
they had an objective. Commend the answers. Emphasize that the
difference between hearing and listening is that listening has an
objective while hearing is general.
2-7
Close the exercise by pointing out that in effective communication

listening is an important element.
Notes for the Facilitator
This exercise points out the difference between hearing and listening. It allows the
participants to learn from their on experience, and therefore, they tend to remember
it. As a peer educator, you may want to use section VI on listening (beginning of this
module).
2-8
Session 2.2
Seeing and Looking
Expected Outcomes
Participants will become aware of the difference between seeing and looking.
Participants will be more observant and aware and this will improve their ability to
communicate.
Objective
To know the difference between seeing and looking.
Materials
None.
Time
20 minutes.
Process
Invite the participants to take a break. Ask them to take a walk outside
and come back in 5 minutes.
When they return, ask them what they saw during their walk outside.
After about 5 minutes, ask them to, once again, go out for a walk. This
time, they should bring back information on something specific
(flowers trees a structure) that they find in the surrounding
environment.
Ask the participants to share their information on the specific item,
then, ask what they think was the difference between their first and
second walk.
Somebody might point out that they had an objective on the second
walk. It is also possible that this point will not be raised. In either case,
the message is that the difference between seeing and looking is that
looking has an objective, while seeing is general. Eyes have an
important role in communication. When we wish to communicate
effectively, we must remember that visuals should require an
objective for them to make sense to the receiver.
Notes to the facilitator

Research shows that visual communication is very effective in transmitting a
message and is often retained by the receiver. Therefore, if you want to be an
effective communicator, remember that in order to have maximum effect, every
visual message should have an objective. This exercise effectively transmits this
message to the participants.
2-9
Session 2.3
Pitfalls of Communication
Expected Outcomes
Participants will learn the importance of feedback in communication.
Participants will know that both verbal and non-verbal means of communication are
important.
Participants will become better communicators.
Objective
How should I Communicate?

To demonstrate the pitfalls of communicating without verbal or visual
feedback.
Materials
A shirt with the front undone.
Time
15 to 20 minutes.
Process
Invite the participants to sit in a circle.

Place the shirt in the centre of the circle.
Ask for two volunteers.
Request that they stand in the centre of the circle. They should stand
with their backs to each other.
The observers should maintain silence during the co urse of the
exercise.
One of the volunteers should take the shirt and the other should give
him/her the instructions how to put it on.
The two volunteers must not look at each other or ask questions. The
instructor should give instructions and the receiver should follow the
instructions.
Allow 5 to 6 minutes for this activity
Ask the volunteers for their reactions by asking the following
questions:
Did you manage to put the shirt on properly by following the
instructions? Why?
Why were you not able to give instructions effectively?
2-10
Now ask the volunteers to stand facing each other.

Ask one volunteer to give instructions while the other volunteer
follows the instructions. The volunteers are allowed to ask questions
and make suggestions.
Allow 5 minutes to finish, but it is likely that they will finish sooner.
Ask about their second experience.
Did you manage to follow the instructions and complete the task?
Why?
Why were you able to follow the instructions this time?
Were you able to give your instructions in a more effective manner?
Why?
You can involve the observers in the discussion by asking for their
opinions and observations. They can also give their responses to the
questions asked.
Notes to the Facilitator
This is exercise demonstrates the importance of verbal and visual feedback in any
communication.
2-11
Session 2.4
What Influences Our Perception?
Expected Outcomes
Participants will understand the reasons people perceive things different.
Participants will design their future methods of communication more effectively.
Objective
Whose Perception Counts?

To demonstrate that recent events influence the way we see things.
Materials
Flip charts, markers, white board or black board, chalk.
Time
15 minutes.
Process
Invite the participants to sit so that everyone is able to see the board.
Exhibit the following diagram:
Ask them, What do you see? They will probably say three arrows,
houses on the side, sign showing go left or you may get the correct
response, which is two Ks. Commend the answers, and quickly move
to the following exhibit:
Ask them What do you see now? It is likely that you will get the
correct response immediately (2 Hs). Now, ask the group if they
would have seen this as quickly, had they not had the benefit of the
first round?
Notes to the Facilitator
It is best to prepare the two diagrams in advance, as the process of drawing them can
reveal the answer. Use this exercise to point out the importance of conditioning. Ask
them why they saw the Hs faster than the Ks, could they give any examples of a
similar experience in their life when they have analyzed something or perceived
something in light of what had happened immediately before. Point out that while
communicating, it is important to keep a link with what has preceded, as it enables
faster learning and analysis.
2-12
Session 2.5
Blocks in Receiving Messages
Expected Outcomes
Participants will understand that even simple messages can be misunderstood.
Participants will be more careful in designing messages and communicating with
others.
Objective
State It Clearly!
To demonstrate that it is easy for messages (even simple ones) to be
misinterpreted, if the words used are not familiar and clear, and that,
things become worse, if the recipient is not able to ask for clarification.
Materials
4 square sheets of paper.
Time
15 minutes.
Process
Ask for 4 volunteers.

Ask the volunteers to stand facing the rest of the participants.
Explain that you will give them some instructions, and they should
follow the instructions without talking and with their eyes closed.
The observers should watch and be silent.
Explain that the exercise is intended to demonstrate some important
issues in communication. If the volunteers are hesitant, ask for
another.
Invite the 4 volunteers to take one piece of the square paper each. Ask
them to close their eyes and follow the instructions. The instructions
to be given are as follows:
Fold your paper in half and tear of the bottom right corner of the
paper.
Fold the paper in half again and tear off the upper left hand corner.
Fold the paper diagonally and make a hole in the centre.
Ask the volunteers to open their eyes and unfold the papers. Invite
them to share the outcome with each other and the participants.
Ask the volunteers:
How were the instructions?
Did all of you understand my instructions in the same manner?
What was difficult or easy to understand?
How could I have framed my instructions to reduce the probabi lity of
multiple interpretations?
2-13
You can involve the observers by opening up the conversation once

the volunteers have answered.
Usually the volunteers end with different results from the same set of instructions. It
is usually because of the way they hear the instructions. Sometimes the words used
are not understood properly. You can use this exercise to point out the importance of
words in communication words must be commonly understood, i.e., they should
be understood by the receiver in the same way as intended by the sender. The ability
to visualize something is important. Volunteers would have corrected their mistakes,
if they had been allowed to keep their eyes open. They would have looked at others
work or peoples expressions. Listening is also important. The person who paid
attention to the instructions would have produced the best results. Since the
volunteers were not allowed to ask questions or get clarification, communication was
unsuccessful.
2-14
Session 2.6
Messages on Prevention of HIV/AIDS
Expected Outcomes
Participants will design messages using the principles of communication learnt in
earlier sessions.
Objective
Modes of Transmission
To prepare and deliver a message on ways in which HIV can be
transmitted.
Materials
Left to the discretion of the users.
Time
2 hours.
Process
Ask the participants to divide into 4 groups.

Explain that each group will use one particular method to deliver
their message on ways in which HIV/AIDS can be transmitted.
While one group presents, the other three will observe the content,
method of delivery and use of language in the message delivered. The
observers will provide the presenters with feedback on the three
criteria.
The four groups can chose from the following methods, or the
facilitator can assign one method to each group:
Posters
Presentation using transparencies or flip charts
Role Play
Jingle or song
Give the groups 30 minutes to prepare their presentation.
Each presentation should not be longer than 10 minutes.
Invite the observers to give feedback after each presentation. Explain
that the feedback should be on the presentation, not on the presenters.
Allow 10 minutes for feedback after each presentation.
Conclude the session with your observations on the presentations and
highlight the positive points of each presentation.
2-15

This exercise builds skill for effective communication. You could make the exercise
more interesting by asking the observers to rate the four presentations on a scale
from 1 to 5. They could also set their own criteria for rating. You could invite an
expert on communication to come and give his/her feedback on the presentations.
HELPLINE for the peer educator

Material for reading, preparation of handouts and facilitation of session
Feedback is the most important element affecting the communication process.
Feedback is a mechanism by which the initiator can understand the impact of
his/her communication on the receiver. It is most effective when it has the following
characteristics:
Is non-judgmental gives descriptive feedback on the content, process and
method rather than on the communicator.
Is specific.
Is useful and useable the receiver should be able to use the feedback to
make corrections or changes. The feedback should contain proactive
suggestions.
Is accurate.
Uses I statements.
Some basic principles of communication while dealing with sensitive topics, such
as HIV/AIDS, reproductive health and drug use are:
Respect
The receiver should feel respected and trusted if s/he is to communicate. If not s/he
may want to end the conversation and leave as soon as possible.
Safety
Safety is important, as one is discussing personal and intimate matters. The person
needs to know that s/he will not suffer negative consequences for the information
being shared, for example, s/he ill not be sent to jail because s/he is using illegal
drugs, or s/he ill not be stigmatized because s/he is HIV positive.
Non judgmental attitude
Do not moralize or lecture people about their life choices. Give factual information
without personalizing it, and do not be shocked, disgusted or alarmed at the
information shared.
Confidentiality
This is an important issue. People infected with HIV/AIDS, using drugs or
discussing any other private matter need to feel assured that their information will
not be shared with anyone else. The choice of sharing or not sharing the information
must be left with the individual.
2-16
Sensitivity
Be aware of the comfort and discomfort of the person speaking with you or to whom
you may be speaking. Learn to read body language and take cues that inform you
about anothers feelings and emotions.
Privacy
In cases where the issues being discussed are private and personal, make sure these
are discussed in private. If you are in a group meeting and personal issues emerge,
establish that these will only be discussed after the group meeting and in private. Do
not refer to personal information in public forums. Do not give examples using
names and places.
Cultural and Religious sensitivity
HIV/AIDS, sexual health, and reproductive health are all sensitive subjects. They are
often mired in religious and socio-cultural taboos and beliefs. Therefore, it is very
important that you become aware of these dimensions. Religious beliefs are an
important part of the cultural identity of many people. Freedom of thought and
religion is a basic human right recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
Most religions and cultures of the world promote tolerance and love. These should
be used to help overcome the discrimination and stigmatization associated with
HIV/AIDS and other sexual and reproductive choices, such as, homosexuality and
use of family planning methods.
General reading material for the peer educator that may also be used to
make posters
Some pointers for an effective question and answer session
Listen to the questions.
Observe the tone and the manner in which the question is asked.
Repeat the question as you understand it, and ask if you got it right.
Answer if you can and cannot involve others in finding an answer.
Speak clearly and confidently.
Do not fidget or read from a paper, if you need to consult your notes, say so.
Establish eye contact with as many people as possible.
Be aware of your body language. Do not point or lean threateningly.
Involve the participants in seeking answers. Ask for their opinion and
knowledge.
Allow time for questions and answers.
Some practical points for working in different socio -cultural and religious settings
Do not address religious or sensitive socio-cultural issues without setting the
stage first. Try to form alliances with people already working at the location,
especially youth groups.
First, find out what is possible, and what is already happening on the issue of
HIV/AIDS, sexual health and reproductive health.
Contact existing open-minded religious leaders and groups because they
might lend you their support.
2-17
Gather knowledge and information about the social, cultural and religious
practices and beliefs of people; research their scriptures and holy books.
Confrontation can be counter-productive.
Remember that all religions are in favour of tolerance, respect for all Gods
children and caring for the weak and the sick.
Present facts and avoid getting into arguments.
Start with simple, non-threatening activities, such as group discussions on
what is culturally acceptable concerning sexuality or reproductive health.
Some people feel that anonymous telephone helplines are a useful initial step.
2-18
#4
Communication techniques
#4
Communication
chapter 4
Effective communication is the fundamental building block

of participation, and central to designing a strategy for participation. This chapter looks at formal and informal ways of
communicating with crisis-affected people. Formal communication takes place through meetings, focus group discussions
and so on, whilst informal communication is more opportunistic, for example simply chatting to people whilst you walk
through a community. There are advantages and disadvantages to both types of communication: informal communication
is often anecdotal and therefore can be biased, but is also
less constrained and people are much more likely to say
what they really think. However, it is easier to control communication in more formal settings. Both aid agencies and
communities are more accountable for what they say during
meetings when an official record is often kept. It isnt necessary to choose between one and the other both should be
part of your strategy.
The way in which you communicate your attitude and behaviour is as important as the method you choose, and is
the key to successful participation. Your origin, status, gender, age, profession, experience or knowledge of the area
all affect how you are perceived. See chapter 3 on building
mutual respect.
IV.1 Informal
communication
It is important to take the time to speak

informally with people. Opportunities
to engage with people on a casual or
informal basis are often missed, yet
they constitute a rich source of exchange, which can complement formal events like focus groups and community
assemblies. They are opportunities to gather information,
to increase your understanding of the community and to be
better accepted in fact you may be thought standoffish
if you fail to take up these opportunities.
There are many situations that offer the opportunity for
informal communication:
102
Communication
in a humanitarian response
stopping at the bar or tea house

going to the market and speaking with peo-
ple in the street, or even just being seen

there
going to the bath house or washing point
both useful places for female aid workers

to talk to women and girls
attending public events, such as religious

ceremonies and village gatherings
taking advantage of minor incidents: fixing a
flat tyre or repairing a car, for instance, can

lead to an informal gathering
techniques
In many situations, if
you start to converse
with one or two
people, you will find
that others join in,
and that a focus
group will take
shape spontaneously.
In a humanitarian
crisis social dynamics
change so look for
new opportunities to
communicate with
different groups.
speaking with the driver and with cooks or

waiters/waitresses in restaurants
stopping by the road and talking with farmers in fields or

with herders at water points.
IV.2 Formal
communication
methods
Formal communication with communities gives an opportunity for leaders

and spokespeople to present information, policy or opinions to the aid
agency. Often the people you communicate with on a formal basis will
have some official position or status within their community (village leader, government official, head of a womens
group) or will be part of a formal structure of some sort
such as the camp management team or the village council.
Much of this section is about formal communication, but
a great deal of it is also relevant to informal and casual
communication methods.
Formal means of communication include:
structured interviews
focus groups
traditional assemblies
103
#4
Communication
for humanitarian field workers
Involving crisis-affected people
Tips & Warnings
Participation Handbook
organised discussions with targeted audiences like
Tips & Warnings
womens groups and children
In humanitarian
crises, new leaders
may emerge. When
dealing with formal
representatives of
a population, try to
find out how they
gained their position
and the basis of their
authority. Were they
democratically elected
or self-selected? Have
they discussed the
issue at hand with the
people they intend to
represent?
You can consider using many different

types of meetings as part of your participation strategy including focus groups,
large assemblies and smaller meetings or
interviews. Whether formal or casual, all
opportunities to exchange with people should
be taken seriously. They are a means of gaining information, developing understanding
and building mutual respect and they allow
people to both influence you and hold you to
account.
Planning meetings with groups

There are already many resources for guidance on facilitating meetings, running focus
groups and using techniques such as participatory rural appraisal or participatory
learning in action. The aim of this handbook is not to repeat
prior information, but to underline the main elements relevant to participation in humanitarian situations. Additional
resources can be found in Part 3.
Although each meeting, interview, or event will differ in
terms of objectives and participants, a number of basic
principles and general guidelines should be followed:
Deciding on the purpose of the exercise
What do you want to achieve and how will you ensure real
mutual communication between you and the people you talk
to, rather than just extraction of information? In order to
decide how you will communicate with different individuals
and groups, it is useful to discuss this in advance with those
concerned.
Gathering background information
In order to prepare for a group session you will need to
collect some background information about the situation
via key informants, observation and informal discussion. It
is important to understand the security situation and the
104
Communication
techniques
potential risks to your team and the

participants, to be aware of local
social dynamics to avoid excluding or marginalising individuals or
groups of people and to be informed about any political issues that
might cast doubt on your independence, neutrality and impartiality.
In humanitarian crises the situation
can change very quickly - be prepared to update your knowledge on a
regular basis.
In large, formal group sessions

individual participation is
determined by power relations
within the group. Socially
marginalized people such as
ethnic minorities, disabled
people or women may not
feel they can contribute freely.
By planning other smaller
events or meetings you can
provide these groups with an
environment where they feel
more comfortable expressing
themselves.
Planning events with the community

Preparation is important for a
group session such as a commuAsk some of your key contacts
nity assembly. Knowing in advance
for advice on how formal the
what methods you are going to use,
meeting should be and any
where the event will take place and
other cultural tips. Dress and
who the participants will be will
behave as is necessary to
be taken seriously and show
help you to achieve your objectives
respect to the participants.
for the meeting. Preparation can
include a preliminary field visit to
a possible venue and discussion of
the purpose of the exercise, how it will be carried out and
who should attend.
Keeping a record
Whatever your purpose or method, you are likely to want to
take notes to help you remember what was said and to ensure
accuracy later on. It is important to explain why you are doing
this. Some people may be suspicious about what later use
will be made of the notes, especially if they are concerned
about their personal security. Avoid such worries by explaining how the notes will be stored, and how you will ensure
confidentiality, for example, by not using real names or other
information that might be used to identify individuals.
Their time
Time is a precious resource, especially when people are struggling to survive. By informing people of what you are doing,
105
#4
Communication
Tips & Warnings
Tips
and why, they can decide whether meeting with you is a priority. People affected by crises have needs that they hope you
may be able to meet, and may be impatient of long drawn out
processes for relatively simple and obvious matters.
Example
Consider whether you can carry out joint exercises with

other agencies to reduce the time-burden on the population
and to make sure that they are not subjected to a stream of
meetings and consultations.
106
Communication
Group size
The size of a group will determine the dynamics of the discussion. There are advantages and disadvantages to different
types of groups (see Table 2) - some people may be more
comfortable in a large assembly, while others will prefer
smaller gatherings. In larger groups the most vulnerable and
socially marginalized may not feel comfortable speaking.
Make sure that you dont plan meetings at inappropriate times

such as during prayer hours, and think about who might be
excluded at different times of the day because of their other
obligations.
Large assemblies
Smaller groups
Allow all stakeholders to

meet each other in one
place
Can be very specific

and focussed
and your time

Participatory processes seem time-consuming in the initial
stages, when a speedy response to urgent needs is called for.
However relationships built at the beginning can make the
humanitarian response more effective and accountable. Even
fairly limited involvement of affected
people at this stage is useful in building
later participatory approaches.
Useful to communicate
general information
about the project and
participatory exercises
Allow marginalised
groups to speak out
more freely
A good forum for giving

feedback to the local
community
Give each participant

more opportunity to
speak
Try to strike a reasonable compromise

between your need to respond to the
crisis and respect for the participants
rhythm. Without losing sight of the need
to achieve results in terms of meeting
their needs, try not to pressure them
into making decisions.
Create a sense of
transparency
Can be used to crosscheck information

gathered in other
circumstances
As humanitarian crises move and

change rapidly, you will have to be flexible about your time. Unexpected events
often crop up and the people you hope
to meet with can suddenly have another,
greater priority. Likewise you might find
yourself unable to attend a meeting at
short notice, in which case try to send
a message and apology by whatever
means available and make a follow-up
visit as soon as possible.
Less chance for each

participant to speak
Possibility
of someone
monopolizing the
debate
Some participants more

reticent about expressing
themselves in front of a lot
of people
May go off at
a tangent
An aid organisation wished

to conduct a focus group in
a Guinean village, and had
agreed on a meeting time with
the village elders. When the
team arrived, somebody had
died in the village, and the
funeral was to take place at
the same time as the meeting.
Elders started dividing the
participants who were present
between those who would
attend the funeral and those
who would attend the meeting.
But the aid worker proposed to
postpone the meeting to enable
all the villagers to attend the
funeral. Grateful for the teams
consideration and respect,
the whole village held an
assembly to meet with the aid
organisation after the funeral.
techniques
Advantages
Table 2
The roles and
constraints of
different group
sizes
Allow debate between

different sections of the
population
Constraints
Voiceless groups may

not be heard
107
#4
Communication
Example
One seldom has control over the number of people who

show up at an open gathering, particularly in the early stages of an emergency, so it is important to be flexible and to
adapt to the number of participants present.
In large public events that encourage the expression of
what is general and normative to the detriment of what is
specific and real9, you can expect an
emphasis on generalised statements.
Make sure that you organise other
An aid agency carrying out a
smaller meetings or events to commuparticipatory assessment in a
Liberian village had previously
nicate on more specific issues.
announced that a meeting
would take place to encourage
the villagers to participate. They
were so successful in gathering
people that they feared the
size of the group would be too
large to manage and carry out
focused discussions. When they
suggested that some villagers
went home, the villagers
insisted that they wanted to
participate, arguing that the
agency had said they would be
able to.
After initial presentations,
explanations and discussions,
the facilitators managed to
split the assembly into smaller
groups for focused discussions,
and they gathered again
afterwards for feedback and
conclusions.
108
Facilitating meetings
Be aware that your origin, status, gender, age, profession, experience or
knowledge of the area all affect how
you are perceived, and determine your
legitimacy as a facilitator. The success
of the discussion is often determined by
the quality of the relationship between
you and the group As de facto facilitator
you have a key role in ensuring the discussions and interactions are fruitful
and positive, and enable maximum participation, especially that of socially
marginalized people.
Keep the discussion to the point. However, if participants main concerns
lie outside the stated objectives and
other important issues arise, do not be
Delville, L. Mathieu, M. and Sellamna, N., Living up to Ambitions: For a More Rigorous
Practice of Participatory Appraisals and Enquiries, Scientific Directorate working paper no. 28,
(Paris: GRET -Groupe de Recherche et dEchanges Techniques-, 2001).
afraid to stray from your planned

agenda.
Remember - you do not hold the
truth! Acknowledge participants
experiences and their knowledge
of their own context and the crisis
they have undergone. Show respect for their opinions (even if you
do not necessarily share them).
You will almost inevitably find
yourself at the centre of the meeting space. As this tends to be
the focus of authority, be careful
about how you use your status.
techniques
The facilitator for group sessions in

Afghanistan was a relatively young
expatriate woman, while the group
of villagers was mostly composed
of Afghan elder men. Despite her
experience of the area, her status
as a young woman made it difficult
to obtain the respect of the elders.
She asked a male Afghan colleague
to replace her as facilitator, as
her position was constraining the
interactions and discussions. It
was only at a later stage, when
mutual trust and respect had been
established between the agency
staff and the villagers that she was
able to engage in discussions with
the elders.
Dealing with sensitive issues

In every culture there are issues
that are difficult to discuss openly,
In many societies, older
and this is often exacerbated in
women can provide very useful
times of crisis when situations
information on issues that younger
women cannot speak about, such
can be very politically charas feminine hygiene and sanitary
ged. There are some topics that
needs, or sexual violence. However
shouldnt even be raised until you
the power dynamics within
have built up a good relationship
families, particularly between
with a community or population.
mothers and daughters-in-law,
may mean that the interests of
Some issues will create tensions
older and younger women do not
between different groups or may
always coincide.
marginalize some individuals, and
in extreme cases can compromise peoples physical security. Your key contacts should
be able to give guidance on what these sensitive issues are
and how and when they can be approached.
#4
Managing group dynamics and conflicts

Social dynamics inevitably change in crisis situations, and
often the context becomes very politicised. If certain participants block the discussion or create tension in the group,
encourage the group to solve the problem so that you do not
get involved personally.
109
Communication
When first engaging with a community, it may be useful to

organise a large assembly, where all are welcome, in order
to present yourself, explain the reasons for your presence
and outline how you are going to spend your time with them.
You will be able to respond to any questions the population
may have.
Communication
Example
Tips & Warnings
Tips & Warnings
Make a point of
observing how
people interact
during the
conversation;
this can help
manage the group
dynamics, and could
provide interesting
information on
social relations
within the
community.
If a meeting has reached stalemate, if there is

growing tension, if people are monopolising
or sabotaging the discussion or if it simply is
not moving forward, try changing the group
configuration. Not every meeting will be successful. If nothing works, you can always call
for a break and address the problem directly
with the people involved.
Do not take sides in a discussion but provide information if needed, and help unblock
situations. Stay calm, even if you disagree with
what certain participants say. If you think people feel threatened by a subject, change it, but
try to learn something from what happens as this may be
relevant for your work.
Responsibility and expectations
During group discussions with crisis-affected populations,
individual or collective wounds, traumas, and conflicts may
re-emerge. Be ready to manage such situations if they
arise. If you feel unable to do so, try to avoid sensitive
subjects. Remember that, though your stay in a village may
be short, it will have lasting effects.
Find out in advance where to refer people for more specialised information or support as you might not be the
most qualified person to manage issues that have arisen,
or your organisation may not be able to deal with needs or
issues that have been brought up during your meeting.
Bringing people together to discuss issues that affect
their lives and especially their practical needs - is likely
to raise expectations. Explain clearly what you can and
cannot do, particularly with regard to the delivery of aid
supplies.
Cross-checking information
The social and political dynamics among participants can
sometimes mean that you get conflicting information from
different sources. The triangulation of information, whereby you cross-check information collected in different
110
Communication
techniques
ways and from different groups of people, is essential.

Work out the reason for any differences in your information as this can often give an insight into social dynamics
and power relations. In conflict and disaster situations
information is often manipulated in order to control, unduly
influence or instil fear in people. Take this into account
when communicating with people affected by a crisis.
Using technical tools and methods
Be careful not to overwhelm people with sophisticated
high-tech equipment, as these devices can create an undesirable distance between participants and yourself. Use
what you find on the spot, including sticks, stones, sand
and drawings on the ground.
#4
Communication
Taking photos during the sessions and showing participants photos of themselves can be a strong motivating
factor. However, make sure people feel comfortable with
this. Also, be aware that a camera changes the dynamic in
a meeting, which may not be helpful. Carrying a camera in
conflict situations can also create a security risk for you
or the people you meet.
There are many ways of collecting information on a single
topic. Be ready to adapt your tools to suit participants. Let
individuals express themselves in their own way according to their own practical experience and usual forms
of dialogue. Some planning tools and methods may also
create a distance see what tools people already use and
are familiar and comfortable with before introducing your
own.
Quot e
I have observed you when you use your calendar

chart. I dont feel very comfortable with that tool.
Please ask me questions directly, and I will explain to
you everything that is happening on my farm.
Guinean farmer. 10
Quoted by Boulier, F., La diversit des stratgies paysannes dans la zone de Koba (Guine), in
Delville, L. et al (eds), Les Enqutes Participatives en Dbat, (Paris : Karthala, 2000).
10
111
Communication
Closing
Before moving on, summarize and clarify what has been said.
This can be done by you, a participant, or collectively. Acknowledge the positive contribution of the meeting, interview,
or event and let people know how they can continue to participate in the project and what will happen next. Take care
to ensure that communication remains a two way process by
letting people know how they can contact you in future, or
when you will next visit them.
techniques
Chapter 4 summary
Communication techniques
1 Good communication is the basic building-block of
participation
By using both formal methods and taking informal

opportunities to communicate with people you will be
able to improve your understanding of the situation and
build the kind of relationships needed for successful
participation.
#4
Communication
Communication is a two-way process and involves

listening, learning and adapting on your part.
Your personal behaviour and attitudes will determine

the quality of the communication and your relationship to
the people with whom you are communicating
Why, how, when and with whom you communicate

should all be part of a participation strategy
112
113
INFORMATION SOCIETY TECHNOLOGIES

EDUCATION AND TRAINING
SCHOOL OF TOMORROW
Project: IST-2000-25385
MODELLINGSPACE
Space of ideas' expression, modelling and collaboration
for the development of imagination, reasoning and learning
Development of Pedagogical Methodology

Deliverable:
Contractual Delivery Date:
Version:
Type:
Responsible Partner:
D13
September 2003
Final
Public
FCTUNL
Faculdade de Cincias e Tecnologia (UNL), March 2004
IST - School of Tomorrow
MODELLINGSPACE : IST-2000-25385
Development of Pedagogical
Methodology
SUMMARY:
This report builds on work done on the ModellingSpace project but

also on the educational and psychological literature. A pedagogical
methodology is a set of procedures that a teacher can
develop in order to help all students learn. A methodology is
seen as something one cannot receive from others. On the
contrary, it is the complex result of instruction, personal
experience and reflection.
The report establish a framework for the procedures, based on
six tenets (Commitment to teaching, to students and to their
learning; knowledge of science and mathematics; knowledge of
students; knowledge of the art of teaching; science as a way of
thinking; and reflection and professional growth) and makes
thirteen proposals for a Modelling Methodology: (1) make
clear goals and plan how concepts and ideas evolve during
the activities, anticipating learning difficulties; (2) elicit and
verbalize students conceptions; (3) promote interaction,
collaboration, and group cohesion; (4) give prompt feedback; (5)
induce self and group formative assessment; (6) proceed from
concrete to abstract; (7) verbalize mathematical procedures; (8)
promote schematic drawing and writing as tools-to-think-with;
(9) scaffold the transition from direct computations to algebraic
reasoning, from number sense to symbol sense; (10) explore
multiple representations; (11) make abstract objects as concrete
as possible but spot the differences between the real thing and
the representation; (12) balance exploratory learning with guided
learning; (13) anticipate, check, and revise the coherence of the
model and data.
KEYWORDS: Pedagogical/teaching methodology; modelling in science and

mathematics; exploratory learning; computers in teaching and
learning; collaborative work; teacher education; teacher training.
Contact: Vitor Duarte Teodoro, FCTUNL, Campus da Caparica, 2829-516 Caparica,

vdt@mail.fct.unl.pt, tel. +351 917509939.
Main Authors: Vitor Duarte Teodoro
Mnica Mesquita
Contributors: ModellingSpace partners
MODELLINGPSACE Project Deliverable D04
TABLE OF CONTENTS
What is a Pedagogical Methodology? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
Effective teaching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Six Tenets of the Pedagogical Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Commitment to Teaching, to Students and to Their Learning . . . . . .7
Knowledge of Science and Mathematics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
Knowledge of Students . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
Knowledge of the Art of Teaching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
Science as a Way of Thinking
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Reflection and Professional Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
Thirteen Proposals for a Modelling Methodology,

with Illustrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Make clear goals and plan how concepts and ideas evolve during
the activities, anticipating learning difficulties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
Elicit and verbalize students conceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Promote interaction, collaboration, and group cohesion . . . . . . . . . .16
Give prompt feedback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Induce self and group formative assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
Proceed from concrete to abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
Verbalize mathematical procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
Promote schematic drawing and writing as tools-to-think-with . . . .21
Scaffold the transition from direct computations to
algebraic reasoning, from number sense to symbol sense. . . . . . . . .22
Explore multiple representations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
Make abstract objects as concrete as possible but spot the
differences between the real thing and the representation . . . . . .24
Balance exploratory learning with guided learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25
Anticipate, check, and revise the coherence of the model and data . .26
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
What is a
Pedagogical
Methodology?
It is well know that most people assume that

anyone who has been a student can teach (just
remember your best teacher, and do like him...).
This is probably true... for teaching, not for
learning. As a matter of fact, it is now also well
known that learning is not necessarily the
outcome of teaching. For example, in the
report Science for All (AAAS, 1989), the authors
wrote:
Cognitive research is revealing that even
with what is taken to be good instruction,
many students, including academically
talented ones, understand less than we think
they do. With determination, students taking
an examination are commonly able to identify
what they have been told or what they have
read; careful probing, however, often shows
that their understanding is limited or
distorted, if not altogether wrong.
Teaching can be easy, but helping students learn
is surely a not so easy task. Students carry with
them many learning obstacles, ranging from
common science misconceptions to
epistemological nave thinking.
A pedagogical methodology is seen, in this
report, simply as a set of procedures that a
teacher can develop in order to help all
students learn, not just those who learn almost
spontaneously. Note the important verb
develop in this statement: a methodology is
not something one can receive from others. It is
the complex result of instruction, personal
experience and reflection.
Pedagogical methodologies can vary and change.
For example, some decades ago, reinforcing
(the relationship between the incidence of
behaviour, the occurrence of a consequence, and
the increased or decreased likelihood of that
behaviour occurring in the future) was seen as
the essential aspect of a good methodology.
Nowadays reinforcement is still considered an
important aspect but others are considered more
relevant to learning. E.g., exploring multiple
representations (verbal, graphical, analytical,
etc., particularly in science and mathematics)
and concrete experience of abstract
concepts are two of current essential aspects to
consider on an effective methodology.
Effective
teaching
Effective teaching is seen on the educational and

psychological literature as having multiple
components, such as:
personal traits of the teacher;
teacher competencies;
teaching methods;
classroom atmosphere;
teacher decision making-skills;
students previous knowledge and skills;
students characteristics.
The interaction between all these factors and the

complexity of each make difficult (or
impossible?) to assert which one is the single
most important factor.
Some authors, such as Ausubel (1968) postulate
that students' previous knowledge is the single
most important factor:
If I had to reduce all of educational
psychology to one principle, I would say this:
the most important single factor influencing
learning is what the learner already knows.
Ascertain this and teach him accordingly.
Ausubel also introduced relevant ideas and
concepts, such as:
the distinction meaningful and rote

learning;
the most general ideas of a subject

should be presented first and them
progressively differentiated;
instructional materials must integrate new

material with previously presented
information;
learning materials should be logically

organized and potentially meaningful to
learners.
anchoring new concepts into the learners

already existing cognitive structure make
new concepts recallable.
In this report, we are particularly interested in

those factors teachers can manage by
themselves. For example, it is not possible for a
teacher to have influence on most students'
characteristics (e.g., personal characteristics and
family background).
Six Tenets of
the
Pedagogical
Methodology
Commitment to Teaching, to Students

and to Their Learning
Teachers acknowledge and value the individuality
and worth of each student, believe that all students can learn and demonstrate these beliefs
in their practice.
Knowledge of Science and Mathematics

Teachers study continuously to have a broad
and deep knowledge of the concepts, principles, techniques, and reasoning methods of
mathematics and science (and the connections
between them and with other fields of knowledge), and they use this knowledge to establish
curricular goals and shape their instruction and
assessment.
Knowledge of Students
Teachers know and care about their students,
know how they learn and develop, understand
the impact of home life and cultural background,
and use this knowledge to guide their curricular
and instructional decisions.
Knowledge of the Art of Teaching

Teachers have an extensive base of pedagogical knowledge to stimulate, motivate and facilitate student learning, using a wide range of formats and procedures to create environments in
which students are active learners, show willingness to take intellectual risks, develop confidence and self-esteem, and value
knowledge.
Science as a Way of Thinking

Teachers develop students abilities to reason
and think alone or with support from others,
to investigate and explore patterns, to discover
structures and establish relationships, to formulate and solve problems, to justify and communicate their conclusions, and to question and
extend those conclusions.
Reflection and Professional Growth

Inspired on the Standards
developed by the National Board
for Professional Teaching
Standards, 2001.
Teachers reflect on what and how they teach

and collaborate with others to strengthen the
learning community.
Commitment to
Teaching, to
Students and to
Their Learning
Teachers acknowledge and value the

individuality and worth of each student, believe
that all students can learn and demonstrate
these beliefs in their practice.
In recent years, international studies such as the
Trends in International Mathematics and Science
Study (TIMSS, http://timss.bc.edu) and the
Programme for International Student Assessment
(PISA, http://www.pisa.oecd.org) have shown
that most countries face complex problems
with student learning in Science and
Mathematics. These studies are being used by
governments and schools to promote changes in
teaching and learning, not only in Europe but
also in many other countries, including the US
(see, e.g., http://nces.ed.gov/timss).
Science and Mathematics in schools has always
been considered a difficult subject by most
people, in probably all countries. And it is...
particularly when teachers assume that only the
best students can learn it. The famous
Pygmalion Effect is a uniquely human
phenomenon: a persistently held belief becomes
a reality.
At least since late 1960s, the mastery learning
and the formative assessment movements and,
later, research-based teaching has shown that
most if not all students can learn, more
concretely or more formally, the habits of
mind, the concepts and the ideas of science and
mathematics.
Theories, like Howard Gardners Theory of
Multiple Intelligences (1983), recognize that
all human beings have different intelligences,
connected to core operations (e.g., logicalmathematical, connected to number,
categorization, and relations; spatial, connected
to accurate mental visualization, mental
transformation of images). Different human
beings have different degrees of each
intelligence, but all have some degree of all
intelligences.
Learning how to make models, in science in
mathematics, can be done by all students, with
different degrees of success. For example,
modelling with tables, as shown below, is easily
grasped by all, but modelling with differential
equations can only be done by formal thinkers,
with a long training path.
Knowledge of
Science and
Mathematics
Teachers study continuously to have a broad

and deep knowledge of the concepts,
principles, techniques, and reasoning methods
of mathematics and science (and the
connections between them and with other
fields of knowledge), and they use this
knowledge to establish curricular goals and
shape their instruction and assessment.
Teachers can be defined as professional
learners. What they learnt in the University is a
very small fraction of what they need to learn
during their professional life, particularly in
subjects like science and mathematics, which are
in the front run of intellectual and technological
change and progress.
For example, for a teacher that finished his or
her professional training in early 1980s, the
following is completely or partially new:
cellular phones, personal computers, universal
networks, graphical based software, digital
media, genetic manipulation, many materials
used in fabrics and sports, etc. These
developments where only possible due to science
and technology and most are now part of the
everyday life of students.
It can be said that foundational knowledge
stays more or less the same for decades. Thats
probably true. The current scientific paradigms
(in the Kuhnian sense, Kuhn, 1962)quantum
mechanics, relativity, plate tectonics, big-bang
theory, evolution, genetics, etc., were developed
between 1900 and 1980. But who can learn
deeply even a very specific subject in the
University? And students, particularly the young
ones, are always eager for specific
knowledgeonly a teacher who is always a
learner can give food for thought to his
students.
Experienced teachers supervisors know that
those teachers who do not regularly study new
and old things tend to have problems
appreciating student learning difficulties. That
can be easily understood: if someone repeats
many times what he teaches, it becomes trivial
and completely familiar to him. But if he is
always studying, learning difficulties are
constantly present and he can understand of
how difficult it can be for students to learn
something they are not familiar with.
Knowledge of
Students
Teachers know and care about their students,

know how they learn and develop,
understand the impact of home life and cultural
background, and use this knowledge to guide
their curricular and instructional decisions.
Traditional teachings methodologies were based
on teaching the same, in the same conditions,
with the same approach to all students. On the
second half on the 20th century, teaching the
same to all was discarded as a feasible
methodology due to multiple factors
(generalization of secondary studies, results of
educational and psychological research,
multiculturalism in schools, etc.).
The now dominant current practices recognize
each student as a different learner, with
different personal knowledge and skills. A good
metaphor (suggested by Bruner, 1960) for the
students learning path is a spiral line.
Different students can be at different places on
the spiral line, on each class. The spiral form
suggests that learning progress is not linear and
it happens with cycles and steps forward.
According to Bruner, the spiral learning approach
can be characterised by a continuum with three
reference levels: enactive, iconic and symbolic
(these levels were inspired on the developmental
psychology of Jean Piaget). On the enactive
level, the child manipulate materials directly.
On the iconic level, deals with mental images
of objects but does not manipulate them directly.
On the symbolic level, can manipulate symbols
and no longer needs mental images or objects.
To understand how students learn, Bruner also
proposed an important principle: cognitive
processes precede perceptions rather than
the other way around. The relevance of this
principle was reinforced by science and
mathematics constructivist authors. For example,
Driver (1983), on her seminal book The Pupil as
Scientist, wrote:
'Looking at' is not a passive recording of an
image like a photograph being produced by a
camera, but it is an active process in which
the observer is checking his perception against
his expectations (pp. 11-12).
Knowledge of
the Art of
Teaching
Teachers have an extensive base of

pedagogical knowledge to stimulate, motivate
and facilitate student learning, using a wide
range of formats and procedures to create
environments in which students are active
learners, show willingness to take intellectual
risks, develop confidence and self-esteem,
and value knowledge.
Active or practical learning methods are not a
panacea for learning. Practical activities dont
mean anything if students dont have anchoring
concepts on their cognitive structures. The
balance between practical and discovery
methods is probably the most important issue a
teacher must manage when planning and
promoting learning activities. As Driver (1983)
pointed out:
If we wish children to develop and
understanding of the conventional concepts
and principles of science, more is required
than simply providing practical experiences.
The theoretical models and scientific
conventions will not be 'discovered' by
children through their practical work. They
need to be presented. Guidance is then
needed to help children assimilate their
practical experiences into what is possibly a
new way of thinking about them (p. 9).
Quoting a famous proverb, (I do and I
understand), Driver changed it to better
illustrate how relevant students knowledge
structures are: I do and I am even more
confused.
Papert (1980), a pioneer of computers in
education, wrote about the importance of
students being computer off, reflecting and
discussing ideas and procedures. Technological
devices, such as computers, can reinforce the
button syndrome (users tend to press the
maximum number of buttons on the shortest
time...) if practical learning activities are done for
their own sake, without previous preparation,
reflection and discussion.
In a simple short statement, the art of teaching
is the art of balancing minds-on activities
with hands-on activities, giving students
sufficient time to internalise concepts and
build a coherent cognitive structure.
10
Science as a Way
of Thinking
Teachers develop students abilities to reason

and think alone or with support from others,
to investigate and explore patterns, to discover
structures and establish relationships, to
formulate and solve problems, to justify and
communicate their conclusions, and to question
and extend those conclusions.
Science is not just about facts. It is best
described as a way of thinking about the
world, as the Nobel winner Leon Lederman
wrote (1998).
The fist amazing idea of science as a way of
thinking is that the world is understandable
(as Einstein pointed out), i.e., the world is
accessible to human thought. Humanity took a
long time to adopt this point of view. We know
now that our understanding of the world is
limitedscience makes and test models about
how the world works, but models are not the
real thing (see, e.g., Giere, 1989)but the
essence of Einsteins idea is a breakthrough of
scientific thought.
A second fundamental way of thinking in science
can be described as informed scepticism.
Popper (1989) has shown that any statement can
only be a scientific statement if it can be tested
by systematic attempts to refute them. Contrary
to common sense (including students common
sense!), scientific ideas are not dogmas and they
are always subject to test and refutation. This
doesnt mean that it is easy to accept a new
scientific view: for example, Planck wrote, in his
autobiography (1950), how difficult it is for most
scientists.
Before formal schooling was invented, family,
religion and apprenticeship were the available
modes to transmit and share ways of thinking,
values, attitudes, and skills from one generation
to the next. They still have today a relevant
place, together with media and peers. But
science requires a way of thinking that cannot be
transmitted by these modes and need a more
formal setting to develop. For example, careful
controlled observation, based on theory and
expectations, is a typical process/way of thinking
of science not used in everyday contexts. The
same is true for most other scientific processes.
11
Reflection and
Professional
Growth
Teachers reflect on what and how they teach

and collaborate with others to strengthen the
learning community.
A traditional classroom is an isolated place for
the teacher: he is alone... with his students.
Working together with other teachers, using
team teaching or just preparing worksheets, is
something relatively new in most schools and it
is not a current practice in many.
Seeing themselves as partners with other
teachers is an essential issue, particularly when
the use of technology tools is embedded in the
curriculum. Teachers have many opportunities
and motivations to collaborate, learn, and work
together with computer tools, either because
these tools facilitate interaction (e.g., email and
chat) or because technological difficulties
cannot most of the time be solved by only one
teacher.
Through reflection and collaboration, a
teacher can develop the art and science of good
teaching practice. Reflection requires thoughtful
and careful reporting and analysis of teaching
practice, philosophy, and experience.
Understanding why an activity or practice was
productive or non-productive in the classroom is
a key element in professional development.
Teacher training has been a recurrent topic of
educational research and educational policy. But
the concept of teacher training is a
controversial one because training is a narrow
concept if one envisions teaching as much more
than using a repertoire of teaching techniques.
Professional development or professional
growth, particularly for those who are certified
teachers, is a much more inclusive concept to
name what is desirable for the teaching
profession.
Schools that have a technology embedded
curriculum need to share a vision of themselves
as collaborative learning communities and
learning organizations (i.e., a group of people
who are continually enhancing their capabilities
to create what they want to create, Senge,
2000). The pace of change in society and in
technology doesnt offer any opportunity for a
less demanding vision.
12
Thirteen
Proposals for
a Modelling
Methodology,
with
Illustrations
As discussed above, a pedagogical methodology

is seen, in this report, as a set of procedures
that a teacher can develop in order to help
all students learn.
A methodology is something a teacher develops,
based on his or her own experience and
knowledge and on proposals made by others
(scientists, peers, teachers educators, etc.). A
methodology is, then, a complex result of
instruction, personal experience and
reflection.
The following thirteen proposals highlight
relevant procedures to help teachers build a
coherent methodology. Most proposals are
illustrated with specific Modelling Space examples
in the following pages.
1
Make clear goals and plan how concepts

and ideas evolve during the activities,
anticipating learning difficulties.
Elicit and verbalize students conceptions.
Promote interaction, collaboration, and

group cohesion.
Give prompt feedback.
Induce self and group formative

assessment.
Proceed from concrete to abstract.
Verbalize mathematical procedures.
Promote schematic drawing and writing

as tools-to-think-with.
Scaffold the transition from direct

computations to algebraic reasoning,
from number sense to symbol sense.
10
Explore multiple representations.
11
Make abstract objects as concrete as

possible but spot the differences between
the real thing and the representation.
12
Balance discovery and exploratory learning

with guided learning.
13
Anticipate, check, and revise the

coherence of models and data.
13
1
Make clear goals and
plan how concepts
and ideas evolve
during the activities,
anticipating learning
difficulties
Establishing goals and objectives is a common

practice in education since late 1950s, after the
publication of Bloom's Taxonomy of Educational
Objectives (1956). Objectives and goals offer
easily understandable guidelines for
systematic planning and evaluation, covering
the multiple cognitive processes (and not only
the lower mental processes, such as
memorization). Goals must put a bigger
emphasis on processes rather than on content
matter.
For example, most students have problems
understanding ratios (e.g., "an object is five
times larger than other"). Then, an activity on
the direct proportionality relation can be
preceded by a familiar context, as far as
possible, where learners can use ratios. The goal
is direct proportionality but before reaching this
goal, understanding ratios is a fundamental step.
Most learning difficulties can and should be
anticipated, giving students less demanding
activities, in order to help them make smooth
transitions, from familiar contexts to more formal
ones.
The goal is a trip to the
Moon... and some
elementary mathematics
about proportionality
(direct and inverse).
Images and sizes. Using

grids, students discuss how
many times the height of an
image is bigger that other.
This discussion
is an essential
pre-requisite
to understand
proportionaly.
14
Eliciting and verbalizing is a powerful didactic

tool. Teachers must give many opportunities to
students talk about what they see, do, and
think. Typical teacher encouragements can be:
Elicit and verbalize

students conceptions
What are you seeing on the screen (or on

the paper)?
Can you describe what you have done?
What do you think it will happen?
What do you think of this?
What does this word/statement mean to

you?
What are the limits of ...?
What does this image mean to you?
What is the relevant information you can

gather from this ...?
It is possible to include these type of eliciting

activities as part of written worksheets but a
balance must be made be between asking
and recording.
Some examples of eliciting questions:
What happens when time
starts? What does it mean to
say time starts running?
What does 0 means

in this image?
How does the height of the

water increases as time runs?
What is the maximum value
of this variable or entity?
What will happen if time
continues to run?
What do you read on
these two arrows?
Can you plan and make a table of values from
this animation?
15
3
Promote interaction,
collaboration, and
group cohesion
Most if not all modelling activities that can be

done with Modelling Space should be made by
groups of 2 to 4 students. Teachers can give
students the chance to choose their partners, or
can put mixed ability students in the same
group.
A typical activity starts computer-off:
students read and discuss the goal of the
activity, as stated on the worksheet. Teachers
supervise students reading and make clear how
important is to understand what is the goal of
the activity. Students should also be encouraged
to browse through all the pages of the
worksheet to have a global idea of its content
and purpose, actions and records required, and
to have a feeling of the time required to
complete it. Certain activities can only be done
on more than one class period.
Worksheets should encourage group interaction.
E.g., instead of asking what do you think of...
it can say what does your group think of....
For younger students, it can be interesting to
allow students to choose a name for their
group. Students usually choose strong and
original names, which helps to create group
cohesion and identity. It can also be useful to
assign roles in each group (e.g., keyboard
manager, worksheet record coordinator,
spokesperson for the group). These roles can
rotate by group members in different activities.
Modelling Space allows collaborative activities,
locally and remotely. Collaborative environments
demand extra-effort from the teacher to
supervise the discussions among the students, as
well as their work on the shared or the individual
workspaces, but it usually pay-off since
students become more aware of their own
reasoning and teachers know explicitly how
students reason. Three main strategies can be
used: tutoring between groups (one group
explains the other how to make a model);
coaching between groups (one group
observes the work done by the other and
intervenes to give advices and make
suggestions); confrontation between
groups (both groups discuss the work done by
the other and both intervene to support actions).
In certain cases, activity logs can provide
teachers with rich information about students
reasoning and knowledge construction.
16
4
Give prompt feedback
Feedback is the information provided to a

learner or to a group concerning the correctness,
appropriateness, or accuracy of actions.
Feedback occurs only after an action, is
observable and describes the effects of the
action. Feedback is, essentially, information
about performance.
Feedback is pervasive in teacher-class
interactions but it less common on an individual
basis since most classroom activities involves the
class as whole.
Feedback is generally considered a critical
component in effective teaching and learning.
The original behaviourist view of feedback as a
reinforcer automatically linked to responses has
been changed to new views and practices with
the raise of cognitive theories of learning.
Feedback is now viewed as more linked with
learner's cognitive processes rather then
solely with answers produced by learners. Typical
instances of feedback involves students
describing their thought processes when solving
a problem, reading a text aloud and discussing it,
managing the computer, listen to the thought
process described by teachers, and then compare
what they did to what the teacher did.
When using ModellingSpace, teachers have many
opportunities to give feedback to students, both
on a individual basis and on a group basis. The
pedagogical question is how to give prompt
feedback. In order to succeed in giving prompt
and meaningful feedback, teachers must be
proactive. The pattern of proactive teacher
behaviour includes:
walking around all groups and sitting with

each group if necessary;
reading aloud to the group what students

have recorded on worksheets and what
they have done on the screen and discuss
it;
asking questions that can provoke

thinking and verbalization.
writing comments, suggestions, and

questions directly on students
worksheets.
making schematic drawings that

describe ideas and processes and discuss
them with students.
17
5
Induce self and group
formative assessment
Students views on assessment are still more

related to summative assessment (related to
knowledge and skills certification) than formative
assessment, a concept that arose in late 1960s
(Scriven, 1967).
Formative assessment is, essentially, a way of
learning, and should be part of all learning
activities. It provides feedback for improvement
of learning and instruction and occurs
throughout the learning process.
The following are characteristics of formative
assessment:
it is detailed and provide specific

information for improvement rather than
single composite scores in the form of
marks or grades;
it is nonthreatening to the student and to

the group so as not to stimulate
defensiveness and rejection but they are
conscious that they are being evaluated;
it is timeliness;
value judgments are explicit and available

to the student, in context.
In order to promote formative assessment during

Modelling Space activities teachers should:
include questions like write down your

group predictions on worksheets;
give preferably indirect hints about

students work;
promote group interaction to assess

students answers (e.g., group B analyze
the answers of group A);
show correctly filled worksheets to give

students reference standards on how to
answer certain types of questions;
make value judgments explicit to

students and groups, accompanied by
reflection hints (e.g.: This is correct, can
you explain why?. Something is still
missing in this in order to be correct. Can
you find what is missing?).
18
6
Proceed from concrete
to abstract
Science and mathematics is about formal

models of objects, not about the objects
themselves (Giere, 1989). This is a subtle and
difficult distinction to novices. Novices'
knowledge usually consists mostly of the
objects and features explicitly presented in
specific situations. For example, most novices
classify introductory physics problems as, e.g.,
inclined plane problems or projectile problems.
Their solution procedures are usually syntactic
and specific, translating problem statements
directly into formulas, that should have an
almost immediately solution. In contrast,
experts' knowledge tend to represent problems
by the relevant implicit physics concepts,
quantities and principles, usually not mentioned
directly in the problem description (Chi et al.
1981).
As multiple authors have shown, in child
development there is a shift from verbatim
representations to gist representations, a
shift from concrete to abstract. Introductory
Modelling Space activities should be designed to
scaffold this shift. For example:
whenever adequate, start with concrete

entities, like car or clock;
discuss what are the properties of each

entity relevant to a certain problem
situation;
define operationally the relevant

properties when analyzing a problem;
discuss how can properties be measured,

i.e., expressed by numbers that represent
quantities.
A concrete model, made with objects
(images have a high degree of perceptual
fidelity). Some questions to discuss: What
are the relevant properties of the clock
and the recipient one is interested to
model the situation? How can the properties
be operationalized and mesuared?
A more formal model of the

same problem... and of many
similar problems.
19
7
Verbalize
mathematical
procedures
Students can learn to articulate reasoning by

presenting their thinking to themselves, to their
peers and to adults.
Verbalization is a powerful heuristics students
can use to learn and to become conscious of how
and what they have learnt, growing into more
self-sufficient learners. Self-sufficient learners
(Miller and Brewster, 1992) are those who know
what can affect their cognition, know how to
control their own cognitive endeavours, and
believe that cognitive effort results in academic
success. This heuristic encourages students to
talk (and write) to themselves and to their peers
as they engage in learning and problem-solving
processes. The types of verbalizations include:
analyzing the task and the goals to be

achieved (e.g., what do I have to do?);
formulating a plan of action (e.g., how

should I do it?);
describing by words mathematical

relationships (e.g., if this increases n
times, this decreases n times);
evaluating the effectiveness of each of

the steps in the plan (e.g., how am I
doing?);
giving themselves positive

feedback for succeeding with
each step (e.g., that's fine
work.);
dealing with obstacles,

employing corrective actions
(e.g., that's not completely
right.).
Teachers should model and display

these steps and the verbalizations in
learning situations, in order to provide
students with information about why the
verbalizations are necessary and how
effectively they work.
This introductory page is

only about promoting
verbalization of linear
relationships...
20
8
Promote schematic
drawing and writing
as tools-to-thinkwith
Young students abilities to talk and listen are

usually more advanced than their abilities to read
and write. Therefore, teachers must provide
experiences that allow varied forms of written
communication as a natural component of
modelling activities.
Recording and communication should always
be explicit activities. Students can make
different types of records, ranging from
words, simple sentences, simple drawings or
more elaborated records, like concept maps,
careful schematic drawings or even full reports.
Drawing and writing are usually preferable to
talk. In fact, drawing and writing demands more
time and consciousness than talk and can be
more easily revised by students.
Drawing and writing usually starts with
thinking-aloud, an activity that must be
common to teachers and students alike. Students
can learn to think aloud if the teacher usually
illustrates that procedure and shows how it can
be used to make records and re-examine
reasoning.
A good record is effective to oneself and to other
students. For example, the record below is a
clear restatement of whats on the text and can
easily be understood by any reader. Students
become better at listening,
paraphrasing, questioning, and
interpreting others ideas when they can
record them, using their own words and
drawings. With time, their records
become more precise.
A drawing made by a student to

describe what happens to the distance
travelled by a car in one hour.
1 hour after
This car moves at a

speed of 100 km/h.
This car has travelled

100 km.
21
9
Scaffold the
transition from direct
computations to
algebraic reasoning,
from number sense to
symbol sense
Different authors (e.g., Kaput, 2001) have

argued that developing algebraic reasoning
since elementary levels is critical for
mathematics teaching and learning. It is
necessary to reconceptualize the nature of
algebra and algebraic thinking and how it relates
to arithmetic. The traditional but artificial
separation of arithmetic (where numbers are
treated as real objects that one can
manipulate) and algebra (where symbols are
treated as quantities and real objectssymbol
sense) makes more difficult for students to learn
algebra and denies students of powerful
mathematical ideas.
Familiarity takes a long time to develop, and
algebraic thinking is no exception. But one must
be careful because the idea is not to push the
current typical high school algebra curriculum to
more elementary grades. The goal is only to
develop algebraic reasoning, not skilled use of
common algebra procedures.
The two central algebraic procedures are (1)
making generalizations and (2) using
symbols to represent mathematical quantities
and solve problems. A typical generalization is
that multiplying a number by a fraction of 1
results on a smaller number and a common
symbolic procedure is representing that quantity
a is the double of quantity b by
a = 2 b.
Modelling Space activities must
smoothly support this transition from
arithmetic reasoning (e.g., making
direct computations on tables of values)
to algebraic reasoning (e.g.,
transforming a table of values of two
variables into an equation).
This table requires number sense...
This mathematical equation illustrates

the transition from direct
computations, as on the table, to
symbolic algebraic representation.
22
10
Explore multiple
representations
Multiple representations (Perkins, Schwartz,

West, & Wiske, 1995) are alternative
coordinated views of a phenomenon, model
or process in a certain cognitive domain, such as
a graph, an equation, and a table.
The concept of multiple representations has been
a recurrent concept in exploratory software
design for science and mathematics, at least
since the publication of Making sense of the
future (Harvard Educational Technology Center,
1988). In this position paper, the authors argue
about how computers can make a difference in
learning environments: they stress the fact that
computers can easily present simultaneously
representations of the same formal object, such
as a function (e.g., the analytical expression, a
table of values, and a graph). Multiple
representations, emphasizing different aspects of
the same idea and affording different sort of
analyses, are now a taken for granted issue in
most educational software for science and
mathematics.
Modelling Space activities should encourage
teachers to use multiple representations,
particularly of simple mathematical
relationships, including those that cannot be
expressed by algebraic expressions. For
example, the model below shows an oscillatory
relation between variable b (on the right) and
variable a (on the left). The relation is
established as a graph but a table is also
available. Running the model, the small square
that represents the value of b oscillates back and
forth. Another representation, the verbal one,
should be asked on the worksheet...
The small square, representing the

value of variable b, oscillates back
and forth as variable a increases.
The oscillatory relation between

variable b and variable a was
established using the mouse but it
can also be done introducing values
on the table.
23
11
In the early beginning of computers in education,

Papert (1980) wrote:
Stated most simply, my conjecture is that
the computer can concretize (and personalize)
the formal. Seen in this light, it is not just
another powerful educational tool. It is unique
in providing us with the means for addressing
what Piaget and many others see as the
obstacle which is overcome in the passage
from child to adult thinking. I believe that it
can allow us to shift the boundary separating
concrete and formal. Knowledge that is
accessible only through formal processes can
now be approached concretely. And the real
magic comes from the fact that this
knowledge includes those elements one needs
to become a formal thinker (p. 21).
Make abstract objects

as concrete as
possible but spot the
differences between
the real thing and
the representation
Reification (using formal objects as real objects

to think with) is at the realm of learning science
and mathematics (Roitman, 1998). Hebenstreit
(1987) coined a term that seems essential to
understand how computers can help in the
reification of knowledge. For Hebenstreit,
computers allow the user to manipulate a new
type of objects, objects that he calls concreteabstract objects. Concrete in the sense that
they can be manipulated on the screen and react
as real objects and abstract because they can
be only physical or mathematical constructs such
as magnitudes, equations, fields, etc.
Modelling Space entities and relations are, in
most contexts, concrete-abstract objects,
sometimes multiple levels of perceptual
fidelity. Using abstract objects concretely, as in
Modelling Space, can be a powerful didactic
heuristics. But there also pitfalls, since a
significative number of students tend to consider
representations as the real thing (Justi &
Gilbert, 2002).
24
12
Balance discovery
and exploratory
learning with guided
learning
The inquiry curricula, associated with discovery

and exploratory learning, were inspired by
Piaget and Bruners ideas, notably the The act of
discovery paper (1961), where Bruner argues
that discovery learning is superior to learning
based on expository modes.
A very different position has been assumed by
other cognitive theorists such as e.g. Ausubel
(1963, 2000). Ausubels most common critique
of discovery learning is that although it can be
effective in certain specific situations, for the
most part it is cumbersome and overly timeconsuming. Discovery learning also demands
from the teacher a greater contextualization in
order to have a better chance of retention than
rote memorization of a procedure. Accordingly to
Ausubel (2000), most meaningful learning is
associated with reception learning, not with
discovery learning. In opposition to Bruner,
Ausubel argues that discovery learning can also
be rote in nature because it does not conform
to the conditions of meaningful learning (p. 5)
and that meaningful reception learning is an
active process, not a passive one, and requires
cognitive analysis in order to define which
aspects of existing cognitive structure are most
relevant to the new potentially meaningful
material.
Balancing exploratory and guided learning is a
fundamental issue in the use of computer tools
like modelling software. Teachers should always
bear in mind that learners cannot explore
what they dont know already!
The balance between exploratory learning and
direct instruction must be managed by
curriculum developers and by teachers. This
balance can be supported via two means:
1
the student activity sheets;
teachers strategies during the sessions.
Activity sheets play a crucial role for this

balance. When someone try to ask questions in a
written way, it is difficult to balance it , and it is
difficult to avoid saying something that finally,
guide students directly. Often a question that is
presented later, reveal something that students
have to discover previously. For this reason, one
need to gradual delivery short and separate
sheets.
25
13
Anticipate, check, and
revise the coherence
of models and data
Models are abstract constructions of human

mind. They cannot be true in the sense that
they are like the real thing. Models only
represent some features of the real thing.
There are two important words in the previous
statement: represent and some. Both words
establish the epistemological status of models.
These status must be explicitly discussed and
learnt by students.
At all levels of modelling, from planning a real
trip to the Moon to learning simple models of
direct and inverse proportions, a fundamental
issue is the anticipation of the coherence of the
model and data.
For example, a student can start making a
model of the trip to the Moon anticipating that
time of travel grows with distance and
decreases with speed... The data for this
statement comes from common sense experience
but it can also come from other sources, such as
graphs of experimental results.
Anticipation is absolutely fundamental to check if
the model makes sense, once it is done. If the
student doesnt anticipate what he will get with
the model, he is more ready to accept
anything... and that happens frequently, usually
based on a mislead view that the computer is
allways right.
A possible sequence for modelling activities
is:
discuss and describe the features of

what is going to be modelled;
select what properties will be used on the

model;
anticipate possible relations between

the properties (if possible, get real data
on these relations);
analyse and discuss the relations and

make a first model, guided by a
worksheet, by the teacher, or by group
discussion;
run the model and compare the output

with the predictions;
make what-if investigations, discuss and

revise, as necessary.
26
References
American Association for the Advancement of

Science. (1989). Science for all americans
(Project 2061). Washington: American
Association for the Advancement of Science.
Ausubel, D. (1963). The psychology of
meaningful verbal learning. New York: Grune &
Stratton.
Ausubel, D. P. (2000). The acquisition and
retention of knowledge: A cognitive view.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Ausubel, D. (1968). Educational psychology: A
cognitive view. N. Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Bloom, B. S. (Ed.). (1956). Taxonomy of
Educational Objectives: The Classification of
Educational Goals, Handbook 1: Cognitive
Domain. New York: McKay.
Bruner, J. (1960). The process of education.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bruner, J. S. (1961). The act of discovery.
Harvard Educational Review, 31(1), 21-32.
Chi, M. T., Feltovich, P. J., & Glaser, R. (1981).
Categorization and representation of physics
problems by experts and novices. Cognitive
Science, 5, 121-152.
Driver, R. (1983). The pupil as scientist? Milton
Keynes: Open University Press.
Educational Technology Center. (1988). Making
sense of the future. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Graduate School of Education.
Gardner, H. (1983). Frames of mind: the theory
of multiple intelligences. New York: Basic Books.
Giere, R. N. (1989). Explaining science: A
cognitive approach (Science and its conceptual
foundations). Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.
Hebenstreit, J. (1987). Simulation et pdagogie:
Une rencontre du troisime type. Gif Sur Yvette:
cole Superieure d'Electricit.
Justi, R. S., & Gilbert, J. K. (2002). Science
teachers knowledge about and attitudes towards
the use of models and modelling in learning
science. International Journal of Science
Education, 24(12), 1273-1292.
27
Kaput, J. (2001). Employing childrens natural

powers to build algebraic reasoning in the
content of elementary mathematics. Mahwah,
NJ: Erlbaum.
Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The structure of scientific
revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lederman, L. M. (1998). ARISE: American
Renaissance in Science Education (No.
FERMILAB-TM-2051). Batavia, Illinois: Fermi
National Accelerator Laboratory.
Miller, G. E., & Brewster, M. E. (1992).
Developing self-sufficient learners in reading and
mathematics through self-instructional training.
In M. Pressley, K. R. Harris & J. T. Guthrie (Eds.),
Promoting Academic Competence and Literacy in
Schools. San Diego: Academic Press.
National Board for Professional Teaching
Standards. (2001). Adolescence and Young
Adulthood Mathematics Standards (2nd ed.).
Arlington, VA: National Board for Professional
Teaching Standards.
Papert, S. (1980). Mindstorms: Children,
computers and powerful ideas. N. Y.: Basic
Books.
Perkins, D. N., Schwartz, J. L., West, M. M., &
Wiske, M. S. (Eds.). (1995). Software goes to
school, teaching for understanding with new
technologies. NY: Oxford University Press.
Planck, M. (1950). Scientific autobiography and
other papers. London: Williams & Norgate.
Popper, K. (1989). Conjectures and refutations.
London: Routledge.
Roitman, J. (1998). A mathematician looks at
national standards. Teachers College Record,
1(Fall), 22-44.
Scriven, M. (1967). The methodology of
evaluation. In R. W. Tyler, R. M. Gagn & M.
Scriven (Eds.), Perspectives of Curriculum
Evaluation. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Senge, P. M. (2000). Schools that learn: a fifth
discipline fieldbook for educators, parents, and
everyone who cares about education. New York:
Doubleday.
28
UK/BM-84 TRANSLATION
TWELFTH LESSON
ESPIONAGE
( 2 ) INFORMATION-GATHERING USING COVERT METHODS
Information needed through covert means: Information needed to

be gathered through covert means is of only two types:
First: Information about government personnel, officers,
important personalities, and all matters related to those
(residence,work place, times of leaving and returning, wives
and children, places visited)
Second: Information about strategic buildings, important
establishments, and military bases. Examples are important
ministries such as those of Defense and Internal Security,
airports, seaports, land border points, embassies, and radio and
TV stations.
General security measures that should be taken by the person
gathering information: During the process of gathering
information, whether about governing personalities or
establishments, the person doing the gathering must take the
following security measures:
1.
Performing the exercises to detect surveillance while

executing the mission. These exercises are not well
defined, but are dependent on the time, place, and the
ability to be creative. These exercises include the
following:
a. Walking down a dead-end street and observing who is
walking behind you. Beware of traps.

b. Casually dropping something out of your pocket and
observing who will pick it up.
c.
Walking fast then stopping suddenly at a corner and
observing who will be affected.
d. Stopping in front of store windows and observing who
is-watchingyou.
e. Getting on a bus and then getting off after it departs
and observing who will be affected.
f.
Agreeing with one of your brothers to look for whoever

is watching you.
2.
When receiving the gathered information, let the informants

travel as far as possible from their place of residence and
yours. Let each of them get there using secondary roads,
preferably at night.
3.
Gather what information you can without emphasizing any

particular part. Do not rush or show urgency because your
excitement may uncover you and the degree of importance of
the information.
4.
Avoid anything that reveals your identity quickly. Do not

attempt to be too creative or inventive. Remember what
Taliran [PHI said to his political emissaries, "Do not be
anxious.
5.
Move slowly and travel a great distance. The one who is

successful in gathering information is the one who is not
known or conspicuous.
6.
Do not accept events at their face value. Do not overlook

a quick friendship or an apparent dispute. Evaluate the
importance of events and do not judge them by their
appearance.
7.
Do not speak vaguely or act mysteriously except when

wanting to get a "blabber mouth" to talk about what he
knows.
8.
Carry personal credentials and know all their contents.
9.
Prior to collecting the information, make sure that all

necessities related to the mission, especially money, are
ready.
10.
Study the area where information-gathering takes place

carefully: Open and closed streets, residents' customs,
ways of dressing, and accent.
11.
It is not permitted to carry any weapons during the

information-gathering process.
12.
Finding a cover prior to gathering the information.
Further, review all security measures concerning members of the

Military [Organization] which are covered in prior lessons.
Methods of Gathering Information Using Covert Means: The
Military Organization may obtain secret information using: A.
Surveillance, intelligence, and observation; B. Theft: C .
Interrogation; D. Excitement; E. Drugging; F. Recruitment.
A. Surveillance, Intelligence, and Observation: Civilian and
military targets (personalities). The monitoring may be done on
foot or by car.
Surveillance on foot:
1.
2.
3.
The brother or brothers performing the surveillance

operation on foot study the available information
about the target (height,weight, way of walking,
looking at a recent photograph)
Knowing the target's habits, places he visits, and
communications
Studying carefully the area where observation will
take place: names of through and dead-end streets,
residents' habits and way of dressing.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Prior to the start of the surveillance mission, making

sure that all needs related to the mission, especially
money, are met.
Agreeing on how communications with the leaders will
take place in case the surveillance plan is uncovered
(telephone, a person used for that purpose). The
telephone number should not be written but memorized.
Agreeing on special signals to exchange orders and
instructions among the surveillance team members.
Knowing the measures to be taken when the target is
lost, such as contacting the leaders or something else
agreed upon.
It is not permitted to carry any weapons during the
information-gathering process.
It is preferable to have a camera with the
surveillance man in case the target is to personally
contact others.
Surveillance by car:
Surveillance by car requires taking certain measures:
1.
Inspecting the car's fuel, water, and lights.
2.
The car should be of a common type so it would not

attract people's attention.
3.
The car should be in good condition and the driver

should be experienced.
4.
The car plates should not contain real numbers. It is

important to use a false license plate and small
numbers in order to prevent anyone from spotting and
memorizing it.
5.
The car's interior light should be disabled in order

to hide the identity of the surveillance team members
sitting inside.
6.
The number and appearance of the car surveillance team

members should match those of the target's car.
Performins Surveillance by Car:

1.
The car being used for surveillance should keep up with the
targets car during the surveillance operation, especially
in crowded areas and on side streets. The distance between
the two cars depends on the circumstances.
2.
If the target gets out of his car and starts to walk, one
of the surveillance team members should get out and observe
him.
3.
Follow all aforementioned measures for surveillance on

foot.
Exercises to detect surveillance by car:

1.
The surveillance car speeds up then stops suddenly while

observing which other car is affected (this is done where
there is not a lot of traffic).
2.
The surveillance car enters a dead-end street.
3.
The surveillance car goes in the opposite direction of

traffic.
4.
The surveillance car stops and goes backwards.
5.
[The surveillance car] enters a parking lot and immediately

goes out.
6.
[The surveillance car] takes a side road and stops.
A.
Surveillance, Intelligence,and Observation (Information

about the enemy places)
The Organizations command needs detailed information about
the enemys vital establishments, whether civilian or
military, in order to make safe plans, reach firm
decisions, and avoid surprises. Thus, the individual who
gathers information about a desired location should, in
addition to drawing a diagram, describe it and all its
details.
The Drawing: The brother should draw a diagram of the area, the
street, and the location which is the target of the informationgathering. He should describe its shape and characteristics.
The drawing should be realistic so that someone who never saw
the location could visualize it. It is preferable to also put
on the drawing the directions of traffic, police stations, and
security centers.
The Description: It is necessary to gather as much information
about the location as possible. For instance:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Traffic directions and how wide the streets are

Transportation leading to the location
The area, appearance, and setting of the place
Traffic signals and pedestrian areas
Security personnel centers and government agencies
Embassies and consulates
The economic characteristics of the area and traffic
congestion times
Public parks
Amount and location of lighting
It is preferable to photograph the area as a whole first, then

the street of the [desired] location. If possible, panoramic
pictures should be taken. That is, the collection of views
should be continuous in a such way that all pictures are taken
from one location and that the ending of one picture is the
beginning of the next. The photographer should be experienced
with and proficient in film processing and developing. It is
risky to use an outside film processing service. When observing
a military installation or camp, we discourage taking pictures
where it is forbidden. The brother/photographer should use a
modern camera that can photograph at night or from a distance,

and only the lens of the camera should be visible. When
gathering information about a military camp, the brother should
draw a diagram of the camps overall area, the camp itself, and
its interior, if possible.
The descriptionof the base or camp must contain the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
Location
Exterior shape
Transportation to it
Space [area]
Weapons used
Unit using the camp
Fortifications and tunnels
Guard posts
Amount and periods of lighting
Number of soldiers and officers. Officers ranks
Ammunition depot locations
Vehicles and automobiles
Leave policy
Commanders name, rank, arrival and departure times
Degree and speed of mobilization
Brigades and names of companies
Sleeping and waking times
Telephone lines and means of communication
The brother gathering the information may start a friendship

with one of the soldiers or officers of that base. Information
may be collected gradually and easily from soldiers when giving
them rides from the camp to the bus or train stations, etc.
B.
Gathering Information Through Interrogation: Security

personnel in our countries arrest brothers and obtain the
needed information through interrogation and torture.
The Military Organization must do likewise. On one hand,

the Organization can obtain important information about
enemy establishments and personnel. On the other hand,
that is a form of necessary punishment.
Information is collected in this method by kidnaping an
enemy individual, interrogating him, and torturing him.
This source of information is not permanent. Also, caution
should be exercised about being deceived by misinformation
from enemy individuals. Thus, the brother who interrogates
the hostage should possess the following characteristics:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
C.
Should have knowledge and expertise about people's

behavior and morals.
Should have a strong personality.
Should possess a sixth sense based on practice and
experience.
Should be extremely patient.
Should be able to act, pretend, and mask himself.
Should be intelligent, observant, analytical, and
deductive.
Should be able to establish an investigative plan.
Gathering Information Through Recruitment: Recruiting

agents is the most dangerous task that an enlisted brother
can perform. Because of this dangerous task, the brother
may be killed or imprisoned. Thus, the recruitment task
must be performed by special types of members.
There are a number of motives that might entice an
uncommitted person to take part in intelligence work.
These motives are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Coercion and entanglement

Greed and love for money
Displaying courage and love of adventure
Love of amusement and deviance
Mental and political orientation
Fear of being harmed
The Organization may use motives No. 2 , 3 , 5, and 6 in

recruitment.
Candidates for Recruitment Are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Smugglers
Those seeking political asylum
Adventurers
Workers at coffee shops, restaurants, and hotels
People in need
Employees at borders, airports, and seaports
Types of Agents Preferred by The American Intelligence Agency

[CIA]:
1.
Foreign officials who are disenchanted with their country's

policies and are looking towards the U.S. for guidance and
direction.
2.
The ideologist (who is in his county but against his

government) is considered a valuable catch and a good
candidate for American Intelligence Agency [CIA].
3.
Officials who have a lavish lifestyle and cannot keep up

using their regular wages, or those who have weaknesses for
women, other men, or alcoholic beverages. The agent who
can be bought using the aforementioned means is an easy
target, but the agent who considers what he does a noble
cause 'is difficult to recruit by enemy intelligence.
4.
For that purpose, students and soldiers in Third World

countries are considered valuable targets. Soldiers are
the dominating and controlling elements of those countries.
Recruitment Stages: Suppose the Islamic Organization, with its

modest capabilities, wants to obtain information about an
important target (important personality, building, camp, agency,
ministry). It has to do the following:
1.
Finding the Agent: In this stage, the Organization picks

the suitable person f o r supplying the information. The
Organization learns about that person: His financial
condition, his family status, his position regarding the
government, and his weaknesses and strengths.
2.
Evaluating the Agent: In this stage, the agent is placed

under continuous observation to learn the times of his
departure to and return from work, the places he visits,
the individuals he meets, and his social interaction with
those that he meets in coffee shops, clubs, etc.
3.
Approaching the Agent: After gathering information about

him, a relationship with him is developed under a certain
cover, such as:
a.
Family connection and tribal relations.
b.
Developing a friendship with him in the club, coffee
shop, and workers union. The [recruiting] brother
develops the friendship as if it were unpretentious
and unplanned. The relationship should develop
naturally and gradually in order not to attract the
targets attention.
Important Note: In case the first brother fails to develop
a friendship with the target, another brother takes over
after learning from the first about the targets weaknesses

(motives that can be exploited) such as his love f o r money,
opposition to the government, love for adventure, or
display courage.
4.
Recruiting the Agent: After finding, evaluating, and

approaching a target, comes the second stage of recruiting
him. Recruiting may be direct, that is, telling the agent
frankly about working for the Organization for a specific
and agreed-upon salary. A promise is secured in writing or
verbally.
Or recruitment may be indirect, that is, information may be
taken from the target without informing him that he is an
agent. That may be accomplished by giving him gifts,
sharing his joys and sorrows, and attempting to solve his
problems.
5.
Testing the Agent: In this stage, the agent is assigned

certain tasks in order to test his ability, loyalty, and
dependability. The agent does not know that the
Organization already has the sought information. If the
information supplied by the agent does not match the
Organizations existing information, then the agent may be
an unreliable source of information or may be trying to
mislead the Organization. During the testing stage, the
agent should remain under careful observation to spot all
his movements.
6.
Training the Agent: This stage applies t ot h e recruited

agent, that is, the agent who has been recruited directly
and is aware that he has been recruited by someone or some

organization for money or other things. That agent: may be
trained on the following:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
Work secrecy and means of gathering and hiding

information
The method of passing information on to officials
Concealment and disguising
Interrogation and resisting the interrogation
Explaining the assigned mission in utmost detail
Photography
There might not be any training at all. The agent may be

given freedom in his work, relying on his instinct,
talents, background, and the capabilities of his superior
brother.
7.
Treating the Agent: The brother who manages the agent

should possess the qualifications of a perfect spy, a
psychiatrist, and an interrogator. There are two points of
view on treating the agent:
First Point of View: Maintaining a strong personal
relationship with the agent. This technique provides the
agent with the motivation that entices him to take chances
in order to please his friend with the information.
However, this technique has disadvantages. The barriers
between the agent and his superiors are removed, and the
agent may ask for many things that were not agreed upon.
Second Point of
him roughly and
getting as much
uses harshness,
View: The person managing the agent treats

pushes him to the limits for the purpose of
information as possible. This technique
cruelty, and threats in order to keep the
agent constantly active. I believe that the Islamic

Military organization can combine the two techniques. The
agent may be treated in a careful Islamic manner, while the
managing brother appeals to the agent's conscience and his
Islamic association with the work for majestic Allah's
religion. He lures the agent with money and gifts, and uses
cruelty and kindness when appropriate.
8.
Terminating the Agents Services: That should occur when

any of the following take place: a. The recruitment mission
terminates, b. Incapacity to work because of sickness or
changes in the job situation, c. Repeated errors in
security measures, d. The agent requests the termination.
Means for Testing the Recruit: 1. Requesting specific

information that the Organization knows well, 2. Monitoring him
while he performs his covert work, 3. Overpaying him in order to
know his trustworthiness, 4. Giving him a chance to tamper with
the work documents (unimportant documents).
Important Advice About Dealing with Agents:
1.
Do not send sealed packages to the agent or receive them

from him. These could be booby traps.
2. Leaving something for the agent should be done as quickly

as possible. When transporting and giving an item to the
agent at the agreed-upon location, it should not attract
attention and lead to the agent's arrest.
3.
The financial status of the agent should be controlled so

that the agent does not suddenly show great wealth. A
UK/BM-98
TRANSLATION
portion of the payment should be given to him, while the

other should be deposited in his bank account.
4.
When wishing to recruit an agent, events should occur

naturally. You may agree with a friend that he invite the
person to be recruited for dinner, or something similar.
While that intermediary person is talking with him, he
notices your arrival at your friends,greets you, starts
to converse with you, and invites you to sit down with the
person you want to recruit.
5.
When meeting with the agent, make sure neither you or the
meeting place are being monitored. Do not enter a place to
meet with an agent before he does. There could be a trap
for you.
6.
If you wait for your agent at the agreed-upon location, you

could be a target for him. Be especially careful if he
goes to the bathroom. Once, in Belgium, an Israeli Mossad
officer met an Arab agent. A few minutes after they sat
down, the Arab agent said that he had to go get something.
When he returned, the Israeli intelligence agent was still
there. The Arab agent then pulled out a pistol and shot
the Mossad agent several times.
7.
In order to communicate with the agent, it is necessary to

specify locations such as parks, a university campus area,
etc.
8.
It is necessary to continuously communicate with the agent,

to learn about his problems and requests, help him as much
as possible, lift his morale, and renew his confidence.
UK/BM-176 TO UK/BM-180 TRANSLATION

Lesson Eighteen
PRISONS AND DETENTION CENTERS
IF AN INDICTMENT IS ISSUED AND THE TRIAL, BEGINS, THE BROTHER HAS TO PAY
ATTENTION TO THE FOLLOWING:
1 . At the beginning of the trial, once more the brothers must insist on proving that torture was
inflicted on them by State Security [investigators] before the judge.
2. Complain [to the court] of mistreatment while in prison.
3. Make arrangements for the brothers defense with the attorney, whether he was retained by
the brothers family or court-appointed.
4. The brother has to do his best to know the names of the state security officers, who
participated in his torture and mention their names to the judge. [These names may be
obtained from brothers who had to deal with those officers in previous cases.]
5. Some brothers may tell and may be lured by the state security investigators to testify against
the brothers [i.e. affirmation witness], either by not keeping them together in the same prison
during the trials, or by letting them talk to the media. In this case,they have to be treated
gently, and should be offered good advice, good treatment, and pray that God may guide
them.
6. During the trial, the court has to be notified of any mistreatment of the brothers inside the
prison.
7. It is possible to resort to a hunger strike, but i t is a tactic that can either succeed or fail.
8. Take advantage of visits to communicate with brothers outside prison and exchange
information that may be helpful to them in their work outside prison [according to what
occurred during the investigations]. The importance of mastering the art of hiding messages
is self evident here.
- When the brothers are transported from and to the prison [on their way to the court] they
should shout Islamic slogans out loud from inside the prison cars to impress upon the people
and their family the need to support Islam.
- Inside the prison, the brother should not accept any work that may belittle or demean him or
his brothers, such as the cleaning of the prison bathrooms or hallways.
- The brothers should create an Islamic program for themselves inside the prison, as well as
recreational and educational ones, etc.
- The brother in prison should be a role model in selflessness. Brothers should also pay
attention to each others needs and should help each other and unite vis a vis the prison
officers.
- The brothers must take advantage of their presence in prison for obeying and worshiping
[God] and memorizing the Qoraan, etc. This is in addition to all guidelines and procedures
that were contained in the lesson on interrogation and investigation. Lastly, each of us has to
understand that we dont achieve victory against our enemies through these actions and
security procedures. Rather, victory is achieved by obeying Almightyand Glorious God and
because of their many sins. Every brother has to be careful so as not to commit sins and
everyone of us has to do his best in obeying Almighty God, Who said in his Holy Book: We
will, without doubt. help Our messengers and those who believe (both) in this worlds life
and the one Day when the Witnesses will stand forth.
May God guide us.
[Dedication)
To this pure Muslim youth, the believer, the mujahid (fighter) for Gods sake. I present this
modest effort as a contribution from me to pave the way that will lead to Almighty God and to
establish a caliphate along the lines of the prophet.
The prophet, peace be upon him, said according to what was related by Imam Ahmed: Let the
prophecy that God wants be in you, yet God may remove it if He so wills, and then there will be
a Caliphate according to the prophets path [instruction], if God so wills it. He will also remove
that [the Caliphate] if He so wills, and you will have a disobedient king if God so wills it. Once
again, if God so wills, He will remove him [the disobedient king], and you will have an
oppressive lung. [Finally], if God so wills, He will remove him [the oppressive king], and you
will have a Caliphate according to the prophets path [instruction]. He then became silent.
THE IMPORTANCE OF TEAM WORK:

1 . Team work is the only translation of Gods command, as well as that of the prophet, to unite
and not to disunite. Almighty God says, And hold fast, all together, by the Rope which
Allah (stretches out for you), and be not divided among yourselves. In Sahih Muslim, i t
was reported by Abu Horairah, may Allah look kindly upon him, that the prophet, may
Allahs peace and greetings be upon him, said: Allah approves three [things] for you and
disapproves three [things]: He approves that you worship him, that you do not disbelieve in
Him, and that you hold fast, all together, by the Rope which Allah, and be not divided among
yourselves. He disapproves of three: gossip, asking too much [for help], and squandering
money.
2. Abandoning team work for individual and haphazard work means disobeying that orders of
God and the prophet and falling victim to disunity.
3. Team work is-conducive to cooperation in righteousness and piety.
4. Upholding religion, which God has ordered us by His saying, Uphold religion, will
necessarily require an all out confrontation against all our enemies, who want to recreate
darkness. In addition, i t is imperative to stand against darkness in all arenas: the media,
education, [religious] guidance, and counseling, as well as others. This will make i t
necessary for us to move on numerous fields so as to enable the Islamic movement to
confront ignorance and achieve victory against it in the battle to uphold religion. All these
vital goals can not be adequately achieved without organized team work. Therefore, team
work becomes a necessity, in accordance with the fundamental rule, Duty cannot be
accomplished without it, and it is a requirement. This way, team work is achieved through
mustering and organizing the ranks, while putting the Amir (the Prince) before them, and the
right man in the right place, making plans for action, organizing work, and obtaining facets of
power......
Page | 1
The Executive Coaching

Handbook
Principles and Guidelines for a
Successful Coaching Partnership
Developed by
The Executive Coaching Forum

Fourth Edition
November 2008
www.executivecoachingforum.com
Page | 2
Copyright ! 2008 by The Executive Coaching Forum
All Rights Reserved
This Handbook may be reproduced only for the benefit of people involved
with executive coaching (executives, coaches, HR professionals supporting a
coaching project, managers and other colleagues of an executive being
coached), and only where no fee will be charged nor profit made as a result of
the reproduction or distribution of the Handbook.
Required Notice for Changes to This Handbook

No changes may be made to this Handbook (additions, subtractions, revisions,
edits, etc.) without the express permission of The Executive Coaching Forum.
To obtain permission to make changes in copies you plan to distribute, or to
suggest changes in future editions, please e-mail your revised copy to The
Executive Coaching Forum c/o Judy Otto, otto.judy@gmail.com. Your input
will help with the continuous improvement of the Handbook.
The following notice must be printed in place of the above copyright
statement when any changes are made to the Handbook:
The original version of this Handbook was developed and copyrighted by
The Executive Coaching Forum (TECF). It has been revised significantly
from its original form by (name of person(s)/entity) in the following ways:
(describe revisions). TECF endorses the original version of the Handbook
only. The revisions are supported by, and are the responsibility of, those
people/entities that have made them.
Page | 3
The Executive Coaching Handbook

Table of Contents
The Need for a Handbook............................................................................................. 5
Why a Handbook? ....................................................................................................... 5
Recent Trends in Executive Coaching....................................................................... 6
The Current State of Research.................................................................................... 7
The Executive Coaching Forum............................................................................... 14
Handbook Organization ........................................................................................... 16
Defining Executive Coaching ..................................................................................... 19
What Is Executive Coaching? ................................................................................... 19
What Is a Coaching Partnership? ............................................................................ 21
What Is Different About Executive Coaching?.......................................................22
Overarching Principles for Executive Coaching ..................................................... 27
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Systems Perspective........................................................................................... 27
Results Orientation ............................................................................................ 30
Business Focus.................................................................................................... 32
Partnership.......................................................................................................... 34
Competence ........................................................................................................ 36
Integrity ............................................................................................................... 41
Judgment..41
Guidelines for Practice..43

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Managing Confidentiality................................................................................. 43
Pre-coaching Activities...46
Contracting ......................................................................................................... 48
Assessment.......................................................................................................... 51
Goal Setting......................................................................................................... 54
Coaching.............................................................................................................. 56
Transitioning to Long-Term Development .................................................... 59
Overview of Guidelines for Each Member of the Executive Coaching

Partnership 61
Executives Guidelines .............................................................................................. 61
Coachs Guidelines .................................................................................................... 64
Other Partners Guidelines ....................................................................................... 66
Page | 4
Core Competencies of the Executive Coach....68
Why a Competency Model?...................................................................................68
Defining Executive Coaching.................................................................................68
Construction of the Model.....................................................................................69
Potential Uses of the Model...................................................................................70
Psychological Knowledge.................................................................................... 72
Business Acumen....................................................................................................73
Organizational Knowledge...................................................................................74
Coaching Tasks and Skills....................................................................................76
Building and Maintaining Coaching Relationships.....................................78
Contracting.........................................................................................................79
Assessment.........................................................................................................80
Development Planning.....................................................................................81
Facilitating Development and Change...........................................................82
Ending Formal Coaching & Transitioning to long-term development.....84
Attributes and Abilities.........................................................................................85
Mature Self-confidence.....................................................................................85
Positive Energy..................................................................................................86
Assertiveness......................................................................................................87
Interpersonal Sensitivity...................................................................................88
Openness and Flexibility..................................................................................89
Goal Orientation................................................................................................90
Partnering and Influence..................................................................................91
Continuous Learning and Development.......................................................92
Integrity...............................................................................................................93
Page | 5
The Need for a Handbook

Why A Handbook and Now a Competency Model
Executive Coaching is becoming commonplace in leadership development and as a
transition tool on an international basis. It is seen as viable lever in the retention of top
talent. Twenty years ago, it was a one-off activity, now organizations that use coaching
report that theyll likely increase its use in the next five years, and numerous large and
small companies say they will introduce executive coaching within two years. Coaching
grows in popularity and prestige. Yet, there still is no widely agreed definition or set of
professional standards. This Handbook was conceived as a step in establishing guidelines
by starting a dialogue in the field about what is executive coaching, what is its purpose,
how do we make sure its being practiced well and ethically, and how do we know it
really works. We have added the Competency Model to help define the knowledge
areas, tasks and skills sets, attributes, and abilities that are critical for executive coaches
to use in their work to be successful and to create effective experiences for clients.
In 1999, when a group of Boston area executive coaches, leadership development
consultants, and human resources professionals began meeting regularly to put
guidelines in place for our own practices and organizations, we realized that we had a
valuable resource for the field and a way to jump start the conversation about
professional standards. We published The Executive Coaching Handbook both in print and
on the web with the explicit intent to get the Handbook out to a broad array of users and
practitioners to promote interest and progress in creating a well-respected profession.
The Handbook is used in hundreds of coaching training programs and by thousands of
coaches in over 25 countries. We distribute the Handbook at the website below as an
open source document, free of charge, with the request that you send us notification if
you use it, and that you dont profit from our work.
(www.executivecoachingforum.com)
Recent Trends
In the past five years, we have seen the field of coaching become intensely interested in
establishing credentials and standards. In the past 10 years, consumers have become
savvier, the coaching engagements more packaged, and the process better managed.
Coaching is now commonly bundled with leadership development programs and
introduced as a key element in leadership transitions. The field is maturing into a
profession, and standards are beginning to be fleshed out. Substantive university-based
academic programs are becoming commonplace in graduate schools across the world,
and practitioners are presenting themselves and their expertise as part of a profession
Page | 6
with unique requirements. Our Handbook has been part of this journey and highly
influential, we hear, in establishing the training curricula. We hope you benefit from
this guide and that you share your learnings and insights with others in the field. Please
let us know if you use the Handbook and provide your comments. (Contact Judy Otto by
emailing her: otto.judy@gmail.net)
Future Trends
Now, coaching is accepted as a viable, impactful leadership development tool.
Coaching will likely increase as baby boomers mature and new leaders need to take
their places and define what leadership looks like in the new business order. Just as the
demand will increase to meet the needs of emerging leaders, the supply of experienced
semi-retired executives and development professionals will increase. The market will
mature further with customers looking for more robust coach credentials, simpler
pricing structures, more common contracting procedures, and protocols to manage
coaching interventions. There will be fewer independent coaches and more firms
offering coaching, as consumers want one-stop shopping, and a third party to watch
over the coaches activities with clients. This will increase barriers to entry for executive
coaches and create clearer definition between coaches who work in organizations and
business systems, and those who do life and career coaching with individuals. There
will be greater networks amongst coaches using their alumni connections from their
coach training and from working together in systems, so that collaboration and sharing
of leads and opportunities are more likely. All of this speaks to consolidation of the
field.
There will be more and better-trained internal coaches within companies, an increase in
peer coaching amongst colleagues, group coaching sessions, and more virtual or
phone/video conference coaching. There will be an increased drive to train and
measure line managers on their coaching abilities as well. All these factors will drive
prices down and make coaching more prevalent in organizations.
Some issues have been challenges from the beginning of executive coaching such as:
"
How do you measure effectiveness of an individual coaching intervention or an

overall program?
"
How do you establish definable, comparable metrics of success?
"
How do you match coaches and executives?
"
Where do we draw the lines of confidentiality?
Page | 7
"
How do you meet the needs of the individual and the organization if they are in
conflict?
"
What is coach/client chemistry and how much of a role does it play in success?
These and other questions need to be further explored as part of making executive
coaching an even more compelling route to performance enhancement. It will be
exciting to watch and participate in the next phase of growth and maturity of the field.
Current State of Research
The first Global Coaching Convention took place in Dublin, Ireland in July 2008. More
than 60 leaders in coaching who represented dozens of coaching and related
organizations represented 22 countries from around the world. Nine working groups
spent a year leading up to the Convention. More than 200 people from all aspects of
coaching from around the world worked as part of those groups, which led to the
development of White Papers. Recommendations came out of that exploration to
further the field of coaching as a professional discipline. One of those Working Groups
was on Coaching Research. The White Paper on the topic was published as part of the
Appendix to the GCCs Declaration for Coaching, which is available at:
http://www.pdf.net/Files/Dublin%20Declaration%20on%20Coaching.pdf
One outgrowth of the call for research on key questions about coaching is that the
Foundation of Coaching sponsored the first International Research Conference on
Coaching at Harvard University in September 2008. More than 100 research questions
were identified with recommendations on how they might be studied. Forty world
leaders on coaching research developed these recommendations at the conference.
Those topics are available at: http://www.coachingresearchforum.org/
Although there is an enormous need to generate useful, reliable and valid data about
executive coaching and coaching in general, in the past few years much research has
begun. We know more about what kinds of coaching are being done by whom in what
ways, but little about the factors that make significant differences in the outcomes of
executive coaching. We also know very little about the satisfaction with its practice, or
what coaches, their leaders, and their organizations do or dont do that differentiates
the better practices of coaching from the least effective. Although controlled
experimental studies are often difficult to conduct in executive coaching situations,
many other research designs can and do add to the evidence we need to inform best
practices and help coaches and the people they coach know what to do to get the
desired results.
Page | 8
Sources of Information on Executive Coaching Research

See the White Paper referenced above, the Resources page, and the Links page on
theexecutivecoachingforum.com website. Below are journals that publish current
research.
Academy of Management Journal

Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources
Australian Psychologist
Career Development International
Coaching at Work
Coaching: An International Journal of
Theory, Research and Practice
Competency and Emotional Intelligence
Quarterly
Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice
and Research
Counselor Education and Supervision
Harvard Business Review
Human Resources Executive
Human Resources Planning
Individual Psychology
Industrial and Commercial Training
Intermediair
International Coaching Psychology Review
International Journal of Coaching in
Organizations
International Journal of Evidence-based
Coaching and Mentoring
International Journal of Mentoring and
coaching
Journal of Business Research
Journal of Business Strategy
Journal of Management Development
Journal of Managerial Psychology
Journal of Occupational and Organizational
Psychology
Journal of Positive Psychology
Leader to Leader
Leadership & Organizational Development
Leadership Quarterly
Management Learning
Management Review
Organizational Development Journal
Organizational Dynamics
People and Organizations at Work
People Management
Performance Improvement Quarterly
Proceedings of the ICF Coaching Research
Symposiums
Public Personnel Management
Public Service Executive
Research in Personnel and Human
Resources Management
Selection and Development Review
Social Behaviour and Personality: An
International Journal
Supervisory Management
The Annual Review of High Performance
Coaching and Consulting
The Coaching Journal
The Coaching Psychologist
The Industrial-Organizational Psychologist
The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science
The Occupational Psychologist
Training and Development
Page | 9
Major Questions in Executive Coaching Research

A partial listing of important research questions to date can be drawn almost directly from the
definition of coaching as stated in this Handbook. Executive coaching is viewed as a multiparty
set of relationship-based activities involving the client, her coach, and her organization. The
goal is to enhance the capability of the executive and her ability to help the organization
achieve short- and long-term goals. Each component of the definition suggests a range of
largely unexplored research questions that can be organized under six topics:
1. The executive
2. The executive coach
3. The relationship between executive and coach
4. The executive coaching process
5. The organizational context of executive coaching
6. Coaching outcomes
(See Hunt and Weintraub, 2002, for a more thorough discussion of these questions.)
1. The Executive
"
Who is most likely to benefit from executive coaching? Who is not?

o What role do emotional maturity, personality, personal values, psychological
defenses, intelligence, career stage, life stage, and other individual attributes of the
executive play in executive coaching?
o How does/should executive coaching relate to other aspects and roles of the
executives life (such as family and health)?
"
What kinds of learning and development needs is executive coaching best suited for?
o Can a useful typology of such needs be developed and validated?
"
How can executives maximize the positive impact of executive coaching?
"
What role does/should organizational position and role (CEO, VP) play on executive
coaching processes and outcomes?
"
What role does/should gender, race, ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation play in
executive coaching processes and outcomes?
"
How are the expectations that executives bring to coaching shaped?
P a g e | 10
"
How do executive clients define success in executive coaching?
2. The Executive Coach

"
What are the appropriate qualifications for an executive coach?
"
Should executive coaches be certified? If so, how?
"
How should executive coaches be trained or developed?

o What is the impact of experience and training in organizational leadership,
organizational development, individual development, and consulting/counseling
techniques?
"
How do the executive coachs personality, life stage, career stage, and values influence
his effectiveness as a coach?
"
How does the executive coachs gender, race, ethnicity, religion or sexual orientation
influence coaching processes and outcomes?
"
How does the executive coach define success in executive coaching?
3. The Relationship between Executive and Coach

"
What factors influence the initial match between the executive and her coach?
"
How can/should the coach handle the executives expectations of or assumptions about
coaching?
"
What role do conscious and unconscious aspects of the relationship between executive
and coach play in the success or failure of the coaching?
"
How does/should the relationship between executive and coach evolve over time?
"
What ethical issues can and will emerge in the relationship between executive and
coach?
4. The Executive Coaching Process

"
What critical success factors are required for successful contracting between executive
and coach? Under what conditions?
"
What assessment processes are best suited to particular executives, executive issues,
organizational contexts, and desired outcomes?
"
What goal-setting processes are best suited to particular executives, executive issues,
organizational contexts, and desired outcomes?
P a g e | 11
"
What coaching activities or techniques are best suited to particular executives, executive
issues, organizational contexts, and desired outcomes?
"
What is the role of planned versus unplanned (emergent) learning opportunities in the
success of executive coaching?
"
How long should coaching last? How frequently should executive and coach meet to
achieve the desired outcomes with specific issues and within particular organizational
contexts?
"
What are the relative strengths and weaknesses of executive coaching that takes place in
person, by telephone, or via the Internet?
o When should such communications tactics be used? When should they not be used?
"
What theoretical frame or frames of reference are best suited to guide the executive
coaching process? Under what circumstances?
o Experiential learning (action, reflection, feedback)
o Adult development
o Social systems interventions
o Psychodynamic
o Emotional intelligence
o Competency modeling
"
What role does confidentiality play in executive coaching? What is/should be the limits
of confidentiality?
o How does confidentiality influence the potential for organizational or team
learning?
"
How can executive coaching best relate to other forms of leadership development such
as job rotation, task force assignments, and classroom-based executive education?
"
How should multiple coaching needs within the same team be handled? By one coach
working with multiple team members, or multiple coaches each working with an
individual team member? What factors influence the choice between the two options?
"
When should team coaching supplement or supplant individual coaching? Under what
conditions?
P a g e | 12
5. The Organizational Context of Executive Coaching
"
What factors (industry, location, size, organizational culture, and business economics)
shape an organizations use of executive coaching?
"
How does executive coaching relate best to the larger organizational system within
which the coaching takes place?
o How should executive coaching fit with other human resources and leadership
development structures and processes?
"
How does the context of the referral for executive coaching influence the executive,
executive coach, coaching process, and outcome? What is the impact of:
o A culture of trust or mistrust?
o A strong focus on performance?
o An organizations values or mission?
o Downsizing or other restructuring measures?
"
How does the relationship between the executive and his immediate boss influence
executive coaching?
o How can the executive coach best improve this relationship?
o When should the executive coach try to influence this relationship?
"
When should an executive consider bringing in a coach to help other individuals or an

executive team?
"
What ethical responsibilities does an executive have when bringing in a coach to work
with an individual or team?
"
How should the organization monitor the executive, the coach, the coaching process,
and coaching outcomes?
6. Coaching Outcomes
"
How does the coaching process change the executive?

o How does executive coaching influence the executives behavior, personal
development, career development, leadership style, family life, and health?
"
Does executive coaching help the executives performance on the job? If so, under what
conditions?
P a g e | 13
"
Does executive coaching improve the following competencies, and under what
conditions?
o Strategy definition and execution
o Vision setting and communications
o Role relationships
o Teamwork
o Organizational and team learning
o Product, process, or organizational innovation
"
What kind of learning takes place as a result of executive coaching?
"
Does coaching influence the executives ethical decision making and actions? If so,
how?
"
Is remedial executive coaching to prevent derailment possible? If so, under what

conditions?
o What are the limits of remedial coaching?
"
How do organizations change by virtue of executive coaching?
"
How can ROI for executive coaching best be assessed?

o Is it possible to assess ROI for executive coaching?
o Is it desirable and helpful to executives, organizations, and society to assess ROI?
o
A Summary of the Research

We have presented a rather daunting list of potential research questions. Obviously, the list
can be prioritized, at least to a degree. Some studies are capable of addressing multiple
questions. When undertaking research, it is clear that we cannot just ask, Does executive
coaching work? or What is the ROI on executive coaching? Research in executive coaching
is every bit as complex as in the field of counseling in general, which has been underway for
decades. Both are complex, relationship-based interventions in which intervener, client,
relationship, problem or goal, and context all play a role. They are also interventions in which
society has a considerable economic and moral stake.
The reality remains, however, that as a multibillion-dollar enterprise, executive coaching
cannot rely on practice wisdom as its only guide. Executives, their families, and their
P a g e | 14
employing organizations have a compelling need for solid answers to most of the questions
above. Similarly, researchers, particularly those from management and
industrial/organizational/consulting psychology, have a tremendous opportunity in
providing answers to such questions. The failure to adequately describe the outcomes,
individual and organizational, of executive coaching and, in particular, the processes that lead
to those outcomes, creates the potential that executive coaching will be guilty of providing
flawed advice (Argyris, 2000).
The research effort requires both theory building and the theoretical testing of research
designs. Theory building will be most useful if it is rooted in the data, an approach to research
that builds grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Because grounded theory relies on
the very careful reporting of data from cases, it should benefit from the strength of the field,
the work of its practitioners. Careful and systematic reporting of cases will be much more
useful in the long run than publications that are heavy on theory but short on data.
The Executive Coaching Forum

The purpose of the Executive Coaching Forum (TECF) is to establish definitions, guidelines,
and standards for executive coaching, a practice area tightly defined by the population it
serves and the nature of the three-party contract among executive, coach, and sponsoring
company. Our charter is to improve leadership and organizational effectiveness by
establishing best practices and advancing the understanding of executive coaching among all
members of the coaching partnership and among the general public.
We are a small group of professionals who coach and manage coaching programs. We are
intensely interested in how the field develops and in participating in that process. We are not a
membership organization, nor do we rate coaching training programs, nor evaluate coaches or
coaching interventions. We maintain the Executive Coaching Handbook and the website
(www.executivecoachingforum.com) to participate in the dialogue of creating standards and
guidelines to advance the field of executive coaching.
Background
In the spring of 1999, a group of executive coaches and executive development and human
resource professionals in the Greater Boston area began a regular series of meetings. As we
discussed how to develop and maintain the highest standards for the practice of executive
P a g e | 15
coaching, we developed principles and guidelines for use in our own practices and
organizations. Our goal in this Handbook is to share these proposed standards with the greater
community. We hope to stimulate a continuing dialog and process that enhances the
professionalism of executive coaching.
For the past 10 years, TECF has expanded the distribution of this Handbook to the World Wide
Web for anyone supplying, receiving, seeking, learning, managing, or supporting executive
coaching. Our website www.executivecoachingforum.com has provided a variety of free
resources since May of 2001. They include this Handbook, links to other executive coaching
resources, executive coaching tools for executives, their organizations, coaches, and Human
Resource professionals, and a comprehensive competency model. At the end of 2008, we are
getting more than 6000 visits a month to our site from all over the United States and dozens of
other countries. Executive coaches are likely to present our Handbook to establish their methods
and ethics with prospective clients. Many Fortune 500 companies and other organizations,
large and small, in many industries, use this Handbook and other TECF resources regularly.
Future Development of Executive Coaching Standards and Guidelines

We plan to continually revise and improve The Executive Coaching Handbook based on your
experience and feedback. We recognize that we are practicing in a newly defined arena and
look forward to a time when we can make use of valid and reliable outcome studies, stories,
and examples from practitioners. Future standards for executive coaching should continue to
draw on related fields, including organization development and consulting psychology.
In the many conversations that have led to the drafting of this document, we uncovered
myriad issues still to be addressed. . Our hope is that this Handbook will continue to enhance
executive coaching and address the issues arising out of this developing professional field for
the mutual benefit of leaders, organizations, and the people they serve.
P a g e | 16
Current Leadership Team in alphabetical order:
Susan A. Ennis, M.Ed.
Judy Otto, M.Ed.
President, Susan Ennis & Associates Inc.
Founding Partner, Foundations for

Change
Susan@SusanEnnisAssociates.com
Otto.judy@gmail.net
Robert Goodman, Ed.D.
Principal, R.G. Goodman Associates
Bob@rgoodmanassociates.com
Lewis R. Stern, Ph.D., Chairman

President, Stern Consulting
executivecoach@comcast.net
Handbook Organization
The Executive Coaching Handbook is divided into five sections as follows:
Defining Executive Coaching describes executive coaching and the partnership required for
maximum success. We believe executive coaching is most successful as a three-way
partnership among coach, executive, and the executives organization. Each partner has an
obligation and responsibility to contribute to the success of the coaching process. Although the
primary work is between executive and coach, coaching is always an organizational
intervention and, as such, should be conducted within the context of the organizations goals
and objectives.
Overarching Principles for Executive Coaching describes a set of values or goals that guide
the coaching process. These principles provide a compass that the coach, the executive, and
other members of the organization will use to set, maintain, and correct their course of action.
Guidelines for Practice provide procedural help for all coaching partners. These guidelines
define the components of the process and outline the commitments that each partner must
make.
P a g e | 17
Overview of Guidelines for Each Member of the Executive Coaching Partnership is a quickreference guide for executives, coaches, and other interested parties in the executives
organization.
Core Competencies of the Executive Coach lists a robust set of four knowledge areas that
underpin the work of coaching, the tasks and skills sets aligned to the six phases of the
coaching process, along with the 10 attributes and abilities that promote superior
performance. Each of these competency areas is delineated into basic and advanced levels.
The Fourth Edition
Major changes to the fourth edition of the Handbook include:
"
updates to the introduction, trends, and research sections
"
a comprehensive Core Competency Model for Executive Coaches 2005
These additions bring The Executive Coaching Handbook materials up to date, and expand the
horizons of the dialogue about what executive coaching is and how to do it well.
Contributors to this Handbook

The Fourth Edition 2008 was edited by Susan Ennis, Robert Goodman, Judy Otto and Lew
Stern. Judy Otto oversaw the editing and production. Along with this team, Bill Hodgetts,
James Hunt and Richard Mansfield co-authored the Core Competencies of the Executive Coach
2005.
Original drafters of Handbook are Susan Ennis, Judy Otto, Lewis Stern, Michele Vitti, and
Nancy Yahanda. Other Human Resource and Management Consulting professionals from
leading organizations in the Greater Boston business community also provided input to the
first edition. They include Betty Bailey, Wendy Capland, William Hodgetts, Mary Jane
Knudson, Kitti Lawrence, Lynne Richer, Casey Strumpf, and Ellen Wingard. Additional
feedback for subsequent editions has come from executive coaching professionals from New
Hampshire to Alabama and Tennessee, Minnesota and Ontario to Texas and California, and
Great Britain to Chile.
Larissa Hordynsky and Lew Stern edited the original version of this Handbook.
P a g e | 18
To help TECF improve its offerings and enhance executive coaching as a viable
development solution, please review our website at www.executivecoachingforum.com.
E-mail your feedback and suggestions on the Handbook to Judy Otto otto.judy@gmail.net
P a g e | 19
Defining Executive Coaching

What Is Executive Coaching?
Executive coaching is a developing field. As such, its definition is still the subject of discussion
and debate among practitioners, researchers, and consumers. Executive coaching involves an
executive, his coach, and his organizational context (as represented by the interests of his
organization and supervisor, including the fact that the organization typically pays for
coaching services). All are key stakeholders in the process. This fact by itself would appear to
differentiate executive coaching from other interventions, such as career counseling and life
coaching.
While both career counseling and life coaching can lend concepts and practice techniques that
an executive coach might use, they focus solely on the individual client and his needs and
goals. Executive coaching, in our view, focuses on the needs and goals of both the executive
and the sponsoring organization. In that spirit, we offer the following definition of executive
coaching.
Executive coaching is an experiential and individualized leader development process that builds a
leaders capability to achieve short- and long-term organizational goals. It is conducted through oneon-one and/or group interactions, driven by data from multiple perspectives, and based on mutual
trust and respect. The organization, an executive, and the executive coach work in partnership to
achieve maximum impact.
Definition of Terms
Experiential. The development of the leader(s) is accomplished primarily by practical, on-thejob approaches rather than through classroom or more abstract methods.
Individualized. The goals and specific activities are tailored to the unique aspects of the
individual(s) and the organizational system.
P a g e | 20
Leader development process: Executive coaching focuses on developing the executives ability
to influence, motivate, and lead others. Rather than relying on tactical problem solving or basic
skill acquisition, executive coaching develops strategic thinking skills.
Leader: We use the term broadly to mean any individual(s) who have the potential of making
a significant contribution to the mission and purpose of the organization.
One-on-one: The primary coaching activities take place between the individual leader(s) and
the coach.
Build capability: Developing new ways of thinking, feeling, acting, learning, leading, and
relating to others builds individual and organizational effectiveness.
Data from multiple perspectives: In order for the executive and her principal stakeholders to
understand, clarify, and commit to appropriate coaching goals, various data collection
methods are used to identify key factors and skills required in the organizational context. The
appropriate use of interviews and standardized instruments assures accuracy and validity of
data gathered from people representing a range of perspectives within the organization.
Mutual trust and respect: Adult learning works best when the executive and the coach, along
with other members of the organization, treat each other as equals, focus on their mutual
strengths, and believe in each others integrity and commitment to both coaching and the
organization.
Three Levels of Learning
Executive coaching involves three levels of learning:
1. Tactical problem solving
2. Developing leadership capabilities and new ways of thinking and acting that generalize
to other situations and roles
3. Learning how to learn: developing skills and habits of self-reflection that ensure that
learning will continue after coaching ends
P a g e | 21
The third level is an important and sometimes overlooked goal of coaching. Its aims are to
eliminate an executive's long-term dependency on his coach and teach habits of learning and
self-reflection that will last a lifetime, enabling him to keep developing throughout his career.
What Is a Coaching Partnership?

The coaching partnership is a win-win approach in which all partners plan the process
together, communicate openly, and work cooperatively toward the ultimate accomplishment
of overarching organizational objectives.
1. The executives, the coach, and other key stakeholders in the organization collaborate to
create a partnership to ensure that the executives learning advances the organizations
needs and critical business mandates.
The executive coach can be external to the organization or an employee.
2. The partnership is based on agreed-upon ground rules, time frames, and specific goals and
measures of success.
3. The coaching partnership uses tailored goals and approaches, including:
"
creation of a development plan
"
skill building
"
performance improvement
"
development for future assignments
"
exploration, definition, and implementation of the executives leadership and the

organizations business objectives.
(From Robert Witherspoon and Randall P. White, Four Essential Ways that Coaching Can Help Executives, Center
for Creative Leadership, 1997.)
4. The coaching process can, but need not necessarily, include:

"
pre-coaching needs analysis and planning
"
contracting
"
data gathering
"
goal setting and development of coaching plan
"
implementation of coaching plan
"
measuring and reporting results
P a g e | 22
"
transitioning to long-term development.
5. The coach applies several of the following practices, among others:

"
problem solving and planning
"
rehearsal (role play) and on-the-job practice
"
feedback
"
dialogue
"
clarification of roles, assumptions, and priorities
"
teaching and applying a variety of management and leadership tools
"
referral to other developmental resources.
6. The focus of the partnership is on using the executives strengths and building the key
competencies needed to achieve strategic business objectives.
7. The partnership involves key stakeholders in the coaching process (called other
partners), including:
"
the executives manager
"
senior management
"
Human Resources
"
Organizational Development or Effectiveness
"
Executive Development
"
peers, including strategic business partners from other organizations
"
direct reports
"
other key people in the executives life.
8. Executive coaching is paid for by the organization that employs the executive.
9. A successful coaching partnership is guided by clear personal values, ethical guidelines,
and experiences that establish the credibility of the coaching process and maintain the
welfare of the executive and her coworkers.
What Is Different About Executive Coaching?

As coaching has grown in popularity over the past few years, it is only natural that some
authors have tried to differentiate among types of coaching. Some of these categories define
coaching type by its goals or ends. Career coaching, for instance, is defined as coaching
P a g e | 23
designed to help individuals make enlightened career choices. Other attempts at
categorization make distinctions based on the means used in a particular kind of coaching. As
an example, presentation and communication skills coaching employs video feedback.
The practice of executive coaching may involve many of the types of coaching described
below. Thus, an executive coaching engagement may over time touch on the executive's career
or personal life issues involving work/life balance, and use video feedback to work on some
particular behavioral or communication problem. Two factors always distinguish executive
coaching from these other types, however:
"
It always involves a partnership among executive, coach, and organization.
"
The individual goals of an executive coaching engagement must always link back and
be subordinated to strategic organizational objectives.
A discussion of some common coaching types follows.

Personal/Life Coaching
The personal/life coach helps individuals gain awareness of and clarify their personal goals
and priorities, better understand their thoughts, feelings, and options, and take appropriate
actions to change their lives, accomplish their goals, and feel more fulfilled.
Career Coaching
The career coach helps individuals identify what they want and need from their career, then
make decisions and take the needed actions to accomplish their career objectives in balance
with the other parts of their lives.
Group Coaching
Group coaches work with individuals in groups. The focus can range from leadership
development to career development, stress management to team building. Group coaching
combines the benefits of individual coaching with the resources of groups. Individuals learn
from each other and the interactions that take place within the group setting.
P a g e | 24
Performance Coaching
Performance coaches help employees at all levels better understand the requirements of their
jobs, the competencies needed to fulfill those requirements, any gaps in their current
performance, and opportunities to improve performance. Coaches then work with the
employees, their bosses, and others in their workplace to help the employees fill performance
gaps and develop plans for further professional development.
Newly Assigned Leader Coaching
Coaches of individuals assigned or hired into new leadership roles help these leaders to
onboard. The goal of the coaching is to clarify with the leaders key constituents the most
important responsibilities of her new role, her deliverables in the first few months of the new
assignment, and ways to integrate the team she will lead with the organization. The major
focus of this type of coaching is on helping the new leader to assimilate and achieve her
business objectives.
Relationship Coaching
The relationship coach helps two or more people to form, change, or improve their
interactions. The context can be work, personal, or other settings.
High-Potential or Developmental Coaching
The coach works with organizations to develop the potential of individuals who have been
identified as key to the organizations future or are part of the organizations succession plan.
The focus of the coaching may include assessment, competency development, or assistance
planning and implementing strategic projects.
Coaching to Provide Feedback Debriefing and Development Planning
Organizations that use assessment or 360 feedback processes often utilize coaches to help
employees interpret the results of their assessments and feedback. In addition, coaches work
P a g e | 25
with individuals to make career decisions and establish professional development plans based
on feedback, assessment results, and other relevant data.
Targeted Behavioral Coaching
Coaches who provide targeted behavioral coaching help individuals to change specific
behaviors or habits or learn new, more effective ways to work and interact with others. This
type of coaching often helps individuals who are otherwise very successful in their current
jobs or are taking on new responsibilities that require a change in specific behaviors.
Legacy Coaching
The legacy coach helps leaders who are retiring from a key role to decide on the legacy they
would like to leave behind. The coach also provides counsel on transitioning out of the
leadership role.
Succession Coaching
The succession coach helps assess potential candidates for senior management positions and
prepares them for promotion to more senior roles. This type of coaching may be used in any
organization that is experiencing growth or turnover in its leadership ranks. It is especially
helpful in family businesses to maintain the viability of the firm. Since assessment is often part
of this intervention, clear expectations and groundrules for confidentiality are essential. It may
be necessary in some companies to use separate consultants for assessment and coaching.
Presentation/Communication Skills Coaching
This type of coaching helps individuals gain self-awareness about how they are perceived by
others and why they are perceived in that way. Clients learn new ways to interact with others.
The use of videorecording with feedback allows clients to see themselves as others do. The
coach helps clients change the way they communicate and influence others by changing their
words, how they say those words, and the body language they use to convey their intended
messages.
P a g e | 26
Team Coaching
One or more team coaches work with the leader and members of a team to establish their team
mission, vision, strategy, and rules of engagement with one another. The team leader and
members may be coached individually to facilitate team meetings and other interactions, build
the effectiveness of the group as a high-performance team, and achieve team goals.
P a g e | 27
Overarching Principles for Executive Coaching

Overarching principles are the values or aspirational goals that guide the coaching process.
These principles provide a compass that the coach, the executive, and other members of the
executives organization will use to set, maintain, and correct their course of action.
1. Systems Perspective
Executive coaching is one of many approaches or types of interventions that can be used to
promote organizational and leadership development. The goal of developing a single
leader must always be pursued within the larger objective of organizational success. Since
executive coaching should be conducted as one of the components of an overall plan for
organizational development, executive and coach must both be aware of the larger
objectives.
Often the components of the executive coaching process are single, discrete activities in a
larger organizational development initiative. These components include pre-coaching
needs analysis and planning, contracting, data gathering, goal setting, coaching, measuring
and reporting results, and transitioning to long-term development. Such coaching activities
do not usually have the impact of full executive coaching unless they are conducted as part
of the process described under Guidelines for Practice in this Handbook.
The coach must have enough expertise in organizational dynamics and business
management to conduct the coaching with awareness and understanding of the systems
issues. Approaching executive coaching from a systems perspective requires the coach to
recognize and appreciate the complex organizational dynamics in which the executive
operates. The coach ensures a systemic approach through continual awareness of the
impact of the coaching process on everyone in the system and vice versa. Accordingly, the
coach encourages a shift in the executives viewpoint, from seeing himself as separate to
recognizing his interdependence with other people and processes in the organization. This
P a g e | 28
approach encourages respect for the complexity of organizational life and an ability to
penetrate beyond this complexity to the underlying structures. In effect, the coach helps the
executive to see both the forest and the trees.
Coaching from a systems perspective helps coach and the executive assess development
needs. By thinking in terms of the big picture and core issues, both partners will
understand long- and short-term strategies and how all the pieces of the organization fit
together into a whole. Systems thinking also encourages all partners to appreciate the
impact of the executives behavioral change on other facets of the organization.
Executives Commitments
! Explore changes in vision, values, and behaviors.
! Examine how your own behaviors and actions affect the systems in which you operate.
! Work in open exploration with your coach; help your coach to understand the forces of
the organizational system.
! During the coaching process, take responsibility for your actions and remain aware of
the impact of your behavioral changes on others and the organization as a whole.
Coachs Commitments
! See the executive, his position, and the organization through multiple lenses and
perspectives.
! Maintain an objective and impartial perspective by resisting collusion with the
executive or the organization.
! Recognize and appreciate the complexity of the organizational structure in which the
executive functions.
! Encourage the executive to explore both long- and short-term views.
! Recognize the interaction of all parts in the wholeespecially how change in one of the
executives behaviors may affect other behaviors and other people.
! Help the executive distinguish between high- and low-leverage changes. Encourage
commitment to the highest-leverage actions to achieve results.
P a g e | 29
Other Partners Commitments
! Identify and share organizational information that may help the coach and the
executive recognize and understand the context, organizational forces, business-related
issues, and financial constraints they must factor into the coaching.
! Guide the coach regarding organizational changes that may influence the coaching.
! Be willing to examine and possibly change aspects of the organizational system in order
to improve both the executives and the organizations performance.
P a g e | 30
2. Results Orientation
Executive coaching is planned and executed with a focus on specific, desired results. The
executive, her coach, and the organization begin by deciding the ultimate goals of the
coaching. Then they agree on specific results for each goal. Key members of the coaching
partnership sign off on a written coaching plan that specifies expected deadlines for
accomplishing each goal. Appropriate measurements are applied to each goal, including
follow-up and feedback reports. Actual activities, during the coaching sessions and in
between, focus specifically on achieving the agreed-upon goals for the executive and her
organization.
! Take responsibility for focusing the coaching on the results you care about most.
! Commit adequate time between coaching sessions to work on the results.
! Prepare well for each coaching session.
! Monitor your own results and communicate with coaching stakeholders about your
accomplishments and the gaps that still exist.
! Enlist support to attain results.
Coachs Commitments
! Push the executive and her organization to be specific about desired accomplishments
and how results will be measured.
! Structure each coaching session with a results-driven agenda, following up on previous
meetings and the actions taken between sessions.
! Facilitate communication between the executive and the organization about what the
executive is working on, her progress, and her support needs.
! Plan follow-up meetings to track progress toward coaching goals. Drive these meetings
even in the face of the organizations work demands.
! Continually check in with the executive to update coaching goals based on changes in
her role, the business environment, and priorities.
P a g e | 31
! Focus coaching sessions on specific issues, executive development, and action items that
contribute to the coaching goals.
! Communicate directly about what you most want and need the executive to do.
! Hold the executive and the coach accountable to the agreed-upon goals.
! Give constant feedback, both positive and negative, to help both the executive and
coach stay on track.
! Demonstrate your trust in the executive.
! Follow through with the commitments you make as part of the coaching to provide
support, attend meetings, communicate with others, and remove barriers.
P a g e | 32
3. Business Focus
Executive coaching is primarily concerned with the development of the executive in the
context of organizational needs. The coaching objective is to maximize the executives
effectiveness and his contribution to the organization. The coach develops an
understanding of the broader business context in which the executive operates, with
particular emphasis on key business initiatives directly relevant to the executive. The
executive and coach then agree upon specific results that best reflect the organizations
business objectives. Successful executive coaching links a business focus with human
processes by closely aligning the executives development with critical business needs.
! As soon as coaching begins, inform your coach of any relevant information about your
company, its business strategy, your key initiatives, and how your role fits into the
overall strategy.
! Regularly update your coach on any changes in business direction or outlook that
might influence business strategy, your role, or your measures of success. Adapt your
development needs as appropriate.
! Take ultimate responsibility for aligning your coaching with the organizations business
focus.
Coachs Commitments
! Strive to maximize the executives contribution to the organizations needs.
! Maintain an ongoing awareness of the executives business and leadership development
objectives, market outlook, competition, products and services, and clients or
customers.
! Understand the indicators of success and key business metrics that determine how the
organization evaluates the executives performance and results.
! Be flexible in adapting the executives development needs to changing business
priorities.
P a g e | 33
! Provide the coach with enough information to understand the context for the coaching.
Such information may include an overview of the organization, strategic and business
planning documents, organizational charts, and key business initiatives.
! Whenever possible, inform the coach of changes in the organization that may affect the
executive, including mergers and acquisitions, restructuring or downsizing, changes in
leadership, key roles and relationships, and relevant business initiatives.
P a g e | 34
4. Partnership
Although executive coaching focuses primarily on individual work with an executive, it is
ultimately an organizational intervention. The executive and her coach are obviously at the
center of the process, but other stakeholders are also involved. They may include the
executives manager, her direct reports, the Human Resources business partner or
generalist, the individual responsible for executive development, training, or
organizational development, and other executives or consultants. The time commitment
and level of involvement will vary for each stakeholder. However, for the coaching
outcome to be of the greatest benefit for the organization as a whole, all stakeholders must
see themselves as partners in the coaching process.
! Assume ownership of your learning. Use your coach as a consultant to help you
maximize your unique learning style.
! Be forthright about what is and isnt working in coaching sessions.
! Engage wholeheartedly in the agreed-upon coaching assignments.
! Take required actions for learning, and reflect on those actions.
Coachs Commitments
! Maintain the highest level of professionalism in serving both the executive and the
organization as your clients.
! Communicate openly about the progress of the coaching with the executive and other
stakeholders (within the limits of agreed-upon confidentiality).
! Invest in the professional and personal success of the executive and in the success of her
organization.
! View the coach as a partner with the organization, working to increase both
organizational and executive learning.
P a g e | 35
! Provide feedback, within the confines of confidentiality agreements, to both the coach
and the executive in the initial data-gathering phase and throughout the coaching.
! Invest in a successful outcome by becoming familiar with and consistently applying the
overarching principles and guidelines set out in this Handbook.
P a g e | 36
5. Competence
Executive coaching requires the use of highly skilled and experienced professional coaches.
These coaches maintain high standards of competence and exercise careful judgment in
determining how best to serve their clients needs, choosing the most appropriate methods
from their range of expertise.
We believe that competence of an executive coach is not determined by any arbitrary
academic degree or coaching certification (although many such degrees or certifications
may represent completion of education, training, and objective evaluation on some of the
following relevant topics and capabilities). Rather, effective executive coaches are
knowledgeable and competent in the Core Competencies of the Executive Coach defined in
this Handbook:
Four knowledge areas that underpin the work of coaching, the tasks and skills sets aligned
to the six phases of the coaching process:
Psychological Knowledge
Business Acumen
Organizational Knowledge
Coaching Knowledge
Coaching Tasks and Skills

"
Building and Maintaining Coaching Relationships
"
Contracting
"
Assessment
P a g e | 37
"
Development Planning
"
Facilitating Development and Change
"
Ending Formal Coaching & Transitioning to long-term development
Ten Attributes and Abilities that promote superior performance.

"
Mature Self-confidence
"
Positive Energy
"
Assertiveness
"
Interpersonal Sensitivity
"
Openness and Flexibility
"
Goal Orientation
"
Partnering and Influence
"
Continuous Learning and Development
"
Integrity
Each of these competency areas is delineated into basic and advanced levels. They fully
understand and adhere to the principles and guidelines in this Handbook.
Finally, competent executive coaches are perceived by the executives they coach as capable,
independent, practical, and interested in the executive and his/her business, flexible, and
able to serve as a good role model.
P a g e | 38
Executive coaches recognize the limitations of their expertise and provide only those
services for which they are qualified by education, training, or experience. They constantly
strive to increase their competence through client interactions, continuing their education
and staying up to date with best practices in coaching.
! Determine your own criteria for a coach, including style, training, and specific areas
of competence, expertise, and experience. Apply these criteria to selecting the best
coach for you.
! Take an active role in your own development by providing feedback to the coach on
how the coaching is progressing and what gaps still exist.
! Communicate with stakeholders of your coaching about progress and results.
! Provide your organization and your coach with feedback, both positive and
negative, about the effectiveness of the coach and the coaching process.
! Coachs Commitments
! Consistently operate at the highest level of competence.
! Accurately represent to clients your training, experience, areas of expertise, and
limitations.
! Understand the requirements of each coaching engagement. Be objective and
flexible in choosing methods to meet these requirements.
! Be aware of your limitations; decline assignments that are beyond your experience,
knowledge, capability, or interest, or where there is not a good match between you
and the executive.
P a g e | 39
! Maintain a network of contacts with other qualified professionals and refer clients
when you are not the best possible resource.
! Update your knowledge of the client organizations core business as well as best
practices in coaching.
! Extend your knowledge and skills through continuing education and other
professional development activities.
! Properly apply psychological and organizational assessment techniques, tests, or
instruments. Use only those for which you are qualified or certified.
! Other Partners Commitments
! Maintain high standards in screening and recommending executive coaches for
assignments.
! If you are responsible for providing coaching referrals or information to your
organization, keep current on the reputation of coaches and best coaching practices.
! Select coaches based on their competence and fit with the executives and the client
organizations needs.
! Monitor the effectiveness of coaching in the organization and provide feedback to
both the coaches and the executives.
! Evaluate the competency of coaches and their results to determine their future use in
your organization.
Core Competencies of the Executive Coach lists a robust set of four knowledge areas that
underpin the work of coaching, the task and skill sets aligned to the six phases of the
P a g e | 40
coaching process, along with the ten attributes and abilities that promote superior
performance. Each of these competency areas is delineated into basic and advanced levels.
P a g e | 41
6. Integrity
Upon beginning executive coaching, the executive is placing significant trust in the coach
and the organization. He is allowing himself to be vulnerable and open. To ensure that he
remains receptive to feedback, new ideas, and learning, the organization, coach, and other
stakeholders must establish and maintain a psychologically safe and respectful
environment.
The relationship between the executive and his coach is sensitive and often private. To
maintain this relationship, all stakeholders must be clear in their presentation of issues,
organizational information, coaching goals, coaching activities, and ground rules for
confidentiality. All partners must adhere to clearly articulated guidelines and rules of
engagement. Breaches of trust or actions that run counter to agreements and guidelines are
extremely serious, especially if the executive suffers negative consequences such as a loss of
reputation, income, or relationships. All parties must therefore function at the highest
levels of integrity and candor when involved in executive coaching activities.
! Trust your coach and the coaching process once you are assured of appropriate
safeguards. Remain open, willing to learn, and appropriately vulnerable.
! Take an active role in establishing appropriate guidelines for your coaching.
! Adhere to agreements of confidentiality, anonymity, and information sharing not only
about you, but also about everyone involved.
! Work within the coaching contract and its learning goals, unless all parties revise these
goals. (For example, do not treat a developmental coaching contract as a job-search
opportunity.)
! Be honest and candid with your coach about you and your situation.
! Follow up on your commitments.
! Provide your coach and the organization with forthright and constructive performanceimprovement feedback.
P a g e | 42
Coachs Commitments
! Develop and adhere to a set of professional guidelines, especially in the areas of
confidentiality, conflict of interest, and expertise.
! Abide by the organizations existing values, ethical practices, confidentiality and
proprietary agreements, business practices, and Human Resource policies.
! Honor the relationship you have established with both the executive and the
organization, seeking resolution when conflicts arise.
! Help the organization to develop guidelines on how its managers and employees will
learn in their jobs. Follow and embellish an organizations learning contract. Strictly
apply existing standards for dealing with personal data, or provide such standards if
the organization does not have any.
! Discuss with the executive organizational requests for information about him and his
coaching, including status updates, feedback data, and input for reviews.
! Act in the executives best interests and well-being.
! Provide coaching guidelines, standards, and business practices that meet the needs of
all parties.
! Present your perspective on the need for coaching, the executives situation, the
organizational context, performance concerns, and organizational goals for coaching in
a realistic and forthright manner.
! Inform all parties if the goals or information you have provided change significantly
during the course of the coaching.
! Establish and adhere to standards for the learning contract, including purpose and
objectives, timelines, scope and types of assessment, measures of success, identification
and roles of stakeholders, confidentiality agreements, use of personal and coaching
information, and distribution of information.
! Establish a problem-resolution process for coaching issues, especially ethical practices.
! Provide both executive and coach with ongoing feedback and support.
! Function within the learning and business agreements. Avoid putting the coach or
executive in difficult positions by requesting feedback or personal data, input for
performance reviews, or promotion discussions.
P a g e | 43
7. Judgment
Executive coaching is a balance of science, art, and expert improvisation. No matter how
many guidelines are developed and followed, successful coaching requires that you
continually step back, evaluate the situation, weigh the options, and apply good judgment
for well-balanced decisions. An executives influence is determined not only by her
attributes and skills, but also by how others perceive her, plus her match to the needs,
circumstances, and culture of the organization. All coaching partners offer different
perspectives which, combined with good judgment, provide the executive with a dynamic
learning experience.
There is no recipe for the perfect coaching experience. Along the way, unpredictable
challenges, conflicts, and opportunities arise. Whether these situations help or hinder the
executives development depends upon the judgment stakeholders exercise in an everchanging work environment.
! Maintain an open mind and be willing to change it.
! Focus on the greater good.
! Weigh all perspectives.
! Ask for help.
! Be flexible.
! Try new approaches.
! Accept the credit and blame when they are yours. Admit your strengths and
weaknesses to be able to deal with them effectively.
! Make decisions by balancing hard data with intuition.
! Be honest and direct.
! Take reasonable risks.
P a g e | 44
Coachs Commitments
! Always maintain a high level of professionalism.
! Do not mix personal and professional relationships that could bias your judgment in a
coaching situation.
! Avoid any activities that could result in a conflict of interest.
! Build and maintain a communication network with all coaching partners.
! Listen attentively, with an open mind.
! Be honest and direct about your intentions and points of view.
! Prevent misunderstandings by explaining your activities beforehand whenever they
could be misunderstood.
! Do nothing that could be misinterpreted as an impropriety within the standards of the
executives organization.
! Tailor your approach to the priorities and preferences of the executive and the coaching
partnership.
! Bring the members of the partnership together to facilitate decision-making.
! Hear all relevant perspectives and mediate conflicts.
! Focus on the development and success of the organization and the executive.
! Be honest and direct about your goals and perspectives on the organization and the
executive.
! Consider all available information before making a judgment.
! Be open-minded.
! Be flexible.
! Support the executive and coach in following through with the judgments they make
about the coaching.
! Be balanced in your judgments regarding the coaching: short vs. long term, work vs.
personal life, data vs. intuition, and individual vs. organizational good.
P a g e | 45
Guidelines for Practice

These guidelines provide procedural help for all partners in the coaching process. They define
the components of the coaching and outline the commitments that each partner makes.
1. Managing Confidentiality
The executive and other members of the organization must be able to open up and share
information with the coach and one another without fear that the information will be
passed on inappropriately or without their approval. Because each coaching situation is
unique, it is important for all partners to develop a formal, written confidentiality
agreement before the coaching begins. This agreement specifies what information will and
will not be shared, in which circumstances, with whom, and how. The agreement helps all
coaching partners remain sensitive to confidentiality issues from each others points of
view. Coaching partners should communicate with other members of the partnership
before sharing any information with anyone outside the partnership.
Coachs Commitments
! Guidelines: Work within the proprietary and confidentiality guidelines noted in the
organizations financial, legal, and business contracts and documents.
! Organizational information: In general, within the boundaries of the law, keep all
organizational information confidential unless it is otherwise available to the public.
Exception to this guideline: You may be required to reveal to the appropriate
representatives of the organization, and possibly to legal authorities, any information
regarding illegal or unethical improprieties or circumstances that pose a physical or
emotional threat to any individual, group, or organization.
! Information about the executive: Do not share with anyone except the executive himself
any details regarding that executive unless members of the coaching partnership have
agreed otherwise.
Exception to this guideline: You are often obligated to provide the organization with a
summary of your conclusions on the executives current and potential ability to serve in
P a g e | 46
his role. Share this summary with the executive and get his input as appropriate. Obtain
a detailed agreement from all partners on what this summary will and will not include
before the coaching begins.
! Feedback from others about the executive: You may often get feedback, usually under
promise of anonymity, from members of the organization or other people familiar with
the executive. Members of the coaching partnership should agree on the anonymity and
confidentiality of such information before it is collected. You should also obtain
agreement, before coaching begins, on exactly how anonymously the feedback will be
reported: no identification, identification by category of person (work group, level, etc.)
or by specific name. You are obliged to the people from whom you obtain this feedback
to be clear up front about the terms of this anonymity and confidentiality and to work
strictly within these terms. Present any feedback to the executive in verbatim or
summary form.
Commitments of the Executive and Other Partners
! Members of the organization who, as a result of coaching, learn confidential
information about the executive, keep that information confidential unless otherwise
agreed before the coaching begins.
! The executive responds to feedback from others in non-defensive ways, without
second-guessing who might have said what or retaliating for feedback that is difficult to
hear. This non-defensive response maximizes the trust the executive will share with
others in the future.
! All members of the coaching partnership ensure that no confidential information
coming out of the coaching process is shared electronically unless they can control
access to that information.
! Before coaching begins, all partners consider how the confidentiality of each of the
following types of information will be managed. They agree on what will or will not be
shared, with whom, by whom, when, in what form, and under what circumstances:
"
assessment results
"
coaching goals
"
job hunting and career aspirations
"
360-degree feedback
"
performance appraisals
"
interpersonal conflicts
"
details of coaching discussions
P a g e | 47
"
proprietary or organizationally sensitive information
! The organization identifies an internal resource who can advise coaches and
stakeholders on questions of confidentiality and other sensitive topics, and who can
help resolve these issues.
P a g e | 48
2. Pre-coaching Activities
Certain activities can determine if coaching is appropriate in the first place, help select the
most appropriate coach, and prepare both coach and executive for the process. This
important set of behind-the-scenes activities, usually conducted by HR, includes sourcing,
selecting, and orienting coaches, consulting with executives on their needs, matching coach
to executive, and establishing standards for practice. The intent of these pre-coaching
activities is to ensure the best possible experience and outcomes for the executive and the
organization.
! Consult with appropriate stakeholders to determine if executive coaching is a viable
option for you. Consider your organizations overall development focus, your specific
learning needs, and the skills and experience of available coaches.
! Conduct exploratory interviews with several coaches before selecting the one who is
best for you.
! Handle all business and financial contract requirements yourself, or make sure
appropriate people in your organization handle them.
! Provide your coach with the necessary background information about your
organization, specific business documents, and personal information.
! Begin the coaching process with a willingness to learn.
Coachs Commitments
! Participate in the organizations process for selecting, matching, and orienting executive
coaches.
! Provide the organization and the executive with requested background information
about you and your practice, your rates, business practices, and references.
! Partner with the Human Resources staff and other stakeholders as needed.
! Establish business practices and standards for executive coaching.
P a g e | 49
! Develop a coach selection and orientation process.
! Apply criteria for analyzing coaching needs and matching the executive with the most
appropriate coach.
! Provide feedback to the coaches you do not select.
! Consult with the executive to provide guidance and support in determining coaching
needs, requirements, and desired outcomes.
! Partner with coaches to ensure their best fit with the organization and the executive.
P a g e | 50
3. Contracting
The purpose of contracting in executive coaching is to ensure productive outcomes, clarify
roles, prevent misunderstandings, establish learning goals, and define business and
interpersonal practices. There are three major components of contracting: the Learning
Contract, the Business/Legal/Financial Contracts, and the Personal Contract between the
executive and the coach.
The Learning Contract includes:
"
Purpose and objectives
"
Timelines
"
Scope and types of assessment
"
Milestones
"
Measures of success
"
Identification and roles of stakeholders
"
Confidentiality agreements
"
Guidelines for the use of personal and coaching information
"
Guidelines for the communication and distribution of information

Business/Legal/Financial Contracts include:
"
Purpose and objectives
"
Executive coaching standards and guidelines
"
Organizationally sponsored proprietary and confidentiality statements
"
Guidelines for relevant business practices
"
Total costs of service
"
Who is paying for coaching services
"
Fee and payment schedules
"
Guidelines for billing procedures
"
Agreements on expense reimbursements
"
Confirmation of the coachs professional liability insurance
P a g e | 51
Personal Contracts between the coach and the executive include:
"
Guidelines on honesty, openness, and reliability between executive and coach
"
Understanding of the coachs theoretical and practical approach and how coaching
sessions will be structured
"
Agreements on scheduling, punctuality, and cancellation of meetings
"
Scoping of how much pre-work coach and executive will do before each coaching
session
"
Guidelines on giving and receiving feedback
"
Understanding of when the coach will be available to the executive and vise versa, and
how contact will be made
"
Agreements on follow-up and documentation
"
Confirmation of locations and times for meetings and phone calls
! Actively participate in establishing learning and personal contracts.
! As your organization deems appropriate, participate in establishing, monitoring, and
administering business/legal/financial contract(s) with the coach.
! Adhere to the learning contract and use it to gauge progress and success.
! Adhere to the personal contract and hold the coach to it as well.
Coachs Commitments
! Share your own standards and guidelines for contracting with the executive and
organization while respecting and agreeing to use the organizations standards.
! Actively use the learning contract to plan and deliver coaching and to assess progress
and results.
! Use the personal contract as the set of guidelines to follow in all interactions with the
executive; hold the executive to the guidelines as well.
! Negotiate the terms of the contracts in good faith or have the appropriate
representative(s) from your practice do so. Comply with the terms of the contract in
full, or reestablish them as mutually agreeable between your practice and the
executives organization.
P a g e | 52
! Establish and disseminate standards for learning contracts in your organization.
! Actively participate in establishing and supporting the executives learning contract.
! Respect the personal contract as established between the coach and executive.
! Ensure that the coach has and uses business/legal/financial contractual information.
! Expedite the contracting and payment process in your organization in support of the
executive and the coach.
P a g e | 53
4. Assessment
The assessment phase of executive coaching provides both the coach and the executive
with important information upon which to base a developmental action plan. The
assessment is customized, taking into account the needs of the executive and the norms
and culture of the organization. The coach can select among a wide variety of assessment
instruments, including personality, learning, interest, and leadership style indicators.
Observing the executive in action in her usual work setting provides assessment data, as
does interviewing her, her peers, direct reports, manager, and other stakeholders. In some
cases, the coach administers a formal 360-degree assessment.
There are times when an executive or her organization chooses not to initiate a full
executive coaching process. Sometimes, rather than providing full coaching, the executive
participates in feedback debriefing/development planning. This process can be
appropriate for gathering data, receiving feedback, and creating a development plan. It is
often conducted without an executive coaching partnership as recommended in this
Handbook. Without that partnership, however, it can be difficult for the executive to
implement change in herself or in the system.
When separate assessment and development planning has been done and coaching is
added after the fact, it may be necessary to include others in further data gathering, review,
and goal setting. When assessment and planning are done without a formal coaching
phase, some coaching should accompany the presentation and review of the results. This
will help the executive not only understand the data and their implications, but also make
the best use of the information to increase self-awareness and identify development areas
with the greatest potential for success.
In addition to assessing the executive, it is also valuable to assess the team and
organization with and within which the executive works. Such additional assessments are
an important part of the systems perspective of executive coaching. By understanding the
P a g e | 54
team and organizational environment, the executive and her coach can better determine
what to change and how to achieve that change.
Additional assessments include such variables as the organizational culture, team
communication, organizational trust, quality, employee satisfaction, efficiency, and
profitability. These systems factors may indicate how the organization operates, the results
achieved, or predictive measures of likely success. They can be assessed through direct
observation, questionnaires, focus groups, one-on-one interviews, and other methods. The
data collected on the organizational system are often valuable to share with others besides
the executive. If the larger assessment is contemplated, the coaching partnership needs to
decide ahead of time how to deal with the data and include these decisions in the learning
contract.
! Maintain an open attitude toward feedback and other assessment results, considering
all information as hypotheses to be proved or disproved.
! Invest the required time to expedite the assessment phase.
! Partner with the coach to identify situations, such as meetings and events, which might
provide on you and your organization.
! Ask questions and digest feedback to make the best use of assessment information.
Coachs Commitments
! Be knowledgeable in a broad range of assessment methodologies.
! Administer only those instruments for which you have been fully trained/certified or
otherwise adequately prepared.
! Maintain the confidentiality of the executive by protecting the assessment data.
! Provide a safe, supportive environment in which to deliver assessment feedback.
Deliver feedback in ways that encourage the executive to act upon her assessment.
! Offer a clear context for the strengths and limitations of the testing process.
P a g e | 55
! Help the executive use her assessment data to create a development action plan.
! Respect the agreed-upon level of confidentiality for executive coaching data.
! Provide information about the executive and the organization.
! Partner with the coach and executive to identify ways for the coach to directly observe
the executive and the organization.
P a g e | 56
5. Goal Setting
Executive coaching is driven by specific goals agreed upon by all members of the coaching
partnership. These goals focus on achievements and changes the executive can target, both
for himself and for his organization. Initial goals are established when coaching begins and
revised or refined as coaching progresses. Based on whether they should be achieved
within weeks, months, or over a longer time period, goals can be divided into short-, mid-,
and long-term targets.
Goals are based on valid and reliable data that exemplify how the executive should learn
new skills, change his behavior, work on organizational priorities, or achieve specific
business results. After a specified time period, progress is measured against goals, and they
are updated to adapt to the executives changing capabilities and the organizations
evolving priorities. Goal achievement is measured both quantitatively and qualitatively.
! Collaborate with and listen to your stakeholders to become aware of how others
perceive your needs for change and development.
! Be honest about your own priorities for coaching.
! Clarify specifically what you will need to do so that others perceive you as achieving
your goals.
! Invest time in the coaching and on the job based on the established goals.
Coachs Commitments
! Facilitate collaboration between the executive and his stakeholders to identify and agree
upon coaching goals.
! Accept responsibility only for coaching activities that are based on specific, measurable
goals.
! Help members of the coaching partnership gather valid and reliable data as a basis for
establishing goals.
P a g e | 57
! Document the coaching goals and communicate them to all partners.
! Assess coaching progress and adjust goals based on interim results and changing
priorities.
! Be honest and direct about your goals for the coaching.
! Collaborate with the executive and other partners to agree on specific, measurable,
achievable, challenging, time-bound, and practical goals.
! Base the goals on valid and reliable data about the executives performance and
organizational priorities.
! Provide ongoing feedback to both executive and coach on the executives progress
toward his goals.
! Support the executives efforts to achieve his goals.
! Allow the executive to take the agreed-upon time to achieve his goals before changing
his responsibilities or the resources he needs.
P a g e | 58
6. Coaching
The quality of the coaching relationship is a key element of success. The coach creates a safe
environment in which the executive can feel comfortable taking the risks necessary to learn
and develop. Drawing from a broad knowledge base and a solid repertoire of learning
tools, the coach offers guidance and activities that help the executive meet her learning
goals. Conversations explore the executives current work situation to find practical,
business-focused learning lab opportunities.
The practical activity of coaching is based on principles of adult learning: awareness,
action, and reflection. Using data gathered from the assessment phase of the process, the
coach engages the executive in discussion and activities designed to:
"
enhance self-awareness of the implications of typical behaviors
"
learn skills, build competencies, change behaviors, and achieve results
"
reflect on ways to improve and refine skills and behaviors.

Learning tools and activities may include, but are not limited to, purposeful conversation,
rehearsal and role-plays, videotaping, supportive confrontation and inquiry, relevant
reading, work analysis and planning, and strategic planning.
After the assessment is complete and goals are established, additional forms of coaching or
development besides executive coaching may be required as part of the executives
learning. These types of coaching and development activities include, among others, career
coaching, management development training, personal coaching, presentation skills
training, coaching on dressing for success, organizational development consultation,
process reengineering, and video coaching. When the coach has expertise in these areas
and they fall within the scope of the learning contract, the coach may provide the assistance
directly. If the coach is not qualified, or the additional coaching is beyond the scope of the
learning contract, other arrangements are made. The coach may make appropriate referrals
or work with other members of the organization to obtain the additional help.
P a g e | 59
! Maintain an open attitude toward experimenting with new perspectives and behaviors.
! Willingly be vulnerable and take risks.
! Focus on your own growth within the context of your current and future organizational
role.
! Transfer learning gained through coaching to your day-to-day work.
! Exchange feedback with your coach about the helpfulness of the coaching.
! Seek feedback from others in the organization about the results of your coaching.
Coachs Commitments
! Adhere to the standards and guidelines for practice outlined in this Handbook.
! Maintain the coaching focus on the executives learning goals.
! Prepare relevant action items for all coaching meetings.
! Role-model effective leadership practices.
! Apply adult learning principles during coaching.
! Participate actively in all meetings with the executive and other stakeholders.
! Offer truthful and relevant feedback.
! Create an environment that supports exploration and change.
! Make appropriate referrals to other resources when you are not the best source for
additional assistance.
! Maintain a supportive and patient attitude toward the change process.
! Provide feedback to both the executive and the coach on progress and concerns.
! Offer to mentor, coach, role model, and support the executive from your own
perspective within the organization.
P a g e | 60
! Assist the executive and coach in finding additional resources within or outside the
organization when help beyond the scope of the coaching or the coachs area of
expertise is needed.
P a g e | 61
7. Transitioning to Long-Term Development

Upon completing the coaching sessions, the executive and his coach take whatever steps
are necessary to ensure that the executive will be able to continue his development.
Applying the results of the coaching within the context of the executives long-term
development is an important part of this process. It usually includes the joint preparation
of a long-term development plan identifying future areas of focus and action steps. The
coach may also recommend a range of internal and external resources relevant to the
executives long-term development needs.
In most cases, transitioning includes handing off the development plan to the executives
manager or another stakeholder who agrees to monitor future progress in partnership with
the executive. The coach, executive, and other stakeholder incorporate into the long-term
plan a regular review of progress toward objectives or goal reassessment. A successful
executive coaching process serves as a catalyst for the executives long-term development.
! When the coaching process is complete, discuss its results with your coach, including
how successfully you feel your development needs have been addressed.
! Identify any areas where gaps might exist or further progress could be made.
! Identify any areas that may become more critical to address in your anticipated future
roles.
! Participate in formulating a long-term development plan identifying specific areas of
focus and action steps.
! Identify a manager or other organizational stakeholder who will take responsibility for
monitoring your future development.
! Hold yourself accountable for adhering to your action plans, including a regular review
of progress with your manager or other stakeholder.
! Provide feedback to your coach on performance, strengths, and development needs.
P a g e | 62
! Provide your organization with a forthright assessment of the coachs capabilities and
organizational fit.
Coachs Commitments
! Use your knowledge and expertise to guide the executive and other stakeholders in
developing a long-range plan that targets areas of focus and action steps.
! Recommend internal and external means of development that best fit the needs of the
executive and the organization.
! Communicate with the executives manager or other stakeholders to ensure
commitment to his future development, including regular progress reviews.
! After the coaching ends, make yourself available for questions and clarification.
! Check in with the executive occasionally, as appropriate, to maintain the relationship.
! Support the executives future development, including a long-term development plan.
! Facilitate internal and external means of development for the executive including, but
not limited to, rotational assignments, stretch assignments, mentoring opportunities,
task force leadership or participation, and internal or external seminars or courses.
! Share constructive feedback about the executives progress toward development
objectives.
! Evaluate the effectiveness of the coach and the coaching process for future use in the
organization.
! Provide feedback to the coach on performance, strengths, and development needs.
P a g e | 63
Overview of Guidelines for Each Member of the Executive

Coaching Partnership
Executives Guidelines
Managing Confidentiality
! Partner with the coach and other members of your organization to write a
confidentiality agreement that specifies what information will and will not be shared, in
which circumstances, with whom, and how, including guidelines on electronic forms of
communication.
! Whenever there is a question regarding how information is or should be handled,
communicate directly with other members of the coaching partnership to come to an
agreement.
! Respond to feedback from others in non-defensive ways, without second-guessing who
might have said what or retaliating for feedback that is difficult to hear.
Pre-coaching Activities
! Consult with your stakeholders to determine if executive coaching is right for you,
establish the appropriate goals, and select the best coach.
! Work in partnership with others to make sure all business and financial contracts are
expedited.
! Inform your coach about you, your organization, and your situation, and begin the
process with a willingness to learn
Contracting
! Actively participate in establishing a learning contract and a personal contract for your
coaching.
! As appropriate in your organization, participate in establishing, monitoring, and
administering business/legal/financial contract(s) with your coach.
! Adhere to the learning and personal contracts. Use them to guide what you do in
activities related to your coaching, including how you gauge your progress and success.
P a g e | 64
Assessment
! Invest the needed time to expedite your assessment.
! Maintain an open attitude toward feedback and other assessment results.
! Work collaboratively with your coach to identify and ask questions about situations
that might provide insight into you and your organization.
! Make the best use of feedback and other assessment information to change you and
your organization as needed.
Goal Setting
! Collaborate with stakeholders to understand how others perceive your needs for
change and development.
! Be honest about your own priorities for coaching.
! Clarify what you need to do to achieve your goals.
! Invest the time in coaching and on the job to achieve your goals.
Coaching
! Be open and willing to try new things and take appropriate risks.
! Focus on what you need to do to learn and take action within the context of your work
role.
! Exchange feedback with your coach and others in your organization about your
performance and how the coaching has helped you achieve the desired results.
Transitioning to Long-Term Development
! Work with your coach and others in your organization to identify improvements and
opportunities for further progress.
! Participate in formulating a long-term plan for your continued development.
! Establish an agreement with an appropriate person in your organization to support and
monitor your future development.
! Follow through with your plan and invest the time needed to achieve your long-term
development goals.
P a g e | 65
! Communicate with your coach and the appropriate people in your organization about
the effectiveness of the coach and the coaching process.
P a g e | 66
Coachs Guidelines
! Work within the proprietary and confidentiality guidelines of the organizations
contracts and documents.
! In general, within the boundaries of the law, keep all organizational information
confidential unless it is otherwise available to the public.
! Do not share with anyone except the executive herself any details regarding that
executive unless members of the coaching partnership have agreed otherwise.
! When getting feedback from others about the executive, be clear up front about the
terms of confidentiality and work strictly within these terms.
! Participate in the organizations selection and orientation process for coaches.
! Provide the needed information about you and your practice.
! Partner with the executive and other members of the organization to facilitate decision
making and communication regarding the coaching.
Contracting
! Share your own standards and guidelines for contracting with the executive and
organization while respecting and agreeing to use the organizations standards as
feasible.
! Actively use the learning and personal contracts to plan and deliver coaching and to
assess progress and results.
! Negotiate the terms of the contracts in good faith and comply with them in full, or
reestablish them as mutually agreeable and in a timely fashion.
Assessment
! Be knowledgeable in a broad range of assessment methodologies. Administer only
those for which you have been fully trained or otherwise adequately prepared, offering
a clear context for their strengths and limitations.
P a g e | 67
! Deliver feedback in a safe, supportive environment and in ways that encourage the
executive to constructively act upon the assessment.
! Help the executive use the assessment data to create a development action plan.
Goal Setting
! Facilitate collaboration between the executive and her stakeholders to identify and
agree upon specific and measurable coaching goals.
! Document the coaching goals and communicate them in writing to all members of the
coaching partnership.
! As the coaching progresses, adjust goals based on interim results and changing
circumstances and priorities.
Coaching
! Adhere to the standards and guidelines for practice outlined in this Handbook.
! Maintain the coaching focus on the goals that have been agreed upon by the
partnership.
! Participate actively in all meetings with the executive and her stakeholders, preparing
relevant action items, role-modeling, applying adult learning principles, and creating an
environment that supports exploration and change.
! Offer truthful and relevant feedback during coaching in helpful and supportive ways.
! Facilitate, guide, and make recommendations for a long-term development plan for the
executive based on the coaching experience and your expertise.
! Communicate with the executives manager and/or stakeholders to ensure
commitment to the executives future development.
! After the coaching ends, make yourself available for questions and clarification. Check
in with the executive occasionally, as appropriate, to maintain the relationship and her
learning momentum.
P a g e | 68
Other Partners Guidelines

! Actively participate in agreeing on what information will or will not be shared, with
whom, by whom, when, in what form, and under what circumstances.
! Keep any information learned about the executive as a result of the coaching
confidential, unless otherwise agreed before the coaching begins.
! Ensure that no confidential information coming out of the coaching process is shared
electronically unless you can control access to that information.
! Identify an internal resource who can advise you and the coach on questions of
confidentiality and other sensitive topics and can help resolve theses issues.
! Establish and follow standard practices for selecting, matching, and orienting coaches
for specific projects.
! Work in partnership with the executive and coach to determine coaching needs,
requirements, and desired outcomes.
! Clear any barriers for coaching contracts and activities to be completed.
Contracting
! Ensure that standards for learning contracts are established and disseminated in your
organization; become familiar with those standards.
! Actively participate in establishing and supporting the executives learning contract.
! As appropriate, actively participate in establishing and supporting
business/legal/financial contract(s) for the coaching.
! As appropriate, facilitate the formal contracting and payment process in your
organization.
Assessment
! Respect the agreed-upon level of confidentiality for information that comes out of the
executive coaching process.
P a g e | 69
! Provide honest, accurate, and complete information about the executive and the
organization.
! Participate in identifying and facilitating ways for the coach to directly observe the
executive and the organization.
Goal Setting
! Be honest and direct about your goals for the coaching.
! Collaborate with the executive and other members of the partnership to agree on
appropriate coaching goals.
! Provide ongoing feedback to both executive and coach on the executives progress
toward his goals.
! Support the executives efforts to achieve his goals, allowing him to take the agreedupon time to achieve them before changing his responsibilities or the resources he
needs.
Coaching
! Maintain a supportive and patient attitude toward the change process.
! Provide feedback to both the executive and the coach on progress and concerns.
! Offer to mentor, coach, role model, and support the executive from your own
perspective within the organization.
! Make suggestions and help the executive get the support he needs from others in the
organization.
! Actively participate in creating a long-term development plan for the executive.
! Facilitate internal and external means of development.
! Share ongoing constructive feedback with the executive about his progress toward
development objectives.
! Evaluate the effectiveness of the coach and the coaching process; provide the coach and
others in the organization with feedback to maximize the effectiveness of future
coaching.
P a g e | 70
Core Competencies of the Executive Coach

By
Susan Ennis, Robert Goodman, William Hodgetts, James Hunt, Richard Mansfield,
Judy Otto, and Lew Stern
Why a Competency Model?
What are the essential competencies of the effective executive coach? This is a challenging and
important question. A number of writers have addressed this question over the past decade.i
Unfortunately, commercial concerns and a lack of research in the field make it difficult to find
a reasonable answer. The danger for consumers is that, given the lack of standards, they may
be vulnerable to fads and sales pitches without a clear sense of how to evaluate executive
coaches and the coaches ability to meet the consumers needs. Our goal in offering this work
is to provide an initial framework of executive coaching to define the needs in specific
situations and develop criteria for coach selection, not dissimilar to any good human resource
selection process. In addition, we also hope to stimulate further research and dialogue on this
critically important topic. The competencies we will describe here are based on our collective
experience and judgment as executive coaches, executives, educators, and consumers of
executive coaching services. The competencies must be considered tentative to be refined as
further research becomes available.
Defining Executive Coaching

Our systems-oriented definition of executive coaching isii:
P a g e | 71
Executive coaching is an experiential and individualized leader development process that
builds a leaders capability to achieve short- and long-term organizational goals. It is
conducted through one-on-one interactions, driven by data from multiple perspectives,
and based on mutual trust and respect. The organization, an executive, and the executive
coach work in partnership to achieve maximum impact.
A discussion of competencies has to begin with the question, competent for what? In this
work we consider those competencies that we believe are necessary to effectively execute the
tasks described in this baseline definition. Clearly such a set of tasks requires a broad set of
competencies.ii Examination of the definition suggests that the competent executive coach will
likely possess or display psychological knowledge, business acumen, organizational
knowledge, knowledge about coaching, coaching skills needed to perform essential coaching
tasks, and a set of personal attributes that serve as a foundation for these competencies and
skills.
Construction of this Competency Description

Drawing on our own experiences as executive coaches, managers of coaching in organizations,
and/or coaching researchers and educators we began a process of attempting to articulate
these competencies, skills and attributes. Ultimately, we developed four competency areas
including psychological, business, organizational and coaching competencies.iii We
stress that it is quite likely that few coaches are highly effective across every single one of the
competency anchors listed under each of these areas. It is also the case that certain coaching
engagements will draw more on one or more competencies or skill sets than other sets.
However, in our experience, significant competence in each of the four areas is in all likelihood
essential.
While the need for some competencies may vary from situation to situation, we also articulate
here a set of personal attributes that are likely to be important regardless of context. Similar to
the growing awareness on the part of leadership-development researchers and practitioners of
the importance of emotional intelligence in that area, our experience suggests that emotional
intelligence competencies are important to the effectiveness of executive coaches as well.iv
Finally, the reader will note that we consider each competency or attribute from a basic or
foundational level and from a more advanced perspective as well. In doing so, we are trying to
P a g e | 72
capture the simple premise that individual coaches will demonstrate a varying level of
effectiveness within each competency as a function of both their natural gifts and their current
level of development and that competency at the basic level is essential while an advanced
level can be helpful in many situations.
We realize that research on this area is continuing apace and that these competency
descriptions are subject to further scrutiny and debate. Matching coach, executive, and
organization still requires a bit of intuition on the part of those involved because of the state of
research in the field and because of the ambiguous nature of many coaching assignments. In
spite of these limitations, given the growth of executive coaching, we believe it is critically
important to assist executives, organizations, coaches and coaching educators and researchers
by providing focus and language and by so doing try to help move the dialogue forward.
Potential Uses of this Model

Executive coaching, by its very nature, must manage the expectations of a variety of
stakeholders. Consistent with that reality, we believe these competency descriptions should be
of assistance to the following audiences:
1. Organizations that contract with executive coaches to provide services to their
employees. Typically, within an organization that utilizes the services of executive
coaches, one or more individuals are responsible for sourcing coaches. This description
of competencies should be useful as part of the application process, in the interviewing
of potential coaches and as a strategy for organizing a database of coaching capabilities.
The list should be useful in assessing coaches references as well. Finally, those
responsible for matching executives and coaches can use this model as an initial
screening tool to assess the kind of issues with which the executive needs help and the
skills and attributes required to offer that help.
2. Executives who are choosing a coach. The executive who is considering coaching can
be operating at something of a disadvantage without some sense of the universe of
competencies from which he or she can draw. The executive using this list of
competencies should consider her or his issues and needs and make sure that in the
interview process she or he checks to see whether the coach appears to have the right
competencies.
3. Executive coaches planning their own development. Most executive coaches are lifelong learners, or should be. Those wishing to guide their development intentionally can
consider their strengths and weaknesses by considering each of these competencies.
P a g e | 73
Likewise, the executive coach can also use the competencies to consider the kinds of
coaching cases to which he or she is best suited.
4. Designers of training programs and curricula for future executive. There are now a
number of executive coaching training institutes and academic programs and more are
likely to start up over the next decade. Too often, training and education for coaches
offers little more than a few days of workshops with some follow up coaching. As this
list of competencies implies, it makes little sense to expect that an individual can
become an effective executive coach in one week, or one month for that matter. Those
teaching executive coaches or running institutes or programs should grapple with the
serious challenge of helping their clients develop a broad and deep set of
organizational, psychological, business, and coaching competencies.
Please Provide Feedback on this Document
Thank you for your interest in Core Competencies of the Executive Coach. As you will read, this effort to
articulate the competencies of effective executive coaches was based on an on-going dialogue involving
individuals with significant experience as executive coaches, coaching practice managers, educators, and
supervisors of coaches, and researchers and authors on the topic. It was undertaken as part of our effort
to support quality practices in the field. We ask that in return for this service, you provide us your
feedback. Please e-mail otto.judy@gmail.com, and let us know your role, how you have made use of this
document, and your own perspective on the competencies of an effective executive coach. We thank you
in advance for your help.
P a g e | 74
The Core Competencies
Psychological Knowledge
In laying out the competencies and knowledge essential for the effective executive coach, it is
important to differentiate between formal psychological knowledge that is, knowledge of
psychological theories and concepts relevant to the practice of executive coaching and tacit
psychological knowledge, sometimes also referred to as social intelligence or emotional
intelligence. This section describes the formal psychological knowledge necessary for effective
executive coaching.
Basic
Advanced
Understanding of:
Understanding of:
" Personality theories
" The psychology of transitions
between developmental stages
" Models of human motivation
" Models of substance abuse
" Adult development theories, including
moral, intellectual, emotional, relational, and
" Clinical diagnoses and how they
spiritual development
play out in workplace (e.g.,
narcissism)
" Models of adult learning
" Conflict resolution and mediation
" Models of career development
" Family systems theory
" Models of personal and behavioral change
" Abnormal
" Work/life balance
psychology/psychopathology
" Stress management techniques
" Psychological assessment
" Social psychology and how social factors
methods and tools (e.g., 16PF,
impact individual and group behavior
Strong Interest Inventory, Firo B)
" How to identify individuals in need of
psychological or medical referral
" Models of emotional intelligence
" The role of gender differences in adulthood
" Models and methods of 360 degree feedback
" Models of personal and leadership style
(e.g., MBTI, DISC)
P a g e | 75
Business Acumen
Executive coaches need business acumen in order to understand the goals and work context of
their coachees. Business knowledge also gives executive coaches credibility with their coachees
and others in the coachees organization. In addition to general business knowledge, coaches
need to acquire knowledge of the specific businesses of their coachees.
Basic
Advanced
Understanding of:
Understanding of:
" Business practices and concepts
" Merger and acquisition issues
" Basic financial concepts (e.g.,
" Several specific industries and
income and balance sheets)
their technologies
" Business functions and their
" The use and abuse of technology
interdependencies
" Leading edge business practices
" The strategic planning process
" Governance structures and
and its relationship with team
practices and how they interface
and individual goal setting
with business operations
" Current information
" Management of the supply
technologies
chain/network
" The role of information
" Product lifecycles
technology in business (e.g.
" Government regulations (e.g.
E.R.P., enterprise management)
compliance, approval, and other
" Process improvement
governmental regulations and
technologies
processes)
" Global capitalism and global
" How boards operate in
firms
relationship to senior
" The differences between
management
regulated and non-regulated
" Re-engineering and downsizing
businesses
" The differences between forprofit and not-for-profit
businesses
" The key leadership roles of
organizations (e.g. COO, CFO,
CTO, CEO, Executive Director,
Board Chair, etc.)
" Knowledge of current business
events, issues and trends
" Management principles and
processes
" Human resource management
P a g e | 76
Organizational Knowledge
Executive coaches work with coachees who must accomplish their work goals and advance
their careers within the context of their organization(s). Therefore, it is important for executive
coaches to understand organizational structures, systems, processes, and how to assess all of
these elements of the organization in which the coachee works.
Basic
Advanced
Understanding of:
Understanding of:
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
Basic organizational structures,

systems and processes including
functional, divisional and matrix
organizational forms as well as
the behavioral patterns
associated with each
Organizational assessment and
diagnosis
Organizational design and
development principles and
practices
The impact and role of
organizational cultures and
subcultures
The phases of team
development and the
characteristics of effective team
leadership
Models of leadership
Leadership development
programs and processes
Organization development
methodologies
Organizational systems theory
The nature and role of
organizational politics, power
and influence
Organizational change
management theories and
practices
Consulting theory and practices
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
The processes of executive talent

management and succession
planning
The tasks, challenges, and
success factors associated with
executives coming into new
roles or assignments (onboarding)
The nature of and processes
associated with organizational
learning (e.g. knowledge
transfer, knowledge
management, information
sharing, etc.)
The distinctive characteristics of
family- owned and familyoperated enterprises
The processes associated with
organizational design principles
The practices associated with
changes in organizational
designs
Diversity management issues
P a g e | 77
"
"
"
The role of ethics in business

and in organizational consulting
Models of the learning
organization
Models of succession and
leadership transition
P a g e | 78
Coaching Knowledge
Executive Coaches need to have specific knowledge of theory, research, and practice in the
developing field of executive coaching.
Basic
Advanced
Understanding of:
Understanding of:
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
The history of executive coaching

Executive coaching models and theories
The definitions of coaching and executive
coaching as a specialty practice
Seven overarching principles for executive
coaching: systems perspective, results
orientation, business focus, partnership,
competence, integrity, and judgment ii
Seven guidelines for practicing the different
phases of executive coaching by the coach, the
executive, and the executives organization:
managing confidentiality, pre-coaching
activities, contracting, assessment, goal setting,
coaching, and transitioning to long-term
development ii
The underlying principles and approaches of
the different types of coaching and how they
differ from and/or can be incorporated into
executive coaching
The distinction between executive coaching and
other models of coaching
"
"
Evolving trends in the practice

of executive coaching
How coaching models can be
developed and customized to
emerging needs and trends
P a g e | 79
Coaching Knowledge (Continued)
Basic
Understanding of:
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
The role of manager as coach and the impact of

executive coaching on the development of that
capability
The roles coaches can play and when and how to
effectively apply them (e.g. trainer, mentor,
advisor, etc.)
The differences between executive coaching and
other helping methods for executives (e.g.
counseling, consulting, therapy, mentoring, etc.)
How coaching theories and methods apply to
various situations of individual coaching clients
How to tailor the coaching process to adapt it to
the unique needs and circumstances of the
coachee and the organization
Measurement of coaching outcomes and process
Research findings on executive coaching (past
and emerging)
The core competencies of executive coaches
The wide variety of available coaching resources
(books, articles, internet sites, tools, etc.)
How to maintain and implement a continuous
plan for ones own professional development
Advanced
P a g e | 80
Coaching Tasks and Skills

The executive coaching process can be divided into six phases: Building and Maintaining
Coaching Relationships, Contracting; Assessment; Development Planning; Facilitating
Development and Change; and Ending Formal Coaching and Transitioning to Long-term
Development. Each of these phases, as outlined below, has a set of tasks. Many of these tasks
can also be viewed as specific skills that an executive coach can develop and hone.
Basic
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
Building and Maintaining Coaching Relationships

Advanced
Build and sustain trust
" Provide guidance on diverse
Hold the coachee, his/her boss, and HR
cultures and cross-cultural
accountable
issues
Identify and manage resistance and conflict
" Use earned trust to challenge
Influence with and without authority
values, assumptions, and
Maintain confidentiality on sensitive
business practices
organizational and individual issues
" Work with a diverse group of
Hold multiple perspectives
clients and stakeholders
Solicit feedback on ones own performance as
(cultures, races, genders,
the coach
styles, ethnicity, etc.)
Utilize the coaching relationship as a tool to
" Hold sessions with senior
help the coachee
management and
Maintain the balance of the close coaching
Organizational
relationship and professional boundaries
Effectiveness/HR staff to
Make and explain observations about what
share observations,
goes on in the coaching relationship and its
organizational knowledge,
similarities and differences to the coachees
data, and themes relating to
other relationships
leadership and organizational
Appropriately challenge the coachee and
issues.
deal with the his/her defensiveness without
impairing the coaching relationship
P a g e | 81
Contracting
Basic
" Evaluate the readiness of the coachee for
coaching
" Engage all appropriate constituents in goal
setting and agenda setting for the coaching
(coachee, boss, HR, others)
" Obtain commitment and support from all
appropriate constituents
" Establish guidelines for confidentiality
" Establish the bosss and HRs role in the
coaching
" Facilitate agenda-setting and goal-setting
meetings between the coachee, his/her
boss and the HR professional
" Develop realistic and challenging coaching
goals
" Set realistic time frames for accomplishing
the coaching goals
" Re-contract when appropriate
" Tailor the coaching process to the unique
needs of the coachee and organization
Advanced
" Play multiple roles without
crossing key boundaries or
compromising the guidelines
for practice
" Challenge the coachees commitm
" Contract with the boss for
feedback to him/her
" Negotiate and write three forms
of coaching contracts: the
learning contract with the
coachee, his/her boss and HR
professional; the
business/legal/financial
contract with the coachees
organization; and the
personal/relationship contract
with the coachee ii
" Manage times of low and high
demand in ones own coaching
practice so as not to negatively
impact client service
P a g e | 82
Assessment
Basic
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
Advanced
Design assessment plans
Administer and interpret 360 degree
feedback instruments and measures of
personal and leadership style (e.g., MBTI,
DISC)
Interview the coachee and his/her key
constituents
Unobtrusively observe/shadow the coachee
in his/her work environment
Gather data from multiple sources, aggregate
them and present the results and
implications in a useful format
Use the results of assessment tools and
instruments to evaluate the coachees
strengths, weaknesses, abilities, tendencies,
preferences, behavior patterns, emotions,
thinking styles, opportunities, constraints,
and other factors important to the coaching
Use the results of assessment tools,
instruments and other methods to evaluate
the coachees organizational context (e.g.
characteristics, strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities, constraints, etc.)
Refer when appropriate to Employee
Assistance Programs, career counselors, or
other specialists for the administration,
scoring, and interpreting of assessments
Identify the coachees learning style
"
"
"
"
"
Design and develop 360degree assessments: surveys,

interviews, observations, and
focus groups
Administer and interpret
assessment instruments in the
service of the coaching
contract (personality,
developmental stage, ability,
interest, culture, climate,
efficiency, quality, etc.)
Interview the coachees
spouse and family
Design and implement
systems and tools for the
measurement and evaluation
of coaching interventions
Conduct specialized
assessments: customer needs
and satisfaction,
benchmarking, team
effectiveness, etc.
P a g e | 83
Basic
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
Development Planning
Advanced
Partner with Human Resources
" Involve other development
Conduct debriefing and feedback sessions
resources in coaching
with the coachee of the assessments and 360interventions (mentors,
degree results
trainers, consultants,
Establish specific coaching goals (behavioral,
therapists, physicians, etc.)
cognitive, skills, business, relationships, etc.)
" Continually build and manage
Help the coachee design and create action
a network of referral sources
plans and a coaching time table
to other relevant professional
Help the coachee, his/her boss, and HR to
services and providers
review assessment results within agreedupon guidelines for confidentiality and
translate those results into actionable
coaching strategies
Establish qualitative and quantitative
measures of results for the coaching goals
Determine what can be achieved in coaching
and recommend appropriate training and
other methods to achieve other
developmental goals
Quickly identify the need for, and make
referrals to other helping professionals
Gain commitment for the coachees selfmanagement of coaching action plans
Help the boss to provide useful feedback
and to coach the coachee as his/her manager
P a g e | 84
Basic
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
Facilitating Development and Change

Advanced
Take the coachees point of view
" Deal with multiple parts
and offer alternative points of view
of the coachees life that
Show accurate empathy
affect his/her job
Listen actively and respectfully
performance and
Communicate clearly, concisely,
satisfaction (spiritual,
and directly
physical, emotional, etc.)
Provide constructive feedback
" Spontaneously design and
Observe the coachees behavior in
improvise unique
coaching sessions and provide realcombinations of
time feedback
approaches to meet the
Offer specific strategies and
special needs of
suggested behavior changes
individual executives
Demonstrate and serve as a role
" Incorporate other
model in the coaching for new
specialty knowledge and
work methods and ways of
techniques in the coaching
communicating
intervention (financial
Create and raise awareness
analysis, market analysis,
Design assignments that encourage
innovation, total quality
experimentation, reflection, and
management, group
learning
process consultation,
Ask powerful questions
family businesses, etc.)
Support and confront
" Use video, audio, and
appropriately
other feedback techniques
Challenge assumptions
in the coaching
Solicit solutions
" Help to design
Swiftly translate ideas into action
organizational structures
plans
" Identify opportunities for
Develop management, executive
organizational
and leadership skills
improvements
Provide learning resources as
" Share knowledge and
needed (reading, models, etc.)
expertise appropriately to
Involve the boss as the ongoing
help the coachee develop
coach
solutions for complex
Measure and monitor the coaching
business challenges
process and results
" Mediate interpersonal and
Address new issues and learning
inter-group conflicts
opportunities as they arise
P a g e | 85
Basic
"
"
Facilitating Development and Change (Continued)

Advanced
Be aware of and recognize ones
own part as the coach in the
" Use stress management
coachees problem or situation
and relaxation techniques
through various methods (e.g., peer
" Manage and supervise
supervision, consultation, etc.)
other coaches and
Coach the boss to better support
members of the
the coachee and his/her business
executives organization
and coaching objectives
in the application of the
guidelines for coaching
practice
" Identify coaching research
needs and design and
conduct research to fill
those needs
" Present and share
knowledge of and
experience with coaching
with other professionals
through publications,
conferences, seminars,
and other vehicles
P a g e | 86
Basic
"
"
"
"
Ending Formal Coaching & Transitioning to long-term development

Advanced
" Collect feedback on personal
Identify the appropriate ending point
effectiveness as a coach to inform
in the formal coaching process
ones own coaching practice
Initiate discussion with the coachee,
" Work with emotional issues that may
his/her manager, and others in the
arise in the coachee concerning
organization about bringing the
ending the formal coaching
formal coaching to an end
" Work with emotional issues that may
Work with the coachee to identify
arise in oneself as the coach
ongoing developmental supports and
concerning ending of the formal
resources in his/her environment and
coaching
to establish a transition/ending plan
" Encourage the coachee to join with
others in peer coaching relationships
Work with the coachee to establish
post-coaching developmental goals
and a plan for meeting those goals
"
Work towards and encourage the

coachees independence
"
Encourage the coachee to continue

learning on his/her own
"
Conduct formal ending meeting with

the coachee, his/her manager, and
HR
"
Leave open the possibility for future

coaching as the need arises and
within the guidelines of the coaching
contract
P a g e | 87
Attributes and Abilities
A number of underlying attributes and abilities facilitate performance of the Coaching Tasks
described in the previous section. An individual who demonstrates the following nine
categories of attributes may be more likely to be effective as an executive coach: Mature Selfconfidence; Positive Energy; Assertiveness; Interpersonal Sensitivity; Openness and
Flexibility; Goal Orientation; Partnering and Influence; Continuous Learning and
Development; and Integrity. An effective executive coach may further develop these
attributes and abilities as a result of the demands and opportunities of the coaching role.
Mature Self-confidence
"
"
"
"
Basic
Appears comfortable with
himself/herself
"
Advanced
Demonstrates a sense of comfort around
senior management or others in power;
views him/herself as a peer to senior
managers.
Shows maturity; demonstrates that

she or he has gained wisdom from
personal and professional experience
"
Shows confidence; places an

appropriate value on his or her own
abilities and perspectives
Demonstrates courage; is willing to take

on situations that may involve
significant risk
"
Thinks independently; considers

options or perspectives that may go
against prevailing views
"
Has experienced and learned from a

variety of personal and work challenges
Shows humility; demonstrates

awareness that success usually follows
from the efforts of a group or team of
other individuals, not solely from
ones own efforts
P a g e | 88
Positive Energy
"
Basic
Shows energy, optimism and
enthusiasm
"
Effectively manages his/her emotions
"
Demonstrates resilience; bounces back

after mistakes and failures
"
Demonstrates an appropriate sense of

humor
"
Helps the coachee to appreciate her or

his strengths and ability to overcome
barriers
"
Helps the coachee to imagine new

possibilities
"
Conveys hopefulness
"
"
Advanced
Uses humor to defuse tense situations
Manages her or his own stress in
unusual coaching situations so as not
to allow it to interfere with the
coaching process or relationship
P a g e | 89
Assertiveness
"
Basic
Asserts him/herself and appropriately
says no to set limits
"
Confronts coachees and others who are

not following through on commitments
"
Speaks directly with others even when

discussing difficult or sensitive issues
"
Addresses conflict with others directly

and constructively
"
Communicates in ways that reflect

respect for ones own worth and the
worth of others
"
Advanced
Is able to challenge or confront even
the most senior leaders
P a g e | 90
Interpersonal Sensitivity
"
"
Basic
Shows empathy with others
"
Is sensitive to how her or his style

impacts others or fits with the needs of
others
"
"
Demonstrates an interest in people;

shows curiosity about the lives, goals,
experiences, and perspectives of others
"
Shows compassion and demonstrates

concern for the needs and emotional
well being of others
"
Demonstrates tact; gives difficult or

critical information to others in a
respectful and supportive fashion
"
Learns and remembers other peoples

most important concerns
"
Uses active listening techniques (e.g.,

maintaining full attention, periodically
summarizing, being non-judgmental) to
reflect and acknowledge the other
persons feelings and concerns
Advanced
Is continually alert to subtle behaviors
providing clues about others interest,
engagement, and concern
Asks questions to elicit concerns and
feelings suggested by subtle
nonverbal behavior or group
dynamics
P a g e | 91
Openness and Flexibility

"
Basic
Is able to understand and appreciate
perspectives that differ from her or his
own
"
Tailors his/her own approach to fit the

preferences and needs of the coachee
"
Demonstrates flexibility; changes

course or approach when the situation
demands it
"
Understands and relates to individuals

and groups from a variety of cultures
with values different from her or his
own culture
"
Seeks out and uses feedback to enhance

the coaching engagement
"
Advanced
Demonstrates comfort with a very high
level of ambiguity
P a g e | 92
Goal Orientation
"
Basic
Sets challenging but achievable goals
for himself/herself
"
Helps coachees to identify and set

realistic and challenging goals
"
Is highly motivated toward the pursuit

of his or her goals
"
Shows resourcefulness; seeks out, or

helps others seek out solutions under
difficult or challenging conditions
"
Demonstrates stability; stays on tasks

for extended periods of time
"
Shows persistence; does not give up

when faced with a challenge
"
Demonstrates the ability to organize

work; effectively plans and manages
resources and time when pursuing a
goal
"
"
Advanced
Manages multiple and sometimes
conflicting goals and their attainment
Translates complex goals into parallel
tracks of actions and their associated
measures of success
P a g e | 93
Partnering and Influence

"
Basic
Carefully plans and tailors his or her
own words in ways that achieve a
desired impact
"
Presents arguments that address

others most important concerns and
issues
"
Involves others as partners in a process,

to gain their support and buy-in
"
Shows interest in and comfort with the

context in which the coaching is taking
place (for-profits, not-for-profits, health
care organizations, the public sector,
marketing, finance, sales, R&D, etc.)
"
Shares some of the values of those in

the context in which the coaching is
taking place and has a fundamental
comfort with private enterprise and/or
public endeavors
"
Demonstrates inclusiveness by
encouraging the participation of
multiple stakeholders
"
Advanced
Is perceived by others as being of the
stature of an executive or senior
consultant
"
Understands, anticipates and manages

highly political situations
"
Formulates effective strategies by

carefully considering the concerns,
motivations, interrelationships, and
preferred styles of all key players
"
Asks powerful questions that facilitate

reflection or problem solving
P a g e | 94
"
Continuous Learning and Development

Basic
Advanced
Seeks feedback to enhance overall
" Does formal research on his/her own
coaching effectiveness
effectiveness as a coach
"
Assesses and addresses gaps in

his/her own knowledge and skill
"
Teaches and coaches others in

executive coaching
"
Undertakes study and learning to

enhance skills that will contribute to
her/his coaching
"
Seeks out peers for mutual supervision

and consultation
"
Assists other coaches, organizations,

and professionals in other areas to avail
themselves of different coaching
resources and referral sources
Demonstrates commitment to his or her
own continuous learning
"
P a g e | 95
Integrity
"
Basic
Takes and holds an ethical stand
regardless of financial or other pressures
"
Carefully maintains appropriate

confidentiality in all dealings
"
Determines what is appropriate through

careful contracting in his or her coaching
and consulting relationships, with the
goal of meeting the needs of all
stakeholders.
"
Demonstrates personal integrity; walks

the talk
"
Appears genuine, honest and

straightforward regarding her or his
agenda and needs
"
Focuses on and puts the clients needs

ahead of her or his own needs
"
Makes and keeps commitments to

others
"
Avoids a coaching workload that

compromises the quality of the coaching
service
"
Respects the established relationships

between the client and other providers
of coaching, consulting, and/or other
services
"
Advanced
Helps all members of the coaching
partnership to challenge their
integrity and impact on the business
P a g e | 96
Sherman, Stratford & Freas, Alyssa (2004/November). The wild west of executive coaching. Harvard
Business Review, pp. 82 90. Hunt (2004), Successful Executive Coaching from the Consumers
Perspective. Creative Consulting: Research in Management Consulting, Vol. 4, Greenwich, CT: IAP Press.
pp. 165 200.
ii We use the term competency here to as it was originally suggested by Boyatzis (1982, in The
Competent Manager, New York: Wiley-Interscience) as: an underlying characteristic of an individual,
which is causally related to effective or superior performance in a job. This definition was further
articulated by Spencer, McClelland & Spencer (1994, Competency Assessment Methods, Boston:
HayMcBer Research Press) as motives, traits, self-concepts, attitudes or values, content knowledge or
cognitive or behavioral skills (p. 6).
iii This articulation process began with each of us listing those competencies that seemed particularly
significant in our own experiences. We then compared lists, added and deleted items, and refined
terminology until we were comfortable that we had an inclusive or complete list of appropriate
competencies. Such a process of course has a number of limitations from a research perspective and as
such, we offer this model as the shared perspective of a varied group of experienced professionals in
the field. We hope that future research will provide quantitative and qualitative evidence that
demonstrates a direct relationship between specific coaching competencies and coaching results.
i
Aggression and Violent Behavior 10 (2005) 533 551
Crisis (hostage) negotiation: current strategies and issues in

high-risk conflict resolution
Gregory M. Vecchia,*, Vincent B. Van Hasseltb, Stephen J. Romanoc
a
Crisis Negotiation Unit, Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Academy, United States
b
Center for Psychological Studies, Nova Southeastern University, United States
c
Crisis and Security Management, Control Risks Group, Washington, DC, United States
Received 24 August 2003; received in revised form 14 September 2004; accepted 4 October 2004
Abstract
Crisis (hostage) negotiation has been described as the most significant development in law
enforcement and police psychology over the past several decades. This paper reviews three primary
components of crisis negotiation: (1) the incorporation of crisis management and intervention in
current broad-spectrum approaches to crisis negotiation; (2) the Behavioral Change Stairway Model
(BCSM), constructed by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) Crisis Negotiation Unit (CNU),
that provides a systematic, multistep process directed toward peaceful, nonlethal resolution of critical
incidents; and (3) role-playing as a vital tool in the assessment and training of crisis negotiation skills.
Advancements and limitations in the field of crisis negotiation are highlighted; suggestions for
directions that future work in this area might take are offered.
D 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Crisis negotiation; Hostage negotiation; Crisis intervention; Role-playing; Conflict resolution; Online
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 540 809 4500.

E-mail address: GVecchi@aol.com (G.M. Vecchi).
1359-1789/$ - see front matter D 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.avb.2004.10.001
534
G.M. Vecchi et al. / Aggression and Violent Behavior 10 (2005) 533551
Contents
1.
Overview and definitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1. Hostage vs. non-hostage situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2. Tactical vs. negotiated resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Crises: states, stages, and intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1. The crisis state. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2. Crisis stages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3. Goals of crisis intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.1. Establishing communication and developing rapport.
2.3.2. Buying time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.3. Defusing intense emotions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.4. Gathering intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.4. Crisis intervention stages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.4.1. Dealing with emotions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.4.2. Establishing communication . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.4.3. Identifying the precipitating event(s) . . . . . . . . .
2.4.4. Problem solving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Behavioral change stairway model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1. Stage 1: active listening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1.1. Core active listening skills . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1.2. Supplemental active listening skills . . . . . . . . .
3.2. Stage 2: empathy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3. Stage 3: rapport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4. Stage 4: influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.5. Stage 5: behavioral change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Role-playing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1. Role-play format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1.1. Family-domestic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1.2. Workplace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1.3. Suicide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2. Negotiation skills building. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Summary and future directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
535
535
536
537
537
537
538
538
538
538
539
539
539
539
540
540
541
541
542
543
543
544
545
545
545
546
546
546
546
547
548
550
550
Law enforcement agencies have been employing negotiation strategies in their responses to
hostage/barricade situations, kidnappings, personal crises, and other critical incidents since
they were first introduced by the New York City Police Department in 1973. This trend
followed the debacle of the 1971 Attica, New York prison riot, and the murder of Israeli athletes
during the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, Germany. Since that time, several models of
negotiation have been developed for use in hostage situations, based primarily on problemsolving approaches to response, management, and resolution of these incidents (Fisher, Ury, &
Patton, 1991; Lanceley, 1999; McMains & Mullins, 2001; Webster, 1998a). However, problemsolving strategies have proven effective only subsequent to addressing and defusing the
subjects emotional state; and this appears true regardless of the situation (Noesner & Webster,
1997; Rogan, Hammer, & Van Zandt, 1997; Romano & McMann, 1997).
535
This paper discusses current strategies in crisis (hostage) negotiation that have been
developed and implemented to facilitate: (a) the transition of a hostage or non-hostage
critical incident from a state of high emotionality (crisis) to rationality (problem solving),
and (b) the eventual peaceful or nonlethal resolution of the crisis situation. Following an
overview and definition of key terms, we review three primary components of the crisis
negotiation process: (1) crisis management and intervention in the context of critical
incidents, (2) the Behavioral Change Stairway Model for achieving conflict resolution,
and (3) utilization of role-play procedures to train requisite crisis negotiation skills.
1. Overview and definitions

Police organizations have historically emphasized problem-solving training for their
negotiators. Illustrative are the four tenants of Fishers et al. (1991) negotiation model that
have enjoyed widespread application in this area: (1) separate the person from the problem,
(2) focus on his or her interests rather than positions, (3) generate options, and (4) establish
clear objective criteria for behavioral change. For years, this model was adopted for hostage
negotiation by law enforcement organizations across the nation (see McMains & Mullins,
2001).
Even the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) focused on problem-solving strategies
for negotiators until 2000. At that time, the FBI Crisis Negotiation Unit (CNU), at
the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia, conducted research that illustrated the need
for change and modification of the curriculum for their National Crisis Negotiation
Course (NCNC). Their work examined data from the CNUs Hostage Barricade Database
System (HOBAS). HOBAS is a post-incident database that collects and stores case
information from law enforcement agencies nationwide and now contains over 3800
hostage/barricade incidents. Their research revealed that over 90% of all reported critical
incidents were, in fact, non-hostage, crisis situations (Flood, 2003). Consequently, the
NCNC curriculum was modified to emphasize a broader range of crisis intervention
strategies and tactics.
1.1. Hostage vs. non-hostage situations
Considerable confusion currently exists regarding the differences between hostage and
non-hostage situations. Hostage situations involve the taking of a person captive for
binstrumentalQ or tangible reasons; the suspect needs the police or other authorities to meet
specific demands (e.g., ransom, transportation, money). In these events, the captive is used
as leverage to obtain other substantive goals. For example, foreign nationals holding prison
guards captive in exchange for the release of political prisoners, money, and transportation
would constitute an actual hostage situation. In a non-hostage situation, a person is taken
captive for bexpressiveQ or intangible reasons; he or she does not need the police or other
authorities. In these situations, the captive is held by a subject who is in a highly emotional
state (e.g., anger, jealousy, frustration), usually as a victim or bhomicide-to-beQ. Examples
536
of these scenarios are: holding ones spouse captive as a result of an extramarital affair, and
rejection due to an impending separation or divorce (Van Hasselt et al., in press c). The
hostagenon-hostage distinction is further underscored in Fig. 1. This figure presents the
bBehavioral ContinuumQ which includes the focus of both hostage (i.e., instrumental) and
non-hostage (expressive) situations.
Even in bpureQ hostage situations, however, there is evidence that perpetrators experience
considerable emotionality, especially during the chaos of the incident onset (Romano, 2002).
This makes hostage-takers, as well as victims, susceptible to slipping into a crisis, which
requires the application of appropriate crisis intervention techniques.
1.2. Tactical vs. negotiated resolution
A tactical response refers to actions taken by a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) or
similar specialized unit to resolve either the hostage or non-hostage situation (Mijares,
McCarthy, & Perkins, 2000). In most of these cases, a determination has been made that
despite negotiation efforts, peaceful resolution appears unlikely (e.g., the subject refuses to
talk with negotiators, or remains adamantly noncompliant/resistive). In some situations, the
subject may have engaged in a behavior, such as a shooting of a victim, that necessitates
an immediate tactical response to prevent additional harm (McGeorge, 1983). SWAT teams
are composed of personnel with highly specialized training in forced entries, hostage/
victim extraction, and subject containment/termination (Jones, 1996; Kaiser, 1990; Vecchi,
2002).
An important concept that has received increased attention in this field is the action
imperative. This refers to the taking of (tactical) action when, in fact, there was no clear basis
for doing so (Dalfonzo, 2002). An example of the action imperative is an on-scene
commander deciding to end a situation tactically because, although negotiations are in
progress, they are (from his perspective): (a) too lengthy, or (b) not resulting in any obvious
resolution. Such decision-making is usually based on a lack of understanding regarding the
negotiation process (Vecchi, 2002). In particular, the action imperative is taken when
commanders or tactical operators are not aware that time (i.e., protracted negotiations) is the
bnegotiators allyQ in defusing critical incidents.
Fig. 1. Behavioral continuum.
537
Conflict can be defined as the perceived blocking of important goals, needs, or interests of
one person or group by another person or group (Wilmot & Hocker, 1998). A persons
response to conflict can be constructive or destructive. For example, in a child custody battle,
the losing parent (whose need to have her children is blocked by her former husband, via a
court order) could respond constructively by taking her ex-husband back to court, or
destructively by taking her children by force. In the event of the latter, a crisis may result if
she is unable to cope with the problem. At this point, the wifes response to the crisis could be
adaptive or maladaptive (Rosenbluh, 2001). For example, she could take an adaptive
approach by returning the children and seeking counseling. Or, she could take a maladaptive
approach by taking the children hostage, barricading herself, and threatening to kill them if
she is not awarded custody.
2. Crises: states, stages, and intervention

A crisis is the result of a conflict gone awry. A crisis is a situation that a person perceives
as presenting insurmountable obstacles to achieving desired goals or outcomes (Caplan,
1961; Carkhuff & Berenson, 1977). Further, there is the sense that these impediments cannot
be managed through the usual problem-solving methods (James & Gilliland, 2001). Whether
or not a situation is viewed as a crisis depends on current perception, previous experiences,
level of resiliency, and coping skills. This explains why a particularly horrific event will result
in crisis for some but not others. For example, a police investigation involving a murder may
have minimal impact on the seasoned homicide detective who has become desensitized to
even the most gruesome crime scenes. By contrast, the murder scene could be a triggering
event for crisis in the victims neighbor, who discovered the body.
2.1. The crisis state
Most crises requiring negotiation/intervention are due to a significant loss or rejection,
termination from employment, a decline in health status, financial reversal, or loss of freedom
(Marino, 1995). Two or more losses within a short period of time (often referred to by police
crisis negotiators as a bdouble whammyQ) are often the bfinal strawQ or antecedent that sends a
person into crisis (McMains & Mullins, 2001; Romano, 2002). A crisis state has the
following characteristics: (1) the person in crisis behaves at an intense emotional and
irrational level (rather than at a rational/thinking level) in response to a situation that is
perceived as overwhelming, (2) the situation has occurred within the past 24 to 48 h, and (3)
the event is seen as a threat to ones psychological and/or physical well-being.
2.2. Crisis stages
A crisis generally occurs in four predictable stages: pre-crisis, crisis, accommodation/
negotiation, and resolution (James & Gilliland, 2001; McMains & Mullins, 2001). In the precrisis stage, a person goes about his or her normal routine, unaware of a problem or looming
538
event. The crisis stage is characterized by high emotions, low rationality, and an inability to
cope with a problem that is perceived to be a serious threat. Here, frustration and tension
increase as a result of conflict and the person being unable to deal with the challenge using
previously effective coping skills. It is often during the onset of the crisis stage that police
negotiators or mobile crisis responders are called upon to intervene. By the accommodation/
negotiation stage, the individual begins to bwork throughQ the crisis by being receptive to
suggestions and thinking more clearly about resolving the situation. In this stage, there is a
lessening of emotional intensity and a shift towards more productive problem solving. The
resolution stage involves the working out of an acceptable solution, thus ending the crisis.
This final stage results in the person experiencing renewed equilibrium and stability.
2.3. Goals of crisis intervention
Once coping mechanisms fail, and a person falls into a crisis state, normal functioning is
disrupted. What is normally resolved at a rational or cognitive level is now dealt with at an
emotional or affective level. Therefore, restoring the ability of a person to cope through the
reestablishment of baseline functioning levels is the primary purpose of crisis intervention
(James & Gilliland, 2001; Roberts, 2000). To accomplish this, crisis negotiation involves: (1)
establishing communication and developing rapport, (2) buying time, (3) defusing intense
emotions, and (4) gathering intelligence to ascertain the optimal negotiation/intervention
strategies and tactics (Lanceley, 1999; Romano & McMann, 1997). These events are
discussed briefly below.
2.3.1. Establishing communication and developing rapport
Individuals who are able to articulate clear statements of feeling are ultimately in a better
position to solve their problems. Thus, in crisis intervention, actively listening to what the
person in crisis is saying is vital. When a listener (negotiator) is able to reflect the subjects
feelings, the former is perceived as being understanding (see bActive Listening SkillsQ
below). This is the basis for a relationship in which the person in crisis is ready to accept and
act upon the suggestions of the negotiator, thereby resolving the crisis.
2.3.2. Buying time
bTime is the crisis negotiators greatest allyQ (Romano, 2002). The passage of time alone
usually decreases stress and emotional levels, and sets the stage for achieving the goals of
crisis intervention. In law enforcement circles, buying time is known as bverbal containmentQ,
or the process of keeping the person in crisis boccupiedQ via ongoing discussions with the
negotiator.
2.3.3. Defusing intense emotions
Communication occurs on two levels. The first level relates to the content or story, which
is based on the facts as related by the speaker. The second level of communication pertains to
emotion, which is the affective reaction to the story (i.e., how the person feels about what he
or she just said). The emotional reaction, and behavior based on that reaction, is what creates
539
crisis, rather than the actual event itself. Assessing communication levels is accomplished by
examining statements in terms of their content and attached emotions; a person may
communicate the same content, but with different emotional overlays. For example, bI hate
youQ may reflect disdain, while bI HATE YOU!Q may reflect anger. How a person feels about
a situation will strongly influence their behavior; therefore, listening for and addressing the
intense emotions behind the content is crucial in influencing the persons behavior in crisis
situations.
2.3.4. Gathering intelligence
This relates to the ongoing assessment of the crisis situation in order to: (a) ascertain the
lethality or potential harm to the person in crisis (and others), (b) identify precipitating events,
and (c) formulate proposed courses of action and post-crisis options (e.g., therapy, medical
follow-up, incarceration). Intelligence gathering is accomplished through communication
with the person in crisis, and by investigating the background of the person via interviews
(family, friends, co-workers) and records checks (criminal, civil, medical, psychological).
2.4. Crisis intervention stages
Regardless of the model employed, crisis intervention in the context of negotiation
encompasses four primary stages (Hammer & Rogan, 1997; Rogan, 1997; Womack & Walsh,
1997): (1) dealing with emotions, (2) establishing communication, (3) identifying the
precipitating event(s), and (4) problem solving.
2.4.1. Dealing with emotions
Dealing with emotions is a requisite skill for a crisis negotiator given the fact that intense,
volatile emotions are a hallmark of crisis situations (Noesner & Webster, 1997; Rogan, 1997;
Webster, 1998a). However, making assumptions about a persons emotions based upon the
circumstances can impede crisis intervention. For example, during a situation where a subject
has barricaded himself in his home and is threatening to commit suicide, the negotiator
attempts to demonstrate empathy by saying: bI know how you feelQ. The subject responds by
saying, bYou dont know how I feel. . .just go awayQ. In this case, the negotiators attempt at
empathy is counterproductive because the person in crisis does not believe the negotiator has
ever tried to commit suicide before. And regardless of whether or not this is true, the
perception of the person in crisis is their reality. Therefore, arguing or trying to be rational
with the person in crisis is pointless. An alternative approach would be for the negotiator to
state, bIve never been in your situation before, but I imagine you must be feeling very
depressed and lonelyQ. In saying this, the negotiator is demonstrating that he or she is trying to
understand the situation from the perspective of the person in crisis without making
potentially faulty assumptions.
2.4.2. Establishing communication
Establishing communication is the vehicle for the delivery of crisis intervention strategies
and tactics (Hammer & Rogan, 1997; Noesner & Webster, 1997; Webster, 1998a). The
540
negotiators voice tone and intonation are at least as important as the content of the
communication. Content can be easily altered by informing the person in crisis that you are
simply trying to understand; however, it is much more difficult to bfixQ an attitude that is
perceived by the person in crisis as being bbadQ, hostile, or disinterested. In addition,
communication delivery must be deliberate, methodical, and, most importantly, nonjudgmental. A nonjudgmental perspective is best described as accepting; the subject
perceives that his or her feelings, values, thoughts, and opinions are viewed as important. The
negotiator should not inject his or her values into the situation; however, this does not mean
that the negotiator agrees with the values of the subject. This disagreement can be relayed to
the subject as follows: bFrom what youre saying, I can imagine how your wife could have
made you angry enough to kill her. . .That would have made me angry too, but I dont think I
could have done what you didQ.
2.4.3. Identifying the precipitating event(s)
A precipitating event is the blast strawQ or btriggerQ that propels a person into crisis. As
mentioned earlier, the precipitating event is often a significant loss or reversal (e.g., spouse,
job, money) (Romano, 2002). Identifying the precipitating event is critical in laying the
groundwork for problem solving because it identifies the conflict that needs to be resolved in
the negotiation process.
Due to initial high levels of emotionality, the person in crisis is often confused about the
impact of the precipitating event. However, these are the bhooksQ used by negotiators to
resolve the crisis, and must be identified and focused upon in crisis negotiations (Dalfonzo,
2002). For example, a scenario encountered by law enforcement might involve a despondent
subject whose ex-wife recently informed him that she is planning to gain full custody of their
children and deprive him of visitation. The subject responds by barricading himself and the
children in his home, refusing to come out or release the children. The bhookQ here is
obviously the anticipated loss (of the children) which must be identified and targeted by the
negotiator. Then, by providing justification (and minimization of hostile intent) for this
behavior (e.g., bYou arent doing this to hurt your children in any way; youre doing this out
of your love and concern for them; youre trying to protect themQ), the actions of the subject
are positively reframed. This serves to alleviate internal conflict, defuse negative emotions,
and set the stage for subsequent problem solving and crisis resolution.
2.4.4. Problem solving
Once emotions are better controlled, communication has been established, and the
triggering event has been identified and discussed, the subject is more likely to be receptive to
problem solving. Problem solving is a multistep behavioral process in which the negotiator
helps the person in crisis explore alternatives and concrete solutions. Problem solving in crisis
negotiation is an adaptation of steps delineated by behavioral researchers over the past several
years: (1) defining the problem, (2) brainstorming possible solutions, (3) eliminating
unacceptable solutions, (4) choosing a solution that both the negotiator and person in crisis
finds acceptable, (5) planning the implementation, and (6) carrying out the plan (e.g.,
DZurilla & Goldfried, 1971; Goldfried & Davison, 1994).
541
Effective problem solving involves, in part, listening for distorted cognitions from the
person in crisis. Cognitive style influences an individuals perception of self and the situation.
Cognitions serve as a bfilterQ through which the world is viewed. Further, they influence a
persons reaction to events, where faulty, dysfunctional, or irrational thinking may lead to
emotional distress or even crisis. Sometimes these distortions affect the prospects for problem
solving and must be addressed by the negotiator. Illustrative is the case of a drug addict who
tries to steal a prescription drug in a pharmacy and is caught. The police are notified and
surround the building before he can escape. As a result, the subject becomes despondent and
demands to be set free or he will kill himself because he does not view going to prison as an
option. Here, the distorted thinking is the presumed assumption of only two options: going free
or to prison. In response, the negotiator offers another choice: the possibility of being sent to
drug rehabilitation rather than prison (which may or may not be a reality). Eventually, the
person surrenders without further incident. This suggestion by the negotiator redirects the
thinking of the subject, who now sees a more acceptable option.
3. Behavioral change stairway model

The Behavioral Change Stairway Model (BCSM), developed by the FBIs Crisis
Negotiation Unit, outlines the relationship-building process involving the negotiator and
subject which culminates in a peaceful settlement of the critical incident (Dalfonzo, 2002;
Noesner & Webster, 1997; Webster, 1998a, 1998b). The heuristic value of this model has
been consistently documented in the resolution of a wide range of highly volatile crisis
situations (Dalfonzo, 2002; Flood, 2003).
BCSM consists of five stages: active listening, empathy, rapport, influence, and behavioral
change. Progression through these stages occurs sequentially and cumulatively. Specifically,
the negotiator proceeds in sequence from Stage 1 (active listening) to Stage 5 (behavioral
change). However, in order to establish rapport (Stage 3) with the subject, active listening
skills (Stage 1) and empathy (Stage 2) must first be demonstrated (and maintained
throughout) by the negotiator. As this process continues, influence (Stage 4) and behavioral
change (Stage 5) follow. The latter stage refers to the successful resolution of the crisis that
can only occur when, and only when, the previous stages have been carried out successfully
(see Fig. 2).
3.1. Stage 1: active listening
Most persons in crisis have a desire to be heard and understood. Active listening attends to
this need and is critical for developing a relationship that will ultimately lead to behavioral
change and crisis resolution (Lanceley, 1999; Noesner & Webster, 1997; Webster, 1998a).
Active listening skills are essential components of BCSM and form the bbedrockQ of crisis
intervention. Active listening is composed of core and supplemental groupings. The core
group consists of Mirroring, Paraphrasing, Emotional Labeling, and Summarizing. Effective
Pauses (silence), Minimal Encouragers, Open-ended Questions, and bIQ statements comprise
542
Fig. 2. Behavioral change stairway.
the supplemental group. These skills are virtually identical to those utilized in counseling to
establish rapport and positive therapeutic relationships with clients (Evan, Hearn, Uhlemann,
& Ivey, 1989; Hersen & Van Hasselt, 1998).
3.1.1. Core active listening skills
Mirroring refers to repeating the last few words or gist of the person in crisis. It
demonstrates to the subject that the negotiator is attentive. Further, it elicits the individuals
specific concerns and problems that must be identified in the negotiation process. Using
mirroring helps to ensure that the discussion focuses on the person in crisis rather than on the
negotiator, thereby remaining in the subjects frame of reference.
Paraphrasing involves restating the content of what the subject said in the negotiators
own words. This reflects an attempt by the crisis negotiator to take the perspective of the
person in crisis. Emotional labeling identifies the emotions of the subject. Even if the
negotiator initially misidentifies an emotion, this effort at least demonstrates to the person
in crisis that the negotiator is trying to understand the situation, which tends to defuse
emotionality. Examples of emotional labeling include: bYou sound angryQ, bYou seem
frustratedQ, and bI hear frustration in your voiceQ.
Summarizing offers a restating of both the content and emotion expressed by the subject.
This provides clarification of what the person in crisis is experiencing. In addition, it further
reflects the effort of the negotiator to view the situation from the perspective of the subject.
An example of summarizing might be, bLet me make sure I understand what youre saying;
you lost your job for no apparent reason (paraphrase) and this makes you angry (labeled
emotion)Q.
543
3.1.2. Supplemental active listening skills

Effective pauses are deliberate silences before or after meaningful comments by the
negotiator. These help the subject focus on the content of what the negotiator is saying
because the pauses increase anticipation (if employed before the meaningful comment) and
reflection (when used after the meaningful comment). For example, the negotiator might say,
bTell me if I have this right. . .(pause). . .You are angry with your mother because she never
showed you loveQ, or bYou sound angry about the loss of your father. . .(pause). . .Tell me
more about thatQ.
Minimal encouragers are verbal cues to the subject that the negotiator is attentive and
attempting to understand the perspective of the person. Minimal encouragers are used while
the negotiator is listening and include: buh-huhQ, byesQ, brightQ, bgo onQ, and bokayQ.
Open-ended questions encourage the subject to expand on his or her responses in an effort
to decrease emotionality and bring the person in crisis to a more rational level. Open-ended
questions do not limit the responses to either-or or yes-no answers, but require elaboration
and further detail from the subject. Open-ended questions typically start with bWhatQ or
bWhenQ or statements such as, bTell me more about thatQ. bWhyQ statements are usually
avoided, as they tend to be perceived as interrogatory.
bIQ statements are used by the negotiator when it is appropriate to make a personal
disclosure to further develop rapport, or when the person in crisis is verbally attacking the
negotiator. A negotiator uses a personal disclosure to connect an emotion or experience within
the context of what the person in crisis is describing. For example, the negotiator may say, bI
am a father too, but I can only imagine what it must be like to lose a son; it must be terribleQ.
When being verbally confronted, the negotiator can use the bIQ message in this way: bWhen
you say that I dont care, it frustrates me because I really am trying to understand your situation
and I really want to help you; I am here because I want to be, not because I have to beQ.
When initially employing active listening, it is recommended that the crisis responder use
the core group (mirroring, paraphrasing, emotional labeling, summarizing) until the
negotiator has determined effective bhooksQ. The supplemental group should be used as
necessary to enhance the effectiveness of the core elements (Vecchi, 2003a) (Fig. 3).
In many cases, the negotiator is the only person who has made an effort to deal with the crisis
situation from the subjects frame of reference (Dalfonzo, 2002). Active listening skills are the
foundation of effective crisis intervention, and the first step towards affecting behavioral
change.
3.2. Stage 2: empathy
Empathy is a natural by-product of effective active listening. It implies an identification with,
and understanding of, anothers situation, feelings, and motives (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972).
The negotiator uses empathy to bsee through the eyesQ of the person in crisis and to absorb some
of the tension. In crisis intervention, the goal is not to bfeel sorryQ for the subject, but to establish
a relationship through effective communication, enabling resolution through collaboration.
A consideration in developing empathy is the importance of voice tone (Romano, 2002).
Tone influences how the person in crisis perceives the meaning of what the negotiator is
544
Fig. 3.
saying. And it is this perception of meaning that counts most in effective crisis intervention
(whether or not the perception is based in reality). Tone reflects concern and genuineness
through inflection and pitch; it also expresses emotion, demeanor, and sincerity.
3.3. Stage 3: rapport
Until this stage of the BCSM, the relationship has been one-sided: the person in crisis has
been talking and the negotiator has been actively listening and empathetic. As empathy is
shown, rapport develops, which is characterized by increased trust and mutual affinity. Once
rapport has been developed, the person in crisis is more likely to listen to (and accept) what the
negotiator has to offer. At this stage, the negotiator, in collaboration with the subject, begins to
build themes that provide bface savingQ justifications, minimizations, or bblendingQ which serve
as precursors to ending the crisis (Dalfonzo, 2002). Themes involve contrived rationales to
545
explain, justify, mitigate, or excuse the faulty behavior; they also address distorted thinking by
positively reframing the situation. Minimization serves to downplaying negative behavior
exhibited by the person in crisis. In blending, the negotiator and subject: (a) agree where
possible without conceding, (b) reduce real or perceived differences, and (c) find common
ground. By now, the subject should be more amenable to behavior change efforts by the
negotiator.
3.4. Stage 4: influence
At this stage, a relationship has been established and the subject is willing to accept the
suggestions of the negotiator as a prelude to behavior change. In negotiator parlance, the
negotiator has bearned the rightQ to recommend a course of action to the subject as a result of
collaborative problem solving. Now, the negotiator and subject work together to identify
solutions and alternatives that are nonviolent and realistic.
3.5. Stage 5: behavioral change
Behavioral change will most likely occur only if the previous four stages have been
successfully completed. Obstacles to reaching this final stage are usually: (1) the negotiator
moving too rapidly through the stages, or (2) omitting stages in a misguided effort to end the
crisis through (premature) problem solving. Again, the key to behavior change in crisis
negotiation is achieving a positive relationship between the negotiator and subject via active
listening, empathy, rapport, and behavior influence strategies and tactics. At this final stage,
the subject will likely follow the negotiators suggestions to the extent that negotiator tasks in
the previous stages have been effectively carried out.
4. Role-playing
Role-playing has become one of the most frequently used instructional tools in law
enforcement. Illustrative of the widespread use of role-playing are results of a survey by
Sharp (2000) who found that over 80% of police agencies polled utilized them in training.
Further, 100% of respondents indicated that role-plays are valuable in a variety of exercises,
such as those conducted by SWAT and Field Force Units. In addition, role-play procedures
have been successfully employed in police recruit selection and promotion evaluations
(conducted in law enforcement assessment centers).
In recent years, role-playing has also become a mainstay in the evaluation and training of
crisis negotiation skills (see review by Van Hasselt and Romano, 2004). Indeed, the vast
majority of crisis negotiation training programs rely on role-playing to provide simulations of
real-world critical incidents. Moreover, role-plays have served as the primary vehicle for the
training of requisite negotiator competencies (e.g., active listening skills) that have been
associated with successful negotiation efforts (Greenstone, 1995; Noesner, 1992). Even online
role-plays have been proven effective in negotiation skills building (Vecchi, 2003b). bAnd
546
although direct or naturalistic observation. . .of negotiators in actual critical incidents would be
a preferred approach for assessment and modification of negotiators skill level, the seriousness
and high-risk nature of these encounters make such an approach unrealistic (and dangerous).
Therefore, role-playing is a vital dnext bestT approachQ (Van Hasselt et al., in press a, p. 4).
4.1. Role-play format
Role-playing in crisis negotiation training has taken a variety of forms. Some role-plays
have been based on actual incidents that have occurred, while others have been designed in
anticipation of situations likely to be encountered. CNU has employed a combination of roleplay scenarios in its NCNC, which provides crisis negotiation training to FBI agents and
police officers. Training incorporates role-play scenarios that are based on hostage,
barricaded, suicide, and kidnapping incidents that have taken place and required a law
enforcement response. These situations reflect CNUs direct involvement in numerous critical
incidents nationally and internationally over the past 25 years.
One set of role-play items developed by CNU consists of scenarios describing crises in
each of three categories: (1) Family-Domestic, (2) Workplace, and (3) Suicide. Sample items
from each category are provided below.
4.1.1. Family-domestic
Jim Smith has abducted his common law wife and their son from a distant state. She had
obtained a court order preventing him from seeing her or her son. She has repeatedly rejected
his efforts at reconciliation and he has stalked and harassed her in the past. He kidnapped her
and the child in the middle of the night from her parents home and drove her to an
unoccupied farmhouse nearby where he ran out of gas. Authorities located his vehicle and
then discovered them holed up in the farmhouse.
4.1.2. Workplace
John Henry is angry because the factory where he has worked for 10 years fired most of
the senior workers to reduce payroll and increase profits. He blames the factory manager for
the loss of his job. He brought a gun into his office and is threatening to kill him if he does not
get his job back. He feels he has been treated badly and not given the respect he has earned
after 10 years of hard work.
4.1.3. Suicide
Frank was a successful banker who has been living the good life. Unfortunately,
several of his investments and financial decisions have failed and he is facing financial
ruin. He feels he will bring shame to his family, his wife will leave him, and his
possessions will be taken away. He feels hopeless and helpless. He believes that killing
himself is the only way out. One of his bank employees observed him with a gun in his
office and called the police to intervene.
For training purposes, the above scenarios may include a series of pre-arranged prompts
delivered by a confederate playing the role of subject. In these cases, the role-play is
547
relatively brief, lasting anywhere from one to several minutes. Where prompts are not
provided, the scenario lasts longer, but is still much shorter than most real-world crisis
situations. However, the relatively brief format allows for frequent instructor feedback
concerning the use of targeted negotiation skills.
Scenarios of longer duration (30 min or more) provide negotiators the opportunity to apply
their skills in increasingly more realistic situations. Examples include a bank robbery gone awry,
and a domestic situation involving a barricaded husband and spouse. The NCNC carries out such
training in bHogans AlleyQ, the FBI Academys mock city that provides a variety of naturalistic
settings (e.g., hotel, drug store, apartment building) to stage critical incidents. Student
negotiation teams are provided with a scenario/incident overview, including some background
on the perpetrator and setting. Then, they are asked to make contact with the subject, and attempt
to resolve the situation peacefully using their newly acquired negotiation skills.
Still another type of role-play involves events that are several hours in duration, and thus
more like actual crisis situations. An example is an NCNC scenario in which a subject has
hijacked a school bus with children and is threatening to blow up the bus and kill everyone
inside if his demands are not met.
Finally, initial experimentation on the use of online role-plays has taken the above precepts
and applied them within a synchronized (live) chat room environment, where confederates
play persons in crisis (suicidal, violent, psychotic) and the negotiator applies the BCSM to
alleviate the crisis (Vecchi, 2003a, 2003b). Communication occurs via the written word;
emotion is portrayed through pauses (b. . .Q), punctuation (b!Q), variations of upper and lower
case letters (bGO AWAYQ or bgo awayQ), or any combination. Advantages of this training
format in which negotiations are automatically recorded verbatim, include the ability to: (1)
provide clear and frequent feedback, (2) make comparisons between training sessions to
assess the negotiators level of skill acquisition, and (3) provide specific suggestions for
improvement. Disadvantages include the variances associated with typing ability, interresponse, time delays, and the absence of visual and audio cues (Vecchi, 2003b).
4.2. Negotiation skills building
As Hatcher, Mohandie, Turner and Gelles (1998) cogently point out, bThe goal or mission
of crisis/hostage negotiation is to utilize verbal strategies to buy time and intervene so that the
emotions of the perpetrator can decrease and rationality can increaseQ (p. 455). The specific
verbal strategies used to accomplish this goal fall under the rubric of bactive listening skillsQ
discussed earlier. Consequently, these behaviors, which are critical for the establishment of
rapport between negotiator and subject in crisis situations, have been targeted in most crisis
negotiation skills training programs (Van Hasselt and Romano, 2004).
To teach these skills, training has typically employed a number of behavior change
strategies, including: (1) direct instructions concerning skills needed (e.g., active listening,
surrender instructions) in crisis situations; (2) performance feedback regarding negotiator
behaviors and skill level displayed in scenarios; (3) positive reinforcement of successive
approximations to desired negotiator responses (i.e., bshapingQ); and (4) modeling by the
trainer to demonstrate effective responses.
548
Despite the widespread application of role-play strategies in law enforcement in general,

and crisis negotiation, in particular, little research has been carried out concerning the
systematic development and validation of these procedures. In the first phase of an initial
effort in this area, Van Hasselt et al. (in press b) describe construction of the role-play
instrument utilized by CNU. This measure was based on actual negotiated encounters by
CNU, and employed specifically for evaluation and training of crisis negotiation skills. The
second phase of their investigation involved validation of the role-play test by determining
the extent to which it discriminated expert from nonexpert crisis negotiators. A self-report
measure of emotional empathy also was administered.
Results indicated that in comparison to nonexperts, expert negotiators showed significantly
higher levels of active listening skill components (paraphrasing, emotion labeling, reflecting,
open-ended questions). Further, significant positive relationships were obtained between use
of active listening skills and emotional empathy.
A second study incorporated the previously validated role-play test to carry out one of the
first empirical investigations of the efficacy of crisis negotiation training (Van Hasselt et al.,
in press a). Here, FBI Special Agents participating in the NCNC were assessed via role-play
before and after training. This behaviorally based program focused on the training of active
listening skills, and a number of other vital competency areas requisite to successful diffusion
and resolution of crisis situations. Van Hasselt et al. (in press a) found significant pre-post
differences on nearly all active listening skills for course participants. Further, attempts to
problem solve, often detrimental in early phases of crisis negotiation, decreased as a function
of training.
Vecchi (2003b) reported similar findings in teaching online crisis negotiation skills to police
officers and other criminal justice students in an academic environment. Direct instructions
were provided, via syllabus and lectures, and performance was gauged in the context of chat
room sessions where students practiced their crisis negotiation skills with role-players
portraying persons in crisis. Over the course of two classes, most students showed a marked
improvement in their ability to effectively employ the BCSM. This included increased
utilization of active listening and reduced use of problem solving during chat sessions.
Improved negotiation skill appeared to be a function of behavior rehearsal and performance
feedback from the instructor and fellow students (Vecchi, 2003b).
5. Summary and future directions
The purpose of this paper was to review three primary components of the crisis (hostage)
negotiation process. The first was the incorporation of crisis management and intervention
in crisis negotiation, which reflects: (a) the wider range of problems targeted by negotiators
over the past several years, and (b) recognition of the utility of applying a broader spectrum
of available strategies based on crisis theory. The second component presently discussed
was the BCSM implemented by the CNU and now adopted (in some form) by most
negotiation training programs. In this model, adherence to a clearly defined series of steps
(in sequential and cumulative fashion) significantly increases the likelihood of successful
549
negotiated resolutions. And third, role-play procedures were described as one of the most
frequently employed vehicles for the evaluation and training of required crisis negotiation
skills.
Interestingly, while a voluminous body of writings has emerged concerning strategies and
issues in crisis negotiation (see Call, 1999; McMains & Mullins, 2001; Romano & McMann,
1997), most of these have been position papers, case studies, or anecdotal reports. Further,
most research in this area has involved attempts to develop typologies of hostage takers
(Kobetz, 1975; Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986; Strentz, 1986), or to determine outcomes of
hostage or barricade incidents (e.g., number of hostages/responding officers killed, wounded,
or unharmed) (Butler, Leitenberg, & Fuselier, 1993; Friedland & Merari, 1992). To date, there
is a modicum of data regarding the utility of specific negotiation approaches themselves.
Moreover, investigative efforts to prescriptively apply the most efficacious negotiation
strategies based on empirically grounded decision-making have yet to be conducted.
In an initial attempt to remedy this situation, CNU is currently carrying out a
comprehensive analysis of crisis negotiation strategies to reduce harm to a group constituting
a significant portion of negotiation call-outs: domestic violence victims (see Van Hasselt et
al., in press c). This will be accomplished through in-depth assessments of domestic violence
perpetrators who have taken a spouse, partner, and/or child(ren) hostage. Evaluations will
include: extensive assessments of a wide range of subject/background, victim, and (where
relevant) child variables, and determination of factors associated with successful or
unsuccessful crisis negotiation and resolution. It is anticipated that this analysis will yield
data that will be of crucial importance to crisis negotiators in their efforts to successfully
resolve high-risk critical incidents occurring in the home.
Another topic warranting further attention is the effectiveness of crisis negotiation skills
training programs. Van Hasselt et al. (in press b) and Vecchi (2003b) found preliminary
evidence for the potential value of such training. However, their results were based on results
of role-play assessments employed pre- and post-training. Evaluation of in vivo skill level, as
well as maintenance of trained skills over time (post-training), is clearly warranted.
There is also a need for further research in online crisis negotiation, both as a training
forum for skills building and as a possible medium for crisis intervention and negotiation. The
practical value of online skills building is evident, as it is generally more convenient and less
costly than traditional training formats. Also, preliminary evidence suggests its potential for
skills building (Vecchi, 2003b). However, data have yet to be adduced regarding its
effectiveness relative to bliveQ training. Further, there is a need for research on the feasibility
of using online crisis intervention and negotiation in real life situations. This is important in
light of the significant increase in computer usage internationally; the computer may become
a preferred method by which some individuals may actually choose to communicate.
Finally, there is a need to make BCSM and role-play strategies presently discussed
available to non-law enforcement professionals, (e.g., psychologists and mediators) since
these groups frequently deal with persons in crisis where violence potential is high. Such
training could be provided by law enforcement experts in non-law enforcement contexts, such
as crisis counseling and family mediation.
550
Acknowledgments
Preparation of this paper was supported, in part, through a Nova Southeastern University
Presidents Faculty Scholarship Award (Grant No. 338339) to the first and second authors.
The authors would like to thank Justin A. Rigsbee for his technical assistance in the
preparation of this manuscript.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Supervisory Special Agent Gregory, M. Vecchi, Crisis
Negotiation Unit, Critical Incident Response Group, FBI Academy, Quantico, VA 22135.
References
Butler, W. M., Leitenberg, H., & Fuselier, G. D. (1993). The use of mental health professional consultants to
police hostage negotiation teams. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 11, 213 221.
Call, J. A. (1999). The hostage triad: Takers, victims, and negotiators. In H. V. Hall (Ed.), Lethal violence: A
sourcebook on fatal domestic, acquaintance, and stranger violence. Boca Raton, FL7 CRC Press.
Caplan, G. (1961). An approach to community mental health. New York7 Grune & Stratton.
Carkhuff, R. R., & Berenson, B. G. (1977). Beyond counseling and therapy (2nd ed.). New York7 Holt, Rinehart,
& Winston.
Dalfonzo, V. (2002). National crisis negotiation course. Quantico, VA7 FBI Academy.
DZurilla, T. J., & Goldfried, M. R. (1971). Problem solving and behavior modification. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology, 78, 102 126.
Evans, D. R., Hearn, M. T., Uhlemann, M. R., & Ivey, A. E. (1989). Essential interviewing: A programmed
approach to affective communication. Pacific Grove, CA7 Brooks/Cole.
Fisher, R., Ury, W., & Patton, B. (1991). Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in (2nd ed.).
New York7 Penguin.
Friedland, N., & Merari, A. (1992). Hostage events: Descriptive profile and analysis of outcomes. Journal of
Applied Social Psychology, 22, 134 156.
Flood, J. J. (2003). Hostage barricade database (HOBAS). Quantico, VA7 FBI Academy.
Greenstone, J. L. (1995). Hostage negotiation team training for small police departments. In M. I. Kurke, & E. M.
Scrivner (Eds.), Police psychology into the 21st century. Hillsdale, NJ7 Lawrence Erlbaum.
Goldfried, M. R., & Davison, G. C. (1994). Clinical behavior therapy. New York7 Wiley.
Hammer, M. R., & Rogan, R. G. (1997). Negotiation models in crisis situations: The value of a communication
based approach. In R. G. Rogan, M. R. Hammer, & C. R. Van Zandt (Eds.), Dynamic processes of crisis
negotiation: Theory, research, and practice (pp. 9 23). Westport, CT7 Praeger.
Hatcher, C., Mohandie, K., Turner, J., & Gelles, M. G. (1998). The role of the psychologist in crisis/hostage
negotiations. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 16, 455 472.
Hersen, M., & Van Hasselt, V. B. (Eds.), (1998). Basic interviewing: A practical guide for counselors and
clinicians. Mahwah, NJ7 Erlbaum.
James, R. K., & Gilliland, B. E. (2001). Crisis intervention strategies (4th ed.). Stamford, CT7 Brooks/Cole.
Jones, T. L. (1996). SWAT leadership and tactical planning: The SWAT operators guide to combat law
enforcement. Boulder, CO7 Paladin Press.
Kaiser, N. F. (1990). The tactical incident: A total police response. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 59, 14 18.
Kobetz, R. W. (1975). Hostage incidents: The new police priority. The Police Chief, 32 35.
Lanceley, F. J. (1999). On-scene guide for crisis negotiators. Boca Raton, FL7 CRC Press.
Marino, T. W. (1995). Crisis counseling: Helping normal people cope with abnormal situations. Counseling Today,
38, 25 40.
McGeorge, H. J. (1983). Plan carefully, rehearse thoroughly, execute violently: The tactical response to hostage
situations. World Affairs, 146, 59 68.
551
Mehrabian, A., & Epstein, N. (1972). A manual of emotional empathy. Journal of Personality, 40, 525 543.
McMains, M. J., & Mullins, W. C. (2001). Crisis negotiations: Managing critical incidents and hostage situations
in law enforcement and corrections (2nd ed.). Cincinnati, OH7 Anderson Publishing. ISBN: 1-58360-513-4.
Mijares, T. C., McCarthy, R. M., & Perkins, D. B. (2000). The management of police specialized tactical units.
Springfield, IL7 Charles C. Thomas.
Noesner, G. W. (1992). First responder negotiation training. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 61, 101 104.
Noesner, G. W., & Webster, M. (1997). Crisis intervention: Using active listening skills in negotiations. FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin, 66, 13 18.
Roberts, A. R. (2000). An overview of crisis theory and crisis intervention. In A. R. Roberts (Ed.), Crisis
intervention handbook (2nd ed.). New York7 Oxford University Press.
Rogan, R. G. (1997). Emotion and emotional expression in crisis negotiation. In R. G. Rogan, M. R. Hammer, &
C. R. Van Zandt (Eds.), Dynamic processes of crisis negotiation: Theory, research, and practice (pp. 25 43).
Westport, CT7 Praeger.
Rogan, R. G., Hammer, M. R., & Van Zandt, C. R. (Eds.), (1997). Dynamic processes of crisis negotiation:
Theory, research, and practice. Westport, CT7 Praeger.
Romano, S. J. (2002). Personal communication. Crisis Negotiation Unit, Critical Incident Response Group.
Quantico, VA7 FBI Academy.
Romano, S. J., & McMann, M. F. (Eds.), (1997). Crisis negotiations: A compendium. Crisis Negotiation Unit,
Critical Incident Response Group. Quantico, VA7 FBI Academy.
Rosenbluh, E. S. (2001). Police crisis intervention: A dilemma in the aftermath of Columbine High School.
Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations, 1(1), 35 46.
Sharp, A. G. (2000). The importance of role-playing in training. Law and Order: The Magazine for Police
Management, 48, 97 100.
Soskis, D. A., & Van Zandt, C. R. (1986). Hostage negotiation: Law enforcements most effective nonlethal
weapon. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 4, 423 435.
Strentz, T. (1986). Negotiating with the hostage-taker exhibiting paranoid-schizophrenic symptoms. Journal of
Police Science and Administration, 14, 12 17.
Van Hasselt, V. B., Baker, M. T., Dalfonzo, V. A., Romano, S. J., Schlessinger, K. M., Zucker, M., & et al.
(in press a). Crisis (hostage) negotiation training: A preliminary evaluation of program efficacy. Criminal
Justice and Behavior.
Van Hasselt, V. B., Baker, M. T., Romano, S. J., Sellers, A. H., Noesner, G. W., & Smith, S. (in press b).
Development and validation of a role play test for assessing crisis (hostage) negotiation skills. Criminal Justice
and Behavior.
Van Hasselt, V. B., Flood, J. J., Romano, S. J., Vecchi, G. M., de Fabrique, N., & Regini, C. (in press c). Hostagetaking in the context of domestic violence: Some case examples. Journal of Family Violence.
Van Hasselt, V. B., & Romano, S. J. (2004). Role playing: A vital tool in crisis negotiation skills training. FBI Law
Vecchi, G. M. (2002). Hostage/barricade management: A hidden conflict within law enforcement. FBI Law
Vecchi, G. M. (2003a). Active listening: The key to effective crisis negotiation. ACR Crisis Negotiation News, 1,
4 6.
Vecchi, G. M. (2003b). Crisis negotiation: Skills building in an online environment. Unpublished Manuscript.
Fort Lauderdale, FL: Nova Southeastern University.
Webster, M. (1998a). Active listening and beyond: Compliance strategies in crisis negotiation. Unpublished
manuscript. British Columbia: Centurion Consulting Services.
Webster, M. (1998b). Active listening and beyond: Problem solving in crisis negotiation. Unpublished manuscript.
British Columbia: Centurion Consulting Services.
Wilmot, W. W., & Hocker, J. L. (1998). Interpersonal conflict (5th ed.). Boston7 McGraw-Hill.
Womack, D. F., & Walsh, K. (1997). A three-dimensional model of relationship development in hostage
negotiations. In R. G. Rogan, M. R. Hammer, & C. R. Van Zandt (Eds.), Dynamic processes of crisis negotiation:
Theory, research, and practice. Westport, CT7 Praeger.
Methods and Techniques Specific

to Human Resource Management
Ovidiu NICOLESCU
The Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies, Romania
E-mail: inst.manager@gmail.com
Phone/fax: +4 0213191967
Abstract
The first part of the study presents the contextual and conceptual novelty
elements concerning human resources on which this human resource management
approach relies. The conceptual novelty element is represented by the comprehensive
approach of human resource management (MRU), focused on the relationships of the
organisation with internal and external human stakeholders, not limiting to the
traditional approach, managers subordonees.
The second part of the paper makes a selection of methods and techniques
used in human resource management, grouped on the 14 activities specific to MRU.
This ensures a coherent and effective methodological basis for human resource
managers and specialists, in agreement with the challenges of the current period of
transition to knowledge-based economy.
The last part of the study indicates the methods and the techniques
recommended to be used in particular during the eight stages of human resource
reengineering.
Keywords: human resource management, specific human resource management

methods, knowledge-based economy, human resources reengineering
Preliminary Considerations
Human resource management is among the fields where managerial

practices and theoretical-methodological research have been going through
extensive development during the last decades. It is a natural situation, generated
mainly by the following variables:
the increase in the training level, the work and the creation potential of
human resources, at very high levels, difficult to imagine not very long
ago;
Review of International Comparative Management
Volume 10, Issue 1, March 2009
awareness for the decisive impact that human resources have on the
functionality of management and the performance of organisations,

whatever their branch or size;
the start of the knowledge revolution, whereby the new economy is
made, which pushes knowledge and the human resource to the
foreground of all economic-social activities, as main generator, holder
and user of knowledge.
In the context of this evolution, our study presents two major novelty
elements.
a) it approaches human resource management with a comprehensive
view, of ours, based on the stakeholders principle, not limiting to the traditional
managers subordonees relationship, which is still necessary and important, but not
enough for the complexity shown in a developed economic environment. In figure
1 we present the activities which, in our opinion, make up the human resource
field.
Human Resources
Assessment
8
Communication with
Human Resources
Career Development
10
Human Resources
Promotion
11
Relationships with
Special Stakeholders
12
Human Resource
Motivation
13
Human Resources
Labour and Social
Protection
14
Organisation Culture
Modelling
Human Resource
Training and Re-Training 6
Employees Integration 5
Human Resource
Recruitment and
Selection
Human Resource
Forecasting
Determining the
Requirements for Human 2
Resources
Human Nature Elements 1
of Managers Work
HUMAN RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT
subsYstem
15
Determining the
eficacity and eficiency
of MRU in organisation
Figure 1 The activities making up the human resources field

6
b) it makes a selection of methods and techniques grouped on the main

human resource activities and the main stages of the human resource management
subsystem reengineering. These elements are particularly useful in
professionalisation and making efficient human resource management within
organisations.
2 The Main Specific Methods and Techniques
The literature and the practice of human resource management use a large
number of methods and techniques, particularly varied, coming from psychology,
sociology, management, mathematics, statistics, and informatics or from their
interface areas. In the following table we present a selection of methods and
techniques which focused on the most frequently used and/or effective in the
professional management of modern enterprises, grouped on the human resource
field activities, as previously established.
Methods and techniques grouped on human resource activities
Table 1
Curren
t No.
1
Activity
Methods, Techniques and Procedures
Determining
the requirements
for human
resources
jobs analysis
workday tasks analysis
instantaneous observation
time recording
workday shooting
standard administrative times
work standards determination
the scenario
extrapolation
the correlation coefficient
physical and/or value work productivity
the critical incidents method
the dynamics of the size and structure of market demand
for the companys products
the dynamics of the size and structure of market offer for
the companys products
the forecasts on companys branch of activity
the forecasts on the evolution of national economy
the dynamics of the companys turnover
the dynamics of the production
productivity dynamics
trends analysis
the regression method
the Delphi method
the business plan
Forecasting
the requirements
for human
resources
Curren
t No.
Activity
Recruiting
and selecting
human resources
Integrating
employees
Training human
resources

the Gantt chart
staff fluctuation index
the extrapolation of the current human resource number
and structure
the retirement index
investment value per workplace
investment value for the next period
human resource selection model
general knowledge tests
specific knowledge tests by field, positions etc.
skills tests (distributed attention, communication, negotiation etc.)
qualities tests (intelligence, memory, reaction time, a.s.o.)
personality tests
practical exam
projects elaboration
case study
writing papers
interview
questionnaire
personnel file
C.V.
studies diploma
recommendations from former managers
individual labour contract
labour protection seminar
orientation discussion between the department manager
and the new employee
companys organigram
description of the job assigned
the organisation and operation handbook of the organisation
the internal regulation of the company
the manager presenting the new employee to the
compartment colleagues
specific work instructions to the job
methodologies in the new employees field of activity
celebrating the new employees special days (birthday,
name day etc.)
individual study
bachelors degree
masters degree
doctors degree
vocational schools
workplace apprenticeship
panel
case study
Curren
t No.
Activity
Communicating
with human
resources
Human resource
assessment

studying specialty papers
presentation
demonstration
elaboration of specific projects
specialized training
job rotation
research project
managerial simulation
managerial game
the incidence method
information seminar
referring to specialty sites
quality, skill and knowledge tests
continue learning
update training programme
requalification programme
information and documentation visits in other companies
participating to specialty conferences, congresses etc.
delegation
coaching
mentoring
sensivity training
in basket method
information, coordination, decision, complex meeting etc.
e-mail
four eyes discussion between manager-subordinate
written notice
written communication
balanced scorecard
set of instructions on certain activities
the organisations newspaper
panel with the performers within the organisation
annual letter of the CEO (or of the organisations
manager) to the employees
3600 assessment
assessment interview
work productivity
management by objectives
the diagnostic analysis
notation
overall assessment
functional evaluation
the (assessment) case method
self-assessment test
assessment test
graphic scale for classifying human qualities
Curren
t No.
Activity
Career
development
Human resource
promotion
10
Relationships
with special
stakeholders
11
Motivating
human resources

mixed standard scale of human qualities
the essay method
the critical incidents method
the behaviours checklist method
human resource assessment centre
job analysis
career plan
organigram
mentoring
tutoring
coaching*
granting gradations and stages within the same job
incumbency within a participative managerial body
inclusion in a scientific, consulting body etc. dealing
with major objectives and/or issues in the company
job description
list of positions
inviting stakeholders to visit the organisation
stakeholders inclusion in the companys participative
managerial body
stakeholders participation to the celebration of major
events in the organisation
continuously informing stakeholders on the special
events within the organisation
sending cards, gifts etc. to stakeholders on the occasion
of the main holidays, of certain special personal events for
them etc.
offering financial incentives to stakeholders (bonuses,
commissions, premiums, discounts etc.) for major
contributions in obtaining the economic performances of
the organisation
stakeholders sponsorship by the company
important stakeholders participation to the companys
capital increases
listen and answer technique
positive verbal feedback
negative verbal feedback
job extension
job enrichment
salary
hourly rate
bonus
gratification
profit sharing
The methods and the techniques specified for human resource training and re-training activities are
quasi-totally added hereto.
10 Volume 10, Issue 1, March 2009
Curren
t No.
Activity
12
Human resource
labour and social
protection
13
Modelling the
organisational
culture*

shares received free of charge or at a preferential price
salary penalty
financial imputation
fine
verbal or written thank you
praise
critics
warning
reprimand and/or invective
honorific titles
medal
ceremony for certain people or events
panel of performances
displacement dwelling
work mobile
treatment ticket
trip organised by the company
labour protection training
labour protection and safety standards
minimum salary
salary indexation
individual labour contract
unemployment compensation
collective labour contract
dialog social meetings
trade union
enterprise committee
negotiation
conciliation
mediation
arbitration
(warning, repeated, revolving, surprise, workplace
occupation etc.) strike
organisational culture audit
organisational transformation
new stories
new myths
new rituals
new ceremonies
case study
employee role change
employee status remodelling
formal organisational norm
organisational norm
This includes also the quasi-totality of the methods, techniques and procedures for training,
promoting and motivating human resources.
11
Curren
t No.
14
Activity
The efficiency
of using human
resources

informal sociogram
the Lundberg model
the Schein model
remythologisation
leadership
(physical, value, conventional unit) work productivity
per employee
salary costs for 1000 lei turnover
staff costs for 1000 lei turnover
average profit per employee
dividend per share
companys share value
3 The Use of Methods and Techniques During the Redesign

of the Human Resource Management Subsystem
It is particularly important to establish the use of these methods during
the eight stages of the human resource management subsystem redesign
process. To satisfy this need we elaborated table 2 where we integrated the
methods most frequently used in redesigning the human resource management
subsystem.
The use of specific human resource management methods and techniques in the human resource management subsystem redesign stages
Table 2
Stages
Current
no.
Method
or technique
0
1
2
3
1
Job analysis
Job description
Workday tasks
analysis
Instantaneous
observation
Work standards
The scenario
technique
Work
productivity
Turnover
dynamics
Physical
production
dynamics
Trends analysis
Investment value
per workplace
Investment value
for the following
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Clearly
Elaborating
Assessing the
establishing Elaborating Analysing Designing the
the specific
Implementing
Outlining
functionality
objectives
the
the human
human
programme for
the human
the
and the
to reach subsystem resource
resource implementing the
resource
design
performances
and the
redesign management management human resource management
team
of the new
scope of the programme subsystem subsystem
management
subsystem
subsystem
project
project
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
13
Current
no.
Method
or technique
1
period
The Delphi
method
Gantt Chart
Business plan
Knowledge tests
Skills tests
Qualities tests
Personality tests
Case study
Interview
Questionnaire
C.V.
Organisation and
operation
handbook
Internal
regulation
Organigram
Training
programme
Re-qualification
programme
Specialisation
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
Stages
Clearly
Elaborating
Assessing the
the specific
Implementing
Outlining
functionality
objectives
the
the human
human
programme for
the human
the
and the
resource
design
performances
and the
team
of the new
management
subsystem
subsystem
project
project
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Current
no.
Method
or technique
1
training
Job rotation
Quality circle
Managerial
simulation
Managerial game
Information
seminar
Sites specialised
on human
resource
management
Professional
conferences,
congresses etc.
Tutoring
Coaching
Mentoring
Meeting
E-mail
Written
communication
Balanced
scorecard
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
Stages
Clearly
Elaborating
Assessing the
the specific
Implementing
Outlining
functionality
objectives
the
the human
human
programme for
the human
the
and the
resource
design
performances
and the
team
of the new
management
subsystem
subsystem
project
project
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
15
Current
no.
Method
or technique
0
44
45
1
3600 assessment
Management by
objectives
Checklist
Career plan
List of jobs
Job description
Informing
stakeholders on
special events in
the organisation
Listen and
answer technique
Verbal feedback
Job extension
Job enhancement
Salary
Bonus
Profit sharing
Verbal and/or
written thanks
Praise
Critics
Performers
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
Stages
Clearly
Elaborating
Assessing the
the specific
Implementing
Outlining
functionality
objectives
the
the human
human
programme for
the human
the
and the
resource
design
performances
and the
team
of the new
management
subsystem
subsystem
project
project
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Current
no.
Method
or technique
1
panel
Labour
protection
regulations
Organisational
culture audit
Organisational
transformation
Remythologisation
Formal
organisational
norms
The Schein
model
The Lundberg
model
Salary costs for
1000 lei turnover
Labor costs for
1000 lei turnover
Average profit
per employee
Companys share
value
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
Stages
Clearly
Elaborating
Assessing the
the specific
Implementing
Outlining
functionality
objectives
the
the human
human
programme for
the human
the
and the
resource
design
performances
and the
team
of the new
management
subsystem
subsystem
project
project
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
17
References
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
Armstrong, M., Personal Management Practic, Kogan Page, London, 1996

Bohlender G., Scott S., Sherman D., Marketing Human Resources, Thomson Learning
Madison, 2001
Cenzo, A. David, Robins P., Human Resources Management, Englewood Cliffs-Hall,
1988
Crainer S., Key Management Ideas, Practice Hall, New York, 2002
Ivancevich J.M., Glueck W.F., Foundation of Personnel/Humane Resource
Management, Business Publications, Texas, 1986
Manolescu A., Managementul resurselor umane, ediia a III-a, Editura Economic,
Bucureti, 2003
Mathis R.L., Nica P.C., Rusu C. (coordinators), Managementul resurselor umane,
Editura Junimea, Iai, 2002,
Mintzberg H., The Nature of Managerial Work, Harper and Raw, New York, 1973
Miles R., Snow Ch., Designing Strategic Human Resources, in Organisational
Dynamics, nr. 3, 1984
Nicolescu O., Management comparat - UE, Japonia i SUA, ediia a III-a, Editura
Economic, Bucureti, 2006
Nicolescu O. (coordinator and author), Managerii i managementul resurselor umane,
Editura Economic, Bucureti, 2004
Nicolescu O., Plumb I., Pricop M., Vasilescu I., Verboncu I., Abordri moderne n
managementul i economia organizaiei, Vol. 1-4, Editura Economic, Bucureti, 2003
Nicolescu O., Verboncu I., Fundamentele managementului organizaiei, Editura
Universitii, Bucureti, 2008
Nicolescu O., Verboncu I., Managementul organizaiei, Editura Economic, Bucureti,
2008
Nicolescu O., Verboncu I., Metodologii manageriale, Editura Tribuna Economic,
Bucureti, 2007
Peters T., Liberation Management, Alfred Knopf, New York, 1992
O Reilly III Ch., Pfeiffer J., Hidden Value, HBSP, Boston, 2000
*** The Industrial Society Revolving Personnel to Managers, in Managing Practice,
nr. 2, 2003
International Coaching Community
METHODOLOGY USED BY ICC TRAININGS
AB O U T IC C
The International Coaching
Community is one of the largest
professional membership
organizations for coaches in the
world with over 6000 coaches in 60
countries.
All ICC members have successfully

completed the International
Coaching Certification Training
and/or Specialization courses in
Life, Business, Teams and
Executive Coaching.
Our trainings are available in more
1 . E X E C U TIV E S UM MAR Y
than 18 countries and there are

over ninety trainings a year.
The Lambent coaching methodology is being used by ICC to deliver over one hundred trainings a year in
over thirty countries.
It has been used to train over six thousand people in sixty countries since 2001. It is structured and
delivered using principles of Andragogy (Adult learning principles) that engage, motivate and efficiently pass
knowledge and skills to adult learners.
The Lambent International Coaching Certification Training certified by the ICC at their level one, has been
independently evaluated according to University Standards. It has been awarded a European Quality Award
(EQA) in 2010 by the European Coaching and Mentoring Association. (EMCC)
It therefore also meets the requirements of the International Coach Federation (ICF) ACC Portfolio path.
The structure and content of the Lambent course is designed to give the students knowledge, skill and self
development. It is applicable to business people at every level.
The method is an integrated framework from the following main coaching models:
Ontological coaching (Fernando Flores, James Flaherty and Julio Ollala)

Integral studies (Ken Wilber)
Inner Game and Co active coaching (Laura Whitworth ,Timothy Gallwey and Sir John Whitmore)
Positive Psychology (Martin Seligman)
Evidence based Coaching (Anthony Grant)
Neuro-Linguistic programming (John Grinder and Richard Bandler)
and Behavioural Coaching (Perry Zeus and Suzanne Skiffington)
The method is suitable to develop executives and for executives to use to develop others.
info@internationalcoachingcommunity.com
2 . I NT E R NA TI O N AL C O A CH IN G COM M UN IT Y
The Lambent coaching methodology is international. It is used exclusively by the International Coaching
Community (ICC). The ICC is one of the largest professional membership organisations for coaches in the
world. It was established in 2001 and is a Not for Profit company registered in London UK. It has trained
over 6000 coaches in 60 countries since 2001 using Lambent methodology. There are currently 34 trainers
worldwide training with this methodology.
Please see www.internationalcoachingcommunity.com
3 . TH EO RETICA L B AC KG RO U ND
The methodology follows the three foundational knowledge traditions of coaching.
1
a) Humanistic psychology and the works of Abram Maslow and Carl Rogers .
The main principles of Humanistic Psychology are:
- People have a valid experience of their own values and goals.
- People want to be the best they can be.
- Everyone is unique and valuable.
- Everyone wants to have a choice and to exercise choice.
These are basic principles of all schools of coaching.
b) Constructivism
3
This viewpoint comes from Cybernetics and the works of Heinz von Foerster
Constructivism developed the idea that we help create the world we live in. Our perception of reality is as
much a construct of our minds as what is in the world outside us. Therefore coaching needs to discover the
world the client is constructing and not try to give them a right answer.
c) Linguistics
People describe the world and themselves in language, and the structure of language shapes their thinking
and limits it. Coaching takes into account how the language the client uses is a clue to how they are thinking
about their issue.
The Lambent methodology is an integrated model, based on sound theoretical foundations and developed
from many further lines of thinking:
Ontological coaching. Ontological coaching focuses on the clients way of being, the dynamic
interaction of the clients language, emotions and physiology. There is a strong emphasis on
listening, language patterns and emotions expressed in physiology. Lambent methodology takes
these dimensions into account; the client is a whole person, mind, heart and spirit. The principles
4
5
of Ontological coaching are taken mainly from the writings of James Flaherty Fernando Flores
6
and Rafael Echeverria .
info@internationalcoachingcommunity com
Integral studies. This rapidly developing field of transpersonal psychology has been pioneered
7
by the writings of the United States Philosopher, Ken Wilber . The integral model uses a number
of different perspectives to gain as full an understanding of a situation as possible. It looks at lines
of development, states of mind, types of psychology, and stages of development. It uses interior
and exterior, individual and collective perspectives. Perspectives are an important part of
Lambent methodology and Integral studies provide some very useful ones.
Inner Game and Co active coaching. The Inner game methodology was very important in the
1
development of coaching. Pioneered by Timothy Gallwey , it focused on defeating your inner
1
opponent to become your best. The method was brought to Europe by Sir John Whitmore .
Coactive Coaching is a model originally also developed in the United States, by Laura
1
Whitworth . The four principles are that the client is naturally creative, resourceful and whole,
coaching addresses the clients whole life, the client sets the agenda and the coaching
relationship is a partnership. Coactive coaching also places emphasis on the coachs intuition as
a coaching tool.
Positive Psychology. This follows Abram Maslows ideas of self actualisation. The approach has
1
been used in the United States and developed by Martin Seligman . Positive psychology
concentrates on mental well being and researches positive emotions and what people can do to
build more of them into their life. Hope and Optimism as character traits are seen as very
important. This has led to a school of coaching known as Authentic Happiness Coaching.
Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP). A system of psychology started by Richard Bandler and

1
John Grinder in the United States in the nineteen seventies, and subsequently developed by
1
Robert Dilts , NLP is the study of the structure of subjective experience and studied outstanding
communicators to see how they achieved their results. Its focus is reflected in the name, Neuro
is the mind, Linguistic is about language and Programming is about sequences of actions to
achieve a goal. NLP adopts a pragmatic approach, based on models of excellence, and teaches
many important skills and tools used in coaching.
Behavioural Coaching. This model focuses on external behaviour rather than inner goals and
seeks sustainable measurable changes in behaviour. It is mostly applied in a business context.
Lambent methodology recognises the importance of measurable results for individuals; teams
and organisations so the impact of coaching can be evaluated from different aspects. Coaching
changes thinking and emotions and this leads to behavioural change. Behavioural Coaching has
1
been primarily developed by Perry Zeus and Suzanna Skiffington in Australia
Lambent methodology also follows the principles of Evidence based coaching , defined as:
Intelligent and conscientious use of best current knowledge integrated with practitioner expertise
in making decisions about how to deliver coaching to individual coaching clients and in
designing and teaching coach training programs.
The designers of Lambent methodology, Andrea Lages and Joseph OConnor have written two
1
1
books on Coaching . Their second book, How Coaching Works , was nominated for the
Financial Times best Business Book of the Year in 2007.
Over 6000 coaches in 60 countries since 2001 using Lambent methodology. There are currently 34 trainers
worldwide training with this methodology.
Please see www.internationalcoachingcommunity.com
4 . M E TH O DO LOG Y A ND S T R UC TU R E
Lambent methodology and design follows principles of adult learning (Andragogy):
Adults are autonomous and self-directed. They want to be free to direct their own learning.
Trainers need to be like facilitators, and guide participants to their own knowledge rather
than supplying them with facts.
Adults need to connect learning to their knowledge and life experience. Adults learn best
when their relevant experience and knowledge of the topic is drawn out and utilised and
theories and concepts relate to that experience.
Adults are goal-oriented. So trainers need to show participants how the training will help
them attain their goals.
Adults need to see learning as applicable to their work or other responsibilities to be of value
to them.
Adults are practical, focusing on the aspects of a lesson most useful to them in their work.
Adults need to be respected.
1
Adult learning follows the Kolb learning cycle of Experience, Reflection, Conceptualisation
and Testing.
The structure of the Lambent coaching course and the way it is trained follows these important principles.
All our trainers are highly experienced and trained specifically in the Lambent methodology and approach.
E X E C U TI V E C O A CH IN G
Executive coaching is a very important application of coaching. Coaching executives to make better
decisions, work better with teams and clarify their goals and values, is an enormous help and can have
great impact on themselves their team and the business. This impact can be measured financially. The
focus on coaching executives is to develop their authentic leadership so they can be their best, and develop
other leaders in the organisation. There is a balance between the business approach where coaching
objectives need to be aligned with organisational and business goals, and coaching the executive as a
unique individual, respecting his or her strengths and developing his or her potential. The Lambent
methodology is well developed to do this in an efficient and effective way.
__________________________________________________________________________________
1
Maslow A., (1998) Towards a Psychology of Being (J.Wiley)

Rogers C., (1980) A way of being (Houghton Mifflin)
Von Foerster H., (1994) Ethics and second order Cybernetics (SEHR)
4
Flaherty J., (1999) Coaching Evoking Excellence in Others (Butterworth)
5
Flores F. and Solomon R., (2001) Building Trust (OUP)
6
Echeverria R., (2003) Ontologia del Lenguaje
7
Wilber K., (1995) Sex Ecology and Spirituality (Shambhala)
2
3
6oo
L. E. HINKLE, JR. ANI) H. C. WVOLFF
THE METHODS OF INTERROGATION

AND INDOCTRINATION USED BY THE
COMi1MUNIST STATE POLICE*
LAWRENCE E. HIINKLE, JR. and HAROLD G. WOLFF
New York
}lospjital-(ornell AMwlicwal
('eter, Nexw Vowk (ity, N. Y.
.se2SaMCIENTIFIC
interest in the methods used by Communist

t State Police xwas stimulated by the experiences of United
|
| ~Nations prisoners of war during the Korean campaign.
S
Since then a considerable body of information has been
,z~e5E~e~e~eS assemt)led tlhrough the efforts of many investigators.
Our own knowledge of these methods was o1)tained during an investigation carried out fronm 1954 to 1956 with the collaboration of the
United States l)cpartimenlt of l)efense. Ain extensive report of the
results of this investigation has been published elsew\here.1
In the course of this study, information was obtained from a nunber of sources. Details of the Communist arrest and interrogation
systems, and a great deal of information about the purposes, attitudes.
and training of those who administer them were obtained from experts
in the area, who for security reasons must remain anonymous. Know\vledge of the prisoners' reactions to their experiences was obtained bv
the direct observation of persons recently released from Communist
prisons. Some of these observations continued for weeks, and were
supplemented by followv-up observations over periods of months. They
included complete physical, neurological and psychiatric examinations,
and often psychological testing as well. Thev were supplemented bv
information supplied by families, friends, and former associates. Among
those studied intensively were militarv and civilian prisoners of diverse
ranks and backgrounds, women as well as men, defectors and resisters,
persons "brain wvashed" and "not brain washed," somle who admiiittedly
cooperated with their captors, and some wvlho said they did not.
In supplement to this pertinent information from investigations
carried out I)v the U. S. Armv and the U. S. .-\ir Force, and froml the
1*resewwte(e at a comlifeil oeeti og of twe Section on Neurology and 1'schiawtrv withi the Ne\% York
Neurological Society at The New York Aca(lemyx of Me(licine, Noxemibhwer 13.. t')-, as part oft
il wlowdic
Panel Dliscussion on Corn inwSt .et11 dlul of Iite'rrw0wwtiww wwwIa
to i itimw
.
Bull. N. Y. Acad. Medw
60o
C(N11U\NIST M ETHODS
A\BLE' 1.-IACKGII()UNI) OF ('O.MMNNIST'

15th Century
Bvyzantine Heritage
1Pth Century
IET-l'OD)S
1. U nrestricte(d Autocracy
2. Internal Intrigue & Fs')ionage
1.
Permanent Bodv of Private Retainers Responsible
only to Czar
2. Central Control of all Aspects of the State
3. Purges
1,7th-18th Century
Central D)irectorate with Mission to Guard the Internal

Security of the State
19th Century
Most Highly Organized, Effective and Powerful Secret

Police of any European State
1. Sudden Arrest
2. D)ossier
.3. Repetitive Interrogation
4. I solution lechnique D)eveloped
20th Centurv
Cheka.
1.
2.
3.
4.
()GPtU-NKVD1)-.I 1VJ)
1. Purges
2. Puhlic Trials
(KGB)
Highly Org'anized and Refined Methods

Communtiist Ideology andl Logic
Ahandonruent of D)irect Brutality
Development of IPersuasion Techniques; Exploitation
of Intimate Interrogaitor-Prisoner Relationship
:.. POWNV
Indoctrination (Exposure to Nothing hut

Conmnunist Interpretation of History and1 Current
Events)
Chinese
System
1.
Group Pressures
Group Criticism
(Applied to Non-Party Personnel & to Prisoners)
2. Self &
3. Prisoner Indoctrination
IR ote Learning
Autobiography and WiaryWriting
material assembled for the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners

of \Var, was utilized. The very large public literature on the subjects
was reviewed also, and was drawn upon when it was helpful. Finally,
various laboratory and clinical investigations were carried out in
order to throw light upon the psychological and physiological processes
involved in some of the interrogation and indoctrination procedures.
September 1957, Vol. 33, No. 9
60
L. F. HINKLE, JR. AMN) 11. G. AWOLFF
The information from all of these Sources is voluminOuS, and is

best presented in outlined form.
The Russian State Police are the model for the Eastern European
police systems. The development of the Russian police syTstem is deeply
embedded in the cultural heritage of Russia, and its operation can
only be understood in the light of the social attitudes and political
institutions which Dr. Berle has described. Organizations similar to a
state police have existed in Russia since the i 6th century, and a forimnally
organized police system has been in operation there for over a centUrvy
and a half (Table I). The Communists abolished this organization only
briefly, and soon revived it as the Cheka. They have reorganized and
reformed it from time to time, as their Czarist predecessors did before
them; but it has nevertheless continued to operate in essentially the
same manner up to the present day, usually as a part of the Ministry
of Internal Affairs, but more recently as an autonomous organization,
uinder the "Committee for State Security" or "KGB".
The distinctly Communist contributions to the methods used by
the Russian State Police were the organization and refinement of police
procedures, the abandonment of official sanction for the use of direct
brutality, and the development of persuasion techniques which exploit
the intimate interrogator-prisoner relationship and make use of the peculiar definitions and tortuous logic associated w\ith Communist ideology in
order to produce a "deposition" or "confession" bya the prisoner.
The formal indoctrination of prisoners of wvar on a mass basis was
developed by the NKVD for use against German prisoners in the latter
stages of WVorld War II. Similar methods were used against the Japanese
who fell into Russian hands in 1945, and knowledge of them w\vas later
transmitted to the Chinese Communists. The Chinese, however, had
previously developed methods of their own for dealing with prisoners
of war, and their present procedures are based in part upon their own
experience, and in part on that of the Russians.
A state police system had existed in China under the Nationalist
government, and one was established in those areas controlled by the
Communists long before they came into power in 1949. Sometimes the
methods used by the Chinese State Police copy very closely those which
they learned from the Russians, but in general they exhibit refinements
which are distinctly Chinese. The most important of these is the use
of group pressures, generated among prisoners who are confined toBull. N. Y. Acad. Med.
COMMUNIST AIETHODS
60 3
TABLE 11.-IMAl'()tTAlNT COM'MAlIUNIST ATTiTUDES
1. Anyone nlho is a Threat to Party or State is a Criminal

2. Potential "Criminals" may Ftall into Broad Categories:
a. Dissident Members of the Conmiunist Party
,b. Ethnic Groups Suspected of Nationalist Aspirations
c. Social Groups "Inimical to the State"
d. Bureaucratic Groups "Out of Favor"
e. Members of Reactionary Classes
f. Foreign Nationals
g. People who have had Contact with Foreign Nationals
3. "KGB" Decides who Threatens Party or State
4. "Crimes" may be "Objective": Committed Accidentailly or with Innocent Motives
-OR"Consequential': Potential Consequences of Acts or Attitudes
5. "Evidence" of Criminality Includes
a. Membership in a "Suspect Group"
b. Minor Infractions
c. Suspicious Acts
d. Unverified Reports of Informers
6. "KGB" does not Arrest a Man without Evidence of Criminality
7. Therefore:
Anyone arrested by "KGB" is a Criminal
gether in cells, each of whom is required to demonstrate his own reform

by tearing down the statements and deriding the past behavior of his
fellow prisoners. The routine of "self-criticism", self-abasement, punishment, recantation, and ultimate rehabilitation, which was developed
by the pre-war Russian Bolshevik Party as a means of insuring discipline among party members, has been extended to the civilian and
prison populations by the Chinese, who use these procedures very
effectively within cell groups to produce pressure on individual prisoners. In addition, the Chinese have introduced into the prison system
pedagogical methods based upon rote learning, recitation, and the
repetition of long, hand-written, essay-like "confessions", as a means
of indoctrinating the prisoner with Communist concepts of economics,
politics and current events. These teaching methods have been drawn
directly from those which had been in use in China for many centuries.
The State Police system in Soviet Russia and the Eastern European
L. E. HINKLE, JR. AND H. G. WVOLFF
TABLE IlIl. CRUCIAL FEATURE OF LEGAL OP1E RATION

If a Man is Arreste(l his Case Cannot be Settled until a
Protocol ("Confession") has been Prepared. This Protocol
Must be Signed by Both Prisoner and Interrogating Officer.
satellites operates against those who are defined as political criminals.

It is not concerned with petty, or personal criminality, such as thievery
or murder. Such crimes are handled by the militia and the regular
system of courts, and need not concern us here. The State Police direct
their activities against those who are considered to be a threat to the
party or the state. These operations can be understood only in the
light of the attitudes outlined in Table II, which are implicit in a
modern Communist society. Perhaps the most important consequence
of these concepts is that the guilt or innocence of one who is arrested
is not at issue. The fact that a man is seized automatically places him
in the category of political criminals, and the only matters to be
determined thereafter are the extent and the nature of his criminality.
It is a deeply ingrained administrative principle of the Soviet state that
this criminality can be formally established only by means of a "protocol" or "deposition" signed by the prisoner and the investigating officer,
and setting forth the nature and extent of the crimes along with the
motives behind them. In the absence of such a protocol, no case can
be settled (Table III). The operations of the interrogating officers,
therefore, are designed with an eye to obtaining a proper deposition as
expeditiously as possible without using direct brutality upon the
prisoner.
The attitudes described in Table II are known to the general
population as well as to the police. The prisoner is under no illusion
as to his legal rights at the time that he is seized, and has no anticipation that he will be released without signing a protocol, even though
he may have every hope that the crime specified in the protocol can
be as mild as possible. His seizure is usually preceded by a period of
surveillance, during the course of which he generally becomes aware
of the fact that the police have an interest in him, and is able to
anticipate the fate that is in store for him (Table IV). The psychological
Bull. N. Y. Acad. Med.
COMINIUNIST
METHODS
COMNS
MEHD
6 00 5
TABLE IV. A TYPICAL TIME TABLEEASTERN EUROPEAN SECRET POLICE SYSTEMS (COMMUNIST)
I Veeks
Steps
Reaction of Prisoner
1. Suspicion
2. Accumiulation of Evidence
Surveillance
12eports of Informers
Seizure of Associates
:3. Seizure
4. Detention
1'
it
0
G
it
E
6
I2 igid Regimen
I
S
Increasing Pressure
0
I'
A
T
1
()
I
N
'1'
1',E
It
it
(.
I
V
E
I)
I
S
0
it
G
A
G
A
I
0
N
N
I
z
A
T
I
7. Deposition
N
11
12
Suspense
Awareness of Being Avoided
Feelings of Unfocused Guilt
Fear aind Uncertainty
Bewildernient
Hyperactivity
!,.
10
Anxiety
Diminishing Activity
Increasing Depression
Fatigue (Pain)
Humiliation, Loss of Self Esteemat
Filth, Mental Dulling
] )espair
Frustration Tolerance
Greatly Reduced
Great Need to Talk
Utter Dependence on Anyone
who "Befriends"
.Much More Pliable
Great Need for Approval
of Interrogator
Repeatedly Frustrated
by Interrogator's Refusal to
Accept Statements, and
by Interrogator's Alternating
"Help" and Withdrawal of
Approval
Increased Suggestibility
Confabulation
Rationalization
Profound Relief
8. Respite
9. Trial "Confession"
10. P'unishment
effect of this is not necessarily planned by the police, but it is imin setting the stage for the reaction of the prisoner to his
experiences during imprisonment. This usually begins with a dramatic
seizure, often at night, which is classically followed by a period in
portant
complete
isolation in
detention
prison.
6o6
L. E. HINKLE, JR. AND H. G. WOLFF
TAB1LE V. THE DETENTION ItMEIAIEiN

1. 'lotal Isolation: No Coiinionicaition of any Sort with anv Person
2. Cell: 6 x 10-Barren No View Outside Light in Ceiling Burns Constantly
3. Rigid Regimen Strict Time Table. For Example:
a. Early Rising
b. Short Time for W\ashing
c. Eat-(No Utensils)
d. Sit-(Fixed Position)
e. Exercise-(Wafldk Alone)
f. Sit (Fixed Position)
g. Eat (No Utensils)
h. Sit-(Fixed Position)
i. Sleep- On Back, Hands Out, Face to Light
4. Immediate Punishment for Infractions
5. Food: P'lain, l)isitsteful--1ust Suflicient to Suitstin N'utrition
Sonmetiines
Excessively Salty
6. Elimination: Slo0) Jar in CellRllemove(d for Infrac( tionis Th'le reafter, Ta'ken
to Latrine only at Pleasure of the Guard
7. Temperature: May I)e Hot, or Cold and
D)anip
8. Pain May Result from Fixed Positions During Sleep and When Awake
The details of this isolation regimen are outlined in Table V, and

its effect upon the prisoner, which is sometimes remarkably predictable,
is described in Table VI. The essential features of it are uncertainty,
anxiety, complete isolation from the social environment, and an overwhelming awareness of the control exercised by the jailers. This, added
to the physiological effects of lack of sleep, alterations in diet, the temperature in the cell, and the pain and circulatory disturbances produced
by unusual postures long maintained, leads to a steady disorganization
of the prisoner which, in the case of new prisoners unfamiliar with the
routine, is usually well advanced within three to six weeks. The characteristics of this disorganization are mental dulling, loss of ability to
make discriminations, feelings of helplessness, depression and despair,
associated with inactivity, filth, self-soiling, and an active fantasy life
of a fearful nature. The reaction maay go on to frank delirium. The
lack of discriminatory capacitv nmalkes it difficult for the prisoner to
differentiate what actuallv has happened front what might have happened, or to understand the fine distinctions contained in the legal
COMMU\I
,NIST NAIETlHODS5
COiINS
MEHD
6 00 7
lAIIJ E VI. EFFECTS OF 1)lTN'l'TION 1IE('liA\FI N ON PIt ISONFAit

I nitiallh
Fear, Incertainty
I to 3 D)avs
Bewilderment tanIn)idscomravemient iollowedl 1y Overalertness,

iExpectanceN Denlaldina2. le jects Foo(1-Coinpl)ainls A.ttellll)ts
:3 to 10() I)a s
Anxiety, Hlyp)eraetiv ity, Sleeplessness, 'Nightnares, Compdiance,

Stea dily Increasing Loneliness, Boredom, Fatiwgue, Lungeer
Pain, iVeight L~oss, GLrmldul Comnpliance.
10) D)avs to 3 AWeeks
Activitv. Inereasing
I)ecreasinior, Repetitive Aets. Intense
:3 to 6 Weeks
Despair, Utter D)ependence, Inaetivitv, Filth, Soilin(g, Mentu1l

Dulling, Loss of D)iscrimination, M\Iuuttering, Weeping, lPraying,
Delusions, IHlallueinations (I)elirium) , "Confilibulation", Neel
for Companionship, (Great Need to Talk, Iruustration Toleraine
Greatl- RedIuced, S rggestible, E]agerly Grasps at anIly Hell).
Pliable.
Fraternizaition (Iejected Or Punnishel).
l)ejeetion, Atitoimiatie Beha Fatigue, Drowsiness, Painl

We ilght Loss, Constipation, Edemna; Craving- for Couinpanionslil); Humiliation, Loss of Self-Esteem.
documents which he may, be called upon to sign. Sometimes prisoners

actually confabulate. Accompanying all of this is an intense need for
companionship and an intense desire to talk to someone, which is utilized cffectively by tile interrogator.
In the typical case, the interrogation -will begin w-hen the interrogator feels that the prisoner is ready to talk, but before he has become
completely disorganized (Table VII). Skillful interrogators utilize the
prisoner's need to talk and craving for human association by discussing
wsith him apparently innocent details from his past life. This cements
a bond of companionship between the two that can be one of the most
effective tools of the interrogator. By maintaining his pressures upon
tile prisoner, and by carrying out the interrogation at night and at
great length, the interrogator keeps the prisoner in a dependent. uncomfortable, and befuddled state, \ hlicl lile can easily manipulate by
rej ectino his statem lnts and increasing tile pressures on tile one hand,
or by praisilngf antid o1pproving fis performance and decreasing tile
pressuircs ()in the other. i-he prisolnCr, ul lcr)oin1o ain ordeal whlichi is
profouindl II nplIeasUlnt aild appaieitlv endless, is hiplio illnotiatcd to
seek sFo1eC end to hi.s misery. I Ic tsLuallv will not confess to bald statemlcnts wllicil he recogllizes as obviously utntrue, but le is vulnerable
6o8
TABLE: VII.
Begin:
Carriedl Ot:
lasts:
Stage I:
Stage II:
L.
F. HINKLE, JR. AND H. (G. WOLFF
ES ANI) Pl'ISONE}R REACTIONS

INPTERRGATtIN I'SROCEDI)I
When Interrogaitor D)ecides Prisoner is Ready to Talk-Usually when
hie has Become D)ejeeted and l)ependent.
Acco)r(ling to 'lan 1'suually aIt Night.

Until D)elosition is Signe(l.
Iteview of Life History in Great D)etail, ltepetitivelv. Interrogator:
FOrnial. Akllow%.s lPrisOner to Talk. Cetmtents Relationship by Long and
Intimate In(luliry into lPrisoner's Life. Persua(des lPrisoner his Aim is
to Help and lBefriend. Attitud(le: "We Know Everything Alrea(ld".
Never Satisfied with 1nfornmation. I)iscrepancies M.1ean Lies. Prisoner:
Anxious to Talkk and IExplain. MAlitch More lPlialde.
Interrogator Uses E1,pisode front life History as Elvidence of Crime.
l)isapproves of lPrisoner's D)enials. Punishes lito. Prisoner Frustrated.
(If m11ade to Stand Many Hours M.,ay IDevelop Circulatory Collapse
in(d Uremia.) Hurt y Rtejection. Strives to Please Interroga'tor.
In('recasinglv Stuggestible.
Stage III:
Stage I V:
Stage V:
Interrogaitor Rewar(ls 1nd(1 Approves of the Prisoner's Cooperation.

Persuades Hitm, Suggrests half TIrumths, ind Helps 1lini to Itationalize
as nly Wa1y
(Wut.
Itepetition of Stages 11 and III Several Times, if Necessa rv. Prisoner
and I net-easingly Frustrated by Interrogator's lefisal to
IRelpeate(llv
Accept St'atements and by hiis Alternatiting "Ilelp" anld Withdrawal of
Apl)lrovI 3Becotes More a1(nd More Suggestible, Realily Confabullates,
Rationalizes Half Truths.
Successful Rationalization. Satisfactory Protocol. "Gentleman's Agreemnent". IPrisoner Feels Great Relief, May Have Gratitude an(l Admiration for Interrogator.
to rationalizations and contrived definitions that allow him to make an

ostensible confession, while retaining a shred of a belief that he has
not really compromised himself beyond the facts of the case. His fatigue
and lack of discriminatory powers may prevent him from seeing that
lhe has actually confessed to all that the police require. Even though
hie may knowv that his confession carries with it an automatic sentence
of death, hie may prefer this to a continuation of his present hopeless
state of misery. Thus, the )rimary wvork on the interrogator is that
of convincing the prisoner thut whllat lhe did was a "crime", as defined
by the Communist state, and as interpreted by the State Police.
There has been a good deal of bewNildermiient at the fact that confessions so obtained are not usually repudiated in open court. I-lowever,
onlyN anl extremely, smll lllinoritv of prisoners ever ap)ear before an
open court of any sort, and those \h-ho do are wcll aware of the fact
CONINIUNIST NIETHODS
\IF'I'HOI)S
(0i\L\IL'NISI'
6o9
609
that a repudiation of their confession will only lead to a repetition of

their torture, while at the same timie thcy have somiie hope that by
playing their roles properly some lenience may be shown to them. A
vast majority of state police prisoners in the past have not been tried
by the regular courts, but by so-called "military tribunals", which
operate in camera within the detention prisons, before which there is
no defense, and from which there is no appeal. So far as the prisoner
is concerned, appearance before such a "court" is merely another step
in the police routine, and the futility of recantation is apparent. In spite
of this, there are many recorded instances of prisoners who have
repudiated their confessions, not once, but several times, and there are
said to have been some who have never signed a protocol at all. However, refusal to sign a protocol (or "confession", as \Western prisoners
usually call it) is very rare, because it is practically impossible to be
released from a Communist detention prison unless a proper protocol
has been prepared and signed.
The period of detention and investigation usually lasts not more
than several months in Eastern Europe and Russia. The police do not
regard this as a period of imprisonment or punishment. "Punishment"
begins only after the trial and sentencing. If the punishment is not
capital, it is usually carried out in a labor camp in some distant place.
The Eastern European police practices which we have described
are somewhat idealized. They vary from place to place, and from time
to time. The official sanctions against direct brutality are not always
observed, especially when the police are under some pressure to settle
a case rapidly. Isolation may not be so prolonged as this, or used wvith
such deliberate finesse. Not uncommonly prisoners newly seized are
immediately subjected to prolonged and uninterrupted interrogation,
which may go on for days until they collapse or sign the necessary deposition. Sometimes prisoners are placed in cells with other prisoners who
are informers. Some are merely bribed, threatened, or otherwise handled
by the police officers upon the basis of their horseback estimate of the
type of man that they are dealing with. But in no case is there reliable
evidence that neurologists, psychiatrists, psychologists or other scientifically trained personnel have designed or participated in these police
procedures. There is no evidence that drugs, hypnosis or other devices
play any significant role in them. The effects produced are understandable in terms of the methods used. There is no reason to dignify
I ()
L. F. HINKLIE, JR. AND H. G.
AWOLFF
T'ABLE:111. COMAIR'kISON OF METHIOI)S OF CHINESE

WITH METHODS OF KG13
1. KGB1 Goal is to Produce a Saitisfactory I'rotoeol in Preparation for Trial.
Additional Chinese Goal is to IPro(luce Long Lasting Changes in the Baisic
Attitudes and Beha vior of the Prisoner.
2. Prolonged Isolation not used Routinelv.
3. Intensive Use of Group Interaction-Greater Dependence on Disor-ganizin,

Effect of Group Rejection and HostilitV. Complete Lack of Privacy.
a. To Obtain Information.
b. To Apply Pressure To Persuade.
c. To In(loctrinate.
4. Use of Public Self-Criticism andt Group Criticisini for Indoctrination of
Non-Party Persons.
5. Use of Diary Writing, Repeatedly Vewritten and RVejected Xutobiogr(aphy,

and Rote Learning as Means of Interrogation and Indoctrination.
6. Detention Greatly Prolonged After Initial Interrogation Indoctrination
May Continue Years Before Trial, with Exposure to Nothing but Communist
Interpretation of History and Current Events.
these methods by surrounding them with an aura of scientific mystery,

or to denote them by terms such as "imenticide" or "brain washing"
which imply that they are scientifically organized techniques of predictable effectiveness.
The Chinese methods of handling political prisoners during the past
five or six years have been somewhat less formalized than those of
the Eastern European Communists, partly because the Chinese are in
the midst of a social revolution, and partly because of the size of the
nation and the variations in available prison facilities. The essential
differences between the Chinese procedures and those of the KGB
are outlined in Table NVIII. An outline of the methods themlselves is
in Table IX.
Suspicion and surveillance act upon a Chinese suspect much as they
do upon a European. Chinese arrests, however, are often carried out
in the daytime, and under dramatic circumstances. Upon his seizure,
the prisoner is often taken before several police officers, who act as
"judges" and carry out the initial interrogation. Most of those AWestern
prisoners who have been held in China have undergone some period
of isolation, which may have been long, but was not necessarily as
TAttLE IX.-.A TYPICAL TIME TABLE

CHINESE' COMAIUNTIST' SECREtl' POLICE SYSTEMAi
I 'eekN
()
1
2
3$
4S
5
17
2()
sleps
Anxiety
1. SuSi)icion
!2.
Preparation for Arrest:

JDenunciation by Neighbors an(d Associaites Covertly and at Local Group
Criticism Sessions
Restrictions anid Annoyance by Police.
V
:3. Seizure under Dramuatic Circurnstances. Initial InterrogaA
1
tion by 3 "Judges"
t
4. House Arrest
1
5. SmIdden ltratsfer to Detentiont
IPrison. Isolation Resembling
'lo KGB Procedure
j
6. transfer to Group Cell

'lotal Absence of iPriva-cy
Rcejecte(l 1 Bv Fellow Prisoners
Revileda
I luulilialted
1
of Background
Attitudes
Because
8n
Brutalized
Public Self- an(l Group Criticism
1)ia ry and Autobiography Writing
Constant Reading, Discussion and Repetition of Cotmmnist Material, wvith

Total Absence of Other Informuation
IntertuittLent Sessions with One or More
Interrogators
24
7. Preparation of "Confession"
(Some Fellow i'risoners Sincerely helpSome Respite front Pressures
To
8. Rejection of "Confession" by Interro-
,ator
.9. Resumption of lPressures itt Group Cell
10)0
Reaction of Prisoner
Suspense
of Being
and
Awareness
Avoided
Feelings of Unfocused
Guilt
Fear, Cotuplete UncertaintY as to Fate
Reaction like that of
KGB Prisoner, Leaving
Subject Feeling Defeate(d, Humiliated, Mentally Dull, Pliable and
with Great Need for
Talk and Approval
Enmotional Nakedness
Unfocused Feelings of
Guilt and Unworthiness
I Ielpless, Degraded
Increasing Dejection, Fatigue, Sleep Loss, Pain,

Hunger, Weight Loss,
TMental Dulling, Confusion (Occasional Delerium)
Increasing Difficulty in
Discriminating Between
this Material and that

tEarlier Memory
from
Attempts at Self Justification
Iio)eful, Rationalizes,
'I'ltankfuml for Kindness
an(1
Help and May
Acknowledge Apparent
Dedication and I(Iealism of his "Teachers"

HIopes Dashed
Alternating Hopefulness,
Frustration and Degradlation
10. Preparation of New "Confession"

I I. Rejection of New "Confession"
(9, 10), (Ind 11 May lbe Rlepealted a^s
Alanv als 3 to (; 'rilles Over as Alanv ais
4 years. Usuali)uration, 6 Months to 2
years.)
12. Final Achievetnent of "Proper" Attitu(le att d A ccel)tad)le "Co'nfession"
'to
Group Acceptance and Approval

13. Continued Study an(1 Discussion of
Rationalization, and1
'Tentative Partial Belief is Able to Conformu
an(d Obtain Group Acceptance and Approval
l'rofound R~elief
By
Cotmmunist Materials
250
14. "Trial" and "Confession"

15. Release, or Punishment
Gradual Readjustment of
Attitudes and Behavior
to the New Realitv
Situation
6 I 2
L. E.
HINKLE',
JR. AND H.
G. WVOLFF
well organized as that of the KGB. Some were detained for a time
under "house arrest" in their own homes, in rooms fitted up as prisons,
and guarded by police.
It is not uncommon that several "depositions" or "confessions" are
obtained from a prisoner of the Chinese, and usually one of these is
obtained from him early in his imprisonment. The most important
point at which the Chinese prison routine differs from that of the
Russians lies in the fact that the preparation of a proper deposition is
not necessarily the prelude to a "trial" and punishment. The prisoner,
even if he has already "confessed", usually finds himself transferred to a
group cell with about eight other prisoners, where he undergoes a
prolonged process of indoctrination, which may last for as many as
five years. The atmosphere within such a group cell, and the interaction of the prisoners with each other and with the various interrogators, has been ably described by Dr. Lifton.2 Disorganization and
demoralization of the prisoners in these cells are produced by the pressures of fellow prisoners, and by their rejection, humiiliation, and even
outright torture of each other, in an atmosphere in which they feel
totally without privacy, while at the same time utterly alone. Sooner or
later most prisoners under such pressure develop reaction patterns similar to those which occur in KGB prisoners, accompanied by a
depressive and fearful mood. Sometimes they attempt suicide.
The same sort of rationalization is offered to the Chinese prisoner
as a wvay out of an impossible situation. This rationalization is implicit
in the behavior and statements of the other prisoners, who make it clear
that only by proper cooperation with the interrogators, by the preparation of a proper confession, by the exhibition of suitable remorse about
his past behavior, and by the enthusiastic acceptance of the "new way
of life" offered to him, will the new prisoner ever escape the intolerable pressures of the situation. WVhen a prisoner achieves the necessary
rationalization, wulhen the pressures upon him are lifted, and when he
is finally accepted by the group, he usually has an exhilarating sense
of relief that may have the characteristics of a religious conversion. But
this is not necessarily the end of his imprisonment. He may recant some
portion of his confession at a later date and may have to go through
the whole procedure again several times before he is finally released.
All of this is carried out in an atmosphere in which the prisoner
group is totally isolated from contact with the outside world. They are
CO.NIIUNIST NIETHODS
METHODS
6I 3
6i
presented only wNith the Communist interpretation of current news,

and are forced to study and discuss iklarxist topics for many hours each
day, and every day. Nor are the effects of the physical features of the
environment to be neglected. Diet may be inadequate or unpalatable,
the cell unheated, and arrangements for elimination absent or so
restricted as to cause acute discomfort. Direct physical brutality in the
form of manacles, leg chains, beatings and prolonged standing or sitting
in uncomfortable positions, are a part of the punishment which is
meted out to Chinese prisoners, even though the guards themselves may
refrain from such practices, w\vhich here, as in Russia, are not "officially"
condoned.
Prisoners who have been released after long periods in Chinese
Communist prisons seem cow\ed and docile. They may talk a great deal,
but they typically avoid criticism of the Chinese Communist, and they
many refrain from describing the details of their unpleasant prison ex)erieilces. They may- use soiile Communist or Chinese terms, and theyT
may seem to subscribe to the Communist interpretation of some recent
events. They are not entirely free of the fear of retaliation, or yet
aware of all of the realities of the outside world. Usually after several
months of reality testing and readjustment to their new environment,
they exhibit attitudes and behavior patterns that are essentially the
same as those which they showed prior to their imprisonment. This is
true even of the people who are said to have been "most thoroughly
brain washed". It must be remembered that among the group of Americans who remained in China after the general evacuation in I949 there
were some who had lived most of their lives in China, who spoke
Chinese fluently, wxho had few ties to the United States, and had
a high degree of interest in the social changes being carried out by the
Communist regime. A number of these people were intellectually sympathetic to the Chinese Communists even before their imprisonment. It
was among this group that those who are said to have been "the most
thoroughly brain washed" wvere found. Even among these people it
xvas hard to tell if their views after imprisonment differed materially
from those that they had held prior to their seizure. Under the pressure
of five years of persuasion some of them did commit themselves temporarily to actively supporting a cause for which they had previously
expressed only intellectual sympatiy. But even this seems to have been
transient. There is, in short, no evidence that the Chinese Communists
6I4
L. E. HINKLE, JR. AND H. G. WOLFF
have developed any new, predictable, or unusually effective methods

of changing human behavior to add to those already known.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Our general conclusions based upon review of the evidence available to us are these:
I. The interrogation methods used by the state police in Communist
countries are elaborations and refinements of police practices,
many of which were known and used before the Russian Communist Revolution.
2. The principles and practices used by the Communist state police
in the development of suspects, the accumulation of evidence,
and the carrying out of arrest, detention, interrogation, trial,
and punishment are known. The effects of these upon prisoners
are known also.
3. The "confessions" obtained by Communist state police are
readily understandable as results of the methods used.
4. Communist methods of indoctrinating prisoners of war were
developed by the Russians and subsequently refined by the
Chinese. These methods and their effects are known, also.
5. Chinese methods of dealing with political prisoners and "enemies
of the state" were adapted from those of the Russians.
6. Intensive indoctrination of political prisoners is a practice primarily used by the Chinese Communists. The methods used in
this indoctrination are known, and their effects are understandable.
The report from which these conclusions were taken was prepared
in January I956. In the year since that time new events have occurred
in Hungary and Poland, accompanied by the release of many former
political prisoners. The Soviet Union is said to have withdrawn from
the state police the right of summary execution, and recently it has
announced that state police cases will be tried in the regular courts
rather than in "military tribunals". However, all of the evidence which
we have received is in support of the conclusions stated above, and we
have received none which would lead us to alter them. The present
curbs upon the State Police in Russia and the restriction of their activities will very probably be temporary, like the many other transient
COMMUNIST
6I
M ETrHODS
reforms of this system that have taken place in the past. From a clinical
point of viewer they can be looked upon as a remission of a chronic
disease that is almost certain to be followed by a serious exacerbation in
the future.
R EF E R E N C E S
1. Hinkle, L. E., Jr. and Wolff, 1I. G.

Coniunaist interrogation and indoctrination of "Enemies of the State". Analysis
of nmethods used by the Communist State
Police (a special report). A. M. A. Arch.
AD DIITION AL
(For those interested in expanding their

knowledge of this subject the following
tarticles and monogra)hs are recommended.)
Alman, G. A. The appeals of Communism.
Princeton, N. J., Princeton University
Press, 1954.
Beck, F. and Godin, W'. Russian purge and
the extraction of confessions. London
and New York, Hurst an(l Blackett,
Ltd., 1951.
Berle, A. A., Jr. Legal background of
Communist methods of interrogation
and indoctrination, Bull. N. Y'. A cad.
Med. 33:645-53, 1957.
Dallin, D. J. Soviet espionage. New Haven,
Conn., Yale University Press, 1955.
lIea.rings before the Permanent Sub-comamimittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, l nited
Neurol. Psychiat. , 6:115-74, 1956.

2. Lifton, It. J. Thought reform of western
civilians in Chinese Coniniunist prison~s
Psglchiatry
1IB LIO
It :173-9.5, 19.56.
R A P II Y
States Senate, Elighty-foutrth Congress,

Seconid Section, Jtune 19, 20, 26 an(d 27,
1956, "Coinintinist interrogation, indoctrination aind exploitation of American
nilitar- an(l
ncivilian prisoners". Wa('shingtorn, 1. S. (Governmmment 1'rinting
Office, 1956.
Leites, N. and Bernard, E. Ritual of liquida(ltio, Bol/,'erikS o0? trikl. Glencoe, Ill.,
The Rand Corporation, Free Press,
1954.
Bidern-man, A. 1). Communinnist attempts to
elicit false confessions from Air Force
lrisoners of war, Bull. N. Y. A cad.
Med. f.l:616-25, 1957.
Schein, E. H. The Chinese indoctrination
progranm for prisoners of war. A study
of attem)te(1 "bra.inwashing", Psg/chiatry 19:149-72, 1956.
Interview as a Method for

Qualitative Research
Presentation by
Dapzury Valenzuela
Pallavi Shrivastava
Definitions
The qualitative research interview seeks to describe and the meanings of

central themes in the life world of the subjects. The main task in
interviewing is to understand the meaning of what the interviewees say.
(Kvale,1996)
A qualitative research interview seeks to cover both a factual and a

meaning level, though it is usually more difficult to interview on a
meaning level. (Kvale,1996)
Interviews are particularly useful for getting the story behind a

participants experiences. The interviewer can pursue in-depth
information around the topic. Interviews may be useful as follow-up to
certain respondents to questionnaires,e.g., to further investigate their
responses. (McNamara,1999)
Aspects of Qualitative
Research Interviews.
Interviews are completed by the interviewer based on what the

respondent says.
Interviews are a far more personal form of research than questionnaires.
In the personal interview, the interviewer works directly with the
respondent.
Unlike with mail surveys, the interviewer has the opportunity to probe or
ask follow up questions.
Interviews are generally easier for respondent, especially if what is sought
is opinions or impressions.
Interviews are time consuming and they are resource intensive.
The interviewer is considered a part of the measurement instrument and
interviewer has to well trained in how to respond to any contingency.
Types of Interviews
Informal, conversational interview - no predetermined questions are

asked, in order to remain as open and adaptable as possible to the
interviewees nature and priorities; during the interview the interviewer
goes with the flow.
General interview guide approach - the guide approach is intended to

ensure that the same general areas of information are collected from
each interviewee; this provides more focus than the conversational
approach, but still allows a degree of freedom and adaptability in
getting the information from the interviewee.
Cont.
Standardized, open-ended interview - the same open-ended

questions are asked to all interviewees; this approach facilitates
faster interviews that can be more easily analyzed and
compared.
Closed, fixed-response interview - where all interviewees are

asked the same questions and asked to choose answers from
among the same set of alternatives. This format is useful for those
not practiced in interviewing.
Telephone Interview
Telephone interviews enable a researcher to gather
information rapidly.
Like personal interviews, they allow for some personal
contact between the interviewer and the respondent.
Disadvantages:
Some people may not have telephones.

People often dislike the intrusion of a call to their home.
Telephone interviews need to be relatively short or people feel
imposed upon.
Many people dont have publicly listed telephone numbers.
Training of the Interviewer
Since the interviewer can control the quality of the result his/her
training becomes crucial.
It is important to organize in detail and rehearse the interviewing

process before beginning the formal study.
Points for Interviewer Training
Describe the entire study - interviewers need to know more than

simply how to conduct the interview itself. They should have
background of the study and why the study is important.
Explain the sampling logic & process - nave interviewer may not
understand why sampling is so important. They may wonder why
you go through all the difficulties of selecting the sample so
carefully.
Interviewer Bias
Interviewer needs to know the many ways that they can

inadvertently bias the results.
Understand why it is important that they not bias the study.
By slanting the results they might jeopardize the results or purpose

of the study.
Preparation for Interview
Choose a setting with the least distraction.
Explain the purpose of the interview.
Address terms of confidentiality.
Explain the format of the interview.
Indicate how long the interview usually takes.
Provide contact information of the interviewer.
Allow interviewee to clarify any doubts about the interview.
Prepare a method for recording data, e.g., take notes.
Qualification Criteria for the Interviewer
Knowledgeable - being familiar with the topic.
Structuring - outline the procedure of the interview.
Clear - simple, easy and short questions which are spoken distinctly and
understandably.
Gentle - being tolerant, sensitive and patient to provocative and

unconventional opinions.
Steering - to control the course of the interview to avoid digressions from the topic.
Critical - to test the reliability and validity of what the

interviewee tells.
Remembering - retaining the subject information from the interviewee.
Interpreting - provide interpretation of what is said by the interviewee.
Types of Topics in Questions
Behaviors - what a person has done or is doing.
Opinions/values - what a person thinks about the topic.
Feelings - what a person feels rather than what a person thinks.
Knowledge - to get facts about the topic.
Sensory - what people have seen, touched, heard, tasted or smelled.
Background/demographics - standard background questions, such

as age, education, etc.
Sequence of Questions
Get the respondents involved in the interview as soon as possible.
Before asking about controversial matters, first ask about some facts.
Intersperse fact-based questions throughout the interview.
Ask questions about the present before questions about the past
or future.
The last questions might be to allow respondents to provide any other

information they prefer to add and their impressions of the interview.
Stages of Interview Investigation
Thematizing - the why and what of the investigation.
Designing - plan the design of the study.
Interviewing - conduct the interview based on a guide.
Transcribing - prepare the interview material for analysis.
Analyzing - decide on the purpose, the topic, the nature and

methods of analysis that are appropriate.
Verifying - ascertain the validity of the interview findings.
Reporting - communicate findings of the study based on

scientific criteria.
Procedure of the Interview
Occasionally verify the tape recorder (if used) is working.
Ask one question at a time.
Attempt to remain as neutral as possible.
Encourage responses.
Be careful about the appearance when note taking.
Provide transition between major topics.
Dont lose control of the interview.
After the Interview
Verify if the tape recorder, if used, worked throughout

the interview.
Make any notes on your written notes.
Write down any observations made during the interview.
Convergent Interviewing
as Action Research
Each pair of interview, including the review session immediately

following them, constitutes an action research cycle. The review
sessions interpret the data emerging from the interviews.
During the review session you also plan the questions which will
give a better understanding of the situation.
The process and the sampling are checked. They can be

modified in the following attempt.
Cont.
There are two types of overlap in the themes
and two corresponding types of probes:
Agreements which were listed by seeking exceptions
Disagreements for which explanation are sought.
You challenge the interpretations arising from early interviews.
Ask more specific questions, pursuing deeper understanding as you follow

up the explanations and disagreements.
By seeking exceptions, you allow disconfirmation of your data and

interpretations. The disagreements guide you into the pool of potentially
available data.
Probes become more specific, each interview begins with a very openended question.
Each informant is given a chance to contribute data uncontaminated by

your interpretations.
Southern Cross University and the Southern Cross Institute of Action Research (SCIAR)
Bibliography
Campion, M.A., Campion, J.E., & Hudson, J.P., Jr. Structured Interviewing: A Note on Incremental
Validity and Alternative Question Types, Journal of Applied Psychology, 79, 998-1002, 1994
Dick, Bob. Convergent Interviewing. Sessions 8 of Areol-Action Research and Evaluation, Southern
Cross University, 2002
Foddy, William. Constructing Questions for Interviews, Cambridge University Press, 1993
General Accounting Office. Using Structured Interviewing Techniques. Program Evaluation and
Methodology Division, Washington D.C., 1991
Groat, Linda & Wang, David. Architectural Research Methods, John Wiley & Sons, Inc
Hollowitz, J. & Wilson, C.E. Structured Interviewing in Volunteer Selection. Journal of Applied
Communication Research, 21, 41-52, 1993
Kvale, Steinar. Interviews An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing, Sage Publications, 1996
McNamara, Carter, PhD. General Guidelines for Conducting Interviews, Minnesota, 1999
Pawlas, G.E. The Structured Interview: Three Dozen Questions to Ask Prospective Teachers, NASSP
Bulletin, 79, 62-65, 1995
Trochim, William, M.K. Types of Surveys, Research Methods Knowledge Base, 2002
Watts, G.E. Effective Strategies in Selecting Quality Faculty, Paper presented at the International
Conference for Community College Chairs, Deans, & Other Instructional Leaders, Phx, AZ, 1993
MCWP 2-14
(Coordinating Draft -- 7 Oct 98)
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
U.S. Marine Corps
PCN ??? ?????? ??
MCWP 2-14, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Headquarters United States Marine Corps
Washington, DC 20380-1775
__ ___ 1998
FOREWORD
Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 2, Intelligence, and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication
(MCWP) 2-1, Intelligence Operations, provide the doctrine and higher order tactics, techniques, and
procedures for intelligence operations. MCWP 2-14, Counterintelligence, complements and expands
upon this information by detailing doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for the conduct of
counterintelligence operations in support of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The
primary target audience of this publication is intelligence personnel responsible for the planning and
execution of counterintelligence operations. Personnel who provide support to counterintelligence or
who use the results from these operations should also read this publication.
MCWP 2-14 describes aspects of counterintelligence operations including doctrinal fundamentals,
equipment, command and control, communications and information systems support, planning,
execution, security, and training. MCWP 2-14 provides the information needed by Marines to
understand, plan, and execute counterintelligence operations in support of the Marine Air-Ground Task
Force across the spectrum of conflict.
MCWP 2-14 supersedes FMFM 3-25, Counterintelligence, dated 22 September 1992.
Reviewed and approved this date.
BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
JOHN E. RHODES
Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding General
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
DISTRIBUTION: ??? ?????? ??

1
MCWP 2-14, Counterintelligence
Table of Contents
Page
3
4 Chapter 1.
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
1001
1002
1003
1004
1005
1006
1007
12 Chapter 2.
13
14
15
16
17
2001
2002
2003
2004
18 Chapter 3.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
3001
3002
3003
3004
3005
3006
3007
3008
3009
28 Chapter 4.
29
30
31
32
33
4001
4002
4003
4004
Doctrinal Fundamentals
Introduction
Objective
Basis for CI Activities
Concepts of CI and Force Protection
MAGTF Counterintelligence OperationsOverview
Counterintelligence Measures
Counterintelligence Support to Operations
1-1
Counterintelligence Functions and Services

Counterintelligence Functions
Counterintelligence Services
Counterintelligence Support to Strategic, Operational and
Tactical Levels of War
Garrison Support
2-1
Organization and Responsibilities

General
Commander
Intelligence Officer
Operations Officer
Individual Marines
Marine Corps Counterintelligence Organization
Naval Component Organization
Joint Counterintelligence Organization
National Level Counterintelligence Support
3-1
Counterintelligence Employment
Operational Environment
Employment of Counterintelligence Elements
Friendly Prisoners of War and Persons Missing (Non-Hostile)
and Missing in Action
Counterintelligence Support during Military Operations Other
TOC-1
4-1

1
Than War
2 Chapter 5.
3
Communications and Information Systems Support to

Counterintelligence Operations
4
5
6
7
8
9
5001
5002
5003
5004
5005
10 Chapter 6.
11
12
13
14
15
16
6001
6002
6003
6004
6005
17 Chapter 7.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
7001
7002
7003
7004
7005
7006
7007
7008
7009
7010
7011
32 Chapter 8.
33
34
8001
8002
General
Basic Counterintelligence CIS Requirements
Command and Control
Communications and Information Systems Support to MAGTF
Counterintelligence Operations
Counterintelligence CIS Planning Considerations
5-1
Counterintelligence Planning
Marine Corps Planning Process and Joint Planning Process
Overview
Counterintelligence Planning
Counterintelligence Planning and the Intelligence Cycle
Counterintelligence Planning Requirements and Considerations
Counterintelligence Plans and Orders
6-1
Execution of Counterintelligence Activities

MAGTF Counterintelligence Operations
Counterintelligence Screening Operations
Cordon and Search Operations
Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations
Tactical Counterintelligence Interrogation
Counterintelligence Investigations
Captured Material Exploitation
Counterintelligence Technical Collection and Investigative
Techniques
Counterintelligence Surveys/Vulnerability Assessments,
Evaluations, and Inspections
Counterintelligence Support to the Crisis Action Team
Intelligence Cell
Counterintelligence Mission Profiles
7-1
Counterintelligence Training
General
Basic Counterintelligence and Security Training for All
TOC-2
8-1

1
2
3
4
5
6
8003
8004
8005
8006
8007
7 Chapter 9.
8
9
10
11
12
9001
9002
9003
9004
9005
13 Chapter 10.
14
15
16
17
18
10001
10002
10003
10004
10005
Personnel
Training for Officers and Staff Noncommissioned Officers
Mission-Oriented Training
Training of Intelligence Section Personnel
Peacetime Counterintelligence Training
Counterintelligence Training Programs
Counterintelligence Administration
General
Files
Reports
Personnel
Emergency and Extraordinary Expense Funds
9-1
Garrison Counterintelligence Support

Mission
Counterintelligence Survey/Vulnerability Assessment
Counterintelligence Penetration Inspection
Counterintelligence Evaluation
Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Support
10-1
Glossary
Counterintelligence Principal and Supporting Equipment
Counterintelligence Operations Appendix
Counterintelligence Analysis and Production
Counterintelligence Plans, Reports and Other Formats
Counterintelligence Training Courses
MAGTF Counterintelligence Planning Checklist
References
A-1
B-1
C-1
D-1
E-1
F-1
G-1
H-1
19 Appendices
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
28 Figures
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
1-1
2-1
2-2
3-1
3-2
3-3
The Counterintelligence Process

Objectives of Counterintelligence Functions
Levels of Counterintelligence Support
CI/HUMINT Company, I and II MEF
CI/HUMINT Company, III MEF
MAGTF G/S-2 Combat Intelligence Center and Subordinate
Elements
TOC-3

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
5-1
5-2
6-1
6-2
6-3
6-4
6-5
6-6
6-7
6-8
7-1
7-2
7-3
7-4
B-1
D-1
D-2
D-3
D-4
D-5
D-6
D-7
D-8
D-9
D-10
Counterintelligence Architecture
Counterintelligence Elements Within the MAGTF Command
Element Combat Intelligence Center
The Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP)
The MCPP and the Joint Deliberate Planning Process
The MCPP and the Joint Crisis Action Planning Process
Functions of the Planning and Direction Phase
Application of the Intelligence Cycle
Counter-HUMINT Operations
Counter-SIGINT Operations
Counterintelligence Threat Assessment
Example of a Checkpoint
Example of a Community Cordon and Search Operation
Example of a Community Collection Screening Station
Captive/Document/Equipment Tag
CI/HUMINT Automated Tool Set (CHATS)
Time Event Chart
Association Matrix
Activities Matrix
Link Diagram
Systems Component Quick Reference Matrix
C-SIGINT Threat Assessment Process
MAGTF Vulnerability Assessment Process
Friendly Unit Communications-Electronics Profile
Example of a Unit EEFI Statement
Vulnerability Matrix Format
TOC-4

1
CHAPTER 1
2
3
DOCTRINAL FUNDAMENTALS
4
5
1001. Introduction. Intelligence strives to accomplish two objectives. First, it provides
6
accurate, timely, and relevant knowledge about the enemy (or potential enemy) and the
7
surrounding environment. In other words, the primary objective of intelligence is to support
8
decision making by reducing uncertainty about the hostile situation to a reasonable
9
levelrecognizing, of course, that the fog of war renders anything close to absolute certainty
10
impossible. The second intelligence objective is that it assists in protecting friendly forces
11
through counterintelligence. Counterintelligence includes both active and passive measures
12
intended to deny the enemy valuable information about the friendly situation. Counterintelligence
13
also includes activities related to countering hostile espionage, subversion, and terrorism.
14
Counterintelligence directly supports force protection operations by helping the commander deny
15
intelligence to the enemy and plan appropriate security measures. The two intelligence objectives
16
demonstrate that intelligence possesses either positiveor exploitativeand protective
17
elements. It uncovers conditions that can be exploited and simultaneously provides warning of
18
enemy actions. Intelligence thus provides the basis for our own actions, both offensive and
19
defensive. Identifying, planning, and implementing MAGTF counterintelligence operations and
20
measures are the main focus of this publication.
21
22 1002. Objective. Counterintelligence (CI) is the intelligence function that is concerned with identifying
23 and counteracting the threat posed by hostile intelligence capabilities and by organizations or individuals
24
engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, or terrorism.
Counterintelligence -- Information
25
The objective of CI is to enhance command security by
gathered and activities conducted to
26
denying an adversary information that might be used to
protect against espionage, other
27
conduct effective operations against friendly forces and to
intelligence activities, sabotage, or
28
assassinations conducted by or on
protect the command by identifying and neutralizing
behalf of foreign governments or
29
espionage, sabotage, subversion, or terrorism efforts. CI
elements thereof, foreign
30
provides critical intelligence support to command force
organizations, or foreign persons, or
31
protection efforts by helping identify potential threats, threat
international terrorist activities. (Jt
32
capabilities and planned intentions to friendly operations while
33 helping deceive the adversary as to friendly capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions. Physical security
34 reduces our vulnerability. Operations security reduces our exposure. Combating terrorism efforts
35 combine to make us a less lucrative target. In so doing, CI increases uncertainty for the enemy, thereby
36 making a significant contribution to the success of friendly operations. CI also identifies friendly
37 vulnerabilities, evaluates security measures, and assists with implementing appropriate security plans. The
38 integration of intelligence, CI and operations culminates in a cohesive unit force protection program.
39
40
41
42
43
1-1

1
2 1003. Basis for CI Activities
3
4
a. Hostile objectives. Adversaries can be expected to use every available means to thwart or
5 otherwise impede our forces with his efforts directed towards intelligence, espionage, sabotage,
6 subversion, and terrorism operations. Hostile intelligence collection activities are directed toward
7 obtaining detailed knowledge of our forces and their capabilities, limitations, centers of gravity,
8 vulnerabilities, intentions, and probable courses of action. These activities also obtain information
9 concerning the area of operations, including weather, terrain, and hydrography.
10
11
b. Adversarial advantage. Adversary knowledge of friendly operations will enable him to
12 concentrate his efforts. His efforts are on preparing the objective for defense, attacking friendly staging
13 areas, and disrupting the operation through espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and subversive activities.
14 Accordingly, CI is essential to the security of our forcescommencing with routine garrison operations,
15 to the inception of planning and until the operation is completedin order to deny the enemy any
16 advantage and manipulate his understanding of us.
17
18
(1) Hostile Espionage Activities. Foreign intelligence services must be estimated with being at
19 least as effective as our own. An adversary should always be given the benefit of the doubt in assessing
20 his capabilities in collecting information and producing intelligence on friendly operations. Foreign
21 intelligence services do not normally develop vital intelligence by obtaining one all-revealing fact. Rather,
22 most of their worthwhile intelligence is the product of the assembly, comparison, and interpretation of
23 many small and seemingly insignificant items of information.
24
25
(2) Enemy Sabotage Activities. Sabotage is an act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with,
26 or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or
27 destroy, any national defense or war material, premises or utilities, to include human and natural
28 resources. Immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities, during combat, and even during military
29 operations other than war (MOOTW) the enemy can be expected to employ sabotage techniques to
30 disrupt friendly operations.
31
32
(3) Subversive Activities. Subversive activities are designed and conducted to undermine the
33 authority of friendly forces and/or that of the local government in order to disrupt friendly activities or to
34 gain aid, comfort, and moral support for the cause of the enemy or hostile force or group. Subversive
35 activity can be directed against individuals, groups, organizations, or entire populations. Frequently,
36 subversive activity supports, conceals, or provides a favorable environment for espionage, sabotage, and
37 terrorist operations. Subversion is an action designed to undermine the military, economic,
38 psychological, political strength or morale of a regime.
39
40
(4) Terrorist Activities. Terrorist activities are often extreme. Any personality, organization,
41 or installation of political or military significance could be a potential terrorist target. Terrorists have
42 become adept in the calculated and systematic use of violence or threat of violence in pursuit of their
43 political or ideological goals. Although the tactics and modus operandi of terrorists may vary from group
1-2

1 to group, the techniques they employ to dramatize their goals through fear, intimidation, and coercion are
2 similar.
3
4 Security -- Measures taken by a
1004. Concepts of CI and Force Protection
5 military unit, an activity, or an
6 installation to protect itself against all
a. Historical Services Perspectives. CI has had a long
acts designed to, or which may,
7 impair its effectiveness. (Joint Pub
history of being a "stovepipe" discipline. The four Services
8 1-02).
each perceive and execute CI differently.
9
10
(1) Navy and Air Force. The Navy's Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) and the Air
11 Force's Office of Special Investigations (0SI) have traditionally viewed CI with a strategic focus drawn
12 from their perspectives as, primarily, law enforcement organizations. NCIS is mainly a civilian
13 investigative organization with a chain of command directly from the Secretary of the Navy to the
14 Director, NCIS. The Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI), however, has policy and oversight
15 responsibilities for Navy CI. CI activities of NCIS are funded from the Foreign Counterintelligence
16 Program (FCIP). OSI is a field operating agency of the Air Force. Policy and programmatic oversight
17 rests with the Secretary of the Air Force Office of the Inspector General, not the Director of Intelligence.
18 CI activities of OSI are also funded from the FCIP. Like NCIS, there is no programmatic provision in
19 OSI for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) funding or resources.
20
21
(2) Marine Corps and the Army. The Army and Marine Corps maintain CI as a component of
22 their intelligence staffs. The Marine Corps CI orientation is entirely tactical, with funding exclusively within
23 the Navy Department's budget for TIARA. The Army emphasizes both strategic and tactical CI and,
24 thus, CI is supported by a mixture of FCIP and TIARA resources.
25
26
(3) Joint. Because of these differences in emphasis and support for CI, during the development
27 of joint CI doctrine, the issue arose as to whether CI should fall under the staff cognizance of intelligence
28 or operations. Doctrinal evolution has placed the CI of the combatant commands and JTFs command
29 under the J2.
30
31
b. Joint Operations and CI. In exercising command and control of CI, different rules also apply.
32 In peacetime and times other than the execution of an NCA-approved OPLAN, Service CI elements are
33 under the command or operational control of their Service (in the case of the Navy and Air Force) or
34 operating forces headquarters. Under execution of an NCA-approved OPLAN, however, the
35 commanders exercise command and control of CI elements organic to or supporting their commands.
36 There are, however, continuous requirements for keeping the commanders informed of any CI activities
37 within their areas of interest.
38
39
c. CI and Intelligence. CI, like all intelligence matters, is a command responsibility. In preparing
40 for operations, all units must develop a CI plan and implement appropriate CI measures to protect
41 themselves from potential threats. CI is integrated into the overall intelligence effort to identify and
42 counter an adversary's intelligence efforts. Failure to adequately plan for and implement CI operations
43 and measures may result in serious damage to the MAGTF. Continuing attention to CI and effective
1-3

1 intelligence and operations integration is thus required at all levels of command, from the MAGTF
2 commander through the individual Marine.
3
4
d. CI and Force Protection. Force protection is a responsibility of command. An operations
5 function, force protection is under the staff cognizance of the unit operations officer. CI is a significant
6
contributor to the commands overall force protection
Force
Protection
-A
security
program
7
effort. Security is a matter of vulnerability and threat
designed to protect soldiers, civilian
8 employees, family members, facilities, and
assessment in conjunction with effective risk
9 equipment, in all locations and situations,
management. CI helps identify the hostile intelligence
10 accomplished through planned and
threat, assists in determining friendly vulnerabilities to it,
integrated
application
of
combating
11
and aids with the development of friendly measures that
terrorism, physical security, operations
12 security, personal protective services, and
can lessen or negate these. The commander weighs the
13 supported by intelligence, CI, and other
importance of intelligence and CI to be used as a tool in
14 security programs. (Joint Pub 1-02)
risk management. Marine Corps CI elements provide
15
unique force protection capabilities through both active
16 and passive CI measures and human resource intelligence (HUMINT) support. Often times, CI
17 elements can provide unique intelligence support to the commander's estimate of the situation and
18 situation development (e.g., providing an assessment of the mood of the area of operations, allowing us
19 to feel the pulse of an incident as it develops). CI also provides critical support to the commands overall
20 intelligence efforts by providing indications and warning (I&W) of potential attack and support to
21 targeting and combat assessment efforts.
22
23 1005. MAGTF Counterintelligence Operations Overview.
24
25
a. Responsibilities. CI, like all intelligence matters, is a command responsibility. In preparing for
26 operations, all units must develop a CI plan and implement appropriate CI measures to protect
27 themselves from potential threats. The unit intelligence officer plans, implements, and supervises the CI
28 effort for the commander. The G-2/S-2 may have access to or request support from MAGTF CI units
29 and specialists to assist in developing CI estimates and plans. All members of the command are involved
30 in executing the CI plan and implementing appropriate CI measures. Key participants in this process and
31 their specific responsibilities are:
32
33
Unit security manager (generally the chief of staff or executive officer)overall integration and
34 effectiveness of unit security practices
35
36
G-3/S-3force protection, operations security (OPSEC), counterreconnaissance, and
37 deception.
38
39
G-6/S-6communications and information systems security
40
41
G-1/S-1information and personnel security
42
43
Headquarters commandantphysical security of unit command post and echelons
1-4

1
2
b. CI Process. The CI process at all levels is conducted by using a standard methodology that
3 consists of three steps: developing a CI estimate, conducting a CI survey, and developing the CI plan.
4 Figure 1-1 summarizes the CI process.
5
6
(1) The CI Estimate. The CI estimate details the capabilities and limitations of hostile
7 intelligence, subversive, and terrorist organizations that could carry out actions against friendly units and
8 facilities or against individuals, groups, or locations of concern to our forces, such as the local population
9 or civilian organizations operating in the area. It also provides an estimate of possible and probable
10 COAs that these threat organizations will adopt. Intelligence and CI analysts of the MAGTF CE and
11 CI/HUMINT company will normally prepare a comprehensive CI estimate that addresses threats to the
12 MARFOR or MAGTF by using an IPB methodology that is focused on CI factors and the CI threat.
13 However, each level of command must conduct its own evaluation to determine which of the adversarys
14 capabilities identified in the MAGTF CI estimate represent a threat to their particular unit. The CI
15 estimate must be updated on a regular basis, and the revised estimate or appropriate CI warning reports
16 must be disseminated to all units involved in the operation.
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
Figure 1-1. The Counterintelligence Process
36
37
(2) The CI Survey. The CI survey assesses a units security posture against the threats detailed
38
39 in the CI estimate. The CI survey should identify vulnerabilities to specific hostile intelligence, espionage,
40 sabotage, subversion, or terrorist capabilities and provide recommendations on how to eliminate or
41 minimize these vulnerabilities. The survey should be as detailed as possible. During the planning phase of
42 an operation, it may be possible to do a formal, written survey. CI specialists from the CI/HUMINT
43 company may be available to assist in this effort. In a time-compressed situation, the survey will likely
1-5

1 result from a brief discussion between the appropriate intelligence, operations, communications, and
2 security personnel. In either case, it is critical that the survey look forward in both space and time to
3 support the development of the CI measures necessary to protect the unit as it carries out successive
4 phases of the operation; that is, the survey makes recommendations to improve the CI posture of the
5 command both now and in the future.
6
7
(3) The CI Plan. The CI plan details the activities and operations that the command will use to
8 counter the CI threat. It includes procedures for detecting and monitoring the activities of hostile
9 intelligence and terrorist organizations and directs the implementation of active and passive measures that
10 are intended to protect the force from these activities. The CI plan is based on the threats identified in the
11 CI estimate and the vulnerabilities detected by the CI survey. The MAGTF staff CI officer normally
12 prepares a detailed, comprehensive CI plan that addresses the entire MAGTF and is integrated with CI
13 plans of the JTF and other pertinent forces. Included in the MAGTF CI plan are details of the
14 employment of dedicated CI capabilities and the conduct of specialized CI operations intended to detect
15 and neutralize or eliminate specific CI threats. Plans of subordinate MAGTF elements closely follow the
16 MAGTF plan, normally adding only security measures that are applicable to their specific units. As with
17 all plans, CI plans must be continually updated to ensure that they are current and support both ongoing
18 and future operations.
19
20
c. CI Execution. CI analysis develops threat assessments that can assist decision makers in
21 determining the threat posed to their plans, strategies, resources, programs, operations and systems by
22 foreign intelligence activity. An understanding of the interest and capability of adversarial intelligence
23 organizations to collect information on evolving U.S. technologies is critical to developing appropriate
24 countermeasures. CI personnel can readily obtain information from other national intelligence and security
25 organizations because of its unique liaison arrangements. That capability not only supports the analytical
26 efforts of the national agencies and intelligence centers, but also can give an added dimension to I&W.
27 One of the most highly effective tools of the CI collection activity is the CI Force Protection Source
28 Operation (CFSO), which has been used with great effectiveness in recently deployed JTFs. The CFSO
29 provides the commander with a collection and production capability to protect his force without resorting
30 to complex national coordination procedures. The role of CI is even greater as U.S. military operations
31 increasingly rely upon cooperation and support of our allies. CI personnel can assess the capabilities,
32 effectiveness, organization and methods of operation of foreign intelligence services as well as the
33 effectiveness of their security procedures and, thus, their ability to support or to detract from the U.S.
34 effort.
35
36 1006. Counterintelligence Measures. CI measures encompass a broad range of both active and
37 passive measures designed to protect against the CI threat. There are two general categories of CI
38 measures: active and passive.
39
40
a. Active Measures. Active CI measures are those designed to neutralize the multi-discipline
41 intelligence effort (all disciplines used to collect intelligence such as human intelligence (HUMINT),
42 signals intelligence (SIGINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT)) and hostile efforts toward sabotage,
43 subversion, and terrorism. Active CI measures include, but are not limited to counterespionage,
1-6

1 countersabotage, countersubversion, counterterrorism, counter-reconnaissance, concealment, and
2 deception operations. Active CI measures vary with the mission and capabilities of the unit. Complex
3 active CI measures such as counterespionage operations, counterterrorism operations, screening and
4 interrogations, and defensive source operations are conducted only by CI personnel or other specialized
5 organizations following the direction of the joint force and/or MAGTF commander
6
7
b. Passive Measures. Passive CI measures are those designed to conceal and deny information
8 to the enemy, protect personnel from subversion and terrorism, and protect installations and material
9 against sabotage. Measures include, but are not limited to, security of classified material, personnel
10 security, physical security, security education, communications security, data security, electromagnetic
11 emission security, censorship, camouflage, concealment, light, and security discipline. Passive measures
12 are readily standardized in the unit's standing operating procedures (SOPS) regardless of the unit's
13 mission.
14
15
c. Types of CI Measures. The three general CI measures are denial, detection, and deception.
16 Frequently, the measures applied to accomplish one of these purposes contribute to the others.
17
18
(1) Denial Measures. Denial measures are applied to prevent the enemy from gaining access
19 to classified and sensitive information, subverting personnel, and penetrating the physical security barriers
20 established at command posts and echelons, facilities and installations. Counter-reconnaissance is one
21 example of a denial measure that may be used.
22
23
(2) Detection Measures. Detection measures are used to expose and to neutralize enemy
24 efforts directed toward intelligence collection, sabotage, subversion, and terrorism. MAGTF units detect
25 or aid in the detection of these enemy efforts by collecting, analyzing, and reporting information on enemy
26 activities that may indicate an intelligence effort, by establishing checkpoints to control the movement of
27 personnel within or through their areas of responsibility, and by evacuations of possible enemy agents and
28 materials to higher echelons for interrogation and exploitation. Other detection measures, usually
29 accomplished by specialists, include document translation and analysis, screening, interrogation, and
30 offensive and defensive CI activities.
31
32
(3) Deception Measures. Deception measures are used to mislead or otherwise confuse the
33 enemy concerning our capabilities, centers of gravity, vulnerabilities, plans and intentions. Deception
34 measures may include feints, ruses, demonstrations, and the provision of false information to the enemy.
35 Control of deception operations should be at the highest level of command that is likely to be significantly
36 affected by the enemy's reactions. Deception measures depend on effective command security for
37 success. Special precautions must be taken to ensure that there is no leakage of friendly force
38 information during the planning or execution of an operation. When enemy intelligence activities are
39 identified, consideration must be given to the potential for using that activity in support of deception
40 measures. The potential threat posed by the enemy must be weighed against the potential intelligence
41 benefits of continued exploitation of the enemy's intelligence system versus its destruction or other
42 degradation
43
1-7

1 1007. Counterintelligence Support to Operations. MAGTF CI support to operations normally is
2 within one of the following two categories.
3
4
a. Support to Military Security. Military security encompasses all measures taken by a command
5 to protect itself from sabotage, terrorism, and subversion, and to deny information to the enemy. In
6 MAGTF units, it emphasizes protection of airfields and other major installations, and the defeat of hostile
7 target acquisition efforts. Typical measures include operations security (OPSEC),
8 counter-reconnaissance, countersigns, passwords, and restrictions on access to selected areas and
9 installations.
10
11
(1) Support to Operations Security
12
13
(a) OPSEC is the functional responsibility of the operations officer (G-3/S-3). To be
14 effective, OPSEC principles and concepts must be established and continuously proactive during the
15 conduct of MOOTW as well as in combat environments. Commanders must determine what essential
16 elements of friendly information (EEFI) and operations must be protected, what OPSEC measures to
17 implement, when to implement them, and what level of risk they are willing to accept. Commanders,
18 staffs, and individuals at all echelons of command are responsible for developing and implementing an
19 effective OPSEC program.
20
21
(b) OPSEC denies the enemy prior knowledge of EEFI regarding command activities,
22 plans, operations, strengths, vulnerabilities and intentions. The enemy collects this information through a
23 variety of meanshuman, electronic, photographic, etc. To effectively counter this threat, commanders
24 must have access to timely, reliable and accurate intelligence on enemy intelligence capabilities and
25 operations.
26
27
(c) CI supports commanders' OPSEC programs by providing assessments of friendly
28 vulnerabilities; briefings on enemy threats of espionage, sabotage, subversion, and terrorism; and
29 assistance in establishing safeguards and countermeasures against these threats.
30
31
(2) Support to Information Security and C2 Protect. Information security (INFOSEC) is
32 designed to protect sensitive information from exposure to potential release or compromise. The
33 INFOSEC program includes a proper security classification determination being made in conjunction
34 with applicable security regulations and the proper protection being afforded to the material throughout it
35 life cycle. These measures included proper preparation, reproduction or manufacturing, storage,
36 utilization and destruction. Failure to comply with required INFOSEC measures expose sensitive
37 information to potential compromise. The rapid advancement of the microprocessor and the maturity of
38 computer age technologies have presented a significant new area of exposure that leaves us particularly
39 vulnerable. While these advances provide new capabilities and opportunities, they also create new
40 vulnerabilities to be exploited. Information operations (IO) is the move to recognize the potential and the
41 threats created by this trend. IO include actions taken to affect adversary information while defending
42 ones own information and information systems during both routine peacetime, MOOTW and combat
43 operations. Command and control (C2) Protect are those defensive measures taken to detect and
1-8

1 prevent hostile efforts against our C2 and supporting communications and information systems. The
2 ability to directly influence key decision-makers through the injection, disruption, manipulation or
3 destruction of information and information means is a powerful tool in the advance of military objectives.
4 Information system vulnerabilities include denial of service, information theft, information replacement or
5 introduction of false data. Defensive measure to provide information assurance include use of secure
6 networks, firewalls, encryption, anti-virus scans to detect malicious code, and proper systems
7 administration to include aggressive auditing. Information protection comprises the authenticity,
8 confidentiality, availability, integrity, and non-repudiation of information being handled by anyone involved
9 with C2. It requires proper implementation of appropriate security features such as passwords,
10 authentication, or other countermeasures. The criticality for CI in this area is the ability to identify the
11 adversary's potential capability to exploit, deny, degrade or destroy friendly C2 before an attack in order
12 to counter the attempt. The reporting and tracking of attempted and successful attacks will, through
13 trend analysis assist in the development of countermeasures.
14
15
(3) Counter-reconnaissance. Of all the CI measures that are taken by a unit in combat, one of
16 the most effective is counter-reconnaissance. Units may be assigned both reconnaissance and
17 counter-reconnaissance responsibilities; these two activities complement each other and are inseparable.
18 Good reconnaissance ensures a certain amount of security, and counter-reconnaissance provides a
19 certain amount of reconnaissance information. However, a unit tasked with a reconnaissance mission is
20 not ordinarily given a supplementary counter-reconnaissance mission as completing the
21 counter-reconnaissance mission generally requires defeat of hostile reconnaissance elements, while the
22 primary goal of reconnaissance is collection of information, not combat. Counter-reconnaissance can
23 include the setting up of a defensive screen to deny enemy reconnaissance or an offensive screen
24 designed to meet and destroy enemy reconnaissance in combat air operations. Counterair operations
25 may be defined as counter-reconnaissance when counterair operations deny or reduce an enemy's
26 capability for visual, photographic, or electromagnetic reconnaissance.
27
28
(a) Principles of Counter-reconnaissance. Counter-reconnaissance elements focus on
29 friendly forces being screened. Hostile reconnaissance forces are destroyed or neutralized by combat,
30 and friendly screening forces are echeloned in depth.
31
32
(b) Forms of Counter-reconnaissance. The defensive screen is protective. It is usually
33 established behind natural obstacles. An offensive screen may be moving or stationary depending on the
34 activities of the friendly force being screened. The offensive screen meets the enemy's reconnaissance
35 forces and destroys them. The commander's adoption of a form of counter-reconnaissance screen
36 depends on the situation, mission, weather, and terrain; thus the form of counter-reconnaissance screen
37 adopted, need not reflect solely the tactical mission of the command. The fact that there are offensive
38 and defensive screens does not imply a requirement for their employment only in support of a like tactical
39 mission. An offensive screen may well be employed to support a tactical mission of defense, while an
40 attack mission may be supported best by a defensive screen.
41
42
(4) Support to Embarkation Security. Embarkation security consists of the special
43 application of military and civil security measures to the embarkation phase which include the movement
1-9

1 to the point of embarkation and the actual embarkation. Examples include the screening of civilians
2 employed in the port or airfield, control of contact between troops and civilians, covering or removing
3 tactical markings and other unit designations, and moving to the port or airfield under cover of darkness.
4
5
b. Support to Civil Security. Civil security operations include all the CI measures affecting the
6 population of the area. Typical measures include security screening of civilian labor, imposing curfews
7 and other circulation control measures, and the monitoring of suspect political groups. Civil security
8 operations are generally conducted in coordination and in conjunction with law enforcement, civil affairs,
9 and other appropriate agencies.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
1-10

1
CHAPTER 2
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS AND SERVICES
3
4
5
6
7
8
Mogadishu has been one tough nut to crack we are making steady
and perceptible progress. From my perspective, one of the most
encouraging outgrowths of our efforts in this socially, politically and
geographically complex urban environment has been the emergence of
tactical HUMINT as the driving force behind operations in-by-9 out-by-5
service on priority intelligence requirements.
9
10
11
12
13
been directed against clearly defined targets there have remarkably

few dry holes. Spared the long unproductive walks in the sun sometimes
associated with the Vietnam Conflict. The troops have remained alert,
tactically disciplined and tightly focused. I believe this accounts, in some
measure, for our low casualty rate.
14
15
16
its refreshing to see things in their proper order INTELLIGENCE

DRIVING OPERATIONS instead of operations driving intelligence.
MGen Wilhelm, USMC
Commander, Marine
Forces-Somalia
17 2001. Counterintelligence Functions. There are four CI functions: CI operations; CI investigations;

18 CI collection and reporting; and CI analysis, production, and dissemination. (See figure 2-1)
a. CI Operations. Offensive CI Operations (OFCO) are the employment of specialized CI
19
20 techniques and procedures. They are directed against the espionage, sabotage, subversive and
21 terrorism threat. These operations are planned, coordinated, and conducted by MAGTF CI personnel
22 and include the following operations:
(1) Counterespionage Operations. These operations are designed to detect, destroy,
23
24 neutralize, exploit, or prevent espionage activity. This is accomplished through the identification,
25 penetration, manipulation, deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting
26 or suspected of conducting espionage activities.
(2) Countersubversion Operations. These operations are designed to detect, prevent, or
27
neutralize
the activities of subversive groups. Subversive activity is closely related to and frequently
28
29 supports, conceals, or provides a favorable environment for espionage and sabotage operations. Based
30 on this environment, the countersubversive mission may include offensive measures directed toward the
31 origin of hostile subversive plans and policies.
2-1
Counterintelligence
Function
CI Operations
CI Investigations
CI Collections
and Reporting
CI Analysis, Production
and Dissemination
Objectives
-- Determine foreign intentions
-- Support tactical and strategic perception
management operations
-- Support all-source intelligence and other CI
operations
-- Support planning and military operations
-- Detect, exploit, prevent, or neutralize espionage
activities
-- Detect and resolve incidents of foreign directed
sabotage, subversion, sedition, terrorist
activities,
and assassinations
-- Documents elements of proof for prosecutions
-- Provide military commanders and policy makers
with intelligence and information to use to
eliminate security vulnerabilities and improve
security postures
-- Provide indications and warning of security
threats to U.S. forces, facilities, and operations
-- Provide intelligence on threats to forces to
support planning and implementation of
defensive
or offensive countermeasures
-- Respond to commanders priority intelligence
requirements
-- Provide analysis and assessments of threats to
U.S. forces, facilities, and operations
-- Provide causal analysis of past events to identify
vulnerabilities and risks
-- Identify adversary organizations, personalities,
and capabilities posing threats to forces,
facilities, and operations
Figure 2-1. Objectives of CI Functions
(3) Countersabotage Operations. These operations require a comprehensive program to

2
penetrate
saboteur, partisan, or other dissident groups. The goal of the program is to determine
3
4 sabotage plans and to identify saboteurs, method of operation, and specific targets and thus MAGTF
5 force protection.
(4) Counterterrorism Operations. These operations are planned, coordinated, and
6
7 conducted to detect, prevent, or neutralize terrorist groups or organizations by determining terrorist
2-2

1 plans or intentions. These operations are also employed to identify terrorists, methods of operation, and
2 specific targets.
(5) Exploitation and Neutralization Operations. These operations are targeted against
3
4 personalities, organizations, and installations of intelligence or CI interest, which must be seized,
5 exploited, or protected. Screening and interrogations are operations designed to identify and apprehend
6 enemy intelligence agents, subversives, terrorists, and saboteurs who attempt to infiltrate friendly lines
7 and operations or conceal themselves among the population.
b. CI Investigations. CI investigations are investigations concerning personnel, security matters,
8
9 espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and subversive activities (including defection). A CI investigation is a
10 duly authorized, systematic, detailed examination/inquiry to uncover and report the facts of a matter. CI
11 investigations fall under the jurisdiction of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS). NCIS
12 operates a worldwide organization in support of the Department of the Navy and holds exclusive
13 investigative jurisdiction. These investigations are about matters involving actual, potential, or suspected
14 espionage, sabotage, and subversion, including defection. During combat operations, the exclusive CI
15 jurisdiction held by the NCIS in garrison is assigned to MAGTF commanders and executed by
16 MAGTF CI elements under the staff cognizance of the unit intelligence officer. Such authority is subject
17 only to legal considerations and restrictions, which may be imposed by the MAGTF commander or
18 other higher authority. Additionally, MAGTF CI elements conduct investigation of friendly prisoners of
19 war and persons missing (non-hostile) in action cases. The type of sensitive activities required in these
20 investigations include collecting information of potential intelligence value on friendly personnel possibly
21 in enemy hands (to include debriefings of returned POW/MIA, with emphasis on identifying, locating,
22 and recovering additional personnel), and the collection of information that aids in identifying, locating,
23 and recovering those friendly personnel known or suspected in enemy hands. Initial damage
24 assessments relating to the possible compromise of operational and sensitive material must be included.
c. CI Collections and Reporting. CI collections and reporting are a significant force multiplier,
25
26 which is intended to identify actual and potential threats to the command. Collections includes:
(1) Liaison. Coordination (within authorized jurisdictional limitations) conducted by CI
27
28 elements with local intelligence, CI, security and law enforcement organizations/agencies, and civil affairs
29 and psychological operations units where appropriate.
30
(2) CI Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO). CFSO are overt source collection
31
32 activities of an expedient nature intended to identify threats to the command in support of the
33 commanders force protection mission.
d. CI Analysis & Production. Limited initial analysis is conducted by MAGTF CI elements that
34
35 originally collected and reported the information. Detailed analysis occurs as part of the MAGTF's
36 all-source intelligence effort.
2-3

1 2002. Counterintelligence Services. CI services include CI surveys and vulnerability assessments,
2 evaluations, inspections, training and technical services. They are conducted to enhance the security of
3 the command against espionage, sabotage, subversion, and terrorism. Technical Surveillance
4 Countermeasures (TSCM) involve the employment of services and techniques designed to locate,
5 identify, and neutralize the effectiveness of hostile intelligence services technical surveillance activity (see
6 chapter 11).
7 2003. CI Support to the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Levels of War
a. The levels of war form a hierarchy. Tactical engagements are components of battle, and battles
8
9 are elements of a campaign. The campaign, in turn, is itself but one phase of a strategic design for
10 gaining the objectives of policy. While a clear hierarchy exists, there are no sharp boundaries between
11 levels. Rather, they merge and form a continuum. Consequently, a particular command echelon is not
12 necessarily concerned with only one level of war. A commander's responsibilities within the hierarchy
13 depend on the scale and nature of the operation and may shift up or down as the operation develops.
14 (See MCDP 1-1, Strategy, and MCDP 1-2, Campaigning, for additional information on the levels of
15 war.)
b. CI provides critical support to all three levels of war. (See figure 2-2) While certain activities
16
17 may cross levels based on the environment and the nature of the threat, the levels and type of CI
18 support remain fairly distinct. The distinctions are based on the supported commanders intelligence and
19 CI requirements. If the support satisfies national interests and policy objectives, it is part of the strategic
20 level CI support. When the objectives and requirements focus on the overall joint force and its
21 operations and sustainment, CI support is at the operational level. Tactical CI support addresses the
22 immediate needs of commanders, particularly maneuver commanders, conducting the battles and
23 engagements, with CI support emphasizing force protection from proximate threats. This publication
24 will focus predominantly on tactical CI support to MAGTF operations.
2-4
Levels of CI Support
Strategic
R&D and Acquisitions Support
Counter-proliferations
Treaty Support
Tech Transfer
OFCO
Rear Area
Security
Operational
Subversion
OFCO
Counterespionage
Investigations
Planning
Counterterrorism
Support
Deception
Combat
Information
Collection
Defensive CI
Operations
Tactical
Antiterrorism
Support
OPSEC
Pe
ac
eti
me
1
2
Te
rro
ris
m
SA
SO
LI
C
Force Protection
Support
Re
Co gio
nf nal
lic
t
UCW
Protection
Ge
ne
ral
W
ar
Figure 2-2. Levels of Counterintelligence Support
a. Strategic CI Support
(1) The strategic level focuses on national security objectives, and involves the National
3
4 Command Authority (NCA), National Security Council, JCS, and Congress. The perspective is far
5 more macro in looking at how the instrument of national power is used to satisfy the overarching
6 national objectives, interests and policies. Marines support these programs independently and are fully
7 integrated into these programs conducting CI Operations, often under the sponsorship of another
8 service or national agencies.
(2) Strategic-level CI helps provides answers to the question, What threats exist to the national
9
10 interests and instruments of national power? Strategic CI primarily supports national-level programs,
11 satisfying requirements across the spectrum of potential combat. Strategic CI emphasizes systems
12 protection, acquisition, proliferation, and strategic level Offensive CI Operations (OFCO). Although
13 the above programs may also impact on the operational and tactical level, they are generally focused on
14 addressing national-level requirements and support. The impact of these programs should be on
15 national-level decision-making with direct linkages supporting combatant commands' strategies and
16 initiatives. National-level agencies centrally manage and control strategic CI support, since the scope of
17 these operations spans across geographic regions or service or organizational lines.
18
b. Operational CI Support
2-5

(1) The operational level looks at how to translate the national strategy and objectives into
1
2 reality through the use of assigned forces. Although strategy, derived from national policies and
3 objectives, defines the nature of the operations, the operational level is responsible for the specific
4 implementation of those strategies. The operational level links strategic security objectives to the tactical
5 decision making and the employment of forces. It is the level that wars are conducted. The operational
6 level looks at the design, organization and integration of strategies, campaigns, and major operations.
7 The operational-level commander is the principal supported commander at this level; JTF and MAGTF
8 commanders also are key recipients of operational level CI support.
(2) Operational CI support, across the joint spectrum of potential employment, is probably the
9
10 most daily active area of CI support. It has a major impact on the overall ability of commanders to
11 conduct operations in support of national objectives. Operational CI focuses on threats to plans and
12 operations, particularly within the context of the wider scope of the campaign, rather than the more
13 specific scope of the tactical commander. Operational CI focuses on the question of What are the
14 threats to continuity and the ability to retain the tempo of overall operations? Operational level CI
15 emphasizes contingency planning, liaison, collections (including CFSO), counterespionage investigations,
16 offensive and defensive CI operations, analysis, production and dissemination of threat related reporting.
17 In contingencies and warfare, many operational CI activities focus on the rear areas, since that is where
18 critical C2, logistics and other sustainment is located. The combatant command's joint intelligence
19 center and the JTF joint intelligence support element are the principal planners and producers of
20 operational CI support.
21
c. Tactical CI Support. The integration, sustainment, and protection of tactical level forces are of
22
23 primary concern at this level. The perspective focuses on implementing or achieving national objectives
24 through the use of tactical forces. To a great extent, the tactical level looks at the application of
25 resources (means) applied to achieve national objectives (ends). Responsibility for fighting battles and
26 engagements rests with tactical commanders. Tactical CI support emphasizes direct support to tactical
27 commanders' intelligence and force protection requirements and operations through the identification,
28 neutralization/destruction and potential exploitation of threats to maneuver forces through the collection
29 of threat related information.
(1) Tactical CI is tailored to the needs of the MAGTF and subordinate commanders. MAGTF
30
31 CI addresses the immediate and continuing need of the MAGTF and subordinate commanders for
32 intelligence relating to all manner of threats posed against tactical or maneuver forces. CI conducts
33 vulnerability assessments to look within at the commands overall security posture. CI provides threat
34 assessments to evaluate the infrastructure, capabilities, and intentions of potential threats to the
35 command. CI also provides commanders with assessments of the civil population within the area of
36 operations, to include determining their response to the MAGTF presence and actions. The following
37 provides typical examples of CI tactical support:
(a) Non-combatant Evacuation Operations. CI elements deploy to the embassy and other
38
39 evacuation sites to coordinate and validate the screening of evacuees and assists at the evacuation site to
40 ensure no one attempts to infiltrate with the evacuees.
2-6
(b) Peace Operations. CI helps identify and monitor the warring factions and possible third
1
2 parties to determine potential threats to the peacekeeping/peace enforcement forces.
3
(c) Humanitarian and Disaster Relief. CI helps identify potential threats to the relief force,
4
5 providers of aid and assistance, and aid recipients. Often the situation requiring assistance is caused by
6 conflict and can flash with little warning.
7
(d) Psychological Operations. Psychological operations are normally an activity embedded
8
9 within other operational activities. CI can assist in gauging the effectiveness of psychological operations
10 and assist in special contingency planning.
(2) Due to the intelligence requirements of commanders in direct contact with adversaries and
11
12 the indigenous forces, the line between CI and HUMINT at the tactical level is blurred almost beyond
13 differentiation. Ground order of battle (GOB) intelligence is a key area of CI support and seeks to
14 identify enemy forces, dispositions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities. In particular, the identification of
15 threats posed against the MAGTF and the development of countermeasures are key areas CI supports.
16 MAGTFs typically task organize CI and HUMINT elements into HUMINT exploitation teams (HET).
17 HETs satisfy both CI and HUMINT requirements through the collection of threat information from all
18 sources. The teams accomplish this through collection activities including CI force protection source
19 operations (CFSO), liaison, interrogation, observation, and debriefings. Threat information in a
20 contingency environment is highly perishable and may have limited utility to anyone other than forces in
21 direct contact. The standard reporting vehicles are the CI Information Report and the CI SALUTE
22 Report. In addition to this time-sensitive direct support, the MAGTF all-source fusion center (AFC) is
23 the other key producer of tactical CI support.
24 2004. Garrison Support. The primary peacetime/garrison mission of CI activities is planning,
25 preparing, and training to accomplish tactical CI functions. A secondary mission is to advise and assist
26 commanders in the planning, coordinating, and implementing of command security and force protection
27 efforts. See chapter 10 for additional information on garrison CI services.
2-7

1
CHAPTER 3
ORGANIZATION & RESPONSIBILITIES
3 3001. General. CI, like intelligence, supports the entire spectrum of the battlefield and all warfighting
4 functions. Its effective integration within the intelligence effort requires a basic understanding of the
5 national through tactical intelligence organizations. The commander, through his intelligence officer,
6 depends on coordination and support from many organizations at all command echelons to satisfy his CI
7 and operational requirements.
8 3002. Commander. Intelligence and CI are inherent and essential command responsibilities that
9 require the personal involvement of the commander. Commanders at all command echelons are
10 responsible for formulating CI plans and implementing CI measures. To do so, commanders must have
11 a comprehensive understanding for the capabilities and limitations of CIan understanding of concepts
12 and theory, and an understanding of the practical capabilities, limitations and support requirements of his
13 CI personnel, systems, procedures, operations and products. He must specify CI requirements, focus
14 its efforts and operations, and provide any necessary guidance to ensure a timely and useful products
15 and support. CI activities and measures help the commander shape the battlefield for a decisive action.
16 CI measures support effective command security and force protection operations. While the intelligence
17 officer advises on, plans and implements command CI activities, it is the commander who ultimately
18 determines the meaning and effectiveness of the CI provided and how to use it. Additionally, the
19 commander supervises the overall intelligence effort to ensure that the product is timely, relevant, and
20 useful.
21 3003. Intelligence Officer. The commander directs the intelligence and CI effort. The intelligence
22 officer manages these efforts for the commander, acting as the principal advisor on intelligence and CI
23 and implementing activities that carry out the commanders responsibilities. The intelligence officer is
24 a full participant in the commanders decisionmaking process, ensuring that intelligence and CI
25 are effectively used throughout the command during all phases of mission planning and
26 execution. His CI responsibilities parallel his basic intelligence responsibilities and include:
27
a. Facilitate understanding and use of CI in the planning and execution of operations.
b. Use CI support situation development and the commanders estimate of the situation through the
28
29 identification of enemy capabilities, strengths, and vulnerabilities as well as opportunities and limitations
30 presented by the environment.
c. Assist the commander in developing priority intelligence requirements and supporting CI
31
32 requirements.
3-1

d. Ensure that the commands intelligence and CI requirements are received, understood, and acted
1
2 on by organic and supporting intelligence assets as part of an integrated, all-source intelligence effort.
e. Supervise the integration of CI in the development and dissemination of all-source intelligence
3
4 products that are tailored to the units mission and concept of operations.
f. Monitor the effectiveness of CI activities and the flow of intelligence and CI products throughout
5
6 the command.
7
g. Provide necessary CI support to command security and force protection operations.
8 3004. Operations Officer. The operations officer is the commander's principal staff assistant in
9 matters pertaining to organization, training and tactical operations. In addition to planning, coordinating
10 and supervising the tactical employment of units, his principal responsibilities requiring CI support
11 include:
12
a. Planning and coordinating command security (to include operations security and signal security).
13
b. Planning and coordinating command force protection operations.
c. Recommending missions and, with the intelligence officer, coordinating reconnaissance and
14
15 counterreconnaissance operations.
d. Planning and coordinating electronic warfare and command and control warfare operations and
16
17 activities (to include electronic protection and C2 protection).
18 3005. Individual Marines. All officers, staff noncommissioned officers, and NCOsregardless of
19 rank or military operations specialitywill ensure that the security of their unit is not compromised
20 through comprehensive understanding of the unique security vulnerabilities of their operations and
21 functions and the enforcement of necessary personnel, information, operations and electronic security
22 measures.
23 3006. Marine Corps Counterintelligence Organization
24
a. CI within the Operating Forces
(1) CI/HUMINT Companies. Counterintelligence/HUMINT company (CI/HUMINT Co)

25
26 are combat support elements organic to each Marine expeditionary forces (MEF) Headquarters Group.
27 CI/HUMINT company is organized and equipped under the 4714 series tables of organization and
28 equipment. As intelligence specialist teams, they are under the command of the MAGTF commander.
29 The MAGTF commander exercises control through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 to accomplish the
30 CI/HUMINT mission. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 exercises direction of the CI/HUMINT
3-2

1 company through the CIHO. The intelligence company commander, MEF headquarters group,
2 exercises command, control, and supervision.
(a) Mission. The mission of the CI/HUMINT Co is to provide CI support and conduct
3
4 CI and human resources intelligence (HUMINT) operations in support of the MEF, other MAGTFs, or
5 other units as directed.
6
(b) Tasks
Conduct tactical CI activities and operations, to include CI force protection source

7
8 operations (CFSO), in support of MAGTF or Joint operations.
9
10 interest.
Conduct screening, debriefing and interrogation of personnel of intelligence/CI
Direct and supervise intelligence activities conducted within the interrogation facility
11
12 and the document and material exploitation facility.
Perform CI and terrorism threat analysis and assist in the preparation of CI and
13
14 intelligence studies, orders, estimates, and plans.
15
Conduct low level source HUMINT operations.
Collect and maintain information designed to identify, locate, and recover captured or
16
17 missing personnel.
18
Debrief friendly personnel recovered from EPW, hostage or detainee status.
19
Translate and exploit captured documents.
20
Assist in the conduct of tactical exploitation of captured material and equipment.
21
Conduct limited CI investigations during combat or operations other than war.
22
Conduct CI surveys and evaluations.
23
Conduct TSCM operations.
Maintain foreign area specialists who can provide sociological, economic, cultural and
24
25 geo-political information about designated countries.
3-3

(c) Organization. Each MEF has one CI/HUMINT Company within the MEF
1
2 headquarters group. A CI/HUMINT Company consists of a headquarters section, a CI platoon, an
3 interrogator-translator (IT) platoon and three to five HUMINT exploitation teams (HETs). The CI
4 platoon is organized into a platoon headquarters, four CI teams (CIT), and a Technical Surveillance
5 Countermeasures (TSCM) team. The IT platoon is organized into a platoon headquarters and six IT
6 teams (ITT). Figures 3-1 shows the organization of CI/HUMINT Co within I and II MEF; figure 3-2
7 shows the organization of III MEF's CI/HUMINT Co.
I & II MEF
CI / HUMINT
Company
2dLt
WO
MSgt
Clerk
0204
0210
0211
0151 x 2
CI
Platoon
CI Team
Capt 0202/0204
1stLt 0204
MSgt 0211
Sgt 0211
Sgt 0251
Clerk 0151
HUMINT
Exploitation
Team
IT
Platoon
1stLt 0204
2dLt 0204
MSgt 0251
Clerk 0151 x 2
IT Team
0210
MSgt 0251
SSgt 0211
GySgt 0211
Sgt
0211
GySgt 0211
SSgt 0211 x 2 Sgt 0251 x 2
SSgt 0211 x 2 Sgt
= 115 MSgt 0251
0211 x 3TOTALS
Sgt
0211 x 5
0202/0204 Capt =
1 SSgt 0251 x 2
0251 x3
0204 1stLt
=
2 Sgt
0204 2dLt
=
2
0210 CWO
=
6
0291 MGySgt
=
1
0211
= 50
0251
= 53
TECH Team WO
Figure 3-1. CI/HUMINT Company, I and II MEF
3-4
III MEF
CI / HUMINT
Company
2dLt
CWO
MSgt
Clerk
0204
0210
0211
0151
CI
Platoon
HUMINT
Exploitation
Team
WO
CI Team
GySgt 0211
SSgt 0211 x 2
Sgt
0211 x 5
Capt 0202/0204
1stLt
0204
MSgt
0211
Sgt
0211
Sgt
0251 x 2
Clerk
0151
IT
Platoon
1stLt
2dLt
MSgt
Clerk
0204
0204
0251
0151 x 2
0210
TECH Team MSgt 0251
GySgt 0251
IT Team
SSgt 0211
SSgt 0251 x 2
Sgt
0211
Sgt
0251 x 3
GySgt 0210 Sgt
0251 x 2
TOTALS
=
82
SSgt
0211
0202/0204 Capt = 1
Sgt
0211 x 3
0204 1stLt
= 2
0204 2dLt
= 2
0210 CWO
= 3
0211
= 36
0251
= 33
0151
= 5
1
2
Figure 3-2. CI/HUMINT Company, III MEF
(d) Command and Control (C2) and Concept of Employment
Command and Control. The CI/HUMINT Co commander exercises full command

4
5 authority over his subordinate elements, less elements which have been detached under a particular task
6 organization. The CI/HUMINT Co is under the direct operational control (OPCON) of the MAGTF
7 commander. The MAGTF commander exercises OPCON through the MAGTF G/S-2. Tactical
8 control or specified support relationships of CI/HUMINT elements may be provided to subordinate
9 commanders of the MAGTF depending upon the situation. However, regardless of the MAGTF C2
10 and support relationships, technical control (TECHON) of all MAGTF CI/HUMINT Co elements will
11 generally be retained by the MAGTF commander. Finally, the commanding officer, MEF headquarters
12 group, exercises administrative control over the CI/HUMINT Co.
Concept of Employment. The CI/HUMINT Co combines the MEF's CI and IT
13
capabilities
into
one
organization to provide unity of effort in CI and HUMINT operations and support
14
15 to force protection. The company is employed in accordance with the concept of intelligence support,
16 the CI plan, and the intelligence operations plan developed by the MAGTF G/S-2. The CI/HUMINT
17 Co or task-organized HETs are usually employed in general support of the MAGTF. Subordinate
18 elements of the company may be placed in general support of the MEF, placed in direct support of
19 subordinate commands, or attached to subordinate elements. Additionally, a task-organized
20 detachment will be provided to most subordinate MAGTFs and may be used to support joint
3-5

1 operations. In all cases other than GS, the degree of OPCON or TACON granted subordinate
2 commanders over designated CI/HUMINT Co elements will be specified by the MAGTF commander.
3
(e) Administrative, Logistics and Other Support
Administrative. CI/HUMINT Company and its subordinate units are not capable of
5
6 self-administration. Administrative support is provided in by the parent MEF's Headquarters Battalion
7 or other designated unit. Administrative support for HETs and CI/HUMINT Company detachments is
8 provided by the supported unit.
Maintenance and Supply. CI/HUMINT Company and its subordinate units are
9
capable
of
first
echelon
maintenance support of organic equipment. All higher maintenance is provided
10
11 from the parent MEF's headquarters group, other designated external units, or the supported unit.
Transportation. CI/HUMINT has limited organic vehicular transportation support
12
to
support
Company
and subordinate units operations. External transportation support from the parent
13
14 MEF's headquarters group, other designated unit or the supported unit is necessary to displace all
15 company elements.
Selected Items of Equipment1
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
TAMCN
A03809
A0420
A0890
A1260
A2030
A2065
A2070
A2145
A2167
D0850
D1158
Description
Counterintelligence Equipment, Tech
Surveillance
Comm System, Counterintelligence
Facsimile, Digital, Lightweight
Navigation Set, Satellite (PLGR)
Radio Set
Radio Set
Radio Set
Radio Set
Radio Set
Trailer, Cargo, 3/4-ton, 2-wheel
Truck, Utility, Cargo/Troop Carrier
1/4-ton, HMMWV
Nomenclature
AN/UXC-7
AN/PSN-11
AN/PRC-68A
AN/PRC-104B(V)
AN/PRC-119A
AN/VRC-46
AN/VRC-88A
M-101A3
M-998
Qty
1
8
9
25
2
8
23
5
20
7
35
(2) HUMINT Exploitation Team (HET). As discussed above, HETs are part of the
31
32 CI/HUMINT Co. The HET, apart from mission specific task organized elements, is the smallest
33 element to deploy in support of a MAGTF and often serve as the basic building block for CI/HUMINT
34 CO support to subordinate elements of the MAGTF. Specific elements and capabilities provided in the
35 detachment will be based upon the mission of the supported unit, commander's intent, results of the
1
T/Es for CI/HUMINT company had not been finalized by the time of publication of this manual. The items and
quantities shown here were drawn from those designated for the ITP and the CITs in the T/Es for the intelligence as
companies
of
22 Oct 97. Refer to the current tables of equipment
for accurate current information.
3-6

1 intelligence preparation of the battlespace, and the supported unit's concepts of operations and
2 intelligence.
(a) Mission. HETs are used to support the MAGTF's focus of effort or other designated
3
4 units, to exploit significant HUMINT or CI collection opportunities, or to provide tailored support to
5 individual subordinate elements of the MAGTF, in particular elements which will be operating
6 independently from the rest of the MAGTF (e.g., a HET is usually attached to the MEU(SOC)
7 command element).
8
(b) Tasks
Conduct offensive and defensive CI activities, including counterespionage,

9
10 countersabotage, countersubversion, and counterterrorism, in support of tactical units.
11
Conduct intelligence collection operations utilizing CFSO.
Advise the commander concerning support to his force protection, OPSEC,

12
13 deception, and security programs.
Assist in the preparation of CI estimates and plans for areas of operations reflected
14
15 by concept/operation plans.
Maintain information and CI databases concerning personalities, organizations,
16
17 installations, and incidents of CI interest in support of concept/operation plans.
Collect and maintain information designed to identify, locate, and recover friendly
18
19 personnel captured, mission (non-hostile), and missing in action.
20
Conduct CI debriefings of friendly POWs who are returned to U.S. control.
Conduct liaison with unit, JTF, other services, allied and host nation intelligence and
21
22 local intelligence, CI, and law enforcement agencies as appropriate.
Conduct CI investigations about espionage, sabotage, terrorism, subversion, and
23
24 defection; and other special CI investigations, during combat operations per theater directives.
Conduct debriefings/interrogation of known or suspected foreign intelligence
25
26 personnel and agents taken prisoner.
27
Maintain foreign language proficiency to support operations.
3-7

Assist in Cl surveys/vulnerability assessments of commands and installations to
1
2 determine the security measures necessary to protect against espionage, sabotage, subversion,
3 terrorism, and unauthorized disclosure of, or access to, classified material.
Debrief Marine Corps personnel detained/held hostage by foreign governments or
4
5 terrorist organizations.
(c) Organization. HETs combine CI and IT personnel in a single unit to integrate CI and
6
7 HUMINT collection capabilities in support of subordinate elements of the MAGTF. The HET normally
8 consists of one CI officer, two CI enlisted specialists, and three enlisted interrogator/translators capable
9 of planning and executing CI/HUMINT operations in support of the designated unit's intelligence and
10 force protection requirements.
11
(d) Command and Control (C2) and Concept of Employment
Command and Control. HETs are normally attached to the units they support, but
12
13 may be placed in direct support. When attached they are OPCON to the supported commander, who
14 exercises this via the unit intelligence officer. Finally, as discussed above, technical direction of HET
15 operations generally will be retained by the MAGTF commander.
Concept of Employment. HETs will be employed in accordance with the supported
16
17 commander's concepts of intelligence and operations.
(3) Intelligence Section Staff Officers CI/HUMINT Responsibilities. The MAGTF
18
19 G/S-2 section is the focus for MAGTF CI and HUMINT planning and management. Its principal C2
20 node is the command element's combat intelligence center (CIC). The CIC may consist of a number of
21 subordinate elements depending upon the size of the MAGTF, operational requirements, and other
3-8

1 factors (see figure 3-3).2
Combat Intelligence Center (CIC) - intelligence operations center established
within the MAGTF CP. Performs primary functions of the MAGTF intelligence
section and includes the sub-elements listed below.
All-Source Fusion Center (AFC) - primary analysis and production element of
the MAGTF. Processes and produces all-source intelligence products in
response to requirements of the MAGTF.
Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC) - primary element for the
supervision of MAGTF collection operations. Directs, coordinates, and
monitors intelligence collection operations conducted by organic, attached, and
direct support collection assets.
Operations Control & Analysis Center (OCAC) - main node for the
command and control of radio battalion SIGINT operations and the overall
coordination of MAGTF SIGINT operations. Processes, analyzes, produces,
Figure 3-3.
2
3
MAGTF G/S-2 Combat Intelligence Center

and Subordinate Elements
4 Intelligence section and intelligence unit commanders/OICs SIGINT and related responsibilities and
5 tasks include:
(a) Intelligence Operations Officer. The intelligence operations officer is responsible to
6
the
G/S-2
for
the overall planning and execution of MAGTF all-source intelligence operations. Specific
7
8 duties include:
Planning and implementing a concept of intelligence operations based upon the
9
mission,
threat,
commander's
intent, and concept of operations.
10
Developing, consolidating, validating and prioritizing recommended PIRs and IRs to
11
12 support MAGTF planning and operations.
Planning, developing, directing MAGTF intelligence collections, production and
13
14 dissemination plans, to include the effective employment and integration of MAGTF multi-discipline
15 intelligence, CI and reconnaissance operations.
See MCWP 2-1,Intelligence Operations, for additional information on the CIC and its component parts.
3-9

Coordinating and integrating MAGTF intelligence operations with other components,
1
2 JTF, theater, and national intelligence operations.
Evaluating and improving MAGTF intelligence operations.
(b) Counterintelligence/HUMINT Officer (CIHO)3 . The CIHO is responsible to the

4
5 G/S-2 (or the MAGTF intelligence operations officer) for the planning, direction and execution of
6 MAGTF CI/HUMINT operations. Specified duties include:
In conjunction with the intelligence operations officer, other intelligence section staff
7
8 officer, the CI/HUMINT company commander, preparing MAGTF CI/HUMINT concept of
9 operations, plans and orders; and directing, coordinating and managing organic and supporting
10 CI/HUMINT operations.
In conjunction with the collection management officer and CI/HUMINT Co planners,
11
12 coordinating, planning, supervising, and assisting CI collection requirements and taskings for MAGTF
13 operations.
14
In coordination with the SARC OIC, CI/HUMINT Co commander, and G/S-3,
15
16 coordinating the movement, operation and reporting of CI/HUMINT Co units.
In conjunction with MAGTF AFC OIC, CI/HUMINT Co commander, coordinate
17
18 MAGTF AFC analyst exchanges and production with CI/HUMINT analysts; develop CI/HUMINT
19 reports, estimates and other products; and the integration of CI/HUMINT with all-source intelligence
20 production.
In coordination with the dissemination officer, planning for the timely reporting of
21
22 CI/HUMINT-derived intelligence to MAGTF and external elements and the rapid handling of
23 perishable CI/HUMINT information. This includes, in conjunction with the G/S-6 and subordinate units
24 intelligence officers, the planning and coordination for special communications paths and operations.
25
Assisting the intelligence operations officer with preparing and presenting intelligence
26
27 briefings and reports as required.
Serve as the principal point of contact between the command and NCIS in matters
28
29 involving the investigation of actual, potential, or suspected espionage, sabotage, terrorism intelligence,
30 and subversive activities, including defection, ensuring that information about these activities is reported
Criminal Investigation Division (CID) of
31 promptly to the nearest NCIS representative. Informs the
32 the Provost Marshal Office (PMO) on criminal matters. These include those of a terrorist nature
33 uncovered in the course of a CI investigation.
3
In intelligence sections without a CIHO, a designated officer will generally be assigned to perform
these tasks. If a HET or other CI/HUMINT Co element is attached, its senior CI/HUMINT officer will
serve in this capacity.
3-10
Maintain liaison with other Cl and HUMINT agencies.
Monitor command Cl/HUMINT MOS training and provide advice and assistance for
2
3 the maintenance of an effective program.
Coordinates, on behalf of the G-2, with the G-3 for support to the commands force
4
5 protection mission, including OPSEC, and deception.
Maintain CI/HUMINT reference material for contingency planning and provides for
6
7 further dissemination as appropriate.
Conduct planning for the CI processing of friendly prisoners of war (POWs) who
8
9 have been returned to friendly control.
When a crisis action team is established in response to a terrorist or criminal situation,
10
11 provide personnel to jointly man the CAT with CID, NCIS, and if required, civilian law enforcement
12 agents.
When the MAGTF CE is designated as a Joint Task Force headquarters, the CIHO
13
14 may assume the role as the Task Force CI Coordinating Authority (TFCICA). (See Joint Pub 2-01.2,
15 JTTP for CI Support to Operations.)
16
(c) Collection Management Officer (CMO). The CMO is responsible for formulating
17
18 detailed intelligence collection requirements (ICR) and tasking and coordinating internal and external
19 collection operations to satisfy these. The CMO receives PIRs and IRs from the intelligence operations
20 officer, and then plans and manages the best methods to employ organic and supporting collection
21 resources. Through coordination with the CIHO and CI/HUMINT Co commander, the CMO is
22 responsible for the following CI/HUMINT-related tasks:
Determination and coordination of the collection effort of PIRs/IRs that may be
23
24 collected via CI resources.
Determination of PIRs/IRs and preparation of requests for intelligence that are beyond
25
26 organic capabilities and must be submitted to higher headquarters and external agencies for satisfaction.
(d) MAGTF All-Source Fusion Center OIC. The MAGTF AFC OIC has primary
27
28 responsibility for managing and supervising the MAGTF's all-source intelligence processing, analytical
29 and production. Key all-source and CI/HUMINT-related responsibilities include:
Maintaining all-source automated intelligence databases, files, workbooks, country
30
31 studies, planning imagery, mapping and topographic resources, and other references.
3-11

Administrating, operating and maintaining intelligence processing and production
1
2 systems, both GENSER and SCI (e.g., JDISS, IAS).
Analyzing and fusing all-source intelligence into tailored products in response to stated
3
4 or anticipated PIRs and IRs.
Developing and maintaining current and future intelligence situational, threat and
5
6 environmental assessment ,and target intelligence based upon all-source analysis, interpretation and
7 integration.
Direction and supervision of the MAGTF AFC's CI analytic team (CIAT). The
8
9 CIAT normally consists of one CI officer and two CI specialists. Its principal tasks include:
10
CI analysis and integration within all-source intelligence production.
11
CI database development and management.
12
Production of CI estimates.
Maintenance of information on personalities, organizations, installations, and

13
14 incidents of CI interest.
(e) Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center OIC. The SARC OIC is responsible for
15
16 supervising the execution of the integrated organic, attached and direct support intelligence collection
17 and reconnaissance operations. Specific CI/HUMINT-related responsibilities include:
Maintaining the status of all ongoing intelligence collection operations, to include
18
19 deployed CI/HUMINT Co elements. This status will include:
20
Mission, tasked ICRs and reporting criteria for collection elements.
21
22 operations.
Locations and times of all restricted fire areas and reconnaissance areas of
23
C2 relationships with subordinate units, to include times of attachments.
24
Primary and alternate communications plans.
Coordinating and monitoring organic and supporting CI/HUMINT and other

25
26 intelligence elements operations.
3-12

Conduct detailed planning and coordination with CI/HUMINT Co elements for
1
2 CI/HUMINT collection. Ensure CI/HUMINT elements understand the collection plan and are able to
3 carry out their responsibilities under the plan.
Ensuring other MAGTF C2 nodes (e.g., the current operations center, the fire
4
5 support coordination center, etc.) are apprised of ongoing intelligence, CI/HUMINT and
6 reconnaissance operations.
Receiving routine and time-sensitive intelligence and CI reports from deployed
7
8 collection teams; cross-cueing amongst intelligence and CI collectors, as appropriate; and the rapid
9 dissemination of intelligence and CI reports to MAGTF C2 nodes and others in accordance with
10 intelligence reporting criteria.
(f) Dissemination Officer. The dissemination officer is responsible for the effective
11
12 conduct of intelligence dissemination within the MAGTF. Specific CI/HUMINT-related responsibilities
13 include:
Developing intelligence dissemination operational plans and supporting architectures
14
15 for both voice and data networked communications, and coordinating and integrating these with theater,
16 joint force and MAGTF CIS and intelligence systems.
17
Recommending intelligence dissemination priorities.
18
Advising on and selecting dissemination means.
Monitoring the flow of intelligence and CI throughout the MAGTF, ensuring that it is
19
20 delivered to intended recipients in a timely fashion.
21
(4) Liaison
(a) CI requires extensive liaison to be effective during tactical operations. CI activities often
22
23 closely parallel functions and responsibilities of other organizations and agencies and, in some cases,
24 may overlap. Close and continuous liaison and coordination aids in the effectiveness of operations, the
25 exchange of information, and in providing for mutual assistance.
(b) Policies and procedures for liaison and the coordination of CI activities are developed
26
27 and promulgated at the MARFOR/MAGTF command echelons. Depending on the mission, area of
28 operations and the type of CI activity, liaison and coordination is normally conducted by CI elements
29 with local intelligence, CI, security and law enforcement organizations/agencies, and civil affairs and
30 psychological operations units where appropriate. In all cases, liaison must be conducted within
31 jurisdictional limitations imposed by higher authority.
3-13

b. Marine Corps CI Organizations within the Supporting Establishment. The Director of
1
2 Intelligence is responsible to the Commandant of the Marine Corps for forming plans and policies
3 pertaining to intelligence and CI within the Marine Corps. The Head, Cl/HUMINT Branch is the
4 principal advisor to the Director of Intelligence for Cl/HUMINT matters. The Cl/HUMINT Branch
5 performs the following functions:
6
(1) Prepares plans, policies, and directives, and formulates controlled CI/HUMINT missions.
(2) Coordinates with national-level Department of Defense (DOD) and non-DOD agencies on
7
8 matters dealing with Cl and HUMINT.
9
10
(3) Acts as the CI military occupational specialty (MOS) sponsor (0204/0210/0211).

(4) Maintains staff cognizance over CI field units and staff management of training.
(5) Exercises staff responsibility for HUMINT resources and certain classified/special access
11
12 programs.
13
(6) Coordinates with the NCIS in special investigations and operations.
14
(7) Conducts security reviews.
(8) Reviews reports from the field commands concerning security violations, loss of classified
15
16 material, and compromises.
17
(9) Coordinates the release of information for foreign disclosure.
(10) Represents the Marine Corps on national level interagency CI committees and
18
19 subcommittees.
20 3007.
Naval Component Organization.
a. N-2 Intelligence Officer. While afloat, the N-2 coordinates activities of the attached NCIS
21
22 agent to identify threats to the amphibious ready group (ARG). The N-2 coordinates vulnerability/threat
23 assessments and other intelligence and CI support of ARG intelligence and force protection
24 requirements for the ships. Close coordination between the MAGTF G/S-2 and the N-2 is required to
25 ensure consolidation and dissemination of applicable threat related data for the formulation of the
26 commanders estimate. Monitoring and rapid reporting of time sensitive information is critical for these
27 deployed commanders as the situation develops. The critical role is the monitoring for indications and
28 warning of impending attack during movement or the deployment of forces ashore. The ARG/MAGTF
29 team continues this interactive relationship through the rapid collection, processing, production and
30 dissemination of intelligence and CI in support of intelligence and force protection requirements.
31
3-14

b. Attached NCIS Agent. In conjunction with MAGTF CIHO and other CI elements, the NCIS
1
2 agent afloat assists the command with the identification of threat and vulnerabilities of the ARG. As a
3 special staff officer under the staff cognizance of N-2, the NCIS agent also has the responsibility for
4 criminal investigation in conjunction with the ships master-at-arms and the MAGTF criminal
5 investigation division (CID) officer. During contingency operations, the NCIS agent serves as the
6 principal planner and host for NCIS's surge capability via its Special Contingency Group (SCG). The
7 SCG is a task organized group of specially trained NCIS agents prepared and equipped for deployment
8 into tactical situations short of combat.
9 3008.
Joint Counterintelligence Organization
a. CI Staff Officer (CISO). In accordance with DOD Dir 5240.10, DOD CI Support to U&S
10
11 Commands, each combatant command has a special staff officer within the J-2 with staff cognizance for
12 all CI activities within the theater. The CISO is the J-2s primary staff officer responsible for advising,
13 planning and overseeing theater CI activities. Responsibilities include:
(1) Advise commander & J-2 on CI investigations, operations, collections and production
14
15 activities affecting the command.
(2) Advise commander on counterdrug, OPSEC, counterterrorism and antiterrorism activities in
16
17 the commands AOR.
(3) Coordinate CI support activities within combatant commands headquarters staff and with
18
19 component organizations.
(4) Coordinate the combatant commanders CI requirements with pertinent U. S. CI
20
21 organizations and U. S. country teams as required.
(5) Coordinate tasking of CI within AOR and area of interest upon implementation of NCA
22
23 approved /directed action.
(6) Coordinate with the military services for integrated CI support to research and development
24
25 and acquisition programs to protect sensitive or critical technologies.
(7) Ensure significant CI threat information developed within commanders AOR is forwarded
26
27 to the J-2, other staff officers, and subordinate component commanders.
(8) Ensure CI support requirements are identified and satisfied during development of command
28
29 intelligence architecture plans (CIAP).
(9) Ensure CI staffing and analytic and production support is integrated the combatant
30
31 command's joint intelligence centers (JICs).
3-15

(10) Ensure CI collection, production and dissemination priorities are integrated into
1
2 commands intelligence operations plans.
b. Task Force CI Coordinating Authority (TFCICA). The TFCICA is a JTF headquarters staff
3
4 officer designated by the combatant commander as the executive agent for all CI activities within a JTF's
5 area of responsibility (AOR). The TFCICA coordinates and deconflicts with the Defense HUMINT
6 Services representative to the JTF and the HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC). Together these two
7 staff responsibilities combine to create the JTF headquarters J-2X, which has the task of coordinating
8 and deconflicting all CI and HUMINT activity within the JTF AOR. This includes coordination with the
9 U. S. country team and any external attachments and agencies conducting CI and HUMINT activity
10 within the AOR.
11 3009. National Level Counterintelligence Support. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is
12 critical in the planning and establishment of military CI activities. DIA is the principal DOD organization
13 for CI analysis and production in support of DOD requirements. It focuses on hostile threat and foreign
14 intelligence and security services, to include the development, population and maintenance of CI
15 databases for personalities, organizations and installations (PO&I). PO&I files become the
16 cornerstone of the CI activities planning and targeting, and guide all CI and HUMINT activities. DIA's
17 Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) is the force provider for strategic HUMINT forces and capabilities.
18 During operations, elements from DHS form a partnership within the supported JTF headquarter's J-2X
19 element for the coordination and deconfliction of all HUMINT-source related collection activities.
3-16

1
CHAPTER 4
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EMPLOYMENT
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
4001. Operational Environment. As forces are committed to an operation, the threat picture
expands and situational awareness improves. As U. S. military involvement increases, existing threats
remain and may increase while new threats may emerge. In a humanitarian operations and other military
operations other than war (MOOTW), the criminal, terrorist, and espionage threats are generally the
principal ones facing the MAGTF. These threats continue into the upper levels of conflict, with the
addition of threats posed by irregular forces, special operations force, and finally, by large-scale
conventional military forces.
10 Within MOOTW and in lesser levels of conflict where there may be no designated MAGTF or joint
11 rear area, CI activities are directed at supporting force protection efforts by engaging with key civic
12 leaders, existing intelligence and security structure, factional leaders and cooperative personnel, and
13 allied forces. Threats are normally at the low to mid level. Threats at the higher levels of conflict
14 normally involve conventional or unconventional force threats that require combat forces to counter.
15 MAGTF CI elements conducts actions in support of these operations within the MAGTF area of
16 operations and other assigned sectors as directed (e.g., the joint rear area (JRA)).
17 The primary operational environmental factor influencing MAGTF CI activities is political, vice physical.
18 Accordingly, three basic political operational categories can be used to frame CI activities. These are:
Permissive Environment -- An operational environment in which there are specific
19
20 agreements that allow CI to conduct activities independently or in coordination with the host nation. In
21 these environments, MAGTF CI activities and support to the security posture of the deployed forces
22 are normally conducted in conjunction with the host nation, or the host nations has provided
23 concurrence, either direct or tacit.
Semi-Permissive Environment -- A operational environment in which there are either no
24
25 in-place government organizations and/or laws, or where the government in power is not duly
26 recognized by the U. S. or other international bodies. In situations of this type, the rules of engagement
27 established by the JTF or multinational force commander is often the key variable as the host nation's
28 civil, military and security agencies are frequently degraded or nonexistent (or may even be supporting
29 threat forces). The rules of engagement of the deploying force primarily drive limitations and restrictions
30 that may be placed on CI activities.
Non-Permissive -- A non-permissive operational environment is one in which U. S. CI
31
32 activities and contacts with the host nation are extremely limited, normally at the direction of the host
33 nation. The situation in these countries may also place the US in a situation where the actions of the host
34 nation or individuals in the host nation government may be inimical to those of the US government. In
4-1

1 most cases, the host government may severely curtail contacts, normally only through a single point of
2 contact. In some cases, the information provided may be of questionable validity.
3 MAGTF CI personnel must be aware of the differences in each operational environment and be able to
4 establish operations based on the mission, nature of the environment and threat conditions. Since much
5 of the threat and vulnerability intelligence will be based on information provided by host nation or other
6 sources, vulnerability assessments must be assessed and rapidly updated as necessary.
7 CI activities MAGTF commanders develop estimates of the situation, shape the battlefield and guide
8 intelligence and force protection operations. The MAGTF commander focuses the CI effort by clearly
9 identifying priority intelligence requirements, careful assignment of CI missions and tasks, and a clear
10 statement of desired results. By orienting CI capabilities, the commander guides who or what are the
11 CI targets and the nature and focus of operations (e.g., whether CI efforts will be designated primarily
12 as defensive CI operations or offensive HUMINT operations).
13 4002. Employment of Counterintelligence Elements
a. Command and Control (C2) and Concept of Operations. The tactical concept of
14
15 operations in depth governs C2 relationships and the execution of CI plans and operations. Specific CI
16 concept of operations and C2 relationships will be established in either annex B (intelligence) to the
17 operations order, fragmentary orders or other directive.
(1) General Support. CI elements normally operate in general support of the MAGTF.
18
19 Operational control of CI elements by the force commander provides the commander with the means to
20 meet the specific operational requirements of the entire MAGTF and other supported forces with his
21 generally limited organic CI resources.
(2) Direct Support and Attachment. Situational and operational factors may require some
22
23 CI elements to be either attached to or placed in direct support of MAGTF subordinate elements (e.g.,
24 during operations involving widely separated units in areas of dense population). Unit commanders
25 employ CI personnel to satisfy their CI requirements or other mission specified by the MAGTF
26 commander.
(3) Technical Direction. Regardless of the type C2 relationships established, the MAGTF
27
28 commander will always retain technical direction authority over all MAGTF CI and supporting elements,
29 which will be exercised by the G/S-2 via the CIHO.
b. Concept of Employment. MAGTF CI elements can be deployed on an area coverage
30
31 concept or by unit assignment.
32
(1) Area Coverage
4-2

(a) Geographic Area of Responsibility. MAGTF CI elements employed under area
1
2 coverage are assigned a specific geographic area of responsibility, under the operational control of the
3 MAGTF commander. Under area coverage, CI support is provided to all commands located within the
4 designated area. Such CI element continue to operate within the assigned area even though the tactical
5 situation or supported units operating in the area may change.
(b) Continuity. Area coverage provides the greatest continuity of tactical CI operations. It
6
7 allows MAGTF CI operations to focus on the enemy's intelligence organization and activities while
8 remaining unfragmented and unrestricted by the tactical areas of responsibility assigned to supported
9 units. It also allows MAGTF CI personnel to become familiar with the area, enemy intelligence
10 organization and operations, and CI targets. Area coverage is particularly effective during MOOTW
11 (e.g., counterinsurgency operations) where the threat forces often operate on political, vice military,
12 boundaries.
(2) Unit Assignment. MAGTF CI elements employed on a unit assignment basis normally
13
14 remain with designated supported units. They operate within that unit's area of responsibility under the
15 specified C2 relationships. As tactical units displace, it is necessary for higher echelons to provide CI
16 coverage for the areas vacated. Relief of an area can be accomplished by three methods 17 augmentation, leapfrog system, and relay system.
(a) Attachment. CI elements may be detached from the MAGTF CE and attached to
18
19 subordinate commanders. This method provides CI support under the operational control of the
20 commanders to which attached for employment against specific CI targets during the initial (and possibly
21 subsequent) phase of an operation. It also prepares for subsequent transfer of areas of responsibility
22 from subordinate units to MAGTF CE without loss of continuity. These CI elements generally operate
23 under the operational control of the supported commander during the initial reduction of CI targets. The
24 CI elements then remain in place as the unit advances, reverting to the operational control of the
25 MAGTF commander (or other specified commander). By remaining in place, the CI element ensures
26 continuous coverage regardless of tactical unit movements.
(b) Leapfrog System. This method is similar to the area coverage concept but on a smaller
27
28 scale. Under the leapfrog system, MAGTF CI elements initially responsible for a specified area are
29 detached from subordinate units and a new team attached as the operation progresses. The new CI
30 element is attached sufficiently in advance to permit it to become thoroughly familiar with current
31 operations within the area of responsibility. This method of relief permits the CI element familiar with
32 the area, informants, and targets to remain and conduct more extensive operations, while continuing to
33 provide necessary CI direct support to subordinate commanders.
(c) Relay System. This method requires MAGTF CI elements to be held in reserve. As
34
35 the subordinate units advance, CI elements are dispatched forward to assume control of designated
36 areas on a rotational basis.
4-3

1
c. CI Employment Considerations
(1) Characteristics of the AOR influence the nature and extent of MAGTF CI operations. The
2
3 following factors influence CI task organization, C2 and resulting concepts of operations and support
4 relationships.
Historical/recent threat, espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism activities within the area
5
6 of operations
7
The population density.
The cultural level of the country.
The attitude of the people and political groups toward friendly and enemy forces.
10
The people's susceptibility to enemy penetration (hostile intelligence threat) and propaganda.
11
The stability of the local government, security and law enforcement.
(2) The number of MAGTF CI resources available, particularly HETs, is critical. Careful
12
13 planning, awareness of CI operations throughout the joint AOR, and detailed intelligence and operations
14 preparation are required. CI targets which require early reduction must be selected and the
15 employment of MAGTF CI operations planned. Care must be taken to not overestimate CI element
16 capabilitiesthis risks overextending and dispersing CI activity on many targets with limited
17 effectiveness.
(3) During amphibious operations, the commander, landing force (CLF), assumes operational
18
19 control over all assigned CI assets. Clear responsibility for CI operations must be assigned amongst
20 MAGTF, naval and other supporting CI elements. CI investigations of a general support nature,
21 particularly in rear areas, may be tasked to NCIS or other supporting CI elements. In such cases,
22 jurisdiction must be clearly defined to optimize overall CI support.
23
24
25
d. Employment of MAGTF CE CI Elements

(1) MAGTF CE CI elements normally operate in the rear area conducting the following tasks:
Overall MAGTF CI operational management and technical direction.
Coordination and integration of MAGTF CI operations with JTF, multinational and other
26
27 supporting CI operations.
28
Conduct CFSO and HUMINT operations of a relatively long term nature.

4-4

1
Provide assistance on military and civil security matters.
Follow-up and complete CI tasks initiated by subordinate elements.
(2) MAGTF CE CI elements normally retain OPCON over technical surveillance

3
4 countermeasures, CI inspections, and CI surveys for the entire MAGTF. If required, it also establishes
5 and operates the MAGTF CI interrogation center.
6
e. Employment of CI Elements with the Ground Combat Element (GCE)
(1) Generally, the number of MAGTF CI elements employed in the GCE AOR is greater than
7
8 in other areas. In combat or occupied areas, the enemy has more opportunities to penetrate the CI
9 screen because of the constant contact of opposing ground forces and the presence of indigenous
10 displaced populations. After the area has been cleared of the enemy, the CI element operating with the
11 GCE is usually the first security unit to enter this area. They help determine initial requirements and
12 establish initial security measures. Additionally, CI element with the GCE perform critical preparatory
13 tasks for all subsequent CI and security operations. Prompt action by a CI element, particularly the
14 rapid development and dissemination of intelligence based upon interrogations or exploitation of
15 captured materials and documents, can be of substantial benefit to the GCEs operations and force
16 protection efforts. CI elements must identify and secure :
17
The most obvious CI targets.
18
Agents left behind by the enemy for espionage and sabotage.
19
Enemy collaborators.
Key public buildings such as the seat of the local government, police stations and
20
21 communication centers.
(2) The CI element focuses its operations on the GCE's distant and close areas, with
22
23 responsibility for GCE rear area generally being coordinated with CI elements operating in general
24 support of the MAGTF or those in direct support of the rear area operations commander. The CI
25 elements operating with a division are generally deployed by task organizing multiple HETs. The HETs
26 are responsible for the CI coverage of specific areas within the jurisdiction of the command. Each HET
27 acts as an independent unit, but its activities are coordinated by the CI/HUMINT Company
28 Commander or by one of the HET OICs.
(3) Time is of the essence during the assault phase of an operation. CI elements employed with
29
30 attacking forces will generally limit their screening operation to identification and classification of civilians
31 disguised as military personnel, enemy agents, and collaborators. If time permits, immediate tactical
32 interrogation may be conducted of suspects. Normally, suspects will be passed to rear area,
4-5

1 intermediate detention facilities, ultimately arriving at the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center for
2 more detailed interrogations and classification.
3
f. Employment of CI with the Aviation Combat Element (ACE)
(1) There is no significant difference in the mission of CI elements employed with either ground
4
5 or air units. However, air units are normally characterized by a static situation. In air operations or an
6 airborne movement, CI personnel are included in the tactical command echelon. They advise the
7 commander on the control and security of sensitive areas, civilian control measures, and screening of
8 local residents and transients. They also conduct security assessments of facilities in the vicinity as
9 required.
(2) The ACE is often widely dispersed with elements operating from separate airfields. Since
10
11 aircraft and support equipment are highly susceptible to damage and difficult to replace, aviation units
12 are high priority targets for enemy saboteurs and terrorists. In many situations, ACE units employ large
13 numbers of indigenous personnel in support roles, personnel who are a key target of enemy intelligence
14 activities. Under such conditions, it may be necessary to provide HETs in direct support of ACE
15 elements.
16
g. CI Support to the Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) and Rear Area Operations
(1) Within rear areas, the MAGTF CSSE (along with other MSE elements) is the principal
17
18 organizations requiring CI support. While the CSSE's CI requirements are primarily concerned with
19 military security, those of civil affairs elements generally deal with civil/military interaction and security of
20 the populace. Despite the apparent differences of interest between their requirements, their CI
21 problems are interrelated (e.g., a dissident civilian population hampering the efforts of MAGTF civil
22 affairs elements attempting to establish effective administrative control in the area also disrupting logistics
23 operations through sabotage, terrorism, and harassment attacks).
(2) MAGTF CE CI elements performing general support CI operations normally provide CI
24
25 support to CSSE and other rear area operation elements. This includes support for installations and
26 facilities dispersed through the combat service support areas. The number of team personnel supporting
27 civil affairs units depends on the number of refugees to be identified in the area.
28 4003. Friendly Prisoners of War and Persons Missing (Non-hostile) and Missing in Action
a. Friendly personnel who are captured by the enemy can be a source of information through the
29
30 compromise of documents, personal papers, or as the result of effective interrogation or coercion. It is
31 a fundamental commander responsibility to take necessary steps to counter any possible disclosure that
32 would affect the immediate tactical situation.
CI units are assigned responsibility for investigating and determining risks posed to MAGTF
33
34 operations by friendly personnel who have or may have been captured, collecting information of
4-6

1 potential intelligence value on friendly personnel who may be under enemy control. They also collect
2 intelligence information to aid in identifying, locating, and recovering captured friendly personnel. In
3 addition, CI personnel conduct the intelligence and CI debriefings of friendly personnel who had been
4 captured and then returned to friendly control.
5 b. When friendly personnel have been or may have been captured, the identifying commander will
6 immediately notify their unit intelligence officer, who will then coordinate with the pertinent CI element to
7 initiate the CI investigative process (see appendix E). The CI unit may be able to immediately provide
8 information that could aid in the search and recovery efforts, such as routes to enemy detention centers,
9 locations of possible holding areas, and enemy procedures for handling and evacuating prisoners. If
10 appropriate, the CI element can also initiate immediate CI collection action, such as using CI sources to
11 gain information for possible recovery or search and rescue operations.
c. If the search or recovery attempts are unsuccessful, the CI unit initiates an immediate
12
13 investigation to gather basic identification data and to determine the circumstances surrounding the
14 incident. The investigation is designed to:
15
(1) Provide information to aid in subsequently identifying and locating the individual.
16
(2) Assess the potential intelligence value to the enemy.
17
(3) Collect intelligence information that will be of value when evaluating future intelligence reports.
18 The investigation must be as thorough and detailed as possible and classified according to content.
19 Every attempt is made to obtain recent photographs and handwriting samples of the captured Marine.
20 A synopsis of the investigation, including a summary of the circumstances, is prepared on the CI report
21 form. The completed basic identifying data form is attached as an enclosure to this report.
22 In the case of aircraft incidents, the investigation includes type of aircraft, location and sensitivity of
23 classified equipment, bureau or registration number, call signs, and any aircraft distinguishing marks,
24 such as insignia, etc. When feasible, the investigator should coordinate with the accident investigation
25 team or aviation safety officer of the unit that experienced the loss.
26
d. The CI report, with the attached personnel data form, is distributed to the following commands:
27
(1) MAGTF CE.
28
(2) Individual's parent command (division, MAW, or Force Service Support Group (FSSG)).
29
(3) Each CI element in the AOR.
(4) Other appropriate headquarters (e.g., combatant commander, MARFOR headquarters,

30
31 etc.).
4-7
(5) Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code C4I-CIC).
e. These reports are designed to aid follow-on CI operations. They do not replace normal G/S-1
2
3 casualty reporting procedures. When the CI report concerns a member of another Service assigned to
4 a Marine Corps unit, a copy of the report is also provided to the appropriate component commander
5 and Service headquarters. All subsequent pertinent information is distributed in the same manner as the
6 initial CI report.
f. MAGTF personnel returned to friendly control after being detained by the enemy are debriefed
7
8 by CI personnel. Normally, CI personnel supporting the unit that first gains custody of the individual
9 conduct an initial debriefing to identify information of immediate tactical value and the locations of other
10 friendly prisoners of war. As soon as possible, the returnee is evacuated to the MAGTF CE for further
11 debriefing and subsequent evacuation to a formal debriefing site.
12 4004. Counterintelligence Support during Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).
13 The CI operations previously discussed are generally applicable across the MOOTW, including
14 non-combatant evacuation, peace, and humanitarian and disaster relief operations. CI activities during
15 MOOTW require CI personnel to be thoroughly familiar with the nature of operation, to include its
16 causes, characteristics, and peculiarities, and with the threat infrastructure directing and controlling
17 efforts. Basic CI tasks are the denial of information to the threat force and the identification and
18 neutralization of intelligence operations. A key aim of MOOTW is to restore internal security in the
19 AOR, which requires a vigorous and highly coordinated CI effort. The nature of operation and the
20 threat's covert methods of operation require the employment of a greater number of CI personnel than is
21 generally required for conventional operations.
a. Jurisdiction. Effective CI operations require extensive coordination with the host country
22
23 intelligence, CI, security, and law enforcement agencies. In such operations, MAGTF operations are
24 normally covered by a status of forces agreement (SOFA). The SOFA may include limitations and
25 restrictions concerning the investigation and apprehension of host country citizens or other operations
26 matters.
27
b. MAGTF CI Employment
(1) The employment of CI elements during MOOTW is similar to that previously described. CI
28
29 area coverage is generally used as it provides continuity of operations. Also, as the threat's intelligence
30 operations usually have been are well established, area coverage allows MAGTF CI personnel to better
31 understand and more effectively counter the threat.
(2) When assigning areas of responsibility, MAGTF CI elements ensure coverage overlaps to
32
33 preclude gaps occurring between areas. Threat forces usually prefer to operate on the political or
34 military boundaries where the assigned responsibilities of U.S. and allied forces may be vague and
35 coordination is more difficult. CI elements employed through unit assignment are assigned responsibility
4-8

1 for the area of interest around specified unit's area of responsibility. Under the unit assignment concept,
2 rear area CI elements assume responsibility for any gap in coverage that may develop.
3
c. Counterintelligence Measures and Operations
(1) The basic CI operations, techniques, and procedures previously are generally applicable
4
5 during MOOTW. However, such operations generally require that both passive and active CI
6 measures be increased and aggressively pursued to effectively counter the threat's advantages and
7 capabilities.
(2) All MAGTF units must institute and continuously enforce CI and security measures to deny
8
9 information to the threat force and to protect friendly units from sabotage. In coordination with host
10 country authorities, emphasis is needed on security measures and checks of indigenous employees or
11 other persons with access to MAGTF installations, facilities or command posts.
(3) A significant factor during MOOTW is population and resources control. The movement
12
13 channels and patterns necessary for support, communications, and operations of insurgent forces are
14 observed and controlled. Prior to implementing control measures, the population should be informed of
15 the reasons for controls. Whenever possible, such controls should be performed and enforced by host
16 country agencies.
(4) MAGTF CI elements must implement imaginative and highly aggressive special CI
17
18 operations and HUMINT collection programs targeted against the threat's intelligence infrastructure and
19 operational forces. The primary objective of special operations is the identification, location, and
20 neutralization of specific members of the threat's infrastructure. A CI special operation consists of
21 systematic intelligence collection and analysis with complete documentation concerning the activities of
22 each targeted individual. This provides the host country with an account of the individual's illegal
23 activities once the person is apprehended. Penetration of the infrastructure must be obtained at all levels
24 possibleHUMINT operations are implemented to cover critical areas to identify and locate threat
25 forces. Intelligence derived from HUMINT programs may also be useful in CI special operations.
(5) In MOOTW, cordon and search operations may be employed to ferret out the threat
26
27 infrastructure. Ideally, a cadre of MAGTF CI personnel are assigned to each unit conducting the
28 cordon and search operation in order to provide on scene exploitation and immediate reporting of threat
29 related time-sensitive intelligence. These operations may also be employed to ferret out individual threat
30 units that may use a community or area as cover for their activities or as a support base. Cordon and
31 search operations should be conducted in conjunction with host country forces and organizations, with
32 U. S. forces including CI units providing support, advice, and assistance for the entire operation. At a
33 minimum, host country personnel should be part of the screening and sweep elements of any cordon and
34 search operation. Sweep/screening is often conducted in conjunction with medical, civil affairs, and
35 psychological operations programs (which are accomplished after the screening phase). Throughout
36 the operation, care must be exercised to prevent an adverse psychological effect on the populace.
4-9

1 More details concerning the intelligence and CI applications of cordon and search operations are
2 contained in Army FM 30-64A, CI Operations. Cordon and search operation basically consists of:
3
4 the area.
Security forces which surround the area, usually at night, to prevent persons from leaving
A sweep element that escorts detained people to a collection point at first opportunity.
Search elements that conduct detailed en-mass searches of the area.
Screening elements to process and screen detainees for identification of known or

7
8 suspected threat personnel.
4-10

1
CHAPTER 5
2
3
COMMUNICATIONS & INFORMATION SYSTEMS SUPPORT TO

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS1
4 5001. General. The MAGTF CI effort is heavily dependent upon a secure, reliable, and fast
5 communication and information systems (CIS) support to receive JTF, other components, theater, and
6 national CI and all-source intelligence and to transmit organically collected and produced CI product
7 and reports. CIS are also required for the command and control of MAGTF and supporting CI units
8 and their integration with multi-discipline intelligence operations. Every mission and situation is unique,
9 requiring some modifications to the supporting CIS architecture to support MAGTF CI operations.
10 Detailed planning and close coordination between the CI/HUMINT company/detachment CO/OICs,
11 the MAGTF G/S-2 and G/S-6, and all pertinent operational and intelligence organizations is critical for
12 establishing a reliable and effective CI CIS support.
13 5002. Basic CI CIS Requirements. Regardless of the size of the MAGTF CI/HUMINT forces,
14 there are certain standing CI CIS requirements must be satisfied. These requirements are:
15
a. The capability to command and control subordinate units. Intelligence officers and
16
17 CI/HUMINT element commanders/OICs must be capable of positive C2 of subordinate units and
18 integration of its operations with broader MAGTF and external intelligence and operations C2.
19 Traditionally single-channel radio (SCR) and record message traffic have been used to support C2 of
20 MAGTF CI units. In semi-static situations, secure e-mail or telephone may be the method of choice,
21 while in highly fluid or mobile scenarios, cellular, SATCOM, and VHF and HF radio may be used.
b. The ability to receive collected data and information from deployed CI elements. The
22
23 CIS architecture must provide connectivity between organic and supporting CI/HUMINT elements
24 (such as the HUMINT exploitation teams or CI liaison elements), CI analysis and production centers,
25 and supported MAGTF operations and intelligence centers. Requirements include the capability to
26 transmit collection files and reports digitally via fiber-optics, wire, or radio in formats (both voice and
27 data) that are readily useable by the CI and all-source intelligence analysts.
c. The ability to provide intelligence to supported commanders. CI CIS requirements will be
28
29 influenced by supported commanders' intents, concepts of operations and intelligence, command
30 relationships, and standing PIRs and IRs. The CIS architecture must be capable of integrating
31 CI/HUMINT element C2 and supporting CIS operations (to include special communications
32 capabilities and channels unique to CI reporting) with the primary CIS channels used to by supported
33 commanders.
See MCWP 6-22, Communications and Information Systems, for a detailed review of MAGTF
communications and information systems (CIS) and supporting tactics, techniques and procedures.
5-1

d. The ability to share CI products and reports with MAGTF all-source intelligence
1
2 centers and with CI and all-source JTF, other components, theater, and national CI and
3 intelligence centers. The traditional means for providing this capability are MAGTF general service
4 secure record and voice communications. While these techniques continue to be used, they are rapidly
5 becoming secondary in importance to the use of the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication
6 System (JWICS), the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), and other CI unique CIS
7 capabilities which allow participants to access each others CI products and databases and to
8 immediately pull required data, intelligence and CI products.
9 5003. Command and Control
a. JTF. The joint force commander has operational control of all JTF CI elements. He exercises
10
11 this authority via the JTF intelligence officer (J-2). Within the J-2, CI activities fall under the functional
12 control of the Task Force CI Coordinating Authority (TFCICA) within the intelligence sections J-2X.
13 All CI collection operations management, CI production and CI dissemination tasks are exercised by
14 the TFCICA, to include source deconfliction with the Central Source Registry, reporting coordination
15 and resource application. Other functional managers, such as the Defense HUMINT Service
16 representative within the J-2X or the HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC), have direct tasking authority
17 over their functional assets, requiring close coordination and planning amongst all to ensure effective JTF
18 CI/HUMINT operations.
19
b. MAGTF
(1) The MAGTF commander has operational control of all MAGTF CI elements. He exercises
20
21 this authority via the MAGTF intelligence officer. The intelligence officer's principal staff assistant
22 responsible for planning, directing and managing organic and supporting CI operations is the
23 Counterintelligence/HUMINT Officer (CIHO). At the CI unit level, the CI/HUMINT company
24 commander/detachment OIC has command and operational control. Regardless of the C2 relationships
25 and MAGTF CI concept of employment, technical control of all MAGTF CI/HUMINT company
26 elements will generally be retained by the MAGTF commander.
(2) The following are the principal C2 nodes from which MAGTF CI operations are planned
27
28 and directed:
(a) MAGTF Command Element Combat Intelligence Center (G/S-2). CI elements
29
30 are integrated within two key elements of the MAGTF CE combat intelligence center (CIC): the
31 surveillance and reconnaissance center (SARC) and the all-source fusion center (AFC). Additionally,
32 the MAGTF CIHO will integrate CI operations with those of the intelligence operations officer. The
33 SARC is the primary element for the supervision of MAGTF collection operations and is responsible for
34 the direction, coordination, and monitoring of intelligence collection operations conducted by organic,
35 attached, and direct support collection assets. A CI/HUMINT element will be established within the
36 SARC to monitor ongoing operations and to maintain designated CI radio nets. The AFC is the
37 primary analysis and production element of the MAGTF, responsible for processing and producing
5-2

1 all-source intelligence products in response to MAGTF requirements. Various CI and
2 interrogator-translator personnel are permanently assigned to the AFC to assist with its operations.
3 Besides the CI nets established within the SARC, CI/HUMINT elements working within the CIC will
4 have access to and use the full range of CIC CIS resources.
(b) CI/HUMINT Company HQ. Specialized CI and interrogator-translator platoons
5
6 elements as well as task-organized HETs generally will be employed throughout the MAGTF. The
7 CI/HUMINT company commander exercises full command authority over his subordinate elements,
8 less elements which have been detached under a particular task organization. To support his
9 operations, a CI/HUMINT company command posts generally will be established in the vicinity of the
10 MAGTF CIC and using the full range of CIS supporting the CIC.
(c) Deployed CI/HUMINT Elements. CI/HUMINT elements will generally be
11
12 deployed at many echelons and locations within the MAGTF. For example, significant elements may be
13 either attached to or placed in direct support of GCE forces or the rear area operations commander.
14 Likewise, CI/HUMINT elements may be employed at the MAGTF enemy prisoner of war (EPW)
15 compound and other EPW collection points. The CIS used by these CI elements will be dependent
16 upon the situation. Generally these elements will provide CIS resources to satisfy their organic C2
17 needs, while using the supported headquarter's CIS resources for broader requirements.
18 5004. CIS Support to MAGTF CI Operations
a. General. The CI CIS architecture for any given operation is dynamic. Key reference
19
20 documentation with respect to a specific theater or MAGTF operation are:
(1) Combatant command, JTF and MAGTF CI/HUMINT plans developed for various
21
22 OPLANs.
(2) MAGTF command element intelligence standing operating procedures and combatant
23
24 commanders intelligence and CI/HUMINT tactics, techniques and procedures.
(3) Annexes B (intelligence), C (operations), J (command relationships), and K
25
26 (communications and information systems) of the MAGTF and JTF OPORDs.
(4) The following parts of Annex B (Intelligence) to a MAGTF OPORD: Appendix 3
27
28 (Counterintelligence Operations); appendix 5 (Human Resources Intelligence Operations); and tab D
29 (Intelligence Communications and Information Systems Plan) to appendix 10 (Intelligence Operations
30 Plan).
b. Communications Systems. Information systems and supporting communications connectivity
31
32 are evolving rapidly within the Marine Corps and other elements of the military. The following
33 information provides typical key MAGTF CI communications requirements. The MAGTF mission, the
34 nature of the threat, friendly concepts of operations and intelligence, supporting task organization and
5-3

1 command relationships, and extent of allied/multinational operations are the key factors influencing what
2 specific CI communications are established during operations.
(1) Intelligence and CI/HUMINT Radio Nets. The following are radio nets typically
3
4 established for either dedicated CI needs or are intelligence nets that CI elements may need to be
5 stations on:
(a) MAGTF Intelligence (UHF-SATCOM/HF/VHF). Used for rapid reporting and
6
7 dissemination of intelligence, collaborative planning of future MAGTF intelligence operations, and
8 command and control of ongoing MAGTF intelligence and reconnaissance operations. Typical
9 organizations/elements participating in this net include: the MAGTF CE; the GCE/ACE/CSSE
10 headquarters; intelligence, CI and reconnaissance elements either attached to, OPCON to or supporting
11 the MAGTF; and others as directed.
(b) GCE/ACE/CSSE Intelligence (HF/VHF). Used to provide rapid reporting and
12
13 dissemination of intelligence, collaborative planning of future intelligence operations, and command and
14 control of ongoing intelligence and reconnaissance operations. Typical organizations/elements
15 participating in this net include: the GCE/ACE/CSSE headquarters; headquarters of their major
16 subordinate units; intelligence, CI and reconnaissance elements either attached to, OPCON to or
17 supporting the a MSE headquarters; and others as directed..
(c) Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Team(s) Command
18
19 (HF/VHF). Used for command and control of counterintelligence teams, interrogator-translator teams,
20 and HUMINT exploitation teams (HET) operations, and the coordination of
21 counterintelligence/HUMINT administrative and logistic support. This net will also generally terminate in
22 the MAGTF surveillance and reconnaissance center (SARC).
(d) Counterintelligence/HUMINT Reporting Net (VHF/HF). Used as a means for the
23
24 rapid reporting of counterintelligence/HUMINT data to supported units. Participants generally include
25 counterintelligence teams, interrogator-translator teams, and HET operations, the SARC, and the
26 intelligence center of any supported units.
(2) CI/HUMINT Communications Equipment. CI elements require extensive
27
28 communications support from the command to which they are attached. The command is responsible to
29 provide frequency management, cryptographic materials system (CMS) control, and logistics support
30 (e.g., batteries and maintenance). These requirements include secure dedicated and shared systems
31 connectivity and are situationally dependent based upon employment method, terrain, distance and other
32 factors. CI elements usually deploy with the following organic communications and information systems:
33
SINGARS radios -- primarily to support CI element C2 and intelligence reporting.
Motorola SABER radios -- principally to support internal CI element communications of

34
35 an operational nature (e.g., surveillance or security).
5-4
c. Intelligence and CI/HUMINT Information Systems. The following are information systems
1
2 and selected databases typically established for either dedicated CI needs or are multi-purpose
3 intelligence systems that CI elements may either use or must interoperate with.
(1) Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS). JDISS is an all-source
4
5 automated intelligence tool that provides the backbone of intelligence connectivity amongst the national,
6 theater, JTF headquarters, component commanders, and other intelligence organizations. JDISS
7 employs a transportable workstation and communications suite that electronically extends a joint
8 intelligence center to a JTF and other tactical users. Either SIPRNET or JWICS will provide the
9 principal communications connectivity for JDISS.
(2) Intelligence Analysis System (IAS). IAS provides automated applications and other
10
11 tools for all-source intelligence planning, management, analysis, production and dissemination. Various
12 configurations of IAS will be organic to intelligence sections from the battalion/squadron through
13 MAGTF CE levels.
(3) Defense Counterintelligence Information System (DCIIS). DCIIS is a DOD system
14
15 which automates and standardizes CI functions at all command echelons. DCIIS contains standardized
16 DOD forms (for CI investigations, collections, operations, and analysis & production) and shared CI
17 databases. DCIIS also contains supplemental forms to satisfy tactical reporting requirements of Marine
18 and Army CI elements. DCIIS is interoperable with JDISS and other intelligence systems.
19 Communications connectivity is via SIPRNET.
(4) Defense Intelligence Threat Data System (DITDS). DITDS is available via JDISS,
20
21 IAS and other intelligence systems. It contains the DOD CI/counter-terrorism/counter- proliferation
22 databases and is principally used by CI analysts and production personnel. The system provides a
23 number of analytical tools, such as automated and graphical link analysis hot-linked to the underlying
24 reports, automatic time lining as well as access to various communications systems to support
25 dissemination.
(5) Migration Defense Intelligence Threat Data System (MDITDS). The MDITDS is
26
27 being developed to operate on the DCIIS to provide an automated production system for DODIIS
28 Indications and Warning (I&W), counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and Arms Proliferation/Defense
29 Industry communities. Many of the current intelligence/counterintelligence databases that reside on
30 other systems will become resident within the MDITDS. Some of these include DITDS, SPHINX
31 (DIA's CI database), CANNON LIGHT (U. S. Army CI database), BLOODHOUND (EUCOM CI
32 database), Automated Intelligence Information Retrieval System (AIIRS), Automated Decision Making
33 and Program Timeline (ADAPT), Defense Automated Warning System (DAWS), Sensitive
34 Compartmented Automated Research Facility (SCARF), Terrorism Research & Analysis Program
35 (TRAP), and many others.
5-5

(6) HUMINT Operational Communications Network (HOCNET). HOCNET is the
1
2 umbrella name given to a collection of systems and applications currently operational or under
3 development which support the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) worldwide activities (i.e., Defense
4 Attach Worldwide Network (DAWN)).
(7) Special Operations Debriefing And Reporting System (SODARS). SODARS
5
6 provides detailed mission debriefs and after-action reports from special operations forces (SOF). As
7 SOF are often the first and perhaps only DOD force committed to an operation, they may provide
8 invaluable intelligence and CI when developing pre-deployment threat assessments.
(8) AN/PYQ-3 CI/HUMINT Automated Tool Set (CHATS). CHATS consists of CIS
9
10 hardware and software designed to meet the unique requirements of MAGTF CI/HUMINT elements.
11 Operating up to the SECRET level and using the baseline DCIIS software suite, the system provides the
12 capability to manage MAGTF CI assets and analyze information collected through CI investigations,
13 interrogations, collection, and document exploitation. With CHATS, CI units may electronically store
14 collected information in a local database, associate information with digital photography, and
15 transmit/receive information over existing military and civilian communications. (See appendix B for
16 additional information on CHATS.)
(9) Joint Collection Management Tool (JCMT). JCMT is the principal automated tool for
17
18 all-source intelligence collection requirements management. It provides a capability for management,
19 evaluation and direction of collection operations. Using DCIIS, CI collection requirements and taskings
20 can be accessed from the JCMT.
(10) Community On Line Intelligence Support End User Management (COLISEUM)
21
22 System. COLISEUM is the automated, DOD Intelligence Production Program (DODIPP) intelligence
23 production requirements system that allows authorized users to directly submit multi-discipline
24 intelligence production requirements to commanders and intelligence production centers. COLISEUM
25 also tracks responses and provide status reports on validated production requirements.
d. Summary -- Counterintelligence Command and Control and Supporting
26
27 Communications and Information Systems. Figure 5-1 depicts a notional MEF CI architecture,
28 while figure 5-2 depicts key CI elements and supporting CIS within the MAGTF CE CIC. Together
29 they emphasize three key aspects of MAGTF CI C2 and supporting CIS operations:
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
The task organization and command/support relationships of MAGTF CI units -CI/HUMINT company headquarters collocated with the MAGTF G/S-2. Although
company elements normally operate in general support of the MAGTF, task-organized
CI, interrogator-translator or HETs may be either attached to or placed in direct
support of MAGTF subordinate units..
Principal CI systems (e.g., CHATS) employed within and in support of the MAGTF.
5-6

1
2
Communications connectivity -- the principal communications pathways and the level

of security classification.
Figure 5-1. Counterintelligence Architecture
5-7
T-SCIF
TROJAN
SPIRIT II
- JWICS
- DSSCS
- Other
TCAC
RadBn
OCAC
RRT
Concept
GOB
AOB
CI
JTF
DOTES
Netscape
Enabler
Integration:
(SECRET LOCAL AREA NETWORK)
Concept
SCR
INTEL, OPS,
FIRES NETS
MEF
IAS
SIPRNET
GATEWAY
TTC-42
Voice Switch
JWICS
GATEWAY
NIPRNET
GATEWAY
TSC-85
or 93
Intel
OpO
CI/HUMINT
Section
FIIU TEG
JSIPS
Collections Mgr
TSC-93
SATCOM
COUNTERINTEL
GENSER
DMS
SSO
INTERROGTRANS
SCR SCR
FORCE
RECON
SCR
UAV
SCAMP
SARC
OIC
Video
SCR
TSC-85 (or 93)

SATCOM
Dissemination Mgr
SCR
INTELLIGENCE
WATCH
MAGTF All-Source
Fusion Center
SCR
Combat
Operations
Center
SSCC/DSSCS
A (
R SC
EA I
N LO
ET C
W AL
O
R
K
)
Click to
submit
comment
Future
MEF
Operations
IAS
Center/
INTELLIGENCE
Future
PLANS TEAM
Plans
SCR
TPCS
JOINT STARS
CGS
SCR
MEWSS
JTF
Netscape
Enabler
TRSS
Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center

[Note: not all systems and connectivity depicted.]
Figure 5-2. Counterintelligence Elements Within the MAGTF CE CIC
2 5005. CI CIS Planning Considerations. The following identifies key CIS requirements and planning
3 considerations in support of MAGTF CI operations.
a. Ensure that the MAGTF CE, CI/HUMINT elements, and other MAGTF units are included in
4
5 the distribution of CI/HUMINT-related address indicator groups to receive pertinent JTF, theater, &
6 national intelligence and CI products.
b. Determine and coordinate radio nets requirements, supporting frequencies, and operational
7
8 procedures in support of CI operations (external to MAGTF, internal MAGTF, intelligence broadcasts,
9 retransmission sites, routine and time-sensitive operations, etc.).
10
c. Coordination of CI CIS activation and restoration priorities and supporting procedures.
11
d. CMS requirements for unique CI communications.
d. Determine and coordinate wire communications (to include telephones) in support of CI

12
13 operations.
14
e. Establishment, operation and management of unique CI communications.

5-8

f. Determine and coordinate local and wide area networks and unique intelligence networks
1
2 information systems requirements in support of CI operations (hardware, software, internet protocol
3 addresses, etc.).
g. Integration of CI/HUMINT elements' CIS operations with those of other MAGTF and pertinent
4
5 JTF and other components intelligence and reconnaissance units (mutual support, cueing, etc.).
h. Communications integration of CI/HUMINT elements employed in general support with
6
7 collocated GCE, ACE, CSSE and other MAGTF elements (e.g., to provide time-sensitive reporting,
8 coordination of maneuver, etc.).
i. Coordination of CI CIS and dissemination operations and procedures with allied and coalition
9
10 forces.
5-9

1
CHAPTER 6
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLANNING
3 6001. Marine Corps Planning Process and Joint Planning Process Overview1
a. General. Planning is an act of preparing for future decisions in an uncertain and
4
time-constrained
environment. Whether it is done at the national or the battalion/squadron level, the key
5
6 functions of planning are:
7
(1) Planning leads to a plan that directs and coordinates action.
(2) Planning develops a shared situational awareness.
(3) Planning generates expectations about how actions will evolve and how they will affect the
9
desired
outcome.
10
11
(4) Planning supports the exercise of initiative.
12
(5) Planning shapes the thinking of planners.
b. Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP). The MCPP helps organize the thought processes
13
14 of a commander and his staff throughout the planning and execution of military operations. It focuses on
15 the threat and is based on the Marine Corps warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare. It capitalizes
16 on the principle of unity of effort and supports the establishment and maintenance of tempo. The MCPP
17 steps can be as detailed or as abbreviated as time, staff resources, experience, and the situation permit.
18 It applies to command and staff actions at all echelons. From the Marine Corps component
19 headquarters to the battalion/squadron level, commanders and staff members must master the MCPP in
20 order to be full participants in integrated planning. Additionally, the MCPP complements deliberate or
21 crisis action planning (CAP) as outlined in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES).
22 The MCPP establishes procedures for analyzing a mission, developing and analyzing COAs against the
23 threat, comparing friendly COAs against the commanders criteria and each other, selecting a COA,
24 and preparing an OPORD for execution. The MCPP organizes the planning process into six
25 manageable, logical steps. It provides the commander and his staff a means to organize their planning
26 activities and transmit the plan to subordinates and subordinate commands. Through this process, all
27 MAGTF levels of command can begin their planning effort with a common understanding of the mission
28 and commanders guidance. The six integrated steps of this process are:
1
MCWP 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process, is now in development and will provide detailed doctrine and TTP regarding
the MCPP. Jt Pub 5-00.2,Joint Task Force Planning Guidance, likewise provides detailed discussion of the joint planning
processes.
6-1
MISSION ANALYSIS
COURSE OF ACTION
DEVELOPMENT
COA ANALYSIS
COA COMPARISON/
DECISION
ORDERS
DEVELOPMENT
TRANSITION
Figure 6-1. The Marine Corps Planning Process
(1) Mission Analysis. Mission analysis is the first step in planning. The purpose of mission
3
4 analysis is to review and analyze orders, guidance, and other information provided by higher
5 headquarters and produce a unit mission statement. Mission analysis drives the MCPP.
(2) COA Development. During COA development, the planners use the mission statement
6
7 (which includes higher headquarters tasking and intent), commanders intent, and commanders planning
8 guidance to develop several COAs. Each prospective COA is examined to ensure that it is suitable,
9 feasible, different, acceptable, and complete with respect to the current and anticipated situation, the
10 mission, and the commanders intent. In accordance with the commanders guidance, approved COAs
11 are further developed in greater detail.
(3) COA Analysis. During COA analysis, each friendly COA is examined against selected
12
13 threat COAs. COA analysis involves a detailed assessment of each COA as it pertains to the threat
14 and the environment. COA analysis assists the planners in identifying strengths and weaknesses,
15 associated risks, and asset shortfalls for each friendly COA. COA analysis will also identify branches
6-2

1 and potential sequels that may require additional planning. Short of actually executing the COA, COA
2 analysis provides the most reliable basis for understanding and improving each COA.
(4) COA Comparison and Decision. In COA comparison and decision, the commander
3
4 evaluates all friendly COAsagainst established criteria, then against each other---and selects the
5 COA that he deems most likely to accomplish the mission.
(5) Orders Development. During orders development, the staff takes the commanders COA
6
7 decision, intent, and guidance, and develops orders to direct the actions of the unit. Orders serve as the
8 principal means by which the commander expresses his decision, intent, and guidance.
(6) Transition. Transition is an orderly handover of a plan or order as it is passed to those
9
10 tasked with execution of the operation. It provides those who will execute the plan or order with the
11 situational awareness and rationale for key decisions necessary to ensure there is a coherent shift from
12 planning to execution.
13 Interactions among various planning steps allow a concurrent, coordinated effort that maintains
14 flexibility, makes efficient use of time available, and facilitates continuous information sharing.
15
c. Comparison of the MCPP and the Joint Planning Processes
(1) Joint Deliberate Planning. The deliberate planning process is used by the joint staff and
16
17 commanders in chief (CINCs) to develop plans (OPLANs, CONPLANs, functional plans) in support
18 of national strategy. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) apportions forces and resources for
19 use during deliberate planning by the combatant commanders and their service component commanders.
20 The figure below illustrates how the MCPP fits within and supports the joint deliberate planning process.
JSCP
Initiation
Delberate Planning Process
Concept
Development
Plan
Development
Plan Review
Supporting
Plans
Situational
Awareness at
MAGTF
Begins Here
AN
OPL
CON
Mission
Analysis
TPFDD
Maintenance
COA
Dev
PLA
COA
Analysis
Comparison/
Decision
Orders
Dev
Transition
MCPP
21
22
Figure 6-2. The MCPP and the Joint Deliberate Planning Process
6-3

(2) Crisis Action Planning (CAP). CAP is conducted in response to crises where national
1
2 interests are threatened and a military response is being considered. In CAP, the time available for
3 planning at the national level is reduced to as little as a few days. CAP procedures promote the logical,
4 rapid flow of information and the timely preparation of campaign plans or OPORDs. The figure below
5 illustrates how the MCPP fits within and supports the joint crisis action planning process.
6
7
Figure 6-3. The MCPP and the Joint Crisis Action Planning Process
8 6002. Counterintelligence Planning

a. Intelligence Planning. CI planning and execution is conducted in concert with the six phases of
9
10 the standard intelligence cycle. The first phase is planning and direction. It consists of those activities
11 that identify pertinent intelligence requirements (IR) and provide the means for satisfying those
12 requirements (see figure 6-4).2 Intelligence planning and direction is a continuous function and a
13 command responsibility. The commander directs the intelligence effort; the intelligence officer manages
See chapter three of MCWP 2-1, Intelligence Operations, for comprehensive discussion of each
phase of the intelligence cycle and the overall conduct of intelligence planning and direction.
6-4

1 this effort for the commander based on the intent, designation of priority intelligence requirements (PIR),
2 and specific guidance provided during the planning process.
Planning and Direction Functions

Requirements development
Requirements management
Collection management
Production management
3
4
Figure 6-4. Functions of the Planning and Direction Phase

b. CI Planning -- General
(1) Focus. CI planning and subsequent operations are conducted in support of the MAGTF or
5
6 designated subordinate commanders in order to both support the overall intelligence effort and to aid
7 with force protection. Accordingly, CI must be planned in conjunction with the overall intelligence and
8 force protection efforts. The commander must incorporate CI early in the planning process in order to
9 formulate his estimate of the situation, identify the MAGTF's risks and security vulnerabilities, and begin
10 shaping his overall operations and supporting intelligence and force protection operations.
(2) CI and HUMINT. CI also has to be considered with many other intelligence activities
11
12 because of the mission of CI. HUMINT is the intelligence activity that has the most important
13 connective tie to CI. CI and HUMINT work hand-in-hand because of the nature of their targets and
14 the type of intelligence missions they perform: CI destroying the enemy intelligence effort and HUMINT
15 collecting information about enemy activity. The differentiation and coordination required for the
16 effective exploitation of human sources is critical, requiring integration of CI activities and HUMINT
17 operations (e.g., interrogator/translator exploitation of enemy prisoners of war (EPW)). See DIAM
18 58-11, DOD HUMINT Policies and Procedures, and DIAM 58-12, The DOD HUMINT
19 Management System, for additional information.
20
(3) CI Planning Responsibilities
(a) Intelligence Officer. Primary staff responsibility for CI operations planning lies with the
21
22 G/S-2. Included in his responsibilities are:
Preparation of integrated, multi-discipline intelligence and reconnaissance operations
23
and
supporting
CI
plans, orders, annexes, and appendices.
24
6-5

Coordination with the G/S-3 to ensure that the planned CI effort will support the
1
2 concept of operations and the scheme of maneuver; to ensure effective prioritization and integration of
3 CI operations with MAGTF force protection operations; to ensure integration of CI operations with
4 PSYOP, civil affairs, and military police activities; and to ensure effective integration of MAGTF CI
5 elements with subordinate units' operations.
Coordination with the G/S-6 officer for communication and information systems
6
7 support to the CI elements, including circuits and networks access, frequency assignment, equipment,
8 call signs, and support to special CI communications.
9
10 J-2X.
Liaison with CI agencies and units external to the MAGTF, in particular the JTF
Coordination with the G/S-4 to ensure adequate logistics support of CI elements, in

11
12 particular transportation and the maintenance of CI units' unique equipment.
(b) CI/HUMINT Officer (CIHO). The CIHO is responsible to the G/S-2 (or the MAGTF
13
14 intelligence operations officer) for the planning, direction and execution of MAGTF CI operations.
15 Specific duties include:
In conjunction with other intelligence section staff officers and the CI/HUMINT
16
17 company (Co) commander, prepare MAGTF CI plans and orders.
In conjunction with the collection management officer and the CI/HUMINT Co
18
19 planners, coordinate, plan, supervise, and assist CI collection requirements and taskings for MAGTF
20 operations.
21
In coordination with the SARC OIC, CI/HUMINT Co, and the G/S-3, coordinate
22
23 the movement, operation and reporting of CI units.
In conjunction with MAGTF AFC OIC and CI/HUMINT Co, coordinate MAGTF
24
25 AFC analyst exchanges with CI analysts; and the integration of CI with all-source intelligence
26 production.
In coordination with the dissemination officer, plan for the timely reporting of
27
28 CI-derived intelligence to MAGTF and external elements and the rapid handling of perishable CI
29 information.
In conjunction with the G/S-6, plan and coordinate CI special communications paths
30
31 and operations.
32
6-6

(c) CI/HUMINT Company Commander. The CI/HUMINT Co commander is responsible
1
2 for the effective conduct of MAGTF CI/HUMINT operations in support of the commander's intent and
3 the operational and intelligence concept of operations. Specific CI tasks include:
Plan and employ CI resources in response to the commander's intent, threat situation
4
5 and the MAGTF G/S-2's guidance and direction and intelligence operations plan.
Effect TECHON of MAGTF organic CI collection, processing and exploitation,
6
7 production, and dissemination operations; and the effective coordination of MAGTF CI operations with
8 JTF, other services, theater, national, and other Service CI agencies.
Coordinate movement and operations of CI units with MAGTF staff elements and
9
10 subordinate units commanders, ensuring that all element movements are coordinated with the current
11 operations center, fire support coordination center and the SARC.
Advise the G/S-2, CIHO, intelligence operations officer, MAGTF AFC OIC,
12
13 collections officer, and dissemination officer on CI employment and its integration with JTF, theater, and
14 national CI operations.
c. Coordination Considerations. The complexity of CI operations requires thorough
15
16 coordination with all intelligence organizations. Detailed coordination ensures that CI operations are
17 both focused upon intelligence priorities and are not duplicative. Constant coordination must be
18 accomplished with the JTF and other component forces, combatant commander, and other supporting
19 intelligence organizations to ensure that a coordinated, manageable and effective CI operations are
20 conducted.
21
(1) CI Planning Considerations. Key considerations in planning CI operations include:
(a) Friendly Considerations. The CI operations effort must support and adapt to the
22
23 commander's intent, concepts of intelligence and operations, and the supporting scheme of maneuver.
24 Questions to answer include:
25
What is the MAGTF area of operations (AO) and area of interest (AI)?
26
27 efforts?
What is the MAGTF concept of operations, task organization, main and supporting
What is the task organization and command/support relationships amongst all

28
29 MAGTF intelligence, CI and reconnaissance units? Can the friendly concept of operations be
30 supported by CI elements operating in MAGTF general support, or are CI direct support/attachments
31 to MAGTF subordinate units required?
32
6-7

What are the standing PIRs and IRs? Which have been tasked to supporting CI
1
2 units? What specific information is the commander most interested in (i.e., enemy air operations, enemy
3 ground operations, friendly force protection, target BDA, or enemy future intentions)?
What is the MAGTF force protection concept of operations? What are the standing
4
5 EEFIs and their assessed priorities?
What are the CI, intelligence and force protection concepts of operations of the JTF,
6
7 other components and theater forces? How can external CI assets be best integrated and employed to
8 support MAGTF operations?
(b) Enemy Considerations. Intelligence operations focus on the enemy. Prior to
9
10 commencing MAGTF CI operations, we must learn as much as we can about the enemy. Key
11 adversary information which must be considered when conducting CI planning include:
12
What threat forces -- conventional, law enforcement/security, paramilitary, guerrilla,
13
14 terrorist -- are within the MAGTF AO and AI? What are their centers of gravity and critical
15 vulnerabilities? Is this a large enemy force organized along conventional military lines or a small, loosely
16 knit guerrillas or unconventional military force? What are their sizes, composition, and tactics,
17 techniques and procedures?
Who are the key enemy military, security and civilian leaders? What and where are
18
19 the enemy's critical nodes for command and control and what are their vulnerabilities? What security
20 countermeasures do they employ to prevent CI exploitation of their operations? What are its command
21 and control and CIS tactics, techniques and procedures?
Who are the know enemy personalities engaged in intelligence, CI, security, police,
22
terrorist,
or
political
activities? Who are known or suspected collaborators and sympathizers, both
23
24 within the populace as well as within other parties?
What are the key installations and facilities used by enemy intelligence, espionage,
25
sabotage,
subversive
and police organizations? What are the key communications, media, chemical,
26
27 biological, utilities, and political installations and facilities?
What are the national and local political parties or other groups known to have aims,
28
beliefs,
or
ideologies
contrary or in opposition to those of the U.S.? What are the student, police,
29
30 military veterans, and similar groups known to be hostile to the U.S.?
31 6003. CI Planning and the Intelligence Cycle
32
a. General
6-8

(1) The intelligence cycle is a procedural framework for the development of mission-focused
1
2 intelligence support. It is not an end in itself, nor should it be viewed as a rigid set of procedures that
3 must be carried out in an identical manner on all occasions. Rather, the commander and the intelligence
4 officer must consider each IR individually and apply the intelligence cycle in a manner that develops the
5 required intelligence in the most effective way.
(2) The application of the intelligence cycle will vary with the phase of the planning cycle. In
6
7 theory, a unique iteration of the intelligence cycle is carried out for each individual requirement. In
8 practice, particularly during the planning phase, requirements are grouped together and satisfied through
9 a single, concurrent intelligence development process that concurrently addresses CI requirements.
10 During the planning phase, intelligence development is generally carried out through two major iterations
11 of the intelligence cycle. The first primarily supports decision planning. Completion of this iteration of the
12 intelligence cycle results in the preparation and use of basic intelligence and CI productsintelligence
13 and CI estimates, supporting studies, and IPB analysisthat describe the battlespace and threat. These
14 products form the basis for development and selection of MAGTF COAs. The second iteration of the
15 intelligence cycle supports execution planning. It is an outgrowth of the selection of the COA and
16 formulation of the concept of operations; the implementation of the intelligence collection, production
17 and dissemination plan; refinement of IPB analysis, and the generation of mission-specific intelligence
18 products and CI measures which are integrated with the concept of operations to support mission
19 execution. During execution, requirements are satisfied on a more individualized basis. New
20 requirements are usually generated in response to a specific operational need. Each requirement is
21 unique and must be satisfied in a timely manner to facilitate rapid decisionmaking and the generation or
22 maintenance of tempo (see figure 6-5).
6-9
Figure 6-5. Application of the Intelligence Cycle
(3) The G-2/S-2 provides CI participation and assistance early in the planning phase of tactical
2
3 operations. The commanders benefit from CI information given at this phase because it helps to
4 formulate tactical plans and because CI/HUMINT operations, by their very nature, generally require
5 more time than other intelligence disciplines to yield substantive results. CI also provides the
6 commander with capabilities that are offered by no other discipline or technical system. CI is one of the
7 tools that can help the commander anticipate the action of the enemy. Particular attention is directed to
8 identifying friendly vulnerabilities to be exploited by hostile collections assets and to recommending
9 specific CI measures.
(4) The CI effort focuses on the overall hostile intelligence collection, sabotage, terrorist, and
10
11 subversive threat. The CI effort is also sufficiently flexible to adapt to the geographical environment,
12 attitudes of the indigenous population, mission of the supported command, and changing emphasis by
13 hostile intelligence, sabotage, terrorist, and subversive organizations.
b. Planning the Activity. The effectiveness of MAGTF CI operations depends largely on the
14
15 planning preceding the operation. The CI staff officer, assisted by the CI/HUMINT Co commander or
16 HET OIC, performs four separate functions in carrying out his planning responsibilities. First, he directs
6-10

1 the effort to collect information on the enemy's intelligence, sabotage, terrorism, and subversion
2 capabilities, coordinating with the intelligence operations officer and collection manager to ensure CI
3 collection requirements levied upon CI/HUMINT elements are realistic and within the capability of the
4 CI elements and are integrated into the MAGTFs all-source intelligence collection plan. Second, in
5 coordination with the AFC OIC and the G/S-3 force protection planners, he support the production of
6 intelligence on the enemy's intelligence, sabotage, terrorism, and subversion capabilities, including
7 clandestine and covert capabilities. Third, in coordination with the intelligence dissemination officer, he
8 ensures the timely dissemination of CI products to all MAGTF units. Finally, he plans, recommends,
9 and monitors CI measures throughout the entire command.
(1) CI Collection and Processing of Information. CI elements can collect both CI and
10
11 combat intelligence information through the use of controlled HUMINT. In addition to its CI functions,
12 an element may be assigned additional responsibility for combat intelligence collection. The area
13 commander normally provides the procedures and authority governing the conduct of controlled
14 HUMINT operations and certain offensive CI operations. These procedures are covered in detail in
15 the classified addendum, DIAM 58-11 DOD HUMINT Policies and Procedures, DIAM 58-12
16 DOD HUMINT Management System, and theater collection plans. The determination of CI collection
17 requirements follows the same process and procedures prescribed for other types of IRs (see MCWP
18 2-1, MAGTF Intelligence Operations, chapter 3). Especially pertinent to CI planning is information
19 on the enemy's intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities and operations. Included are such matters
20 as the hostile intelligence organization, means available to the enemy for the collection of information,
21 and hostile sabotage, terrorism, and subversive agencies and capabilities.
(a) CI Collection Sources. CI sources of information include:
22
23
Casual Sources. A casual source is one who, by social or professional position,
24
25 has access to information of CI interest, usually on a continuing basis. Casual sources usually can be
26 relied on to provide information which is routinely available to them. They are under no obligation to
27 provide information. Casual sources include private citizens, such as retired officials or other prominent
28 residents of an area. Members of private organizations also may furnish information of value.
Official Sources. Official sources are liaison contacts. CI personnel conduct
29
30 liaison with foreign and domestic CI intelligence, security, and law enforcement agencies to exchange
31 information and obtain assistance. CI personnel are interested in investigative, operational, and threat
32 information.
Recruited Sources. Recruited sources include those who support CFSO and
33
34 are by design, human source networks dispersed throughout the area of operations who can provide
35 timely and pertinent force protection information
Refugees, Civilian Detainees and EPWs . Refugees, civilian detainees, and
36
37 EPWs are other sources of CI information. Interrogators normally conduct these collection operations,
38 often with technical assistance from a CI agent. The key to identifying the source of valuable CI force
6-11

1 protection information is in analyzing the information being sought and predicting who, by virtue of their
2 regular duties, would have regular, frequent, and unquestioned access to such information.
Open Sources. Open source publications of all sorts (newspapers, magazines,
3
4 etc.) and radio and television broadcasts are valuable sources of information of CI interest and
5 information. When information is presented in a foreign language, linguist support is required for timely
6 translation. Depending on the resources, this support can be provided by MAGTF interrogation
7 personnel, allied personnel, or indigenous employees.
Documents. Documents not openly available, such as adversary plans and
8
9 reports, are exploited in much the same way as open source publications.
(b) Counterintelligence Targets. CI targets include personalities, organizations, and
10
11 installations (PO&I) of intelligence or CI interest, which must be seized, exploited, neutralized or
12 protected. The PO&I targeting triad forms the basis of CI activities. Incidents are also included within
13 CI databases to conduct trend analysis of potential targets. DIA has the responsibility, in response to a
14 validated requirement, to establish and maintain CI databases. Operational control of the database will
15 pass to the Joint Task Force, once deployed. The AFC CIAT has the responsibility of establishing and
16 maintaining CI databases for the MEF and will coordinate with the local collection elements to eliminate
17 duplication of effort and maximize information sharing (within smaller MAGTFs, the CI/HUMINT Co
18 detachment or HET performs this function).
19 Selecting and assigning targets is based on an assessment of the overall hostile threat, unit mission,
20 commanders intent, designated PIRs and other IRs, and the overarching intelligence and force
21 protection concepts of operations. The assessment considers both the immediate and estimated future
22 threats to security. It normally is conducted at the MAGTF level where the resultant CI targets lists are
23 also produced and which include any CI targets assigned by higher headquarters. Numerical priority
24 designations are assigned to each target to emphasize the relative importance and value of the target.
25 The designations also indicate the degree of security threat and urgency in neutralizing or exploiting the
26 target. Priority designations established by higher headquarters are not altered; however, lower
27 echelons may assign priorities to locally developed targets. CI targets are usually assigned priority
28 designations according to the following criteria:
Priority One. Priority One targets represent the greatest security threat to the
29
30 MAGTF. They also possess the largest potential source of intelligence or CI information/material which
31 must be exploited or neutralized as soon as possible.
Priority Two. Priority Two targets are of lesser significance than priority one.
32
33 They are to be taken under control after priority one targets have been neutralized or exploited.
Priority Three. Priority Three targets are of lesser significance than priority one
34
35 or two. They are to be neutralized or exploited as time and personnel permit.
6-12

1 Personalities. Except for well-known personalities, most persons of CI interest are
1
2 identified and developed by CI units once operations have commenced. Personalities are divided into
3 three categories. These categories comprise those persons who are a threat to security, whose
4 intentions are unknown, and who can assist the intelligence and CI effort. For ease in identification, a
5 color code indicates the categories.
DETAIN (Black) List. An official CI listing of actual or potential enemy
6
7 collaborators, sympathizers, intelligence suspects, and other persons whose presence menaces the
8 security of friendly forces (Joint Pub 1-02). The black list includes the following persons:
Known or suspected enemy or hostile espionage, sabotage, terrorist,
9
10 political, and subversive individuals.
11
12 or guerrilla groups.
Known or suspected leaders and members of hostile paramilitary, partisan,
Political leaders known or suspected to be hostile to the military and political

13
14 objectives of the United States and/or an allied nation.
Known or suspected officials of enemy governments whose presence in the
15
16 theater of operations poses a security threat to the U.S. Forces.
Known or suspected enemy collaborators and sympathizers whose presence
17
18 in the theater of operations poses a security threat to the U.S. Forces.
Known enemy military or civilian personnel who have engaged in intelligence,
19
20 CI, security, police, or political indoctrination activities among troops or civilians.
Other enemy personalities such as local political personalities, police chiefs,
21
22 and heads of significant municipal and/or national departments or agencies.
OF INTEREST (Gray) List. Gray lists, compiled or developed at all echelons
23
24 of command, contain the identities and locations of those personalities whose inclinations and attitudes
25 toward the political and military objectives of the United States are unknown. Regardless of their
26 leanings, personalities may be on gray lists when known to possess information or particular skills
27 required by friendly forces. They may be individuals whose political motivations require further
28 exploration before they can be used effectively. Examples of individuals who may be included in this
29 category are:
30
31 been established.
Potential or actual defectors from the hostile cause whose credibility has not
6-13

Individuals who have resisted, or are believed to have resisted the enemy
1
2 government and who may be willing to cooperate with friendly forces, but whose credibility has not
3 been established.
Nuclear, biological, chemical and other scientists, and technicians suspected
4
5 of having been engaged in enemy weapons of mass destruction and other programs against their will.
PROTECT (White) Lists. White lists, compiled or developed at all echelons of
6
7 command, contain the identities and locations of individuals in enemy controlled areas. These individuals
8 are of intelligence or CI interest. They are expected to be able to provide information or assistance in
9 the accumulation of intelligence data or in the exploitation of existing or new intelligence areas of interest.
10 They are usually in accord with or favorably inclined toward U.S. policies. Their contributions are
11 based on a voluntary and cooperative attitude. Decisions to place individuals on the white list may be
12 affected by the combat situation, critical need for specialists in scientific fields, and such intelligence
13 needs as are indicated from time to time. Examples of individuals included in this category are:
14
15 leaders.
Former political leaders of a hostile state deposed by the hostile political
16
Intelligence agents employed by U.S. or Allied intelligence agencies
Key civilians in areas of scientific research, to include faculty members of

17
18 universities and staffs of industrial or national research facilities whose credibility have been established.
19
Leaders of religious groups and other humanitarian groups.
Other persons who can significantly aid the political, scientific, and military
20
21 objectives of the U.S. and whose credibility has been established.
2 Organizations. These include any organization or group which is an actual or
22
23 potential threat to the security of JTF. or other allied forces and must be neutralized. However, an
24 organization or group may present a threat that is not immediately apparent. The enemy frequently
25 camouflages his espionage or subversive activities by establishing front organizations or groups. If these
26 organizations are permitted to continue their activities, they could impede the success of the military
27 operations. Examples of hostile organizations and groups which are of major concern to the CI unit
28 during tactical operations include:
29
Hostile intelligence, sabotage, subversive, and insurgent organizations or groups.
National and local political groups and parties known or suspected to have aims,
30
31 beliefs, or ideologies contrary or in opposition to those of the United States.
6-14

Paramilitary organizations, including student, police, military/veterans, and
1
2 ex-combatant groups, known to be hostile to the United States.
Hostile sponsored groups and organizations whose objectives are to create
3
4 dissension and spread unrest among the civilian population in the area of operation.
3 Installations. The installation target is any installation, building, office, or field
5
6 position that may contain information or material of CI interest or which may pose a threat to MAGTF
7 security. Examples of installation type targets are:
Installations formerly or currently occupied by enemy espionage, sabotage, and
8
9 subversive agencies of enemy police organizations, including prisons and detention centers.
Installations occupied by enemy intelligence, CI, security, or paramilitary
10
11 organizations, including operational bases, schools, and training sites.
12
Enemy communication media and signal communication centers.
Research centers and chemicals laboratories used in the development of weapons

13
14 of mass destruction.
15
Enemy political administrative headquarters.
Production facilities, supply areas, and other installations to be taken under

16
17 control to deny support to hostile guerrilla and partisan elements.
Public utilities and other installations to be taken under early control to prevent
18
19 sabotage. These installations are usually necessary for the rehabilitation of civil areas under U.S.
20 control.
21
Embassies and consulates of hostile governments.
4 Incidents. The recording of details of incidents occurring within the area of

22
23 operations allows for trend analysis which may reveal patterns and indications of future intentions.
24 Incidents do not occur in a vacuum. They are planned, organized, and carried out by individuals acting
25 alone or in groups. Detailed recording of incidents that occur within an area of operations is a critical
26 ingredient in the analysis of trends and patterns designed to identify indications of future intentions.
27 Matrix manipulation, link analysis, and visual investigative analysis are tools aften used in the incident
28 analysis process. The matrix allows for a considerable amount of information to be stored in a relatively
29 small space. Link analysis then
30 analyzes these bits of information by displaying the links that exist between them. Visual investigative
31 analysis is used to time sequence names and events to show an even clearer picture of these
32 relationships.
6-15
(c) Counterintelligence Target Reduction. The timely seizure and exploitation of CI

1
2 targets requires a detailed and well coordinated CI reduction plan. This plan should be prepared well in
3 advance and kept current. CI elements supporting tactical assault units normally prepare the reduction
4 plan. All assigned or developed targets located within the unit's area of operation, are listed in the
5 reduction plan. This plan is based on the MAGTF's scheme of maneuver, with CI targets listed in the
6 sequence in which they are expected to appear in the area of operation. However, the target priority
7 designations remain as assigned on the CI target list with highest priority targets covered first when more
8 than one target is located in the same general area. Neutralized and exploited targets are deleted from
9 the CI reduction plan and appropriate reports are submitted. A well-prepared and comprehensive CI
10 reduction plan ensures coverage of all significant CI targets. It also allows all CI units to conduct daily
11 operations based on established priorities. (See appendix E for a sample CI reduction plan.)
(d) Counterintelligence Measures Worksheet. The CI worksheet is prepared or
12
13 revised based on the conclusions reached in the intelligence estimate of the enemy capabilities for
14 intelligence, subversion, terrorist activities and sabotage. This worksheet is an essential aid in CI
15 planning for the CIHO and CI/HUMINT Company Commander. It is also the basis for preparing CI
16 orders and requests. See appendix E for an example of a CI measures worksheet. (See appendix E
17 for a sample CI measures worksheet.)
(2) CI Production. Analysis and production is the heart of CI as it is with intelligence. No
18
19 matter what quality and quantity of information is gathered, it does absolutely no good if the information
20 is not turned into intelligence and disseminated to commanders and planners in time to use for
21 decisionmaking. Critical to the success of MAGTF CI activities is taking collected information and
22 producing tactically relevant intelligence (usually via all-source intelligence production), and providing it
23 to commanders and planners in a timely manner. The transition of raw information into finished
24 intelligence is the process of analysis. Fusing the finished intelligence into something usable by the
25 customer is known as production.
(a) CI Production Threat Focus. CI analysis and production is focused on three
26
27 well-defined threat activities: HUMINT, IMINT and SIGINT.
Counter Human Intelligence (C-HUMINT). C-HUMINT requires effective and
28
29 aggressive offensive and defensive measures as shown in figure 6-6. Our enemies collect against
30 MAGTFs using both sophisticated and unsophisticated methods. We must combat all of these methods
31 to protect our force and to ensure the success of our operations. MAGTF CI elements recommends
32 countermeasures developed by CI analysts that the commander can take against enemy collection
33 activities. CI C-HUMINT analysis focuses not only upon the standard enemy CI targets within the area
34 of operations, but also upon the intelligence product most likely being developed through their collection
35 activities. The analytical effort should attempt to identify the enemy's HUMINT cycle (collection,
36 analysis, production, targeting) and key personalities. To produce a complete product, the CI analyst
37 may need access to considerable data and require significant resources. The CI analyst will require
38 collection in the areas of subversion, espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and other HUMINT supported
6-16

1 activities. Collection of friendly force data is also required to substantiate CI analytical findings and
2 recommendations. Consistent with time, mission, and availability of resources, efforts must be made to
3 provide an analytical product that identifies the enemy's intelligence, espionage, subversion, sabotage,
4 and terrorism efforts. To accomplish C-HUMINT, MAGTF CI elements will conduct CI
5 investigations, collection, and operations. Key C-HUMINT tasks include:
6
7
Figure 6-6. C-HUMINT Operations

Identify the hostile HUMINT collectors and producers.
Developing, maintaining, and disseminating multi-discipline threat data and

8
intelligence
on
organizations,
locations, and individuals of CI interest. This includes insurgent and
9
10 terrorist infrastructure and individuals who can assist in the CI mission. Performing personnel security
11 investigations and records checks on persons in sensitive positions and those whose loyalty is
12 questionable. Also, all personnel must be educated and trained in all aspects of command security. A
13 component of this is the muiti-discipline threat briefing. Briefings can and should be tailored, both in
14 scope and classification level. Briefings could then be used to familiarize MAGTF units with the nature
15 of the multi-discipline threat posed against the command or activity. Additionally, CI elements must
16 search for enemy personnel who pose an intelligence collection or terrorist threat to the MAGTF.
17 Should CI investigations result in identifying the location of terrorists, their apprehension is done in
18 conjunction with military, civil and law enforcement authorities. Also, debriefing of selected personnel
19 (friendly and hostile) including combat patrols, aircraft pilots, or other elements who may possess
20 information of CI interest is necessary. (See appendix D, section I, for additional information on
21 C-HUMINT.)
22
Neutralize or exploit these to deny the enemy key friendly force information.
6-17

Control our own information and indicators of operations so they are not readily
1
2 accessible to the enemy's HUMINT operations.
Support C-HUMINT commanders through effective and stringent adherence to
3
4 physical, information, and personnel security procedures. They apply force or assets to ensure security
5 daily. MAGTF CI and intelligence elements provide continuous and current threat information so the
6 command can carry out its security responsibilities.
Counter Imagery Intelligence (C-IMINT). C-IMINT requires the CI analyst to
7
8 have an in-depth knowledge of the supported commander's plans, intentions, and proposed AO as far
9 in advance as possible. The analyst must have access to all available data and intelligence on enemy
10 IMINT methodology, systems, and processing as well as in-depth information on commercial satellite
11 systems and the availability of their products to the enemy or to other parties supporting him. The CI
12 analyst attempts to define the specific imagery platform deployed against the MAGTF and the cycle
13 involved (time-based) from time of imaging through analysis to targeting. Knowledge of enemy
14 intelligence support to targeting is critical in developing countermeasures to defeat, destroy, or deceive
15 enemy IMINT. For ground-based HUMINT oriented IMINT (video cassette recorders, cameras, host
16 nation curiosity, news media organizations), MAGTF CI elements will be required to collect the data for
17 the analyst. This type of information cannot be reasonably considered to exist in any current database.
18 Traditional enemy IMINT data is readily available and should not require any CI collection effort.
19 However, collection to support CI (overflights of friendly forces by friendly forces) during identified,
20 critical, and IMINT vulnerable times will validate CI C-IMINT findings and support countermeasures
21 planning and execution. This will be of immense value to the CI analyst and the supported commander in
22 determining what, if anything, enemy imagery has been able to exploit. (See appendix D, section II, for
23 additional information on C-IMINT.)
24 The enemy may possess or acquire IMINT systems or products with a comprehensive and
25 sophisticated capabilities. The MAGTF must have in place carefully developed countermeasures to
26 negate any tactical and strategic threat. The enemy may acquire IMINT through a variety of ways, from
27 handheld cameras to sophisticated satellite reconnaissance systems. Such IMINT capabilities may
28 include:
29
Aerial cameras.
30
Infrared sensors.
31
Imaging radars.
32
Electro-optical sensors (TV).
33
Multispectral and digital imagery products.
6-18

Counter Signals Intelligence (C-SIGINT). C-SIGINT operations, including
1
2 COMSEC monitoring and information systems security, are conducted during peace, war, and
3 MOOTW to enhance MAGTF force protection, survivability, mobility and training; to provide data to
4 identify friendly CIS vulnerabilities; to develop countermeasures recommendations and plans; and when
5 implemented, to determine if countermeasures are effective. C-SIGINT includes full identification of the
6 threat and an integrated set of offensive and defensive actions designed to counter the threat as shown in
7 figure 6-7. Counter-SIGINT focuses upon the enemy's entities which can conduct SIGINT and EW
8 against friendly forces. It also focuses on the intelligence which is most likely being collected and
9 produced from their efforts. C-SIGINT analysis effort should be fully automated (data storage, sorting,
10 and filing). The CI analyst requires SIGINT data collection to support vulnerability assessment and
11 countermeasures evaluation. Validation of vulnerabilities (data and operations that are exploitable by the
12 enemy's SIGINT operations) and the effectiveness of implemented countermeasures (a before and after
13 comparison of MAGTF electromagnetic signatures and data) will be nearly impossible without active
14 and timely collection as a prerequisite to analysis. The CI analyst requires a comprehensive database
15 consisting of enemy SIGINT systems, installations, methodology, and associated SIGINT cycle
16 information. In addition, all friendly CIS systems and user unit identification must be readily available, as
17 well as a library of friendly countermeasures and a history of those previously implemented
18 countermeasures and results achieved. Ideally, the CI analyst should, at any given time, be able to
19 forecast enemy SIGINT activity. However, such estimates must rely upon other CI, interrogator,
20 SIGINT, and IMINT collection as well as access to adjacent friendly unit CI files. Information on
21 enemy SIGINT must be readily accessible from intelligence elements higher as well as lower in echelon
22 than the supported command. Effective conduct of C-SIGINT requires close coordination and
23 integrated production between MAGTF CI, SIGINT and all-source intelligence producers.
24
Figure 6-7. C-SIGINT Operations
25 C-SIGINT provides commanders and planners with the knowledge to assess the risk and probable
26 success of alternative courses of action before a plan is implemented. C-SIGINT is a cyclic process
6-19

1 requiring a strong analytical approach integrating MAGTF CI, SIGINT, CIS and force protection
2 personnel. C-SIGINT is based on a thorough knowledge of:
3
Enemy SIGINT capabilities and tactics, techniques and procedures.
MAGTF communications and information systems profiles.
Enemy operations and plans.
Realistic security measures, both INFOSEC and physical, that can be taken to deny
6
7 information to the enemy.
8 (See appendix D, section III, for additional information on C-SIGINT.)
(b) CI Analytical and Production Functions. CI analysts perform the following
9
10 analytical and production functions:
Analyze the multi-discipline intelligence, espionage, subversion, sabotage and
11
12 terrorism threats targeted against the MAGTF.
Assess enemy intelligence vulnerabilities and susceptibilities to friendly deception
13
14 efforts and other countermeasures.
15
Support MAGTF force protection vulnerability assessment.
Develop, evaluate, and recommend countermeasures to reduce, eliminate, or take

16
17 advantage of MAGTF vulnerabilities.
Support rear area operations by identifying intelligence, espionage, subversion,
18
19 sabotage and terrorism threats to rear area units and installations (to include low-level agents
20 responsible for sabotage and subversion).
21
Nominate CI targets for exploitation, neutralization, or destruction.
22
Develop and maintain a comprehensive and current CI database.
Identify CI IRs and provide these to the collection officer.

23
24
(c) CI Products. CI products convey pertinent intelligence resulting from CI analysis to
25
26 the commanders and planners in a readily useable form. CI analysts prepare a range of products, some
27 focused upon specific needs and others of a more general nature. Among these products of most use
28 to commanders and planners are CI estimates, CI surveys/vulnerability assessments, CI summary, and
29 CI threat assessments.
6-20
Counterintelligence Estimate. Normally a CI estimate is prepared only by the

1
2 MAGTF G/S-2 and higher command echelons. The CI estimate forms the basis of the CI plan and
3 operations. It includes the enemy's capabilities and limitations for intelligence, subversion, terrorism, and
4 sabotage and the effects of the characteristics of the area on these capabilities and friendly CI measures.
5 If a CI estimate is not prepared, such CI planning information can be consolidated within the basic
6 intelligence estimate (appendix 8 to annex B, Intelligence). Key parts of the CI estimate include sections
7 on enemy intelligence, subversion, sabotage, guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and the effects of the area on
8 these enemy capabilities. See appendix C for a sample format of a MAGTF CI estimate.
CI Survey/Vulnerability Assessment. CI surveys/vulnerability assessments are
9
10 studies conducted by CI personnel to provide a supported command or agency a picture of its
11 susceptibility to foreign intelligence collection. The CI survey/vulnerability assessment assesses a units
12 security posture against threats detailed in the CI estimate. The survey should identify vulnerabilities to
13 specific hostile intelligence, espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorist capabilities and provide viable
14 recommendations to eliminate or minimize these vulnerabilities. The survey should be as detailed as
15 possible and combine the expertise of other disciplines such as engineers, Provost Marshall, and civil
16 affairs personnel. The survey must look forward, in both space and time, to support the development of
17 CI measures necessary to protect the unit as it carries out successive phases of the operation. The
18 objective of a CI survey/vulnerability is to provide the MAGTF or other supported elements a realistic
19 tool with which to evaluate internal force protection or security programs, and to provide a
20 decisionmaking aid for the enhancement of these programs. CI surveys/vulnerability assessments
21 include:
Estimating the enemy's likely PIRs and then evaluating the enemy's and any potential
22
23 supporting forces' multi-discipline intelligence collection and production capabilities to answer these.
24
Identifying MAGTF activity patterns (physical and electronic), friendly physical and
25
26 electronic signatures, and resulting profiles to enhance MAGTF OPSEC.
Monitoring or collecting MAGTF CIS transmissions to aid in vulnerability
27
28 assessments, and providing a more realistic and stable basis from which to recommend
29 countermeasures. (Note: these operations are generally conducted either by elements of the radio
30 battalion or other supporting elements.)
Identifying MAGTF vulnerabilities based upon analysis of collected information and
31
32 recommendations of countermeasures.
33
Analyzing the effectiveness of implemented countermeasures.
34 See appendix E for a CI survey checklist and the format for a CI Survey/Vulnerability Assessment.
6-21

Counterintelligence Summary (CISUM). The CISUM is a graphic portrayal of
1
2 the current situation from a CI point of view. The CI analyst uses the CISUM to show known adversary
3 intelligence units as well as known/estimated threats within the friendly area. The CISUM is a periodic
4 report usually covering a 12-hour period. It shows friendly targets identified as adversary objectives
5 during the specified timeframe. The CI analyst includes a clear, concise legend on each CISUM
6 showing the time period, map reference, and symbols identifying friendly and adversary information. As
7 the CI analyst identifies a friendly critical node, element, or resource as an adversary combat or
8 intelligence collection target, he puts a box around it and labels it with a "T" number. The legend explains
9 whether the "T" is:
10
An enemy intelligence target.
11
A source and time confirmation.
12
13 future.
An enemy resource or element that will attack or collect against the target in the
14
The expected timeframe for the enemy to exploit the target.
15
16
The CISUM might portray the following information:

Satellite or tactical reconnaissance patterns over the MAGTF AO.
Sweeps by enemy side looking airborne radar (SLAR) or EA air platforms to

17
18 the full extent of their maximum ranges.
Suspected landing zones or drop zones which will be used by an enemy
19
20 element in the rear area.
21
22 attacks.
Area or unit which has received unusual enemy jamming or other electronic
Movement of an enemy mobile SIGINT site forward along with a graphic

23
24 description of the direction and depth of its targeting.
25
Location of an operational enemy agent or sabotage net.
26
Last known location of threat special operations forces.
Counterintelligence Threat Assessment. The CI threat assessment is a

27
28 four-paragraph statement which is published as often as necessary or when significant changes occur,
29 depending on the situation and the needs of the commander. The CI threat assessment provides
6-22

1 justification for CI target nominations and guidance for CI production. Essentially, the CI threat
2 assessment provides the following (see figure 6-8 for the format of a CI threat assessment):
3
A quick overview of significant activity during the reporting period.
An assessment of the intelligence damage achieved by the enemy.
A projected assessment of enemy activity for the next reporting period.
CI target nominations.
1. ENEMY ACTIVITY DURING PERIOD ____ TO ____ (LIST DTGs)

A. HUMINT: Summarize in one paragraph all known HUMINT activity during the reporting period. Compile data
from HUMINT situation overlay, matrices, link diagrams, & other CI products.
B. SIGINT: Summarize in one paragraph all known SIGINT activity. Compile from SIGINT situation overlay,
matrices, and other CI products.
C. IMINT: Summarize in one paragraph all known IMINT activity. Compile from IMINT situation overlay, pattern
& analysis chart, and other CI products.
D. OTHER: Summarize any other pertinent enemy activity not already addressed.
2. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT FOR THE PERIOD ____ TO ____ (LIST DTGs)
Briefly assess the CI damage to friendly units for whom the assessment is being prepared. Assessment is based
upon enemy intelligence & reconnaissance activities that were identified, analyzed, and reported, measured
against the friendly force operations profile and countermeasures implemented. Coordination with the G/S-3
OPSEC/Force Protection staff is essential when preparing this paragraph.
3. ESTIMATED ENEMY ACTIVITY FOR THE PERIOD ____ TO ____ (LIST DTGs)
A.
B.
C.
D.
HUMINT: briefly describe estimated enemy HUMINT activity for the reporting period.
SIGINT: briefly describe estimated enemy HUMINT activity for the reporting period.
IMINT: briefly describe estimated enemy HUMINT activity for the reporting period.
OTHER: briefly describe any other pertinent estimated enemy activity not addressed above.
4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TARGET NOMINATION

A. EXPLOITATION: identify any CI targets worthy of exploitation. Provide recommended timeframes, methods of
exploitation, locations, justification, and any other pertinent information.
B. NEUTRALIZATION: identify any CI targets worthy of neutralization. Provide recommended timeframes, methods
of neutralization, locations, justifications, and any other pertinent information.
C. DESTRUCTION: identify any CI targets worthy of destruction. Provide recommended timeframes, methods of
engagement, locations, justification, and any other pertinent information.
Figure 6-8. Counterintelligence Threat Assessment
(3) CI Dissemination. Refer to chapter 5 for a detailed review of CI dissemination planning

8
9 considerations.
10 6004. Counterintelligence Planning Requirements and Considerations . CI planning activities
11 follow a logical sequence consistent with the MCPP and the six functions of intelligence. The following
12 describes the CI planning requirements, considerations and activities. It is provided as a guide for
13 MAGTF intelligence, force protection, and CI officers in planning MAGTF operations.
6-23

1
a. Formulation of the Commanders Estimate
(1) Provide assistance to the command operations security program. During the initial planning
2
3 phase, CI assets provide assistance to the G-3/S-3 in establishing the force protection planning and
4 operations.
(2) Complete studies of the enemy organization, weapons and equipment, techniques, and
5
6 effectiveness in conducting intelligence, subversion, terrorism, and sabotage operations. Timely
7 completion and dissemination throughout the MAGTF of the CI estimate is critical.
(3) Complete as early as possible the CI survey/vulnerability assessment to assist with
8
9 MAGTF force protection planning and countermeasures development and implementation.
(4) Release CI planning information and products in accordance with PIRs and IRs and
10
11 specified reporting criteria or as directed by the G/S-2. It is critical that CI personnel follow-up with
12 recipients of these products to ensure that the information is understood and to identify early any
13 resulting new CI IRs.
(5) Give appropriate security classification to all key information referring to the MAGTF's
14
15 operation. CI personnel will provide advice and assistance to the MAGTF security manager or force
16 protection officer with the development of operational classification guidance. MAGTF command
17 guidance should ensure that particularly sensitive items are identified and protected, particularly within
18 forward areas or in aircraft flying over enemy held areas. It should be determined if code symbols are
19 necessary for marking of vehicles and operational equipment. If so, code symbols are used to cover
20 existing tactical marking.
(6) Avoid compromising activities. Special inoculations or the issuance of special clothing and
21
22 equipment should be postponed until after embarkation or other time, when possible, to avoid providing
23 the enemy indications of future MAGTF activities. Leave and liberty are reduced gradually since any
24 sudden curtailment will engender speculation. Submit recommendations on the selection of
25 embarkation, assembly, and rehearsal areas, routes, and times for the movement to these areas in order
26 to minimize the probability of later compromise.
(7) Prepare appendix 3, Counterintelligence, and assist with preparation of appendix 5,
27
28 HUMINT, to the intelligence annex.
29
(b) Situational Development
(1) Establish liaison with other CI agencies to ensure control of civilians in the area of
30
31 operations. Screen all civilians working within MAGTF command posts and installations.
(2) Initiate an aggressive CI/HUMINT collection program in response to the MAGTF PIR and
32
33 IRs developed by the G/S-2 and in support of EEFIs developed by the G/S-3.
6-24
(3) Recommend active and passive CI measures to deny the enemy access to potentially
1
2 lucrative MAGTF targets.
(c) Indications & Warning
(1) Emphasize protective collection activities to reveal plans and intentions of hostile elements
4
5 to inflict damage and casualties upon friendly forces.
6
(2) Lessen the chance of surprise by acting as an alarm to hostile intent. Extensive and
7
8 aggressive CI source networks provide a protective buffer to alert the MAGTF to developments that
9 run counter to previously made assumptions3 .
(d) Support to Force Protection
10
(1) Contact host nation authorities and persons known to be friendly to the U.S. to collect all
11
12 available CI information and to aid with screening of local inhabitants.
(2) In conjunction with the MAGTF provost marshall, advise the commander on establishing
13
14 security against sabotage and terrorism for all military installations and those civilian installations to be
15 kept in operation.
(3) Recommend procedures for all areas vacated by MAGTF units, particularly command
16
17 posts, to determine if any compromising material has been inadvertently left behind.
(4) Advise the G/S-3 on counter-reconnaissance and OPSEC measures.
18
(5) Identify necessary restrictions on informing MAGTF personnel about mission details,
19
20 D-day, H-hour, designated landing beaches, helicopter landing zones, selected objective and other
21 critical friendly force information requirements..
(6) In coordination with the G/S-6 and subordinate commanders, provide assistance with
22
23 MAGTF communications and information systems security.
(e) Support to Targeting. Supervise the accomplishment of CI operations in accordance with
24
25 the CI plan. Included are the following:
(1) Exploit sources of information to provide critical intelligence to commanders and planners.
26
27 Provide pre-targeting surveillance and route reconnaissance enabling the commander to determine the
28 appropriate method and force to be applied against the target.
3
This concept was effectively applied during Somalia operations to identify, with a 95% accuracy
rate, the impending attack of opposition elements of U.S. and multinational forces.
6-25

(2) Assist with identifying MAGTF security and target vulnerabilities, evaluating the relative
1
2 importance of each (MAGTF targets may be personalities, organizations, installations or capabilities).
3 Additionally, identify security vulnerabilities of nongovernmental organization, private volunteer
4 organizations, media and other such organizations that are within the MAGTF's AO.
(3) Locate and recover contraband materials, such as arms, explosives, communication
5
6 equipment, food, medical supplies, or other items not surrendered in accordance with proclamations.
7 This denies critical capabilities to adversaries.
8
(4) Seize, exploit, and protect CI targets.
(f) Combat Assessment. Continue an aggressive CI/HUMINT collection program in response

9
10 to the MAGTF PIR and IRs and in protection of MAGTF EEFIs in order to gauge the impact of
11 friendly actions on the enemy and civilian populace and to evaluate the effectiveness of MAGTF security
12 countermeasures.
13 See appendix G for a list of MAGTF CI planning actions associated with each step of the Marine
14 Corps planning process.
15 6005. CI Plans and Orders.
a. General. Guidance for the conduct of MAGTF CI operations comes from many sources.
16
17 The DIA 58 series of manuals and joint publication 2-01.2, Counterintelligence Support to Joint
18 Operations (draft) are the principal references for U.S. CI operations and contains policy, direction,
19 guidance, and instruction on how to perform the CI operations, activities and functions in compliance
20 with national directives and security requirements (see appendix G to this publication for a detailed
21 listing of CI and related references). Additionally, since MAGTFs will normally be part of a joint task
22 force or naval expeditionary force, reference to pertinent orders, guidance, and CI TTPs is necessary to
23 identify unique operating concepts and methodologies and support procedures and formats. MAGTF
24 CI plans and orders are prepared by the G/S-2. The intelligence operations officer coordinates the
25 overall effort and with the assistance of the CIHO, other intelligence section staff officers, and the
26 CO/OICs of organic and supporting CI units. MAGTF CI plans and orders appear as an appendix to
27 the intelligence annex of the MAGTF operation plan or order and will focus on internal MAGTF CI
28 requirements, operations and TTP.
b. The CI Appendix. The CI appendix to an operations plan (OPLAN) or operations order
29
30 (OPORD) will be prepared consistent with format outlined in the Joint Operational Planning and
31 Execution System (JOPES) and appear as Appendix 3 (Counterintelligence Operations) to Annex B
32 (Intelligence) in all operations plans and orders. See appendix C of this publication for a sample CI
33 appendix format. The CI appendix should include the following:
34
(1) Friendly forces to be utilized including:

6-26

1
(a) Personnel augmentation requirements.
(b) CI units of adjacent or other theater forces and the support expected.
(c) In amphibious operations, JFMCC and amphibious task force CI elements that may
3
4 provide support to the landing force.
(d) Within JTF operations, pertinent CI capabilities and support from the combatant
5
6 command's joint intelligence center/joint analysis center, JTF J-2X, JFLCC, JFACC, and other
7 component commanders/task forces.
(2) Planned arrangement, employment, and use of external CI support (to include any special
8
9 collection, production, dissemination and CIS arrangements.)
(3) Establishment of coordinating instructions for the planning and control of CI operations to
10
11 include technical support expected from higher headquarters.
12
(4) Tasking of MAGTF CI elements.
13
(5) CI production priorities and plans.
(6) CI dissemination priorities and plans, to include communication and information systems
14
15 support to the MAGTF CI effort.
16
(7) CI unique equipment and logistics requirements.
(8) An appendix providing MAGTF countersigns challenges and passwords and supporting
17
18 procedures.
6-27

1
CHAPTER 7
TACTICAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
3 7001. MAGTF Counterintelligence Operations

4 The mission assigned CI/HUMINT Co and its concept of operations depends upon many factors.
5 Major external factors affecting CI/HUMINT Co operations include the mission, commanders' intent,
6 the size and nature of the AO and AOI, operations and intelligence concept of operation, stated PIRs
7 and EEFIs, and C2 of the MAGTF and the JTF. Key internal CI/HUMINT Co factors include the
8 type of team control, various potential employment options, communication and information systems
9 capabilities, and unique CI equipment. Finally, key tasks, such as completing necessary CI
10 surveys/vulnerability assessments, the CI estimate, and development of a CI target-reduction plan, all
11 affect the employment of CI/HUMINT Co.
a. Planning. The successful accomplishment of the company's mission requires thorough planning
12
13 by the commander. The following must be considered when planning for CI activities:
(1) The intelligence concept of operations, designated PIRs and IRs, and supporting collection,
14
15 production and dissemination plans.
16
(2) The force protection concept of operations and designated EEFIs.
17
(3) Detailed study of available maps and photographs of potential areas of operations.
18
(4) Study of all available intelligence products about the area of operations and threat.
(5) Location and plotting of all critical CI targets, categorized by personalities, organizations
19
20 and installations. These are categorized and studied and plans formulated for coverage and reduction.
21 Target priorities must be assigned in advance to ensure efficient use of personnel. The area surrounding
22 a target is studied to determine points where sealing off would be most effective. Streets and
23 approaches to targets are studied thoroughly, thereby minimizing the need for extensive physical
24 reconnaissance. Main traffic routes are studied to determine locations in which to establish screening
25 centers and checkpoints.
(6) Acquisition or development of personalities (black, gray, and white lists), organizations,
26
27 installations and incidents Databases (POI&I) for the target area.
(7) Study of all available records to identify host country, third party or other officials and
28
29 leaders within the area of operations that the enemy is hostile to. Also study of other persons who could
30 be of value in administrative assignments. These include members of the local police force, fire
7-1

1 department, post office, railway, telephone, telegraph, and broadcasting stations. Much of this data can
2 be obtained from the U.S. country team, civil affairs units, and various other sources.
(8) Acquisition of available information concerning pro-American or anti-opposition elements.
3
4 These elements include guerrillas and partisans in the zone of operations and other areas that would
5 facilitate immediate utilization of such groups if necessary.
(9) Acquisition and study of all information concerning other underground forces, groups, and
6
7 personnel who, by reason of training and experience, can provide assistance in the conduct of CI
8 interrogations.
(10) Other sources of information and intelligence such as CI contingency materials (CICM)1 ,
9
10 MDITDS, DCIIS and the various all-source intelligence databases..
b. Command and Control . CI/HUMINT Co operations will generally be conducted in general
11
12 support of the MAGTF. Tactical and technical control of CI/HUMINT Co activities is generally
13 centralized under the CI/HUMINT Co commander. CI/HUMINT Co direct support or attachment
14 may be necessary in the following situations:
15
(1) Where the nature of subordinate units missions require organic CI support.
16
(2) In those situations where centralized MAGTF control is unfeasible.

c. Tactical Deployment
17
(1) During both static and fluid tactical situations in populated areas, CI/HUMINT Co
18
19 headquarters normally is centrally located and easily accessible to indigenous personnel. The
20 headquarters is located to provide maximum assistance to other agencies and to ensure protection by
21 them if required. During high tempo operations, however, the CI/HUMINT Company HQ will be
22 located near the supported units main command post, but outside of its key vital area perimeter, in
23 order to enhance security while remaining accessible to key indigenous personnel.
(2) In deploying CI personnel, consideration is given to retaining at least one subteam at the
24
25 headquarters for special assignments and emergencies.
(3) When CI elements are held in reserve, personnel are organized and equipped so that the
26
27 augmentation subteams may be immediately dispatched to forward units that require CI support or
28 reinforcements.
1
CI Contingency Materials (CICM) are focused CI analytical products such as sanitized mapping,
imagery and reference material available from the MAGTF all-source fusion centers CI analytical team;
the theater JICs CI analytical cell through the combatant command's CISO; and DIAs Operational
Intelligence Coordination Center, Counterintelligence Division and Transnational Threat Division.
7-2
(4) CI elements are attached to subordinate units sufficiently in advance to coordinate

1
2 operational, intelligence, communications-information systems and CI plans in support of the units
3 mission and concepts of operations.
4 7002. CI Screening Operations. CI screening operations are designed to identify and apprehend
5 enemy intelligence agents, subversives, terrorists, and saboteurs attempting to infiltrate friendly lines or
6 conceal themselves among the population. The purpose of CI screening operations is to identify
7 persons of CI interest or verify persons referred by interrogators who are of CI interest, and gather
8 information of immediate CI interest. During conventional combat situations, screening operations
9 primarily consist of screening refugees and EPWs at mobile and static checkpoints in populated areas in
10 cooperation with other MAGTF elements such as military police, interrogator/translators, civil affairs
11 (CA), combat units, and psychological operations teams.
a. Persons of CI Interest. The following are examples of categories of persons of CI interest (this
12
13 list is not all inclusive):
14
(1) Persons suspected of attempting to infiltrate through refugee flow.
15
(2) Line crossers.
16
(3) Deserters from enemy units.
17
(4) Persons without identification papers or with forged papers (inconsistent with the norm).
18
(5) Repatriated prisoners of war and escapees.
19
(6) Members of underground resistance organizations seeking to join friendly forces.
20
(7) Collaborators with the enemy.
21
(8) Target personalities, such as those on the personalities list (black, gray, or white lists).
22
(9) Volunteer informants.
(10) Persons who must be questioned because they are under consideration for employment with
23
24 U.S. forces or for appointment as civil officials by CA units.
b. Coordination. CI personnel plan these screening operations, as far as possible, in conjunction
25
26 with the following:
(1) Commander. The commander is concerned with channeling refugees and EPWs through
27
28 the AO, particularly in the attack, to prevent any hindrance to unit movement, or any adverse effect on
7-3

1 unit mission. Accordingly, screening operations must be compatible with the supported commander's
2 concept of operations and scheme of maneuver.
(2) Interrogator/Translators . MAGTF interrogator/translator personnel must understand
3
4 what CI is looking for and have the commander's current PIR, IRs and EEFIs. Close coordination with
5 interrogators is essential for successful CI operations.
(3) Military Police (MP). MP elements are responsible for collecting EPW and civilian
6
7 internees from capturing units as far forward as possible in the AO. MP units guard the convoys
8 transporting EPW and civilian internees to EPW camps, and command and operate the EPW camps.
9
(4) Civil Affairs. CA elements are responsible for the proper disposition of refugees.
(5) Psychological Operations (PSYOP). PSYOP elements, under the G3, contribute to
10
11 screening operations by informing the populace of the need for their displacement.
(6) Local Civil Authorities in Hostile Areas. Civil authorities in hostile areas are included in
12
13 planning only if control has been returned to them.
14
c. Preparation
(1) Prior to the operation, CI personnel must become thoroughly familiar with all available
15
16 information concerning the enemy intelligence organization, the military and political situation within the
17 enemy controlled area, and the geography of the area.
(a) Enemy's Intelligence, Infrastructure and Organization. To successfully identify enemy
18
19 intelligence agents, CI personnel must be knowledgeable of the enemy intelligence organization,
20 including its mission, methods of operation, officials, schools and training, known agents, equipment, and
21 policies and regulations.
(b) Regulations. Knowledge of the political situation and of the restrictions placed on the
22
23 population within the enemy controlled area aid in detecting discrepancies during the screening.
24 Information required includes travel restrictions, curfews, draft and conscription regulations, civilian
25 labor forces and work patterns, and the education system.
(c) Enemy Order of Battle. Researching, analyzing and producing order of battle
26
27 information is primarily the responsibility of the MAGTF G-2 AFC. Collection of order of battle
28 information from human sources is the primary responsibility of the interrogator translators. However,
29 CI personnel must be aware of the enemy military units operating within the area. They must also be
30 knowledgeable of their disposition, composition, activities, training, equipment, history, and
31 commander's personalities. This information aids in identifying military intelligence personnel or other
32 persons attempting to hide their identity.
7-4

(d) Area of Operations. CI personnel must also be familiar with the geography and the
1
2 political, social, and economic conditions of the area. Travel conditions, distances, major landmarks,
3 customs, and composition of the population is essential to the successful screening operation.
(2) Lists and Information Sheets. CI elements should distribute apprehensions lists and
4
5 information (or basic data) sheets listing indicators of CI interest to the combat units, MPs, or other
6 personnel assisting with the screening operation. Basic data sheets should be tailored to the mission.
7 The basic data sheets are filled out by CI personnel to aid in determining the individual's knowledge and
8 in formulating questions for further interrogation, and provided to the individuals to be screened requiring
9 them to record personal data. This form will aid in formulating the type of questions to be asked and in
10 determining the information needed to satisfy PIRs and IRs. Include the following data, plus anything
11 else judged necessary, on the form3 :
(a) Full name, aliases, date and place of birth, current and permanent residences, sex, race,
12
13 religion, marital status, and current citizenship.
(b) The same information as above concerning the father, mother, and siblings, including the
14
15 occupation and whereabouts of each.
(c) If married, the names of spouse (including female maiden name), date, place of birth
16
17 (DPOB), nationality, occupation, and personal data on spouse's family.
18
(d) The individual's education and knowledge of languages.
19
(e) Political affiliations and membership in other groups or organizations.
(f) Details of the individual's career to include schools, military service, technical and
20
21 professional qualifications, political affiliations, and foreign travels.
(g) Details of current travel to friendly lines/point of capture, to include point of departure,
22
23 destination, times, and purpose.
(h) Additional questions may be included which relate to specific indicators revealing areas
24
25 of CI interest.
d. Initial Screening
26
(1) The initial screening is designed to identify those persons who are, or are most likely to be,
27
28 of CI interest and who require interrogation by CI personnel. Initial screening is conducted as soon as
3
The Geneva Conventions do not require all of this. If the person refuses to give the information,
there is nothing that can be done about it. Prepare the form in the native language of the host nation and
enemy force, if different, ensuring that it is prepared in the proper dialect of the language.
7-5

1 possible after the EPWs or refugees come under friendly control. EPWs and refugees normally enter
2 EPW and refugee channels rearward of the forward line of own troops for further movement to rear
3 areas. Unit intelligence personnel, interrogators, or CI personnel usually perform the initial screening. In
4 the case of a large number of refugees, military police, civil affairs units, psychological operations
5 personnel, and tactical troops, if available, may provide assistance with initial screening.
(2) Persons identified or suspected to be of CI interest are separated from other EPWs or
6
7 refugees. After information of immediate tactical value has been obtained from personnel of CI interest,
8 they are referred to CI personnel for interrogation. Personnel of CI interest are exploited, if possible.
9 Then rear area CI elements evacuate them to higher headquarters for further detailed interrogation and
10 exploitation. Further CI screening also continues for other EPWs and refugees at the higher echelons.
11 Procedures for the handling of captured enemy personnel and civilian detainees are contained in MCRP
12 4-27C, Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees.
13
e. Conduct of the Screening
(1) The success of the screening operation is influenced by the degree of preparation and the
14
15 quality of the information provided to CI and other personnel conducting the initial screening. CI
16 interrogation is the method used to confirm or to deny that the person is of CI interest and to exploit the
17 information obtained, when appropriate. CI interrogation is used throughout the entire screening
18 process.
(2) In many cases, numerous EPWs and refugees preclude CI interrogation of every individual.
19
20 Those persons who are of CI interest are evacuated through CI channels for further interrogation and
21 exploitation by rear area CI elements. During the conduct of the screening process, persons who are
22 determined not to be of CI interest are returned to EPW or refugee channels as appropriate. A
23 screening or an interrogation report is completed on each individual referred for further interrogation.
24 This report clearly identifies those areas of CI interest. It includes as much information as possible
25 concerning the individual's identity and documentation, background, recent activities, and route of travel
26 to friendly lines or point of capture.
(3) CI Screening Report. Appendix E contains formats for the CI screening report and for an
27
28 interrogation report. The CI screening report should include the following:
(a) Identity. Screen all identifying documents in the form of ID cards, ration cards, draft
29
30 cards, driver's license, auto registration, travel documents, and passport. Record rank, service number,
31 and unit if a person is, or has been a soldier. Check all this information against the form previously filled
32 out by the detainee if this was done.
(b) Background. The use of the form identified earlier will aid in obtaining the information
33
34 required; however, certain information areas on the forms will have to be clarified, especially if data
35 indicate a suspect category or the person's knowledge of intelligence information. If the form has not
36 been filled out at this point, try to gain the information through questioning.
7-6
(c) Recent Activities. Examine the activities of persons during the days before their
1
2 detainment or capture. What were they doing to make a living? What connection, if any, have they had
3 with the enemy? Why were they in the MAGTF's area? This line of questioning may bring out
4 particular skills such as those associated with a radio operator, linguist, or photographer. Make
5 physical checks for certain types of calluses, bruises, or stains to corroborate or disprove his story.
6 Sometimes soil on shoes will not match that from the area he claims to come from.
(d) Journey or Escape Route. CI personnel should determine the route the individual took
7
8 to get to MAGTF lines or checkpoints. Question the individual further on time, distance, and method of
9 travel to determine whether or not the trip was possible during the time stated and with the mode of
10 transportation used. Discrepancies in travel time and distances can be the key to the discovery of an
11 infiltrator with a shallow cover story. By determining what an individual observed enroute, the screener
12 can either check the person's story or pick up intelligence information concerning the enemy forces.
13 Interrogators/translators are well trained in this process and should be called upon for assistance and
14 training.
15
f. Indicators
(1) Indicators aid with identifying possible hostile infiltrators or other targets of CI interest.
16
17 They are determined after a thorough study of the enemy area, the political and military situation, and the
18 enemy intelligence organization.
(2) For maximum effectiveness, indicators must relate to designated PIRs and other IRs tasked
19
20 to CI elements. However, the following general indicators may serve as a guide to identify persons as
21 possible infiltrators:
22
(a) Persons of military age who are not members of the armed forces.
23
(b) Persons without identification or with unusual or altered documents.
24
25
26
(c) Persons attempting to avoid detection or questioning, or displaying peculiar activity.
27
(e) Persons possessing unusually large amounts of money, precious metals, or gems.
28
(f) Persons traveling alone or in pairs.
(d) Persons using enemy methods of operation.
(g) Persons having a pro-enemy background, family members in enemy area, or who have
29
30 collaborated with the enemy.
7-7

(h) Persons with a suspicious story, who display any peculiar activity, or who have violated
1
2 regulations in enemy areas.
3
(i) Persons having technical skill or knowledge.
g. Other Methods of Screening. In addition to interrogation, the following methods of screening

4
5 EPWs and refugees can be used separately or in combination:
(1) Insertion of informants into EPW compounds and camps; into civilian internee camps; or
6
7 into refugee centers.
8
(2) Use of concealed informants at screening collection points.
(3) Use of technical equipment (audio and visual) in holding areas.
10
(4) Polygraph examination.
11
(5) Specialized identification equipment.
12
g. Mobile and Static Checkpoints
(1) Checkpoints are employed in screening operations in populated areas and along routes of
13
14 travel. Checkpoints are used to detect and prevent enemy infiltration of espionage, sabotage, terrorist,
15 and subversive agents. They are also used to collect information which may not otherwise be available
16 to intelligence units.
(2) Checkpoints are established at key locations throughout the AO where sufficient space is
17
18 available for conducting searches and assembling the people to be screened. Provision is made for the
19 security of the checkpoint, and personnel are positioned to the front and rear of the checkpoint to
20 apprehend anyone attempting to avoid it. Figure 7-1 depicts a typical checkpoint.
7-8
1
2
Figure 7-1. Example of a Checkpoint

(3) There are two types of checkpoints employed in a screening operation - mobile and static.
(a) A mobile checkpoint can be used as a moving system. This system consists of the
3
screening
team,
either mounted in vehicles or on foot, selecting individuals to be stopped for questioning
4
5 and a check of identity. The mobile checkpoint also may be established at various locations, usually for
6 periods not to exceed one day.
7-9

(b) Static checkpoints are those manned permanently by military police or combat troops at
1
2 entrances to towns, bridges, and other strategic locations.
(4) The preparation for employment of mobile and static checkpoints is the same as for other
3
4 screening operations. Lists of persons known or suspected of enemy activity (black-detain and gray-of
5 interest lists) and lists of indicators are normally utilized in the screening operation. Specialized detection
6 equipment (e.g., metal or explosive detectors) may also be used, if available.
(5) Screening teams may be composed of combat troops, intelligence interrogators, military
7
8 police, CI personnel, civil affairs personnel, or a combination of such personnel. Screening teams
9 conduct the initial screening and refer suspects to the CI element for interrogation and further
10 exploitation.
11 7003. Cordon and Search Operations
12
a. General
(1) The timely seizure and exploitation of CI targets require a detailed and coordinated plan that
13
14 has been prepared well in advance. CI elements, in most instances, cannot neutralize, guard, or
15 physically control targets without assistance. In some cases, this assistance must come from ground
16 combat units for the seizure and protection of well-defended targets. In other cases, the assistance may
17 be provided by combat support, combat service support, aviation units or even host country elements.
18 It is essential that the required assistance be provided for during the planning phase.
(2) The senior tactical unit commander will be the individual responsible for the conduct of the
19
20 cordon and search operation. That commander will plan, with advice from CI, interrogation, CA, and
21 PSYOP personnel, the cordon which is usually deployed at night, and the search which normally begins
22 at first light.
(3) MAGTF CI personnel normally accompany the troops used in cordon and search
23
24 operations to advise, assist, and examine and/or exploit the target at the earliest possible time. In some
25 instances, it may be advantageous for CI personnel to rendezvous with the assigned troops at the target
26 area. Except in unusual cases, the tactical effort takes precedence over the neutralization and
27 exploitation of CI targets. If assistance in target seizure is not available, CI elements may have to rely
28 on their own assets to neutralize or exploit targets. In friendly controlled areas, CI elements may
29 coordinate through the JTF TFCICA to receive assistance from other service CI elements, civil police
30 and security agencies.
31
b. Types and Conduct of Cordon and Search Operations
(1) Community Operations. The basic operation is the community cordon and search operation
32
33 shown in figure 7-2.
7-10
Figure 7-2. Example of a Community Cordon and Search Operation
2 As the screening element sets up the collection or screening station (see figure 7-3), the sweep element
3 escorts the residents toward the station, leaving behind one resident to care for family belongings, if
4 required by law.
7-11
Figure 7-3. Example of a Community Collection Screening Station
(a) The search element follows behind the sweep element searching houses, storage areas,
2
3 cemeteries and so forth, with dogs and metal detection equipment. CI personnel are searching for
4 evidence of enemy intelligence collection operations to include communications codes or other such
5 paraphernalia. Each search element should include a CI team with an interrogator/translator element as
6 required, which will have a list of persons of CI interest.
(b) In the collection or screening station, bring the residents to the collection area (or holding
7
area)
and
then
systematically lead them to specific screening stations. Enroute to the screening station,
8
9 search each individual for weapons. Then lead the residents past the mayor or community leaders
10 (enemy defectors or cooperating prisoners who will be hidden from view so that they can
11 uncompromisingly identify any recognizable enemy). These informants will be provided with the means
12 to notify a nearby guard or a screener if they spot an enemy member. Immediately segregate this
13 individual and interrogate by appropriate personnel.
7-12
(c) At specific screening stations, ask the residents for identification, check against
1
2 personalities list (black list), and search for incriminating evidence by electronic equipment.
(d) Move suspected persons on for photographing, further interrogation, or put them in the
3
4 screening area detention point to be taken back to a base area or interrogation facility for detailed
5 interrogation upon completion of the operation.
(e) Pass innocent residents through to the post screening area where they are provided
6
7 medical assistance and other civic assistance, as well as entertainment and friendly propaganda.
(f) Return any persons caught attempting to escape or break through the cordon
8
9 immediately to the detention area.
(g) When the operation is terminated, allow all innocent individuals to return to their homes,
10
11 and remove the enemy suspects under guard for further interrogation. Photograph all members of the
12 community for compilation of a village packet, which will be used in future operations.
(2) "Soft" or area operation. The second type of cordon and search operation is very frequently
13
14 referred to as the "soft" or area cordon and search. This operation includes the cordoning and searching
15 of a rather vast area (for example, a village area incorporating a number of hamlets, boroughs, town, or
16 villages which are subdivisions of a political area beneath country level).
(a) This type of operation requires a larger military force to cordon off the area; a pooling of
17
18 all paramilitary, police, CA, CI and intelligence resources to conduct search and screening; and a
19 formidable logistical backup. This kind of operation extends over a period of days and may take as
20 long as a week or possibly longer.
(b) While screening and search teams systematically go from community to community and
21
22 screen all residents, military forces sweep the area outside the communities over and over again to seek
23 out anyone avoiding screening. As each resident is screened, CI personnel will issue documents
24 testifying to the fact that he was screened and if necessary, allow him restricted travel within the area.
(c) Other population and resource control measures are used as well. Such an opportunity
25
26 may allow the chance to issue new ID cards and photograph all of the area's residents.
(d) As each community screening proceeds, send individuals who were designated for
27
28 further interrogation to a centralized interrogation center in the cordoned area. Here, CI personnel will
29 work with interrogator/translator personnel, both MAGTF and indigenous, police, and other security
30 service interrogators.
7-13

(e) Besides field files and other expedient facilities, a quick reaction force should be located
1
2 at the interrogation center to react immediately to intelligence developed during the interrogations and
3 from informants planted among the detainees.
4 7004. Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO). CFSO's are flexible
5 and aggressive collection operations conducted by CI personnel to quickly respond to the needs of the
6 supported command. CFSO are focused on the collection of force protection information designed to
7 assess threats from foreign intelligence collectors; provide early warning of impending attack; warn of
8 sabotage or subversive activity against U.S. forces; identify and neutralize potential enemy infiltrations;
9 provide information on local security forces; identify population and resorce control measures; locate
10 hostile or insurgent arms caches and safe havens; and identify local insurgent support personnel in
11 regions where local security forces cannot or will not support U.S. operations. Additional policy
12 guidance and procedures for the conduct of CFSOs in support of MAGTF operations is contained in
13 classified MCO 003850.2, Marine Corps Counterintelligence Force Protection Source
14 Operations, (U). (See appendix E for the format of a CFSO Concept Proposal).
15 7005. Tactical CI Interrogation. Within the area of operations, there may be numerous people who
16 are viewed as threats to security based solely on their presence in the combat zone. The number of
17 suspect personnel varies. Frequently, it precludes detailed interrogation of all but a selected few that are
18 of primary interest. CI personnel are partly dependent on such agencies as the provost marshal, civil
19 affairs units, and interrogator-translator platoons to identify suspect persons or persons of CI interest.
20 In some situations, the number of persons volunteering information to CI operations permit
21 concentration on those of the greatest potential interest or value. Most suspects are apprehended while
22 trying to enter the area when their cover stories (which will closely parallel their true places of origin and
23 identities) are exposed. The CI or interrogation personnel's success in such interrogations is primarily
24 dependent on his questioning skill, linguistic ability or support, knowledge of the area of operations and
25 adjacent areas, and familiarity with the intellectual, cultural, and psychological peculiarities of the persons
26 encountered.
a. Types of Subjects. As the battle lines in combat change, entire segments of the population may
27
28 be overrun. The local population in any area may also be increased by refugees and displaced persons
29 (persons from other countries conscripted by enemy forces for labor). The following categories of
30 persons are of CI interest:
31
(1) Refugees and displaced persons.
32
(2) Line crossers.
33
(3) Deserters from enemy units.
34
(4) Enemy intelligence personnel.
35
(5) Inmates of enemy detention camps.

7-14
(6) Members of underground resistance organizations seeking to join friendly forces.
(7) Collaborators with the enemy.
(8) Target personalities, such as black, gray, or white list personalities.
(9) Volunteer informants.
(10) Persons who must be questioned because they are under consideration for employment with
5
6 MARFOR units or for appointment as civil officials.
b. Objectives of CI Interrogators. The CI interrogation in combat areas assists in the
7
8 accomplishment of three major objectives:
(1) In the screening process, refugees whose very presence threatens overall security are
9
10 removed from the battlefield.
(2) In detailed interrogations, enemy agents with espionage, sabotage, terrorist, or subversive
11
12 missions are detected.
(3) The wide range of CI activities and types of interrogations permit the collection of information
13
14 of value to other intelligence and security agencies and to the planners of military operations. CI
15 interrogators must be especially alert to obtain and report information of immediate tactical value which
16 may not have been previously obtained or reported.
c. Indicators Warranting Suspicion. CI personnel must be alert during interrogations for
17
18 indications of intelligence activity. The following are indicators which, separately or collectively, may
19 generate suspicion that a subject is in the employ of or acting in sympathy with enemy forces.
(1) Access to Information or Targets. A prospective terrorist, subversive, espionage, or
20
21 sabotage agent must have access to the information desired by the enemy or to the target installation to
22 be destroyed to carry out his mission. The interrogation should establish a subject's accessibility to
23 potential targets, including his location at the time he was apprehended.
(2) Technical Skills. Proficiency in certain technical skills is frequently an attribute of an
24
25 espionage or sabotage agent. The subject who has a mastery of one or several foreign languages and a
26 knowledge of radio operation or cryptography is questioned carefully on the nature and purpose of his
27 training in those fields. His practical experience and his work in those fields, during or shortly prior to
28 the war, should give CI personnel cause for strong suspicion. The individual's story then must be closely
29 examined.
7-15

(3) Documents and Funds. An overabundance of documents and new documents of
1
2 questionable authenticity are reason for doubt. They provide the basis for detailed questioning.
3 Discrepancies in the document's contents or conflicts between data and the subject's story may lead to
4 the detection of hostile agents. Unexplainable possession of large amounts of money, valuable jewelry,
5 or other items of great value are investigated carefully.
(4) Pro-Enemy Background. Residence or travel in enemy territory, membership in a hostile
6
7 party, or known former collaboration with the enemy are facts of obvious importance. CI personnel
8 must determine whether the subject is actually in sympathy with the enemy or has acted merely to serve
9 his own best interests with regard to his life, the welfare of his family, or his property.
(5) Family in Enemy-Held Territory. Enemy pressure is often applied to individuals whose
10
11 families reside under enemy control. Individuals who have family members threatened with
12 death/torture/incarceration by the enemy will always be a threat to friendly forces.
(6) Inconsistent Story. Small discrepancies in the subject's story may be important.
13
14 Contradictions in a subject's story do not warrant jumping to conclusions. However, CI personnel must
15 remain alert to all possibilities. Allowances must be made for defective memory or lack of logic due to
16 emotional stress. The following discrepancies may be warning signals to the CI interrogator:
17
(a) Distance compared to travel time.
18
(b) Accent peculiar to an area the subject refuses to acknowledge as his own.
19
(c) Unreasonable explanation of deferment, exemption, or discharge from military service.
20
(d) Exemption from labor conscription.
21
(e) Implausible reasons for risking the crossing of combat lines.
(7) Suspicious Actions or Activities. Indigenous persons displaying unusual interest in troop
22
23 units of equipment or loitering persistently in the vicinity of troop units and installations without
24 reasonable explanation are sufficient to warrant interrogation for the purpose of clarifying the stature of a
25 person so involved.
(a) Violations of Civil or Military Regulations. Mere violation of military regulations in
26
27 an area controlled by the military may be relatively unimportant to CI elements. These violations may be
28 mandatory registration, curfews, travel restrictions, or declaration of weapons. However, the motives
29 which cause such violations despite severe penalties may be compelling and possibly of great interest to
30 CI personnel.
(b) Modus Operandi (MO). The frequent similarity in tactics of hostile agents working for
31
32 the same enemy agency, their means of contact with their agent handlers, type of cover story, and
7-16

1 manner of collecting and reporting their information may lead to identification of suspects with a known
2 enemy agency or group. Established patterns of activity or behavior of enemy agents are disseminated
3 to other intelligence and security agencies to assist in the identification of agents still operating.
d. Screening or Initial Interrogation. Initial interrogation and screening are generally
4
5 synonymous. However, initial interrogation indicates that there will be a follow-up detailed interrogation
6 while screening involves the selection, by brief questioning, of a relatively small number of persons from
7 a large group for detailed interrogation. In both cases, the technique, purpose, and scope of the
8 questioning are generally the same. The object is to select for detailed interrogation a reasonable
9 number of persons who appear to be knowledgeable of matters of CI interest. Initial interrogation or
10 screening is generally concerned with identity, background, recent activities, travel or escape routes, and
11 information of immediate value. Documents and personal belongings of a subject are examined. Then
12 the circumstances of apprehension are studied. Finally the available files are checked.
e. Detailed Interrogation. Detailed CI interrogations may be conducted in Joint Interrogation
13
14 Facilities or at MAGTF interrogation sites/collection points established by G/S-1s and manned by
15 interrogators and CI personnel. Detailed interrogation does not differ radically from the initial
16 interrogation except that attention is now focused on individuals who are suspect or who are known to
17 have extensive information of interest. A study of the initial interrogation report, examination of the
18 subject's documents and belongings, and checks of available files and information must be conducted
19 and analyses made in preparation for the interrogation.
(1) Details of the subject's personal history must be reviewed. Should the subject admit that he
20
21 is an enemy agent, he becomes an important source of information on enemy intelligence methods of
22 operation and, perhaps, on identities of other hostile agents. This leads to exhaustive interrogations on
23 such issues as hostile intelligence training and missions assigned. However, CI personnel must be alert
24 to the possible insertion of confusion agents.
25
(2) The suspect, or any person being interrogated, may also be an important source of
26
27 information of intelligence value strategic and/or tactical.
(3) The questioning usually follows a logical sequence to avoid confusing the subject and to
28
29 facilitate reporting. However, an illogical sequence may be used as a technique to purposely confuse
30 the subject so that he inadvertently contradicts himself. The interrogator must be alert for discrepancies
31 and retain his psychological advantage.
32 (See the paragraph 7006 for additional information on CI interrogations.)
33 7006. CI Investigations . CI investigations are conducted when sabotage, espionage, spying, treason,
34 sedition, or subversive activity is suspected or alleged. CI investigations may also be conducted
35 regarding security matters and defections of friendly personnel to the enemy. The primary purpose of
36 each investigation is to identify, neutralize, and exploit information of such a nature, form, and reliability,
37 that may determine the extent and nature of action, if any, necessary to counteract the threat and
7-17

1 enhance security. The investigation is a duly authorized, systematic, detailed examination/inquiry to
2 uncover and report the facts of a matter. While facts, hearsay, information, opinions, allegations, and
3 investigators' comments may make a significant contribution, they should be clearly labeled as such in
4 the report of investigation. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service Manual, NIS-3, Manual for
5 Investigations, may be used as a guide for investigation techniques and procedures. Investigations are
6 generally incident investigations concerning acts or activities which are committed by, or involve, known
7 or unknown persons or groups of persons. CI agents conducting investigations must have a thorough
8 understanding of the objectives and operations of foreign espionage, sabotage, and subversive
9 organizations.
a. Counterintelligence Investigations. CI investigations use basic investigative techniques and
10
11 procedures. The primary purpose of the investigation is to provide the commander with sufficient
12 factual information to reach a decision or to ensure the security of his command. Investigations may be
13 conducted overtly or discreetly depending on the type of investigation and the area of operations.
14 Investigations will normally include the examination of records, interviews or interrogations, and the
15 collection and handling of evidence. Surveillance and the conduct of raids and searches may also be
16 appropriate as the investigation progresses.
(1) On assuming primary CI jurisdiction, MAGTF CI investigations are conducted in accordance
17
18 with guidance and instructions published by higher authority.
(2) CI personnel are normally responsible for conducting security investigations of indigenous
19
20 personnel employed by MAGTF elements. They may also be involved in the investigation of indigenous
21 personnel retained in official civilian positions.
(a) Certain unique problems are involved in conducting investigations of indigenous personnel
22
23 in a tactical environment. One problem that may hinder investigation is lack of files and records in the
24 repositories of civilian police and investigative agencies. This documentation may have been destroyed
25 or removed during tactical operations. Every effort must be made to check all files and records which
26 are available.
(b) Another problem may be lack of qualified personnel to perform investigations. Special
27
28 investigative techniques, such as the use of polygraph examinations by criminal investigative personnel,
29 may be required.
(c) A problem that presents security threat to the MAGTF is the use of indigenous personnel
30
31 for a wide range of support functions. Indigenous civilian employees may be sympathetic to the enemy's
32 cause or may be coerced to serve the enemy cause. If using indigenous personnel, caution must be
33 exercised to preclude the enemy's collection of useful information, both classified and unclassified. In
34 addition to the initial security investigation, continual checks are made on indigenous employees. CI
35 elements maintain close liaison with civil affairs units responsible for providing civilian labor to the
36 MAGTF.
7-18

(d) In the conduct of a CI investigation if evidence or indicators of criminal activity is
1
2 discovered, this information should be provided to the Criminal Investigation Division of the Provost
3 Marshals Office. The information should only be provided if such disclosure does not compromise the
4 ongoing CI investigation.
b. Investigative Plan. When required, CI personnel formulate an investigative plan at each
5
6 command level down to and including the individual CI Marine. Normally the lead investigative element
7 will develop the plan. The investigative plan must be updated as new developments arise, including an
8 ongoing analysis of the results. Although this list is not all encompassing, an investigative plan should
9 include as many of the following planning considerations as applicable:
10
(1) Purpose of the investigation.
11
12
(2) Definition of the problem.
13
(3) Phases or elements of the investigation which have been assigned.
14
(4) Whether the investigation is to be conducted overtly or discreetly.
15
(5) Priority and time permitted for completion.
16
(6) Special instructions or restrictions.
17
(7) Information from the unit or office files.
18
(8) Methods and sources used, to include surveillance and polygraph support.
19
(9) Coordination required.
c. Order of Investigation. All CI investigations vary, and as such, all investigative plans will be
20
21 different. The following actions are typically conducted during an investigation. Tailor investigative plans
22 to each investigation. Investigative actions selected should be sequenced to ensure a swift and successful
23 completion of the investigation.
24
(1) Files and records checks for pertinent information.
25
(2) Individual interviews for additional information and leads.
(3) Exploitation of new leads and consolidation of all available data for analysis and planning a
26
27 course of action (COA).
28
(4) Surveillance, both physical and technical, of the subject(s) to be investigated.

7-19

1
(5) Interrogation or interview of the subject(s) to prove or disprove the allegations.
(6) Polygraph examination.
d. Investigative Techniques. CI personnel use the following basic techniques in CI investigations

3
4 and operations, as appropriate:
(1) Examine records to locate, gain access to, and extract pertinent data from diverse official and
5
6 unofficial documents and records.
(2) Conduct interviews to obtain information. The type of interviews conducted depend upon
7
8 the investigation.
(3) Use interrogation and elicitation techniques as additional methods to gather information.
(4) Conduct physical and technical surveillance to augment other investigative activities4 .
10
(5) Conduct cordon, search and seizure when necessary. Do not conduct searches unless
11
12 directed by proper authority. CI personnel may coordinate this activity with law enforcement agencies,
13 depending on the nature of the investigation.
e. Files and Records. Checking files and records for pertinent information on the subject of the
14
15 investigation is the first action in CI investigations. Checks should begin with local unit files and expand
16 to include other possible sources. The full exploitation of records examination as an investigative tool
17 depends on several factors which the CI agent must consider.
(1) CI personnel must know what, where, by whom, and for what purpose records are
18
19 maintained throughout the AO. Upon assignment to an operational unit, the initial orientation should
20 stress that CI personnel be thoroughly familiar with records that may be of assistance in investigations.
(2) Most records are available to CI personnel upon official request. If all efforts to obtain the
21
22 desired information through official channels are unsuccessful, the information or records cannot be
23 subpoenaed unless legal proceedings are initiated.
(3) There are occasions when documentary information or evidence is best obtained through
24
25 other investigative means. The possibility of intentional deception or false information in both official and
26 unofficial records must always be considered. Because data is recorded in some documentary form
27 does not in itself ensure reliability. Many recorded statistics are untrue or incorrect, particularly items of
28 biographical data. They are often repetitious or unsubstantiated information provided by the subject
29 being investigated and are not to be confused with fact.
4
See FM 34-5, (S) Human Intelligence and Related Counterintelligence Activities, for a
detailed explanation of surveillance operations.
7-20

(4) Reliability of records varies considerably according to the area and the status of the agency
1
2 or organization keeping the records. Records found in highly industrialized areas, for example, are more
3 extensive and generally far more reliable than those found in underdeveloped areas. Until experience
4 with a certain type of record has been sufficient to make a thorough evaluation, treat the information
5 with skepticism.
(5) In CI investigations, the absence of a record is often just as important as its existence. This
6
7 is especially important in the investigation of biographical data furnished by the subject being
8 investigated. The systematic and meticulous examination of records to confirm or refute the subject's
9 story is very often the best means of breaking the cover story of an enemy intelligence agent.
(6) The types and content of records vary markedly with the AO. Regardless of the area, CI
10
11 personnel must be aware of the types of records to be used in conducting investigations. Available
12 records include police and security agencies, allied agencies, vital statistics, residence registration,
13 education, employment, citizenship, travel, military service, foreign military records, finance records, and
14 organization affiliation.
(a) Police and Security Agencies. Some major types of records which are often of value
15
16 are local, regional, and national police agencies. Most nations maintain extensive personality files
17 covering criminals, CI investigative subjects, victims, and other persons who have come to official police
18 attention because of actual or alleged criminal activity. Police interest in precise descriptive details,
19 including photographs and fingerprint cards, often make police records particularly valuable and usually
20 more reliable than comparable records of other agencies. Police and security agency, files are usually
21 divided into subcategories. CI personnel must be familiar with the records system to ensure all pertinent
22 files actually have been checked.
(b) Allied Agencies. Access to records of allied intelligence agencies often depends on the
23
24 personal relationship between JTF or MAGTF CI personnel and the custodian of the records of
25 interest. Such examinations are normally the assigned responsibility of a CI liaison officer. Liaison also
26 may be necessary with other agencies when the volume of records examinations dictate the need for a
27 single representative of the CI element. At times it may be necessary, due to the sensitivity of a
28 particular investigation, to conceal specific interest in a person whose name is to be checked. In this
29 instance, the name of the individual may be submitted routinely in the midst of a lengthy list of persons
30 (maybe five to seven) who are to be checked.
(c) Vital Statistics. The recording of births, deaths, and marriages is mandatory in nearly
31
32 every nation, either by national or local law. In newly developed countries, however, this information
33 may be maintained only in family journals, bibles, or in very old records. In any case, confirmation of
34 such dates may be important. The records sought may be filed at the local level, as is usually the case in
35 overseas areas; or they may be kept at the state or regional level, such as with state bureaus of vital
36 statistics in the U.S. Rarely will original vital statistics records on individuals be maintained centrally with
37 a national agency.
7-21

(d) Residence Registration. Some form of official residency registration is required in most
1
2 nations of the world. The residence record may be for tax purposes, in which case it probably will be
3 found on file at some local fiscal or treasury office. When the residence record is needed for police and
4 security purposes, it is usually kept in a separate police file. Residence directories, telephone books, and
5 utility company records also may be used.
(e) Education. Both public and private schools at all levels, from primary grades through
6
7 universities, have records which can serve to verify background information. The school yearbook or
8 comparable publication at most schools usually contains a photograph and brief resume of the activities
9 of each graduating class member. These books are a valuable record for verification and as an aid to
10 locating leads. Registrar records normally contain a limited amount of biographical data but a detailed
11 account of academic activities.
(f) Employment. Personnel records usually contain information on dates of employment,
12
13 positions held, salary, efficiency, reason for leaving, attendance record, special skills, and biographical
14 and identifying data. Access to these records for CI agents is relatively simple in the U.S., but may
15 prove difficult in some overseas areas. In such areas, it may be possible to obtain the records through
16 liaison with local civil authorities or through private credit and business rating firms. Depending on the
17 AO, there may be either local, regional, or national unemployment and social security program offices.
18 Records of these offices often contain extensive background material. In most cases, these data
19 represent unsubstantiated information provided by the applicant and cannot be regarded as confirmation
20 of other data obtained from the same individual.
(g) Citizenship. Immigration, nationalization, passport, and similar records of all nations
21
22 contain data regarding citizenship status. In most instances, an investigation has been undertaken to
23 verify background information contained in such records; therefore, these records are generally more
24 reliable than other types. The records of both official and private refugee welfare and assistance
25 agencies also provide extensive details relating to the citizenship status of persons of CI interest. As a
26 general rule, refugee records (particularly those of private welfare groups) are used as a source of leads
27 rather than for verification of factual data, since they have been found to be unreliable in nearly all AOs.
(h) Travel. A system of access to records of international travel is especially important to
28
29 overseas CI operations. Such records include customs records, passport and visa applications,
30 passenger manifests of commercial carriers, currency exchange files, transient residence registrations,
31 private and government travel agency records, and frontier control agency files.
(i) Military Service. Records of current and past members of the armed services of most
32
33 nations are detailed and usually accurate.
(j) Foreign Military Records. Access to foreign military records in overseas areas may be
34
35 difficult. In cases where it is not possible to examine official records, leads or pertinent information may
36 be obtained from unofficial unit histories, commercially published documents, and files of various
37 veterans organizations. Since listing or claiming military service is a convenient means of accounting for
7-22

1 periods of time spent in intelligence activities or periods of imprisonment, it is frequently a critical item in
2 dealing with possible enemy agents. Special effort must be made to locate some form of record which
3 either confirms or denies an individual's service in a particular unit or the existence of the unit at the time
4 and place the individual claims to have served. Order of battle and personality files of various
5 intelligence services also may be helpful.
(k) Finance Records. Finance records are an important source of information. They may
6
7 provide information to indicate whether a person is living beyond one's means. They may provide
8 numerous leads such as leave periods and places, and identification of civilian financial institutions.
(l) Organization Affiliation. Many organizations maintain records which may be of value to a
9
10 particular investigation. Examples are labor unions; social, scientific, and sports groups; and cultural and
11 subversive organizations. CI personnel should research these organizations. But when seeking sources
12 of information, they must be thoroughly familiar with the organization before attempting to exploit it.
13 Organizations are often established as front groups or cover vehicles for foreign intelligence operations.
f. Interrogation Techniques. Interrogation is obtaining the maximum amount of usable
14
15 information through formal and systematic questioning of an individual. CI interrogations should be
16 conducted by at least two CI personnel.
(1) CI personnel use interrogation techniques when encountering a hostile source or other subject
17
18 being investigated. The self-preservation instinct is stimulated in an individual who is considered the
19 subject. This deep-rooted reaction is frequently reflected in stubborn resistance to interrogation. The
20 subject may consider the interrogation as a battle of wits where the subject has much to lose. The
21 subject may look upon the CI interrogator as a prosecutor.
(2) When interrogating a subject, CI personnel must keep in mind the two-fold objective of the
22
23 interrogation:
24
25
26
27
(a) Detection and prevention of activity that threatens the security of the U.S. Army.
(b) Collection of information of intelligence interest.
(3) When preparing for an interrogation, CI personnel should:
(a) Gather and digest (complete familiarization) all available material concerning the subject
28
29 and the case.
(b) Be familiar with those legal principles and procedures which may apply to the case at
30
31 hand. Legal requirements may differ depending on: whether the U.S. is at war or in a military
32 occupation; status of forces agreements; whether the subject being interrogated is a U.S. citizen; or
33 whether the subject is an EPW.
7-23

(4) Determine the best way to approach the subject. Previous investigative efforts may have
1
2 determined that the subject is under great psychological pressure; therefore, a friendly approach might
3 work best. CI personnel should carefully consider the approach and the succeeding tactics, to ensure
4 that nothing the agent does will cause the subject to confess to a crime he or she did not commit.
5
(5) Before an interrogation, CI personnel must ensure the following:
(a) The interrogation room is available and free of distractions.
(b) If recording equipment is to be used, it is installed and operationally checked.
(c) All participants in the interrogation team are thoroughly briefed on the case and
8
9 interrogation plan.
10
(d) Sources or other persons to be used to confront the subject are available.
11
(e) Arrangements are made to minimize unplanned interruptions.
(f) As appropriate, arrangements are made for the subject to be held in custody or provided
12
13 billeting accommodations.
14
15
(6) When conducting the interrogation, the following points are important:
(a) Use background questioning to provide an opportunity to study the subject face-to-face.
(b) Avoid misinterpretation and impulsive conclusions. The fact that the person is suspected
16
17 may in itself create reactions of nervousness and emotion.
18
(c) Do not allow note-taking to interfere with observing the subject's reaction.
19
(d) Seek out all details concerning the subject's implication in a prohibited activity.
(e) Examine each of the subject's statements for its plausibility, relationship to other statements
20
21 or to known facts, and factual completeness. Discrepancies which require adjustment frequently
22 weaken the subject's position.
(f) Attempt to uncover flaws in details not considered relevant to the issue; finding the story's
23
24 weakness is the key to a successful interrogation.
(g) Build up to a planned final appeal as a sustained and convincing attack on the subject's
25
26 wall of resistance. Eloquent and persuasive reasoning and presenting the facts of the case may succeed
27 where piecemeal consideration of evidence failed to produce a confession. This appeal may be based
7-24

1 on overwhelming evidence, on contradictions, story discrepancies, or the subject's emotional
2 weaknesses.
(h) Obtain a sworn statement if the subject wants to confess. If the subject has been given an
3
4 explanation of individual rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), or the 5th
5 Amendment to the US Constitution, any unsworn statement normally can be used in court. If the subject
6 is neither a US citizen nor a member of the armed forces, requirements will be stipulated in the unit's
7 SOP.
(7) CI personnel may use polygraph examinations as an aid to CI interrogations and investigations
8
9 of intelligence operations, but only at the direction of higher headquarters.
g. Elicitation. Elicitation is gaining information through direct communication, where one or more
10
11 of the involved parties is not aware of the specific purpose of the conversation. Elicitation is a planned,
12 systematic process requiring careful preparation.
13
(1) Preparation. Always apply elicitation with a specific purpose in mind.
(a) The objective, or information desired, is the key factor in determining the subject, the
14
15 elicitor, and the setting.
(b) Once the subject has been selected because of his or her access to or knowledge of the
16
17 desired information, numerous areas of social and official dealings may provide the setting.
(c) Before the approach, review all available intelligence files and records, personality
18
19 dossiers, and knowledge possessed by others who have previously dealt with the subject. This will help
20 to determine the subject's background, motivation, emotions, and psychological nature.
(2) Approach. Approach the subject in normal surroundings to avoid suspicion. There are two
21
22 basic elicitation approaches: flattery and provocation. The following variations to these approaches may
23 be used:
(a) By appealing to the ego, self-esteem, or prominence of the subject, you may be able to
24
25 guide him or her into a conversation on the area of operation.
(b) By soliciting the subject's opinion and by insinuating that he or she is an authority on a
26
27 particular topic.
(c) By adopting an unbelieving attitude, you may be able to cause the subject to explain in
28
29 detail or to answer out of irritation. CI personnel should not provoke the subject to the point where
30 rapport is broken.
7-25

(d) By inserting bits of factual information on a particular topic, you may be able to influence
1
2 the subject to confirm and further expound on the topic. Use this approach carefully since it does not
3 lend itself to sudden impulse. Careless or over use of this technique may give away more information
4 than gained.
(f) By offering sincere and valid assistance, you may be able to determine the subject's
5
6 specific area of interest.
(3) Conversation. Once the approach has succeeded in opening the conversation, devise
7
8 techniques to channel the conversation to the area of interest. Some common techniques include:
9
(a) An attempt to obtain more information by a vague, incomplete, or a general response.
(b) A request for additional information where the subject's response is unclear; for
10
11 example, "I agree; however, what did you mean by...?"
(c) A hypothetical situation which can be associated with a thought or idea expressed by the
12
13 subject. Many people who would make no comment concerning an actual situation will express an
14 opinion on hypothetical situations.
h. Sabotage Investigations. Sabotage is defined as an act, the intent of which is to damage the
15
16 national defense structure. Intent in the sabotage statute means knowing that the result is practically
17 certain to follow, regardless of any desire, purpose, or motive to achieve the result. Because the first
18 indication of sabotage normally will be the discovery of the injury, destruction, or defective production,
19 most sabotage investigations involve an unknown person or persons. We expect acts of sabotage, both
20 in overseas AOs and in CONUS, to increase significantly in wartime. Sabotage is a particularly
21 effective weapon of guerrilla and partisan groups, operating against logistic and communications
22 installations in occupied hostile areas, and during insurgencies. Trained saboteurs sponsored by hostile
23 guerrilla, insurgent, or intelligence organizations may commit acts of sabotage. Individuals operating
24 independently and motivated by revenge, hate, spite, or greed may also conduct sabotage. In internal
25 defense or limited war situations where guerrilla forces are active, we must be careful to distinguish
26 among those acts involving clandestine enemy agents, armed enemy units, or dissatisfied friendly
27 personnel. Normally, we categorize sabotage or suspected sabotage according to the means employed.
28 The traditional types of sabotage are incendiary, explosive, and mechanical. In the future, nuclear and
29 radiological, biological, chemical, magnetic, and electromagnetic means of sabotage will pose an even
30 greater threat to military operations. Sabotage investigations require immediate action. The possibility
31 exists that the saboteur may still be near the scene, or that other military targets may require immediate
32 or additional security protection to avoid or limit further damage. We must preserve and analyze the
33 incident scene before evidence is altered or destroyed.
(1) Questions. The investigation must proceed with objective and logical thoroughness. The
34
35 standard investigative interrogatives apply:
7-26

(a) Who -- Determine a list of probable suspects and establish a list of persons who
1
2 witnessed or know about the act.
(b) What -- Determine what military target was sabotaged and the degree of damage to the
3
4 target (both monetary and operational).
(c) When -- Establish the exact time when the act of sabotage was initiated and when it was
5
6 discovered; confirm from as many sources as possible.
(d) Where -- Determine the precise location of the target and its relation to surrounding
7
8 activities.
(e) Why -- Establish all possible reasons for the sabotage act through the investigation of
9
10 suspects determined to have had motive, ability, and opportunity to accomplish the act.
(f) How -- Establish the type of sabotage (such as incendiary, explosive, chemical) and
11
12 determine the procedures and materials employed through investigation and technical examination and
13 analysis.
(2) Investigative Actions. An outline of possible investigative actions which may be used to
14
15 investigate alleged or suspected sabotage incidents follows:
(a) Obtain and analyze the details surrounding the initial reporting of the incident to the
16
17 MAGTF PM. Establish the identity of the person reporting the incident and the reasons for doing so.
18 Determine the facts connected with the reported discovery of the sabotage and examine them for
19 possible discrepancies.
(b) Examine the incident scene as quickly as possible. CI personnel must attempt to reach
20
21 the scene before possible sources have dispersed and evidence has been disturbed. They will help MP
22 personnel protect the scene from disruption. The MP will remove all unauthorized persons from the
23 area, rope off the area as necessary, and post guards to deny entrance and prevent anything from being
24 removed. Although CI personnel should help MP investigators at the sabotage scene, they should not
25 interfere with the crime scene investigation.
(c) Preserve the incident scene by taking notes, making detailed sketches, and taking
26
27 pictures. Arrange for technical experts to help search the scene and collect and preserve physical
28 evidence and obtain all possible clues. Arson specialists, explosives experts, or other types of
29 technicians may be required. Take steps to prevent further damage to the target and to safeguard
30 classified information or material.
(d) Interview sources and obtain sworn statements as soon as possible to reduce the
31
32 possibility of forgetting details or comparing stories.
7-27

(e) Determine the necessary files to be checked. These will be based on examination of the
1
2 incident scene and by source interviews. CI conducts such action only in coordination with the MAGTF
3 PM, which retains sabotage scene expertise and responsibility.
4.
(3) Files checks should include background information on sources and the person or persons
5
6 who discovered or reported the sabotage. Files of particular importance may include:
7
(a) Friendly unit modus operandi (MO) files.
(b) Partisan, guerrilla, or insurgent activity files.
(c) Local police files on arsonists.
10
(d) Local police MO files.
11
(e) Host country's intelligence agency MO files.
12
(f) Terrorist modus operandi files.
13
(g) Provost marshal files.
(4) Study all available information such as evidence, technical and laboratory reports, statements
14
15 of sources, and information from informants in preparation for interrogation of suspects.
i. CI Walk-in Interviews. A walk-in is defined as an individual who seeks out MAGTF
16
17 authorities to volunteer information which is believed to be of intelligence value. The primary concern of
18 CI personnel is to obtain all information, both of intelligence and CI value. They must be alert to detect
19 whether the source provides leads for further exploitation.
(1) Motivation. When interviewing such persons, CI personnel must consider the source's
20
21 motives for divulging information. The motivation may not always be known, and sources may not
22 always be truthful about their motives. If the motive can be determined early in the interview, however,
23 it can be valuable in evaluating the information supplied and in determining the nature and extent of the
24 source's knowledge and credibility. Motivation includes, but is not limited to: ideology, personal gain,
25 protection of self or family ties, fear, misunderstanding of the function and mission of the MAGTF,
26 mental instability, and revenge.
27
(2) Preparation. In preparing for and conducting a Walk-in Interview, CI personnel:
(a) Should adapt to the intellectual level of the source, exercise discretion, and avoid
28
29 controversial discussions.
7-28

(b) Must obtain all names and whereabouts of other individuals who may directly or
1
2 indirectly know the same information.
3
(c) Must remember security regulations and make no commitments which cannot be fulfilled.
(3) Conduct of a Walk-In Interview. Put the Source at ease. After determining that a walk-in
4
5 source has information of intelligence value, display the appropriate credentials.
(a) Take the source to a private place to conduct the interview. The initial attitude frequently
6
7 affects the success of the interview. The atmosphere should be pleasant and courteous, but
8 professional. In accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, the source must be given a four point
9 Privacy Act Advisement to include authority, principle purpose, routine uses, and voluntary and
10 mandatory disclosure, prior to the CI agent obtaining the source's personal information. Ask the source
11 for some form of identification, preferably one with a picture.
12
(b) Record the pertinent data from the ID card and tactfully exit the room.
(c) Using the identity information just obtained from the source, check the office source or
13
14 informant files to see what, if any, information on the source is on file. Determine if the source is listed as
15 a crank, has a criminal record, or has reported information in the past, and if so, what was the validity
16 and value of that information.
(d) If the source is listed as a crank or a nuisance continue with the interview, but include this
17
18 information in the appropriate memorandum.
(e) Let the source tell the story. Suggest that the source start the story from the beginning,
19
20 using the Source's own words. Once started, let the Source talk without interruption. CI personnel
21 should, however, guide the source back if the he strays from the basic story. From time to time,
22 interject a word of acknowledgment or encouragement. At no time, however, should CI personnel give
23 any indication of suspicion or disbelief, regardless of how incredulous the story may seem. While the
24 source gives an account for the first time, take minimal notes. Taking notes could distract the source or
25 the CI interviewer. Instead, pay close attention and make mental notes of the salient points as a guide
26 for subsequent detailed interviewing.
27
(f) Review the story with the source and take notes. Once the source has finished telling the
28
29 basic story, he or she generally will freely answer specific questions on the details. Being assured that
30 the information will be kept in strict confidence, the source will be less apprehensive of your note taking.
31 Start at the beginning and proceed in a chronological order, using the salient features of the source's
32 account. Interview the source concerning each detail in the account so that accurate, pertinent
33 information is obtained, meticulously recorded, and that the basic interrogatives are answered for every
34 situation. This step is crucial.
7-29

(g) Develop secondary information. The story and background frequently indicate that the
1
2 source may have further information of significant intelligence interest. Also develop this information
3 fully.
4
(h) Terminate the interview. When certain that the source has no further information, close
5
6 the interview in a manner which leaves a favorable impression. At this point in the interview, ask the
7 source, point blank, what motivated him or her to come in and report the information, even if the source
8 volunteered a reason earlier in the interview. Obtain a sworn statement from the Source, regarding the
9 information, if appropriate. It is best to have the Source write (or type) the statement. Advise the
10 source of the Privacy Act of 1974 and, if the source is a U.S. citizen, ask for full name, rank (for military
11 or DOD civilian personnel) or occupation for non-DOD personnel, duty position, unit of assignment (for
12 military or DOD civilian personnel), social security number, date and place of birth (required for military
13 or DOD civilian personnel, requested for non-DOD personnel), type of security clearance and level of
14 access, and full current address. Determine who else knows about the incident or situation, either
15 directly or indirectly. Determine the source's desires regarding the release of the source's identity.
16 Determine the source's willingness to be recontacted by CI personnel or those from another agency
17 should the need arise regarding the information provided. Obtain recontact information from the source
18 (work or residence). Have the source execute a disclosure warning and attach the affirmation to the
19 report as an exhibit. Finally, express appreciation for the information received.
20 7007. Captured Material Exploitation. If the situation permits, CI personnel should exploit enemy
21 installations immediately following its neutralization or capture. The installation is searched thoroughly
22 for documents, equipment, and other material of intelligence or CI interest5 , which will marked and
23 rapidly transported to MAGTF interrogator/translators (see figure 7-4 for an example of a
24 captive/document/equipment tag). In some instances, it may be desirable to retain the documents or
25 material within the installation for thorough examination by technical intelligence personnel or other
26 specialists. Due to the risks of boobytraps, mines, and explosives, extreme caution must be used when
27 searching installations known or suspected to have been occupied by the enemy.
Procedures for the disposition of enemy documents and material will be contained in MCWP
2-15.5, Human Resource Intelligence, planned for publication by the end of FY99.
7-30
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
DO NOT REMOVE TAG FROM CAPTIVE/DOCUMENT/EQUIPMENT

DOCUMENT TAG
TAG NUMBER_____________
DATE/TIME OF CAPTURE__
_________________________
PLACE OF CAPTURE (coord.)
_________________________
DOCUMENTS FOUND ON:
__CAPTIVE
__OTHER (Describe)_____
_________________________
_________________________
CAPTURING UNIT________
_________________________
INSTRUCTIONS
(Document Tag)
1. Complete lower half of tag for
each document or group of
documents captured from one
individual or location.
2. Wrap document to prevent loss
or damage.
3. Securely affix tag to document.
4. If captured from other than an
individual, evacuate through
intelligence channels.
Additional information:________
___________________________
___________________________
DO NOT REMOVE TAG FROM CAPTIVE/DOCUMENT/EQUIPMENT

Figure 7-4. Captive/Document/Equipment Tag
19 7008. CI Technical Collection and Investigative Techniques. Technical collection and

20 investigative techniques can contribute materially to the overall CI investigation and activities. They can
21 assist in supplying the commander with factual information on which to base decisions concerning the
22 security of the command. CI investigators selectively a variety of technical investigative techniques, of
23 which the following are those most typically employed in support of MAGTF operations: electronic
24 surveillance; investigative photography and videotaping; polygraph, and technical surveillance
25 countermeasures (TSCM).
a. Electronic Surveillance. Electronic surveillance is the use of electronic devices to monitor
26
27 conversations, activities, sound, or electronic impulses. It is an aid in conducting CI investigative
28 activities. Various constitutional and directives regulate the use of wiretapping and electronic
29 eavesdropping and must be strictly adhered to by CI personnel.
7-31

(1) Technical Surveillance Methodology. Technical surveillance methodology (including those
1
2 which may be employed by enemy intelligence and security forces) consists of:
(a) Pickup Devices. A typical system involves a transducer (such as a microphone, video
3
4 camera, or similar device) to pick up sound or video images and convert them to electrical impulses.
5 Pickup devices are available in practically any size and form. They may appear to be common items,
6 such as fountain pens, tie clasps, wristwatches, or household or office fixtures. It is important to note
7 that the target area does not have to be physically entered to install a pickup device. The availability of
8 a power supply is the major limitation of pickup devices. If the device can be installed so its electrical
9 power is drawn from the available power within the target area, there will be minimal, if any, need for
10 someone to service the device.
(b) Transmission Links. Conductors carry the impulses created by the pickup device to the
11
12 listening post. In lieu of conductors, the impulses can go to a transmitter which converts the electrical
13 impulses into a modulated radio frequency (RF) signal for transmission to the listening post. The
14 simplest transmission system is conventional wire. Existing conductors, such as used and unused
15 telephone and electrical wire or ungrounded electrical conduits, may also be used. The development of
16 miniature electronic components permits the creation of very small, easily concealed RF transmitters.
17 Such transmitters may operate from standard power sources or may be battery operated. The devices
18 themselves may be continuously operated or remotely activated.
(c) Listening Posts. A listening post consists of an area containing the necessary equipment to
19
20 receive the signals from the transmission link and process them for monitoring or recording. Listening
21 posts use a receiver to detect the signal from an RF transmission link. The receiver converts the signal to
22 an audio-video frequency and feeds it to the monitoring equipment. Use any radio receiver compatible
23 with the transmitter. Receivers are small enough to be carried in pockets and may be battery operated.
24 For wire transmission links only, a tape recorder is required. You can use many commercially available
25 recorders in technical surveillance systems. Some of these have such features as a voice actuated
26 start-stop and variable tape speeds (extended play). They may also have automatic volume control and
27 can be turned on or off from a remote location.
(2) Telephone Monitoring. Monitoring telephone conversations is one of the most productive
28
29 means of surreptitious collection of information. Because a telephone is used so frequently, people tend
30 to forget that it poses a significant security threat. Almost all telephones are susceptible to "bugging" and
31 "tapping."
(a) A bug is a small hidden microphone or other device used to permit monitoring of a
32
33 conversation. It also allows listening to conversations in the vicinity of the telephone, even when the
34 telephone is not in use.
(b) A telephone tap is usually a direct connection to the telephone line which permits both
35
36 sides of a telephone conversation to be monitored. Tapping can be done at any point along the line, for
37 example, at connector blocks, junction boxes, or the multiwire cables leading to a telephone exchange
7-32

1 or dial central office. Telephone lineman's test sets and miniature telephone monitoring devices are
2 examples of taps. Indirect tapping of a line, requiring no physical connection to the line, may also be
3 accomplished.
(c) The most thorough check is not absolute insurance against telephone monitoring. A dial
4
5 central office or telephone exchange services all telephone lines. The circuits contained within the dial
6 central office allow for the undetected monitoring of telephone communications. Most telephone circuits
7 servicing interstate communications depend on microwave links. Communications via microwave links
8 are vulnerable to intercept and intelligence exploitation.
(3) Miscellaneous. Current electronic technology produces technical surveillance devices that
9
10 are extremely compact, highly sophisticated, and very effective. Miniaturized technical surveillance
11 systems are available. They can be disguised, concealed, and used in a covert or clandestine manner.
12 The variations of their use are limited only by the ingenuity of the technician. Equipment used in
13 technical surveillance systems varies in size, physical appearance, and capacity. Many are identical to,
14 and interchangeable with, components of commercially available telephones, calculators, and other
15 electronic equipment.
b. Investigative Photography and Video Recording. Photography and video recording in CI
16
17 investigations includes:
(1) Identification of Individuals. CI personnel perform both overt and surreptitious photography
18
19 and video recording.
(2) Recording of Incident Scenes. CI personnel photograph overall views and specific shots of
20
21 items at the incident scene.
(3) Recording Activities of Suspects. CI personnel use photography and video recording to
22
23 provide a record of a suspect's activities observed during surveillance or cover operations.
c. Polygraph. The polygraph examination is a highly structured technique conducted by specially
24
25 trained CI personnel certified by proper authority as polygraph examiners. DOD Dir 5210.48, DOD
26 Polygraph Program, provides guidance for the polygraph program generally.
(1) When Used. Do not conduct a polygraph examination as a substitute for securing evidence
27
28 through skillful investigation and interrogation. The polygraph examination is an investigative aid and can
29 be used to determine questions of fact, past or present. CI personnel cannot make a determination
30 concerning an individual's intentions or motivations, since these are states of mind, not fact. However,
31 consider the examination results along with all other pertinent information available. Polygraph results
32 will not be the sole basis of any final adjudication.
33 The conduct of the polygraph examination is appropriate, with respect to CI investigations, only:
7-33

(a) When all investigative leads and techniques have been completed as thoroughly as
1
2 circumstances permit.
3
(b) When the subject of the investigation has been interviewed or thoroughly debriefed.
(c) When verification of the information by means of polygraph is deemed essential for
4
5 completion or continuation of the investigation.
(d) To determine if a person is attempting deception concerning issues involved in an
6
7 investigation.
(e) To obtain additional leads concerning the facts of an offense, the location of items,
8
9 whereabouts of persons, or involvement of other, previously unknown individuals.
10
(f) To compare conflicting statements.
11
(g) To verify statements from witnesses or subjects.
(h) To provide a just and equitable resolution of a CI when the subject of such an
12
13 investigation requests an exculpatory polygraph in writing.
(2) Phases. The polygraph examination consists of three basic phases: pretest, intest, and
14
15 posttest.
(a) During the pretest, appropriate rights advisement are given and a written consent to
16
17 undergo polygraph examination is obtained from all examinees who are suspects or accused. Advise
18 the examinee of the Privacy Act of 1974 and the voluntary nature of examination. Conduct a detailed
19 discussion of the issues for testing and complete the final formulation of questions to be used during
20 testing.
(b) During the intest phase, ask previously formulated and reviewed test questions and
21
22 monitor and record the examinee's responses by the polygraph instrument. Relevant questions asked
23 during any polygraph examination must deal only with factual situations and be as simple and direct as
24 possible. Formulate these questions so that the examinee can answer only with a yes or no. Never use
25 or ask unreviewed questions during the test.
(c) If responses indicate deception, or unclear responses are noted during the test, conduct a
26
27 posttest discussion with the examinee in an attempt to elicit information from the examinee to explain
28 such responses.
(3) Outcomes. A polygraph examiner may render one or more of four possible opinions
29
30 concerning the polygraph examination:
7-34

(a) No Opinion (NO) -- rendered when less than two charts are conducted concerning the
1
2 relevant issues, or a medical reason halts the examination. Normally, three charts are conducted.
(b) Inconclusive (INCL) -- rendered when there is insufficient information upon which to
3
4 make a determination.
5
(c) No Deception Indicated (NDI) -- rendered when responses are consistent with an
6
7 examinee being truthful regarding the relevant areas.
(d) Deception Indicated (DI) -- when responses are consistent with an examinee being
8
9 untruthful to the relevant test questions.
(4) Factors Affecting Polygraph Results. Certain mental or physical conditions may influence a
10
11 person's suitability for polygraph examination and affect responses during testing. CI personnel should
12 report any information they possess concerning a person's mental or physical condition to the polygraph
13 examiner before scheduling the examination. Typical conditions of concern are:
14
(a) Mental disorders of any type.
15
(b) Any history of heart, respiratory, circulatory, or nervous disorders.
(c) Any current medical disorder, to include colds, allergies, or other conditions (such as
16
17 pregnancy or recent surgery).
18
(d) Use of drugs or alcohol before the examination.
19
(e) Mental or physical fatigue.
20
21 .
22
(f) Pain or physical discomfort

(5) Conducting the Polygraph
(a) To avoid such conditions as mental or physical fatigue, do not conduct prolonged or
23
24 intensive interrogation or questioning immediately before a polygraph examination. CI personnel tell the
25 potential examinee to continue taking any prescribed medication and bring it to the examination. Based
26 on information provided by CI personnel and the examiner's own observations, the polygraph examiner
27 decides whether or not a person is fit to undergo examination by polygraph. When CI personnel ask a
28 person to undergo a polygraph examination, the person is told that the examination is voluntary and that
29 no adverse action can be taken based solely on the refusal to undergo examination by polygraph.
30 Further, the person is informed that no information concerning a refusal to take a polygraph examination
31 is recorded in any personnel file or record.
7-35

(b) CI personnel will make no attempt to explain anything concerning the polygraph
1
2 instrument or the conduct of the examination. If asked, they should inform the person that the polygraph
3 examiner will provide a full explanation of the instrument and all procedures before actual testing and
4 that all test questions will be fully reviewed with the potential examinee before testing.
(c) Conduct polygraph examinations in a quiet, private location. The room used for the
5
6 examination must contain, as a minimum, a desk or table, a chair for the examiner, and a comfortable
7 chair with wide arms for the examinee. The room may contain minimal, simple decorations; must have
8 at least one blank wall; and must be located in a quiet, noise-free area. Ideally, the room should be
9 soundproof. Visual or audio monitoring devices may be used during the examination; however, the
10 examiner must inform the examinee that such equipment is being used and whether the examination will
11 be monitored or recorded in any manner.
(d) Normally, only the examiner and the examinee are in the room during examination.
12
13 When the examinee is an accused or suspect female and the examiner is a male, a female witness must
14 be present to monitor the examination. The monitor may be in the examination room or may observe
15 through audio or visual equipment, if such is available.
(e) On occasion, CI personnel must arrange for an interpreter to work with the examiner.
16
17 The interpreter must be fluent in English and the required language, and have a security clearance
18 appropriate to the classification of material or information to be discussed during the examination. The
19 interpreter should be available in sufficient time before the examination to be briefed on the polygraph
20 procedures and to establish the proper working relationship.
(6) Miscellaneous. CI personnel will not prepare any agent reports concerning the results of a
21
22 polygraph examination. This does not include information derived as a result of pretest or posttest
23 admissions, nor does it include those situations where CI personnel must be called upon by the examiner
24 to question the subject concerning those areas which must be addressed before the completion of the
25 examination.
26
d. Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM)
(1) TSCM versus TEMPEST. TSCM is concerned with all signals leaving a sensitive or secure
27
28 area, to include audio, video, and digital or computer signals. There is a definite distinction between
29 TSCM and TEMPEST.
(a) TEMPEST is the unintentional emanation of electronic signals outside a particular piece of
30
31 equipment. Information systems, computers, and electric typewriters create such signals. The words to
32 focus on in TEMPEST are "known" and "unintentional" emanations. TEMPEST is controlled by careful
33 engineering or shielding.
(b) TSCM is concerned with the intentional effort to gather intelligence by foreign intelligence
34
35 activities by impulsing covert or clandestine devices into a U.S. facility, or modifying existing equipment
7-36

1 within that area. For the most part, intelligence gained through the use of technical surveillance means
2 will be accurate, as people are unaware they are being monitored. At the same time, the implanting of
3 such technical surveillance devices is usually a last resort.
(2) Threat. Enemy intelligence and security forces, their agents, and other persons use all
4
5 available means to collect sensitive information. One way they do this is by using technical surveillance
6 devices, commonly referred to as "bugs" and "taps." Such devices have been found in U.S. facilities
7 worldwide. Security weaknesses in electronic equipment used in everyday work have also been found
8 worldwide. The enemy easily exploits these weaknesses to collect sensitive or classified conversations
9 as well as the information being processed. They are interested in those things said in (supposed)
10 confidence, since they are likely to reveal future intentions. It should be stressed that the threat is not
11 just audio, but video camera signals, as well as data. Devices are usually placed to make their detection
12 almost impossible without specialized equipment and trained individuals.
(3) The TSCM Program. The purpose of the TSCM program is to locate and neutralize
13
14 technical surveillance devices that have been targeted against U.S. sensitive or secure areas. The TSCM
15 program is designed to identify and enable the correction of exploitable technical and physical security
16 vulnerabilities. The secondary, and closely interrelated purpose, is to provide commanders with a
17 comprehensive evaluation of their facilities' technical and physical security postures. DODINST 5240.5,
18 DOD Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Survey Program", OPNAVINST C5500.46,
19 "Technical Surveillance Countermeasures, and MCO 5511.11D, Technical Surveillance
20 Countermeasures Program, govern the implementation of this program.
(a) The TSCM program includes four separate functions; each with a direct bearing on the
21
22 program.
Detection. Realizing that the threat is there, the first and foremost function of the
23
24 TSCM program is to detect these devices. Many times these devices cannot be easily detected.
25 Occasionally, TSCM personnel will discover such a device by accident. When they discover a device,
26 they must neutralize it.
Nullification. Nullification includes both passive and active measures used to neutralize
27
28 or negate devices that are found. An example of passive nullification is soundproofing. But
29 soundproofing that covers only part of a room is not very helpful. Excessive wires must be removed, as
30 they could be used as a transmission path from the room. Nullification also refers to those steps taken to
31 make the emplacement of technical surveillance systems as difficult as possible. An example of active
32 nullification is the removal of a device from the area.
Isolation. The third function of the TSCM program is isolation. This refers to limiting
33
34 the number of sensitive or secure areas and ensuring the proper construction of these areas.
Education. Individuals must be aware of the foreign intelligence threat and what part
35
36 they play should a technical surveillance device be detected. Additionally, people need to be alert to
7-37

1 what is going on in and around their area, particularly during construction, renovations, and installation of
2 new equipment.
(b) The TSCM program consists of CI technical investigations and services (such as surveys,
3
4 inspections, pre-construction advice and assistance) and technical security threat briefings. TSCM
5 investigations and services are highly specialized CI investigations and are not be to confused with other
6 compliance-oriented or administrative services conducted to determine a facility's implementation of
7 various security directives.
TSCM Survey. This is an all-encompassing investigation. This investigation is a
8
9 complete electronic, physical, and visual examination to detect clandestine surveillance systems. A
10 by-product of this investigation is the identification of physical and technical security weaknesses which
11 could be exploited by enemy intelligence forces.
TSCM Inspection. Normally, once a TSCM survey has been conducted, it will not
12
13 be repeated. If TSCM personnel note several technical and physical weaknesses during the survey,
14 they may request and schedule an inspection at a later date. In addition, they will schedule an inspection
15 if there has been an increased threat posed to the facility or if there is some indication that a technical
16 penetration has occurred in the area. No facility, however, will qualify automatically for recurrent
17 TSCM support.
TSCM Pre-construction Assistance. As with other technical areas, it is much less
18
19 expensive and more effective to build in good security from the initial stages of a new project. Thus,
20 pre-construction assistance is designed to help security and construction personnel with the specific
21 requirements needed to ensure that a building or room will be secure and built to standards. This saves
22 money by precluding costly changes later on.
23
(c) Request for TSCM Support
Requests for, or references to, a TSCM investigation will be classified SECRET,

24
25 marked with the protective security marking, and receive limited dissemination (to include no
26 dissemination to any non-U.S. recipient). The fact that support is scheduled, in progress, or completed,
27 is classified SECRET.
No request for TSCM support will be accepted via nonsecure means. Nonsecure
28
29 telephonic discussion of TSCM support is prohibited.
All requests will be considered on a case-by-case basis and should be forwarded
30
31 through the chain of command via the unit's intelligence officer or security manager.
When requesting or receiving support, the facility being inspected must be complete
32
33 and operational, unless requesting pre-construction advice and assistance. If any additional equipment
34 goes into the secure area after the investigation, the entire area is suspect and the investigation negated.
7-38
Fully justified requests of an emergency nature, or for new facilities, may be submitted
1
2 at any time, but should be submitted at least 30 days before the date the support is required.
(d) Compromises. The compromise of a TSCM investigation or service is a serious security
3
4 violation with potentially severe impact on national security. Do not compromise the investigation or
5 service by any action which discloses to unauthorized persons that TSCM activity will be, is being, or
6 has been conducted within a specific area. Unnecessary discussion of a TSCM investigation or service,
7 particularly within the subject area, is especially dangerous. If a listening device is installed in the area,
8 such discussion can alert persons who are conducting the surveillance and permit them to remove or
9 deactivate their devices. When deactivated, such devices are extremely difficult to locate and may
10 require implementation of destructive search techniques. In the event a TSCM investigation or service is
11 compromised, the TSCM team chief will terminate the investigation or service at once. Report the
12 circumstances surrounding the compromise of the investigation or service to the supported unit's or
13 installations intelligence officer or security manager.
(e) Completion. When a TSCM survey or inspection is completed, the requester is usually
14
15 given reasonable assurance that the surveyed area is free of active technical surveillance devices or
16 hazards.
TSCM personnel inform the requester about all technical and physical security
17
18 vulnerabilities with recommended regulatory corrective actions.
The requester should know that it is impossible to give positive assurance that there
19
20 are-no devices in the surveyed area.
The security afforded by the TSCM investigation will be nullified by the admission to
21
22 the secured area of unescorted persons who lack the proper security clearance. The TSCM
23 investigation will also be negated by: (a) Failing to maintain continuous and effective surveillance and
24 control of the serviced area; (b) allowing repairs or alterations by persons lacking the proper security
25 clearance or not under the supervision of qualified personnel; and (c) introducing new furnishings or
26 equipment without a thorough inspection by qualified personnel.
(f) Subsequent Security Compromises. Report immediately to the intelligence officer or
27
28 security manager the discovery of an actual or suspected technical surveillance device via a secure
29 means. All information concerning the discovery will be handled at a minimum of SECRET. Installation
30 or unit security managers will request an immediate investigation by the supporting CI unit or supporting
31 TSCM element.
32 7009. Counterintelligence Surveys/Vulnerability Assessments, Evaluations, and Inspections
a. Tactical Operations. During operations, CI surveys/vulnerability assessments, evaluations, and
33
34 inspections, including TSCM inspections and surveys, are usually limited to permanent installations in
7-39

1 rear areas or to key MAGTF C2 facilities. Purely physical security surveys and inspections not falling
2 under the cognizance of CI are conducted by trained physical security specialists under the purview of
3 the MAGTF PMO. In those instances where perimeter security is the responsibility of a tactical unit,
4 the physical security portion of the CI survey is primarily concerned with those areas within the
5 perimeter containing classified material and areas susceptible to sabotage and terrorist attack. Special
6 weapons sites require extra emphasis and may include CI monitoring of shipments in addition to other
7 security services. Close and continuous liaison and coordination should be conducted with the local
8 PMO during any CI survey, with the exception of a TSCM survey, to ensure complete coverage of the
9 physical security aspects and any other areas with which the PMO may assist. See appendix E for a CI
10 survery/vulnerability assessment checklist and the format for a CI survery/vulnerability assessment
11 report.
12
b. Garrison Counterintelligence Inspections
(1) CI inspections are performed by commanders to determine compliance with established

13
14 security policies and procedures. CI credentials are intended for use of personnel on official CI mission.
15 CMC(CIC) is designated as the office of record for CI credentials. Credentials are not transferable
16 and may not be reproduced nor altered. Credentials are only issued to personnel who have completed
17 a formal course of instruction in CI which qualified them for MOS 0204/0210/0211. The presentation
18 of CI credentials certifies the bearer as having a TOP SECRET security clearance and special
19 compartmented information (SCI) access. Personnel are directed to render all assistance to properly
20 identified CI personnel in the performance of their duties. CI personnel, while in the performance of
21 their official duties are authorized access to all spaces (see MCO 3850.1H, Counterintelligence, and
22 SECNAV 5510.1H for additional amplification). The commander is overall responsible for security
23 within his command, however these responsibilities are executed by a variety of personnel to include the
24 Command Security Manager, Intelligence Officer, Operations Officer, Classified Material Control
25 Center (CMCC) Custodian and COMSEC Material System (CMS) Custodian. The scope of the
26 inspection will vary depending on its type and purpose. Inspections may include the following:
27
(a) Determine if assigned personnel with access to classified material are properly cleared.
28
(b) Determine if classified material is properly safeguarded by assigned personnel.
(c) Examination of facilities and containers used for storing classified material to determine
29
30 adequacy.
(d) Examination of procedures for controlling entrances and exits, guard systems, and special
31
32 guard instruction relating to security of classified material and sensitive areas.
33
(e) Examine the security and control of unit communications and information resources.
(f) Provide back brief to command security/intelligence personnel and formal results as
34
35 required.
7-40
(2) Command inspections include announced and unannounced inspections.
(a) Announced Inspections. An announced inspection is one that has been publicized. All
2
3 personnel concerned are aware of the inspection schedule and make preparations as necessary.
4 Inspections are conducted on a recurring basis to ensure security standards remain at a high level. The
5 announced inspection is often accomplished with inspections conducted by the inspection staff of the
6 common or a senior headquarters.
(b) Unannounced Inspections. The unannounced inspection is conducted to determine
7
8 compliance with security policies and procedures at a time when special preparations have not been
9 made. The unit or section to be inspected is not informed in advance of the inspection. The inspection
10 may be conducted at any time during or after normal working hours.
11 7010. CI Support to the Crisis Action Team Intelligence Cell. When an intelligence cell is
12 established in response to a terrorist threat or incident, CI personnel jointly man it with CID, NCIS, and
13 if required, civilian law enforcement agents. The intelligence cell coordinates the intelligence,
14 investigative, and criminal information needs of the installation and the on-scene operational commander.
15 It should be separate from both the operations center and the crisis management force/on-scene
16 commander but linked to both by a side variety of wire and wireless communications means, including a
17 direct data link. The design of the intelligence should be flexible to allow for the rapid integration of
18 other federal, state, and local agencies, as appropriate. An intelligence cell may be established both in a
19 garrison and a field environment.
20 7011. CI Mission Profiles. The following CI mission profiles were initially developed to aid CI
21 planning and execution in support of MEU(SOC) special operations missions. They are, however,
22 pertinent to CI support of any MAGTF unit executing these missions.
a. Amphibious Raid. An amphibious raid is a landing from the sea on a hostile shore which
23
24 involves swift incursion into or temporary occupancy of an objective and mission execution, followed by
25 a planned withdrawal. Key CI requirements include:
(1) Assist the unit intelligence, operations and communications and information systems (CIS)
26
27 officers with intelligence, CI, security and force protection planning.
28
(2) Provide operations security (OPSEC) guidance.
(3) Assess mission-oriented security vulnerabilities and develop requirements; provide

29
30 countermeasures recommendations.
(4) Establish access to CI and HUMINT databases, automated links to JTF, other joint and
31
32 services, coalitions, and host nation sources to help identify, assess, and develop countermeasures for
33 threats.
7-41
(5) Conduct CI/HUMINT collection operations to satisfy tasked priority intelligence

1
2 requirements (PIR) and intelligence requirements (IR).
(6) Explore CI database for information related to enemy or other potential hostile personalities,
3
4 organizations, and installations (PO&I), and then develop the CI target reduction plan.
(7) Develop/update CI threat estimates; assist intelligence officer with development/update of
5
6 all-source intelligence estimate.
(8) Conduct liaison with U.S. embassy country team for third party assistance/escape and
7
8 evasion.
(9) Attach CI personnel to raid force, when required, for document and material exploitation or
9
10 on-scene debriefing/interrogation of friendly and/or enemy personnel in the objective area.
11
(10) Provide countersigns challenges and passwords.
12
(11) Conduct CI debrief of raid force; update CI files and databases.
b. Limited Objective Attacks

13
14
(1) Assist the unit intelligence, operations and CIS officers with intelligence, CI, security and
15
16 force protection planning.
17
(2) Provide OPSEC guidance.
18
19
(3) Develop/update CI threat estimates.

20
(5) Assist in the planning and conduct of counter-reconnaissance operations to support the
22
23 attack.
24
26 threats. Explore CI database for information related to enemy or other potential hostile personalities,
27 organizations, and installations (PO&I), and then develop the CI target reduction plan.
28
(7) Conduct CI/HUMINT collection operations (e.g., photographic reconnaissance) to satisfy
29
30 tasked PIRs and IRs.
7-42

1
(8) Identify CI targets for possible exploitation and/or neutralization.
(9) Assist ground combat element (GCE) and aviation combat element (ACE) intelligence
2
3 officers with escape and evasion plans.
(10) Attach CI personnel to GCE when required.
4
5
(11) Conduct liaison with U.S. embassy country team for third party escape and evasion
6
7 assistance.
8
(13) Conduct CI debrief of assault force; update CI files and databases.
c. Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO). A NEO is conducted for the purpose of

10
11 evacuating civilian noncombatants from locations in a foreign faced with the threat of hostile or
12 potentially hostile action. It will normally be conducted to evacuate U.S. citizens whose lives are in
13 danger, but may also include the evacuation of U.S. military personnel, citizens of the host country and
14 third country nationals friendly to the U.S. Key CI requirements include:
15
16
18
19
20

21
23
(5) Assist in the planning and conduct of counter-reconnaissance operations to support key sites.
24
26 threats. Explore CI database for information related to enemy or other potential hostile PO&I, and then
27 develop the CI target reduction plan.
28
(7) Provide recommendations and planning assistance regarding antiterrorism measures.
29
(9) Provide CI officer -- and possibly a CI subteam or HET -- to the forward command element
30
31 (FCE) for on-scene liaison and support.
7-43
(10) When directed, attach CI personnel to the combat service support element (CSSE)
1
2 evacuation control center (ECC) to assist in time sensitive debriefs, liaison, antiterrorism measures, and
3 to assist in personnel screening.
(11) Provide from CI database, a sanitized copy of the black, white, and gray lists to the CSSE
4
5 ECC for screening of persons of immediate interest.
6
(12) Conduct liaison with U.S. embassy country team for third party assistance.
(13) Conduct in-depth debriefs of non-combatant evacuees who may have information of
7
8 intelligence/CI value.
d. Show of Force Operations. A show of force operation is designed to demonstrate U.S.
9
10 resolve, which involves increased visibility of deployed military forces in an attempt to defuse a specific
11 situation that, if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to U.S. interests or national objectives.
12
(2) Assist and coordinate with unit psychological operations, public affairs, and civil affairs
14
15 planners, with emphasis on development of operational plans to target and influence attitudes and
16 behaviors of personnel within the AO.
17
18
19
(5) Conduct liaison with U.S. embassy country team for third party assistance.
20
e. Reinforcement Operations
21
23

24
26
(4) Assist in the planning and conduct of counter-reconnaissance operations to support key sites.
7-44

1
3 threats. Explore CI database for information related to enemy or other potential hostile PO&I, and then
4 develop the CI target reduction plan.
5
(7) Attach CI personnel to GCE when directed to provide direct CI support.
f. Security Operations
8
10
(3) Provide recommendations and planning assistance regarding past hostile antiterrorism
11
12 measures, capabilities, and countermeasures development.
(4) Provide estimates and recommendations on on counterespionage and countersabotage
13
14 vulnerabilities and countermeasures.
15
(5) Conduct CI/HUMINT collection operations to satisfy tasked PIRs and IRs.
(6) Attach CI personnel to the GCE when directed for direct support to the GCE Commander
16
17 and to conduct special activities ashore.
18
(7) Assist in the planning and conduct of counter-reconnaissance operations in the rear area..
19
21 threats. Research CI database for information related to PO&I and development of the CI target
22 reduction plan.
23
g. Civic Action. Military civic action is the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on
24
25 projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works,
26 agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and
27 social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the
28 population.
29

7-45
1
3 threats.
4
(3) Provide terrorist and hostile intelligence services (HOIS) threat data.
5
6
(5) Conduct debriefs in support of the FORMICA6 program.
h. Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP). TRAP is a mission performed by an

8
9 assigned and briefed aircrew for the specific purpose of the recovery of friendly personnel, equipment,
10 and/or aircraft when the tactical situation precludes search and rescue assets from responding and when
11 survivors and their location have been confirmed. The mission is to expeditiously recover friendly
12 aircrews or personnel in a wide range of political environments and threat levels. Additionally,
13 equipment will either be recovered or destroyed, dependent upon the severity of the threat and
14 environment, and the condition of the equipment. Key CI requirements include:
15
17
18
(3) Provide CI personnel to the recovery and security forces.
(4) Ensure isolated personnel report (ISOPREP) cards are up-to-date and readily accessible
19
20 for all appropriate personnel prior to any operation. ISOPREP cards should be prepared and retained
21 by either the unit security manager or its administrative officer. (See appendix J to Joint Publication
22 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, for the format and instructions for completing
23 ISOPREP cards.)
(5) Conduct friendly POW/MIA investigations.
24
(6) Assist GCE and ACE intelligence officers and TRAP commanders in developing escape and
25
26 evasion plans.
Foreign military intelligence collection activity (FORMICA) is an overt intelligence collection

program, managed by the Defense HUMINT Service, concerning the debriefing of U.S. military and
DOD civilians in reference to their travels and activities. Within the MAGTF FORMICA debriefings are
usually conducted by CI personnel. Additional information on the FORMICA program can be found in
DIAM 58-11, DOD HUMINT Policies and Procedures, and MCO 003820.1, FORMICA Program.
7-46

(7) Conduct liaison with U.S. embassy country team for third party escape and evasion and
1
2 other support.
3
4
(8) Conduct CI debrief of TRAP force.

i. In-Extremis Hostage Rescue (IHR)
(1) Assist the unit intelligence and operations officers with intelligence, CI and force protection
5
6 planning.
7
8
9
(3) Attach CI personnel to the IHR strike element when directed for target exploitation and
10
11 personnel handling.
12
13
14
(5) Assist in rapid planning.
15
16
(6) Arrange for IHR force isolation.
17
18
(7) Conduct on-scene document and material exploitation when directed.
19
20
(8) Conduct initial hostage/terrorist debriefs.
21
22
(9) Provide assistance in training the IHR force in urban surveillance and counter-surveillance.
23
(10) Conduct liaison with national and theater intelligence agencies on hostage rescue and
24
25 HUMINT operations.
7-47

1
CHAPTER 8
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TRAINING
3 8001. General. The effectiveness of command and supporting CI and force protection security
4 measures often rests on the individual Marine's ability to recognize and accurately report threats to the
5 security of the command. It also rests on his willing acceptance of a high degree of security discipline.
a. Overall Objective. The ultimate objective of CI training is to ensure effective contribution by all
6
7 MAGTF personnel to the CI effort and to instill a sense of security discipline. To ensure that the
8 individual Marine can provide effective CI and security measures, CI training is integrated with other
9 intelligence and command training programs.
b. CI Personnel Objective. For CI personnel, the objective of CI/HUMINT training is to ensure
10
11 that MAGTF CI personnel are capable of providing CI/HUMINT support required by the commander.
12 The desired result of CI/HUMINT training is that CI personnel can assist the commander in
13 accomplishing the assigned missions. Additionally, it is to ensure non-MAGTF CI organizations and
14 capabilities are understood and prepared to effectively integrate with and support MAGTF operations.
c. Basic CI Training. Basic CI and security training requirements are common to all commands.
15
16 However, emphasis on certain subjects will vary according to the mission of the command and duty
17 assignments of personnel within the unit. Generally, training can be divided into the following categories:
18
(1) Basic CI and security training for all personnel.
19
(2) Training for officers and staff noncommissioned officers.
20
(3) Mission-oriented training.
21
(4) Training for intelligence personnel.
22 8002. Basic Counterintelligence and Security Training for All Personnel. All personnel receive
23 training in CI and force protection in order to safeguard friendly force information of value and
24 operations from exploitation by the hostile intelligence threat. Although not directly related to CI or
25 security, the following related areas should be covered to instill awareness on the part of all personnel:
a. Marine Corps personnel are subject to detention or captivity by foreign governments or
26
27 organizations because of their wide range of activities. At a minimum all Marines require training -28 individual, collective and unit -- in the following:
(1) Operations security, to include its purpose, how to identify unit/individual patterns and
29
30 profiles that can be identified and exploited by the enemy, and countermeasures to minimize or eliminate
31 these.
8-1
(2) Information security, to include levels of security classification, when to apply and
1
2 ramifications of these on friendly operations, development of operational and functional classification
3 guidance and criteria, downgrading and declassification,
(3) Personnel security, to include individual standards, how to identify risks and vulnerabilities,
4
5 and individual and command actions to take when these are identified.
(4) Challenges and practices for each of the above when conducting MAGTF operations with
6
7 non-U.S. military forces, non-governmental organizations, private volunteer organizations, and news
8 media organizations.
(5) Purpose and procedures for the use of countersigns challenges and passwords.
(6) Survival, evasion, resistance to interrogation, escape (SERE), to include training on

10
11 prospective areas of operation, the nature and attitude of the civilian populaces, and the techniques and
12 procedures used by threat forces.1
13
(7) Communications and information security vulnerabilities and countermeasures.
14
(8) U.S. code of conduct.
b. Marines may be required by operational necessity to detain foreign nationals. As a result, they
15
16 are required to know the laws of war and the individual rights and responsibilities under the Geneva
17 Convention of 12 Aug 1949, for those captured or detained by MAGTF units.
18 8003. Training for Officers and Staff Noncommissioned Officers. All officers and enlisted
19 personnel -- regardless of MOS -- must receive training in the following CI and security subjects. Entry
20 level and basic military occupational specialty training programs are best suited for initial training to these
21 areas. Follow-on training based on unit mission (mission-oriented training) and professional
22 development/education should be conducted throughout the careers of all Marines.
DOD Dir 1300.7, Training and Education Measures Necessary to Support the Code of
Conduct, provides policy and guidance on SERE training. It establishes three levels:
a. Level A: the minimum level of understanding required of all Armed Forces personnel, to be
provided during entry level training.
b. Level B: the minimum level of understanding required of military personnel whose military
occupational specialities and assignments entail moderate risk of capture. Level B training is to be
conducted as soon as possible upon assumption of the duty/MOS that makes them eligible.
c. Level C: the minimum level of understanding required of military personnel whose
MOS/assignment entails significant risk of capture, or whose position, rank, or seniority make them
vulnerable to greater than average targeting/exploitation by enemies or other threats. Examples include
aircrews, ground reconnaissance personnel, and military attaches.
8-2

a. Operations security is a process of analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and
1
2 other activities to:
(1) Understand, identify and properly employ the use of essential elements of friendly
3
4 information (EEFI).
(2) Identify those friendly actions and operational patterns that can be observed and exploited
5
6 by enemy intelligence forces.
(3) Determine indicators that hostile intelligence elements might obtain. These indicators could
7
8 be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries.
(4) Select, plan and execute friendly protective measures that eliminate or reduce to an
9
10 acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.
b. Protecting classified material and other information that may be of value to the enemy. All
11
12 personnel must be able to name and define, in general terms, the three levels of security classification,
13 minimum security standards, and the potential damage that may be caused if this information should be
14 exposed to unauthorized persons. Officers and SNCOs must in particular understand how to apply
15 these to their activities and products, both generally as well as within the specific exercise/operation
16 classification guidance.
c. Evaluating the suitability of subordinate personnel who have access to classified information.
17
18 Officers and staff noncommissioned officers must be able to recognize indicators associated with
19 potential involvement or susceptibility to espionage activities, such as unexplained affluence, erratic
20 behavior, or mood swings, and then initiative action in accordance with OPNAVINST 5510.1.
d. Hostile intelligence services organizations, capabilities, and methods of operation and acquisition
21
22 of information. Additionally, briefs on current events concerning attempts and/or acts of espionage,
23 subversion, terrorism, or sabotage should be emphasized. Individual responsibilities for reporting
24 foreign contact, perceived or actual attempts at espionage or subversion, and undue interest on the part
25 of anyone to acquire terrorist countermeasures as well as intelligence collection operations should be
26 stressed regardless of MOS. Routine threat awareness should become a part of each person's
27 professional military education objectives. This is most easily satisfied at formal professional military
28 education courses or correspondence courses, but can also be obtained during mission-oriented
29 training. Special attention should be paid to indications of the level of terrorist/subversive activity
30 through unclassified or classified articles/publications and through tailored briefs, particularly in those
31 countries identified as high threat areas. (See DODINST 5240.6, CI Awareness and Briefing
32 Program, for additional information.)
33
e. Use of countersigns challenges and passwords.
34
f. Purpose, scope, organization, capabilities and limitations of Marine Corps CI assets.

8-3
g. The identities and responsibilities of all unit personnel responsible with key leadership roles
1
2 regarding unit security, to include:
3
(1) Unit security manager2 -- overall coordination of unit security.
(2) G/S-1 -- principal staff cognizance for classified materials control.
(3) G/S-2 -- principal staff cognizance for sensitive compartmented information and special
5
6 security, and identification of enemy intelligence capabilities and operations.
(4) G/S-3 -- principal staff cognizance for force protection, command and control protection,
7
8 operations security, counter-reconnaissance, deception, and electronic protection.
(5) G/S-6 -- principal staff cognizance for communications and information systems (CIS)
9
10 security, cryptographic materials system.
(6) Headquarters commandant -- principal staff cognizance for physical security.
11
h. Handling of personnel of CI interest during MAGTF operations, to include the identification,

12
13 control, and reporting of persons, installations and materials of CI interest.
14 8004. Mission-Oriented Training
a. General. Mission-oriented training ensures that the unit's objectives are achieved by employing
15
16 the proper CI measures. Unit SOPs and training exercises should include the following:
(1) Operations security measures and passive countermeasures to protect sensitive or classified
17
18 information from the enemy or unauthorized personnel.
(2) Counter-reconnaissance activity to prevent observation from opposing forces, such as
19
20 patrols, camouflage, and other measures.
(3) Other security measures designed specifically for each type of unit and the nature of the
21
22 operation.
(4) CIS security procedures designed to lessen friendly signatures and susceptibility to hostile
23
24 radio electronic combat operations.
(5) SERE training for those personnel whose military jobs, specialties, or assignments entail
25
26 moderate risk of capture.
2
The unit security manager is generally either the chief of staff or executive officer.
8-4
b. Counterintelligence Personnel. A complete listing and description of mission performance

1
2 standards for CI personnel can be found in MCO 1510.58. The following identifies the principal
3 individual and mission training standards.
4
(1) Supervise marine staff counterintelligence/HUMINT section garrison activities
(2) Supervise marine staff counterintelligence/HUMINT section in a tactical environment
(3) Supervise counterintelligence team/HUMINT exploitation team headquarters activities and

6
7 operations
8
(4) Monitor counterintelligence training plan for counterintelligence personnel
(5) Prepare the counterintelligence standing operating procedures (SOP)
10
(6) Brief CI/HUMINT mission and authorizing directives and regulations.
11
(7) Conduct counterintelligence screening
12
(8) Conduct mobile and static checkpoints
13
(9) Conduct counterintelligence activities in support of cordon and search
14
(10) Conduct counterintelligence survey
15
(11) Conduct missing in action investigation
16
(12) Conduct an investigation of an act of espionage, sabotage, subversion, or terrorism
17
(13) Conduct counterintelligence surveillance
18
(14) Conduct counterintelligence countersurveillance
19
(15) Conduct HUMINT operations
20
(16) Conduct counterintelligence interrogation
21
(17) Conduct map tracking during interrogation and interviews
22
(18) Exploit captured documents and equipment
23
(19) Conduct counterintelligence elucidation

8-5
(20) Conduct counterintelligence debrief
(21) Conduct counterintelligence interview
(22) Conduct counterintelligence/humint liaison
(23) Account for operational funds
(24) Conduct technical surveillance countermeasures service
(25) Maintain counterintelligence and human resources equipment
(26) Operate current automated intelligence systems
(27) Provide counterintelligence support to MAGTF operations
(28) Conduct CI activities in support of noncombatant evacuation operations
10 8005. Training of Intelligence Section Personnel. The following subjects are considered
11 appropriate for the CI training of intelligence section personnel and should incorporate MAGTF, other
12 services, joint and national capabilities, issues and operations:
a. Counterintelligence Collection, Processing, Production and Dissemination Capabilities
13
14 and Organizations
b. C2 and CIS Architecture. C2 and supporting communication-information systems operations,
15
16 both for internal CI activities and for overall integrated CI/intelligence operations.
c. Counterintelligence Sources of Information and Methods of Reporting. Walk-ins, host
17
18 nation liaison activity, and line crossers and CFSO are examples of sources utilized in CI/HUMINT
19 operations to support command information objectives.
d. CI Support Activities. This includes CI surveys/vulnerability assessments, technical support
20
21 and technical surveillance countermeasures.
e. Intelligence Oversight. When intelligence specialist assets are attached/assigned, the minimum
22
23 reporting requirements and prohibited activities should be strictly monitored and enforced in accordance
24 with DOD 5240.1R Intelligence Oversight.
25
f. Unique Supply, Embarkation, Maintenance, and Other Functional Support to CI
26 8006. Peacetime Counterintelligence Training

8-6
a. Exercises. The conduct of CI operations in exercises is closely controlled. All aspects of CI

1
2 operations require the same security precautions and controls for exercises that are required for real
3 world operations.
(1) Planning. The use of exercise CI provides commanders, staffs, and units involved
4
5 experience regarding CI operations and in working with CI information, rules, communications, and
6 personnel. Exercise CI operations may be conducted whether or not an opposition force exists.
(a) Exercise CI may be scripted or preplanned if an opposition force does not participate in
7
8 the exercise, such as for a staff exercise (STAFFEX) or a command post exercise (CPX). Use of
9 scripted CI should be planned well in advance of the exercise to allow adequate time to script the
10 exercise CI necessary to realistically support the exercise scenario. Coordination between exercise
11 planners and exercise CI scripters is important to ensure that the exercise CI emulates realistic CI
12 activities, information flow and timelines (e.g., the time-sensitive limitations of CI for timely reporting and
13 access to sources often do not integrate well with accelerated wargaming time clocks) in relation to the
14 notional opposition force. All security requirements, such as for the use of special CI communications,
15 must be maintained throughout the exercise.
(b) Exercise CI operations may also be conducted against a live opposition force, such as
16
17 during a MAGTF field exercise. This provides for more realistic training for both the CI element and
18 users of SIGINT participating in the exercise, as well as better CI/other intelligence elements integration
19 and training. Dependent on the level of the exercise, use of simulators and national systems may be
20 requested for participation in the exercise to add realism and enhance training.
b. Real World Support. During the conduct of exercises, particularly overseas, CI performs
21
22 critical, real-world support to the units force protection mission. This support involves protecting the
23 force during prior to and during training process from exposure to or exploitation by hostile intelligence
24 and security services, and terrorist actions targeting the force.
25 8007. CI Training Programs. CI training is a dynamic, evolutionary, and never ending process. Due
26 to continual technological advances and ever increasing sophistication of CI/HUMINT operations and
27 activities, its importance cannot be over emphasized. All personnel are to receive training in CI and
28 security as a basis for fulfilling their basic responsibilities to safeguard information of value to the hostile
29 intelligence threat. CI personnel receive additional training to improve their proficiency in accomplishing
30 the CI mission.
a. Individual CI Personnel Training. The training of CI personnel is driven by MCO 1510.58
31
32 (Individual Training Standards [ITS]). ITS' are derived from mission performance standards (MPS).
33 MPS are further derived from the combat requirements of the operating forces and establish a common
34 base of training for all Marines who have the same MOS. CI personnel undergo four distinct levels of
35 training to acquire, maintain, and increase their proficiency in the prescribed ITS.
36
(1) Pre-resident/on-the-job training (OJT).

8-7
(2) MAGTF CI Course, Formal Resident Training (formal MOS school, NMITC).
(3) Advanced training.
b. Responsibilities. The following personnel have the responsibility for ensuring that a viable
3
4 program is established for each of the four levels of training:
5
(1) Pre-resident OJT -- Commanding Officer, CI/HUMINT Company.
(2) CI resident course -- Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC).
(3) Advanced training community (CI/HUMINT Companies, MEF CIHOs, parent units,
7
8 HQMC).
9
c. Descriptions
(1) Pre-Resident On-The-Job Training. The foundation of the pre-resident OJT program is
10
11 a standardized pre-resident training course (PRTC). The pre-resident OJT program also serves as a
12 vehicle for screening and evaluating candidates for the CI MOS. The PRTC prepares the candidate for
13 the resident CI Course. It also provides him with a baseline knowledge from which resident training
14 commences. All candidates for the CI MOS must successfully complete the PRTC prior to advancing
15 to the second level of training. Commanders will diligently observe candidates during this period to
16 ensure they meet the high personal and professional standards required of CI personnel. To better
17 prepare a candidate for resident training, commanders should expand on the PRTC once a candidate
18 completes it. This training will include:
19
(a) Correspondence procedures/administration
20
(b) Communications and information systems
21
(c) Mapping and land navigation
22
(d) MAGTFs, JTF and theater CI and intelligence organizations and capabilities
23
(e) CI methodology
24
(f) Report writing/writing skills
25
(g) Interpersonal communications
(2) CI Resident Formal School Training. CI resident entry-level formal school training for
26
27 both officers and enlisted Marines is via the 17-weeks MAGTF Counterintelligence Agents Course
8-8

1 conducted at the NMITC, Dam Neck, Virginia. Successful completion of this course provides basic
2 MOS qualification (officers -- MOS 0204; enlisted -- MOS 0211) and certification as Level I
3 Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection Instructors. Once qualified, all CI personnel are required to
4 maintain proficiency in those ITS' achieved.
(3) Advanced Training. Advanced training of CI personnel in specialized skills is conducted
5
6 to enhance their abilities to perform increasingly complex tasks. This training supplements and is
7 conducted with the post resident training process. This training includes, but is not limited to, the
8 following:
9
(a) Intelligence cross training
10
(b) TSCM
11
(c) Photographic, video and electronic surveillance systems training
(d) Military Officer Training Course/Military Officer Familiarization Course/Officer Support

12
13 Specialty Course (MOTC/MOFC/OSSC)
14
(e) Language training
15
(f) SERE training
16
(g) Terrorism/counterterrorism
17
(h) Intelligence and CI communications and information systems
8-9

1
CHAPTER 9
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ADMINISTRATION
3 9001. General. Administration for the CI elements consists of files, reports, communications, and
4 emergency funds. CI elements are responsible for establishing and maintaining operational files essential
5 to their combat CI mission. The accomplishment of the CI mission requires accurate, timely, and
6 pertinent reports disseminated in a usable form. CI has organic communications equipment to help
7 coordinate CI activities and report information to other organizations. Emergency and extraordinary
8 expense (E&EE) funds are made available for CI because of the nature of the missions.
9 9002. Files. The following operational files are normally maintained in a combat environment by CI
10 elements at all echelons. Formats, organization and content for each should be coordinated with the
11 MEF AFC OIC or the supported unit's intelligence officer.
a. Information concerning personalities, organizations, installations, and incidents, of current and
12
13 future CI interest. Often basic information of this type is recorded in a card file/folder or automated
14 data base for ready reference. It is also cross-indexed to more detailed information.
15
b. Correspondence and reports about specific operations and investigations.
16
c. Source records containing essential data on sources of information.
d. Area files containing basic reference data and information on enemy intelligence activity and CI
17
18 measures within a particular geographic area.
19 9003. Reports. CI reports are prepared to transmit accurate information to units to support planning,
20 decisionmaking and execution, to aid in the processing of intelligence, and to serve as a record of CI
21 activities. The method of dissemination of CI information depends primarily on the nature and urgency
22 of the information, the location of the receiving units, the security requirements, and the means available.
23 Normally, information is disseminated by record or voice messages, personal liaison, telephone,
24 briefings, messenger, and written reports. All CI reports will be written in accordance with the formats
25 prescribed for a standard naval letter or message. The report formats in appendix E of this publications
26 are DOD standardized formats meant to enhance joint interoperability and should not be modified
27 unless absolutely necessary and following coordination with all pertinent intelligence organizations.
28 Reports are classified according to content.
29 9004. Personnel
a. Augmentation. When additional personnel are needed, the requirement is identified through the
30
31 intelligence officer to the personnel officer for validation by the commander. The request will then be
9-1

1 forwarded through the chain of command to the MEF G-2 for follow-on tasking to the CI/HUMINT
2 company.
b. Global Sourcing. When the MEF's CI/HUMINT company resources are insufficient to fulfill a
3
4 validated requirement, it is then forwarded to Headquarters, Marine Corps, for global sourcing support
5 from either the other MEFs or Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES).
c. Reserves. There are three reserve CI teams within MARFORRES. The 10th and 12th CI
6
7 teams are located at Anacostia Naval Air Station, Washington DC, while the 14th CI team is located at
8 Miramar Naval Air Station, San Diego, CA. The reserve CI teams are a lucrative source of
9 experienced CI personnel.
10 9005. Emergency and Extraordinary Expense (E&EE) Funds. The nature of certain CI and
11 intelligence activities are such that security considerations, opportunity, timeliness, or other
12 circumstances may make the use of normal military funds impractical or undesirable. Accordingly, the
13 Secretary of the Navy has authorized the use of E&EE funds for certain intelligence and CI activities.
a. Intelligence collection funds to support HUMINT operations conducted by Marine Corps CI
14
15 assets are available through E&EE (subhead 123.A2 ) funds. These funds are not authorized for the
16 conduct of CI activities.
b. CI funds to support offensive and defensive CI operations are available through E&EE (subhead
17
18 123.B3 ) funds. These funds are not authorized for the conduct of positive HUMINT or other controlled
19 intelligence collection activities.
c. The MAGTF CIHO initiates early planning and coordination to ensure the availability of both
20
21 types of funds. This function is performed by the CI detachment or HET OICs within MEU(SOC)s or
22 SPMAGTFs.
d. See MCO 7040.10A, Emergency and Extraordinary Expense Funds, for additional
23
24 information on the use, control and accounting of E&EE funds.
Subhead 123.a funds are General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) monies intended for use
by Naval Attaches in the performance of their official duties and are managed by the Office of Naval
Intelligence and coordinated by CMC (CIC).
3
Subhead 123.b funds are Foreign Counterintelligence Program (FCIP) monies intended for CI
functions only and are managed through NCIS.
9-2

1
CHAPTER 10
GARRISON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
3 10001. Mission. The primary garrison mission of CI activities is planning, preparing, and training to
4 accomplish MAGTF CI functions and operations. A secondary mission is to advise and assist the
5 commander in implementing the command's force protection and security programs and supporting
6 command initiated security measures. CI is designed to identify and neutralize the effectiveness of both
7 potential and active hostile collection efforts and to identify and neutralize the effectiveness of individuals,
8 activities, or organizations capable of engaging in hostile intelligence collection, sabotage, subversion, or
9 terrorism directed against his command. Additional doctrine pertaining to combating terrorism is
10 contained in MCO 3302.1, Antiterrorism Program.
11 10002. Counterintelligence Survey/Vulnerability Assessment
a. Basis. The CI survey/vulnerability assessment is designed to assist commanders in establishing
12
13 security systems, procedures, and safeguards to protect military personnel, organizations and
14 installations from espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or subversion. The survey assesses a units overall
15 security posture against threats identified in the CI estimate. The CI survey/vulnerability assessment will
16 identify specific vulnerabilities to hostile intelligence, espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorist
17 capabilities and provide recommendations on how to eliminate or minimize these vulnerabilities. The
18 survey/vulnerability assessment is not a recurring event. Once it is conducted, the survey/vulnerability
19 assessment will remain valid for that specific installation until there are major changes in the physical
20 security of the installation, the mission of the command, or potential threats. It is necessary that the
21 survey/vulnerability assessment look forward in both space and time to support the development of CI
22 measures necessary to protect the unit as it carries out successive phases of the operation. The CI
23 survey/vulnerability assessment includes:
24
(1) Analysis of CI factors influencing security within the unit or installation.
25
(2) A determination of CI measures required by the sensitivity or criticality of the installation.
26
(3) An assessment of CI measures and deficiencies that currently exist and their effectiveness.
(4) Recommendations for improvements to these measures or the initiation of new security
27
28 measures to achieve required security standards and protection.
b. Initiation. The initiation of a CI survey/vulnerability assessment begins with a request from the
29
30 commander of a unit or installation concerned or with a higher commander in the same chain of
31 command. That request will normally occur under the following circumstances:
32
(1) Changes in known or estimated threat risks.

10-1
(2) Activation or reactivation of an installation or a major command.
(3) Significant change in the mission, functions, or physical reorganization of an installation or

2
3 major command.
(4) New hazardous conditions affecting an installation which necessitate the reevaluation of the
4
5 security systems in place.
(5) Significant changes in the level/scope of classified material stored, handled, processed,
6
7 and/or produced.
8
(6) Change in locale or environment in which the installation is located.
c. Preparation. When preparing to conduct a CI survey/vulnerability assessment, there are four

9
10 areas that need to be considered: selection of personnel, collection of data, coordination, and the
11 preparation of checklists. The scope and depth to which each of the areas will be considered will
12 depend entirely on the unit or installation itself. The following paragraphs offer some ideas.
(1) Selection of Personnel. Selection of personnel will consider the number of persons required
13
14 to complete the task and available assets and should include TSCM personnel, if possible.
(2) Collection of Data. At a minimum, data collected should include the mission, organization,
15
16 functions, and security directives pertinent to the installations. Also, reports of previous
17 CIsurveys/vulnerability assessments, inspections, or evaluations should be acquired and reviewed.
(3) Coordination. Coordination with the commander of the unit or installation should be
18
19 conducted by a CI officer/specialist. This coordination will help in determining the scope of the
20 survey/vulnerability assessment, arrange for access to any/all required records or areas, procurement of
21 any directives if not already acquired, arrangements for any required escorts, and arrangements for any
22 necessary briefings.
(4) Preparation of Checklist. Checklist preparation will evolve once a thorough review of the
23
24 commander's objectives and the unit/installation's mission, organization and operations has been
25 completed. The checklist includes general and specific points to be covered during the
26 survey/vulnerability assessment. It also serves as a reminder to the surveying personnel to satisfy the
27 predetermined scope of the survey/vulnerability assessment. In an effort to assist in formulating a
28 checklist, areas of emphasis typically include document security, personnel security, communications
29 and information systems security, and actual physical security requirements (less those physical security
30 requirements falling under the purview of the provost marshal). Physical security requirements should be
31 coordinated with the PMO because the PMO has resident knowledge and expertise as the primary
32 agency for physical security aboard the installation. From those three general points, more specific
10-2

1 points will evolve. A comprehensive CI survey/vulnerability assessment checklist is contained in
2 appendix E of this publication.
d. Conduct. The actual conduct of the CI survey/vulnerability assessment will depend solely on the
3
4 findings set forth in the data collected and the needs developed in the checklist(s). The judgment of the
5 leader will determine just how/what the team will do. There are several things that should be noted as
6 specific methods and/or ways to conduct the CI survey/vulnerability assessment.
(1) Using one possible concept of concentric circles, the survey/vulnerability assessment team
7
8 should make a physical tour of the installation from its perimeter areas to the center, including the area
9 immediately outside its physical boundary. This tour should include every building, area, facility, or
10 office which requires special security considerations or which are considered sensitive. It is also
11 recommended the unit/installation staff personnel and subordinate commanders be interviewed, as
12 required, to assist in determining the operational importance, know vulnerabilities and security practices
13 of each area surveyed.
(2) The cost of replacement, (in terms of time and not necessarily dollars and cents), of
14
15 personnel, documents, and materials in the event the installation is neutralized or destroyed. The
16 potential sources for the procurement of comparable personnel and sources for copies of essential and
17 critical documents to replace or reactivate the installation.
(3) The location of the unit/installation and the effects of the surrounding environment/elements
18
19 on the overall security of the installation.
20
(4) The level of classified and sensitive information used, produced, stored, or compiled.
(5) The criticality of the installation with the overall defense posture of the U.S. based on its
21
22 mission/function.
(6) Whether there are other units/installations/facilities that can assume the role of the surveyed
23
24 unit/installation if it is neutralized or destroyed.
(7) The unit/installation's vulnerability to terrorist or special operations forces attacks based on
25
26 local/international threat and conditions.
e. Baseline. Once the level of security required has been determined, the posture and
27
28 effectiveness of existing security measures must be assessed. Areas that should be examined include:
(1) Document Security. Document security is systematic review and inspection of all security
29
30 procedures and records used in the handling of classified document, information, and other classified
31 material. The review should include the flow of classified material beginning from its creation/receipt at
32 the installation/unit/command/ to its final storage area or destruction.
10-3

(2) Personnel Security. Personnel security is based on the relationship that exists between a
1
2 unit/installation's mission, local CI threat estimates, the actual security level of assigned personnel, and
3 the supporting security education and awareness program.
(3) Physical Security. This assesses the system of security controls, barriers, and other
4
5 devices procedures to prevent destruction, damage, unauthorized access to the installation and facilities.
6 In accordance with MCO 3302.1 Antiterrorism Program, this is normally the responsibility of the
7 provost marshal. However, in conjunction with the storage of classified material where the susceptibility
8 to espionage, sabotage, subversion, or terrorism is a consideration, the CI survey/vulnerability
9 assessment is applicable. Whether the installation is a controlled one or an open post, the actual
10 physical requirements established by directives will be examined based on the unit/installation's mission
11 and nature/type materials being used. Emphasis is on the examination of the physical security factors
12 affecting classified storage areas, security areas, critical areas that require protection from sabotage or
13 terrorist attack and other locations that may be designated as sensitive.
f. Exit Brief. Once the survey/vulnerability assessment has been completed and all
14
15 recommendations have been formulated, the survey/vulnerability assessment team will provide the
16 unit/installation commander with a exit brief addressing preliminary findings and recommendations.
17 Compliance will then be the commander's responsibility.
g. CI Survey/Vulnerability Assessment Report and Recommendations. Once the CI
18
19 survey/vulnerability assessment has been completed and all data compiled, a formal report of findings
20 will be written and recommendations made. The recommendations will be based on the security
21 measures required of the command, existing measures, and procedures. The recommendations are
22 made to provide measures to safeguard the installation/organization against sabotage, espionage,
23 subversion, and/or terrorism. Each recommendation will be in response to a specific identifiable hazard
24 with consideration given to cost, time, manpower, and availability of materials. If at all possible,
25 alternate recommendations should be included. See appendix E of this publication for the format of a
26 CI survey/vulnerability assessment report.
27 10003. CI Penetration Inspection. Once a survey/vulnerability assessment has been conducted on a
28 unit/installation/facility, a CI penetration inspection may be conducted to determine the effectiveness of
29 recommendations implemented. The inspection is designed to provide a realistic test of established
30 security measures and practices. It is conducted in a manner that installation personnel, other than the
31 commander and those persons he desires to inform, are unaware that such an action is taking place.
32 The inspection may be all-inclusive or may be limited to an attempt by CI personnel to fraudulently gain
33 access to specific sensitive areas for performing simulated acts of espionage or sabotage. These
34 simulated acts should be as realistic as possible. These acts should correspond to activities which could
35 be attempted by area threats or hostile agents. The penetration inspection must be thoroughly planned
36 and coordinated and include the following considerations:
(1) A responsible person, who is knowledgeable of the inspection, and a representative of the
37
38 inspected command must be present during the inspection.
10-4
(2) In addition to the CI credentials and military identification, inspectors must carry a letter of
1
2 identification and authorization for use only in emergency situations.
(3) Termination of the inspection will be done immediately if at any time personnel is subject to
3
4 physical danger or other safety risks.
(4) Preparation for and conduct of the inspection must not impair or disrupt the normal
5
6 operation/function of the command unless the inspection is specifically designed to do so.
(5) Command or installation personnel will not be utilized in any manner which would tend to
7
8 discredit them.
9 10004. Counterintelligence Evaluation
a. CI evaluations are similar to surveys but are limited in scope. The CI evaluation is normally
10
11 conducted for a small unit or a component of a larger organization when there has been a change in the
12 security posture, an activation or reactivation of a facility, a physical relocation, or substantive changes
13 to the units facilities or communications-information systems infrastructure. CI evaluations are normally
14 limited to areas containing or processing classified material.
b. The CI evaluation may be limited to an assessment of only one type of security, such as
15
16 document, personnel, or physical security, or it may include any combination, depending on the needs of
17 the unit. The procedures for the preparation and conduct of the evaluation are the same as those for the
18 CI survey/vulnerability assessment. However, the procedures usually are not as extensive. The CI
19 evaluation also may be used to update CI surveys when only minor changes have occurred within an
20 installation or major organization.
21 10005. Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) Support
a. As discussed in chapter 7, the purpose of the TSCM program is to locate and neutralize
22
23 technical surveillance devices that have been targeted against U.S. sensitive or secure areas. CI TSCM
24 teams have specialized equipment and techniques to locate and identify threat technical surveillance
25 activity. TSCM support consists of inspections and surveys. A TSCM inspection is an evaluation to
26 determine the physical security measures required to protect an area against visual and audio
27 surveillance. TSCM surveys include a complete electronic and physical search for unauthorized
28 modification of equipment, the presence of clandestine audio and visual device, and other conditions
29 which may allow the unauthorized transmission of any conversation out of the area being surveyed. All
30 TSCM operations are governed by DOD Directive 5200.9, SECNAVINST 5500.31, and MCO
31 05511.11.
b. Historically, hostile intelligence services have used technical surveillance monitoring systems in
32
33 their intelligence and espionage operations against U.S. targets, both in the continental United States and
10-5

1 abroad. A technical surveillance monitoring system may be defined as any visual surveillance or audio
2 monitoring system which is used clandestinely to obtain classified or sensitive unclassified information for
3 intelligence purposes. These monitoring systems include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) Sound pickup devices, such as microphones and other transducers which use wire and
4
5 amplifying equipment.
6
(2) Passive modulators.
(3) Energy beams; i.e., electromagnetic, laser, and infrared.
(4) Radio transmitters.
(5) Recording equipment.
10
(6) Telephones; i.e., taps and bugs.
11
(7) Photographic and television cameras.
c. Requests for TSCM support must be classified and no conversation concerning the inspection
12
13 should take place in the vicinity of the area to be inspected. Procedures for requesting inspections and
14 surveys, TSCM responsibilities, and further information on the audio surveillance threat are contained in
15 OPNAVINST 0500.46 and MCO 5511.11.
d. Normally, one Marine team within the CI/HUMINT company at each MEF maintains a TSCM
16
17 capability to support tactical units of the MEF. This capability, designed primarily for combat support,
18 also supplements the NCIS TSCM responsibilities during peacetime garrison conditions.
19 (See chapter 7, paragraph 7008, for additional information on TSCMs.)
10-6

1
APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY
Part I -- ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS
4 Note: Acronyms change over time in response to new operational concepts, capabilities, doctrinal
5 changes and other similar developments. The following publications are the sole authoritative sources for
6 official military acronyms:
7
1. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
2. MCRP 5-12C, Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military
8
9 and Associated Terms.
10 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------11 ---------------
12 ACE
13 AFC
14 ASAS
15 ATFIC
16 BDA
17 bn
18 CA
19 CE
20 C-HUMINT
21 CI
22 CIAT
23 CICM
24 CIC
25 CID
26 CIHO
27 CIIR
28 C-IMINT
29 CINC
30 CIS
31 CITEX
32 CLF
33 co
34 COA
35 CP
36 CPX
37 C-SIGINT
aviation combat element

all-source fusion center
all source analysis system {Army}
amphibious task force intelligence center
battle damage assessment
battalion
civil affairs
command element
counter human intelligence
counterintelligence
counterintelligence analytical team
counterintelligence contingency material
combat intelligence center
criminal investigation division
CI/HUMINT officer
counterintelligence information report
counter imagery intelligence
command-in-chief
communications-information systems
counterintelligence training exercise
commander, landing fForce
company
course of action
command post
command post exercise
counter signals intelligence
A-1

1 CSS
2 CSSE
3 C2
4 C2W
5 det
6 DCID
7 DF
8 DIAM
9 DOD
10 DON
11 DS
12 DST
13 EEFI
14 EPW
15 EW
16 FIIU
17 FISS
18 FSCC
19 FSSG
20 GCE
21 GI&S
22 GS
23 HET
24 HLZ
25 HPT
26 HUMINT
27 HVT
28 IAS
29 ICR
30 IDR
31 IHR
32 IMA
33 IMINT
34 IPB
35 IPR
36 IR
37 IT
38 I&W
39 J-2X
40 JCISB
41 JDISS
42 JFC
43 JIC
combat service support

combat service support element
command and control
command and control warfare
detachment
Director Central Intelligence Directive
direction finding
Defense Intelligence Agency manual
Department of Defense
Department of the Navy
direct support
direct support team
essential element of friendly information
enemy prisoner of war
electronic warfare
force imagery interpretation unit
foreign intelligence and security services
fire support coordination center
force service support group
ground combat element
geospatial information and services
general support
HUMINT exploitation team
helicopter landing zone
high payoff target
human intelligence
high value target
intelligence analysis system
intelligence collection requirement
intelligence dissemination requirement
in-extremis hostage rescue
individual mobilization augmentation
imagery intelligence
intelligence preparation of the battlespace
intelligence production requirement
intelligence requirement
interrogator-translator
indications and warning
joint CI/HUMINT deconfliction cell
joint CI support branch
joint deployable intelligence support system
joint force commander
joint intelligence center
A-2

1 Joint STARS
2 JISE
3 JTF
4 JWICS
5 MAG
6 MAGTF
7 MARFOR
8 MARFORLANT
9 MARFORPAC
10 MARFORRES
11 MASINT
12 MAW
13 MCIA
14 MCISU
15 MEF
16 MO
17 MEU(SOC)
18 MOOTW
19 MOTC
20 MSC
21 NAI
22 NGO
23 NIPRNET
24 NMITC
25 NSA
26 obj
27 OCAC
28 OFCO
29 OMFTS
30 OPCON
31 OPSEC
32 OSI
33 OSINT
34 plt
35 PIR
36 PMO
37 POI
38 POI&I
39 PSYOP
40 QSTAG
41 RFC
42 ROE
43 SARC
Joint Surveillance & Target Acquisition Radar System

joint intelligence support element
joint task force
joint worldwide intelligence communications system
Marine aircraft group
Marine air ground task force
Marine Corps Forces
Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic
Marine Corps Forces, Pacific
measurement and signature intelligence
Marine aircraft wing
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
Marine Corps Imagery Support Unit
Marine expeditionary force
modus operandi
Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable)
military operations other than war
Military Operations Training Course
major subordinate command
named area of interest
non-governmental organization
nonsecure internet protocol router network
Navy Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center
National Security Agency
objective
operations control and analysis center
offensive counterintelligence operations
operational maneuver from the sea
operational control
operations security
Office of Special Investigations (Air Force)
open source intelligence
platoon
priority intelligence requirement
Provost Marshal office
personalities, organizations, and installations
personalities, organizations, installations, and incidents
psychological operations
quadripartite standardization agreement
raid force commander
rules of engagement
surveillance and reconnaissance center
A-3

1 SASO
2 SCAMP
3 SIGINT
4 SIPRNET
5 SOA
6 SOFA
7 SOP
8 TACON
9 TDN
10 topo
11 TFCICA
12 TRAP
13 TSCM
14 TTP
15 UAV
16
stabilization and security operations

sensor control and management platoon
signals intelligence
SECRET internet protocol router network
sustained operations ashore
status of forces agreement
standard operating procedures
tactical control
tactical data network
topographic
task force CI coordinating authority
tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel
technical surveillance countermeasures
tactics, techniques, & procedures
unmanned aerial vehicle
A-4

1
Part II -- Definitions
2 Note: Definitions of military terms change over time in response to new operational concepts,
3 capabilities, doctrinal changes and other similar developments. The following publications are the sole
4 authoritative sources for official definitions of military terms:
5
1. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
2. MCRP 5-12C, Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military
6
7 and Associated Terms.
8 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------9 ---------------
10
11 accountability - The obligation imposed by law or lawful order or regulation on an officer or other
12 person for keeping accurate record of property, documents, or funds. The person having this obligation
13 may or may not have actual possession of the property, documents, or funds. Accountability is
14 concerned primarily with records, while responsibility is concerned primarily with custody, care, and
15 safekeeping. (Joint Pub 1-02)
16 administrative control - Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in
17 respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and
18 equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization,
19 demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate
20 or other organizations. Also called ADCON. (Joint Pub 1-02)
21 agent - (1) One who is authorized or instructed to obtain or to assist in obtaining information for
22 intelligence or CI purposes. (Joint Pub 1-02)
23 agent authentication - The technical support task of providing an agent with personal documents,
24 accouterments, and equipment which have the appearance of authenticity as to claimed origin and which
25 support and are consistent with the agent's cover story. (Joint Pub 1-02)
26 agent net - (1) An organization for clandestine purposes which operates under the direction of a
27 principal agent. (Joint Pub 1-02)
28 all-source intelligence - Intelligence that incorporates all available sources of information, including,
29 most frequently, human resources intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature
30 intelligence, signals intelligence, and open source data, in the development of the finished intelligence
31 product. (Joint Pub 1-02)
A-5

1 antiterrorism - Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to
2 terrorism. (Joint Pub 1-02)
3 area of interest - That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas
4 adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations.
5 This area includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the
6 mission. Also called AOI. (Joint Pub 1-02)
7 area of operation - That portion of an area of war necessary for military operations and for the
8 administration of such operations. Also called AO. (Joint Pub 1-02)
9 assessment - (1) Analysis of the security, effectiveness, and potential of an existing or planned
10 intelligence activity. (2) Judgment of the motives, qualifications, and characteristics of present or
11 prospective employees or "agents. (Joint Pub 1-02)
12 asset - (1) Any resource -person, group, relationship, instrument, installation, or supply -at the
13 disposition of an intelligence organization for use in an operational or support role. Often used with a
14 qualifying term such as agent asset or propaganda asset. (Joint Pub 1-02)
15 assign--1. To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent,
16 and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function,
17 or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel. 2. To detail individuals to specific duties or
18 functions where such duties or functions are primary and/or relatively permanent. (Joint Pub 1-02)
19 attach -1. The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively
20 temporary. 2. The detailing of individuals to specific functions where such functions are secondary or
21 relatively temporary, e.g., attached for quarters and rations; attached for flying duty. (Joint Pub 1-02)
22
23 basic intelligence - (1) Fundamental intelligence concerning the general situation, resources,
24 capabilities, and vulnerabilities of foreign countries or areas which may be used as reference material in
25 the planning of operations at any level and in evaluating subsequent information relating to the same
26 subject. (Joint Pub 1-02)
27 battle damage assessment - The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the
28 application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a predetermined objective. Battle damage
29 assessment can be applied to the employment of all types of weapon systems (air, ground, naval, and
30 special forces weapon systems) throughout the range of military operations. Battle damage assessment
31 is primarily an intelligence responsibility with required inputs and coordination from the operators. Battle
32 damage assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and
33 target system assessment. Also called BDA. (Joint Pub 1-02) In Marine Corps usage, the timely and
34 accurate estimate of the damage resulting from the application of military force. BDA estimates physical
A-6

1 damage to a particular target, functional damage to that target, and the capability of the entire target
2 system to continue its operations. (MCRP 5-12C)
3 battlespace - All aspects of air, surface, subsurface, land, space, and electromagnetic spectrum which
4 encompass the area of influence and area of interest. (MCRP 5-12C)
5 battlespace dominance - The degree of control over the dimensions of the battlespace which
6 enhances friendly freedom of action and denies enemy freedom of action. It permits force sustainment
7 and application of power projection to accomplish the full range of potential operational and tactical
8 mission. It includes all actions conducted against enemy capabilities to influence future operations.
9 (MCRP 5-12C)
10 biographical intelligence -That component of intelligence which deals with individual foreign
11 personalities of actual or potential importance. (Joint Pub 1-02)
12 black list -An official counterintelligence listing of actual or potential enemy collaborators, sympathizers,
13 intelligence suspects, and other persons whose presence menaces the security of friendly forces.
14 Currently known as the DETAIN category of the Personalities Database within DCIIS (Joint Pub 1-02)
15 border crosser - An individual, living close to a frontier, who normally has to cross the frontier
16 frequently for legitimate purposes. (Joint Pub 1-02)
17 bug - (1) A concealed microphone or listening device or other audio surveillance device. (2) To install
18 means for audio surveillance. (Joint Pub 1-02)
19 bugged - Room or object which contains a concealed listening device. (Joint Pub 1-02)
20
21 case - (1) An intelligence operation in its entirety. (2) Record of the development of an intelligence
22 operation, including personnel, modus operandi, and objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)
23 cell - Small group of individuals who work together for clandestine or subversive purposes. (Joint Pub
24 1-02)
25 center of gravity - Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives
26 its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. (Joint Pub 1-02).
27 centralized control - In military operations, a mode of battlespace management in which one echelon
28 of command exercises total authority and direction of all aspects of one or more warfighting functions.
29 It is a method of control where detailed orders are issued and total unity of action is the overriding
30 consideration. (MCRP 5-12C)
A-7

1 clandestine operation -An activity to accomplish intelligence, counterintelligence, and other similar
2 activities sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies, in such a way as to assure
3 secrecy or concealment. (It differs from covert operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of
4 the operation rather than on concealment of identity o' sponsor.) (Joint Pub 1-02)
5 classification -The determination that official information requires, in the interests of national security, a
6 specific degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure, coupled with a designation signifying that
7 such a determination has been made. (Joint Pub 1-02)
8 classified information - Official information which has been determined to require, in the interests of
9 national security, protection against unauthorized disclosure and which has been so designated. (Joint
10 Pub 1-02)
11 code word - (1) A word which has been assigned a classification and a classified meaning to safeguard
12 intentions and information regarding a classified plan or operation. (2) A cryptonym used to identify
13 sensitive intelligence data. (Joint Pub 1-02)
14 collection - Acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing and/or
15 production elements. (Joint Pub 1-02) The gathering of intelligence data and information to satisfy the
16 identified requirements. (MCRP 5-12C)
17 collection (acquisition) -The obtaining of information in any manner, including direct observation,
18 liaison with official agencies, or solicitation from official, unofficial, or public sources. (Joint Pub 1-02)
19 collection agency - Any individual, organization, or unit that has access to sources of information and
20 the capability of collecting information from them. (Joint Pub 1-02)
21 collection management - The process of converting intelligence requirements into collection
22 requirements, establishing priorities, tasking or coordinating with appropriate collection sources or
23 agencies, monitoring results, and retasking, as required. (Joint Pub 1-02)
24 collection plan - A plan for collecting information from all available sources to meet intelligence
25 requirements and for transforming those requirements into orders and requests to appropriate agencies.
26 (Joint Pub 1-02)
27 collection requirement - An established intelligence need considered in the allocation of intelligence
28 resources to fulfill the essential elements of information and other intelligence needs of a commander.
29 (Joint Pub 1-02)
30 combat data - Data derived from reporting by operational units. (MCRP 5-12C)
31 combatant command - One of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the
32 President. (Joint Pub 1-02)
A-8
1 combat information - Unevaluated data, gathered by or provided directly to the tactical commander
2 which, due to its highly perishable nature or the criticality of the situation, cannot be processed into
3 tactical intelligence in time to satisfy the user's tactical intelligence requirements. (Joint Pub 1-02)
4 combat information center - The agency in a ship or aircraft manned and equipped to collect, display,
5 evaluate, and disseminate tactical information for the use of the embarked flag officer, commanding
6 officer, and certain control agencies. Certain control, assistance and coordination functions may be
7 delegated by command to the combat information center. Also called "action information center." (Joint
8 Pub 1-02)
9 combat intelligence - That knowledge of the enemy, weather, and geographical features required by a
10 commander in the planning and conduct of combat operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)
11 combatant command -A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single
12 commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with
13 the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically
14 have geographic or functional responsibilities.
15 combat surveillance - A continuous, all-weather, day-and-night, systematic watch over the battle area
16 to provide timely information for tactical combat operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)
17 command and control - The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander
18 over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control
19 functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities,
20 and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces
21 and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (Joint Pub 1-02) In Marine
22 Corps usage, the means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that
23 appropriate actions are taken. (MCRP 5-12C)
24 commander's critical information requirements - Information regarding the enemy and friendly
25 activities and the environment identified by the commander as critical to maintaining situational
26 awareness, planning future activities, and facilitating timely decisionmaking. Also called CCIR. NOTE:
27 CCIRs are normally divided into three primary subcategories: priority intelligence requirement; friendly
28 force information requirements; and essential elements of friendly information. (MCRP 5-12C)
29 commander's intent - A commander's clear, concise articulation of the purpose(s) behind one or more
30 tasks assigned to a subordinate. It is one of two parts of every mission statement which guides the
31 exercise of initiative in the absence of instructions. (MCRP 5-12C)
32 communications intelligence -Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign
33 communications by other than the intended recipients. Also called COMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)
A-9

1 communications intelligence data base -The aggregate of technical and intelligence information
2 derived from the interception and analysis of foreign communications (excluding press, propaganda, and
3 public broadcast) used in the direction and redirection of communications intelligence intercept, analysis,
4 and reporting activities. (Joint Pub 1-02)
5 communications security - The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized
6 persons information of value which might be derived from the possession and study of
7 telecommunications, or to mislead unauthorized persons in their interpretation of the results of such
8 possession and study. Also called COMSEC. Communications security includes:
1. cryptosecurity - The component of communications security which results from the
9
10 provision of technically sound crypto-systems and their proper use.
2. transmission security -The component of communications security which results from all
11
12 measures designed to protect transmissions from interception and exploitation by means other than
13 cryptanalysis.
3. emission security -The component of communications security which results from all
14
15 measures taken to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from intercept
16 and analysis of compromising emanations from crypto equipment and telecommunications systems.
4. physical security-The component of communications security which results from all physical
17
18 measures necessary to safeguard classified equipment, material, and documents from access thereto or
19 observation thereof by unauthorized persons. (Joint Pub 1-02)
20 compartmentation -Establishment and management of an intelligence organization so that information
21 about the personnel, organization, or activities of one component is made available to any other
22 component only to the extent required for the performance of assigned duties. (Joint Pub 1-02)
23 complaint-type investigation - A counterintelligence investigation in which sabotage, espionage,
24 treason, sedition, subversive activity, or disaffection is suspected. (Joint Pub 1-02)
25 component command - The service command, its commander, and all its individuals, units,
26 detachments, organizations, or installations that have been assigned to the unified command. (Joint Pub
27 1-02)
28 compromise -The known or suspected exposure of clandestine personnel, installations, or other assets
29 or of classified information or material, to an unauthorized person. (Joint Pub 1-02)
30 compromised - A term applied to classified matter, knowledge of which has, in whole or in part,
31 passed to an unauthorized person or persons, or which has been subject to risk of such passing. (Joint
32 Pub 1-02)
A-10

1 confidential - National security information or material which requires protection and the unauthorized
2 disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security. (Joint Pub
3 1-02)
4 confirmation of information (intelligence) - An information item is said to be confirmed when it is
5 reported for the second time, preferably by another independent source whose reliability is considered
6 when confirming information. (Joint Pub 1-02)
7 confusion agent - An individual who is dispatched by the sponsor for the primary purpose of
8 confounding the intelligence or counterintelligence apparatus of another country rather than for the
9 purpose of collecting and transmitting information. (Joint Pub 1-02)
10 contingency - An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists,
11 subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies
12 require plans, rapid response, and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel,
13 installations, and equipment. (Joint Pub 1-02)
14 control - (1) Authority which may be less than full command exercised by a commander over part of
15 the activities of subordinate or other organizations. (2) In mapping, charting, and photogrammetry, a
16 collective term for a system of marks or objects on the earth or on a map or a photograph, whose
17 positions or elevations, or both, have been or will be determined.
18 (3) Physical or psychological pressures exerted with the intent to assure that an agent or group will
19 respond as directed. (4) An indicator governing the distribution and use of documents, information, or
20 material. Such indicators are the subject of intelligence community agreement and are specifically
21 defined in appropriate regulations. (Joint Pub 1-02)
22 controlled information -Information conveyed to an adversary in a deception operation to evoke
23 desired appreciation. (Joint Pub 1-02)
24 coordinating authority--A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific
25 functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments or two or more forces of the
26 same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the
27 agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential
28 agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating
29 authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised.
30 Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (Joint Pub
31 2-01.2)
32 coordination - The action necessary to ensure adequately integrated relationships between separate
33 organizations located in the same area. Coordination may include such matters as fire support,
34 emergency defense measures, area intelligence, and other situations in which coordination is considered
35 necessary. (MCRP 5-12C)
A-11

1 counter-deception - Efforts to negate, neutralize, diminish the effects of, or gain advantage from, a
2 foreign deception operation. Counter-deception does not include the intelligence function of identifying
3 foreign deception operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)
4 counterespionage--That aspect of counterintelligence designed to detect, destroy, neutralize, exploit,
5 or prevent espionage activities through identification, penetration, manipulation, deception, and
6 repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or suspected of conducting espionage
7 activities. (Joint Pub 1-02)
8 counter-guerrilla warfare - Operations and activities conducted by armed forces, paramilitary forces,
9 or nonmilitary agencies against guerrillas. (Joint Pub 1-02)
10 counterinsurgency - Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions
11 taken by a government to defeat insurgency. (Joint Pub 1-02)
12 counterintelligence (1) Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage,
13 other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign
14 governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist
15 activities. Also called CI. See also counterespionage; security. (Joint Pub 1-02) (2) Within the Marine
16 Corps, counterintelligence (CI) constitutes active and passive measures intended to deny a threat force
17 valuable information about the friendly situation, to detect and neutralize hostile intelligence collection,
18 and to deceive the enemy as to friendly capabilities and intentions. (MCRP 5-12C)
19 counterintelligence activities - The four functions of counterintelligence: operations; investigations;
20 collection and reporting; and analysis, production, and dissemination. See also counterintelligence.
21 (Joint Pub 2-01.2)
22 counterintelligence collection - The systematic acquisition of information (through investigations,
23 operations, or liaison) concerning espionage, sabotage, terrorism, other intelligence activities or
24 assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign
25 organizations, or foreign persons which are directed against or threaten Department of Defense
26 interests. Includes Liaison and CFSO. (Joint Pub 2-01.2)
27 counterintelligence force protection source operations - Collection activities conducted by CI
28 personnel to provide force protection support. These operations respond to local command
29 requirements for force protection and do not fall within the purview of DCID 5/1. Also called CFSO.
30 (MCRP 5-12C)
31 counterintelligence investigations - Counterintelligence investigations establish the elements of proof
32 for prosecution or administrative action. Counterintelligence investigations can provide a basis for or be
33 developed from conducting counter-intelligence operations. Counterintelligence investigations are
34 conducted against individuals or groups suspected of committing acts of espionage, sabotage, sedition,
35 subversion, terrorism, and other major security violations as well as failure to follow Defense agency and
A-12

1 military Service directives governing reporting of contacts with foreign citizens and "out-of-channel"
2 requests for defense information. Counterintelligence investigations provide military commanders and
3 policymakers with information used to eliminate security vulnerabilities and otherwise to improve the
4 security posture of threatened interests. See also counterintelligence. (Joint Pub 2-01.2)
5 counterintelligence production--The process of analyzing all-source information concerning
6 espionage, or other multi-discipline intelligence collection threats, sabotage, terrorism, and other related
7 threats to US military commanders, the Department of Defense, and the US Intelligence Community and
8 developing it into a final product which is disseminated. Counterintelligence production is used in
9 formulating security policy, plans, and operations. See also counterintelligence. (Joint Pub 2-01.2)
10 countermeasures - That form of military science that by the employment of devices and/or techniques,
11 has as its objective the impairment of the operational effectiveness of enemy activity. (Joint Pub 1-02).
12 counter-reconnaissance - All measures taken to prevent hostile observation of a force, area, or place.
13 (Joint Pub 1-02)
14 countersabotage - That aspect of counterintelligence designed to detect, destroy, neutralize, or
15 prevent sabotage activities through identification, penetration, manipulation, deception, and repression of
16 individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or suspected of conducting sabotage activities. (Joint
17 Pub 1-02)
18 countersign - A secret challenge and its reply. (Joint Pub 1-02)
19 countersubversion - That aspect of counterintelligence designed to detect, destroy, neutralize, or
20 prevent subversive activities through the identification, exploitation, penetration, manipulation, deception,
21 and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or suspected of conducting subversive
22 activities. (Joint Pub 1-02)
23 countersurveillance - All measures, active or passive, taken to counteract hostile surveillance. (Joint
24 Pub 1-02)
25 counterterrorism - Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Also called
26 CT. (Joint Pub 1-02)
27 cover - (1) The action by land, air, or sea forces to protect by offense, defense, or threat of either or
28 both. (2) Those measures necessary to give protection to a person, plan, operation, formation or
29 installation from the enemy intelligence effort and leakage of information. (3) The act of maintaining a
30 continuous receiver watch with transmitter calibrated and available, but not necessarily available for
31 immediate use. (4) Shelter or protection, either natural or artificial. (5) Photographs or other recorded
32 images which show a particular area of ground. (6) A code meaning, "Keep fighters between
33 force/base and contact designated at distance stated from force/base" (e.g., "cover bogey twenty-seven
34 to thirty miles"). (Joint Pub 1-02)
A-13
1 cover (military) - Actions to conceal actual friendly intentions, capabilities, operations, and other
2 activities by providing a plausible, yet erroneous, explanation of the observable. (Joint Pub 1-02)
3 covert operations - Operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or
4 permit plausible denial by the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis is
5 placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation. (Joint Pub
6 1-02)
7 critical information - Specific facts about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities vitally needed
8 by adversaries for them to plan and act effectively so as to guarantee failure or unacceptable
9 consequences for friendly mission accomplishment. (Joint Pub 1-02)
10 critical vulnerability - An aspect of a center of gravity that if exploited will do the most significant
11 damage to an adversary's ability to resist. A vulnerability cannot be critical unless it undermines a key
12 strength. Also called CV. (MCRP 5-12C)
13 cultivation - A deliberate and calculated association with a person for the purpose of recruitment,
14 obtaining information, or gaining control for these or other purposes. (Joint Pub 1-02)
15 current intelligence - Intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest which is usually
16 disseminated without the delays necessary to complete evaluation or interpretation. (Joint Pub 1-02)
17
18 damage assessment - (1) The determination of the effect of attacks on targets. (2) A determination of
19 the effect of a compromise of classified information on national security. (Joint Pub 1-02)
20 deception - Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification
21 of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (Joint Pub 1-02)
22 decentralized control - In military operations, a mode of battlespace management in which a
23 command echelon may delegate some or all authority and direction for warfighting functions to
24 subordinates. It requires careful and clear articulation of mission, intent, and main effort to unify efforts
25 of subordinate leaders. (MCRP 5-12C)
26 declassification - The determination that in the interests of national security, classified information no
27 longer requires any degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure, coupled with removal or
28 cancellation of the classification designation. (Joint Pub 1-02)
29 departmental intelligence - Intelligence that any department or agency of the Federal Government
30 requires to execute its own mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)
A-14

1 descriptive intelligence - Class of intelligence which describes existing and previously existing
2 conditions with the intent to promote situational awareness. Descriptive intelligence has two
3 components: basic intelligence, which is general background knowledge about established and
4 relatively constant conditions; and current intelligence, which is concerned with describing the existing
5 situation. (MCRP 5-12C)
6 detachment - 1. A part of a unit separated from its main organization for duty elsewhere. 2. A
7 temporary military or naval unit formed from other units or parts of units. (Joint Pub 1-02)
8 detection - (1) In tactical operations, the perception of an object of possible military interest but
9 unconfirmed by recognition. (2) In surveillance, the determination and transmission by a surveillance
10 system that an event has occurred. (3) In arms control, the first step in the process of ascertaining the
11 occurrence of a violation of an arms-control agreement. (Joint Pub 1-02)
12 disaffected person - A person who is alienated or estranged from those in authority or lacks loyalty to
13 the government; a state of mind. (Joint Pub 1-02)
14 dissemination - The timely conveyance of intelligence to users in a suitable form. (Joint Pub 1-02)
15 dissemination management - Involves establishing dissemination priorities, selection of dissemination
16 means, and monitoring the flow of intelligence throughout the command. The objective of dissemination
17 management is to deliver the required intelligence to the appropriate user in proper form at the right time
18 while ensuring that individual consumers and the dissemination system are not overloaded attempting to
19 move unneeded or irrelevant information. Dissemination management also provides for use of security
20 controls which do not impede the timely delivery or subsequent use of intelligence while protecting
21 intelligence sources and methods. (MCRP 5-12C)
22 domestic intelligence - Intelligence relating to activities or conditions within the United States that
23 threaten internal security and that might require the employment of troops; and intelligence relating to
24 activities of individuals or agencies potentially or actually dangerous to the security of the Department of
25 Defense. (Joint Pub 1-02)
26 double agent - Agent in contact with two opposing intelligence services, only one of which is aware of
27 the double contact or quasi-intelligence services. (Joint Pub 1-02)
28
29 espionage - Actions directed towards the acquisition of information through clandestine operations.
30 (Joint Pub 1-02)
31 espionage against the United States -Overt, covert, or clandestine activity designed to obtain
32 information relating to the national defense with intent or reason to believe that it will be used to the
A-15

1 injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation. For espionage crimes see Chapter
2 37 of Title 18, United States Code. (Joint Pub 1-02)
3 essential elements of friendly information - Key questions likely to be asked by adversary officials
4 and intelligence systems about specific friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities so they can obtain
5 answers critical to their operational effectiveness. Also called EEFI. (Joint Pub 1-02) Specific facts
6 about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities needed by adversaries to plan and execute effective
7 operations against our forces. (MCRP 5-12C)
8 estimative intelligence - Class of intelligence which attempts to anticipate future possibilities and
9 probabilities based on an analysis of descriptive intelligence in the context of planned friendly and
10 assessed enemy operations. (MCRP 5-12C)
11 evaluation - In intelligence usage, appraisal of an item of information in terms of credibility, reliability,
12 pertinence, and accuracy. Appraisal is accomplished at several stages within the intelligence cycle with
13 progressively different contexts. Initial evaluations, made by case officers and report officers, are
14 focused upon the reliability of the source and the accuracy of the information as judged by data available
15 at or close to their operational levels. Later evaluations by intelligence analysts, are primarily concerned
16 with verifying accuracy of information and may, in effect, convert information into intelligence. Appraisal
17 or evaluation of items of information or intelligence is indicated by a standard letter-number system. The
18 evaluation of the reliability of sources is designated by a letter from A through F, and the accuracy of the
19 information is designated by numeral 1 through 6. These are two entirely independent appraisals, and
20 these separate appraisals are indicated in accordance with the system below. Thus, information
21 adjudged to be "probably true" received from an "usually reliable source" is designated "B-2" or "B2,"
22 while information of which the "truth cannot be judged" received from "usually reliable source" is
23 designated "B-6" or "B6." (Joint Pub 1-02)
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
-- Reliability of Source
A
B
C
D
E
F
Completely reliable
Usually reliable
Fairly reliable
Not usually reliable
Unreliable
Reliability cannot be judged
-- Accuracy of Information
1
2
3
4
5
Confirmed by other sources

Probably true
Possibly true
Doubtful
Improbable
A-16

1
6 - Truth cannot be judged
2 evasion and escape intelligence - Processed information prepared to assist personnel to escape if
3 captured by the enemy or to evade capture if lost in enemy-dominated territory. (Joint Pub 1-02)
5 fabricator - Individuals or groups who, without genuine resources, invent information or inflate or
6 embroider over news for personal gain or for political purposes. (Joint Pub 1-02)
7 force protection--Security program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members,
8 facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated
9 application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services,
10 and supported by intelligence, CI, and other security programs. (Joint Pub 1-02)
11 foreign intelligence - Information relating to the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign
12 powers, organizations, or persons, but not including counterintelligence (with the exception of
13 information on international terrorist activities). (Joint Pub 1-02)
14 friendly force information requirement - Information the commander needs about friendly forces in
15 order to develop plans and make effective decisions. Depending upon the circumstances information on
16 unit location, composition, readiness, personnel status, and logistics status could become a friendly force
17 information requirement. Also called FFIR. (MCRP 5-12C)
18 fusion - In intelligence usage, the process of examining all sources of intelligence and information to
19 derive a complete assessment of activity. (Joint Pub 1-02)
20
21 global sourcing - A process of force provision or augmentation whereby resources may be drawn
22 from any location/command worldwide. (MCRP 5-12C)
23
24 host country - A nation in which representatives or organizations of another state are present because
25 of government invitation and/or international agreement. (Joint Pub 1-02)
26 host nation - A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO
27 organizations to be located on, or to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (Joint Pub 1-02)
A-17

1 hostage - A person held as a pledge that certain terms or agreements will be kept. (The taking of
2 hostages is forbidden under the Geneva Conventions, 1949.) (Joint Pub 1-02)
3 human intelligence - intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human resources.
4 Also called HUMINT. (Jt Pub 1-02) HUMINT operations cover a wide range of activities
5 encompassing reconnaissance patrols, aircrew reports and debriefs, debriefing of refugees,
6 interrogations of prisoners of war, the conduct of CI force protection source operations and controlled
7 operations. (MCRP 5-12C)
8 human resources intelligence - The intelligence information derived from the intelligence collection
9 discipline that uses human beings as both sources and collectors, and where the human being is the
10 primary collection instrument. Also called HUMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)
11
12 imagery - Collectively, the representations of objects reproduced electronically or by optical means on

13 film, electronic display devices, or other media. (Joint Pub 1-02)
14 imagery exploitation -The cycle of processing and printing imagery to the positive or negative state,
15 assembly into imagery packs, identification, interpretation, mensuration, information extraction, the
16 preparation of reports and the dissemination of information. (Joint Pub 1-02)
17 imagery intelligence - Intelligence information derived from the exploitation of collection by visual
18 photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar
19 wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices
20 or other media. Also called IMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)
21 imagery interpretation - (1) The process of location, recognition, identification, and description of
22 objects, activities, and terrain represented on imagery. (2) The extraction of information from
23 photographs or other recorded images. (Joint Pub 1-02)
24 imitative deception - The introduction of electromagnetic energy into enemy systems that imitates
25 enemy emissions. (Joint Pub 1-02)
26 indications and warning - Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time-sensitive
27 intelligence information on foreign developments that could involve a threat to the United States or allied
28 military, political, or economic interests or to U.S. citizens abroad. It includes forewarning of enemy
29 actions or intentions; the imminence of hostilities; insurgency; nuclear/non-nuclear attack on the United
30 States, its overseas forces, or allied nations; hostile reactions to United States reconnaissance activities;
31 terrorists' attacks; and other similar events. Also called I&W. (Joint Pub 1-02)
32 indications (intelligence) - Information in various degrees of evaluation, all of which bears on the
33 intention of a potential enemy to adopt or reject a course of action. (Joint Pub 1-02)
A-18
1 indicator - In intelligence usage, an item of information which reflects the intention or capability of a
2 potential enemy to adopt or reject a course of action. (Joint Pub 1-02)
3 infiltration - (1) The movement through or into an area or territory occupied by either friendly or
4 enemy troops or organizations. The movement is made, either by small groups or by individuals, at
5 extended or irregular intervals. When used in connection with the enemy, it infers that contact is
6 avoided. (2) In intelligence usage, placing an agent or other person in a target area in hostile territory.
7 Usually involves crossing a frontier or other guarded line. Methods of infiltration are: black
8 (clandestine); gray (through legal crossing point but under false documentation); white (legal). (Joint Pub
9 1-02)
10 informant - (1) A person who, wittingly or unwittingly, provides information to an agent, a clandestine
11 service, or the police. (2) In reporting, a person who has provided specific information and is cited as a
12 source. (Joint Pub 1-02)
13 information - (1) In intelligence usage, unevaluated material of every description that may be used in
14 the production of intelligence. (2) The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known
15 conventions used in their representation. (Joint Pub 1-02)
16 information exchange requirement - The requirement for information to be passed between and
17 among forces, organizations, or administrative structures concerning ongoing activities. Information
18 exchange requirements identify who exchanges what information with whom as well as why the
19 information is necessary and how that information will be used. The quality (i.e., frequency, timeliness,
20 security) and quantity (i.e., volume, speed, and type of information such as data, voice, and video) are
21 attributes of the information exchange included in the information exchange requirement. Also called
22 IER. (MCRP 5-12C)
23 informer - Person who intentionally discloses to police or to a security service information about
24 persons or activities considered suspect, usually for a financial reward. (Joint Pub 1-02)
25 infrared imagery - That imagery produced as a result of sensing electromagnetic radiation emitted or
26 reflected from a given target surface in the infrared position of the electromagnetic spectrum
27 (approximately 0.72 to 1,000 microns). (Joint Pub 1-02)
28 insurgency - An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use
29 of subversion and armed conflict. (Joint Pub 1-02)
30 integration - (1) A stage in the intelligence cycle in which a pattern is formed through the selection and
31 combination of evaluated information. (2) In photography, a process by which the average radar picture
32 seen on several scans of the time base may be obtained on a print, or the process by which several
33 photographic images are combined into a single image. (Joint Pub 1-02)
A-19

1 intelligence - (1) The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation,
2 and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. knowledge about the
3 enemy or the surrounding environment needed to support decision making. (2) Information and
4 knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding.
5 (Joint Pub 1-02) In Marine Corps usage, intelligence is knowledge about the enemy or the surrounding
6 environment needed to support decisionmaking. This knowledge is the result of the collection,
7 processing, exploitation, evaluation, integration, analysis, and interpretation of available information
8 about the battlespace and threat. (MCRP 5-12C)
9 intelligence contingency funds - Appropriated funds to be used for intelligence activities when the
10 use of other funds is not applicable or would either jeopardize or impede the mission of the intelligence
11 unit. (Joint Pub 1-02)
12 intelligence cycle - The process by which information is converted into intelligence and made available
13 to users. (Joint Pub 2-01)
14 intelligence data - Data derived from assets primarily dedicated to intelligence collection: imagery
15 systems, electronic intercept equipment, human intelligence sources, etc. (MCRP 5-12C)
16 intelligence discipline - a well-defined area of intelligence collection, processing, exploitation, and
17 reporting using a specific category of technical or human resources. There are five major disciplines:
18 human intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence
19 (communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence),
20 and open source intelligence. (Joint Pub 2-01)
21 intelligence estimate - The appraisal, expressed in writing or orally, of available intelligence relating to
22 a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of action open to the enemy or
23 potential enemy and the order of probability of their adoption. (Joint Pub 1-02)
24 intelligence operations - The variety of intelligence tasks that are carried out by various intelligence
25 organizations and activities. (Joint Pub 1-02)
26 intelligence preparation of the battlespace - An analytical methodology employed to reduce
27 uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligence
28 preparation of the battlespace builds an extensive data base for each potential area in which a unit may
29 be required to operate. The data base is then analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the enemy,
30 environment, and terrain on operations and presents it in graphic form. Intelligence preparation of the
31 battlespace is a continuing process. Also called IPB. (Joint Pub 1-02) In Marine Corps usage, a
32 systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area.
33 (MCRP 5-12C)
34 intelligence-related activities - (1) Those activities outside the consolidated defense intelligence
35 program which: a. Respond to operational commanders tasking for time-sensitive information on
A-20

1 foreign entities; b. Respond to national intelligence community tasking of systems whose primary mission
2 is support to operating forces; c. Train personnel for intelligence duties; d. Provide an intelligence
3 reserve; or e. Are devoted to research and development of intelligence or related capabilities. (2)
4 Specifically excluded are programs which are so closely integrated with a weapon system that their
5 primary function is to provide immediate-use targeting data. (Joint Pub 1-02)
6 intelligence report - A specific report of information, usually on a single item, made at any level of
7 command in tactical operations and disseminated as rapidly as possible in keeping with the timeliness of
8 the information. Also called INTREP. (Joint Pub 1-02)
9 intelligence reporting - The preparation and conveyance of information by any means. More
10 commonly, the term is restricted to reports as they are prepared by the collector and as they are
11 transmitted by him to his headquarters and by this component of the intelligence structure to one or
12 more intelligence-producing components. Thus, even in this limited sense, reporting embraces both
13 collection and dissemination. The term is applied to normal and specialist intelligence reports. (Joint Pub
14 1-02)
15 intelligence requirements - Any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for the
16 collection of information, or the production of intelligence. Also called IR. (Joint Pub 1-02) In Marine
17 Corps usage, questions about the enemy and the environment, the answers to which a commander
18 requires to make sound decisions. (MCRP 5-12C)
19 internal security - The state of law and order prevailing within a nation. (Joint Pub 1-02)
20 interpretation - A stage in the intelligence cycle in which the significance of information is judged in
21 relation to the current body of knowledge. (Joint Pub 1-02)
22 interrogation - Systematic effort to procure information by direct questioning of a person under the
23 control of the questioner. (Joint Pub 1-02)
24 interview (intelligence) - To gather information from a person who is aware that information is being
25 given although there is ignorance of the true connection and purposes of the interviewer. Generally
26 overt unless the collector is other than purported to be. (Joint Pub 1-02)
27 investigation - A duly authorized, systematized, detailed examination or inquiry to uncover facts and
28 determine the truth of a matter. This may include collecting, processing, reporting, storing, recording,
29 analyzing, evaluating, producing and disseminating the authorized information. (Joint Pub 1-02)
30
31 joint force - A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached,
32 of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. (Joint Pub 1-02)
A-21

1 joint force commander - A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander,
2 or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or
3 operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (Joint Pub 1-02)
4 joint intelligence - Intelligence produced by elements of more than one Service of the same nation.
5 (Joint Pub 1-02)
6 joint intelligence center - The intelligence center of the joint force headquarters. The joint intelligence
7 center is responsible for providing and producing the intelligence required to support the joint force
8 commander and staff, components, task forces and elements, and the national intelligence community.
9 Also called JIC. (Joint Pub 1-02)
10 joint operational intelligence agency - An intelligence agency in which the efforts of two or more
11 Services are integrated to furnish that operational intelligence essential to the commander of a joint force
12 and to supplement that available to subordinate forces of the command. The agency may or may not be
13 part of such joint force commander's staff. (Joint Pub 1-02)
14 Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System - The sensitive compartmented information
15 portion of the Defense Information System Network. It incorporates advanced networking technologies
16 that permit point-to-point or multipoint information exchange involving voice, text, graphics, data, and
17 video teleconferencing. Also called JWICS. (Jt Pub 1-02)
18
19 law of war - That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. Also called
20 the law of armed conflict. (Joint Pub 1-02)
21 liaison -That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces to ensure
22 mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (Joint Pub 1-02)
23
24 main effort - The designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to
25 overall mission success. It is usually weighted with the preponderance of combat power and is directed
26 against a center of gravity through a critical vulnerability. (MCRP 5-12C)
27 maneuver warfare - A warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a
28 variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating
29 situation with which the enemy cannot cope. (MCRP 5-12C)
30 Marine Corps planning process - A six-step methodology which helps organize the thought
31 processes of the commander and staff throughout the planning and execution of military operations. It
32 focuses on the threat and is based on the Marine Corps philosophy of maneuver warfare. It capitalizes
A-22

1 on the principle of unity of command and supports the establishment and maintenance of tempo. The six
2 steps consist of mission analysis, course of action development, course of action analysis,
3 comparison/decision, orders development, and transition. Also called MCPP. NOTE: Tenets of the
4 MCPP include top down planning, single battle concept, and integrated planning. (MCRP 5-12C)
5 Marine expeditionary force -The Marine expeditionary force, the largest of the Marine air-ground
6 task forces, is normally built around a division/wing team, but can include several divisions and aircraft
7 wings, together with an appropriate combat service support organization. The Marine expeditionary
8 force is capable of conducting a wide range of amphibious assault operations and sustained operations
9 ashore. It can be tailored for a wide variety of combat missions in any geographic environment. Also
10 called MEF. (Joint Pub 1-02)
11 Marine expeditionary force (Forward) - The designated lead echelon of a Marine expeditionary
12 force, task-organized to meet the requirements of a specific situation. Also called MEF(Fwd). (MCRP
13 5-12C)
14 Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) - The Marine expeditionary unit is a task
15 organization which is normally built around a battalion landing team, reinforced helicopter squadron, and
16 logistic support unit. It fulfills routine forward afloat deployment requirements, provides an immediate
17 reaction capability for crisis situations, and is capable of relatively limited combat operations. Also
18 called MEU(SOC). (Joint Pub 1-02)
19 measurement and signature intelligence - Scientific and technical intelligence obtained by
20 quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence,
21 modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of
22 identifying any distinctive features associated with the source, emitter, or sender and to facilitate
23 subsequent identification and/or measurement of the same. Also called MASINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)
24 military intelligence - Intelligence on any foreign military or military-related situation or activity which
25 is significant to military policy making or the planning and conduct of military operations and activities.
26 (Joint Pub 1-02)
27
28 national intelligence - Integrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national
29 policy and national security, is of concern to more than one department or agency, and transcends the
30 exclusive competence of a single department or agency. (Joint Pub 1-02)
31 need to know - A criterion used in security procedures which requires the custodians of classified
32 information to establish, prior to disclosure, that the intended recipient must have access to the
33 information to perform his official duties. (Joint Pub 1-02)
34 neutralize - As pertains to military operations, to render ineffective or unusable. (Joint Pub 1-02)
A-23
2 official information - Information which is owned by, produced for or by, or is subject to the control
3 of the United States Government. (Joint Pub 1-02)
4 open source intelligence - information of potential intelligence value that is available to the general
5 public. Also called OSINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)
6 operational control - Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any
7 echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant
8 command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform
9 those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and
10 forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish
11 the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations
12 and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control
13 should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is
14 exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component
15 commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and
16 to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish
17 assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for
18 logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called
19 OPCON. (Joint Pub 1-02)
20 operations security - A process of analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other
21 activities to:
22
a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems.
b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or
23
24 pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries.
c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities
25
26 of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (Joint Pub 1-02)
27 order of battle - The identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of the personnel,
28 units, and equipment of any military force. Also called OOB. (Jt Pub 1-02)
29 overt operation - The collection of intelligence openly, without concealment. (Joint Pub 1-02)
30
A-24

1 penetration - (1) In land operations, a form of offensive which seeks to break through the enemy's
2 defense and disrupt the defensive system. (Joint Pub 1-02) (2) The recruitment of agents within, or the
3 infiltration of agents or technical monitoring devices in an organization or group for the purpose of
4 acquiring information or of influencing its activities. (Joint Pub 1-02)
5 personnel security investigation - An inquiry into the activities of an individual which is designed to
6 develop pertinent information pertaining to trustworthiness and suitability for a position of trust as related
7 to loyalty, character, emotional stability, and reliability. (Joint Pub 1-02)
8 physical security - That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard
9 personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material and documents, and to
10 safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. (Joint Pub 1-02)
11 positive intelligence - A term of convenience sometimes applied to foreign intelligence to distinguish it
12 from foreign counterintelligence.
13 principal agent - An agent who, under the direction of an intelligence officer, is responsible for the
14 operational activities of other agents.
15 priority intelligence requirement - Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an
16 anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decision making. Also called PIR. (Joint Pub
17 1-02) In Marine Corps usage, an intelligence requirement associated with a decision that will critically
18 affect the overall success of the command's mission. (MCRP 5-12C)
19 production management - Encompasses determining the scope, content, and format of each product,
20 developing a plan and schedule for the development of each product, assigning priorities among the
21 various IPRs, allocating processing, exploitation, and production resources, and integrating production
22 efforts with collection and dissemination. (MCRP 5-12C)
23
24 ratline - An organized effort for moving personnel and/or material by clandestine means across a
25 denied area or border. (Joint Pub 1-02)
26 reach back - The ability to exploit resources, capabilities, expertise, etc. not physically located in the
27 theater or a joint area of operations, when established. (MCRP 5-12C)
28 rear area - For any particular command, the area extending forward from its rear boundary to the rear
29 of the area of responsibility of the next lower level of command. This area is provided primarily for the
30 performance of combat service support functions. (Joint Pub 1-02)
31 refugee - A civilian who by reason of real or imagined danger has left home to seek safety elsewhere.
32 (Joint Pub 1-02)
A-25
1 repatriate -A person who returns to his country or citizenship, having left his native country, either
2 against his will or as one of a group who left for reason of politics, religion, or other pertinent reasons.
3 (Joint Pub 1-02)
4 restricted area - (1) An area (land, sea, or air) in which there are special restrictive measures
5 employed to prevent or minimize interference between friendly forces. (2) An area under military
6 jurisdiction in which special security measures are employed to prevent unauthorized entry. (Joint Pub
7 1-02)
8 rules of engagement - Directive issued by competent military authority which delineate the
9 circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement
10 with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (Joint Pub 1-02)
11
12 sabotage - An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a
13 country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war
14 material, premises or utilities, to include human and natural resources. (Joint Pub 1-02)
15 safe area - A designated area in hostile territory that offers the evader or escapee a reasonable chance
16 of avoiding capture and of surviving until he can be evacuated. (Joint Pub 1-02)
17 safe haven - (1) Designated area(s) to which noncombatants of the United States Government's
18 responsibility, and commercial vehicles and material, may be evacuated during a domestic or other valid
19 emergency. (2) Temporary storage provided Department of Energy classified shipment transporters at
20 Department of Defense facilities in order to assure safety and security of nuclear material and/or
21 non-nuclear classified material. Also includes parking for commercial vehicles containing Class A or
22 Class B explosives. (Joint Pub 1-02)
23 safe house - An innocent-appearing house or premises established by an organization for the purpose
24 of conducting clandestine or covert activity in relative security. (Joint Pub 1-02)
25 sanitize - Revise a report or other document in such a fashion as to prevent identification of sources, or
26 of the actual persons and places with which it is concerned, or of the means by which it was acquired.
27 Usually involves deletion or substitution of names and other key details. (Joint Pub 1-02)
28 scientific and technical intelligence - The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis,
29 and interpretation of foreign scientific and technical information which covers: (a) foreign developments
30 in basic and applied research and in applied engineering techniques; and (b) scientific and technical
31 characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of all foreign military systems, weapons, weapon systems,
32 and material, the research and development related thereto, and the production methods employed for
33 their manufacture. (Joint Pub 1-02)
A-26
1 security - (1) Measures taken by a military unit, an activity or installation to protect itself against all acts
2 designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness. (2) A condition that results from the establishment
3 and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences.
4 (3) With respect to classified matter, it is the condition that prevents unauthorized persons from having
5 access to official information that is safeguarded in the interests of national security. (Joint Pub 1-02)
6 security classification - A category to which national security information and material is assigned to
7 denote the degree of damage that unauthorized disclosure would cause to national defense or foreign
8 relations of the United States and to denote the degree of protection required. There are three such
9 categories:
a. Top secret - National security information or material which requires the highest degree of
10
11 protection and the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause
12 exceptionally grave damage to the national security. Examples of "exceptionally grave damage" include
13 armed hostilities against the United States or its allies; disruption of foreign relations vitally affecting the
14 national security; the compromise of vital national defense plans or complex cryptologic and
15 communications intelligence systems; the revelation of sensitive intelligence operations; and the
16 disclosure of scientific or technological developments vital to national security.
b. Secret - National security information or material which requires a substantial degree of
17
18 protection and the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause serious
19 damage to the national security. Examples of "serious damage" include disruption of foreign relations
20 significantly affecting the national security; significant impairment of a program or policy directly related
21 to the national security; revelation of significant military plans or intelligence operations; and compromise
22 of significant scientific or technological developments relating to national security.
c. Confidential - National security information or material which requires protection and the
23
24 unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national
25 security. (Joint Pub 1-02)
26 security clearance - An administrative determination by competent authority that an individual is
27 eligible, from a security standpoint, for access to classified information. (Joint Pub 1-02)
28 security countermeasures - Defensive security programs and activities that seek to protect against
29 both foreign intelligence collection efforts and unauthorized access to, or disclosure of, protected
30 facilities, information, and material. (Joint Pub 2-01.2)
31 security intelligence - Intelligence on the identity, capabilities and intentions of hostile organizations or
32 individuals who are or may be engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism. (Joint Pub
33 1-02)
A-27

1 sensitive - Requiring special protection from disclosure which could cause embarrassment,
2 compromise, or threat to the security of the sponsoring power. May be applied to an agency,
3 installation, person, position, document, material, or activity. (Joint Pub 1-02)
4 sensitive compartmented information - All information and materials bearing special community
5 controls indicating restricted handling within present and future community intelligence collection
6 programs and their end products for which community systems of compartmentation have been or will
7 be formally established. (These controls are over and above the provisions of DOD 5200.1-R,
8 Information Security Program Regulation.) Also called SCI. (Joint Pub 1-02)
9 sensor - An equipment which detects, and may indicate, and/or record objects and activities by means
10 of energy or particles emitted, reflected, or modified by objects. (Joint Pub 1-02)
11 sensor data - Data derived from sensors whose primary mission is surveillance or target acquisition:
12 air surveillance radars, counterbattery radars, remote ground sensors. (MCRP 5-12C)
13 signal security - A generic term that includes both communications security and electronic security.
14 Also called SIGSEC. (Joint Pub 1-02)
15 signals intelligence - A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all
16 communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence,
17 however transmitted. Intelligence derived from communications, electronics, and foreign instrumentation
18 signals. Also called SIGINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)
19 situational awareness - Knowledge and understanding of the current situation which promotes timely,
20 relevant and accurate assessment of friendly, enemy and other operations within the battlespace in order
21 to facilitate decisionmaking. An informational perspective and skill that foster an ability to determine
22 quickly the context and relevance of events that are unfolding. Also called SA. (MCRP 5-12C)
23 source - (1) A person, thing, or activity from which intelligence information is obtained. (2) In
24 clandestine activities, a person (agent), normally a foreign national, in the employ of an intelligence
25 activity for intelligence purposes. (3) In interrogation activities, any person who furnishes intelligence
26 information, either with or without the knowledge that the information is being used for intelligence
27 purposes. In this context, a controlled source is in the employment or under the control of the
28 intelligence activity and knows that the information is to be used for intelligence purposes. An
29 uncontrolled source is a voluntary contributor of information and may or may not know that the
30 information is to be used for intelligence purposes. (Joint Pub 1-02)
31 special access program - Any program established under Executive Order 12356 that imposes
32 additional controls governing access to classified information involved with such programs beyond those
33 required by normal management and safeguarding practices. These programs may include, but are not
34 limited to, access approval, adjudication or investigative requirements, special designation of officials
A-28

1 authorized to determine a need-to-know, or special lists of persons determined to have a
2 need-to-know. Also called SAP. (Joint Pub 1-02)
3 special activities - As defined in Executive Order No. 12333, activities conducted in support of
4 national foreign policy objectives that are planned and executed so that the role of the U.S. Government
5 is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, but which are not intended to influence U.S. political
6 processes, public opinion, policies, or media and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection
7 and production of intelligence or related support functions. (Joint Pub 1-02)
8 special agent - A person, either United States military or civilian, who is a specialist in military security
9 or the collection of intelligence or counterintelligence information. (Joint Pub 1-02)
10 special operations - Operations conducted by specially trained, equipped, and organized DOD forces
11 against strategic or tactical targets in pursuit of national military, political, economic, or psychological
12 objectives. These operations may be conducted during periods of peace or hostilities. They may
13 support conventional operations, or they may be prosecuted independently when the use of
14 conventional forces is either inappropriate or unfeasible. (Joint Pub 1-02)
15 split base - Two or more portions of the same force conducting or supporting operations from
16 separate physical locations. (MCRP 5-12C)
17 stay behind - Agent or agent organization established in a given country to be activated in the event of
18 hostile overrun or other circumstances under which normal access would be denied. (Joint Pub 1-02)
19 strategic intelligence - Intelligence that is required for the formation of policy and military plans at
20 national and international levels. Strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence differ primarily in level of
21 application but may also vary in terms of scope and detail. (Joint Pub 1-02)
22 strategic warning - A warning prior to the initiation of a threatening act. (Joint Pub 1-02)
23 subversion - Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, political strength or
24 morale of a regime. (Joint Pub 1-02)
25 subversive activity - Anyone lending aid, comfort, and moral support to individuals, groups or
26 organizations that advocate the overthrow of incumbent governments by force and violence is
27 subversive and is engaged in subversive activity. All willful acts that are intended to be detrimental to
28 the best interests of the government and that do not fall into the categories of treason, sedition,
29 sabotage, or espionage will be placed in the category of subversive activity. (Joint Pub 1-02)
30 subversive political action - A planned series of activities designed to accomplish political objectives
31 by influencing, dominating, or displacing individuals or groups who are so placed as to affect the
32 decisions and actions of another government. (Joint Pub 1-02)
A-29

1 surveillance - The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons,
2 or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (Joint Pub 1-02)
3 surveillance and reconnaissance center - Primary element responsible for the supervision of
4 MAGTF intelligence collection operations. Directs, coordinates, and monitors intelligence collection
5 operations conducted by organic, attached, and direct support collection assets. Also called SARC.
6 (MCRP 5-12C)
7 sustained operations ashore - The employment of Marine Corps forces on land for an extended
8 duration. It can occur with or without sustainment from the sea. Also called SOA. (MCRP 5-12C)
9
10 tactical intelligence - Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting tactical operations.
11 (Joint Pub 1-02) In Marine Corps usage, tactical intelligence concerns itself primarily with the location,
12 capabilities, and possible intentions of enemy units on the battlefield and with the tactical aspects of
13 terrain and weather. (MCRP 5-12C)
14 tactical intelligence and related activities - Those activities outside the National Foreign Intelligence
15 Program that: a. respond to operational commanders' tasking for time-sensitive information on foreign
16 entities; b. respond to national intelligence community tasking of systems whose primary mission is
17 support to operating forces; c. train personnel for intelligence duties; d. provide an intelligence reserve;
18 or e. are devoted to research and development of intelligence or related capabilities. Specifically
19 excluded are programs which are so closely integrated with a weapon system that their primary function
20 is to provide immediate use targeting data. Also called TIARA. (Joint Pub 1-02)
21 tactical warning - (1) A warning after initiation of a threatening or hostile act based on an evaluation of
22 information from all available sources. (2) In satellite and missile surveillance, a notification to
23 operational command centers that a specific threat event is occurring. The component elements that
24 describe threat events are: Country of origin -country or countries initiating hostilities. Event type and
25 size -identification of the type of event and determination of the size or number of weapons. Country
26 under attack-determined by observing trajectory of an object and predicting its impact point. Event
27 time-time the hostile event occurred. Also called integrated tactical warning. (Joint Pub 1-02)
28 target - (1) A geographical area, complex, or installation planned for capture or destruction by military
29 forces. (2) In intelligence usage, a country, area, installation, agency, or person against which intelligence
30 operations are directed. (3) An area designated and numbered for future firing. (4) In gunfire support
31 usage, an impact burst which hits the target. (Joint Pub 1-02)
32 target intelligence - Intelligence which portrays and locates the components of a target or target
33 complex and indicates its vulnerability and relative importance. (Joint Pub 1-02)
A-30

1 tasking - The process of translating the allocation into orders, and passing these orders to the units
2 involved. Each order normally contains sufficient detailed instructions to enable the executing agency to
3 accomplish the mission successfully. (Joint Pub 1-02)
4 task force counterintelligence coordinating authority (TFCICA) - The
5 counterintelligence officer, or civilian equivalent, assigned responsibility for coordinating all
6 counterintelligence activities within a joint task force. Also called TFCICA. The TFCICA has the
7 authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to
8 compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred
9 to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through
10 which command may be exercised. Together, the TFCICA and the DHSs HUMINT Operations Cell
11 (HOC) for the nucleus of the J-2X. (Joint Pub 2-01.2)
12
13 technical control - The performance of specialized or professional service, or the exercise of
14 professional guidance or direction through the establishment of policies and procedures. (Proposed
15 USMC definition for next revision of MCRP 5-12C.)
16 technical surveillance countermeasures - Techniques and measures to detect and neutralize a wide
17 variety of hostile penetration technologies that are used to obtain unauthorized access to classified and
18 sensitive information. Technical penetrations include the employment of optical, electro-optical,
19 electromagnetic, fluid, and acoustic means, as the sensor and transmission medium, or the use of various
20 types of stimulation or modification to equipment or building components for the direct or indirect
21 transmission of information meant to be protected. Also called TSCM. (Joint Pub 2-01.2)
22
23 technical survey -A complete electronic and physical inspection to ascertain that offices, conference
24 rooms, war rooms, and other similar locations where classified information is discussed are free of
25 monitoring systems. (Joint Pub 1-02)
26 telecommunication - Any transmission, emission, or reception of signs, signals, writings, images,
27 sounds, or information of any nature by wire, radio, visual, or other electromagnetic systems. (Joint Pub
28 1-02)
29 TEMPEST - An unclassified term referring to technical investigation for compromising emanations from
30 electrically operated, information processing equipment; they are conducted in support of emanations
31 and emissions security. (Joint Pub 2-01.2)
32 terrain intelligence - Processed information on the military significance of natural and man-made
33 characteristics of an area. (Joint Pub 1-02)
34 terrorism - The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to
35 coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological
36 objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)
A-31

1 treason - Violation of the allegiance owed to one's sovereign or state; betrayal of one's country. (Joint
2 Pub 1-02)
3
4 unconventional warfare--A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long
5 duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained,
6 equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare
7 and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect
8 activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. Also called UW.
9 (Joint Pub 1-02)
10 unconventional warfare forces - United States forces having an existing unconventional warfare
11 capability consisting of Army Special Forces and such Navy, Air Force, and Marine units as are
12 assigned for these operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)
13 United States country team - The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising
14 body, headed by the Chief of the United States diplomatic mission, usually an ambassador, and
15 composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency. (Joint Pub
16 1-02)
17
18 validation - A process normally associated with the collection of intelligence information that provides
19 official status to an identified requirements and confirms that the requirement is appropriate for a given
20 collector and has not previously been satisfied. (Joint Pub 1-02)
21
22 warfighting functions - The six mutually supporting military activities integrated in the conduct of all
23 military operations are:
1. Command and control -- the means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be
24
25 done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken.
2. Maneuver -- the movement of forces for the purpose of gaining an advantage over the
26
27 enemy.
3. Fires -- those means used to delay, disrupt, degrade, or destroy enemy capabilities, forces,
28
29 or facilities as well as affect the enemy's will to fight.
A-32
4. Intelligence -- knowledge about the enemy or the surrounding environment needed to

1
2 support decisionmaking.
3
5. Logistics -- all activities required to move and sustain military forces.
6. Force protection -- actions or efforts used to safeguard own centers of gravity while
4
5 protecting, concealing, reducing, or eliminating friendly critical vulnerabilities. (MCRP 5-12C)
6 warning - A communication and acknowledgment of dangers implicit in a wide spectrum of activities by
7 potential opponents ranging from routine defense measures, to substantial increases in readiness and
8 force preparedness, to acts of terrorism or political, economic, or military provocation. (Joint Pub 1-02)
A-33

1
APPENDIX B
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PRINCIPAL & SUPPORTING EQUIPMENT
3 1. Marine Corps Common Equipment. The CI detachment or HUMINT exploitation team (HET)
4 is the basic building block for CI HUMINT support to support a MAGTF or subordinate unit. The
5 HET reports to the supported commander with their authorized organic equipment under the table of
6 equipment (T/E) 4714 series. This generally includes at a minimum, but is not limited to, the following
7 organic Marine Corps common equipment for each 3-man element and would require two sets to fully
8 equip a HET:
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Qty
Description
(1)
M998, High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) Complete
with SINGARS Radio mount
(1)
Trailer, Cargo, Ton, 2 Wheel, M101A3
(1)
Command Post (CP) Tent, with applicable support poles
(2)
Radar Scattering nets, with applicable support poles
(1)
Records Chest
(1)
Lantern Chest with (2) lanterns and Stove
(1)
SINGARS Radio (SL-3 Complete), Radio Set, AN/PRC-140B
(1)
Radio Set, AN/PRC-119A
(1)
Navigation Set, Satellite (PLGR) AN/PSN-11
(3)
Sleeping cots
(1)
6 Cube box containing, stools, extension cords, supplies etc.
22 2. CI/HUMINT Equipment Program (CIHEP). In addition to that equipment brought under T/E
23 4714, the CI/HUMINT company maintains a special allowance account of CI unique equipment
24 maintained in the companys CI platoon's technical surveillance countermeasures (TSCM) team. This
25 CIHEP allotment provides increased capabilities for conducting CI operations in an urban or
26 non-tactical environment. The CIHEP allowance is continuously upgraded. The following are items
27 currently included:
28
Qty
Description
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
(3)
(3)
(1)
(1)
(2)
(6)
(1)
Motorola SABER, Receiver - Transmitter

Antenna, Magnetic Mount
Motorola 20 Watt Base Station/Repeater
Digital Encryption Loader (DES)
Motorola SABER Recharger bank
SABER Batteries
Kodak DCS-420 Digital Camera Set
B-1
Qty
Description
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
(1)
CI/HUMINT Automated Tool Set (CHATS) containing a notebook computer, color

printer, color scanner, DC-50 digital camera and secure communications and FAX
capability.
AT&T 1100 STU-III Telephone
Tripod
Camera, Hi-8mm Video
Video capture card
Video, Hi-8mm, TV Recorder/Player, 5-Inch Screen
Video, Hi-8mm, TV Recorder/Player, 2 Inch Screen
Recorder, Microcassette
Metal Detector
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(2)
(1)
13 3. CI/HUMINT AUTOMATED TOOL SET (CHATS) CURRENT CAPABILITIES. CHATS

14 is a suite of hardware designed to meet the unique requirements of MAGTF CI/HUMINT elements.
15 Operating up to the SECRET level and using the baseline and DCIIS software suite, the system
16 provides the capability to manage assets and analyze information collected through investigations,
17 interrogations, collection, and document exploitation. With CHATS, MAGTF CI elements may
18 electronically store collected information in a local
19 database, associate information with digital
31
20 photography, and transmit/receive information over
32
21 existing military and civilian communications. The
33
H
22 CHATS provides these functions primarily with
34
ar
23 commercial off-the-shelf software operating in a laptop
35
d
24 computer within a hardened transport case. Major
36
D
25 systems components include:
37
riv
38
e
26 Operating System: MS Windows 95/MS Plus for
39
Windows 95
27
40
C
28 Hardened System: Intel Pentium
41
166 MHz or faster
D
29
42
1.3 GB Removable
30 Disk Drive:
43
12X
44 ROM:
32 MB
45 RAM:
STU-III (AT&T 1100)
46 Communications:
(unit provided) or
47
Secure Terminal
Equipment (FY98)
48
49
B-2
Secure FAX:
External Modem:
Digital Camera:
Printer:
Color Scanner:
1
2
3
4
5
Ilex PCMCIA
PCMCIA 33.6 BPS
Kodak Color DC50
Cannon BJC-70
Logitec PowerPage
Figure B-1. CI/HUMINT Automated Tool Set

Comms Paths:
Ethernet Thin LAN,

Commercial
Telephone, CNR
6 When fully fielded1 , the system will enhance seamless integration of CI/HUMINT information from the
7 HET to intelligence units throughout the MAGTF. Current planning envisions the capability to be global
8 command and control system compliant and able to support the information exchange between CHATS
9 and the Marine Corps intelligence analysis system (IAS), the armys all source analysis system (ASAS),
10 and the joint community's joint deployable intelligence support system (JDISS).
PLANNED IMPROVEMENTS
11
12 Continuous and incremental upgrades to the CHATS through the entire product life-cycle. Current
13 plans include:
FY 98
14
FY 99
Multi-Media Teleconference Capabilities

15 INMARSAT-B Connectivity
16 Tactical Radio Interface (TCIM/ViaSat Cards) Read/Write CD-ROM Data Services
Bulk Storage (Zip, LS-120, HiFD)
17 GPS Interface
Full operational capability is anticipated during fiscal year 1999.
B-3

1
APPENDIX C
Counterintelligence Operations Appendix
(Appendix 3 to Annex B, Intelligence)
4------------------------------------------------------------------CLASSIFICATION
Copy no. ___ of ___ copies

Issuing Unit
PLACE OF ISSUE
Date/time group
Message reference number
6
7
8
9
10
11 APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD XXX ( )
12 Counterintelligence Operations ( U )
13 ( ) REFERENCES: List unit standing operating procedures (SOP) for intelligence and
14 counterintelligence, maps and any other relevant documents that authorize the various levels of
15 anticipated CI operations.
16 1. ( ) GENERAL
17
a. ( ) Objectives. Discuss general objectives and guidance necessary to accomplish the mission.
b. ( ) Command Responsibilities and Reporting Procedures. Provide a general statement of

18
19 command responsibilities and reporting procedures to ensure the flow of pertinent counterintelligence
20 information to higher, adjacent, or subordinate commands.
c. ( ) CI Liaison Responsibilities. Discuss responsibility to coordinate and conduct liaison
21
22 between command counterintelligence elements and those of other U.S. and allied commands and
23 agencies.
d. ( ) Restrictions. Discuss the effect of U.S. Statutes, Executive Orders, DOD and Higher
24
25 Headquarters Directives, and SOFA on counterintelligence activities.
26 2. ( ) HOSTILE THREAT. Summarize the foreign intelligence activity and collection threat; foreign
27 security and CI threat; and threats from sabotage, terrorism, and assassination directed by foreign
28 elements. Emphasize capabilities and intentions.
29 3. ( ) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS
C-1

a. ( ) Command's CI Structure. Provide strengths, locations, and capabilities (to include special
1
2 qualifications) of command's CI assets.
b. ( ) Supporting Command/Agencies CI Structure. Provide strengths, locations, capabilities, and
3
4 type of support to be provided.
c. ( ) Allied/Host Nation CI Structure. Provide strengths, locations, capabilities, and type of
5
6 support anticipated.
7 4. ( ) SECURITY. Provide planning guidance concerning procedures and responsibilities for the
8 following security activities:
9
a. ( ) Force or Headquarters
10
b. ( ) Military Security
11
c. ( ) Civil Authority
12
d. ( ) Port, Frontier, and Travel Security
13
e. ( ) Safeguarding Classified Information and Codes
14
f. ( ) Security Discipline and Security Education
15
g. ( ) Protection of Critical Installations
16
h. ( ) Special Weapons Security
17
i. ( ) Counterterrorist Measures
18 5. ( ) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLANS, ACTIVITIES, AND FUNCTIONS

a. ( ) Defensive. Identify the staff of those commands that have supporting counterintelligence
19
20 assets and provide planning guidance concerning procedures, priorities and channels for:
21
(1) ( ) Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO).
22
(2) ( ) Interrogatiion of enemy prisoners of war (EPW) and defectors.
23
(3) ( ) Screening of indigenous refugees, displaced persons, and detained suspects.
(4) ( ) Debriefing of U.S. or other friendly personnel who evade, escape, or are released from
24
25 enemy control.
C-2
(5) ( ) Exploitation of captured documents and material.
b. ( ) Offensive. Establish guidance, to include control and coordination, for approval of

2
3 counterespionage, countersabotage, countersubversion, counterterorist, double agent, deception and
4 other special operations.
5 6. ( ) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TARGETS AND REQUIREMENTS
a. ( ) Targets. Provide guidance to subordinate commands for developing counterintelligence
6
7 targets based on an assessment of the overall counterintelligence threat. Designate priorities that
8 emphasize the relative importance of the following counterintelligence target categories:
9
(1) ( ) Personalities
10
(2) ( ) Installations.
11
(3) ( ) Organizations and groups.
12
(4) ( ) Documents and material.
b. ( ) Priorities. Identify special counterintelligence collection requirements and priorities to be

13
14 fulfilled by counterintelligence operations.
15
c. ( ) Miscellaneous. Identify any other command information required.
16 7. ( ) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION AND DISSEMINATION. Provide

17 guidance for the analysis, production, and dissemination of CI from all sources.
18 8. ( ) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. Provide a statement of the administrative and
19 logistic arrangements or requirements for CI not covered in the Basic Plan or in another Annex.
20 Specific operational details on early deployments, mode of transportation, clothing, equipment,
21 operational or contingency funds will be discussed according to the specific operation.
22 9. ( ) COMMAND AND SIGNAL
a. ( ) Command. Include details of conditions that would prompt change of command and
23
24 procedures to implement that change during execution of the plan. Address what information and
25 activities require the commander's knowledge and approval.
b. ( ) Communication. Ensure that communications requirements are addressed in Annex K.
26
27 Unique communications requirement for CI should be addressed to include identifying what
28 communication channels should be used.
C-3
1 10. ( ) COORDINATION. Identify coordination requirements peculiar to the counterintelligence

2 activities listed in the paragraphs above.
3 Tabs
4
5
6
A - ( ) Counterintelligence Estimate
B - ( ) Counterintelligence List of Targets
C - ( ) Countersigns Challenges and Passwords
C-4
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
2 Purpose. Provides a baseline of historical, threat related information to support initial MAGTF for
3 inclusion
4 ______________________________________________________________________________
CLASSIFICATION
Copy no. __ of __ copies

ISSUING HEADQUARTERS
PLACE OF ISSUE
Date/Time Group
6
7
8
9
10 TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD XXX ( )

11 Counterintelligence Estimate ( U )
12 ( ) REFERENCES:
13
a. Unit standing operating procedures (SOP) for intelligence and

counterintelligence.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
b. JTF, NTF, other components, theater and national intelligence and

counterintelligence plans, orders and tactics, techniques and procedures;
and multinational agreements pertinent to intelligence operations.
c. Maps, charts and other intelligence and counterintelligence products
required for an understanding of this annex.
d. Documents and online databases that provide intelligence required for
planning.
e. Others as appropriate.
25 1. ( ) MISSION. (State the assigned task and its purpose.)

26 2. ( ) CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OR OPERATIONS. (State conditions and other
27 pertinent characteristics of the area which exist and may affect enemy intelligence, sabotage, subversive
28 and terrorist capabilities and operations. Assess the estimated effects. Also, assess their effects on
29 friendly counterintelligence capabilities, operations and measures. Reference appendix 8, Intelligence
30 Estimate, to annex B, Intelligence, as appropriate.)
31
32
a. ( ) Military Geography
(1) ( ) (Existing situation)
C-5
(2) ( ) (Estimated effects on enemy intelligence, sabotage, subversive and terrorist operations
1
2 and capabilities.)
3
4
5
(3) ( ) (Estimated effects on friendly counterintelligence operations, capabilities and measures.)

b. ( ) Weather
6
8
c. ( ) Other Characteristics. (Additional pertinent characteristics are considered in separate

9
10 subparagraphs: sociological, political, economic, psychological, and other factors. Other factors may
11 include but are not limited to telecommunications material, transportation, manpower, hydrography,
12 science, and technology. These are analyzed under the same headings as used for military geography
13 and weather.)
14 3. INTELLIGENCE, SABOTAGE, SUBVERSIVE, AND TERRORIST SITUATION
15 (Discusses enemy intelligence, sabotage, subversive, and terrorist activities as to the current situation
16 and recent/significant activities. Include known factors on enemy intelligence, sabotage, subversive, and
17 terrorist organizations. Fact sheets containing pertinent information on each organization may be
18 attached to the estimate or annexes.)
19
a. ( ) Location and disposition.
20
b. ( ) Composition.
c. ( ) Strength, including local available strength, availability of replacements, efficiency of enemy

21
22 intelligence, sabotage, subversive, and terrorist organizations.
d. ( ) Recent and present significant intelligence, sabotage, and subversive activities/movements
23
24 (including enemy knowledge of our intelligence and counterintelligence efforts).
25
e. ( ) Operational, tactical and technical capabilities and equipment.
26
f. ( ) Peculiarities and weaknesses.
27
g. ( ) Other factors as appropriate.

C-6

1 4. ( ) INTELLIGENCE, SABOTAGE, SUBVERSIVE, AND TERRORIST CAPABILITIES
2 AND ANALYSIS. (List separately each indicated enemy capability which can affect the
3 accomplishment of the assigned mission. Each enemy capability should contain information on what the
4 enemy can do, where they can do it, when they can start it and get it done, and what strength they can
5 devote to the task. Analyze each capability in light of the assigned mission, considering all applicable
6 factors from paragraph 2, and attempt to determine and give reasons for the estimated probability of
7 adoption by the enemy. Examine the enemys capabilities by discussing the factors that favor or militate
8 against its adoption by the enemy. The analysis of each capability should also include a discussion of
9 enemy strengths and vulnerabilities associated with that capability. Also, the analysis should include a
10 discussion of any indications that point to possible adoption of the capability. Finally, state the estimated
11 effect the enemys adoption of each capability will have on the accomplishment of the friendly mission.)
12
13
a. ( ) Capabilities
(1) ( ) Intelligence. (Include all known/estimated enemy methods.)
(2) ( ) Sabotage. (Include all possible agent/guerilla capabilities for military, political, and
14
15 economic sabotage.)
(3) ( ) Subversion. (Include all types, such as propaganda, sedition, treason, disaffection, and
16
17 threatened terrorists activities affecting our troops, allies, and local civilians, and assistance in the escape
18 and evasion of hostile civilians.)
(4) ( ) Terrorist. (Include capabilities of terrorist personalities and organizations in area of
19
20 operation.)
b. ( ) Analysis and discussion of enemy capabilities for intelligence, sabotage, subversive, and
21
22 terrorism as a basis to judge the probability of their adoption.
23 5. CONCLUSIONS AND VULNERABILITIES. (Conclusions resulting from discussion in
24 paragraph 4. Relate to current all-source intelligence estimates of the enemy's centers of gravity, critical
25 and other vulnerabilities and estimated exploitability of these by friendly forces, enemy courses of action
26 beginning with the most probable and continuing down the list in the estimated order of probability, and
27 the estimated effects adoption of each capability would have on the friendly mission.)
a. ( ) Probability of enemy adoption of intelligence, sabotage, subversive, and terrorist programs or
28
29 procedures based on capabilities.
30
b. ( ) Effects of enemy capabilities on friendly course of action.
c. ( ) Effectiveness of our own counterintelligence measures and additional requirements or

31
32 emphasis needed.
C-7
1 Enclosures
2 (As appropriate)
3
C-8

1
CLASSIFICATION
Issuing Unit
PLACE OF ISSUE
Date/time group
2
3
4
5
6
7 TAB B TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD XXX ( )

8 Counterintelligence List of Targets ( U )
9 1. ( ) Friendly Infrastructure. Develop a listing of offices and agencies where CI personnel can obtain
10 CI information and assistance.
11 2. ( ) Foreign Intelligence and Security Service (FISS) Infrastructure. Develop a listing of specific
12 offices and institutions within the FISS structure that can provide information of FISS targeting,
13 operations, etc.
14 3. ( ) FISS Personalities. Develop and update a specific listing of FISS personalities who, if captured,
15 would be of CI interrogation interest.
16
C-9

Countersigns Challenges and Passwords
1
2 1. Guidance and Procedures
a. Countersigns (challenge/password) are used during MAGTF operations as a means of positive

3
4 identification of friendly personnel. Countersigns will, be changed daily at a predetermined time to be
5 published in Annex C to the OPORDER. Compromise of the countersign will be reported immediately
6 to the Command Element S-2 Section.
b. The countersigns list will be issued separately as Tab C to Appendix 3 to Annex B of the
7
8 OPORDER. It will appear in the following manner:
Code
Challenge
Password
10
11
Lamp
Wheel
11
12
Powder
Powder
12
13
Black
Table
Alternate
c. Dissemination of the initial primary and alternate countersigns for the initial introduction of forces
13
14 will be made in Annex B to the OPORDER. Subsequent countersign dissemination will be made by
15 other secure means (i.e. covered radio nets) prior to the effective time. A sample message form is as
16 follows:
17
18 Code 13."
"Code 11 countersign effective 011201(L) through 021200 (L). Alternate countersign
Procedure: Alternate countersigns are any two numbers, that equal the alternate
19
20 number, one given as the challenge, the other as the password reply.
d. If at any time, there is reason to believe that a password or countersign has been compromised,
21
22 the unit which suspects the compromise will notify the MAGTF command element G/S-2 via the fastest
23 means available. The command element will issue alternate and any changes to the remaining
24 countersigns.
25
26
e. Below is the basic format for the countersigns challenges and passwords tab to appendix 3.
C-10
CLASSIFICATION

Issuing Unit
PLACE OF ISSUE
Date/time group
2
3
4
5
6
7 TAB B TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX B TO OPORD XXX ( )

8 Countersigns Challenges and Passwords ( U )
9 1. ( ) This tab provides the initial dissemination of the primary and alternate countersigns to be used
10 within the MAGTF. Subsequent countersign dissemination will be made by other security means prior
11 to the effective time.
12
CODE/DATE
CHALLENGE
PASSWORD
C-11
ALTERNATE
APPENDIX D
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION

2
______________________________________________________________________________
3
4
Section I
5
6
7
TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES FOR

COUNTER-HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION
8 1. General. Counter human intelligence (C-HUMINT) analysis increases in importance with each new
9 US involvement in worldwide operations. Especially in MOOTW, C-HUMINT analysis is rapidly
10 becoming a cornerstone upon which commanders base their concepts operations. This section presents
11 information for analysts to develop some of those products that can enhance the probability of
12 successful operations.
a. Counterintelligence (CI) analysts, interrogators, and CI agents maintain the C-HUMINT
13
14 database. Using this database, they produce15
(1) Time event charts.
16
(2) Association matrices.
17
(3) Activities matrices.
18
(4) Link diagrams.
19
(5) HUMINT communication diagrams.
20
(6) HUMINT situation overlays.
21
(7) HUMINT-related portions of the threat assessment.
22
(8) CI target lists.
b. The analytical techniques used in HUMINT analysis enable the analyst to visualize large amounts
23
24 of data in graphic form. We emphasize, however, that these analytical techniques are only tools used to
25 arrive at a logical and correct solution to a complex problem; the techniques themselves are not the
26 solution.
c. There are three basic techniques (tools) used as aids in analyzing HUMINT-related problems.
27
28 These techniques-time event charting, matrix manipulation, and link diagramming-used together, are
D-1

1 critical to the process of transforming diverse and incomplete bits of seemingly unrelated data into an
2 understandable overview of an exceedingly complex situation.
3
(1) Time Event Charting
(a) The time event chart (see figure D-1) is a chronological record of individual or group
4
5 activities designed to store and display large amounts of information in as little space as possible. This
6 tool is easy to prepare, understand, and use. Symbols used in time event charting are very simple.
7 Analysts use triangles to show the beginning and end of the chart. They also use triangles within the chart
8 to show shifts in method of operation or change in ideology. Rectangles or diamonds are used to
9 indicate significant events or activities.
10
Figure D-1. Time Event Chart
(b) Analysts can highlight particularly noteworthy or important events by drawing an "X'
11
through
the
event symbol (rectangle or diamond). Each of these symbols contains a chronological
12
13 number (event number), date (day, month, and year of event), and may contain a file reference number.
14 The incident description is a very brief explanation of the incident, and may include team size, type of
15 incident or activity, place and method of operation, and duration of incident. Time flow is indicated by
16 arrows.
D-2

(c) Analysts also use a variety of symbols such as parallelograms and pentagons, and
1
2 others, to show different types of events and activities. Using these symbols and brief descriptions, the
3 CI analyst can analyze the group's activities, transitions, trends, and operational patterns. Time event
4 charts are excellent briefing aids as well as flexible analytical tools.
5
(2) Matrix Manipulation
(a) Construction of a matrix is the easiest and simplest way to show relationships between
6
7 similar or dissimilar associated items. The 'items" can be anything relevant to the situation under
8 investigation: persons, events, addressees, organizations, or telephone numbers. During this process, CI
9 analysts use matrices to determine "who knows whom" or "who has been where or done what." This
10 results in a clear and concise display which viewers can easily understand simply by looking at the
11 matrix.
(b) In general terms, matrices resemble the mileage charts commonly found in a road atlas.
12
13 Within the category of matrices, there are two types used in investigative analysis-association matrix and
14 activities matrix.
1 Association Matrix. The association matrix is used to show that a relationship
15
16 between individuals exists. Within the realm of HUMINT analysis, the part of the problem deserving the
17 most analytical effort is the group itself. Analysts examine the group's elements (members) and their
18 relationships with other members, other groups and associated entities, and related events. Analysts can
19 show the connections between key players in any event or activity in an association matrix shown in (see
20 figure D-2). It shows associations within a group or similar activity, and is based on the assumption that
21 people involved in a collective activity know one another.
D-3
Figure D-2. Association Matrix
a This type of matrix is constructed in the form of a right triangle having the same
2
3 number of rows and columns. Analysts list personalities in exactly the same order along both the rows
4 and columns to ensure that all possible associations are shown correctly. The purpose of the personality
5 matrix is to show who knows whom. Analysts determine a known association by "direct contact"
6 between individuals. They determine direct contact by a number of factors, including face-to-face
7 meetings, confirmed telephonic conversation between known parties, and all members of a particular
8 organizational cell. (NOTE: When a person of interest dies, a diamond is drawn next to his or her
9 name on the matrix.)
b CI analysts indicate a known association between individuals on the matrix by a
10
11 dot or filled-in circle. They consider suspected or "weak" associations between persons of interest to be
12 associations which are possible or even probable, but cannot be confirmed using the above criteria.
13 Examples of suspected associations includeA known party calling a known telephone number (the analyst knows to whom
14
15 the telephone number is listed), but cannot determine with certainty who answered the call.
The analyst can identify one party to a face-to-face meeting, but may be able to
16
17 only tentatively identify the other party.
D-4

(c) Weak or suspected associations on the personality matrix are indicated by an open
1
2 circle. The rationale for depicting suspected associations is to get as close as possible to an objective
3 analytic solution while staying as close as possible to known or confirmed facts. If analysts can confirm a
4 suspected association, they can make the appropriate adjustment on the personality matrix.
(d) A secondary reason for depicting suspected associations is that it may give the analyst a
5
6 focus for tasking limited intelligence collection assets to confirm the suspected association. An important
7 point to remember about using the personality matrix: it will show only that relationships exist; not the
8 nature, degree, or frequency of those relationships.
1 Activities Matrix. The activities matrix is used to determine connectivity between
9
10 individuals and any organization, event, entity, address, activity, or anything other than persons. Unlike
11 the association matrix, the activities matrix is constructed in the form of a square or a rectangle (see
12 figure D-3). It does not necessarily have the same number of rows and can tailor rows or columns to fit
13 the needs of the problem at hand or add them later as the problem expands in scope. The analyst
14 determines the number of rows and columns by the needs of the problem and by the amount of
15 information available.
16
Figure D-3. Activities Matrix
D-5

a Analysts normally construct this matrix with personalities arranged in a vertical
1
2 listing on the left side of the matrix; and activities, organizations, events, addresses, or any other
3 common denominator arranged along the bottom of the matrix.
b This matrix can store an incredible amount of information about a particular
4
5 organization or group, and can build on information developed in the association matrix. Starting with
6 fragmentary information, the activities matrix can reveal an organization's7
Membership.
Organizational structure.
Cell structures and size.
10
Communications network.
11
Support structure.
12
Linkages with other organizations and entities.
13
Group activities and operations.
14
Organizational and national or international ties.
c As with the association matrix, known association between persons and entities is
15
16 indicated by a solid circle, and suspected associations by an open circle.
d Analysts use matrices to present briefings, present evidence, or store information in
17
18 a concise and understandable manner within a database. Matrices augment, but cannot replace,
19 standard reporting procedures or standard database files. Using matrices, the analyst can:
20
Pinpoint the optimal targets for further intelligence collection.
21
Identify key personalities within an organization.
22
Increase the analyst's understanding of an organization and its structure.
(3) Link Diagramming. The third analytical technique is the link diagram (see figure D-4).
23
24 Analysts use this technique to depict the more complex linkages between a large number of entities, be
25 they persons, events, organizations, or almost anything else. Analysts use link analysis in a variety of
26 complex investigative efforts including criminal investigations, terrorism, analysis, and even medical
27 research. Several regional law enforcement training centers are currently teaching this method as a
D-6

1 technique in combating organized crime. The particular method discussed here is an adaptation
2 especially useful in CI investigative analysis in general and terrorism analysis in particular.
Figure D-4. Link Diagram
(a) The difference between matrices and link analysis is roughly the same as the difference
4
5 between a mileage chart and a road map. The mileage chart shows the connections between cities using
6 numbers to represent travel distances. The map uses symbols that represent cities, locations, and roads
7 to show how two or more locations are linked to each other. Different symbols on the map have
8 different meanings, and it is easy to display or discover the best route between two or more locations as
9 well as identify obstacles such as unpaved roads or bodies of water.
(b) The same is true with link analysis. Different symbols are used to identify different items.
10
11 Analysts can easily and clearly display obstacles, indirect routes or connections, and suspected
12 connections. In many cases, the viewer can work with and follow the picture easier than the matrix. Link
13 analysis can present information in a manner that ensures clarity.
(c) As with construction of association matrices, certain rules of graphics, symbology, and
14
15 construction must be followed. Standardization is critical to ensure that everyone constructing, using, or
16 reading a link diagram understands exactly what the diagram depicts. The standard rules follow:
D-7
1 Show persons as open circles with the name written inside the circle.
2 Show persons known by more than one name (alias, also known as [AKA]) as
2
3 overlapping circles with names in each circle.
4
5 person.
3 Show deceased persons as above, with a diamond next to the circle representing that
4 Show non-personal entities (organizations, governments, events, locations) by squares

6
7 or rectangles.
8
5 Show linkages or associations by lines: solid for confirmed and dotted for suspected.
6 Show each person or non-personal entity only once in a link diagram.
(d) Certain conventions must be followed. For the sake of clarity, analysts arrange circles
10
11 and squares so that whenever possible, lines of connectivity do not cross. Often, particularly when
12 dealing with a large or especially complex problem, it is difficult to construct a link diagram so that no
13 connecting lines cross. Intersecting lines, however, muddle the drawing and reduce clarity. If lines must
14 cross, show the crossing as a crossing, not as an intersection, in exactly the same manner as on an
15 electrical schematic or diagram.
(e) Link diagrams can show organizations, membership within the organization, action teams
16
17 or cells, or participants in an event. Since each individual depicted on a link diagram is shown only once,
18 and some individuals may belong to more than one organization or take part in more than one event,
19 squares or rectangles representing non-personal entities may overlap.
(f) Construct the appropriate association matrices showing "who knows whom," "who
20
21 participated in what," "who went where," and "who belongs to what group."
(g) Draw information from the database and intelligence reports, and relationships from the
22
23 matrices. Group persons into organizations or cells based on information about joint association,
24 activities, or membership. Draw lines representing connections between individuals, organizations, or
25 activities to complete the diagram. You may have to rearrange the diagram to comply with procedural
26 guidelines, such as crossed lines of connectivity. The finished product will clearly display linkages
27 between individuals, organizations, and other groupings.
(h) When you finish the matrices and link diagram, make recommendations about the
28
29 group's structure. Identify areas for further intelligence collection targeting. Task intelligence assets to
30 confirm suspected linkages and identify key personalities for exploitation or neutralization. The
31 combination of matrix manipulation and the link diagram present, in effect, a graphic depiction of an
32 extremely complex threat situation in a clear and concise picture.
D-8
(i) Overlapping organizations.
1 There is more to overlapping organizations than is immediately obvious. At first

2
3 glance, the overlap indicates only that an individual may belong to more than one organization or has
4 taken part in multiple activities. Further study and analysis would reveal connections between
5 organizations, connections between events, or connections between organizations and events.
2 When, as is often the case, an organization or incident shown in a link diagram
6
7 contains the names of more than one individual, it is not necessary to draw a solid line between those
8 individuals to indicate connectivity. We assume that individual members of the same group or
9 participants in the same activity know each other, and the connection between them is therefore implied.
(j) A final set of rules for link diagrams concerns connectivity between individuals who are
10
11 not members of an organization or participants in an activity, but who are somehow connected to the
12 group or activity. Two possibilities exist: The individual knows a member or members of the
13 organization but is not directly connected with the organization itself. The person is somehow connected
14 with the organization or activity but cannot be directly linked with any particular member of that
15 organization or activity. In the first case, draw the connectivity line between the circle representing the
16 individual and the circle representing the person within the organization or activity.
(k) If you keep in mind the preceding outline of principles and rules, you can construct a link
17
18 diagram effectively. Because this is a rather complex form of analytical graphic display to construct, it
19 may prove difficult at first and require a little extra time and effort. The payoff, however, is the powerful
20 impact of the results, which are well worth the extra effort.
21
D-9

1
Section II
2
3
4

COUNTER-IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE
5 1. General. The proliferation of imagery systems worldwide, especially the platforms carrying imagery
6 systems, makes the task of the counter imagery intelligence (C-IMINT) analyst much more complicated
7 than ever before. Relatively inexpensive platforms that are easily transported and operated, such as
8 unmanned aerial vehicles, are becoming available to anyone who wants to employ them. For the more
9 sophisticated, there are other platforms either continuously circling the planet or in geosynchronous
10 orbit, available for hire by anyone with the desire and the ability to pay the freight. An adversary need
11 not possess the technology to build and launch such a platform. He merely buys time from the operators
12 of the platform and obtains the products acquired during his allotted time. Like all other CI functions,
13 C-IMINT depends on the analyst knowing the adversary and knowing ourselves. It begins long before
14 friendly forces deploy for any operation and continues throughout the operation. It goes on even after
15 our forces return to their home station after completion of the operation. Details on requesting Satellite
16 Vulnerability Assessments are contained in the classified supplement.
17 2. Operations. C-IMINT begins with knowledge. The CI analyst must have a thorough knowledge of
18 the threat in the objective area and any threat from outside the AO that may influence our operations.
a. Predeployment. Prior to any operation, the CI analyst needs to prepare in-depth. In addition to
19
20 researching data on the threat and the AO, the CI analyst gathers information and builds a database to
21 serve C-IMINT in the coming operation. During this phase, the CI analyst initiates quick reference
22 matrices and the IMINT situation overlay.
(1) Adversary Intelligence Flight Matrix. These matrices are concerned with other
23
24 platforms used by the adversary. Tracking these collection systems continuously allows the analyst to
25 analyze threat IMINT collection patterns.
(2) System Component Quick Reference Matrix. These matrices are concerned with
26
27 adversary system's capabilities and processing times (see figure D-5). This file is part of the database
28 which equates to an OOB file on threat IMINT systems.
D-10
Figure D-5. Systems Component Quick Reference Matrix
(3) IMINT Situation Overlays. These are the paths of adversary intelligence collection flights
2
3 depicted on the friendly operations graphics. They identify areas susceptible to collection.
b. Friendly Patterns. Pattern analysis is the detailed study of friendly activities to determine if a
4
unit
performs the activities in a predictable manner, thus creating a monitorable pattern of activity. These
5
6 actions cue an observer to a unit's type, disposition, activity, and capability. Imagery coverage of the
7 AO is essential for planning and for reference later during operations. Small or intermediate scale
8 imagery covering the entire AO may be obtained from general reference files or national sources and
9 need not be newly flown. The presence of U.S. reconnaissance aircraft making numerous passes over
10 territory belonging to another nation would tip off an impending operation. Therefore, file imagery or
11 imagery obtained by satellite may be the only reference available.
(1) Friendly IMINT is used, when available and of high enough priority, to determine friendly
12
13 patterns which may be susceptible to IMINT collection. These patterns are key indicators to the enemy
14 of specific operational activities. Patterns usually occur because of a unit's SOP and doctrine. Example
15 patterns include16
(a) Relocating fire support units forward before an attack.
(b) Locating command posts and other C2 facilities in the same relative position to
17
maneuver
elements
and to each other.
18
D-11

(c) Repeating reconnaissance overflights of areas planned for ground or air attack about the
1
2 same time before each operation.
(2) Information gained from imagery provides a means of checking other reports and often
3
4 produces additional detailed information on a specific AI. All friendly activities thus need to be examined
5 collaterally with imagery of a particular area. Imagery can provide confirmation of installations, lines of
6 communications, and operational zones. SLAR, for example, can detect night movements of watercraft.
(3) Finally, in the overall evaluation, analysts synthesize the separate trends developed during
7
8 analysis. Such a process identifies the possible compromise of an existing element, activity, or
9 characteristic based on logical relationships and hypotheses developed by analysis. The pattern analysis
10 technique is just one of many techniques designed to help evaluate friendly units for vulnerability to threat
11 IMINT. The process is a continuous one.
(4) Analysis of a unit's movements gives significant clues to its intentions, capabilities, and
12
13 objectives. By applying this technique against our own units, analysts can identify vulnerabilities.
14 Movement analysis forms an important step in the identification and recommendation of
15 countermeasures.
(a) SLAR is a primary sensor in detecting moving targets or moving target indicators
16
17 (MTIs) and is usually associated with the special electronics mission aircraft and Joint STARS platform.
18 While the sensor is primarily focused at enemy MTIs, it can be used to identify friendly movement
19 patterns that may also be collected by the enemy.
(b) The tracks created by a unit can give excellent indication of a unit's disposition. Any
20
21 time a unit moves away from hard packed roads, the danger of leaving track signatures is very high.
22 There are certain countermeasures which should be observed to disguise or eliminate these signatures:
23
1 Conceal tracks by netting or other garnish.
24
2 Disperse turnouts near CPs.
25
3 Place installations and equipment near hard roads where concealment is available.
(c) Our IMINT resources can determine the effectiveness of a friendly unit's program to
26
27 suppress its visual and thermal signatures, including positioning of assets. Friendly aerial reconnaissance
28 is extremely limited and must be planned for well in advance. The following are examples of
29 countermeasures that could be used to reduce our vulnerability to enemy IMINT:
1 Using traffic discipline when moving into and out of the installation. This may require
30
31 walking some distance to a CP.
32
2 Driving in the tree lines when roads are not available.

D-12
3 Extending new roads beyond the CP to another termination.
4 Controlling unauthorized photographic equipment.
5 Using physical security measures to prevent optical penetration.
6 Using proper camouflage procedures.
7 Limiting the dissemination of photographs made from within the installation.
8 Avoiding the use of direction signals and other devices which provide information.
9 Concealing equipment markings.
10 Preventing detection by infrared imaging (nets, infrared generators).
11 Eliminating open-air storage of special equipment, raw materials, and telltale objects.
(d) The key to proper positioning of assets on the ground is to use natural features as much
10
11 as possible. Obvious locations such as clearings may be more convenient but should be avoided at all
12 costs. This includes night operations. Infrared and SLAR missions are particularly effective at night.
13 Units should be well dispersed since a high concentration of tents and vehicles, even well hidden, will
14 stand out on imagery to a trained analyst.
c. Evaluation of Countermeasures. For these countermeasures to be effective, every command
15
16 should develop a self-evaluation system to ensure proper employment.
17
D-13

1
Section III
2
3
4

COUNTER-SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE
5 I. Threat SIGINT Capabilities and Assessment

6 1. General. One of the key words in the definition of intelligence is enemy. We must know our
7 adversary as well or better than we know ourselves. We need to know and understand the capabilities
8 and limitations of the threat arrayed against us and how the threat can influence our operations and
9 mission. The first step in the counter signals intelligence (C-SIGINT) process, provides extensive
10 information on determining foreign technical and operational capabilities and intentions to detect, exploit,
11 impair, or subvert the friendly C-E environment.
a. Threat assessment is the key in planning C-SIGINT operations. The subsequent steps are
12
13 necessary only when a defined threat exists.
b. Threat assessment is a continuous activity. It takes place throughout the conflict spectrum. A
14
specific
threat assessment is required to support a specific operation or activity.
15
c. The CI analyst gathers and analyzes information. He interacts with staff elements and higher,
16
17 lower, and adjacent units to obtain the necessary data and access to supportive databases. Command
18 support and direction are essential to success in the threat assessment process.
19
d. The major information sources available to the CI analyst include:
20
(1) Validated finished intelligence products.
21
(2) Theater and national level SIGINT threat database.
22
(3) Previous tasking.
23
(4) Analyst experience.
24
(5) The CI database.
e. CI analysts must continue to refine this list and identify other sources of information that may be
25
26 available for their particular AO.
D-14

1 2. Procedures. There are six tasks associated with the C-SIGINT threat assessment (see figure
2 D-6)1 .
Intelligence
Figure D-6. C-SIGINT Threat Assessment Process
a. Identify threat systems in the geographic area of responsibility. This task provides the initial focus
4
5 for the remaining threat assessment tasks. The primary objective of this task is to determine the specific
6 threat faced by the MAGTF. The CI analyst collects the required data to properly identify the threat.
7 Additionally, the CI analyst must coordinate and request assistance from the collection management
8 element. The procedures for identifying the threat systems follow:
(1) Identify the generic threat. The CI analyst enters the CI database and retrieves the most
9
10 recent appropriate threat assessment. Analysts then review this data to determine what threat systems
11 were known to be in their AO on the date of the assessment. Next, the analyst examines finished
12 intelligence products published by national level agencies to obtain technical and operational data on the
13 threat system. Some of the intelligence products include:
(a) ES and EA capability studies.
14
1
Within a MAGTF, C-SIGINT analysis and production generally results from the integrated
operations of the MAGTF all-source fusion center, the radio battalion operations control and analysis
center, and the supporting CI/HUMINT company element.
D-15

1
(b) Hostile intelligence threat to the Army publications.
(c) SIGINT threat by country.
(d) SIGINT support to combat operations.
(2) Create the doctrinal template. The doctrinal template is a graphic display of threat's systems
4
5 deployment when not constrained by weather and terrain. The analyst should review the database for
6 existing templates before constructing a new one.
(3) Collect data. Data collection is required when the analyst receives tasking for a specific unit
7
8 or operation. The analyst must collect additional data to identify the threat to a particular unit or AO.
9
(4) Create the SIGINT situation overlay. The analyst reviews the collected data to determine:
10
(a) Technical and operational capabilities.
11
(b) Typical modes of operation.
12
(c) Current deployment.
13
(d) Probable tasking.
14
(e) Activities of the collectors of interest.
15
(5) Enter data. The analyst enters this data on the situation overlay.
(6) Summarize the data and identify the threat system. The CI analyst reviews the SIGINT
16
17 situation overlay for patterns, electronic configurations, and threat C2, CIS and EW. Generally this
18 information is available from either the MAGTF all-source fusion center (AFC) or the radio battalion's
19 operations control and analysis center (OCAC). A common approach is to pose and answer questions,
20 such as:
21
(a) Is the threat system part of a larger system?
22
(b) What are the threat system's capabilities?
23
(c) How is the threat system doctrinally used?
24
(d) How does the threat system obtain information?
25
(e) How many collection systems were located?

D-16

(7) Request Intelligence. In some instances, sufficient information may not be available in the unit
1
2 to make an accurate determination. For example, the type of equipment may be known but the technical
3 characteristics of the system may not be available from local sources. If additional intelligence is
4 required, the CI analyst compiles the information needed and coordinates with the MAGTF collections
5 manager to request additional intelligence from outside the unit.
b. Prepare information requirements. The CI analyst fills information shortfalls by requesting
6
7 information from sources external to the unit. These external information sources are adjacent or higher
8 echelons and national level assets. Each echelon satisfies a request with available data or organic assets,
9 if possible. Requirements exceeding their organic capabilities are consolidated and forwarded to the
10 next higher echelon as a request for information.
11
c. Analyze threat indicators and data.
(1) The CI analyst reviews, organizes, and evaluates key information components of the
12
13 collected information. He evaluates the data looking for trends and patterns of the threat system that will
14 provide an estimate of capabilities and intentions. He focuses on each component of the collected
15 information to determine if it reveals a tendency of the threat system to act or react in a particular
16 manner. Additionally, the analyst evaluates the information for trends or characteristics that will aid in the
17 ID and evaluation of the capabilities and intentions of the threat system. Additional support may be
18 required from other staff elements.
19
(2) The procedures for analyzing threat indicators and data are to:
(a) Compile and organize data. First, the analyst compiles and organizes the data that has
20
21 been collected. He updates the database with new information and organizes the data into collector
22 categories.
(b) Review data. The analyst reviews the collected data to determine the ability of the threat
23
24 systems to collect against a specific target.
(c) Determine intentions. To determine the intentions of the threat system, the CI analyst
25
26 poses the following questions and enters this information in the database:
27
1 What area will the threat system target?
28
2 When will the targeting take place?
29
3 Why is the targeting taking place?
30
4 How will the threat system attempt to collect against the target?
31
5 How has the threat system been used in the past?

D-17
6 What does threat doctrine suggest about probable threat?
7 Does the threat system have a distinctive signature?
(3) Doctrinal templates are extracted from the database and compared to the SIGINT situation
3
4 overlay. The analyst lists similarities between current and doctrinal deployments and selects the doctrinal
5 template that has the greatest similarity to the current situation.
6
d. Estimate probable threat.
(1) The CI analyst identifies the probable threat. He reviews all the information that has been
7
8 collected and applies this information to the geographic AI and the capabilities and intentions of the
9 threat system.
10
(2) The procedures for predicting the probable threat follow:
(a) Determine probable location. Use the SIGINT situation overlay and doctrinal templates
11
12 to determine the location of the collectors. Overlay the doctrinal template over the situation overlay.
(b) Analyze terrain and weather effects. Integrate the terrain and weather data with the
13
14 doctrinal template and the SIGINT situation overlay and create a situation template for the current
15 environment. Terrain and weather conditions affect a threat system's ability to operate according to their
16 doctrine. For example, a radio DF site must have a clear line of sight (LOS) on the emission of the
17 target in order to gain an accurate bearing. Mountains, dense foliage, and water distort electronic
18 emissions and impair a collector's ability to target.
19
(c) Update the SIGINT situation overlay. Place the symbols for the collectors on the
20
21 doctrinal template that have not been confirmed on the SIGINT situation overlay as proposed locations.
e. Confirm threat. The CI analyst attempts to verify threat predictions. The procedures for confirming
22
23 the threat follow:
(1) Validate existing data. Review current intelligence reports and assessments to determine if
24
25 the information received in response to requests for intelligence submitted to higher headquarters and
26 other information sources used in the assessment are valid. If there are indications that the capabilities or
27 intentions of the threat system have changed, additional information may be required. This is determined
28 by looking for information that could indicate a change in a collector's ability to collect against the
29 command. For example, additional antennas have been added to the collector, or the collector has
30 moved to provide for better targeting are indicators of a change in collection capabilities.
(2) Request additional information. If additional information is required, these intelligence
31
32 requirements will be tasked to organic intelligence units or submitted to higher headquarters.
D-18
(3) Evaluate new information. If new information on the collector's intentions or capabilities is
1
2 received, review this information to determine its impact on the original assessment, and update the
3 situation overlay. If intentions and capabilities of the collector change, reevaluate the original threat
4 prediction by following the tasks identified in previous sections.
f. Produce output from SIGINT threat assessment. The CI analyst can present the SIGINT threat
5
6 assessment in briefings or reports. Portions of the threat assessment are included and presented in other
7 CI and all-source intelligence products.
8 II. MAGTF Vulnerability Assessment

9 1. General. After examining the enemy's SIGINT and EW equipment, capabilities, and limitations, we
10 now must examine our own unit to see how our adversary can affect us. The second step in the
11 C-SIGINT process, details specific areas where a threat effort can be most damaging to the friendly
12 force.
a. The vulnerabilities are ranked according to the severity of their impact on the success of the
13
14 friendly operation. The vulnerability assessment:
(1) Examines the command's technical and operational communications-electronics (C-E)
15
16 characteristics.
17
(2) Collects and analyzes data to identify vulnerabilities.
18
(3) Evaluates vulnerabilities in the context of the assessed threat.
19 The CI analyst performs the primary data gathering and analysis required. Assistance by and
20 coordination with the appropriate staff elements (intelligence, operations, CIS) is key to this process.
b. Data gathering requires access to command personnel and to local databases. Data sources
21
22 include:
23
(1) Technical data on C-E inventories.
24
(2) Doctrinal and SOP information.
25
(3) Output from the threat assessment step.
26
(4) Command friendly force information.
27
(5) Essential elements of friendly information (EEFI).

D-19
(6) PIR and IR.
c. The database of friendly technical data is used throughout the vulnerability assessment process for
2
3 key equipment information, mission data, and other supporting information.
d. MAGTF Vulnerability assessment is comprised of ten tasks. The first three tasks are ongoing
4
5 determinations of general susceptibilities. The next six are specific to the commander's guidance and
6 involve determinations of specific vulnerabilities. The final task is the output. MAGTF vulnerability
7 assessment tasks are shown in figure D-7.
Figure D-7. MAGTF Vulnerability Assessment Process
9 2. Compile Friendly C-E Characteristics.

a. The CI analyst compiles friendly C-E characteristics. He collects and organizes unit C-E data and
10
11 equipment characteristics for analysis. This analysis provides a baseline for analyzing friendly C-E
12 equipment and operational susceptibilities to threat operations. The compilation of C-E characteristics is
13 an ongoing process. Assistance from the command's communications and information systems (CIS)
14 and electronic warfare officers should be able to provide all needed information..
D-20
b. The C-E data are a baseline for identifying friendly susceptibilities. A unit's equipment, personnel,
1
2 and associated characteristics must be identified before the pattern and signature analysis can proceed.
3 The CI analyst uses available databases to extract the table of equipment (T/E) and technical manuals
4 (TM) on MAGTF C-E equipment.
5
c. The procedures for compiling friendly C-E characteristics follow:
6
7
(1) Gather data on friendly C-E characteristics. Gather C-E data and characteristics of the
equipment. Identify the following types of C-E data:
(a) T/Es, TMs and technical data for all C-E equipment in a unit.
(b) References describing the unit and its equipment configuration.
10
(c) Current maintenance levels and normal status of the equipment.
11
(d) Personnel status, including current training levels of personnel in the unit.
(e) Equipment performance capabilities and operational capabilities in all weather conditions,
12
13 at night, over particular terrain, and toward the end of equipment maintenance schedules.
14
(f) Equipment supply requirements.
15
(g) Special combat support requirements.
(2) Organize C-E data. The CI analyst organizes the information into a format useful for
16
17 signature analysis. The data are organized by type of unit (if the support is multi-unit), type of emitter,
18 frequency range, number and type of vehicles or weapons which emit or carry emitters and the type of
19 cluster.
20 3. Determine Friendly Force Profiles.
a. This task includes the analysis of signatures and patterns of the C-E equipment and a summary
21
22 statement of the unit's C-E profile. A profile consists of the elements and standard actions, equipment,
23 and details of a unit, the sum of signatures and patterns.
24
SIGNATURES + PATTERNS = PROFILE
25
b. Procedures for determining the friendly force's profile follow:
26
(1) Analyze friendly force signatures. The CI analyst:

D-21

1
(a) Extracts organic equipment characteristics for the operation.
(b) Determines environmental effects.
(c) Determines C-E characteristics for each friendly COA.
(d) Determines C-E equipment employment.
(e) Compares planned use with technical parameters.
(f) Determines if further evaluation is required.
(g) Performs tests with support from unit or higher echelon assets.
(h) Evaluates the information collected above.
(i) Diagrams physical and electronic signatures on an overlay or other product.
10
(j) Updates the CI database.
(2) Perform friendly pattern analysis. Identify standard practices, common uses of a unit's C-E
11
12 equipment, and operational patterns by:
(a) Reviewing the database to obtain information that might provide the threat with critical
13
14 data regarding unit type, disposition, activities, or capabilities.
(b) Extracting from the OPLAN and operations order (OPORD) particular means of
15
16 communication, operational characteristics, and key and secondary nodes for communications support.
17
(c) Identifying specific patterns associated with types of operations.
(3) Correlate patterns and signature. In this subtask, compile the information from the signature
18
19 and pattern analysis, which creates the profile. The analyst:
20
(a) Lists the signature and pattern data for particular types of C-E equipment.
21
(b) Matches signature with patterns to form the profile.
22
(c) Organizes data into types of C-E operations.
23
24
(d) Correlates signature and pattern data with past profiles to produce the current profile
shown in figure D-8.
D-22
higher headquarters
Figure D-8. Friendly Unit C-E Profile
(4) Produce unit profile. Patterns and signatures can change as commanders, staff, and
2
3 operators change. Profile development must be an ongoing effort. To produce the unit profile, use the
4 OPORD to obtain the past task organization and then select the areas of concern to that organization,
5 that is, C2, intelligence, maneuver, fires, logistics, and force protection.
6 4. Identify Susceptibilities.
a. The analyst determines how the profiles would appear to threat systems and which equipment or
7
operations
are susceptible. A susceptibility is defined as the degree to which a device, equipment, or
8
9 weapon system is open to effective attack due to one or more inherent weaknesses. Any susceptibilities
10 are potential vulnerabilities.
11
b. Information sources are of the following types:
12
(1) Current friendly C-E profile.
13
(2) Historical profiles to compare with current profile.
14
(3) Knowledge and experience from other analysts.
15
c. The procedures for identifying susceptibilities follow:

D-23
(1) Identify weaknesses:
(a) Review current profile and identify unique equipment or characteristics that the threat
2
3 may use to determine intentions.
(b) Review the CI database and compare historical profiles with current profile, noting
4
5 correlations and deviations.
(c) Plot friendly weaknesses to threat operations on a MAGTF electronic order of battle
6
7 (EOB) overlay shown in.
(2) Categorize susceptibilities. Categorize susceptibilities to allow more specific analysis by
8
9 equipment type, organization, and use. Do this:
10
(a) By type (for example, equipment, operations, or both).
11
(b) By activity (for example, logistic, CIS, intelligence, operations, and fire support).
12
(c) According to resource requirements.
13
(d) According to the length of time the susceptibility has existed.
14
(e) According to scope (number of units or equipment types).
15 5. Obtain Commander's Operational Objectives and Guidance.

a. The commander states his operational objectives for missions in OPLANs and OPORDs. The
16
17 analyst uses this information to plan the most effective support for the commander and to identify the
18 commander's preferences for types of operations. The commander's operational concept and an
19 example of a unit EEFI statement as shown in figure D-9 are essential to the analysis of friendly COAs.
D-24
FRIENDLY SUPPORTED UNIT: 1ST MARDIV

1. Subordinate Element: HQ, 1st MARDIV
2. Location: 32U NB51452035
3. Operational Objective: Defend to PL Gray;
counterattack at 300001Z Oct 98
4. EEFI:
a. Significant Compromises:
(1) Time of counterattack
(2) Identification & location of regimental &
& higher HQ elements
(3) Identification of attached units
(4) Loss/degradation of main C2 facilities
or supporting comms & info systems
b. Insignificant Compromise: identification
of 1st MARDIV
Figure D-9. Example of a Unit EEFI Statement
2 b. This information enables the analyst to evaluate indicators of friendly COA in the context of what
3 the commander considers essential to the success of the operation. Setting priorities for the
4 vulnerabilities depends on the commander's operational concept. The primary information sources are:
5
(1) Concept of operation.
(2) OPORDs.
(3) OPLANs.
(4) Prioritized EEFIs.
9 6. Determine Friendly COA.

a. Based on the general description of the commander's objectives, the operations element plans
10
11 locations and events. The analyst produces an overlay of the friendly force profile integrated with the
12 commander's objectives.
13
b. The procedures for determining friendly COA follow:

D-25

(1) Identify COA. For each applicable level of command, identify friendly COA. At division
1
2 level, for-example, COA would include the following minimum information:
3
(a) Summary of operations.
(b) Higher headquarters support.
5
6
7
8
(2) Compare COA to specific EEFIs. Review the COA for events or actions that could
compromise the unit's mission by disclosing key EEFI. The review is summarized in an events list
that describes a particular mission, COA, or event which may compromise the EEFI or the friendly
intentions.
9 7. Determine Indicators of Friendly COA.

10 a. Indicators of friendly COA are those events and activities which, if known by the threat, would
11 compromise a friendly COA.
12
b. The procedures for determining indicators of friendly COA follow:
(1) Identify the commander's preferences and perceptions about C-SIGINT operations. Seek
13
14 information about the commander's style from sources such as previous concepts, plans, and orders, or
15 interviews with subordinate commanders and staff officers.
(2) Integrate friendly profiles and COA. In the event planned location or movement data are not
16
17 available, retrieve friendly operational overlays shown from the database. The overlays help identify
18 friendly historical positions for the new COA. The integrate friendly force profiles and COAs:
19
(a) Noting current position and expected COA.
(b) Identifying key C-E capabilities associated with the COA (for example, radio nets, types
20
21 of radios, radar, teletypewriters).
22
(c) Noting past C-E operational patterns.
23
(d) Plotting critical C-E nodes, paths, or circuits.
24
(3) Determine standard C-E procedures for types of operations:
(a) Begin by using the commander's objectives to identify key operational constraints, that is,
25
26 nodes, paths, chokepoints, and standard C-E procedures followed during a particular COA. New or
27 critical data, not previously included in the friendly profile and COA integration, are then added to the
28 situation overlay.
D-26

(b) Also consider constraints and procedures while determining indicators. Document these
1
2 as factors associated with those indicators. After completing the review of existing data as obtained
3 from the commander's objectives, determine what additional information is required.
(4) Determine impact of weather and terrain. As the situation changes, the significance of
4
5 particular nodes or paths may shift or additional nodes may become critical. Consider the following in
6 determining the impact:
7
(a) Inclement weather.
(b) Night activity.
(c) Terrain masking.
10
(d) Poor C-E equipment maintenance.
(5) Set priorities. Once the type of operation is determined, set priorities for the events,
11
12 movements, and nodes by their overall importance to the operation.
13
(6) Identify critical C-E nodes:
(a) Using the C-E constraints and procedures identified from the information provided by the
14
15 commander, together with data obtained from previous tasks, determine key indicators of friendly
16 operations. For each COA, extract those preparations, activities, or operations that could tip off the
17 threat to the particular COA.
(b) List the indicators associated with a COA. Any special factors such as operational
18
19 constraints, optimum weather conditions, or terrain requirements associated with an indicator should be
20 described accordingly.
21 8. Review and Validate Threat Assessment Data.
a. Threat assessment data are further refined in order to proceed with the remainder of the
22
23 vulnerability assessment. The analyst organizes threat data in a format comparable to the friendly forces
24 data. Missing data is identified and requested. The C-SIGINT analyst performs the review and
25 validation of threat data with considerable exchanges of information with other analysts.
26
27
28
b. The procedures for reviewing and validating threat assessment data follow:
(1) Summarize and reorganize threat assessment data.
(a) Compile recent threat assessment information.
D-27

1
(b) Identify information shortfalls.
(c) Coordinate with the collection management section to initiate requests for information.
(2) Extract relevant data for vulnerability assessment.
(a) Extract areas of threat operations most critical to the supported command.
(b) Document threat capabilities and intentions.
(c) Store data for later application.
7 9. Identify Vulnerabilities.
a. The analyst compares the enemy's intelligence collection threat with the friendly unit susceptibilities
8
9 to determine the vulnerabilities. Once the vulnerabilities have been identified, the analyst can rank them.
10
11
12
b. The procedures for identifying vulnerabilities follow:

(1) Compare current threat to friendly C-E susceptibilities.
(a) Review indicators of friendly COA.
(b) Use the products developed earlier in the C-SIGINT process to determine where threat
13
14 capabilities and intentions are directed against susceptible MAGTF operations.
15
16
(c) Determine the probability of threat activity against MAGTF C-E operation.
(2) Determine which susceptibilities are vulnerabilities.
(a) Designate as vulnerabilities those C-E susceptibilities which are targetable by a specific
17
18 threat collector.
19
(b) List (and maintain separately) nontargetable indicators.
(c) Match indicators with threat systems and document specific event characteristics if
20
21 known; for example, time and location of vulnerabilities.
22 10. Rank Vulnerabilities.
a. The C-SIGINT analyst ranks the vulnerabilities by analyzing them in view of the indicators of
23
24 friendly COAs and EEFIs. The ranking is based on criteria estimating the uniqueness, degree of
D-28

1 susceptibility, and importance of the vulnerability. The analyst designates the vulnerability as either
2 critical, significant, or important to the success of the overall operation.
3
b. The procedures for ranking vulnerabilities follow:
(1) Establish criteria for measuring the vulnerability. Develop a means for judging whether each
4
5 identified vulnerability is critical, significant, or important to the success of the operation. These final
6 ratings are attained by evaluating each vulnerability against criteria which address how critical they are to
7 the success or failure of the operation. Uniqueness, importance, and susceptibility to threat are three
8 criteria which measure vulnerability and criticality, and permit an accurate ranking of them. They are
9 defined as follows:
10
(a) Uniqueness--the extent to which a vulnerability can be readily associated with a COA.
11
(b) Importance--a measure of how critical the vulnerability is to the success of the operation.
(c) Susceptibility to threat--a measure of the number and variety of threats placed against the
12
13 indicator.
14
(2) Compare vulnerabilities to criteria:
(a) Combine the criteria and vulnerabilities in a matrix format shown in figure D-10. For
15
16 each vulnerability, conduct a review against the established criteria. The analysts have in their possession
17 the commander's objectives, prioritized EEFI, and ranking criteria, and can evaluate the vulnerabilities
18 using these data. Vulnerabilities are first rated according to each of the criteria. The horizontal axis of the
19 matrix lists the criteria of uniqueness, importance, and susceptibility.
D-29
Vulnerability
EEFI
Numerical
Rating
CRITERIA
Uniqueness
Importance Susceptibility
MUX at main
CP vulnerable
to DF
4(a)2
14
MUX at main
CP vulnerable
to jamming
4(a)4
Criteria Rating Values
Overall Rating Values
0 - 2 = Low
3 = Medium
4 - 5 = High
0-4=
5-8=
9 - 11 =
12 - 15 =
Unimportant
Important
Significant
Critical
Figure D-10. Vulnerability Matrix Format
(b) List the vulnerabilities on the vertical axis. The degree of satisfaction of a criterion is
2
3 expressed numerically on a scale of 0 to 5 with 5 being the highest rating. If a vulnerability is highly
4 unique, that is, pertaining to very specialized and infrequently exhibited indicators, it would be assigned a
5 high rating. If the vulnerability is such that it is exhibited in many COA, in many operations, its
6 uniqueness rating would be low (0 to 2).
1 If a vulnerability is highly important, that is, involving disclosure of a critical EEFI, its
7
8 rating would be high. An EEFI lower-on the commander's list of priorities would receive a lower rating.
9 If the vulnerability is highly susceptible, that is, targeted by numerous threat systems of several types, its
10 rating for susceptibility would be high.
2 If a single threat system of limited capability is targeting the vulnerability, the rating
11
would
be
low.
The
overall ratings are determined by adding the values of the three criteria and placing it
12
13 under the overall number rating.
14
(3) Develop ranking.
(a) Once an overall rating is established for each vulnerability, develop a prioritized ranking.
15
16 Vulnerabilities fall into the broader categories of critical, significant and important, based on the criticality
17 level of criteria satisfied. Vulnerabilities receiving overall ratings between 5 and 8 are considered
D-30

1 important; those between 9 and 11 are significant; and those falling between 12 and 15 would be
2 critical.
(b) Enter the list of ranked vulnerabilities in the database. h is retained in hard copy for
3
4 dissemination, and applied in the countermeasures options development in step three of the C-SIGINT
5 process.
6 11. Produce Output From Vulnerability Assessment. The CI analyst presents the vulnerability
7 assessment findings as a briefing or a report to the commander, G/S-3, unit security manager, and other
8 key staff members.
D-31

1
APPENDIX E
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLANS, REPORTS
AND OTHER FORMATS
4 SECTION
TITLE
PAGE #
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REDUCTION PLAN
E-7
7
8
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SALUTE REPORT

FORMAT
E-9
9
10
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
REPORT
E-11
11
12
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FORCE PROTECTION

SOURCE OPERATIONS CONCEPT PROPOSAL
E-12
13
14
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SOURCE LEAD

DEVELOPMENT REPORT
E-14
15
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SCREENING REPORT
E-17
16
17
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TACTICAL
INTERROGATION REPORT
E-19
18
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT
E-22
19
20
10
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT -BIOGRAPHICAL
E-24
21
22
11
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INSPECTION/
EVALUATION REPORT
E-28
23
24
12
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SURVEY/
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
E-29
25
26
13
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SURVEY/VULNERABILITY E-31

CHECKLIST
E-1
E-3

1
14
2 SECTION
REPORT OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY
TITLE
E-55
PAGE #
3
4
15
REPORT OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY SWORN

STATEMENT
E-56
5
6
16
PERSONNEL DATA FORM -- POW/MIA/MISSING

(NON-HOSTILE)
E-57
7
8
17
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MEASURES
WORKSHEET
E-2
E-60
SECTION 1
3 Purpose. Provides a baseline of historical, threat related information for inclusion as Tab A of
4 Appendix 3, Counterintelligence to Annex B, Intelligence.
5 ______________________________________________________________________________
6
CLASSIFICATION
Copy no. __ of __ copies
ISSUING HEADQUARTERS
PLACE OF ISSUE
Date/Time Group
7
8
9
10
11 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE (Number)
12 ( ) REFERENCES:
13
a. Unit standing operating procedures (SOP) for intelligence and

counterintelligence.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
b. JTF, NTF, other components, theater and national intelligence and

counterintelligence plans, orders and tactics, techniques and procedures;
and multinational agreements pertinent to intelligence operations.
c. Maps, charts and other intelligence and counterintelligence products
required for an understanding of this annex.
d. Documents and online databases that provide intelligence required for
planning.
e. Others as appropriate.
25 1. ( ) MISSION. (State the assigned task and its purpose.)

26 2. ( ) CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OR OPERATIONS. (State conditions and other
27 pertinent characteristics of the area which exist and may affect enemy intelligence, sabotage, subversive
28 and terrorist capabilities and operations. Assess the estimated effects. Also, assess their effects on
29 friendly counterintelligence capabilities, operations and measures. Reference appendix 8, Intelligence
30 Estimate, to annex B, Intelligence, as appropriate.)
E-3

1
2
a. ( ) Military Geography
3
5
6
7

b. ( ) Weather
8
10
c. ( ) Other Characteristics. (Additional pertinent characteristics are considered in separate

11
12 subparagraphs: sociological, political, economic, psychological, and other factors. Other factors may
13 include but are not limited to telecommunications material, transportation, manpower, hydrography,
14 science, and technology. These are analyzed under the same headings as used for military geography
15 and weather.)
16 3. INTELLIGENCE, SABOTAGE, SUBVERSIVE, AND TERRORIST SITUATION
17 (Discusses enemy intelligence, sabotage, subversive, and terrorist activities as to the current situation
18 and recent/significant activities. Include known factors on enemy intelligence, sabotage, subversive, and
19 terrorist organizations. Fact sheets containing pertinent information on each organization may be
20 attached to the estimate or annexes.)
21
a. ( ) Location and disposition.
22
b. ( ) Composition.
c. ( ) Strength, including local available strength, availability of replacements, efficiency of enemy

23
24 intelligence, sabotage, subversive, and terrorist organizations.
d. ( ) Recent and present significant intelligence, sabotage, and subversive activities/movements
25
26 (including enemy knowledge of our intelligence and counterintelligence efforts).
27
e. ( ) Operational, tactical and technical capabilities and equipment.
28
f. ( ) Peculiarities and weaknesses.

E-4
g. ( ) Other factors as appropriate.
2 4. ( ) INTELLIGENCE, SABOTAGE, SUBVERSIVE, AND TERRORIST CAPABILITIES

3 AND ANALYSIS. (List separately each indicated enemy capability which can affect the
4 accomplishment of the assigned mission. Each enemy capability should contain information on what the
5 enemy can do, where they can do it, when they can start it and get it done, and what strength they can
6 devote to the task. Analyze each capability in light of the assigned mission, considering all applicable
7 factors from paragraph 2, and attempt to determine and give reasons for the estimated probability of
8 adoption by the enemy. Examine the enemys capabilities by discussing the factors that favor or militate
9 against its adoption by the enemy. The analysis of each capability should also include a discussion of
10 enemy strengths and vulnerabilities associated with that capability. Also, the analysis should include a
11 discussion of any indications that point to possible adoption of the capability. Finally, state the estimated
12 effect the enemys adoption of each capability will have on the accomplishment of the friendly mission.)
13
14
a. ( ) Capabilities
(1) ( ) Intelligence. (Include all known/estimated enemy methods.)
(2) ( ) Sabotage. (Include all possible agent/guerilla capabilities for military, political, and
15
16 economic sabotage.)
(3) ( ) Subversion. (Include all types, such as propaganda, sedition, treason, disaffection, and
17
18 threatened terrorists activities affecting our troops, allies, and local civilians, and assistance in the escape
19 and evasion of hostile civilians.)
(4) ( ) Terrorist. (Include capabilities of terrorist personalities and organizations in area of
20
21 operation.)
b. ( ) Analysis and discussion of enemy capabilities for intelligence, sabotage, subversive, and
22
23 terrorism as a basis to judge the probability of their adoption.
24 5. CONCLUSIONS AND VULNERABILITIES. (Conclusions resulting from discussion in
25 paragraph 4. Relate to current all-source intelligence estimates of the enemy's centers of gravity, critical
26 and other vulnerabilities and estimated exploitability of these by friendly forces, enemy courses of action
27 beginning with the most probable and continuing down the list in the estimated order of probability, and
28 the estimated effects adoption of each capability would have on the friendly mission.)
a. ( ) Probability of enemy adoption of intelligence, sabotage, subversive, and terrorist programs or
29
30 procedures based on capabilities.
31
b. ( ) Effects of enemy capabilities on friendly course of action.

E-5
c. ( ) Effectiveness of our own counterintelligence measures and additional requirements or

1
2 emphasis needed.
3
4
5
6 TABS:
/s/ _____________________
Name
Rank and Service
7 (As appropriate)
8 DISTRIBUTION:
9
E-6

1
SECTION 2
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REDUCTION PLAN
3 Purpose. A visual working tool for managing the CI targeting triad -- personalities, organizations and
4 installations (PO&I) -- and unit assignments.
5 _____________________________________________________________________________
6
CLASSIFICATION
Counterintelligence Reduction Plan
8 PERSONALITY/INSTALLATION: Operation Bold Lighting MAP REF: Name, Series
9 TGT TARGET
10 NO.
11
12 1 Broadcasting
Station
13
14
15
16
LOCATION/
DESCRIPTION
Grid coordinates 3 km 1
NW of city on Victory
Road
17 2
18
19
20
21 3
22
23
24
25
26 4
27
28
29
30
31
32 5
33
34
35
36
37
38
Government
Control
Center
Military
Intelligence
Headquarters
SPECIAL
INSTRUCTIONS
INTERESTED
UNITS/SECT.
Locate/take into
custody station
state security officer
and all propaganda
file material
G-5/PAO
Grid coordinates
3
largest building in city
center, gable roof
Ensure file information protected for

further analysis
G-5
Grid coordinates
located on liberation
military compound E
of city
Locate/search Cl
and agent operations section
Task Force
N2
Smith, John Q Grid coordinates

2
Intelligence
military intelligence
Cadre
headquarters (above).
Home address: 134 8th
St, Apt 3B
Potential defector
handle accordingly
10th Army
MI
Infiltration
Training
Facility
Secure/search for
file information on
personalities and
operations. Coordinate with Task Force
N2
Task Force
N2
Grid coordinates
located W of city on
seaward peninsula
PRI
CI TEAM
ASSIGN
E-7

1
CLASSIFICATION
CLASSIFICATION
3 TGT TARGET
4 NO.
LOCATION/
DESCRIPTION
PRI
CI TEAM
ASSIGN
SPECIAL
INSTRUCTIONS
INTERESTED
UNITS/SECT.
56
6
7
8
9
10
11
Political
Prison
Grid coordinates triangular shaped compound enclosed by

20-foot block wall
bordered by
Liberation Ave,
9th St, and bay
Personalities of Cl
interest on separate
listing. Provide list
of recovered
personalities to HQ
via most expedient
means
G-5
12 7
13
14
15
16
National
Intelligence
Field Office
Grid coordinates
located in concrete
block building on
corner of 5th St and
Liberation Ave
Immediately
evaluate all
documents/
equipment
G-2
E-8
CLASSIFICATION
E-9

1
SECTION 3
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SALUTE REPORT FORMAT
3 Purpose. A quick response report to get information into the All Source Correlated Database.
4 _____________________________________________________________________________
5
CLASSIFICATION
SALUTE
7 Reporting Unit:
(Text Field)
8 Record Creator:
(Text Field)
9 Report Number:
(Text Field)
10 References:
11 Requirement Reference:
12
(Text Area)
(Text Field)
13 Size (of Enemy Unit):
(Text Field)
14 Activity Type:
(Text Field w/Picklist)
15 Activity Status:
16 Activity Location:
(Text Field)
17
18
19
20
21
(Text Fields for

--Latitude
--Longitude
--Map Grid Reference
--UTM)
Map Coordinates:
22 Activity Direction:
(Text Field)
23 Unit:
(Text Field)
24 Date Event Began/To Begin:
(Text Field)
25 Time Event Began/To Begin:
(Text Field)
26 Date Event Ended/Expected

to end
27
(Text Field)
28 Time Event Ended/Expected

to end
29
(Text Field)
E-10
1
2
CLASSIFICATION
CLASSIFICATION
3 Equipment:
(Text Area)
4 SRC #:
(Text Field)
5 SRC Description:
(Text Area)
6 SRC Reliability:
7 Comments:
(Text Area)
8 Map Data:
(Text Field)
CLASSIFICATION
9
10 _________________________________________________________________________________
11 Additional Requirement:
a. Army tactics, techniques and procedures requires that transmit portions of the SALUTE report
12
13 to its ASAS (All Source Automated System). Hence, there is a requirement to parse some data
14 elements of a completed SALUTE message into U. S. message text format.
b. The TCP for DCIIS V2.0 includes a requirement to convert the CIIR from its database record
15
16 format to the USMTF message format as a step in transforming the CIIR into an IIR. The technique to
17 accomplish the CIIR requirement may be applicable to the SALUTE requirement.
18
E-11

1
SECTION 4
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT
3 Purpose. A standard report used to report tactical CI information.

4 _____________________________________________________________________________
5
CLASSIFICATION
6
7
CI Information Report
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
ord Management and Classification

Record ID: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Point of Contact: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Classification: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Abstract: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Discretionary Access Control: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Caveats: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Release To: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Record Type: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Record Status: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Date Created (yyyymmdd): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Date Modified (yyyymmdd): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Community of Interest: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Source Record: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Requirement Info
Requirement Reference: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Requirement: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
26
Title (Text):
27
28
29
30
Report Number: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Report Date (yyyymmdd): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
To:
...............................................
Target: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
Individual Source: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reliability of the Source: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Source ID Number: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Information Reliability: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Information Date (yyyymmdd): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Collection Date (yyyymmdd): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Location: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
38
Report (Text):
39
Comments (Text):
E-12
E-13

1
SECTION 5
2
3
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FORCE PROTECTION

SOURCE OPERATIONS CONCEPT PROPOSAL
4 Purpose. Serves as the planning, approval, and execution vehicles for MAGTF Counterintelligence
5 Force Protection Source Operations.
6 _________________________________________________________________________________
7
CLASSIFICATION
CFSO Umbrella Concept Proposal
9 From:
10
11 To:
12
13 Info:
(Originator)
(Text FieldPicklist?)
(Next Higher Echelon)
(Text FieldPicklist?)
(Addees to be informed) (Text AreaPicklist?)
14
15 Project Number:
(Text Field)
16 Name:
(Text Field)
17 Originating Hqs:
(Text Field)
18 Implementing Element:
(Text Field)
19 Collection Requirements:
(Text Area)
20 References:
(Text Area)
21 Date Submitted:
(Text Field)
22 Date Approved:
(Text Field)
23 Approval Authority:
(Text Field)
24 Operation Type:
25 Target Focus:
(Text Area)
26 Target Personnel:
(Text Area)
27 Target Country:
(Text Area)
28 Organizations:
(Text Area)
29 Base of Operations:
(Text Field)
30 Communications Methods
(Text Area)
E-14
1
2
CLASSIFICATION
CLASSIFICATION
3 Risks:
(Text Area)
4 Technical Support:
(Text Area)
5 Finances:
(Text Area)
6 Coordination:
(Text Area)
7 Administration and Management:(Text Area)

8 Additional Support Requirements:
(Text Area)
9 Point of Contact:
(Text Field)
CLASSIFICATION
10
11 ____________________________________________________________________________________
E-15

1
SECTION 6
2
3
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SOURCE
LEAD DEVELOPMENT REPORT
4 Purpose. For local planning and development of counterintelligence sources.

5 ____________________________________________________________________________________
6
CLASSIFICATION
Source Lead Development Report
8 Date:
(Text Field)
9 Subject:
(Mandatory)
(Text Field)
(Mandatory)
10 Report No:
(Text Field)
11 Project No:
(Text Field)
12 References:
(Text Field)
13 Record Creator:
(Text Field)
(Mandatory)
(Mandatory)
14 Origin:
15
Source of Lead
(Text Field)
16
Proposed Use of Lead
(Text Area)
17
Lead Screening Process
18
Placement and Access
(Text Area)
19
20
Circumstances for Meeting

with Source
(Text Area)
21
Security Issues
(Text Area)
(Text Area)
22 Personnel Information:
23
Lead Status
(Text Area)
24
Nationality
(Text Field)
25
Citizenship
(Text Field w/PL)
E-16
CLASSIFICATION
CLASSIFICATION
1
2
3
Personality and Character Traits
Motivation
(Text Area)
Character
(Text Area)
Personality
(Text Area)
Trait Exploitation
(Text Area)
8 Biographical Data
9
10
(Link to the INDIVIDUAL record. When printing, whole INDIVIDUAL record needs to print
out.)
11 Summary of Family/Personal History

12
(Text Area)
(Consider autopopulate from INDVIDUAL record.)
13 Investigative Checks:
14 Type
(Text Field w/PL)
Status
15 Coordination Required
(Text Field w/PL)

(Text Field w/PL)
16 Assessment of Operational Potential:

17
Type of Source
(Text Field w/PL)
18
Placement
(Text Area)
19
Access
(Text Area)
20
Cover (For Status & Action)
(Text Area)
21
Qualifications
(Text Area)
22
Personal
(Text Area)
E-17
Date (Text Field w/PL)
(Multiple Choice)
Motivation
(Text Area)
Strengths/Weaknesses
(Text Area)
CLASSIFICATION
CLASSIFICATION
3
4
5
Risk
To C/O & Collection Element (Text Area)
To Source
8 Approach Plan:
(Text Area)
(Text Area)
9 ICF:
(Text Area)***
10 Comments:
11 Attachments:
(Text Area)
(Standard Repeating Group)
CLASSIFICATION
12
13 ______________________________________________________________________________
E-18

1
SECTION 7
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SCREENING REPORT
3 Purpose. Used to report information obtained during CI screening operations.

4 _____________________________________________________________________________
5
CLASSIFICATION
Screening Report
7 Reporting Unit:
(Text Field)
8 Screener:
9
10 Report Date:
(Text Field)
11 Report Time:
(Text Field)
12 Capturing Unit:
(Text Field)
(Text Field)
(Text Field)
14 Status:
PL - Military
15
Paramilitary
16
Civilian
17
Other
18
(Text Field w/PL)
19 Name:
(Text Field)
20 Alternate Name(s):
(Repeating Group)
21 Personal ID No:
(Text Field)
22 EPW ID No:
(Text Field)
23 Date of Birth:
(Text Field)
24 Sex:
(Text Field w/PL)
E-19

1 Marital Status:
(Text Field)
CLASSIFICATION
CLASSIFICATION
2
3
4 Language Competence:
(Use text and field input from DCIIS Individual form)
5 Language Used:
(Text Field)
6 Education:
7 Employment:
8 Military Service:
9 Date Captured:
(Text Field)
10 Time Captured:
(Text Field)
11 Place Captured:
(Text Field)
12 Circumstances of Capture:
(Text Area)
13 Documents at Capture:
(Text Area)
14 Equipment Captured:
(Text Area)
15 Sources Physical Condition:
(Text Field w/PL)
16
Remarks:
17 Sources Mental State:
(Text Area)
(Text Field w/PL)
18 Sources Intelligence Level:
(Text Field w/PL)
19 Specific Knowledgeability:
(Text Area)
20 Sources Cooperation:
(Text Field w/PL)
21 EPW Category
(Text Field w/PL)
E-20

1 CI Interest
(Text Field w/PL)
2 Sources Current Location:
(Text Field)
3 Approach Plan
(Text Field w/PL)
4 Comments:
5
(Text Area)
CLASSIFICATION
E-21

SECTION 8
2 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

3 _____________________________________________________________________________
4
CLASSIFICATION
Tactical Interrogation Report
6 Reporting Unit: (Text Field)

7 Report No:
(Text Field)
Record Creator:
(Text Field)
8 Report Date:
(Text Field)
Interpreter:
(Text Field)
9 Report Time:
(Text Field)
Language Used:
(Text Field w/PL)
10 Capturing Unit:
(Text Field)
(Text Field)
12 Map Data:
(Text Area)
13 Source No:
(Text Field)
14 Source Status:
(Text Field w/PL)
15 Name:
(Text Field)
16 Alternate Name(s):
(Repeating Group)
17 Personal ID No:
(Text Field)
18 EPW ID No:
(Text Field)
19 Place of Birth:
(Text Field)
20 Date of Birth:
(Text Field)
21 Nationality:
(Text Field)
E-22
1 Sex:
2
3
4 Marital Status:
5 Language Competence:
(Text Field w/PL)
CLASSIFICATION
CLASSIFICATION
(Text Field)
6 Language Used:
(Text Field)
7 Education:
8 Employment:
9 Military Service:
10 Date Captured:
(Text Field)
11 Time Captured:
(Text Field)
12 Place Captured:
(Text Field)
13 Circumstances of Capture:
(Text Area)
14 Documents at Capture:
(Text Area)
15 Equipment Captured:
(Text Area)
16 Sources Physical Condition:
(Text Field w/PL)
17 Sources Mental State:
(Text Field w/PL)
18 Sources Intelligence Level:
(Text Field w/PL)
19 Specific Knowledgeability:
(Text Area)
20 Sources Cooperation:
(Text Field w/PL)
21 EPW Category
(Text Field w/PL)
E-23

1 CI/Humint Interest
(Text Field w/PL)
2 Sources Current Location:
(Text Field)
3 Sources Reliability:
(Text Field)
4
5
CLASSIFICATION
CLASSIFICATION
6 Sources Production
(Text Area)
7 Approach Plan
(Text Field w/PL)
8 Comments:
(Text Area)
CLASSIFICATION
9
10 _____________________________________________________________________________
E-24

1
SECTION 9
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT
3 Purpose. Standard report used to report unevaluated, unanalyzed intelligence information.

4 ______________________________________________________________________________
5
CLASSIFICATION
Intelligence Information Report
7 From:
(Text Field)
8 To:
(Text Field)
9 Info:
(Text Field)
10 Serial:
(Text Field)
11 Country:
(Text Field)
12 //IPSP:
(Text Field)
13 Subj:
(Text Area)
14 WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED

15 INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED (Autopopulate with classification)
16 ______________________________________________________________________________
17 ________________________DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE____________________________
18 DOI:
(Text Field)
19 REQS:
(Text Area) (Association Mechanism)
20 SOURCE:
(Text Area)
21 SUMMARY:
(Text Area)
22 TEXT:
(Text Area)
23 COMMENTS:
E-25

1
(FIELD COMMENT) (Text Area)
2
3
CLASSIFICATION
CLASSIFICATION
4 PROJ:
(Text Field)
5 INSTR: US NO
(Text Field)
6 PREP:
(Text Field)
7 ENCL:
(Text Field) (Repeating Group)
8 ACQ:
(Text Field)
9 DISSEM: FIELD--
(Text Field)
10 WARNING: REPORT CLASSIFIED (Text Field) (Autopopulate)

11 DRV FROM--
(Text Field)
12 DECL:
(Text Field)
CLASSIFICATION
13
14 ______________________________________________________________________________
E-26

1
SECTION 10
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT -- BIOGRAPHICAL
3 Purpose. Standard report used to report unevaluated, unanalyzed biographical intelligence information.
4 ______________________________________________________________________________
5
CLASSIFICATION
Intelligence Information Report -- Biographical
7 FROM:
(Text Field)
8 TO:
(Text Field)
9 INFO:
(Text Field)
10 SERIAL:
(Text Field)
11 COUNTRY:
(Text Field)
12 //IPSP:
(Text Field)
13 SUBJ:
(Text Area)
14 WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED

15 INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED (Autopopulate with classification)
16 ______________________________________________________________________________
17 ________________________DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE____________________________
18 DOI:
(Text Field)
19 REQS:
(Text Area) (Association Mechanism)
20 SOURCE:
(Text Area)
21 SUMMARY:
(Text Area)
E-27
CLASSIFICATION
CLASSIFICATION
3 TEXT:
4 1.
Name of Country
(Text Field w/PL)
5 2.
Date of Information
(Text Field)
6 3.
Date of Report
(Text Field)
7 4A. Full Name
(Text Field)
8 4B. Name(s) By Which Individual

Prefers To Be Addressed
9
10
4B(1). In Official Correspondence
(Text Field)
11
4B(2). Orally at Official Gatherings
(Text Field)
12
13
4C. Full Name in Native Alphabet
(Text Field) (In standard telegraphic

code or other transcription code)
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
4D. Variants, aliases or Nicknames
(INDIVIDUAL Record repeating group

autopopulate)
Rank
5A. English Language
(Text Field)
5B. Native
21
Date of Rank
22
Position/Billet
(Text Field)
(Text Field)
23
7A. Present Position
(Text Field)
24
7B. Military Address
(Text Area)
25
7C. Date Assumed Position
(Text Field)
E-28
7D. Scheduled Date of Departure
CLASSIFICATION
CLASSIFICATION
2
3
4
(Text Field)
7E. Name of Predecessor
7E1. Predecessors Name
(Text Field)
6
7
7E2. Predecessors Branch

of Service
(Text Field)
8
9
7E3. Date Predecessor

Assigned
(Text Field)
7E4. Duration of Predecessors

Assignment
(Text Field)
10
11
12
Branch of Armed Service
13
Specialty/Other Organizations
14
Date of Birth
(Text Field)
15
Place of Birth
(Text Field)
16
Sex
(Text Field)
17
Home Address
(Text Fields) (autopopulate)
18
Telephone Number
19
14A. Home
(Text Fields)
20
14B. Work
(Text Fields)
21
Marital Status
22
Citizenship
(Text Field)
(Text Field)
(Text Field)
E-29
1
2 COMMENTS:
3
(FIELD COMMENT)
(Text Area)
4 PROJ:
(Text Field)
CLASSIFICATION
CLASSIFICATION
5
6
7 INSTR:
US NO
(Text Field)
8 PREP:
(Text Field)
9 ENCL:
(Text Field) (Repeating Group)
10 ACQ:
11 DISSEM:
(Text Field)
FIELD--
(Text Field)
12 WARNING: REPORT CLASSIFIED
(Text Field) (Autopopulate)
13 DRV FROM--
(Text Field)
14 DECL:
(Text Field)
CLASSIFICATION
15
16 ______________________________________________________________________________
E-30

SECTION 11
2 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INSPECTION/EVALUATION REPORT

3 ______________________________________________________________________________
4
CLASSIFICATION
5
6
CI Inspection/Evaluation Report
(Normally hard copy report not templated in DCIIS)
7 Reporting Unit:
8 Dissemination:
9
10 Report Date:
11 Report Time:
12 Reference:
13 Enclosure:
14 SYNOPSIS: (Summary of the report)
15 1. ( ) PREDICATION: (What initiated the inspection/evaluation).

16 2. ( ) PURPOSE: (What the inspection/evaluation was to determine. State any limitations that
17 were placed on the activity.)
18 3. ( ) BACKGROUND: (Information on previous inspections/evaluations or surveys on the same area.
19 Information on level and amount of classified material maintained. Identity of person(s) conducting the
20 activity.)
21 4. ( ) RESULTS: (Detailed information obtained during the inspection/evaluation, describe security
22 measures in effect, whether the measures required by appropriate references were adequate, and any
23 identified security weaknesses/deficiencies.)
24 5. ( ) RECOMMENDATIONS: (List recommendations to correct security weaknesses or deficiencies
25 as they appear in paragraph 4 above, reference the paragraph for clarity.)
26
27
(Signature on line above typed name)
28
29

APPROVED BY. (Typed name and title of approving authority)
REPORTED BY. (Typed name of evaluator)
E-31
CLASSIFICATION
E-32

SECTION 12
2 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SURVEY/VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

3 ______________________________________________________________________________
4
CLASSIFICATION
5
6
CI Survey/Vulnerability Assessment
(Normally hard copy report not templated in DCIIS)
7 Reporting Unit:
8 Dissemination:
9
10 Report Date:
11 Report Time:
12 Reference:
13 Enclosure:
14 SYNOPSIS: (Summary of the report)
15 1. PREDICATION: (How the survey was initiated.)
16 2. PURPOSE: (What the survey was to determine. State any limitations on the survey.)
17 3. BACKGROUND:
18
a. Person(s) conducting the survey.
19
b. Previous surveys.
20
c. Mission.
21
d. Inherent hazards of the area.
e. Degree of security required (Maximum, medium, or minimum based of the following

22
23 factors):
24
(1) Mission
25
(2) Cost of Replacement
26
(3) Location
27
(4) Number of like installations
28
(5) Classified Material
E-33

1
CLASSIFICATION
CLASSIFICATION
(6) Importance
4 4. RESULTS
5
a. Security of information
b. Security of personnel
c. Physical security
8 5. RECOMMENDATIONS. (List recommendations to correct security hazards as they appear in

9 paragraph 4 under the subparagraph heading, reference the paragraph for clarity.)
10
a. Security of information.
11
b. Security of personnel.
12
c. Physical security.
13
14

REPORTED BY. (Typed name of evaluator)
15
16
17

APPROVED BY. (Typed name and title of approving
authority)
18
CLASSIFICATION
E-34

SECTION 13
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SURVEY/
2
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST
3
4 ____________________________________________________________________________________
5 BACKGROUND:
6 Counterintelligence surveys/vulnerability assessments are conducted during peacetime as well
7 as times of hostilities, both in and outside the continental United States.
8 Manning of counterintelligence survey/vulnerability assessment teams should be task-organized
9 to meet the needs/requirements of the survey; i.e., counterintelligence officers/specialists,
10 physical security specialists from provost marshal, communications specialists, automatic data
11 processing security specialists, etc.
Name of Installation
Location of Installation
Type of Installation
12
13
14
15 1. Functions, Purpose, or Activities at Installation

a. What troops, units, and command elements are stationed there or use or control the
16
17 installation?
18
b. What military activities (conventional, unconventional, or special) take place?
19
c.
20
d. What is the military importance?
What material is produced, processed, tested, or stored?
21 2. Critical Rating of the Installation

a. How important to national security or Marine Corps forces are the activities that take
22
23 place at the installation?
24
b. What activity on the installation should be veiled in secrecy? Why?
25
c.
26
d. Is this the only location where the activities taking place can be conducted?
27
e. Are there substitute places available which are suitable and practical?
28
f. Is there a key facility/organization aboard the installation?
What information about the installation would be of interest to hostile intelligence? Why?
E-35

g. Is there any sensitive or critical material or equipment stored, tested, or developed
1
2 aboard the installation?
h. Is the installation a likely target for espionage?
4 3. Names of Principal Officers of the Installation/Organization

5 4. Names of Persons Directly Responsible for the Security of the Installation
6 5. Physical Location and Description of the Installation
a. This is the physical description of the general area surrounding the installation, paying
7
8 particular attention to road networks, rail facilities, air facilities, transportation, terrain, etc.
b. Include a general physical description of the entire installation, to be accompanied
9
10 wherever possible by a map, sketch or aerial photograph, and the following information:
11
(1) Area and perimeter.
(2) Numbers, types, and locations of buildings, and relationships among the various
12
buildings.
13
14
(3) Roads, paths, railroad sidings, canals, rivers, etc., on the premises of the installation.
15
(4) Wharves, docks, loading platforms, etc., on the premises.
16
(5) Any other distinctive structures or features.
c. Note any particularly vulnerable or sensitive points on the installation, and the reasons for
17
18 their vulnerability or sensitivity. Pay particular attention to the following:
19
(1) Command element/headquarters buildings.
20
(2) Operations/crisis action facilities.
21
(3) Repair shops (armor, vehicle, aircraft, weapons, communications).
22
(4) Power plants.
23
(5) Transformer stations.
24
(6) Warehouses.
25
(7) Communications systems/facilities.
26
(8) Fuel storage.
27
(9) Water tanks, reservoirs, supply systems.
E-36
(10) Motor pools.
(11) Ammunition dumps.
(12) Aircraft
(13) Firefighting equipment.
(14) Military police/reaction force location and reliability.
(15) Special training/testing sites.
7 6. Perimeter Security
8
a.
Description of the perimeter and physical barriers.
(1) Type of fence or other physical barrier around the installation that affords perimeter
9
10 security?
11
(2) What type of material is the fence/barrier constructed?
12
(3) How high is the fence/barrier?
13
(4) Is the fence/barrier easily surmountable?
14
(5) Is the top protected by barbed wire outriggers?
(6) Are there any cuts, breaks, tears, holes, or gaps in the fence/barrier or any holes
15
16 under it?
17
(7) Are there any tunnels near or under the fence/barrier?
18
(8) Are vehicles parked near or against the fence/barrier?
19
(9) Are piles of scrap, refuse, or lumber kept near the fence/barrier?
(10) Is the fence/barrier patrolled and checked daily for cuts, breaks, holes, gaps,
20
21 tunnels, or evidence of tampering?
22
(11) Where are pedestrian and vehicle gates located?
23
(12) Are unguarded gates firmly and securely locked?
(13) Are the gates constructed in a manner where identity and credential checks of
24
25 persons or vehicles entering or exiting are accomplished, particularly during rush hours?
26
(14) During what hours is each gate open?
27
E-37
(15) Are there any railroad rights of way, sewers, tree lines, or other weak points on the
1
2 perimeter?
(16) Are these weak points guarded, patrolled, or secured in any fashion?
(17) Is high intensity lighting used to light up the perimeter during hours of darkness?
(18) Where are the lights located?
(19) Are there dead spots between lighted areas?
(20) Is there backup emergency power for the lighting?
(21) Does the lighting inhibit/hamper security force observation?
9 7. Perimeter Security Force

10
a.
Description of the organization of the security force.
11
(1) What is the strength of perimeter security forces?
12
(2) What are the number and location of guard posts?
13
(3) What is the length of perimeter covered by each post?
14
(4) What is the length of watch of each post?
15
(5) Is there a reserve or backup or security force?
16
(6) What weapons do the guards carry?
17
(7) What is the level training for each member of the security force?
18
(8) What instructions are given to security forces regarding identity checks/challenges?
19
(9) Are there vehicle checks?
20
(10) Are there any watchtowers to facilitate observation of the perimeter?
21
(11) What are the height and location of each watchtower?
(12) Have roving patrols been utilized to patrol the perimeter? What are their number,
22
strength,
frequency, routes, and activity?
23
24
25
(13) What is the efficiency and manner of performance of perimeter guards and patrols?
b. Security weaknesses and recommendations.
E-38
(1) What specific weaknesses pertaining to both physical barriers and the perimeter
1
2 security force were noted during the survey?
(2) What specific and reasonable recommendations may be made to improve perimeter
3
security?
4
5 8. Security of Buildings and Structures

6
a. Nature and purpose of building.
(1) Where is the location of the building?
(2) What activities take place in the building?
(3) What material/information is developed or stored?
10
(4) What machinery or equipment is in the building?
11
(5) Is the building a vulnerable point? Why?
12
b. Description of building -exterior, interior, and immediate surroundings.
13
(1) Describe the design and construction of the building.
14
(2) How many stories? Height?
15
(3) Does the building have a basement?
16
(4) What percentage is wood?
17
(5) What percentage is concrete?
18
(6) What other materials are used in the exterior?
19
(7) Describe walls.
20
(8) Describe floors.
21
(9) Describe ceilings.
22
(10) Describe roof.
23
(11) Is the building safely designed and constructed?
24
(12) Is the building properly maintained and constructed?
E-39

(13) Check locations of doors, windows, sewers, sidewalks, elevators, stairs, fire
1
2 escapes, skylights, crawl spaces/false ceilings, and any other possible means of exit or entry.
(14) Are these entrances properly locked, or otherwise safeguarded against unauthorized
3
4 entry?
(15) Are windows and skylights screened, grilled, or barred?
(16) Can unauthorized or surreptitious entry be effected in any manner?
(17) Are exit and entry facilities adequate to meet an emergency situation?
(18) Are all keys to building controlled?
(19) Where is the key control maintained?
10
(20) Who maintains the key control?
11
(21) How rigorously is it kept?
12
(22) Who is authorized to receipt for the keys?
(23) Are any measures taken to restrict entry into the building; i.e., pass, badges, access
13
14 rosters, etc.
15
(24) Are controlled access methods enforced?
(25) If the building is determined to be sensitive, high threat priority, or vulnerable, has it
16
17 been declared as restricted, and is the area surrounding it so designated?
(26) Are daily security checks conducted at the end of each working day in areas where
18
19 classified material is stored? Are all security containers checked?
20
21
c. Guard and patrol system around the building.

(1) What are the duties of guards and patrols?
(2) Are high intensity lights used to light up the exterior and the area surrounding the
22
23 buildings during hours of darkness?
24
(3) Is there a reactionary security force?
25
(4) What is the response time? Has it been tested?
26
(5) What is the size of the guard force? Reactionary force?
27
(6) What are the means of activating the reactionary force? Are there backup systems?
28
d. Security of electrical equipment.
E-40
(1) Is there auxiliary lighting?
(2) Are circuit breakers properly protected?
(3) Are telephone junction boards protected
e. List the frequency of periodic checks made throughout the building to detect the following:
(1) Holes, cracks, crevices which might conceal explosives, incendiary devices, or
5
6 audio/visual monitoring devices. Are such repaired?
(2) Tampered wiring, or broken or electrical connections and wires.
(3) The presence of suspicious packages or bundles.
(4) Any dangerous practices, including safety, electrical, or fire hazards which may result
9
10 from negligence or deliberate attempts at sabotage,
11
f. Security weaknesses and recommendations
(1) What specific weaknesses pertaining to the security of interiors and exteriors were
12
13 noted during the survey?
(2) What specific reasonable recommendations may be made to improve the security of
14
15 the buildings?
16 9. Security of Docks, Wharves, and Platforms

17
a.
Description of the location, nature, and purpose of each dock, wharf, or platform.
(1) What administrative supervision of the docks, wharves, and loading platforms is
18
19 exercised? By whom?
20
(2) What type of security force provides protection for each?
21
(3) What measures are taken to prevent loitering in the vicinity of each?
(4) What measures are taken to prevent unauthorized observation of loading and
22
23 unloading?
(5) What protection is afforded mechanical sabotage, arson, explosion, or dangerous
24
25 practices)
(6) Are same precautionary measures taken as outlined for access as outlined above for
26
27 building interiors and exteriors?
28
b. Traffic conditions.
E-41
(1) Are inspections of deliveries made to guard against sabotage devices; i.e.,
1
2 explosives, caustic chemicals, etc.?
(2) What precautions are taken to conceal the loading and unloading of personnel or
3
material
if such handling requires secrecy?
4
(3) Are delivery trucks, railroad cars, and privately owned vehicles checked for possible
5
6 sabotage devices?
(4) How much is the movement of drivers and helpers about the installation controlled?
(5) In the case of movement of personnel, equipment, and material, are identifying
8
9 markings removed in an effort to assist in operations security?
10
c. Security weaknesses and recommendations.
(1) What specific weaknesses pertaining to the security of docks, wharves, and loading
11
12 platforms were noted during the survey?
(2) What specific and reasonable recommendations may be made to improve the
13
14 security of docks, wharves, and loading platforms?
15 10. Motor Pools, Dismount Points, and Parking Areas

16
a. Security measures at each facility.
17
(1) Are motor pools, dismount points, and parking areas adequately guarded?
18
(2) Are vehicles properly checked and accessible only to authorized personnel?
19
(3) What system of checking vehicles is used?
(4) What measures are taken to safeguard fuels, lubricants, tools, and equipment
20
21 against sabotage, theft, fire, and explosion?
22
(5) Are frequent checks made of all vehicles for possible mechanical sabotage?
(6) Are drivers and mechanics instructed as to the proper checks, to be made to guard
23
24 against or detect sabotage?
(7) What provisions are made to prohibit privately owned vehicle parking in motor pools,
25
26 dismount points/parking areas?
27
(8) Are fuels and lubricants frequently tested for possible contamination?
28
(9) Are parking/staging areas restricted or supervised in any way?
E-42

(10) Are parking arrangements consistent with security against sabotage, terrorist, or
1
2 other hazards?
(11) What provisions are made for visitors parking?
(12) Do parking arrangements/facilities impede efficient traffic flow through and near the
4
5 compound?
(13) Would parking arrangements interfere with firefighting or other necessary
6
7 emergency vehicles if there was an emergency?
(1) What specific weaknesses about the security of motor pools and parking lots were
9
10 noted during this survey?
11
12 security of the motor pool and parking lots.
13 11. Power Facilities and Supply

14
a. Description of supply, facilities, and security measures.
15
(1) What type of power is used by the installation?
16
(2) What is the peak load of electric power?
17
(3) What percentage of the electric power is generated on the installation?
18
(4) What is the installation's electric generating capacity?
19
(5) What percentage of electric power is purchased from outside sources?
20
(6) Are all current sources ample to provide a reserve beyond full load demands?
21
(7) From whom is the electric power purchased?
22
(8) Is an alternate or auxiliary electric power system available for emergency use?
23
(9) Can the auxiliary electric power system be used immediately?
24
(10) How many and what kind of power substations/transformers fare on the installation?
(11) Are control panels, pressure valves, gas facilities, and control valves in good working
25
order?
How
frequently are they checked? Is adequate fire protective equipment available and
26
27 nearby?
E-43

(12) Are power substations/transformers adequately safeguarded against trespassers
1
2 and saboteurs?
(13) Are generators properly maintained and checked with particular emphasis on oil
3
4 levels and temperatures?
5
6
7
(14) Are combustible materials removed from their vicinity?

b. Miscellaneous features:
(1) Are replacement units for generators and motors available in safe storage?
(2) Do transformers have sufficient capacity, are they safely located and well protected
8
9 by physical barriers and guards?
10
(3) Are oil-filled transformers located in noncombustible well-drained buildings or outside?
11
(4) Are frequent inspections made of the oil, contact, and control apparatus of circuit
12
13 breakers and transformers?
14
(5) What is the system of power lines in use?
15
(6) What is the number of independent power feeds?
16
(7) Is the pole line or underground line safe, reliable, and frequently checked?
17
(8) Are all power lines protected by lightning arresters?
18
(9) Are power distribution lines properly installed and supported?
19
(10) Are electric circuits overloaded at any time?
20
(11) Are current national or civil electric codes followed?
21
(12) Is there a single or multiple main switch(s) for emergencies?
22
c. Security weaknesses and recommendations.
(1) What specific weakness about the security of power facilities and supply were noted
23
24 during the survey?
25
26 security of power facilities and supply?
27 12. Fire Fighting Equipment and Facilities

28
a. Describe the amount and condition of equipment and facilities.
E-44

1
(1) What fire fighting and first aid equipment are available on the installation?
(2) What types of fire extinguishers are available; i.e., foam, dry chemical, halon, water,
2
3 carbon dioxide, and carbon tetrachloride? Are they at locations where such types may be
4 needed?
(3) Are all extinguishers and other equipment in working order and frequently tested and
5
6 inspected?
(4) Are fire extinguishers sealed to prevent tampering?
(5) Do competent personnel make inspections of fire equipment and are the results
8
recorded?
9
(6) Are both first aid and firefighting equipment painted so as to be conspicuous? Are they
10
11 within reach of all personnel, unobstructed, and of reasonable size and weight to permit ease of
12 handling by all personnel?
Is first aid equipment available? Does it include ample amounts of materials that may
13
14 be needed?
15
(8) Are first aid supplies checked periodically and safeguarded?
16
(9) What type of fire alarm system(s) is/are installed?
17
(10) Are there sufficient numbers of alarms and sensors in the system?
18
(11) Is the fire alarm system frequently inspected and tested?
19
(12) Are vulnerable and/or important facilities equipped with sprinkler systems?
(13) What type of sprinkler system(s) is/are used? Are they fed by public mains, tanks,
20
21 private reservoir, or pumps?
22
(14) How often and thoroughly is the sprinkler system inspected?
23
(15) Where are the main control valves of the system located?
24
(16) Are fire hydrants near vulnerable or important facilities?
25
(17) Are hydrants in working order? How often are they inspected and tested?
(18) Is the water pressure sufficient so that streams of water will reach and extinguish
26
27 flames in all sections of the installation?
28
(19) Is there a secondary source of water supply available?
(20) Does the installation have its own fire department? A brigade? What equipment does
29
30 it have? Are the personnel well trained?
E-45
(21) Have arrangements been made with public fire departments to furnish equipment
1
2 and personnel to augment the installation department/brigade?
(22) Is the nearest public fire department paid or is it a volunteer unit?
(23) Has a program of fire drills been inaugurated? Are such drills conducted in an
4
5 efficient and earnest manner?
(24) Has a fire prevention program been inaugurated?
(25) What plans have been made for the action of all personnel if there is a fire?
(1) What specific security weaknesses about the firefighting equipment and facilities
9
10 were noted during the survey?
11
security
of firefighting equipment and facilities?
12
13 13. Water Supply

14
15
a. Description of water supply and security measures taken to safeguard it.

(1) What sources of water supply are used by the installation?
(2) Are sources of water reasonably safe, adequately guarded, and protected by physical
16
17 security?
18
(3) If a public supply is used, what is the diameter of the main line?
(4) What is the water pressure? Is it adequate for normal use as well as for
19
20 emergencies?
(5) If a private reservoir or tank is used, what is its capacity, level, pressure, and
21
22 condition?
23
(6) Is it adequate for the installation's needs?
(7) What type of pumps are used in the water system (underwater, suction, centrifugal,
24
25 electric, etc.)?
26
(8) Are water pumping stations adequately protected, frequently inspected, and tested?
27
(9) Are all valves secured properly?
28
(10) Is a supplementary water system available? Where? Is it secure?
E-46
(11) How often is water tested for purification? By whom? Is the water treated? By
1
2 whom? By what chemicals?
(12) Are taps/sources of unpotable water adequately marked?
(13) Is the sewage system adequate for the installation?
(14) Are sewer mains, control, pumps, and disposal systems adequate?
(15) Is there a possibility of water or food contamination from the sewage system?
(16) Has there been any epidemic outbreak at the installation traceable to waste
7
8 disposal?
10
11 security of the water supply?
12
(2) What specific weaknesses about the water supply were noted during the survey?
13 14. Food Supply

14
a. Description of security measures.
(1) From what sources does the installation receive food and allied supplies? Can these
15
16 sources be considered reliable?
(2) If food supplies are purchased from merchants and farmers in the local vicinity, have
17
they
been
checked and their food tested for cleanliness?
18
(3) Have caterers and companies or individuals who operate food, candy, soft drink, or
19
20 other concessions on or near the installation been checked? Have their products been
21 thoroughly tested?
22
(4) Have local food handlers been checked for health, cleanliness, and loyalty?
(5) Is entry to kitchens and food storerooms restricted to authorized personnel? How are
23
24 such restrictions enforced?
25
(6) Are pantries and refrigerators locked when not in use?
26
(7) Are kitchens and storerooms in sanitary condition?
27
(8) Is there any evidence of unsanitary conditions?
28
(9) Are frequent checks made of foods, drinks, etc., to prevent or detect toxicological or
E-47

1 bacteriological sabotage?
(10) Has there been any epidemic or excess absenteeism traceable to food or water
2
3 supplies of the installation?

(1) What specific weaknesses about the security of food supply were noted during the
6 survey?
7
8 security of the food supply?
9 15. Communications Facilities

10
a.
General service and special communications message centers.
11
(1) Description.
12
(2) Where is the message center located?
13
(3) Is the message center adequately protected by physical barriers and guards?
14
(4) Is someone on duty at the message center at all times?
(5) Who handles the mail at the message center? Have all mail handlers been subject to
15
background
and local records checks?
16
(6) Are all encryption (hardware and software) devices properly safeguarded and properly
17
18 destroyed when obsolete?
19
(7) Are logs kept of authorized couriers and message traffic distribution?
20
(8) Are unauthorized personnel excluded from the message center?
21
(9) Are classified messages handled in accordance with OPNAVINST 5510.1-'?
(10) Through what channels do classified messages pass?

22
23
(11) Have messengers, couriers, and operators been checked? Do they have
24
25 appropriate security access(es)?
26
(1) What specific weaknesses about the security of the communications systems were
27
E-48

1
2 security of the communications system?
3 16.
4
Wire and Wireless Communications Equipment

a. Description.
(1) What means of wire and wireless communications are used throughout the
5
6 installation?
(2) Where are the central points of such communications networks located?
(3) Are switchboards adequately guarded?
(4) Have operators been checked and cleared?
10
(5) Is auxiliary power available?
11
(6) Is auxiliary or replacement equipment available?
(7) Are open wires, terminal boxes, cross connecting boxes, cables, and manholes
12
13 frequently inspected for indications of sabotage and/or wire tapping?
14
(8) Are maintenance crews alerted to search for tapping?
15
(9) Are civilian repairmen used? Are they checked and cleared?
(10) Have preparations been made to take care of sudden breaks in the system
16
17 efficiently?
(11) Have personnel been cautioned about discussing classified or sensitive matters
18
19 over unsecured telephone, teletype, or radios?
20
(1) What specific weaknesses about the security of the communications system were
21
23
24 security of the communications system?
25 17. Security of Information

a. Where on the installation are plans, blueprints, photos, classified material/equipment, or
26
27 other information of value to the enemy kept? The following list is not all-inclusive and is not a
28 replacement for the checklist in OPNAVINST 5510.1-.
E-49

(1) Is such material centralized in a single facility or scattered through various offices or
1
2 buildings?
(2) In what sections are classified material processed stored and what level of
3
4 classification is authorized in each area?
(3) Is all classified or valuable information kept in authorized/approved security containers
5
6 or vaults?
(4) Are fight safes and cabinets affixed to floors or chained to immovable objects?
(5) Are container doors closed and locked when not in use?
(6) Is there any protection other than the container itself.
10
(7) What protection is given to a combination of containers?
11
(8) What security measures are enforced about keys to doors, gates, or file cabinets?
12
(9) Is access limited to combinations and keys?
(10) Who has access to combinations and keys? Do all authorized personnel have
13
14 access? Have they been cautioned about passing keys and combinations to unauthorized
15 personnel?
(11) Is a rigid chain of custody required for classified information (Secret and above).
16
17 Can custodians identify the location of classified at any time?
(12) Are only personnel with completed background checks and appropriate access
18
19 assigned to positions requiring the handling of classified material?
(13) Plans, blueprints, reports, or other classified material returned as promptly as
20
21 possible and properly turned in?
22
(14) Who has access to classified material (with and without approved access)?
(15) Is dissemination of classified material strictly limited to those with a "Need to

23
24 Know?"
25
(16) Is rank or position considered sufficient reason for access to classified information?
(17) Is classified material left unattended on desks where persons passing by can
26
27 observe or steal without detection?
28
(18) Have civilian janitors been checked and placed under supervision?
29
(19) How is classified waste disposed of? Are destruction records kept?
E-50

(20) What policy has been established regarding releases and statements to local or
1
2 national news media?
3
4
(21) Have all personnel been cautioned about unauthorized statements and releases?
b. Security of personnel.
(1) What specific weaknesses about the security of information were noted during the
5
survey?
6
7
8 security of information?
9 18.
Security of Personnel
10
a. OPNAVINST 5510.1- provides guidelines on personnel security.
11
b. Who is responsible for the security of the installation?
12
c. What is the attitude towards security?
d. Is the command aware of continuous evaluation of those who have access to classified
13
or
sensitive
material or equipment?
14
15
e. Are all personnel in positions of trust and confidence considered reliable?
16
f. What is the attitude towards security?
17 19.
Identification System
a. What system is used to identify personnel authorized access within the confines of the
18
19 installation/facility?
20
b. If badges are used -
(1) Are badges or identification cards of tamper-proof design and difficult to reproduce or
21
counterfeit?
22
(2) Is the makeup and issue of badges and identification cards rigidly controlled to
23
24 prevent:
25
(a) Reproduction?
26
(b) Theft?
27
(c) Unauthorized use or issue?
E-51

(d) Failure to return to issuing authority?
1
2
(3) Are photographs used on the face of the cards/badges?
(4) Is a detailed description used to positively identify holder?
(5) Are color or coded systems used to identify level of access or department personnel
4
5 are granted?
(6) Are specific badges valid for specific areas?
(7) Is enforcement of such identification rigid?
(8) Do regulations prescribe that everyone wears the badge at all times and are
8
9 regulations enforced?
10
(9) Is admittance to the installation/facility governed by the identification system?
11
(10) When badges are reported missing, lost, or forgotten what action is taken?
12
c.
Is entrance permitted by wearing a military uniform?
13
(1) What other means of identification are used?
14
(2) Are access rosters passed from one facility/ command to another via secure means?
15
(3) Are passes or identification cards closely scrutinized?
d. What system is used to prevent persons working in one building, section, or unit from
16
wandering
about restricted areas without proper authorization.
17
18 20.
Visitor Controls
a. What system is used to identify and admit authorized and legitimate visitors to the
19
20 installation or facility?
21
(1) How and by whom is the legitimacy or necessity of a visitor's mission established?
22
(2) Are regulations lax in the control of visitors?
(3) On arrival at the gate, entrance of the facility or section, are visitors escorted to a
23
24 reception area?
25
(4) Are regulations lax in the control of visitors?
26
(5) Is the identity of visitors verified?
27
(6) Is adequate information obtained visitors?
E-52
(7) Is the purpose of the visit obtained?
(8) Are visitors required to register in a logbook with the following information:
(a) Full name.
(b) Social security number.
(c) Rank.
(d) Parent Organization.
(e) Date and time of entry.
(f) Time of departure.
(g) Number of security badge issued and level of access.
10
(h) Reason for visit.
11
(i) Name of official authorizing entry or providing escort.
12
(9) Are visitors required to provide identity on departure?
(10) Are visitors escorted or kept under surveillance during the time they are on the
13
14 installation?
15
b. Is a vehicle register kept which includes:
16
(1) Date and time of entrance.
17
(2) Registration numbers.
18
(3) Name of owner(s).
19
(4) Signatures of driver(s) and passengers.
20
(5) Brief description of contents of vehicle.
21
(6) Inspections conducted on vehicle.
22
(7) Time of departure.
23
c. Are news media carefully checked and verified?
24
(1) Are credentials examined and verified?
25
(2) Has their visit been checked with higher commands to verify authority?
E-53
d. Are orders and credentials of allied military personnel examined by competent personnel
1
2 (linguists, etc.).
(1) Are such visits verified by higher authority?
(2) Is security unduly sacrificed to courtesy?
e. Are spot checks of persons within the installation/facility made from time to time?
f. Security weaknesses and recommendations.
(1) What specific weaknesses about identification and visitor's control were noted during
7
8 the survey?
(2) What specific reasonable recommendations may be made to improve security by
9
further
identification
and visitor's control?
10
11 21.
12
Description of Guard System

a. General description of the guard force.
13
(1) Strength.
14
(2) Shifts.
15
(3) Reserves.
16
(4) Weapons.
17
(5) Training.
18
(6) Number and type of posts.
19
(7) Communications.
20
b. Check the following points.
21
(1) What is the organization of the guard force?
22
(2) What is the numerical strength of each shift or relief?
23
(3) How many shifts or reliefs are there?
24
(4) How many supervisors does each shift have?
25
(5) Is supervision of the guard force adequate?
E-54

1
(6) How many fixed posts does the force cover?
(7) Where is each post located?
(8) How many patrols are covered by the guard force?
(9) What is the route of each patrol?
(10) Are routes of the patrols varied?
(11) What is the time of each patrol?
(12) Are doors and gates closely checked by the patrols?
(13) What functions are performed by the patrols?
(14) Does the supervisor make inspection tours of the routes?
10
(15) How frequently and thoroughly are such tours made?
11
(16) Are inspections varied as to route and time?
12
(17) Are guard force communications and alarm systems in use? Are they adequate?
(18) What type of communication and alarm system does the guard force have? Are
13
14 there backup systems?
15
(19) Is a record kept of all guard force activity?
16
(20) Does the guard force have communications with the military police?
17
(21) What armament does the guard force have?
18
(22) Are the weapons in serviceable condition?
19
(23) Are the weapons suitable for the mission?
20
(24) Are arms and ammunition adequately safeguarded when not in use?
21
(25) Is there a record of custody when weapons are
issued during each shift?
(26) Where are the weapons and ammunition stored? Does storage prevent rapid
22
23 access to the guard force?
24
(27) How are guards recruited?
25
(28) What physical, mental, age, or other qualifications must protective guards have?
26
(29) How thoroughly are prospective guards investigated?
E-55
(30) Are guards uniformed, and do they have credentials or badges? What other system
1
2 of identification is used?
(31) Is the guard force competent and respected by personnel of the installation?
(32) How thoroughly is the guard force trained?
(33) How much time is spent on training the guard force?
(34) How is the training of the guard force conducted?
(35) Does such training cover the following points?
(a) Care and use of weapons and ammunition?
(b) Common forms of espionage and sabotage activity?
10
(c) Common forms of bombs explosives?
(d) Familiarization with the entire installation/facility, with particular emphasis on

11
12 restricted and vulnerable areas?
13
(e) Location and character of hazardous material and processes?
(f) Location and operation of all important steam and gas valves and of all main
14
15 electrical switches?
(g) Location and operation of fire protective equipment including use of sprinkler
16
17 control valves?
18
(h) Conditions which may cause fires and explosions.
19
(i) Location and use of all first aid equipment?
20
(j) Duties is the event of fire, blackouts, or other emergencies that can be foreseen?
21
(k) Use of communication systems?
22
(i) Observation and description?
23
(m) Preservation of evidence?
24
(n) Patrol work?
25
(o) Searches of persons and places?
26
(p) Supervision of visitors?
E-56

1
(q) General and special guard orders?
(r) Location of all guard posts?

(36) Do guards have keys to gates, buildings, and offices?
(37) Do guards check the credentials of visitors and personnel working on the installation
4
5 or facility?
(38) Is the strength of the guard force consistent with -
6
7
8 open?
(a) The number of pedestrian, vehicle, and railroad gates and the hours they are
(b) The approximate number of daily visitors? Proper visitor reception?
10
(c) The number of loading platforms, storage facilities, working areas, etc.?
11
(d) The number of vehicles to cover the entire installation in a reasonable time?
12
(e) The number of restricted areas and vulnerable points?
13
(f) The number of plants or pumping stations?
14
(g) The number and extent of parking areas?
15
(h) Necessary supervision of the guard force?
16
(i) Sickness, leave, injury, etc., of guard personnel?
(39) What are the duties of the guard force if there are security violations? Does the
17
18 guard force have security clearance and access?
19
20
c. Guard headquarters.
(1) Is the guard headquarters conveniently located?
(2) Is the guard headquarters properly secured at all times, and does it contain all
21
22 necessary equipment?
(3) Does the guard headquarters contain adequate facilities for all members of the guard
23
24 force?
25
d. Security weaknesses and recommendations.
(1) What specific security weaknesses were noted during the survey of the installation's
26
27 guard force?
E-57

(2) What specific and reasonable recommendations regarding the guard force may be
1
2 made to improve the security of the installation?
3 22. Description of Security Conditions and Security Measures of Adjacent Areas

4
a. What is the general nature of the population and the area surrounding the installation?
(1) Does the nationality or political nature of the surrounding populace offer a natural
5
6 cover and aid to hostile agents and saboteurs?
(2) Is the installation within a commercial air zone of travel?
(3) If so, are minimum altitudes for planes published at all local airports?
(4) Is the installation isolated or screened from public view?
10
(5) Are restricted areas screened or isolated from public curiosity?
(6) Is the installation exposed to hazards that may be brought onto the installation by
11
12 natural conditions such as floods, extreme winds, forest fires, electrical storms, etc.?
(7) Is the installation or buildings within the installation well camouflaged against both air
13
14 and ground observation?
(8) Have places of amusement near the installation and persons frequenting them been
15
16 investigated, scrutinized, and checked?
(9) Have night clubs, pool rooms, bowling alleys, houses of prostitution, barber shops,
17
18 restaurants, taverns, stores, and other places frequented by personnel from the installation been
19 included and thoroughly checked.
(10) Has the surrounding area been carefully scrutinized for any place likely to be used
20
21 as bases for espionage or sabotage agents? Areas that could conceal antenna's, audio and
22 visual surveillance, etc.?
23
(1) What specific security weaknesses were noted during the survey of the area adjacent
24
to
the
installation?
25
26
(2) What specific and reasonable recommendations may be made to improve security?
27 23. Security of Air Installations. The security of air installations does not differ from that of
28 any other installation. Aircraft and maintenance facilities are high priority targets of saboteurs
29 and espionage agents. In general, checking the following major areas will assist in establishing
30 the security afforded to the installation.
E-58

1
a. Is the guard system adequate?
b. Are individual aircraft guarded sufficiently?
c. Are hangers and other vital buildings in a restricted area?
d. Have precautions been taken to see that there is no smoking in the area?
e. Are aircraft stored in hangers inspected periodically against sabotage?
f. Are special precautions taken to ensure visitor control in hangars?
g. Are vital repair parts in storage areas protected from unauthorized personnel, fire, and
7
8 the elements.
h. Are there fire trucks, crash and rescue vehicles available?
i. Is emergency equipment parked in a convenient location readily available to any part of

10
11 the installation?
12 24.
Practical Use of Security Checklist
a. This checklist is not all encompassing and should be used as a guide to initiate a survey.
13
14 Several methods of organizing a security check may be used. The following methods, through
15 usage, have been found to be practical and efficient.
(1) Itemize on index cards or automated data file all requirements as listed on the
16
17 checklist and write the required information on each card/file as it is checked off the list.
(2) Itemize basic subdivisions of survey checklist requirements on separate pages with
18
itemized
requirements listed in required order. Write in the required information in the proper
19
20 space as each item is checked off.
(3) Itemize all requirements of the survey checklist on separate pages, subdividing the
21
pages
according
to main subdivision requirements. Make detailed notes about each item as it is
22
23 checked off.
b. After completing notes on all requirements for each item, assemble in order and prepare
24
25 report.
E-59

1
SECTION 14
REPORT OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY
3 Purpose. Standard report used to report the results of a CI investigation.

4 ____________________________________________________________________________________
5
CLASSIFICATION
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Report of Investigative Activity

Record Management and Classification
Record ID: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Point of Contact: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Classification: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Abstract: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Discretionary Access Control: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Caveats: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14
Release To: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Record Type: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Record Status: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Date Created (yyyymmdd): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Date Modified (yyyymmdd): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Community of Interest: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Source Record: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Report Detail
Case Number Reference: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Case: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Event: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Date of Record (yyyymmdd): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
26
Title (Text):
27
Reason for Investigation (Text):
28
Individuals Involved (Text):
29
Role: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
30
Status (Text):
31
32
33
34
35
36
Period of Report From (yyyymmdd): . . . . . . . . . . . .

Period of Report To (yyyymmdd): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reporting Unit: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Agent Name: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Executive Summary
E-60

1
Executive Summary (Text):
CLASSIFICATION
SECTION 15
REPORT OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY SWORN STATEMENT
5 Purpose. Standard report for preparing and documenting sworn statements.

6 ____________________________________________________________________________________
CLASSIFICATION
7
Record ID: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8
Point of Contact: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9
Classification: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
Abstract: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11
Discretionary Access Control: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12
Caveats: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
13
14
Release To: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
Record Type: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Record Status: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Date Created (yyyymmdd): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Date Modified (yyyymmdd): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Community of Interest: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Source Record: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Report Detail
Date (yyyymmdd): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Case Number: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lead Number: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ROIA Number: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Name: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
27
Title
28
Sub Title
29
30
Agency: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Number of Investigative Materials: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
31
Text
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
Agent Name: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Organization: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sworn Statement
Individual Information: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Name: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Employer: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
OR Unit: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sworn Statement
E-61
1
2
Number of Witnesses: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CLASSIFICATION
E-62

1
SECTION 16
2
3
PERSONEL DATA FORM

POW/MIA/MISSING (NON-HOSTILE)
4 Purpose. Standard report used to record and document POW/MIA/missing personnel investigations.
5 ____________________________________________________________________________________
6
CLASSIFICATION
Personnel Data Form
Persons Captured (POW),
Missing in Action or Missing (Non-hostile)
10 1. Personal Data
11
a. Name:
12
b. Rank:
13
c. SSN/MOS:
14
d. Former Service Number:
15
e. Organization:
16
f. Date of Birth:
17
g. Place of Birth:
18
h. Home of Record:
19
i. Residence (if other than home of record):
20
j. Marital Status (Include number, sex, citizen status, and age of children):
21
k. PEBD:
22
1. EAS/EOS:
23
m. Date arrived in country:
24
n. Duty assignment:
25 2. Physical Characteristics
26
a. Height (Metric as well as U.S. equivalent):
27
b. Weight (Metric as well as U.S. equivalent):
28
E-63
CLASSIFICATION
CLASSIFICATION
2
3
c. Build:
d. Hair:
e. Eyes:
f. Complexion:
g. Race:
h. Right/left handed:
9 3. Distinguishing Characteristics
10
a. Speech (Include accent and speech patterns used):
11
b. Mannerisms:
12
c. Scars/identifying marks (Include type, location, size, color, and detailed description):
13
d. Others:
14 4. Circumstances of Incident
15
a. Date:
16
b. Location (Coordinates and geographic name):
17
c. Circumstances:
18
d. Reported wounds:
19
e. Last known location:
20
f. Last known direction of travel:
21
g. Last known place of detention:
22
h. Status (prisoner of war/missing [non-hostile]/missing in action as reported by unit):
23 5. Other Pertinent Data

24
a. General physical condition:
25
b. Linguistic capabilities and fluency:
26
c. Religion:
27
d. Civilian education:
28
e. Military schools:
29
f. Clothing and equipment when last seen
E-64
CLASSIFICATION
CLASSIFICATION
g. Jewelry when last seen (Include description of glasses, rings, watches, religious
4 medallions, etc.):
5
h. Other personnel listed POW/MIA during same incident:
6 6. Photograph
7 7. Handwriting Samples (Attach sample of correspondence, notes, etc. If no other sample is
8 available, include reproduction of signature from Service Record Book/Officer's Qualification
9 Record [SRB/OQRI.)
10 Enclosures: (May not be given wide dissemination based on classification or content.)

a. Clearances/Access Information. (Include information concerning security clearance,
11
12 access, knowledge of recurring tactical operations, knowledge of projected or proposed
13 operations, or any other special knowledge possessed.)
b. Medical Profile. (Include pertinent information extracted from medical records and
14
15 summarized information gained concerning ability to survive in captivity, known personal
16 problems, relationship with seniors/contemporaries or other personal, medical, or personality
17 information which would indicate his ability to cope in a prisoner-of-war situation.)
c. References. (List any messages, letters, or other correspondence pertaining to the
18
19 individual. If circumstances under which the individual is listed as captured or missing
20 predicated a command investigation, a copy of that investigation is included as an enclosure.)
d. Unresolved Leads/investigators Comments. (Include unresolved leads or names of
21
22 personnel who were unavailable for interview because of transfer, evacuation, etc. Use
23 investigator's comments as necessary but do not recommend a casualty determination.)
24
CLASSIFICATION
25 ____________________________________________________________________________________
E-65
SECTION 17
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MEASURES WORKSHEET

Purpose. The CI worksheet is prepared or revised based on the conclusions reached in the intelligence estimate of the
enemy capabilities for intelligence, subversion, terrorist activities and sabotage. This worksheet is an essential aid in CI
planning for the CIHO and CI/HUMINT Company Commander. It is also the basis for preparing CI orders and requests.
The following is a partially completed sample of a CI measures worksheet.
____________________________________________________________________________________________
Units/Personnel Responsible for Execution
of Counterintelligence Measures
(1)
Phases or
Periods of the
Operation
(2)
Categories of
Counterintelligence
Activities Involved
Assault Phase
1. Military Security
a. Security discipline.
(3)
Counterintelligence Measures
to be Adopted
Civil
CIS
Affairs Officer
c. Communication &
information security.
All
Units
CI
Units
Coordinate with G-4

Provost marshal report violations
(2) Remove identification from uniform
Coordinate with G-1

(3) Restrict personnel to area except when

on official business
(4) Emphasize security discipline in

command posts/echelons, and
elsewhere, with particular reference to
handling of communications &
information systems, documents and
maps, phone conver sations, loose talk,
and speculation which might convey
information to the enemy. All
personnel
will be instructed regarding same.
Coordinate with G-3 CI elements assist

with instruction and check
SOP
Coordinate with G-1
SOP
CI elements check
SOP
CI elements check
(5) Report all known or suspected security

compromises to unit security manager
and intelligence officer.
X
(6) Collect and place under guard or
evacuate as determined appropriate by
unit commander civilians in position
to observe critical unit C2, fires &
combat service support sites.
X
(7) Check SOP plans for security of

cryptographic devices for destruction
and for report of loss or compromise.
X
(8) Check plans and equipment for
destruction of documents in event of
imminent capture.
X
d. Security of unit
movements.
(5)
Instructions regarding entries
in columns (3) and (4). Notes
for future action, and staff
coordination measures
(1) Cover or paint all vehicle and

aircraft markings.
X
b. Safeguarding of
classified
information and
equipment.
Provost Comm
Marshal Intel
Unit
SOP
(9) Use only authorized call-signs, authenticators, and cryptographic codes.

(10) Check that unauthorized personnel are
prohibited from entering CPs,
message
centers, and other sensitive areas.
SOP
SOP
Check with CIS officer for compliance
Coordinate with other military forces
Coordinate with G-3 and G-4

(11) P atrol all wire lines used by units .
(12) Cut all wire lines leading into enemyoccupied territory.

(13) Control the movement of all vehicles
and aircraft to the extend that a
change in normal operations if not
indicated.
(Others as required)
E-60

1
APPENDIX F
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TRAINING COURSES
3 1. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Counterintelligence Basic

4 Course (U)
5 What This Course Offers
6 Provides instruction in theater, national, DOD, and organic Marine Corps intelligence assets; CI application
7 of the combat intelligence cycle; CI hostile threat; terrorism; CI/tactical HUMINT operations; photography;
8 interrogations; espionage, sabotage, subversion, and terrorism investigations; interview skills; intelligence
9 report writing; and surveillance techniques.
10 Who Should Attend
11 Marine Corps, corporal through lieutenant screened by CI assets and approved for lateral move to MOS
12 0211/0210/0204 by HQMC in accordance with MCO 3850.1H. Other services-for example, US Army
13 enlisted personnel have attended. Projected attendance for additional US Army and possible US Air Force
14 personnel is anticipated
DESCRIPTION
15 Course Activities
16
17 Lectures, videos, discussions, and
18 practical exercises
Trains USMC enlisted men and officers serving

as members of a CI team, or subteam, in
support of a MAGTF command.
19 Faculty
Emphasis is placed on requirements in

amphibious and subsequent operations.
20 Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence

21 Training Center, Dam Neck, Virginia
22 How Long? How Often?
Trains USMC enlisted and officers in CI/HUMINT

related tasks when serving as a member of a CI
team, CI/HUMINT branch, or in support of
MAGTF/JTF command.
23 Seventeen and a half weeks, 88 training

24 days/annually
Emphasizes theater and national-level CI

support provided to the commander.
25 Security Clearance Needed

26 Top Secret based on completed SSBI
27 and eligible for SCI access
28 Further Information
29 HQ, US Marine Corps, code CIC at (703) 614-2219/2058, DSN 224-XXXX
F-1

1 2. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Advanced CI Course (U)
3 Provides instruction to CI/Tactical HUMINT collection; intelligence architecture; systems and
4 communications; MAGTF, theater, and national-level staff planning; MAGTF/JTF/CI/ITT
5 employment and deployment; case method leadership practicums; CI espionage, sabotage,
6 subversion, and terrorism theory; and legalities of investigations.
7 Who Should Attend
8 Marine Corps, Gunnery Sergeant through Lieutenant Colonel (MOSs 0211/ 0210/0204) with at
9 least one successful tour. Other service quotas are available.
11 Lectures, videos, discussions, and practical exercises
12 Faculty
13 Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center, Dam Neck, Virginia
15 Twenty-six days, 20 training days/annually
17 Top Secret/SCI
19 HQ, US Marine Corps, code CIC (703) 614-2219/2058, DSN 224-XXXX
F-2
1 3. Advanced Foreign CI Training Course (U)

DESCRIPTION

3 Advanced counterespionage concepts, principles, and
4 techniques for foreign CI special agents
5 Who Should Attend
6 DOD CI special agents with three years of strategic CI
7 experience; 12 seats per class for Army and two seats
8 designated joint, which rotate among the military services.
9 Course Activities
10 Lectures, presentations, discussions, case studies,
11 practical exercises, and videos
Provides tough, demanding, realistic,

mission focused counterespionage
training to selected foreign CI (foreign
CI) special agents who are programmed
for assignment within the national
foreign CI community in support of the
warfighters and the DOD foreign CI
strategy. Provides students with a
synergistic perspective for applying
advanced foreign CI skills and
methodologies focusing on the foreign
CI Triad of investigations, operations,
and surveillance.
12 Faculty
13 Eight full-time instructors with intensive counterespionage background supplemented with guest
14 speakers/subject-matter experts from DOD and other Intelligence Community components.
16 Fifteen weeks (approximately 750 hours)/offered twice a year
18 Top Secret
20 Contact the course director or senior instructor at (301) 677-5778/5779, FAX (301) 677-6362. Mailing
21 address is Commander, US Army Foreign CI Activity (USAFCA), USAINSCOM, Attn. IAFC-TC, Fort
22 Meade, MD 20755
23 Registration Data
24 Limited to those working in or en route to an foreign CI assignment; graduate of a basic CI course; three
25 years of strategic CI experience; effective communicator; supervisory and command recommendations;
26 favorable SSBI; CI-scope polygraph; and a valid civilian drivers license. Army registration procedures, a
27 special nomination packet must be submitted to Commander, US Army Intelligence and Security
28 Command; Attn. IAOPS-HUCI, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5246. An INSCOM selection board chooses
29 students on a best qualified basis. Other military services per service directives and guidance.
F-3
1 4. CI Analytic Methods Course (U)

2 Who Should Attend
DESCRIPTION
3 Entry-level CI analysts
Introduction to the multi-discipline CI

analytical methods, tools, matrix,
link, and pattern analysis, collection
threats, deception analysis, and
intelligence oversight.
4 Course Activities
5 Lectures, discussions, videos, and case studies
6 Faculty
7 Instructors from the JMITC
9 One week/two times a year
11 Top Secret/SCI
13 JMITC, DIAC, Bolling AFB, (202) 373-3312
F-4

1 5. Joint CI Staff Officers Course (U)
DESCRIPTION
3 This course introduces the student to CI support to joint

4 operations
5 Who Should Attend
6 Personnel who will be working in a joint CI support role
7 during contingencies in a joint environment.
8 Course Activities
9 Lectures, videos, discussions, and practical exercises
10 Faculty
11 JCISB and civilian and military members of the intelligence
12 and CI communities
14 Five day s/several times a year
Know how CI activities are integrated

into joint-military organizations at the
levels of command and into the
formulation of contingency plans.
Know how to develop and execute a CI
appendix to the intelligence annex to a
joint operational/exercise plan or OP
order.
Know the Joint Planning System and
how it supports both deliberate and
time-sensitive plans. Know the
roles/responsibilities of DOD, NSA,
FBI, CIA, JCS, combatant commands,
and the Services CI agencies in
providing CI support to contingency
planning and execution.
Know how CI HUMINT and Special
Operations Forces will coordinate and

16 Top Secret/SCI
18 Defense Intelligence Agency (DAC-1B), Joint CI Support Branch (JCISB), Pentagon, Room 1E821,
19 (703) 614-9155.
20
F-5

1 6. Multi-Discipline CI Course (U)
DESCRIPTION
3 Improves professional CI officers' understanding of the

4 multi-discipline approach to CI. This course is not a course
5 in analytic methods or methodology.
6 Who Should Attend
7 CI professionals from throughout DOD and the Intelligence
8 Community (IC).
9 Course Activities
10 Lectures, discussions, videos, and case studies
11 Faculty
12 Instructors from the JMITC and subject-matter experts from
13 the Intelligence Community
Learn the all-source CI national and

DOD environments.
Learn how to access HUMINT, SIGINT,
IMINT, MASINT, and other information
and resources in the IC.
Learn how organizationally perceived
roles effect CI policy and analysis.
Learn the threats to US national
interests from foreign intelligence and
security services (FISS) and about the
US resources that drive responses to
FISS threats.
Understand the complex
interdependent relationships of CI
organizations from operations to finished
15 Two weeks/three times a year/also available as a two-three day mobile course.

17 Top Secret/SI/TK/G
19 JMITC, DIAC, Bolling AFB, Washington, DC, (202) 373-3897
F-6

1 7. Evolution of American CI (U)
DESCRIPTION

3 Provides the students with a broad historical
4 perspective of the growth and development of US CI
5 from the historical legacy of the American Revolution
6 to the current day.
7 Who Should Attend
8 New or mid-level intelligence officers or special agents
9 whose present or future assignments may involve CI
10 responsibilities.
12 Lectures, videos, case studies, and class participation
Evaluates the historical significance of key

events in the development of the CI discipline in
the United States.
Applies the lessons learned to future public
and legislative scrutiny and helps students
make decisions based on a historical
perspective.
Projects the need for a strong CI program.
Lists and explains the five core issues
affecting CI policies and strategies
in the post-Cold War era.
Advances interagency cooperation and
creates a learning environment.
13 Faculty
14 NACIC and guest speakers
Identifies various agencies' perspectives and

16 One week/twice a year
17 Security Clearance Needed Secret
19 Community Training Branch, NACIC, (703) 874-4122
20 Registration Data - Three weeks before course
F-7

1 8. Strategic Approaches to CI (SACI) (U)
DESCRIPTION
3 Designed to illuminate the "big picture," emphasizes US

4 national CI strategies and the approaches taken
5 throughout the CI community to implement these
6 strategies. Focuses on the five core issues that will be
7 enduring challenges for the CI community for the next
8 decade.
Analyzes foreign
intelligence
services CI threat data.
Determines risks and
vulnerabilities to information
9 Who Should Attend

10 New or mid-level managers in operational CI agencies or other CI community elements who
11 demonstrate a potential for advancement to more senior CI positions, and whose present or future
12 assignments may involve CI policy formation or interagency responsibilities.
14 Lectures, videos, case studies, and group discussions to develop a strategy with examples of
15 successful strategies used by US companies to compete in today's world. Student
16 presentations.
17 Faculty
18 Instructors, program managers, and subject-matter experts from throughout the intelligence and CI
19 communities, sponsored by the NACIC
20 How Long? How Often? Class Size
21 Fifty hours/April and October/30
23 Top Secret/SCI
25 Community Training Branch, NACIC, (703) 874-4122. Usually at an off-site location
27 Nomination by parent agency. Thirty days before course date
F-8

1 9. The Threat to Information Systems (U)
3 This course reviews an updated summary of various threats to information systems.
4 Who Should Attend
5 Students should have familiarity with the concept of threat from foreign intelligence services
6 Course Activities
7 Lectures, discussions, demonstrations, and practical problems
8 Faculty
9 Instructors from the National Cryptologic School (NCS)
10 How Long?
11 Twenty-four hours/three days, full-time
13 Top Secret and indoctrinated for special intelligence. Pass to NSA Office of Security electronically.
15 NCS (410) 859-6336 or secure 968-8054
17 Open to CI community personnel. Registration request should be made through parent agency training
18 coordinator to the NSA/NCS registrar.
F-9

1 10. INFOSEC Familiarization Course (U)
DESCRIPTION

3 This course is a survey of communications security (COMSEC)
4 principles and techniques with an emphasis on electronic
5 COMSEC systems and cryptographic equipment.
6 Who Should Attend
7 Students requiring fundamental knowledge of COMSEC
8 Course Activities
Topics include:
A history of COMSEC and
cryptology
The national information security
(INFOSEC) structure, mission, and
relationships
The vulnerability of threats to US
military and civil communications
systems
9 Lectures and discussions

10 Faculty
11 Instructors from the National Cryptologic School (NCS)
12 How Long?
Physical, cryptographic,
transmissions, and emission
(TEMPEST) security
Off-line cryptosystems
13 Forty hours/one week, full-time
Emergency destruction
COMSEC material production
15 Top Secret. Pass to NSA Office of Security electronically.

Computer security digital

encryption theory
Key management
17 NCS (410) 859-6336 or secure 968-8054
INFOSEC system and

cryptographic equipment
applications
19 Open to CI community personnel.
20 Registration request should be made
21 through parent agency training
22 coordinator to the NSA/NCS registrar.
Systems and equipment under

development
F-10

1
Appendix G
MAGTF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLANNING CHECKLIST
3 INTRODUCTION .
This appendix identifies typical MAGTF counterintelligence/HUMINT

during each phase of the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP).
MCPP STEP MAGTF STAFF ACTIONS
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLANNING ACTIONS
G-1

MISSION Identify the higher
ANALYSIS headquarters
Review HHQ and MAGTF standing intelligence plans (e.g., Annex B to an OPLAN), CI plans (Appendix 3 to Annex B),
HUMINT plan (Appendix 5 to Annex B), etc.
(HHQ)/supported
Assist with determination of the MAGTF AO and AOI
headquarters intent
Assess DIA's, CIA's
, combatant commands and other external organizations ongoing CI operations and
within
plans
the AO
Identify tasks
and AOI (e.g., availability and currency of CI contingency materials)
Determine the area of
Provide initial CI estimates
and other CIproducts to support initial planning (ensure needs of subordinate units are identified
operations (AO) and area of and met)
interest (AOI)
Determine specified, implied and essentialtasks
CI
Review available assets Develop proposed CImission statement; coordinate with G/S-2 intelligence operations officer and G/S-3 force protection
and identify personnel and officer; obtain G/S-2 officer's
approval
equipment resource shortfalls Assist security manager with development of security classification guidance to support planning and subsequent operations
Determine constraints and
Identify organic/supporting CI
elements & subordinate units' points
CI
of contact
; acquire an immediate operational status
restraints
report from each; determine personnel and equipment deficiencies
Determine recommended Review/prepare new CI survey/vulnerability assessment;
determine and prioritize significant security vulnerabilities
exist;
commanders critical
provide recommendations (e.g., CI active and passive measures); identify requirements for technical surveillance countermeasures
information requirements
support
(priority intelligence
Identify JTF/multinational CI
interoperability issues; provide recommendations
requirements, friendly force Establish/review/update the MAGTF CI databases
; special attention to
current threat estimates,
current CI estimates, and
CI
information requirements, targets (personalities, organizations, and installations)
essential elements of friendly Ensure subordinate units CI
POCs kept advised of pertinent actions and developments
information [EEFI])
Identify external organizations CI collection and production plans, and assess against MAGTF's initial requirements
Identify requests for
Determine CI personnel & equipment deficiencies; initiate augmentation requests (coordinate with intelligence operations
information
officer)
Determine assumptions Assign/task-organize organic CI elements (e.g., CI/HUMINT company detachments or HUMINT exploitation teams to
Draft mission statement major subordinate elements; CI element to MAGTF future operations/plans sections)
Present mission analysis Validate/update JTF CI tactics, techniques and procedures and MAGTF standing operating procedures (coordinate with
brief
HHQ and subordinate units)
Draft the warning order Validate and prioritize CI requirements; special attention to those needed for COA development
Convene/alert red
cell (if Begin development of CI operations plan; issue orders to CI collection and production elements (coordinate with collections
appropriate)
manager and AFC OIC, respectively)
Begin staff estimates
Update/begin necessary CI surveys/vulnerability assessments
Refine commanders
Determine initial CI communications and information systems (CIS) requirements & dissemination plans; identify
intent
deficiencies (coordinate with dissemination manager and G/S-6)
Develop the commanders Validate CI database management procedures (coordinate with JTF and subordinate units)
planning guidance
Ensure subordinate units' CI POCs kept advised of pertinent actions and developments
MCPP STEP
MAGTF STAFF ACTIONS
G-2

COURSE OF
ACTION
DEVELOPMENT
Continue intelligence
preparation of the battlespace

(throughout all steps of the
planning process)
Array friendly forces
Assess relative combat
power
Centers of gravity and
critical vulnerabilities analysis

Brainstorm possibilities
Develop roughcut
course(s) of action (COA)
Commanders input
COA(s) refinement
COA(s) validation
COA(s) graphic and
narrative development
Prepare and present
COA(s) briefing
Commander
selects/modifies COA(s)
Assist with development and continued updating of the intelligence & CI estimates, with emphasis on the following:
Development of CI target reduction plans
Periodic CI summaries and threat estimate update
Development of CI target reduction plans
Recommendations and implementation of current/future CI countermeasures
Assist the intelligence, operations, and other staff sections with COA development
Develop the CI concept of operations for each COA; begin preparation of:
Appendix 3 (CI operations) to Annex B
Assistance to Appendix 5 (HUMINT operations) to Annex B
Assist operations section with force protection plans to Annex C
Determine CI capabilities required for each COA
Coordinate CI-related collection, production, and dissemination requirements for each COA
Continue development of CI estimate of supportability for each COA
Ensure subordinate units' CI POCs kept advised of pertinent actions and developments
COURSE OF Conduct COA analysis Complete CI estimateand threat assessments

ACTION
wargaming
Complete CIestimates of supportability
ANALYSIS Refine staff estimates and Assist intelligence section with completion of the intelligence estimate and the friendly intelligence estimate of
estimates of supportability supportability
Develop concepts based Assist operations section with completion of the force protection estimate
upon warfighting functions (as
Continue to monitor and update CI collection production
and
activities
required)
Ensure subordinate units receive necessary
products;
CI
verify understanding; identify/update subordinates' current
Prepare COA analysis
intelligence requirements (IR) and force protection
EEFIs
brief
Validate and update CI
information requirements
Ensure subordinate units CI
G-3
MCPP STEP
COURSE OF
ACTION
COMPARISO
N AND
DECISION
MAGTF STAFF
ACTIONS
Evaluation of each Assist intelligence and operations sections with evaluation and comparison of each COA
COA
Continue development of Appendixto3Annex B consistent with the selected COA
Comparison of
Update, validate & prioritize CI
information requirements and supporting CI collection/
production requirements for the selected
COAs
COA; issue orders as appropriate to elements
CI
Commanders
Coordinate CIelement task-organization needs associated with the selected COA, with special attention to necessary support to
decision
the main effort
Issuance of
Continue coordination with the G/S-6 regardingCIS
CI requirements, to include standard and unique CIS for internal CI operations
warning order
and with other joint/multinational organization
Continue coordination with G/S-1 as necessary for physical courieringproducts
of CI to subordinate units; and with the G/S-1
and PMO for EPW handling/compound related plans development
Review actions associated with satisfyingpersonnel
CI
and equipment deficiencies associated with the selected COA
Ensure subordinate units receive pertinentproducts
CI
(e.g., current CI threat assessment); verify understanding; identify/update
subordinates current CI
IRs
Validate MAGTF CI IRsand tasks to support force protection EEFIs
Ensure subordinate units CI
G-4

ORDERS
DEVELOPMENT
MCPP STEP
Commanders
intent is refined
Concept of
operations turned into

an operations order or
a fragmentary order
Staff estimates and
other planning
documents updated
and converted into
operations order
(OPORD) annexes and
appendices
Commander
approves OPORD
MAGTF STAFF
ACTIONS
TRANSITION Transition brief

Drills
Plan refinements
(as required)
Complete Appendix 3 to Annex B; ensure copies provided to subordinate units and they understand
Update, validate & prioritize CI
information requirements and associated collection operations;
Monitor ongoing CI
production operations; update and issue orders as appropriateelements
to CI
Ensure pertinent CIproducts are disseminated to all subordinate units
Complete CIrelated CISactions
Maintain coordination with external elements
CI
Assist intelligence section with transition brief

Modify CI plans as necessary
Monitor ongoing CI
collection and production operations; update and issue orders as needed
elements
to CI
Ensure all subordinate units CI
POCs and CIofficers in JTF and other components fully understand plans and standing
requirements; and ensure they have received necessary
products
CI
Identify, validate and prioritize remaining CI IRs and force protection EEFIs
Participate in drills
Remain engaged in MAGTF future plans activities
G-5

1
APPENDIX H
REFERENCES
3 National
4 EO 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities."
5 NSCID 5, "U.S. Clandestine Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Abroad."
6 DCID 1/7, "Security Control on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information."
7 DCID 5/1, "Espionage and Counterintelligence Abroad." (With supplemental MOAs)
8 Department of Defense
9 DOD Dir 1325.6, "Guidelines for Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of the
10 Armed Forces."
11 DOD Dir 0-2000.12, "DOD Combating Terrorism Program."
12 DOD Dir 3025.1, "Use of Military Resources During Peacetime Civil Emergencies Within the United
13 States, Its Territories and Possessions."
14 DOD Dir 5105.29, "Human Resources Intelligence (HUMINT) Activities."
15 DOD Dir 5105.32, "Defense Attach System."
16 DOD Dir 5200.27, "Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated
17 with the Department of Defense."
18 DOD Dir S-5205.1, "Acquisition and Reporting of Information Relating to National Security."
19 DOD Dir 5205.2, "DOD Operations Security Program."
20 DOD Dir 5210.48, "DOD Polygraph Program."
21 DOD Dir 5210.50, "Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information to the Public."
22 DODINST 5210.84, "Security of DOD personnel at U.S. Missions Abroad."
23 DOD Dir C-5230.23, "Intelligence Disclosure Policy."
H-1
1 DOD Dir 5240.1, "DOD Intelligence Activities."

2 DOD Dir 5240.2, "DOD Counterintelligence Activities."
3 DODINST 5240.4, "Reporting of Counterintelligence and Criminal Violations."
4 DODINST 5240.5, "DOD Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) Survey Program."
5 DOD Dir 5240.6, "Counterintelligence Awareness Briefing Program."
6 DODINST C-5240.8, "Security Classification Guide for Information Concerning the DOD
7 Counterintelligence Program."
8 DODINST S-5240.9, "Support to Department of Defense Offensive Counterintelligence Operations."
9 DODINST 5240.10, "DOD Counterintelligence Support to Unified and Specified Commands."
10 DODINST 5505.3, "Initiation of Investigations by Military Criminal Investigative Organizations."
11 DODINST 5505.6, "Investigation of Allegations Against Senior Officials of the DOD."
12 DOD Dir 5525.5, "DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials."
13 DIA Manual 57-1, "General Intelligence Production."
14 DIA Manual 57-6, "DOD Indications and Warning System."
15 DIA Manual 58-1, "Defense Intelligence Collection."
16 DIA Manual 58-7, "Time Sensitive Requirements Coordination and Management."
17 DIA Manual 58-11, Department of Defense HUMINT Policies and Procedures.
18 DIA Manual 58-12, "Department of Defense HUMINT Management System"
19 DIA Reg 60-4, "Procedures Governing DIA Intelligence Activities that Affect U.S. Persons."
20 Joint Publications
21 --------, "Concept for Future Joint Operations --- Expanding Joint Vision 2010."
H-2

1 Joint Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces "
2 Joint Pub 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms."
3 Joint Pub 2-0, "Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations."
4 Joint Pub 2-01, "Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations."
5 Joint Pub 2-01.2, (Draft) "Counterintelligence Support to Joint Operations" (with classified supplement)
6 Joint Pub 2-01.2, (Draft) "Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace."
7 Joint Pub 2-02, (Draft) "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations."
8 Joint Pub 3-02, "Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations."
9 Joint Pub 3-07, "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War."
10 Joint Pub 3-07.2, "Joint Doctrine for Antiterrorism."
11 Joint Pub 3-10, "Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations."
12 Joint Pub 3-13, (Draft) "Information Operations" (with classified supplement)
13 Joint Pub 3-13.1, "Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare."
14 Joint Pub 3-50.2, "Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue"
15 Joint Pub 3-50.3, "Joint Doctrine for Evasion and Recovery."
16 Joint Pub 3-54, "Joint Doctrine for Operations Security."
17 Joint Pub 3-57, "Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs."
18 Joint Pub 5-00.2, "Joint Task force Planning, Guidance and Procedures."
19 Joint Pub 5-03.1, "Joint Operations Planning and Execution System, Volume I."
20 Joint Pub 6-0, "Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications and Computers Systems Support to
21 Joint Operations."
22 Marine Corps Order and Publications

H-3
1 MCO 3302.1, "Antiterrorism Program".

2 MCO 3850.1H, "Policy and Guidance for Counterintelligence Activities."
3 MCO 3820.1, "Foreign Military Intelligence Collection Activities (FORMICA).
4 MCO 003850.2 Marine Corps Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO).
5 -------6
Operational Maneuver from the Sea -- A Concept for

the Projection of Naval Power Ashore
1996
7 --------
Ship to Objective Maneuver
Jul 97
8 --------
Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain
Jul 97
9 -------10
11
Beyond Command and Control --- A Concept for

Command and Coordination of the Marine Air-Ground
Task Force
Jul 98
12 --------
A Concept for Information Operations
Aug 98
13 MCWP 0-1
Marine Corps Operations
(Draft)
14 MCWP 0-1.1
Componency
Jun 98
15 MCDP 1
Warfighting
Jun 97
16 MCDP 2
Intelligence
Jun 97
17 MCWP 2-1
Intelligence Operations
Feb 98
18 MCDP 3
Expeditionary Operations
Apr 98
19 MCWP 3-1
Ground Combat Operations
(Draft)
20 MCWP 3-2
Aviation Operations
(Draft)
21 MCWP 4-1
Logistics Operations
(Draft)
22 MCRP 4-27C
Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees
Apr 98
23 MCDP 5
Planning
Jun 97
H-4
1 MCWP 5-1
Marine Corps Planning Process
(Draft)
2 MCRP 5-12C
3
Marine Corps Supplement to the DOD Dictionary of

Military and Associated Terms
Jul 98
4 MCDP 6
Command and Control
Oct 96
5 MCWP 6-1
MAGTF Command and Control Operations
(Draft)
6 MCWP 6-22
Communications and Information Systems
(Draft)
7 FMFRP 3-23-2/ Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

8 FM 34-130
Jul 94
9 Navy Publications
10 SECNAVINST 3300.2, "Combating Terrorism."
11 SECNAVINST 3800.8B, "Intelligence Oversight Within the Department of the Navy."
12 SECNAVINST S3810.5A, "Management of Foreign Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Investigative
13 Activities within the Department of the Navy."
14 SECNAVINST 3820.2D, "Investigative and Counterintelligence Collection and Retention Guidelines
15 Pertaining to the Department of the Navy."
16 SECNAVINST 3820.3D, "Oversight of Intelligence Activities Within the Department of the Navy."
17 SECNAVINST 3850.2B, "Department of the Navy Counterintelligence."
18 SECNAVINST S3850.3, "Support to Department of Defense Offensive Counterintelligence
19 Operations."
20 SECNAVINST 3875.1, "Counterintelligence and Awareness Briefing Program."
21 SECNAVINST 5500.30E, "Reporting of Counterintelligence and Criminal Violations to Office of the
22 Secretary of Defense Officials."
23 SECNAVINST 5500.31A, "Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) Program."
24 SECNAVINST 5500.34, "Security of DOD Personnel at U.S. Missions Abroad."
H-5
1 SECNAVINST 5520.3B, "Criminal and Security Investigations and Related Activities Within the
2 Department of the Navy."
3 OPNAVINST 1620.1A, "Guidelines for Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of
4 the Armed Forces."
5 OPNAVINST 3300.53, "Navy Combating Terrorism Program."
6 OPNAVINST S3850.5, "Support to DOD Offensive Counterintelligence Operations."
7 OPNAVINST C5500.46, "Technical Surveillance Countermeasures."
8 OPNAVINST 5510.1, "Department of the Navy Information and Personnel Security Program
9 Regulation."
10 Army Publications
11 AR 381-10, "US Army Intelligence Activities."
12 AR 381-20, "The Army Counterintelligence Program."
13 AR 381-47, "US Army Counterespionage Activities."
14 AR 381-172, "Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations and Low Level Source
15 Operations
16 FM 34-5, Human Intelligence and Related Counterintelligence Activities.
17 FM 34-60, "Counterintelligence."
18 FM 34-60A, "Counterintelligence Operations -- Classified Supplement."
H-6
Beyond Spy vs. Spy
The Analytic Challenge of Understanding

Chinese Intelligence Services
Peter Mattis
Introduction
Clear understanding of
Chinese intelligence
serves more than the CI
mission.
Scholars of intelligence and comparative politics have tended to

overlook intelligence services as
bureaucratic organizations and as
components of government information-processing systems. As a consequence, conventionally trained
analysts and most journalists tend to
overlook the role of intelligence and
security services in extending and
maintaining state power and international policy goals.
In the case of China, the intense
focus of writers on the ups and
downs of US-Chinese relations seldom leads to efforts to more deeply
understand China and the sources of
its governments behavior, and, in
particular, the effects that Chinese
intelligence services might have on
that behavior. Even when journalists and other commentators address
the seemingly monthly appearance
of new details of Chinese human
and technical espionage, analysts
tend to focus on each incident as a
bellwether of the US-Chinese relationship or as a straightforward
counterintelligence (CI) issue.
Protecting the integrity of US
intelligence and policy processes is
an important task for the US Intelligence Community, but clear understanding of Chinese intelligence
serves more than the CI mission. At
the core, analysis of Beijings intelligence institutions is about trying to
understand systematically how the
Chinese government uses information to inform its policy formulation, guidance to diplomats and
security officials, and the execution
of its policies.
Just as importantly, Chinas civilian intelligence and security agencies are empowered to arrest and to
operate inside and outside China.
The distinction between intelligence
and internal security policy is minimal, institutionally speaking. This
makes these services not just part of
a policy staff process but an integral
tool for the preservation of the
power of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP). a 1 Yet, very little is
known about the organizations
themselves and their importance to
China and its future. 2
The Analytical Questions

The Chinese intelligence services
(CIS) present three distinct analytic
challenges critical to understanding
Beijing has consistently identified this goal as a core interest of China, indicating a willingness to
use force if necessary.
a
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the
author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September 2012)
47
Analysis of Chinese Intelligence
As Chinese foreign interests widen, Beijing increasingly will call

upon the intelligence services.
the future of China and US-Chinese
relations.
The CIS and Domestic Political
Activists
First, insights into Chinas political future require analysis of the
competition between domestic political activists and the security services. A decade ago, Chinas
security state appeared to be eroding as modern communications technology swept across the country.
Today, domestic intelligence agencies have adapted to the Internet and
mobile communications and are
capable of following electronic
breadcrumbs left behind as people
move through Chinas informatized (xinxihua) society. Whether
the current regime stays in power or
a political movement generates
enough momentum for political
reform will depend on how effectively Chinas internal security
forces perform their work.
Evolution of Chinese Intelligence
The second issue to be watched is
the evolution of the Chinese intelligence community, particularly on
the civilian side. Internally oriented
security services tend to reinforce
the leaderships worst fears about
potential adversaries, the United
States in particular, 3 and Chinas
civilian intelligence organizations
both focus on internal security.
The degree to which Beijing
resolves the issues of overlapping
jurisdictionsor, at least, insulates
the foreign intelligence function
from internal securitywill help
determine the tone and relative
objectivity of foreign intelligence
products reaching the leadership. As
48
Chinese foreign interests widen, Beijing increasingly will call upon the
intelligence services to provide
inputs to assessments of the intentions of states capable of harming
Chinas interests abroad.
Information Processing Systems
The final challenge is evaluation of
the Chinese intelligence communitys information processing systems. The civilian ministries include
national, provincial, and local elements, which operate under competing horizontal and vertical lines of
authority. The military intelligence
services under the General Staff
Department compose Chinas only
all-source intelligence capability, but
the mechanics of intelligence fusion
in the Peoples Liberation Army
(PLA) are opaque.
How these agencies collect, process, and disseminate intelligence
affects Chinese behavior, and, with
the rise of cyberspace issues, the
volumes of information are potentially staggering and difficult to
manage. Knowing how this system
works is a prerequisite to ensuring
US leaders can be certain US statements and acts are interpreted as
they were intended.
In this essay I will outline a
research agenda on the Chinese
intelligence services built around
these three challenges, and I will
suggest some of the factors that
should underpin future analysis.

Fundamentals of Chinese
Approaches
Before addressing the analytic
questions, I will briefly address some
misunderstandings of the nature of
Chinese intelligence operations.
Many, perhaps most, US observers of
Chinese intelligence have argued that
the Chinese think about and collect
intelligence in ways fundamentally
different from Western or even Russian intelligence.
In large measure this perception
stems from Chinese attempts to
acquire, legally and otherwise, Western technology information to support Chinese modernization and
economic priorities. These efforts
have been equated with Chinese
intelligence collection and have been
labeled the mosaic or grains of
sand approach. Chinese intelligence, it has been argued in this context, has four basic tenets:
Chinese intelligence focuses
on ethnic Chinese as sources;
It relies on amateur collectors
rather than professional intelligence officers;
It does not use intelligence
tradecraft familiar to Western services;
It pursues high volumes of
low-grade (if not entirely
unclassified) information. 4
This view falls down on both conceptual and empirical grounds. Conceptually, both US and Chinese
analysts describe intelligence in similar termsa specialized form of
knowledge for reducing uncertainty
during decision making. Empirically, the cases linked to the Chinese intelligence servicesnot
simply the illegal activities of Chinese nationals or companiesdemonstrate that professional Chinese
intelligence officers use familiar
tradecraft in formalized intelligence
relationships with their sources.
Additionally, cases are not limited to
ethnic-Chinese whatever their
nationality. a 5
Chinese Doctrine
Chinese writings on intelligence
bear remarkable similarity to familiar US definitions of intelligence
functions and goals. Sun Tzu taught
that foreknowledge (xianzhi)
allowed commanders to outmaneuver opponents. More modern definitions range from activating
[catalytic] knowledge (jihuo zhishi) to information to protect
national security, domestic stability,
or corporate interests in a competitive environment. 6
Chinese military scholars today
frame intelligence as a distinct subset of knowledge, defined by its relevance to decision makers and a
competitive environment. Specifically, intelligence is transmittable
(chuandi xing) and is knowledge that
satisfactorily (manzu xing) resolves
a specific decision-making
problem. 7
Empirically, Chinese intelligence
officers consistently have demonstrated the use of widely practiced
professional tradecraft, having successfully exploited for political and
military intelligence purposes agents
Chinese writings on intelligence bear remarkable similarity to

familiar US definitions of intelligence functions and goals.
with vulnerabilities familiar to anyone who follows the subject. The use
of such tradecraft goes back to the
most famous early known cases,
Larry Wu-Tai Chin and Bernard
Boursicot (M. Butterfly). The former began in the 1940s and latter in
the 1960s.
Similar techniques have been
applied in more recent casesGregg
Bergersen, Chi Mak, James Fondren, and Tai-Shen Kuo. These
revolved around a single Chinese
intelligence officer, and possibly a
second. 8 Each of these sources was
paid for sensitive information and all
were aware of an intelligence relationship.
Consequences of the Conventional
View
Misapprehension of Chinese intelligence practices has consequences.
Most basically, the mosaic or
grains of sand concepts fail to
guide the organization, prioritization, and execution of CI efforts
against Chinese national and corporate intelligence threats because the
concepts do not differentiate
between the varied Chinese collectors and their motivations as well as
their varied signatures and risks to
the United States:
The mosaic concept does not
help clarify what aspects of
Chinese information and tech-
nology collection are important, whether the collection is

linked to Chinese intelligence
services or not. If Chinese
intelligence includes everything from the intelligence
services to a corporation to a
criminal entrepreneur, then
the term becomes almost
meaningless. b
A belief that the Chinese rely on
amateur operatives risks leading
CI professionals to dismiss or be
inattentive to the threat posed by
Chinas professional services. 9
When economic espionage
with no connection to the Chinese intelligence services is
interpreted as Chinese intelligence, less attention will be
paid to what those organizations actually do. The Chinese
intelligence services and the
Chinese defense industries are
distinct entities, although they
may sometimes work for
mutual benefit.
The grains of sand concept
focuses analytic attention on
the CI risk individuals pose
rather than on government
intelligence services.
Still, it should be borne in mind
that while the evidence shows that
Chinese and US intelligence con-
a The Chinese intelligence services have balanced finding targets with access and sources able to travel back-and-forth to China. That many of these individuals were ethnically Chinese is a function more of opportunity than intent, because China-based case officers have run most known Chinese operations. Moreover, many of Beijings intelligence targets are, in fact, ethnically Chinese, such as Taiwan and overseas dissident groupswhere foreigners are targeted, the
results are cases like Boursicots and Glenn Shrivers.
b After the Congressional investigation into the Chinese espionage scandals of the 1990s, the committee tried to warn future analysts to be clear in their distinctions. The Cox Committees final report admonished that those unfamiliar with Chinese intelligence practices often conclude that, because intelligence
services conduct clandestine operations, all clandestine operations are directed by intelligence agencies. In the case of [China], this is not always the rule.
49
What Beijing really appears to be aiming for is creation of the

capacity to create a panoptic state.
cepts and methods may not be too
far apart, intelligence organizations
operate in the service of national
policy. The needs and priorities of
decision makers guide the activities
of intelligence services and their
operations.
Beijing and Washington are
engaged in dramatically different
competitions that need active intelligence support. For example, counterterrorism in both countries
focuses on noticeably different problems. US intelligence agencies primarily are concerned with terrorists
abroad and their efforts to go operational within the United States.
China, by contrast, confronts
domestic terrorists that apparently
have relatively fewer foreign links.
The operational challenges related to
collecting intelligence on these
essentially different terrorist threats
produce different kinds of intelligence activity. Observers should be
careful not to go too far in describing the similarities between the two
systems, especially given the differing cultures and ways of thinking. 10
The Challenges
Thinking of Chinas intelligence
services as bureaucratic organizations raises questions of what functions they serve as part of the states
administrative apparatus and how
well they perform those functions.
Below, I will outline what I believe
are the three principal analytic challenges to understanding the Chinese
intelligence services and their relationship to the future of China and
US-Chinese relations.
50
1. Assessing Chinas Internal

Security Apparatus
Informed assessments of the capabilities and performance of Chinas
internal security system may not
have direct payoffs in terms of immediate US policy goals, but they are
key elements in evaluations of
Chinas stabilityin turn a key factor in a number of US strategic
interests in Asia. Analysis of Chinas
internal security forces is the first
step toward a net assessment of the
competition between Chinas political reformers and its governing
apparatus. While the United States
may not wish to influence this contest directly, US policymakers should
be aware of its progress and the viability of Chinese opposition.
outpaced the cost of Chinas dramatic military modernization, coming in at $95 billion compared to
$92 billion in 2010 and up to $111
billion for 2012. 13
Following several years of locallevel experimentation with intelligence-led policing, State Councillor
and Minister of Public Security
(MPS) Meng Jianzhu announced the
nation-wide adoption of public
security informatization (gongan
xinxihua) at an MPS conference in
2008. Public security informatization refers to the process of integrating information more closely
into police operations, including
both domestic intelligence gathering
and information management components.
For at least the past 15 years,

China has appeared precariously
unstable; various sources have noted
mounting unrestnow well over
100,000 mass incidents per year. 11
Reports and photographs of violent
demonstrations in various places
have given rise to analysis that Beijings control over the coercive system, as well as that systems
capacity to maintain social control,
appears to be slipping. 12
On the former, the MPS directs its

officers to focus on collecting information about potential social disturbances. The most well-known
example of the latter is the Golden
Shield project, which is primarily
about linking a variety of nationaland local-level databases with personal information collected from
hotels, phone companies, and other
businesses that require true-name
registration. This data then can be
aggregated and used to generate
tasking for police stations automatically when a person-of-interest turns
up in that jurisdiction. 14
Since that assertion was published

in 2001, Beijing has reinvigorated its
coercive apparatus. As the Chinese
citizenry gained access to the Internet and mobile communications, the
authorities have increased their
investment in internal security.
According to press reports, State
Council budget figures for 2010 and
2011even if not broken out by
agencyshow that the expenditures
on internal security systems have
What Beijing really appears to be

aiming for is creation of the capacity to create a panoptic state, a
capacity that goes beyond what normally is thought of as domestic
intelligence. In the CCPs leading
journal, Chinas senior leader
responsible for security and stability, Zhou Yongkang, laid out the
desired social management system (shehui guanli tixi), which he
said would include integrating MPS
intelligence with public opinion

monitoring and propaganda to shape
peoples decision making about
appropriate actions in the public
sphere. 15
Since the publication of Zhous
article, the MPS has launched two
new efforts to change the level of its
public engagement. On 27 September 2011, the MPS formally
approved a nationwide policy for
public security elements use of
microblogs to spread a ministry perspective and inform Chinese citizens about safety concerns. 16 In
December 2011, the MPS also
pushed police officers out of their
stations as part of a campaign to win
over the hearts and minds of the Chinese peopleand to monitor public
opinion. 17
The idea of information control has deep roots in Chinese strategic thought.
how far the MPS and MSS go in

attempting to draw out potential dissidentsnot just identifying already
active subversive elements. 20
The MPS rejuvenation fits within a
broader strategy of localizing grievances while preserving the legitimacy of the central government in
Beijing. 21 The visible signs that this
strategy is working include examples of protestors in Guangdong
Province, who, despite their problem with corrupt local officials, still
appealed to Beijing. 22
The idea of information control

has deep roots in Chinese strategic
thought and may provide insight into
how Beijing is acting on its domestic ambitions. Beginning with Sun
Tzu, Chinese strategists have envisioned a seamless web of counterespionage, information collection,
agent provocateurs, and propagandistswhat Sun Tzu called the
divine skein. 18
The potential ability to track millions of people and register their

communications would support this
strategy by making it easier to follow activists and malcontents wherever they go, physically and
virtually. People like the lawyers
Chen Guangcheng and Gao Zhisheng, artist Ai Weiwei, and authors
Chen Wei, Yu Jie, and Liu Xiaobo
are dangerous because they draw
attention to systemwide grievances
and directly challenge the CCPs
role in perpetuating official abuse. 23
Intelligence as information to support decision making is only one

part of the overarching idea of
achieving information superiority.
For example, modern PLA strategists divided strategic information
operations into multiple categories
including manipulation of adversary
decision making, intelligence and
offensive counterintelligence, and
efforts to erode or destroy an opponents sensors, both human and
technical. 19
The final question about the MPS

and related security offices is what is
their degree of political influence.
Do the internal security forces
merely execute policy or are they
intimately involved in its creationand, consequently, in CCP
policymaking and strategy formulation? Little open-source materialother than published career
information and public leadership
functionshelp in analyzing this
question.
The question is whether these

ideas permeate internal security and
The largely unchronicled rise of the

MPS during the past decade sug-
gests Meng and his predecessor Zhou

Yongkang are largely responsible for
reforming the MPS and raising the
profile of social management and
preserving stability.
Yet despite the growing importance of the CCPs efforts to monitor and shape an increasingly
contentious Chinese society, 24
nowhere can be a found a public
profile of either of these two men
that analyzes their impact on policy
or the organizations they oversee.
2. Evolution of the Chinese

Intelligence Community
While analysts of Chinese intelligence activities often invoke Chinas
long history of espionage, the Chinese intelligence community as currently constituted is less than 30
years old. While culture matters,
institutions are affected by much
moreincluding incentives, leadership attention, and measurements of
performance. Assessments of developing bureaucratic and political
relationships may be difficult, even
impossible, using only open-source
material, but clearer understanding
of them will help US intelligence and
policymakers understand the conflicting interests that will shape the
Chinese intelligence apparatus and
its contribution to Chinese policymaking, especially as Beijings interests abroad grow and create new
bureaucratic space and possibly
greater influence for the intelligence service most able to respond
to leadership needs.
Since its creation in 1983, the Ministry of State Security (MSS) has
51
Recent developments suggest Beijing may be placing more

emphasis on the MSS and other intelligence services to develop more capable foreign intelligence capabilities.
fought to carve out its operational
and policy space from the Ministry
of Public Security. When Beijing
created the MSS, it fused the remnants of the CCPs Investigation
Department with the intelligenceand counterintelligence-related components of the MPS.
The first minister of state security
had been a senior vice minister of
public security. Thus, the MSS
lacked a distinct identity, drawing as
it did from several organizations that
were still in the process of reconstiChinese Intelligence and
Security Services a
Civilian
Ministry of State Security (MSS)
Counterespionage and Counterintelligence; Foreign Intelligence;
Domestic Intelligence
Ministry of Public Security (MPS)
National Police; Domestic Intelligence;
Military
Second Department of the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) General
Staff Department (2PLA)
Foreign Intelligence; Defense Attach System; Imagery Intelligence;
Tactical Reconnaissance
Third Department of the PLA General Staff Department (3PLA)
Signals Intelligence
Other major intelligence and security

departments not specifically discussed in this
essay include the Fourth Department of the
PLA General Staff Department (4PLA); the
Liaison Office of the PLA General Political
Department; the intelligence departments of
the PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, and Second
Artillery; and the State Secrecy Bureau.
a
52
tuting from the chaos of the Cultural

Revolution (196676). 25
Recent developments suggest Beijing may be placing more emphasis
on the MSS and other intelligence
services to develop stronger foreign
intelligence capabilities. The first
sign was the selection of Geng
Huichang as the new MSS chief in a
ministerial shakeup in August 2007.
Geng became the first minister with
a foreign affairs, rather than internal
security, background. He reportedly
served as a professor at the MSSaffiliated Beijing International Relations Institute and as a scholar, and
later director, at the MSS think tank,
the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. 26
A second sign is the emergence
since 2008 of PRC intelligence operations conducted entirely outside of
China. Until then, no exposed Chinese espionage case occurred without operational activity inside China
that is, no operation occurred
without a physical connection to
China. The Swedish first identified
the new approach in 2008, when
they uncovered Chinese intelligence
officers in the Chinese embassy in
Stockholm who had recruited a
Uyghur migr to spy on fellow
migrs in Europe and beyond. The
Germans may have identified the
second, alleging the existence of a
spy ring run by a Chinese intelligence officer out of the Chinese consulate in Munich in 2009. Last year
a case involved the Taiwan Armys
director of telecommunications and
electronic information, who was
recruited in Bangkok. 27
Understanding is also needed of

the role of military intelligence
(especially 2PLA) in any competition for shares of the state budget
and for influence within the central
leadership. Chinese military modernization, especially the PLAs
development of precision-guided
weaponry, has created a new need
for timely tactical intelligencetargeting and data guidance, as well as
information to guide bomb damage
assessments, for example. 28 While
2PLA has been known as Chinas
CIA, 29 the militarys need for more
intelligence support would have created pressure for 2PLA to focus
more on military requirements rather
than national policymakers. 30
Chinese policymakerswith the
exception of two civilian members
of the Central Military Commission
can exercise little direct influence
over the PLA. Thus the PLAs intelligence needs could lead it to
monopolize intelligence resources or
underinvest in capabilities that might
otherwise go to meet the requirements of the central leadership. If
PLA intelligence resources become
more internally directed, as suggested by senior personnel
appointments, 31 then Beijing may
lose an alternative to the internally
oriented civilian security and intelligence apparatus.
A second factor to be understood is
the degree to which bureaucratic
inertia and the influence of the internal security elements of the Chinese
intelligence and security apparatus
affect developments. The civilian
organizations, the MPS and MSS,
report to the political-legal system
(zhengfa xitong) overseen by Zhou
Yongkang, who also sits on Politburo Standing Committee. His portfolio emphasizes preserving internal
stability (weihu wending gongzuo)
and, according to the Hong Kong

press, Zhou does not sit on any of
the foreign policymaking bodies,
such as the Foreign Affairs Leading
Small Group (FALSG). 32 The minister of state security only gained an
FALSG seat in 1998. 33
Both civilian ministries also have
substantial portionsprobably the
majorityof their personnel in provincial departments or local bureaus,
which report to the provincial and
local party committees in addition to
their home ministries. Foreign affairs
however are not handled at the subnational level, encouraging these local
MPS and MSS units to focus on provincial, rather than national, concerns like internal stability.
3. Understanding the Chinese

Intelligence Processing System
If US policymakers hope to shape
the way China exercises its growing
influence in the world, 34 they will
require clear understanding of how
Chinese intelligence interprets official US statements and intelligence
about the United States its services
collect and evaluate. Will information the United States purposefully
transmits reach Chinas senior civilian and military decision makers?
How it is interpreted will depend on
the biases and underlying assumptions about the United States that
each of the services have, subjects
we know little about. Without
answers to such questions the risk
will be high that US statements and
actions will be misinterpreted.
In part the answers to such questions lie in understanding the ideo-
It is highly likely that whatever reaches the top will have been
influenced by local procedures and biases.
logical and political prisms through
which Chinese officials at multiple
levels view the United States. In part
the answers lie in the institutional
frameworks through which intelligence about the United States flows
and the ways in which the Chinese
manage intelligence derived from
the new digital world of large data.
Institutional Frameworks
China, like the United States, has
separate civilian and military organizations, but it also has components
of national security and intelligence
distributed throughout provincial
and, in some cases, lower levels.
This is true both for civilian ministries, which have provincial and
lower level bureaus, and for PLA
intelligence organizations. An excellent military example is the Third
Department of the PLAs General
Staff Department (3PLA). The
3PLAresponsible for signals intelligence, computer network reconnaissance (cyber), and technical
countermeasureshas offices and
technical reconnaissance bureaus in
each of Chinas seven military
regions and several major cities, 35
and it is likely that the Chinese services have their own training and
procurement units in these areas. If
so, it follows that regional differences in performance and equipment will exist throughout the PLAs
intelligence organizations. 36
With multiple levels between the
sources of intelligence and Chinas
leadership, it is highly likely that
whatever reaches the top will have
been influenced by local procedures

and biases. 37 Understanding how
each of Chinas intelligence organizations processes reports, identifies
important issues, and validates information will be key to understanding
how Chinese perceptions are
shaped. a 38 Even if understanding
these processes does not provide the
insights British signals intelligence
did into German intentions, it forms
the beginnings of serious assessment and awareness.
A related question is to what extent
are institutional and procedural
biases reflected in the public writings of Chinese intelligence-affiliated analysts. Examples are the
works of analysts at the military
intelligencerun China Institute of
International and Strategic Studies
and the MSS-run China Institutes of
Contemporary International
Relations. 39 Are their writings useful in understanding how PLA and
MSS intelligence analysts filter and
interpret world events and foreign
intentions?
Large Data Processing
The reported scale of Chinas
hacking activities suggests terabytes
of data may be finding their way to
Chinese intelligence organizations. 40
What happens to the data there
remains unknown. The intricacy of
Chinas civilian and military security and intelligence organizations
and the variety of services they are
presumed to provide to a multitude
of government organizations make it
a Students of deception basically come to the same conclusions about what makes deceptioninfluencing an adversary to make disadvantageous decisions by
denying or supplying informationfunction well. Would-be deceivers need time, control over their own information, channels through which pass information, and the ability to monitor the adversarys thinking and behavior.
53
Ferreting out of internal, generally secret, processes may

seem irrelevant to national policy or the daily diplomatic and
commercial relations, but it is no less important for analysts
and policymakers to understand.
difficult, if not impossible, to examine solely through open sources.
Key questions include how will the
Chinese take on the challenge of
processing vast amounts of data that
human beings, even in the large
numbers Chinese intelligence presumably could recruit, are unable to
process. The challenge goes well
beyond simple translation problems
or conversion of data into searchable formats by organizations with
different bureaucratic practices and
jargon. How exploitation of such
data adds value to Chinese leaders
and policymakers is yet another
questionone which Western services have probably not even begun
to address, let alone resolve.
Conclusion
Chinas intelligence services have
long been underanalyzed as major
bureaucratic organizations and components of state power. This may
have mattered relatively little during
Chinas inward-looking and underdeveloped years. Today, its leaders
are significant players on the world
stage, and understanding how and
what they learn about the world and
how they formulate their policy
choices is more important than ever.
Given the complex choices the Chinese face, it is likely that their intelligence services will play an even
greater role than they have in the
past. 41
The intelligence and intelligence
analysis challenges the Chinese face
will look familiar to many US analysts:
Determining sources of energy
and maintaining the security
of delivery routes.
Protecting Chinese officials
and citizens working abroad.
Preserving markets for Chinese goods and defense of key
supply chains, among many
others.
All of these interests will put pressure on the intelligence services to
be more active abroad against a wide
variety of targets, both official and
not. How intelligence performs missions in support of these and other
goals will also serve as indicators of
Chinese national policy, and possibly in some cases as indicators of
independent policymaking in the
services.
At the same time, understanding

Chinese intelligence remains crucial
to understanding the state of Chinas
internal stability, although this topic
cannot be watched solely from an
intelligence perspectivethe pace of
economic development, indications
of the PLAs loyalty to the CCP, and
signs of the partys cohesion are
other keys.
Recent Western misconceptions
about Chinese intelligence operations and insufficient scholarly
attention to intelligence organizations have limited awareness of how
these institutions actually function,
but, as Chinas influence grows and
domestic unrest continues, failure to
remedy these deficiencies will be to
the detriment of the United States
and others with similar policy perspectives.
Finally, open-source researchers
are likely only to be able to establish the broad contours and systemic
pressures under which Chinese intelligence operates. They may also be
able to offer the questions in need of
research. But much of that research
involves the ferreting out of internal, generally secret, processes. That
work may seem irrelevant to broad
national policy or the daily blow-byblow of diplomatic and commercial
relations, but it is no less important
for analysts and policymakers to
understand.
54
Endnotes
1. See, Chinas Peaceful Development, Information Office of the State Council, Peoples Republic of China, 6 September
2011.
2. Ely Ratner and Steven Weber, American Policy toward China: Getting Beyond the Friend-or-Foe Fallacy, New America
Foundation Policy Paper, June 2011. For example, many analysts and commentators focus on the Chinese Peoples Liberation
Armys (PLA) new equipment and senior most leaders at the expense of analyzing doctrine, internal self-assessments of PLA
modernization, and training exercises that are more critical to Beijings ability to use force. See, Dennis Blasko, China in
2012: Shifting PerspectivesAssessing the PLA from the Ground Up, Jamestown Foundation China Brief 12, no. 2 (20 January 2012).
3. Christopher Andrew, Intelligence, International Relations, and Under-Theorisation, Intelligence and National Security 19,
no. 2 (2004): 17084; Michael Herman, Intelligence Services in the Information Age. (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 1920.
4. For the three most accessible descriptions of the mosaic, grains of sand, or human-wave approach to intelligence collection, see David Wise, Tiger Trap: Americas Secret Spy War with China (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing
Company, 2011), 519; Special Report: Espionage with Chinese Characteristics, StratFor, 24 March 2010; and Howard
DeVore, Chinas Intelligence and Internal Security Forces (Coulsdon, UK: Janes Information Group, 1999). For a separate
analysis of the validity of these propositions for Chinese intelligence related to the Glenn Duffie Shriver case, see, Peter Mattis, Shriver Case Highlights Traditional Chinese Espionage, Jamestown Foundation China Brief 10, no 22 (5 November
2010).
5. The Chinese intelligence services have balanced finding targets with access and sources able to travel to and out of China.
That many of these individuals are ethnic Chinese is in part of a function of the fact that most operations have been managed
by intelligence officers inside China and in part a reflection of Beijings concern for Chinese dissidents abroad and developments in Taiwan. See Peter Mattis, Chinese Intelligence Operations Reconsidered: Toward a New Baseline, M.A. Thesis,
Georgetown University (April 2011).
6. Chen Jiugeng, Guanyu qingbao he xinxi [Regarding Intelligence and Information], Qingbao Zazhi (Journal of Information) 19, no. 1 (January 2000): 46.
7. Yan Jinzhong, Junshi qingbao xue [The Study of Military Intelligence] (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2003), 12; Cheng Lei,
Qingbao yuan yu qingbao genyuan [Intelligence Sources and Intelligences Roots], Tushuguan zazhi [Library Journal], No.
3 (1994), 1618.
8. Wise, Tiger Trap, 22126, 238.
9. This deficiency shows in the publication record. Of the books and articles written on Chinese intelligence, only three, however minimally, examine the Chinese intelligence services as organizations and a fourth explores public security within the
context of governance. For the former, see, Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations; Eftimiades, Chinas Ministry of
State Security Comes of Age in the International Arena, Intelligence and National Security; and Devore, Chinas Intelligence
and Internal Security Forces. For the latter, see, Murray Scot Tanner and Eric Green, Principals and Secret Agents: Central
Versus Local Control over Policing and Obstacles to Rule of Law in China, The China Quarterly no. 191 (September 2007):
64470.
10. These differences can be explained both psychologically and philosophically, see, respectively, Richard Nisbett, The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think DifferentlyAnd Why, (New York: The Free Press, 2003); Robert Ames
and Bruce Hall, Thinking through Confucius (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987).
11. Mass incidents presumably refer to riots or other kinds of public demonstrations against local authorities. The last official statistics were released in 2006 and placed the number of mass incidents around 90,000. Leaked figures and Chinese
scholars estimates range as high 180,000 per year in more recent years. See, Barbara Demick, Protests in China over Local
Grievances Surge, and Get a Hearing, Los Angeles Times, 8 October 2011; Jeremy Page, Wave of Unrest Rocks China:
Threats to Social Order Increasingly Hit Cities, Bringing Iron-Fist Response, Wall Street Journal, 14 June 2011.
55
12. Murray Scot Tanner, Cracks in the Wall: Chinas Eroding Coercive State, Current History 100, no. 647 (September
2001): 243.
13. Leslie Hook, Beijing Raises Spending on Internal Security, Financial Times, March 6, 2011; China boosts domestic
security spending by 11.5 pct, Reuters, 5 March 2012.
14. Peter Mattis, Chinas Adaptive Approach to the Information Counter-Revolution, Jamestown Foundation China Brief
11, no. 10 (3 June 2011).
15. Zhou Yongkang, Jiaqiang he chuangxin shehui guanli; jianli jianquan zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi shehui guanli tixi
[Strengthen and Innovate Social Management; Construct a Sound Social Management System under Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics], Qiushi [Seeking Truth], 1 May 2011.
16. Gongan bu: ba gongan weibo jianshe cheng jingwu gongkai xin pingtai [MPS: Let microblog construction take police
openness to a new level], Xinhua, 27 September 2011; Liu Yang and Wu Min, Gongkai wei xian fuwu wei ben; zunzhong
junzhong shunying minyi; goujian juyou xianming tese de gongan weibo jun [Place openness first and be service-oriented;
respect the masses and heed public opinion; construct a public security microblogging group with distinct characteristics],
China Police Daily, 27 September 2011. See also, Peter Mattis, Public Security Officially Joins the Blogosphere, Jamestown
Foundation China Brief 11, no. 16 (30 September 2011).
17. Liu Xuegang, Renmin gongan bao kaizhan ruhe tigao qunzhong gongzuo nengli da taolun [China Police Daily reports a
great discussion over how to improve capability for mass work], Renmin Gongan Bao [China Police Daily], 31 January
2012.
18. Michael Warner, The Divine Skein: Sun Tzu on Intelligence, Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 4 (August 2006):
48392.
19. Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, The Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Academy of Military Science, 2005),
340343; Li Yueli, Lun junshi qingbao zuozhan [On Military Intelligence Warfare], Qingbao Zazhi [Journal of Information]
21, No. 7 (July 2002): 99100.
20. The idea of infiltrating potentially dissenting sectors of society continues to be present, see, Li Anjin, Mao Zedong tongyi
zhanxian sixiang de dangdai jiazhi [The Contemporary Value of Mao Zedongs United Front Thinking], Xuexi Shibao
[Study Times], 8 August 2011. For a full explanation of united front activities during the Chinese revolution, see, Lyman
Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1967).
21. Cheng Li, Think National, Blame Local: Central-Provincial Dynamics in the Hu Era, China Leadership Monitor 17
(Winter 2006).
22. Sui-Lee Wee, Chinese Rebel Villagers Vow March to Press Complaints, Reuters, 19 December 2011.
23. Mattis, Chinas Adaptive Approach to the Information Counter-Revolution.
24. Joseph Fewsmith, Social Management as a Way of Coping with Heightened Social Tension, China Leadership
Monitor 36 (Winter 2012).
25. Communist China: The Political Security ApparatusPart II Destruction and Reconstruction 19651969, POLO Paper
No. 37, CIA Directorate of Intelligence, 28 November 1969 (Declassified May 2007).
26. Peter Mattis, Assessing the Foreign Policy Influence of the Ministry of State Security, Jamestown Foundation China
Brief 11, no. 1 (14 January 2011).
27. Amber Wang, Sex Lured Taiwan General to Become China Spy, Agence France Presse, 9 February 2011; TECRO Representative: Lo Hsien-che Posted to Thailand, Not United States [zhu mei guan yuan: luo xianzhe zhu tai fei zhu mei], China Times
[zhongguo shibao], 9 February 2011; Lo Hsien-che Spies for Mainland; President Demands Thorough Investigation and
Strengthening of Protection of Secrets [luo xianzhe she gong die; zongtong yaoqiu che cha, zuo hao mimi baowei], China Times
[zhongguo shibao], 9 February 2011; Rich Chang, General Arrested, Accused of Spying, Taipei Times, 10 February 2011.
28. Luo Tianwen, Liu Ying, Liu Shoushuo, Tan Haifeng, and Wu Di, Junshi qingbao gongzuozhong mubiao yaohai panding
yanjiu, Qingbao Zazhi [Journal of Information] 29, no. 6 (June 2010): 107109.
56
29. Kan Zhongguo, Intelligence Agencies Exist in Great Numbers, Spies Are Present Everywhere; Chinas Major Intelligence Departments Fully Exposed, Chien Shao (Hong Kong), 1 January 2006.
30. For a useful analysis of the importance of Chinas growing military intelligence needs see, Ian Easton and Mark Stokes,
Chinas Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Developments: Implications for U.S. Air and Naval Operations, Project
2049 Institute Occasional Paper, 23 February 2011.
31. For an analysis of the PLA intelligence and foreign affairs leadership and the transition from intelligence experts to military operations personnel, see James Mulvenon, The Dawn of HeavenA New Player in Sino-U.S. Mil-Mil, China Leadership Monitor, no. 24 (Spring 2008); James Mulvenon, Ding, Dong, The Witch is Dead!Foreign Policy and Military
Intelligence Assessments after the Retirement of General Xiong Guangkai, China Leadership Monitor, no. 17 (Winter 2006).
32. Jen-kai Liu, China Data Supplement: The Main National and Provincial Leadership, Journal of Current Chinese
Affairs 19, no. 5 (2011).
33. Lu Ning, The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party Departments,
in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform 19782000, ed. David Lampton (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2001), 50, 414.
34. For expression of these views at the highest levels, see, for example, President Obamas remarks in Australia, The White
House, Office of the Press Secretary Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament, Parliament House, Canberra, Australia, 17 November 2011; Hillary Clinton, Americas Pacific Century, Foreign Policy, 11 October 2011.
35. Mark Stokes, Jenny Lin, and L.C. Russell Hsiao, The Chinese Peoples Liberation Army Signals Intelligence and Cyber
Reconnaissance Infrastructure, Occasional Paper, Project 2049 Institute, 11 November 2011; John Pomfret, China Finds
Bugs on Jet Equipped in U.S.; Devices Taken Off Presidential Plane Could Become Issue at Summit, Washington Post, 19
January 2002.
36. Mattis, Chinas Adaptive Approach to the Information Counter-Revolution.
37. James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 1989),
especially pp. 1428, 158171; Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1971), especially pp. 7896.
38. See, Michael Handel, War, Strategy, and Intelligence, New York: Routledge, 1989, 38095; J.C. Masterman, The DoubleCross System in the War of 1939 to 1945 (New York, Ballantine Books, 1972), 132; Li Mingyang, ed., Sunzi Bingfa [SunTzus Art of War] (Hefei, Anhui: Huangshan Shushe, 2001), 193.
39. These official linkages with Chinese intelligence are well-known and have been thoroughly traced in the public literature,
see, Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, Chinese Military-Related Think Tanks and Research Institutions, The China Quarterly,
No. 171 (September 2002); Bonnie Glaser and Phillip Saunders, Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes: Evolving Roles and Increasing Influence, The China Quarterly 171 (September 2002): 599; Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations, 19; Intelligence Threat Handbook, 2004 (Interagency OPSEC Support Staff. Alexandria, VA: Centre for
Counterintelligence and Security Studies, 2004), 7273; DeVore, Chinas Intelligence and Internal Security Forces, Sections
310.
40. For example, see, China-based Hacking of 760 Companies Shows Cyber Cold War, Bloomberg, 13 December 2011;
Michael Joseph Gross, Enter the Cyber-dragon, Vanity Fair, 1 August 2011; Josh Rogin, The Top 10 Chinese Cyber
Attacks (That We Know Of), Foreign Policy (22 January 2010).
41. Francesco Sisci, Too Many Cooks Spoil Foreign-Policy Stew, Asia Times Online, 7 January 2011; Linda Jakobson and
Dean Knox, New Foreign Policy Actors in China, SIPRI Policy Paper, no. 26 (September 2010).

57
NEGOTIATION:
Methodology and training
Free download from www.hsrcpress.ac.za
Louise Nieuwmeijer
Human Sciences Research Council
CHSRC 1988
All rights reserved. No part of this

publication may be reproduced or
transmitted In any form or by any means,
electronic or mechanical, Including
photocopy, recording or any Information
storage and retrieval system, without
permission In writing from the publisher.
ISBN 07969 1303 X
First published 1988

by Owen Burgess Publishers
Revised edition 1992
Published by
HSRC Publishers
134 Pretorius Street
PRETORIA
Reproduced & Printed by: Sigma Press
To my husband Johan, for

teaching me the rudimentaries
of integrative negotiation, and
Tiina, our greatest mutual gain.
The viewpoints in this book are those of the author

and not necessarily those of the HSRC.
Contents
Preface
1
Introduction: The nature and significance of

negotiation................................................................ 1
2.
Concept and definitions ............................................... 7
3.
Theories and models of negotiation............................ 13
4.
Negotiation research .................................................. 29
5.
Elements of negotiation .............................................. 45
6.
Training in negotiation .............................................. 151

References ............................................................... 157
Index ........................................................................ 175
Preface
Negotiation is a process through which two or more parties

communicate with one another in an effort to resolve their
opposing interests. It occurs in fields as diverse as labour
relations, international conflicts, political and constitutional
issues, socio-economic development and personal relations.
Negotiation: Methodology and training started as a literature
review identifying research areas to be investigated by the
Programme on Negotiation of the Institute for Communication
Research (Human Sciences Research Council). The need for
a general overview of negotiation methodology (theory and
research methods) became apparent from the demand for the
review from students, instructors and practitioners. It was
therefore decided to publish the review as a book and to add a
chapter on training.
The purpose of the book is to provide a useful overview of
negotiation theory, research and training. It covers the work of
practitioners and researchers from many disciplines. It also
includes references to research done by directly observing real
(as opposed to simulated) intercultural negotiations in
Southern Africa.
The book surveys the nature and significance of negotiation
and discusses the latest thinking on the subject. Concepts like
negotiation, collective bargaining, mediation, persuasion,
arbitration and lobbying are defined.
vii
The most prominent theoretical approaches and the models

that developed from these approaches are discussed and
classified in terms of their underlying structure. In addition the
strong points and limitations of the models are compared. The
methods used to study negotiation and the type and value of
knowledge resulting from the various methods are covered.
Elements such as power, credibility, trust, negotiator
personality, experience and perception all of which play a
role in negotiation are discussed. The book concludes with
an evaluation of well-known training materials and courses.
The need to base training courses on research is stressed,
and areas that still require attention are pointed out.
Louise Nieuwmeijer January 1988
viii
1
Introduction:
The nature and significance of negotiation
THE NATURE OF NEGOTIATION

Negotiation is a fact of life; just as we as humans cannot exist
without communicating, so we can barely exist without
negotiating.
Negotiation is a basic way of getting what one party wants from
another, it is an exchange of information through communication.
The information exchanged is formulated as strategies and
techniques. These strategies and techniques originate from the
negotiation relationship between the parties, and they also serve
to continue or discontinue the relationship. The purpose of this
communication exchange is to reach agreement between parties
who have certain things ill common while disagreeing on others.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NEGOTIATION

No South African (and certainly no-one aware of the international
situation) needs be convinced of the significance of negotiation
today. As the escalation of conflict becomes evident in the world
in diverse fields such as labour-management, international

affairs, business and personal relationships the significance of
negotiations and the need to negotiate increase.
THE STATE OF NEGOTIATION KNOWLEDGE

In spite of the enormous developments in communication
technology and the management sciences, parties are still
negotiating in much the same way as in the days of yore.
Compare the negotiation between the following: Abraham and
God on the destruction of Sodom and Gomorra as chronicled in
Genesis 18; Thucydides account of Pericles negotiation with the
Spartans; De Calliress notes on Cardinal dOssats negotiations
in France in 1716; Ghandis negotiations on the trusteeship of
India; the negotiations between Italy and Yugoslavia on Trieste in
1954; the numerous negotiations during the last two decades on
Zimbabwe, Namibia, and the Middle East; the arms race between
America and Russia; the transfer of land to National States in
Southern Africa. The question is, however, whether the
knowledge of negotiation has increased with the importance of
the phenomenon. Do we have a better understanding of the
negotiating process today?
Iklss (1964) pretheoretical pioneering work, How nations
negotiate, and Sawyer and Guetzgows (1965) Bargaining and
negotiation in international relations, were the first of many
publications and research articles that today form part of the
knowledge which is available on negotiation. Basic sources (for
example Rubin and Browns (1975) Social Psychology of
negotiation and bargaining); numerous articles in journals of
various disciplines (Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of
Communication, Journal of Applied Psychology); and various
recent books such as Raiffas (1982) The art and science of
negotiation, Bazerman and Lewickis (1983) Negotiation in
organizations, and Pruitts (1981) Negotiation behavior are
evidence of the advancement in the negotiation field since the
appearance of the pioneering works.
The significance and establishment of the negotiation field is
underlined by the appearance of scientific journals concentrating
2
exclusively on negotiation, (for example The Winning Negotiator

and Havard Negotiation Journal, since April 1984 published
under the auspices of the Harvard Program on Negotiation). This
programme entails the training, research co-ordination and
advancement of publications on negotiation by prominent
academics and researchers like Professors Jeffrey Rubin, Roger
Fischer, Dean Pruitt and Howard Raiffa.
There has not only been an increase in negotiation

publications, but also in the number of disciplines studying it.
Negotiation is being studied by social scientists from diverse
fields such as management sciences, industrial psychology,
political science, sociology, and group and organisational
communications.
In 1983 the Human Sciences Research Council initiated a
research programme on negotiation at the Institute of
Communication Research, as a result of a need for better
understanding of this process in our complex South African
society. The purpose of this programme is to identify research
problems in negotiation, to systematise and extend knowledge on
the subject (both the theory and research methods) and to help
implement this knowledge in practice. This is done by
undertaking self-initiated projects, and projects commissioned by,
and in conjunction with, other organisations (including overseas
researchers).
In spite of the advance in the negotiation field and a realisation
of the significance of negotiation as a conflict management
process, Gulliver (1979:xiv) describes the state of negotiation
knowledge as being in a formative stage, characterised by
tentative conceptualising and hypothesising, with a small amount
of targeted accumulated data and analysis. Pruitt (1986:237)
goes as far as to compare the scientific nature of negotiation
knowledge (the extent to which the theory has been tested in
reality) with the state of the knowledge of medicine during the
middle ages. This is evident from the following: . . . the fields of
negotiation and mediation subsist largely on a diet of maximsprescriptive rules of thumb, succint statements about what to do
and not to do. The knowledge of negotiation is, therefore, not
only unorganised, but largely untested in practice.
3
Weiss-Wik (1983) reinforces Pruitts statement in his criticism

of six prominent American negotiation training programmes. He
observes that these courses are not based on available research,
but on what Pruitt (1986) calls maxims, or subjective and
superficial observations.
There certainly is a need for the systematisation and critique of
the existing information on negotiation; clear and unambigious
definitions of relevant concepts; the testing of these concepts in
practice, and the use of these results as the basis of courses on
negotiation.
THE PURPOSE OF THIS BOOK

Based on the needs in the negotiation field, the purpose of this
book is to
clearly define negotiation concepts,

systematise existing models and theories on negotiation,
critique existing research methods employed in the
negotiation field,
give a short overview of elements that influence the
negotiating process,
abstract the most important negotiating skills covered by
training programmes, and
identify negotiation areas that still need attention.
ORGANISATION OF THE TEXT

In Chapter two the concepts relevant to negotiation will be defined and discussed; in Chapter three existing models and theories of negotiation will be systematised and reviewed; existing
research methods will be critiqued in Chapter four; a discussion
of elements that influence the negotiation process is covered in
Chapter five; in Chapter six the work is concluded with a
summary of the most important negotiating skills covered in

negotiation training literature, and courses and areas that still
need attention in the negotiation field are discussed.
2
Concept definitions
The clear and unambiguous definition of concepts relevant to the
negotiation field, is one of the needs as identified in Chapter one.
One concept often constitutes more than one meaning, while
various concepts are often defined in the same way.
NEGOTIATION AND BARGAINING

The greatest confusion results from the differences in meaning
between the concepts negotiation and bargaining. The aim of this
chapter is to define these and other relevant concepts to enable
the reader to understand negotiation as a process.
Three categories of negotiation and bargaining are defined in
the literature:
Negotiation as the complete negotiating process (from when

the parties decide to negotiate over a conflicting issue until
the final decision is implemented or the negotiation is broken
of off, while bargaining is defined as the face-to-face
communication process that takes place within the broader
negotiation process.
Negotiation as co-operative and bargaining as competitive

interaction.
The use of only the negotiating or bargaining concept, or the

interchange of both concepts to describe the whole
negotiation process.
The last of these categories of definitions is supported by a

dictionary definition.
According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, bargaining is an

agreement on terms of give and take; come to terms . . .
Negotiation is defined as: confer with another with view to
compromise or agreement; arrange; bring about According to
these definitions, both negotiation and bargaining aim to reach an
agreement or compromise through the process of give and take.
The last category, in which negotiation and bargaining are used
interchangeably, will be the essence of this study. To prevent
misunderstanding, only the term negotiation will be used.
Negotiation is therefore seen in this study as the complete
process of planning, face-to-face communication and the
implementation of an agreement.
The nature of the negotiation process may very well vary,
depending on the strategy followed. If an integrated approach is
taken, both parties attempt to achieve the greatest gain, with the
smallest possible loss for the other party by means of cooperation. Distributive negotiation entails the greatest gain for a
party without considering the position of the other, and is
achieved through competition. In practice, negotiation is usually
of a mixed-motive nature in other words, both co-operative and
competitive interaction take place. Notwithstanding the nature of
the interaction, all action taking place during the process is seen
as negotiation.
Numerous definitions of negotiation, describing the number of
participants involved, the nature of the interaction that takes
place, the elements of the process, and various other issues
concerning negotiation, are found in various publications
(Atkinson 1980:25; Bazerman, Lewicki 1983:14; Donohue, Diez,

Hamilton 1984:403; Fowler, Fowler 1964:807; Gulliver 1979:xiii;
Marais 1979:125; Pruitt 1981:1; Putnam 1985a:1; Rubin, Brown
1975:2; Sawyer, Guetzkow 1965:466; Zartman, Berman 1982:1).
These definitions have the following in common:
negotiation is a process (transactional, exchange, or

problem solving)
where two or more parties (individuals and groups) that

have a direct stake in the issues under discussion
strive through the exchange and structuring of information
to come to an effective behaviour binding agreement
on a common problem or conflict that exists between them.
In terms of these underlying, factors common to the definitions

of negotiation, negotiation can be defined as
A process through which two parties with a vested interest in
the issues at stake, strive to reach a mutual behaviour binding
agreement through the exchange of structured information that
becomes available through the communication relationship.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Collective bargaining, or rather collective negotiation, is a
negotiation process between two or more parties consisting of
groups of people acting collectively. The purpose is therefore to
come to an agreement on issues that concern the group.
Collective negotiation can also be undertaken by agents or
representatives on behalf of the group, and moreover, these
agents need not be members of the groups concerned. This form
of negotiation is usually found in labour relations (Piron 1978).
PERSUASION
Persuasion is a communication process that results in a change
of attitude or behaviour. Bostrom (1983:11) expands on this
description of persuasion in the following way: Persuasion is a

communicative behavior that has as its purpose the changing,
modification, or shaping of the responses (attitudes or behavior)
of the receivers. An important aspect of persuasion is
behavioural change. Persuasion, however, should be
distinguished from intimidation or force, where the behavioural
change is not by choice.
Persuasion is a key component of negotiation. Bostrom
(1983:231) states that . . . the really persuasive task is to get
individuals to bargain at all. Persuasion is not only found in the
face-to-face phase of negotiation, but also in the important prenegotiation phase.
MEDIATION
Mediation is the process through which agreements are reached
with the aid of a neutral third party or helper (Susskind, Ozawa
1983). The third party should have no decision making power and
have no vested interest in either of the parties. The mediator acts
mainly as a communication and problem-solving catalyst, or as
an agent to maximise the exploration and generation of
alternatives; while the responsibility for the final agreement rests
with the conflicting parties.
In South Africa, the appointment and function of a mediator in
labour conflicts is controlled by Section 44 of the Labour
Relations Act of 1981.
ARBITRATION
Arbitration is also based on the intervention by a third party in an
attempt to reach an agreement, but the final decision lies with the
arbitrator. The parties no longer have the right to conclude an
agreement. Each presents his case to the arbitrator, who takes
the facts into consideration in forming his verdict. The arbitrators
decision is usually binding (Piron 1982:91). For further reading on
the role of the arbitrator and how it differs from that of the
mediator, refer to Susskind (Susskind, Bazerman 1985).
10
LOBBYING
Lobbying is mainly found in national and international
negotiations, where one party tries to pressurise the other,
directly or indirectly through a third party, to accept their point of
view or objective. Lobbying includes influencing a person or
persons influential enough to advance your issue or viewpoint
(Peters 1983).
As outlined earlier, attention will be focused on the process of

negotiation defined in this chapter and not on persuasion,
arbitration, mediation, or lobbying.
11
12
Theories and models of

negotiation
There is hardly a theoretical perspective in the whole spectrum

ranging from the most mechanistic to the most humanistic
approach that has not been used in negotiation research where
a theoretical approach has been used at all. These diverse
approaches contribute to the richness of the available knowledge
on negotiation, but they have also led to a great deal of
confusion. As discussed in the previous chapter, the concepts
that were utilised in research are diverse, and the meanings
attributed to the concepts vary greatly. The disparity between the
theoretical paradigms involved also makes integration of
available knowledge in the particular field difficult, if not
impossible.
Instead of adding to the confusion in the negotiation field by
proposing yet another theoretical perspective to those already
used, this chapter gives a short overview of the major existing
theoretical approaches in negotiation research. The models that
have developed from these theoretical approaches will be
classified and compared in terms of their strengths and
weaknesses in representing negotiation as dynamic human
behaviour.
13
THEORETICAL APPROACHES
The most prominent theoretical approaches used in negotiation
studies are
the game theory approach,
the bilateral monopolistic theory approach
different theories of a non-mathematical (more verbal) nature.
The latter theoretical approach is called verbal theories, for lack

of a better collective term.
The game theory approach
The game theories developed from the classical work of Von

Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), Theory of games and
economic behavior. This approach has been used by many
researchers but expanded mainly by Rapoport (1964) and his
associates (1976, 1984).
As a theoretical approach to the study of negotiation as
complex, dynamic human behaviour, this approach has more
limitations than advantages. Game theorists focus on fixed-sum
dilemmas, where there are only winners and losers. In practice,
this is hardly ever the case as there are usually shared gains and
losses (Walton, McKersie 1965). Secondly, communication in the
negotiation process often changes the participants objectives,
preferences and expectations. As a static model, the game theory
does not allow for such changes, especially where objectives are
set in advance. Thirdly, the game theory oversimplifies the
negotiation interaction of the participants on the basis of its
underlying assumptions that there are only a set number of
participants, issues and courses of action available, and that
participants are always rational in their actions (see Putnam
1985:3 for a detailed discussion of the underlying assumptions of
the game theory approach).
14
The limitations discussed here prohibit the transfer of the

research findings (mostly done under simulated or laboratory
situations) for application in practice (Kohan 1980).
The bilateral monopolistic theory approach

The bilateral monopolistic theorists address themselves to real
negotiation problems, but their research designs do not reflect
this advance in their knowledge. Their concepts can only be put
into operation with difficulty, or not at all, and many variables that
are present and fluctuate in practice, have been omitted or strictly
controlled in research of this nature. Strausss (1977:331)
statement supports this: Bargaining theory made little allowance
for such complexities as mixed-motive situations, past history and
socio-economic environment, intra-organisational bargaining, or
the institutional needs of the parties.
Verbal or non-mathematical theory approach

The verbal type theory approach includes research based on
various theoretical perspectives such as transactional analysis,
exchange theory, systems theory, and is combined with a wide
variety of research methods such as case studies, historical
analysis and interviews with negotiators.
These studies have contributed greatly to the understanding of
negotiation, by diverting from the previous types of theories in
reaction to the deductive methodology that was employed.
Researchers using this approach do not favour the limiting
Quantitative techniques of the game theory and usually
concentrate on in-depth discussions of a few (or a single) case
studies. Knowledge gained by such an approach brought a new,
in-depth dimension to the existing knowledge of negotiation. The
results obtained by these studies, however, cannot be
generalized in all negotiation situations, as there are no
standards, measures, or observation guidelines that can be
compared, and the research designs (if any) do not allow for
15
external validation. The research available within this grouping of

research approaches, therefore, does not at present contribute to
systematic theory development in the negotiation field (Kohan
1980, Bercovitch 1983).
Future theoretical developments
None of the available research in these theoretical approaches

explains negotiation as a complex and dynamic process of
human behaviour. It has, however, led to the development of
various models of negotiation. By systematising and comparing
the underlying structures, strengths, and limitations of these
negotiation models, it is possible to establish guidelines for a
productive model that can represent negotiation in a more
realistic and productive way.
Gulliver (1979) advises the use of an approach and a model
that are less restrictive in terms of the negotiating process, and
that make allowance for various negotiation situations and the
many variables and issues that influence the process. Such an
approach, and models resulting from it, should assist in the
understanding of negotiation as a complete, complex process
that takes place in a social and organisational context.
NEGOTIATION MODELS
Negotiation models that have developed from the discussed
theoretical approaches are as numerous as the theories of
negotiation, if not more so. A discussion of each model will not
add to a better understanding of the viewpoints covered by
contributors to the field. A synopsis of existing models will be
given in the form of a typology. A typology has been chosen as
classification framework, since negotiation models cannot be
classified in non-overlapping classes, because of their humanscientific nature.
16
A typology of negotiation models

The development of a typology of negotiation models can be
approached in various ways. Negotiation models can be
classified as mathematical versus non-mathematical, analytical
versus descriptive, or dynamic versus passive dichotomies.
Despite the fact that no generally accepted classification exists,

Coddington (1968) tentatively endeavoured to establish criteria
for a typology of negotiating models. Oliva and Leap (1981)
elaborated on the Coddington principles and developed a
promising classification system, based on the mathematical
versus non-mathematical dichotomy. It has been decided to
make use of this dichotomy in this study, as the nature of
negotiation models can easily be distinguished on the grounds of
their mathematical or non-mathematical nature.
In the mathematical negotiating models, negotiation is
represented by calculating the negotiating results mathematically
(Rapoport, Gyer, Gordon 1976), or by calculating the optimum
point for an agreement (Susskind, Bazerman 1985). They can
represent a large number of complex variables, their relation, and
the analytical levels more precisely and accurately, as they do not
have to make use of verbal input and can therefore be more
exact. It is, nevertheless, this precision that restricts a
comprehensive phenomenon such as negotiation, because the
process whereby the result is derived the negotiating phases,
the relation, the elements which playa role therein and in the
broader context has not, as yet, been thoroughly investigated.
The economic models, such as the usefulness or profit models
that are also mainly mathematically orientated, are used in
business, and their development can be ascribed to the businessworlds willingness to provide money for this research.
Both the mathematical and economic type of models are
classified in greater detail than the non-mathematical models.
They do, however, reflect more serious defects, which make
them unsuitable for describing negotiation as a complex
communication process functioning within a social context.
(Compare the discussion later in this chapter).
17
18
A synopsis of existing negotiating models, classified according

to mathematical or non-mathematical disposition, is shown in
Figure 1. This typology of negotiating models is an adaptation
and expansion of that of Coddingtons (1968) and Oliva and
Leaps (1981).
Models on the mathematical side of the dichotomy include

economic, game theory and hybrid models. The game theory
models attracted much attention in the negotiation writings of the
past decade or two, resulting in their redefinition as zero-sum and
variable-sum models. Typical zero-sum models are, for example,
the archetype of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), while
the most recent developments make provision for more than two
parties, such as the variable models of Rapoport (1974), and
Rapoport and Kahan (1984).
Non-mathematical models cover a broad spectrum that include
process, phase, element, limitations, intervention, and hybrid-type
models. Each one of these types of model has its own strengths
and limitations. This will be discussed in detail later and also in
Table 3.
The fundamental differences illustrated in Figure 1 and the
manner in which the models can be refined can be understood
only when the differences in the underlying structure of each
model class have been indicated. The underlying structure of the
model types will be discussed to determine their potential use in
understanding negotiation.
The underlying
classes
structure
of
negotiation
model
The underlying structure of negiotiation model classes is

illustrated in Figure 2. As in Figure 2, the focus point of models
such as the utility models, is the optimum agreement that can be
reached between two parties. Refinement of these models will
therefore be aimed at, or improve, the prediction of the optimum
point of agreement also called the Pareto frontier
19
20
(Susskind, Bazerman 1985). This type of model should be useful

in the practical negotiating situation, aiding the decision of how
much gain and how much loss could be allowed in the given
situation. This model type is, however, of no use for understanding negotiation as a complex communication process.
The element type non-mathematical model provides the
possibility of Quantifying the strength and direction of a
negotiation element (for example power) as vectors. The
characteristics in terms of which the model can be refined will
therefore constitute its strength and direction. This type of model
shows more potential than the mathematical models, but can only
be used in one aspect of negotiation and not in the whole
phenomenon in its social context, or in the interaction between
various elements.
There is a need for a negotiation model in which the underlying

structure lends itself to a representation of the whole dynamic
process. The potential of each model type must therefore be
examined in greater detail.
Contributions, limitations, language and contributors

to negotiation models
The contributions, limitations and language of each negotiation
model type will for the sake of clarity and systematic ordering
be done in Table 1. Examples of some contributors to each type
will also be given.
CONCLUSION
Negotiation is a process that proceeds in phases that can be
identified through the interaction patterns. This process is
influenced by various elements. An ideal model of negotiation
should therefore be a combination of these three typology types.
The detailed discussion of negotiation model types in Table 1
indicates that mathematical type of model has severe limitations
21
o
d
TABLE 1
OVERVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATION MODEL TYPOLOGY
Mathematical
(a) Continuous
(mostly
economical)
Strengths
Limitations
1. Exact result can be

determined through
mathematical analysis
1. Assumes rationality
of negotiator
2. No semantically related
problems
2. Utility functions have

mathematical
limitations
3. Models can be refined by

adding variables,
relationships, etc.
3. Does not delineate

factors that influence
negotiation results
Language
Theoretical
calculus
Selected models
Zeuthen
Nash
Pen
Schelling
1930
1950
1952
1960
Foldes
Cross
Coddington
Harsanyi
1964
1965
1968
1977
Type
4. Does not lend itself to

resolution of discrete
negotiation issues
22
o
d
TABLE 1 (cont.)
Type
Strengths
(b) Non1
continuous
(mostly game
theory)
Realistic mathematical
1
assumptions not found
in continuous models
Assumes rationality
of negotiator
Discrete negotiation
issues
Language
(1944)
(1952)
(1960)
Prediction validity for

face-to-face
communication is
questionable
Fouraker & Siegel

Tedeschi et al.
(1963)
(1973)
3 Empirically testable,
especially in two-party
situations
3 Does not lend itself to

multiparty (>2)
situations
Rapoport, Gyer &

Gordon
(1976)
4 Best result can be

determined
Does not lend itself

to the iterative
process or dynamics
of negotiations
5 Relative little
semantically related
problems
Payoff (utility) values

may not be known
for each choice
23
Theoretical
algebra
Selected models
Von Neumann &
Morgenstern
McKinsey
Schelling
Limitations
o
d
TABLE 1 (cont.)
Type
Strengths
Limitations
Language
Selected models
6 Conceptual framework
can be designed and
altered
Hybrid
Strengths and
weaknesses depend on
the nature of the model
Primarily Oliva &

mathemaCapdevielle
tical
(1977)
Verbal
theory
Boolean
algebra
(1950)
(1964)
(c)
Verbal
Process
1 Provides a realistic,
understandable
description of the
negotiation process
Does not define

optimal agreement
or range of
agreement
(a)
2 Factors influencing the

negotiation process can
be described
Semantic problems,
e.g. concept
definition,
complicates comparison of models
24
Homans
Berne
Walton &
McKersie
Peterson &
Tracey
Mastenbroek
(1965)
(1977)
(1983)
TABLE 1 (cont.)
Type
Strengths
Limitations
3 Allows the inclusion of

an unlimited number of
variables
(b)
Phase
(stages)
1 Strengths as process
models
Language
Selected models
No equilibrium
result is defined
Empirical testing is
limited because of
model range
often to a few
variables
Difficult to analyse
the sequence of
events
Limitations as
process models,
with the exception
of no. 5
25
Verbal
interaction
analysis
Markov
analysis
Douglas
Karrass
Druckman
Richardson
(1957)
(1970)
(1973)
(1977)
TABLE 1 (cont.)
Type
Strengths
Limitations
Language
2 Permits analysis of
negotiations that lead to
a breakdown or
settlement
(c)
(d)
Elements
Limits
models
1 Limitations as
process models
2 May lend itself to

mathematical treatment
through vector analysis
2 Primary emphasis is
placed on
psychological
elements with little
attention to structural
considerations
models
1 Process model
limitation nos. 2 & 3
26
Selected models
Atkinson
Zartman &
Berman
Pienaar &
Robinson
(1980)
Verbal
vector
analysis
Weber
McGarth
Robinson
(1961)
(1966)
(1977)
Verbal
calculus
Pigou
Stagner &
Rosen
Randle & Wortman
(1924)
(1982)
(1983)
(1965)
(1966)
TABLE 1 (cont.)
Type
Strengths
Delineates a settlement
range
More amenable to
empirical testing than
other verbal models
Provides some insight

into the sequence of
negotiation events
Language
Selected models
Does not lend itself

to resolution of
discrete negotiation
issues
Limitations
Not discussed as it is not negotiation

according to the definition in Chapter 2
(f)
Strengths and limitations depend on the

nature of the model
Clarke
(e) Intervention
Hybrid
27
Primarily
verbal,
depends
on model
(1977)
in spite of its exactness and possibility of refinement. The number

of negotiators participating is limited and rationality is accepted as
a given. Most obvious are the limitations that this type of model
has regarding description and representation of the process
dynamics.
Non-mathematical models of negotiation also have limitations.
The optimum point for agreement and the range of the agreement
are difficult to determine. Problems with semantics, such as
conceptualization, make comparison between models difficult,
unless they are clearly defined. Empirical testing must be clearly
limited because of the scope of the models and the potential
variables that influence the negotiation process. Nevertheless,
they do lend themselves to a fairly accurate representation of
negotiation as complex human behaviour.
In the following chapter the research methods used to study

negotiation both those that developed from the theoretical
approaches and those that have no direct connection with them
will be discussed.
28
Negotiation research
Our knowledge of human behaviour, such as negotiation,

depends upon the verified research available on that particular
behaviour. It stands to reason that our knowledge of negotiation
depends on and is reflected by the research results available
and the methods by which such knowledge is gained.
Pruitts (1986:237) statement in the Negotiation Journal
summarizes the state of negotiation knowledge:
the fields of negotiation and mediation subsist largely on a
diet of maxims prescriptive rules of thumb, succint
statements about what to do and not to do.
The amount of articles published on negotiation leaves no
doubt about the quantity of research on the subject. The question
is, however, as to the quality of the research available. According
to Weiss-Wik (1983:717) there is little detectable concern for
more credible forms of substantiation.
Knowledge of negotiation can only be substantiated if it is
based on sound research; research that is based on theory and
29
tested by empirical reality. Research published on negotiation,

however, is often not as a result of scientific research, nor does it
fully report the various steps in the research process (for example
defining the concepts to be appraised, and the research design or
methods used). This prevents the results from being verified as
is necessary for knowledge to be scientific. The knowledge
emanating from negotiation research is dependent upon and
closely related to the research methods used to obtain it.
Research methods employed in the negotiation field are as

diverse as the negotiation theories themselves. This can probably
be explained by the need to cope with such a complex and
dynamic process as negotiation. The richness of the negotiation
process is not likely to be captured in a single experiment or even
a line of experimentation. Rather it is through attempts to
organize and integrate the specific aspects of negotiation...
(Druckman 1973:6).
At present there seems to be more research done on specific
negotiation aspects than on integration of available negotiation
knowledge, making it more accessible for use in practice. In the
next chapter, an effort will be made to integrate what is known of
this complex human behaviour. To be able to assess the value of
this knowledge, the methods used to obtain it will be discussed.
Various ways to systematize research exist. Van Leents (1968)
three research dimensions, the depth, height and breadth
dimensions, will be used to organise the discussion on methods
used in negotiation research.
RESEARCH DIMENSIONS
Van Leent (1968) distinguished three research approaches or
dimensions: the depth, height and breadth dimensions. Marais
(1983) illustrated and explained these research dimensions as
follows:
30
Figure 3
RESEARCH DIMENSIONS
Height
dimension
Depth
dimension
Explain
(causality)
Quantitive
(digital data)
Understand
Qualitative
(non-digital data)
Breadth dimension
Describe
Quantitative
(digital data)
Research in the depth dimension focuses on an

understanding of the phenomenon and usually results in
qualitative data. Some research methods employed in this
approach comprise theoretical analysis of the history of
negotiation cases and a description of a particular negotiation
setting. In the height dimension, experimental research methods
are used to explain the phenomenon researched, resulting in
quantitative data. The breadth dimension includes research such
as field studies and surveys, by means of which the phenomenon
studied is described.
The results obtained with these research methods vary greatly
and each contributes to the complete picture. It is important to
understand, however, what each has to offer and what type of
research problems it can be applied to in the negotiation field.
Depth dimension
Research in the depth dimension in the negotiation field includes
direct observational case studies, retrospective case studies and
31
qualitative analysis of the negotiation process, or specific aspects

of the process. The latter studies are mainly theoreticalconceptual by nature, utilising, for example, theoretical analysis in
terms of the game theory, transactional analysis, or exchange
theory. Examples of research methods that fall under the depth
dimension are historical-ethnography and introspection.
Historical-ethnography
Many negotiation studies are theoretical analyses of cases from a
historical or ethnographical viewpoint. Gulliver (1979:64) used
this method for example to study negotiation among African
tribes. He explored the theoretical premise, that negotiations and
joint decision-making, in any society, deal with any kind of issue
over which dispute occurs, that is with anything at all, and the
hypothesis that there are common patterns and regularities of
interaction between the parties in negotiation irrespective of the
particular context or the issue in dispute. Gulliver used direct
observation in a variety of negotiation situations to study his
hypotheses, where many other researchers that employ this
method, often use descriptions of historically important
negotiations such as those on Vietnam for their analyses.
The advantage of the analysis method used by Gulliver is that
it can be used in real negotiation situations and factors that
influence negotiation can be exposed to add to the knowledge of
the process. Gullivers study spanned various cultures. More
recent examples of this research method are Touvals (1987)
study of Arab-Israeli negotiations, and a study of a New York
State negotiation by Vessels (1987).
This method does, however, have certain limitations. It is not
possible to determine the external validity of the results of this
type of research. It is therefore not possible to generalise the
results in other negotiation situations. Comparison between
cases is not possible, unless the framework used for the
comparison is clearly spelled out which makes the study less of
a case study and more quantitative by nature.
32
Self-reflective introspection
Bostrom (1983) and Krippendorf (1984) mention another depth
research method used in negotiation research, namely selfreflective introspection. A participant or observer reflects on his
observation of the negotiation. This method can provide a useful,
overall view of the negotiation process. This overview must by
nature of the research method be superficial, unverifiable and
unstructured. Examples of this research can be found in
negotiations that took place on Korea, Vietnam, the Middle-East,
Zimbabwe and Namibia (see Zartman, Berman 1982:3).
Research methods in this dimension are mainly applied to gain
a better understanding of the negotiation process as a whole; the
result is qualitative data that reflect the nature of the process well,
but that cannot be compared with or generalised in negotiation
processes in general.
Height dimension
Studies in the height dimension are usually simulated or
laboratory studies that take place in situations where the
negotiation process and factors that influence the process
can be controlled to establish the result of a treatment. Many
negotiation studies fall under this category (for example
Bazerman, Neale 1982; Donohue, Diez, Hamilton 1984; Hillthrop,
Rubin 1982; Putnam, Jones 1982; and Rapoport, Kahan 1984).
The results of the laboratory studies are usually quite useful in
understanding the role of a particular variable in the controlled
negotiation situation. Given the complex nature of real life
negotiation, and the vast differences between the settings (the
participants are usually students and the negotiation is not
subject to the many factors in the environment that influence it),
the results cannot be transferred to real negotiations. The results
of Donohue, Diez and Hamilton (1984), and Konetchnis (1987)
empirical research, and studies by Pruitt (1986) and others
support this statement.
33
By far the greatest amount of research in negotiation has been

done with methods that fall within the height dimension. The two
methods most frequently found in research literature are game
simulations and analysis of simulated negotiation interaction.
Game simulations
For at least three decades, research based on the game theory
principles was very popular amongst researchers. Many
researchers still use game simulations for research, as these do
not involve all the complexities of other simulations or real life
research.
Game theory models or matrixes are designed and then tested

in simulated situations to obtain the results of rational negotiating
interaction, on a limited amount of issues by a limited amount of
parties usually two. The simplest form of the game matrix is the
prisoners dilemma.
Figure 4
PRISONERS DILEMMA
Prisoner A
Not
Admit
admit
Not
admit
0,0
10,0
Admit
0,10
5,5
Prisoner B
34
m
o
r
f
d
a
Figure 5
EXPERIMENTAL GAME FOR SOCIAL INTERACTION
Rapoport (1974) reports a number of studies utilising the game

matrix. These studies can be classified as two person and
Research with this negotiation game entails the allocation of

numerical values to the result of the alternative action chosen by
two prisoners in this case in terms of years imprisoned. If
prisoner A decides to confess his crime, but not prisoner B,
prisoner A turns state witness and is exonerated (0), while
prisoner B is convicted (10). The same goes for prisoner B. If
both confess, they are both convicted, but for a shorter period
(5,5), and if neither confesses, no one can be convicted (0,0).
B
O
Right
Button
Left
Button
Left
Button
Right
Button
B
35
n-person games. An example of a game experiment was

undertaken by Sidowski, Wycoff and Tabory in 1956. Two
respondents were connected to a shock system and each given
two switches that they could use. The object of the game is to
accumulate the highest number of points and to avoid an electric
shock. The respondents did not know that their choice influenced
the others results. If P used the left switch, O got a shock and if
P used the right switch O got a point. The same criteria applied to
Os reactions. If the shocks were strong, the respondents soon
learnt which switch rewarded and which one shocked the other
person.
Figure 5 A illustrates this game matrix and Figure 5 B the
respondents choice combinations.
More complex matrixes were used by Deutsch and Krauss

(1960, 1962), Gallo (1966), and Beisecker (1970) to experiment
on verbal persuasion strategies in mixed motive simulated
negotiations.
Even though the simulated game experiments enabled the
researchers to predict the negotiation results, they do not add to
the ability to predict real negotiation outcomes. American
politicians and ambassadors have been disillusioned with the use
of games to help predict the outcome of certain alternative
options (Gribbin 1983:434). The limitations of game theory based
research results in real situations were discussed in the previous
chapter.
Negotiation interaction analysis

Negotiation interaction analysis is a method whereby negotiation
interaction is systematically observed and coded with the aid of
category systems developed to analyse negotiation at microlevel. All existing category systems have been developed in
simulated negotiations. Very few have been tested in real life
negotiations, such as those of Donohue, Diez and Hamilton
(1984), which will be discussed under research undertaken in the
breadth dimension.
36
A few observers, with or without the aid of recorders, observe

the face-to-face interaction that takes place in these simulated
negotiations and code the interactions according to the category
system. An example of such category systems are those
developed by Bales (1950), Putnam and Jones (1982), Donohue
(1981), and Donohue, Diez and Hamilton (1984). Baless (1950)
interactional process analysis category system, as prototype of
the negotiation behaviour analysis methods, consists of 12 categories representing three major areas of behaviour: the positive
and negative socio-emotional areas, and a neutral task area.
The analysis unit used is the smallest identifiable verbal and

non-verbal behaviour, such as facial expressions or body
position. Not only actions were analysed, but also the meaning of
the message content and the situation in which it took place.
Although Bales did not use his system to analyse negotiations, it
indicated the possibility and led to a great deal of research based
on his work for example that by Landsberger (1955), Theye and
Seiler (1979), Sermat (1970), Stern, Sternthal, Craig (1975), and
Hunger and Stern (1976).
Baless IPA could not, however, identify strategies,
commitments and concessions that take place in negotiations,
and as a result, researchers started developing their own
category systems. The three systems that were extensively
refined and have survived researchers probes are the
Conference Process Analysis Method (CPA), the Negotiation
Process Analysis Method (NPA), and the Negotiation Cue
Response Coding Method (NCRC).
McGrath and Julian (1963), Lewis and Fry (1977), and
Zechmeister and Druckmans (1973) systems merged in the NPA
method of Hopmann and Walcott (1976). Their category system
consists of five dimensions and 13 categories: content (initiation,
accommodation, pull back); strategic behaviour (commitments,
threats, promises); task (agreements, disagreements, questions,
answers); affective behaviour (positive, negative); and process
(subject changes).
Putnam and Jones (1982) extended this category system and
used it to analyse management-labour negotiations. These
37
Figure 6
BALES INTERACTIONAL PROCESS ANALYSIS

CATEGORY SYSTEM
38
systems enabled the researchers to analyse the content and the

sequence of the negotiation strategies (both distributive and
integrative), but do not provide insight into the negotiation
relationship (the basis of all negotiation behaviour) and the way
the use of specific negotiation tactics indicates the use of broader
negotiation strategies (Nieuwmeijer 1988b).
Morley and Stephensons (1977) CPA method consists of three

dimensions: (a) the type of information exchange (rejection,
acceptance, etc.), (b) nine categories of information types, and
(c) seven referent categories (subject of the message such as
self, opponent, party). The results of these researchers studies,
and others based on their category system, do not fall within the
scope of this work and are discussed in detail by Nieuwmeijer
(1988a).
Donohue (1981) and Donohue, Diez and Hamilton (1984)
solved the problem of including the coding of the negotiation
relationship in the behaviour and strategy used, by coding each
action twice as cue or response for behaviour and as defensive,
attacking or integrative behaviour in their NCRA. A detailed
critique of this system and the results achieved with it can be
found in Nieuwmeijers (1988a) Analyzing intercultural negotiation
in Southern Africa.
Breadth dimension
Research in the breadth dimension includes data collection
methods such as questionnaires, interviews, and surveys. An
important issue perceived in real life that is not well understood
can be researched with the use of these methods, by developing
hypotheses about it and then testing the hypotheses. The
influence of the negotiators credibility on the negotiation process
in which data is collected through questionnaires is an
example of such a study (De Koning, Hall 1988).
Studies in the breadth dimension can also be stimulated by
theory on, for example, the effect of mood on negotiation.
Concepts pertinent to an understanding of mood can be put into
operation and researched with the aid of the above mentioned
methods in the empirical reality.
39
Interviews
Interviews are usually preferred to questionnaires, as the

knowledge available on negotiation is not yet of such a nature
that questionnaires can be drawn up with confidence, and
relevant variables for example traditional elements that
influence negotiation in Southern Africa (Nieuwmeijer 1987) can
be elicited from the negotiators themselves. Interviews also allow
the respondent to be more flexible in terms of the issues raised,
while saving the busy negotiator the time and effort to complete a
questionnaire.
Interviews may be more or less structured, depending on the
purpose of the interview. Zartman and Berman (1982) used semistructured interviews, based on previous case studies they had
conducted, to establish what knowledge experienced negotiators
have acquired that may be of use to other negotiators. They did
not ask set questions with limited choice answers, but simply
asked one question during personal interviews: What do you
know now, that you would have liked to know when you started
negotiating for the first time? The interviews were conducted with
senior negotiators in key negotiation positions in the American
and other diplomatic services, and 50 United Nations
ambassadors and members of the secretariat.
Direct observation in real situations

The greatest lack of research exists in this type of study, even
though research done in this manner could be extremely effective
and productive to an understanding of negotiation as it takes
place in real life.
An extensive literature search conducted by Nieuwmeijer
(1988a) revealed only two studies of this nature: those by
Rackam (1979), and Donohue, Diez and Hamilton (1984).
Analysing successful negotiators behaviour
Rackam (1979) analysed the behaviour of successful negotiators
through direct observation. He defined successful as:
40
seen as successful by negotiators of both sides,

having a track record of significant success, and
having a low incidence of implementation failures.
Rackam observed the frequency of certain key negotiation

actions such as irritators, counter proposals, defend/attack
spirals, behaviour labelling, information seeking, questions and
summarizing.
Analysing negotiation interaction
Behaviour analysis consists of methods used to analyse and

describe human behaviour. The basic unit used in the analysis is
usually the transaction that is the exchange of paired sequential
messages over a period of time. Research done with this method
has this basic research unit (the transaction) in common, but can
vary on the following aspects according to Rogers and Farace
(1975:223):
the amount and complexity of categories used;
the number of inferences by the observer (from a minimum

inference on the purpose, expectations, functions, to difficult
inferences on the basis of complex analysis);
the breadth of the application (from specific type negotiation

situations to very broad applications);
the message exchange point of focus (emphasizing the

content, the process of exchange, or dimensions such as
division of time);
the purpose or result of the interaction (does the focus lie

with the communicators meaning, the result of the process,
or the group function of the message?); and
the unit of analysis (the analysis of single messages to a

focus on sequentially organised messages that reflect the
process aspect of the interaction).
41
It has only been in the last decade, however, that negotiation

behaviour or interaction has been analysed in this way.
One of the most prominent studies using this method and
reflecting the accumulated knowledge available on negotiation
interaction analysis as discussed under the height dimension, is
the study by Donohue, Diez and Hamilton (1984). They observed
negotiations between labour and management and identified
strong patterns of communication strategies used in the
negotiation.
Their category system was adapted for and applied to
intercultural negotiations in Southern Africa (Nieuwmeijer 1988b).
This research revealed interesting negotiation patterns, the
formation of intercultural negotiating relationships, and the
strategies used in a wide spectrum of negotiations in Southern
Africa. The complex nature of negotiation and the sensitivity of
the issues being discussed, are two of the reasons for the lack of
research by means of this method.
Rackam (1979:7) summarises this problem as follows:

Very few studies have investigated what actually goes on
face-to-face during a negotiation. Two reasons account for
this lack of published research. Firstly, real negotiators are
understandably reluctant to let a researcher watch them at
work. Such research requires the consent of both negotiating
parties and constitutes a constraint on a delicate situation.
The second reason for the poverty of research in this area is
the lack of methodology. Until recently there were few
techniques available which allowed an observer to collect
data on the behaviour of negotiators without the use of
cumbersome and unacceptable methods such as
questionnaires.
Rackam (1979:7) reports, for example, that despite the
necessary precautions, he still had to cancel 20 negotiation
session observations because of the sensitivity of the subject.
The behaviour interaction analysis studies have great potential
for negotiation research as they can focus on the process of
negotiation, use the transaction between participants, and not
42
single unrelated actions, as research unit, and they lend

themselves to the analysis of multi-party and multi-issue
negotiations. They are, however, currently used to analyse
simulated negotiation situations, with the exception of Donohue,
Diez and Hamiltons (1984) study. These authors found in their
study that significant differences exist between simulated and
natural or real life negotiations.
Although field experiments are ideal, they are difficult to
execute, because of the problems entailed in manipulating
negotiation variables in naturalistic settings.
CONCLUSION
The type of research method used in negotiation determines the
value of the available knowledge. Most of the research is in the
form of simulated studies, where causal relationships between
variables are synthetically manipulated. These research methods
are extremely useful, as all the practical problems and external
influences are circumvented, but the applicability of the results in
real life negotiation is in serious doubt.
Field research such as negotiation interaction analysis and
interviews based on participants experience in naturalistic
negotiations, proved to be of value in understanding negotiation,
but they still need a great deal of refinement.
In an era where negotiation is becoming an increasingly
important process to manage conflict in many areas of life, it is
essential to systematize and extend the knowledge on
negotiation so that it becomes more accessible and therefore
useful. It is also necessary to pool all research resources and
methods to gain more useful knowledge, for example, to develop
research designs that enable the researcher to compare results
of research done with different research methods, and methods
that enable one to collect qualitative and quantitative data so that
the results reflect the richness of the negotiation process as well
as being exact and applicable to other negotiation situations.
43
There are still many areas in negotiation research that need

attention, such as intercultural negotiation in Southern Africa in its
broadest sense, guidelines for the formulation of negotiation
techniques and strategies, and key negotiators personality
characteristics (Nieuwmeijer 1988a; Pottas 1987). Crucial
research, however, should be directed at establishing a theory for
negotiation methodology, in other words, how should research on
negotiation be conducted to ensure the best possible results that
will enhance our knowledge of negotiation.
44
5
Elements of Negotiation
The negotiation process as defined in chapter two, is influenced

by many elements. These elements, such as persuasion, conflict,
trust and the particular context, are often processes in their own
right. Volumes have already appeared on each one of these
elements, but for the purpose of this book a concise synopsis of
each will be given.
Negotiation is also a dynamic human communication system,
where information is formulated by the participants in the form of
negotiation tactics and strategies, exchanged and interpreted
within the negotiation context and the developing relationship.
The elements discussed in this chapter influence the
negotiation process, are also being influenced by the process and
by each other. Power, for example, does not exist without
perception. Although the elements are interdependent, for the
sake of completeness and clarity, they will be discussed
separately.
PERCEPTION
Perception is the process by which man ascribes meaning to
information. Mortensen (1972:69) defines perception as, . . . how
man translates raw sensory data into meaningful experience. . .
45
This makes perception a key element in negotiation.
THE PROCESS AND DYNAMICS OF PERCEPTION

Milburn (1977: 137) states the importance of perception in
negotiation as follows:
To function well together the superpowers need to be able to
predict accurately the perceptions and responses of one
another and, as a second-order perception, to understand that
the messages that they as threat sources emit are thoroughly
understood. Attention to the way the other perceives threats
enables one to ascertain whether threats designed to inhibit
violence are likely to provoke it.
Fischer (1981:22) argues that negotiation occurs as a result of

a difference in opinion. Because people perceive differently,
conflict arises which must be solved through negotiation.
The process of perception comprises three phases, namely the
obtaining or retrieving of information, the evaluation of
information, the forming of associations and the assigning of
meaning to these associations (Nieuwmeijer 1981:20-21).
These dynamics and creativity of perception are the essence of
successful negotiation. Man does not perceive passively, but
assigns meaning to the perceived information and places it in an
acceptable and useful pattern negotiation tactics. Devito (1978:
121) describes perception and its creative nature as follows:
Each percept (that which is perceived), from the simplest to
the most complex, is the product of a creative act. . . We can
never encounter a stimulus before some meaning has been
assigned to it by some perceiver. . . Therefore, each
perception is the beneficiary of all previous perception in turn,
each new perception leaves its mark on the common pool. A
percept is thus a link between the past which gives it its
meaning and the future which it helps to interpret.
46
It is precisely this interpretive function that causes so many

problems in negotiation, or alternatively, makes it successful.
According to Adler and Rodman (1982:42), and Mortensen (1972:
70), the interpretation of perceived information is based on
previous experience, assumptions about human behaviour,
expectations, knowledge, and current physical and psychological
conditions. It is therefore imperative that negotiators should be
aware of the influence of these factors on their perception in
negotiating situations. Stereotyping is in particular a serious
perception problem: it is, generalisation about a class of people,
objects or cultures (Tubbs, Moss 1974:84), which prejudices the
negotiator against his opponents.
Perception plays a role in every phase of negotiation: planning,
face-to-face communication, and the implementation of the
decision.
THE ROLE OF NEEDS AND GOALS IN PERCEPTION

Perception is in turn influenced by the parties needs (Karrass
1970:121), goals (Atkinson 1980:34), exertion of power
(Bacharach, Lawler 1981: 45), culture (Mortensen 1973:295),
which determine the semantic value and therefore the
interpretation of the communication, and by the functioning of the
negotiating process itself. The bargaining process consists of
offers and communications which are intended to influence an
opponents perceptions of alternatives and utilities (Druckman
1973:26).
Perception in the negotiation process is also influenced by the
perceptions of others. Hatch (1979:19) maintains that, You cant
expect to have much effect upon another persons perceptions
and behaviour if you refuse to allow him or her to affect your own
perceptions and behaviour. Perception is therefore a learning
process, and as the negotiating process progresses, it should be
adjusted accordingly.
Karrass (1970:120-122) maintains that perception is affected,
by mans hierarchy of needs as explained by Maslow.
47
Figure 7
MASLOWS HIERARCHY OF NEEDS
Selfactualisation
Worth
Social Acceptance
(love and acceptance)
Security
(protection, comfort, predictability)
Basic Survival
(hunger, thirst, reproduction)
According to Maslow (1954), needs are linked to goals. All

behaviour strives towards the attainment of some goal. When the
achievement of this goal has been satisfied, the next goal in the
hierarchy becomes the aim. That is why it is essential to focus on
the other parties needs and not their stated positions.
According to Karrass (1970:121-122), the behaviour of
negotiators is usually predictable, based on the perception of
their goals and needs. Figure 8, however, illustrates that the
interaction between needs, goals, and perception is not as simple
as it sounds.
48
Figure 8
download
If a party could accurately perceive the other partys needs and

goals, he will be able to predict that partys behaviour and plan
effective strategies and techniques to obtain the desired results.
Free
from
www.hsrcpress.ac.za
PERCEPTION, GOALS AND NEEDS KARRASS
MEASURING PERCEPTION IN NEGOTIATION

Rotter (1966) has developed a scale that measures the influence
of perception on negotiating behaviour. The locus of
49
control the way in which human behaviour is controlled is

used as the criterion. Bobbit (1967) used Rotters scale in his
experiments and found that individuals with an internal locus of
control, are less sensitive to others perceptions and therefore
less influenced by their behaviour. Individuals with an external
locus of control are less concerned about their own gain and
more interested in interpersonal behaviour. They are therefore
more inclined towards co-operation, while the first group exhibits
behaviour that is more competitive.
In the light of the importance of perception in negotiation, much
more research about the role of this negotiating element in
negotiating behaviour is required. The restructuring of perception,
in order to be seen as successful is one of the problem areas that
should be examined.
POWER
The concept of power is as ancient and ubiquitous as any that

social theory can boast (Dahl, 1957:201).
Although power may be as old as negotiation itself, the study
thereof has been sorely neglected. Pfeffer (1981: 2) offers the
following reasons for this state of affairs:
(a)
(b)
(c)
the concept power is problematical in most social scientific

literature;
power is important (also in negotiation), but it is not the only
significant factor; and
the implementation of expertise on power is problematical
as a result of the implications and connotations inherent in
the concept.
Mintzberg (1983:xiv) summarizes in one phrase the problem of

conceptualizing power: . . . power is a sly and elusive
phenomenon. Mintzberg found the literature so diverse and
meagre, the concept definition so elusive and the phenomenon
so complicated that he had to review his hefty work on power
seven times between 1971 and July 1982.
Power is described by Dahl (1957:201) as a bottomless
swamp and by Perrow (1970:ix) as the messiest problem of all.
50
What is power
Power is therefore a concept as difficult to define, as it is
complicated. The literature studied throws little light on the nature
and function of power. Power is, however, a social reality and so
relevant in negotiation that one should attempt to define and
examine it.
As starting point for an examination of power the dictionary
definition (Concise Oxford Dictionary) is used, namely that power
is the ability to do, to obtain, or bring about something.
Definitions of power can be divided into three types, namely:
(a)
(b)
(c)
The attainment of goals, for example, Chamberlains (in

Bacharach, Lawler 1981: 37) definition: . . . the capacity of
a party to produce an agreement on its own terms.
The relationship and actions of actors A & B, for example,
Dahls (1957:202-203) definition of power in terms of the
division of the power between actor A and actor B.
The ability to bring about something. Emerson (1962:32)
describes power as the resistance B has to overcome in
order to accomplish something. Thibaut and Kelley (1959)
view negotiating power as the potential of one party to
influence anothers results, and Zartman (1974:396) sees it
as the ability to direct anothers behaviour as desired.
A simple definition of negotiating power that includes all these

elements is
the ability to influence the negotiating results.
Elements of power
Power building is a process that takes place in negotiation and is
influenced, according to Mintsberg (1983:3) by basic elements
such as
(a)
the manipulators, power users or power builders in

negotiation the negotiators or parties;
51
(b)
(c)
(d)
the sources of power and channels through which power is

exercised;
the goals of power building; and
the structure or configurations of power for example
closed systems, autocracy, democracy, the political arena.
Principles of power
Karrass (1970:56) identifies eight basic principles of power,
namely:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
Power is always relative. It hardly ever belongs totally to

one party.
Power can be real or false. One of the parties may be in a
strong position of power, but if he or the other party does
not recognise or realise this, it is of no consequence.
Power can be exercised without action. If the other party
believes that action could or would be taken against him,
the action is not necessary.
Power is always limited. The extent depends on the
situation, laws, ethical standards, and current and future
competition.
Power exists to the degree that it is accepted. Certain
parties are less willing to be dominated than others.
The end goal of power cannot be distinguished from the
means. The other party will not negotiate again, if he feels
that he has been exploited.
The exertion of power always involves costs and risks.
Power relations change eventually. The balance of power
changes as the balance of the parties advantages and
contributions changes.
Coser (1975:151) adds two more principles to those of

Karrasss, namely:
52
(a)
(b)
in the end the exertion of power depends on the ability to

apply sanctions should there be no compliance; and
power always refers to a social relationship between at
least two parties.
Goldstein and Sies (1974:44) differentiate between two types of

power relations: symmetrical and complimentary. When both
parties respect one another and share the responsibility of the
success of the negotiation, there is a symmetrical power
relationship. An acknowledgement of differences leads to a
complimentary power relationship where each party strives to
build his own power.
Sources of power
How does power originate, or what can be used to build power?
Sources from which power originates, or is built, exist in the

negotiating situation, the negotiator, or outside both of these.
Situational power
(a)
Power of expertise.
This refers to the amount of knowledge that individuals or

groups have relative to one another. If one party has a need for
power, the other party will have power that is relative to the
dependence of that party.
(b)
Legitimate power.
Legitimate power is defined as the power that arises from

internalised values in person A that determine that person B has
a legitimate right to influence A and that it is Bs duty to accept
that influence (French, Raven 1968: 192). In all cases the sense
of legitimacy is based on a code or standard accepted by the
individual and used as external power agent by another. An
example of this would be cultural or ethnic norms or values, or
53
ground rules layed down for the purpose of negotiation.

Legitimate power may also be transferred to a subordinate.
(c)
Referred power
This is power which a party obtains as a result of his

association with a strong or authoritarian party that is highly
regarded by the opposing party. This is usually achieved by name
dropping during a conversation.
(d)
Power of reward
This is based on the ability to reward the other party. The

strength of the power increases with the importance of the
reward. The reward does not have to be tangible, it can be
psychological. This power is especially important when
concessions are granted, which will be discussed later.
(e)
Coercive power
Coercive power is the ability of a party to enforce actions which

leave the other party with negative options only. This power is not
often used in negotiating situations, with the exception of threats.
(f)
Official power
This power is based on the position or office that a person or

party holds. Official power could be seen as, and is often
confused with, legitimate power. Official power however is vested
in the office and not the person. It can therefore be seen as
official power that is bestowed upon a person who holds an
office and it may be used when acting in an official capacity. It
was, for example, only since Yuri Andropof had become
president of Russia that his power was connected with the
government of the USSR.
(g)
Power of coalition
Parties or individuals often decide to band together about a

particular matter. They then form a coalition of power in order to
achieve a specific goal (see page 138 for further particulars
about the forming of coalitions). This formation provides the
54
parties with more and a greater variety of resources, which may

influence to the success of the negotiation.
(h)
Team power
A team will naturally have more power than an individual,

because they will have more resources at their disposal. It is a
known fact that negotiation between teams is more successful
than between individuals. The total power available to a team
depends on the composition of the team. The team should
therefore be selected carefully, so that the necessary power
resources are on hand.
(i)
Other situational power sources
Karrass (1970: 61-63) also identifies the following situational

power sources: the difference between parties regarding
commitment, competition, uncertainty, courage, bargaining skill,
time and effort.
Personal power
Apart from situational power, the motivation of the individual is
also a source of power (McClelland 1961). The individual can
have three motives or sources of power, namely:
(a)
(b)
(c)
achievement, which is task directed,

a need for power, which according to McClelland and
Burnham (1976:103) has the greatest influence on
negotiation; and
affiliation, which is directed at personal relations.
Other power resources

Certain power sources are not to be found in people, teams or in
the negotiating situation, but lie outside of these. Examples are
the economic market and the possession of strategic resources.
55
(a)
The market
Power in the market is the ability to persuade the other party to

follow a strategy envisaged by the negotiator. For example, there
is more power in product or service monopolies, according to the
law of supply and demand, than when there is competition in the
market. According to Galbraith (1962:125) this law is only
controlled by . . . the countervailing power of those who are
subject to it.
(b)
Product image
A product may develop an image that gives it great negotiating

power. An example of this is Hewlett-Packards image in the
calculator industry and Coca-Cola, in the soft drinks industry.
(c)
Possession of strategic resources
A resource is usually strategic when too little of it or a limited

amount is available. Such a resource gives the owner power in
negotiation, for example, the oil power of the Middle-East
countries and South Africas mineral power.
(d)
Control of alternatives
The more alternatives an organisation has available relative to

its opponents, the more power it has (MacMillan 1974:20). If the
Nuclear Energy Board is the only organisation that employs
nuclear technologists, it will control the alternatives and power in
this field.
(e)
Use of a third party
When a party does not have a strong power base it might be

expedient to use a third party; for example employees use of
trade unions.
(f)
Meeting place
The negotiation venue, is a source of power. Thus a

negotiation between America and Russia will never occur in
either the USA or the USSR.
56
Indicators and circumstances for the use of power

Indicators of power can vary from verbal and non-verbal
communication to positioning, physical location, salary, and
representation in meetings. The negotiating situation determines
the indicators.
The circumstances in which power is used, vary greatly. Pfeffer
(1981: 69) provides the following model for why and when power
will be used.
Figure 9
CIRCUMSTANCES FOR THE USE OF POWER
Differentiation
Interdependence
Scarcity
Environment
Heterogeneous
goals
Heterogeneous
persuasions
about
Technology
Conflict
Significance
Distribution of Power
Politics
The model offers the following conditions for power use:

(a)
(b)
interdependence the use of power by one negotiator

influences the power of the other;
heterogeneous goals the end goal of negotiators (the
successful achievement of an agreement) must correspond
57
(c)
in order to be successful; if the end goals do not

correspond, power building takes place;
scarcity rare resources cause power building: the more
severe the degree of scarcity, the greater the power buildup and the greater the attempt should be at resolving the
conflict.
Perception of power
An accurate perception of the power distribution in the social

arena in which he lives is . . . a necessary prerequisite for the
man seeking powerful support for his demands (Pettigrew
1973: 240).
Accurate perception does not only influence power build-up,
but power must be perceived to have any effect, or indeed to
exist. The negotiator must think or know that he has power, and
the opponent must believe and accept this. As the essence of
power is perception, a party never really commands power,
unless he is perceived as the possessor of power. The partys
own and other parties perception of that partys access to
resources and the value of those resources, determine the force
of the power (Pienaar, Robinson, 1983:7).
The perception of power involves more than the mere question,
How much power do I have relative to my opponent? According
to Karrass (1970:64), other information required for the accurate
perception of power, falls under two categories:
A.
1.
2.
3.
B.
1.
Questions related to the negotiators power:

How does the negotiator perceive his own power?
How does the negotiator think his opponent sees his
power?
How would the negotiator like his opponent to see his
power?
Questions related to the opponents power:
How does the negotiator perceive the opponents power?
58
2.
3.
How does the opponent perceive his own power?

How would the opponent like the negotiator to see his
power?
Karrass (1970:65) maintains that the perception of power is

connected to the power sources and the type of negotiation. He
illustrates this in the following diagram.
Figure 10
KARRASSS MODEL OF POWER PERCEPTION
It is clear, according to Figure 10 that perception plays on

important role in power building.
59
Power goals
A party must decide what his own and the other partys power
goals are.
According to Mintzberg (1983), goals and power are
inseparable. The perception of power and power building will
depend on the number and the nature of the negotiators goals.
The goals or aspirational level of a negotiator can be decided
on or determined with the aid of a technique such as Atkinsons
(1980:44) Expectation Test.
Negotiating goals are arranged between two positions, namely
the base level and the aspirational level. The base level is the
lowest possible offer that will be accepted, while the aspirational
level is the goal towards which is strived or aspired. The positions
are not static and may be moved many times during a negotiating
situation. Robinson (1977:199) represents the goal positions as
follows:
Figure 11
NEGOTIATING BASE AND ASPIRATION LEVEL
Negotiater A
Base level
Aspiration level
Direction of
diminished use
Direction of
increased use
Base level
Aspiration level
Negotiater B
The opponents aspirational basis or goal aspirations is not

known and must be perceived, estimated or determined by
60
means of questions. If the opponent should have a higher

aspirational base, or greater power, power build-up will occur.
Strategy to achieve the goals of power building may be
determined by asking the following questions (Karrass, 1970:67):
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
Could I extend my power base level by taking some action

that I am not currently performing?
Could I extend my power base level by allowing or forcing
the opponent to perform an action in which he is not
engaged at the moment?
Could I extend my power base level by conjoining my
opponent and myself in an action that we are not doing
now?
Could I extend my power base level by not continuing an
action that I am now doing?
Could I extend my power base level by restraining my
opponent from a current action?
Could I extend my power base level by restraining my
opponent, as well as myself, from a current action?
An example of (d) is Britains threat to the USA in the late fifties

to disestablish their military base in South East Asia, unless
America grants Britain more favourable trade and military
concessions. Britain thus extended her power by threatening to
desist from an action which America needed to have continued in
order to achieve her own objectives.
One should always keep in mind that power building leads to
more power building, which results in unnecessary escalation of
power exertion.
The use of, consequences of, and need for power

Use of power
The results of negotiation do not depend on how much power a
party has, but on whether it can be perceived and whether it can
61
be used, should the need arise. The party must be aware of the
extent of the power, how it is composed, how to build it and how
to use it in order for it to be effective. According to Bacharach and
Lawler (1981: 43), power constitutes the tactical possibilities for
action in negotiation.
The paradox of power is that it is not always the obvious
person who could utilize it the most effectively. It is not the most
intelligent, physically strongest, most rational, or person with the
largest financial resources who obtains the best results.
Agreement is often reached, because a negotiators bluff has not
been called, a final offer was interpreted as final instead of as a
feeler, or because a negotiator has acted irrationally and played
on the others feelings. An agent who has been restricted by his
superiors has more bargaining power in certain situations than
someone who has total jurisdiction that enables him to make
large concessions. This use of power has already been
successfully employed on several occasions against America by
Russia and Japan (Karrass 1970:55-64).
Apart from using a negotiating agent, there are other uses of

power:
(a)
No power
There is rower in possessing no power (Karrass 1970:68). A

teenager who is punished for unacceptable behaviour may, for
instance, reject his parents power and retribution by running
away from home. They will probably ask him to return. The tears
of a helpless woman have also caused many a negotiation to turn
in her favour.
(b)
Brinkmanship
Brinkmanship was used by John Foster Dulles during his term

as minister of Foreign Affairs for the USA. His concept of
diplomacy was based on large scale reprisal. If Russia should
start a war, America would terminate it at all costs. This use of
power is a valid, but a very dangerous way of trying to maintain a
62
balance of power. In the industry, this use of power is found in

threats to withdraw from negotiation, or enlist a mediator.
(c)
Focus points
Focus points are sometimes contained in the situation. They

are linked to social or economic factors and playa role in
establishing power relations between opponents. An example of
focus points in power sharing is dividing a pie into quarters for
four people, or the use of a river as boundary in the division of
land in a tribal land dispute (even though one section of the land
may be smaller), or the use of the thirty eighth parallel degree of
latitude as dividing line in Korea. It is easier to reach an
agreement when splitting the difference is used as focus point.
This form of power sharing, though not always fair, is the easiest.
(d)
Irrationality
It is sometimes expedient to be unreasonable and irrational.

There is no law which decrees that a negotiator has to be
rational. If the opponent is convinced that the negotiator is
emotionally committed to his irrational viewpoint, the negotiator
possesses power.
(e)
Influence
Influence has a broader and less negative meaning than

power. Influence is therefore considered to be more acceptable.
This is the restructuring of the other partys perception in order for
them to act as expected. Influence may occur during verbal or
non-verbal communication and requires a credible influencer, a
knowledge of the others value system, relevance to the situation,
and a knowledge of the alliance structures.
Tendeschi, Schlenker and Sonoma (1973:85) illustrate the
modes of influence that are available to a party, as follows:
63
Figure 12
source mediates
reinforcements
MODES OF INFLUENCE
Open influence
Manipulation
YES
Threats
and
Promises
Reinforcement
Control
NO
Persuasion
(warnings &
mendations)
Information Control
1. Cue control
2. Filtering of
information
3. Warnings &
mendations
Influence is therefore also a form of power use.

Need for power
The need for power arises as a result of a variety of reasons.
These reasons are related to aspects such as Maslows hierarchy
of needs (for instance self actualisation or the gratification of
social needs), personality characteristics of the negotiator, or
circumstances within the situation (as discussed on page 53
under situational power).
Consequences of power use

The consequences of power use are unique to each situation.
Inequality is an important result of power use and may also be
the cause for power building. Before inequality can be
understood, it is necessary to discuss position first.
64
Position is the place or status held by a person. In negotiation

this means the importance that the other parties ascribe to a
party or individual. Position plays an important role in power, as it
influences perception.
If a party perceives that his position (and therefore also his
power) is not equal to that of the other party, an imbalance or
inequality results (Hamblin, Kunkel 1977:165). Emerson
(1969:388) considers inequality a result of the balance of power
and inherent in the structure of the negotiation. Whatever the
cause of inequality may be, it has a definite influence on the
behaviour of the participants.
Rubin and Brown (1975:221) examined 28 studies on the

influence of inequality on behaviour and found that
(a)
the unequal distribution of power usually results in less

successful negotiations than equal distributions;
(b)
parties with greater power act more manipulatively towards

those with less power (there is disparity about this
statement in the literature that was studied);
(c)
parties with less power may form coalitions, or attempt

some form of power building.
Approaches to and measurement of power

From the extensiveness of the literature on power and the
complexity of the phenomenon, it stands to reason that there are
different approaches to power. All the literature that has been
examined, however, perceives power as an important negotiation
element. Some authors, such as Bacharach and Lawler
(1981: 43) and Schmikl (1977), even go as far as to consider
power the basis or crux of negotiation.
The literature that has been studied also indicates strongly that
power is specific to a relationship or situation. Power should
therefore be approached from a structural point of view and
interpreted within the situation in which it manifests.
65
Pfeffer (1981: 4) identifies the following measurement problems

in power:
(a)
(b)
(c)
what happens if power is not present;

what are the objectives of the one who is exercising his
power; and
how do the actions affect the probability of achieving power
building goals?
Summary
A considerable amount is known about the players in a powergame, as well as about the sources of power, and the
circumstances for the use of power, but there is still a need for
information about the nature and functioning of power. Mintzberg
(1983:xiv and i) reiterates this need: More important, though, is
the nature of the phenomenon; . . ., that what is of interest in the
study of power in and around organisations who gets it, when,
how and why, . . .
Therefore, because power is situation bound, its role in the
negotiating situation will have to be examined specifically.
CREDIBILITY
Credibility refers to the image of a source in any communicative
situation (Mortensen 1972:145). Credibility is therefore the
receivers perception of certain characteristics attributed to the
source. The receiver must believe that the information that is
communicated is credible.
The concept credibility has been identified 2 300 years ago by
Aristotle. In his Rhetoric (Devito 1978:79) he writes that
persuasion is achieved by the speakers personal character
when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible.
There are things which inspire confidence in the orators own
character the three, namely, that induce in us to believe a
66
thing apart from any proof of it: good sense; good moral character
and good will. The perception of certain character attributes (not
tangible characteristics) therefore leads to a belief in the truth of
the senders message. The three characteristics identified by
Aristotle continue to play an important role in the success of
negotiation.
Hovland and Weiss (1951) are pioneers in the research on
credibility characteristics. They found that dependability and
accomplishment are such characteristics. Since Hovland and
Weisss research, a variety of studies have been launched in this
field.
Bostrom (1983: 68-73) differentiates between two approaches

in research on the characteristics of credibility, namely, factor
analytical approaches and alternative approaches. The factor
analytical approach has been followed by researchers such as
Berlo, Lemmert and Mentz (1969), Baudhuin and Davis (1972);
Mortensen (1972); and Burgoon, Heston and McCroskey (1974).
They have isolated the following factors:
Berlo, Lemmert and Mentz
security
qualifications
dynamics
Baudhuin and Davis
authority
attractiveness
respect
personal integrity
Mortensen
authority (which he perceives to

be informed, qualified,
intelligent, valuable, and
expert knowledge)
dependability (perceived as
honest, friendly, acceptable,
et cetera)
dynamics
67
Burgoon, Heston and

McCroskey
capability
character
equanimity
sociability
extroversion
Alternative approaches to the examination of credibility

characteristics were taken by Cronkhite and Liska (1976), Liska
(1978) and McLaughlin (1975). Cronkhite and Liska (1976) and
Liska (1978) maintain that there are methodological and
statistical problems in the factor analytical approach and that the
characteristics are influenced by the goal, situation, and the use
of information in the communication process. In contrast to the
factor analytical methods, McLaughlin makes use of a non-metric
multidimensional scale. His findings indicate that the perceivers
ideologies, earnestness, and his image of the sender are
important elements that influence credibility.
The literature that has been examined indicates that the
credibility of the source definitely has an influence on
communication effectiveness in negotiation. If the perceiver
considers the source to be credible, he will not only accept the
information more readily, but his negotiation behaviour will tend to
be positive.
PERSONALITY
Negotiation is the face-to-face interaction between two or more
parties, with the aim to reach an agreement. The parties,
however, are not abstract representatives, but people with
emotions, and values and who live in a real world. (Fisher, Ury
1981: 19). Although it is essential to separate the person and the
problem in order to reach an agreement, insight in the
participants personalities is also necessary to reach an effective
agreement. The reason for negotiating failures is often a lack of
knowledge of the failure of human relations (Hannah 1981: 2).
Personality traits for successful negotiators

Research on the role of personality in the negotiating situation, or
the type of personality traits that make a negotiator successful
68
is rare and discouraging; . . . research on effect of personality on

negotiation behaviour is generally discouraging (Druckman
1977:247).
A problem common to the human sciences is encountered in
negotiation personality research: behaviour can be measured, but
the intrinsic element of personality, which induces behaviour, is
difficult to measure (Drucker 1982:62).
Literature that does cover negotiation personality falls under
three categories predominantly, namely:
(a)
(b)
(c)
anecdotal, or this is how it is done, reports by successful

negotiators usually based on the actual situation, but very
subjective and personal;
so called theoretical models which are idealised, complex,
unverified and difficult to apply in actuality; and
laboratory studies conducted over a short term and which
are somewhat artificial.
Statements or predictions about the personality of successful

negotiators, however, are often bandied about.
Atkinson
Atkinson (1980:22) lays down three requirements for a successful
negotiator, namely:
(a)
(b)
(c)
flexibility in dealing with individuals and situations,

an awareness of everything and everybody around him, and
sensitivity.
Chelune
According to Chelune (1979:28), self-revelation is a criterion of a
good negotiator. Self-revelation is the verbal presentation of
69
the self to other individuals. If a person finds it easy to

communicate about him (her)self, it is easier to establish a
relationship and thus negotiate more successfully. According to
Archer (1979: 30), such a person would not be dogmatic,
impulsive and anxious, and would exchange social rewards such
as information and concessions.
Druckman
According to Druckman (1977:250-252), motivation is an
important element, which enables the negotiator to manipulate a
situation. Motivation springs from needs, perception, the situation,
et cetera.
Zartman and Berman

Zartman and Berman (1982:16) maintains that, . . . negotiators
are made, not born . . . They consider personality an important
element that influences negotiation, but not the only element.
They have identified certain personality and attitudinal traits and
surmises that they do influence certain actions, but the relations
between these variables must still be determined. These
personality traits are
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
integrity dependability;
empathy it is essential to understand the other partys
standpoint, even if only to improve ones own reaction;
value adjustment and accommodation learning must be
allowed to take place over time, in order to solve problems
and to accomplish effective communication (sometimes
also within parties);
self-assurance a certain courage is needed if you are to
succeed as a negotiator (Zartman, Berman 1982:20);
ingenuity the ability to proffer new arguments, and
especially, alternative suggestions when differences arise;
stamina especially under mental and physical pressure;
stamina to persevere is more important than any intelligent
70
arguments, was Harrimans (the USAs delegate) opinion

after his interview with prince Sihanouk of Cambodia.
The following personality traits are weak characteristics in a
negotiator, according to Zartman and Berman (1982:22-23):
(a)
(b)
(c)
the need to be liked and to be seen as friendly: . . . it is

essential to create maximum clarity in terms of what the
issues are and what the options are, and not to be seen as
a reasonable person;
involvement in personal situations. It is important to stick to
the goal;
the inability to control emotions. One maxim is never to
lose your temper unless you intend to, are the words of
Philip C. Jessup, previous special delegate of the USA.
Zartman and Berman (1982:23) express their perception of the

connection between specific personality traits, attitudes and
negotiating behaviour, based on their experimental studies, as
follows:
(a)
(b)
(c)
the more complex and tense the situation and the clearer
the definition of roles in the situation, the less significant the
influence of the personality variables will be on the
negotiating behaviour;
the greater the uncertainty about the goal and the
opponents goals, the greater the tendency will be for
personality variables to have an influence on negotiating
behaviour;
negotiating behaviour is most closely linked to aspects of
the immediate situation which confronts the negotiator, for
example strategy, the structure of results, and threats.
Mortensen
Like Zartman and Berman, Mortensen (1973:241) also refers to
negotiation as a meeting of personalities. He too, upholds
Argyles social interaction techniques as good negotiator
characteristics. These characteristics comprise a capacity for
71
intimacy, co-operation, but also competition, emotional empathy,

communicativeness, tempo of interaction and domination.
Karrass
Karrass (1970:53, 87, 93, 122) distinguishes three aspects of

personality (identified through his experiments) that are
significant in negotiation. The achievement oriented person takes
realistic risks, approaches difficult situations with confidence,
optimism and enthusiasm, is a problem solver, chooses
specialists to help him in the pursuit of his goal, is patient,
determined and competitive. He is inclined to talk shop at work,
expects success and is open to feedback.
The behaviour of a negotiator under stress, is significant in
determining his negotiating potential. If he can retain his patience,
sense of humour and creativity, he will be successful. It, however,
he becomes defensive or unrealistic, or withdraws, becomes
aggressive, blames others, or becomes emotional, he will
probably behave in the same way under similar conditions in
future.
It is also important to know whether a person is predisposed to
learning, acceptance and change. A person should, however, not
be too easily swayed, otherwise he will eventually give up the
pursuit of his own goal.
Rubin and Brown

Rubin and Browns (1975:233-262) premise is that the
interpersonal orientation (10) of a person has an influence on his
negotiating behaviour. It is possible to manipulate 10, at least
indirectly, in various ways. The communication can be
manipulated for example by varying the type and amount of
interpersonal information made available to a party. This will
influence 10, which in turn will influence the quality of the
negotiation. According to Rubin and Brown, 10 is predominantly
concerned with the degree of a persons responsiveness. If he
72
is not responsive, he stands to gain much in the negotiating

situation due to the deliberateness of his behaviour. Responsive
people are more co-operative and therefore expect positive
results. The personality type should therefore be determined first
to obtain the best results in negotiation.
Summary
Different authors consider different personality traits important to
a good or successful negotiator. In contrast to the viewpoint that
specific characteristics make a successful negotiator, there is the
latest school of thought on the personality of successful
negotiators. This school of thought has developed from research
on leadership qualities. Authoritarianism (Rubin, Brown 1975:
186187) and Machiavellism (Rubin, Brown 1975: 189-191 and
Tubbs, Moss 1974: 67) are no longer acceptable as leadership
types, and a specific set of characteristics is also no longer
acceptable in all situations. According to this latest view, specific
characteristics, which would ensure a negotiators success in all
situations, do not exist, but there is a nucleus of characteristics
that vary from situation to situation (Pottas 1987). The negotiator
should therefore be selected and, if necessary, trained for a
specific negotiating situation.
Leaversuch (1983:5) for example does not consider the
negotiators personality, but his flexibility in a situation, to be
conclusive. The Bible tells us that for all things there is a season.
For negotiations, there is a time to bargain forcefully, fight, and
win. There is also a time to harmonize and heal . . .
Archibald (1971:8) maintains that a negotiator does not
necessarily have to be a specialist in negotiating, but that he
should have the general ability to communicate effectively.
It is therefore evident that a negotiator should possess a few
core characteristics such as communication skills, adaptibility,
perceptivity, integrity and motivation, but that the other abilities
are specific to the situation.
73
This conclusion holds many implications for the selection of

negotiators. They could be selected not only by virtue of certain
characteristics, but mainly for the specific negotiating situation.
Although research has focused on specific personality traits,
the literature nevertheless shows that promising research on
successful negotiating behaviour and on personality styles has
been conducted.
Behaviour of successful negotiators
Neil Rackham, managing director and prominent international

consultant and researcher into negotiation, has conducted a
number of studies at the Huthwaite Research Group since 1968.
He makes use of behaviour analytical methods (1979:7) in his
research. Rackhams technique involves direct observation
during actual negotiation situations, to gather objective and
quantifiable data on the behaviour of successful negotiators.
A prominent problem in negotiation research is the definition of
the concept successful. Rackham also encounters this problem
in his research, as is evident from the following observation:
there is not much agreement among the experts on what
negotiation means let alone a commonly agreed definition of a
skilled negotiator.
He lays down the following three criteria for successful
negotiation:
(a)
(b)
(c)
the negotiators must be considered successful by both

parties;
they must show a record of significant successes over a
long period; and
they must have a low incidence of implementation failures.
For his research Rackham chose 49 successful negotiators

who satisfied these criteria from 103 negotiating sessions. A
control group was assembled from negotiators who did not satisfy
74
all the criteria, or about whom there were not sufficient data
available.
After 56 planning and goal setting sessions with the
experimental group and 37 sessions with the control group, the
researchers gathered data from actual negotiating situations with
the aid of notes and sound recordings.
The findings, measured
behaviour, were as follows:
during
face-to-face
negotiating
Table 2
SUMMARY OF RACKHAMS FINDINGS
Frequency of behaviour displayed

per hour
Successful
Negotiators
Control
Group
1. Irritating remarks
2,3
10,8
2. Counter proposals
3. Aggressive
1,7
1,9
3,1
6,3
1,8
6,4
3,0
1,2
17,2
21,3
12,1
8,3
9,6
7,8
4. Reasons to substantiate
statements
5. Prediction of behaviour
6. Testing for understanding and
recapitulations
7. Search for information
8. Information on emotions
Rackham and the Huthwaite Research Group have not only

contributed to the information on negotiating behaviour, but
above all, demonstrated a sound research method and indeed in
the actual situation a rare event in negotiation research.
Behaviour, such as questions, negotiating techniques, and goal
setting still needs to be examined.
75
Figure 13
HALLS MODEL OF DEALING WITH CONFLICT
9
1/9
9/9
Differences only serve to drive people apart;

their personal implications cannot be
ignored. Realistically, to differ is to reject.
Maximum attention to the needs and desires
of others is required if relationships are to
endure. Conflict requires self-sacrifice and
placing the importance of continued
relationships above ones own goals. It is
better to ignore differences than to risk open
combat by being oversensitive; one must
guard against causing irreparable damage to
his relationships.
Differences are a natural part of the human

condition. In and of themselves, they are
neither good nor bad. Conflict is usually a
symptom of tensions in relationships, and
should be treated accordingly. When
accurately interpreted, they may be resolved
and serve to strengthen relationships; rather
than to divide. Conflict requires confrontation
and objective problem solving, often of a type
that goes beyond the apparent needs and
opinions of the parties involved. Not only are
people brought more closely together when
conflicts are worked through, but creativity
may be achieved as well.
Concern for Relationships
5/5
Differences should be treated in the light of the common good.
At times some parties are obliged to lay aside their own views
in the interest of the majority; this allows the relationship to
continue to function, however imperfectly, and affords a basis
for redress later on. Everyone should have an opportunity to
air his views and feelings, but these should not be allowed to
block progress. It is never possible for everyone to be satisfied
and those who insist on such an unrealistic goal should be
shown the error of their way. Resolution requires a good deal
of skill and persuasive ability coupled with flexibility.
1/1
9/1
Differences simply reflect the more basic

attributes which distinguish among people: past
experiences, irrational needs, innate limitations
and potentials and levels of personal
aspirations. As such, they are essentially
beyond the influence of others. They constitute
necessary evils in human affairs, and one must
either accept them or withdraw from human
contacts. Impersonal tolerance is the most
enlightened approach to handling conflicts.
Differences are to be expected among people

for they reflect the nature of the species:
some have skills and others have none, and
some are right and some are wrong.
Ultimately right prevails, and this is the central
issue in conflict. One owes it to himself and
those who rely on his judgment to prevail in
conflicts with others whose opinions and
goals are in doubt. Persuasion, power, and
force are all acceptable tools for achieving
conflict resolution; and most people expect
them to be employed.
1
Concern for Personal Goals
76
Personality styles in negotiation

Hall (1971), Cummings (1972), Berne (1964), Harris (1967), and
Filley (1975) were major contributors to our knowledge of
negotiation personality styles.
Hall (1971):51-53) deducted personality styles from his model
of dealing with conflict as illustrated in Figure 13.
Depending on whether a negotiator considers the negotiating
relationship or his own aims the most important, he will,
according to Hall, exhibit the following conflict resolution styles.
Figure 14
HALLS NEGOTIATING STYLES
9
1,9
Win lose
tough battler
Relationship
orientation
9,9
Integrative
problem solver
5,5
compromise
1,1
Iose withdraw
(physically and
mentally
1
9,1
concede lose
friendly helper
9
goal directed
77
Cummings (1972-67-84) identified negotiating styles such as the

tough bargainer, the soft bargainer, and the equalizer.
Filleys (1975:53) personality dimensions are four dichotomies,
namely:
placatory versus rebellious
risk evasive versus risk taking
external control versus internal control
suspicious versus trusting.
Berne (1964) and Harriss (1967) personality-ego-statuses, as
described in their works on transactional analysis, are the Parent
(P), Adult (A) and Child (C). These statuses can interact with one
another in various ways (Berne 1964: 31):
Figure 15
INTERACTION PATTERNS OF
PERSONALITY EGO STATUSES
1
2
3
1
2
3
4
5
6
4
5
6
7
8
9
7
8
9
R
78
From the above contributions Filley compiled three negotiating

personality styles. The first style is the tough battler/bargainer
(9, 1), or the Parent. This negotiator has high internal control, is
willing to run risks, is rebellious and will do everything to win the
negotiation and to protect his own ego.
The second style is the soft bargainer or friendly helper

(1, 9) who concedes and helps. He looks for acceptance and
affiliation with others and will want to hang on to the relationship
at the expense of his own goals. A high external control is
present in this case and conflict cannot be resolved with mutual
respect and understanding, as he is inclined to fantasizing and
emotional instability.
The third style is the equaliser or problem solver (9, 9). This
is the dominant style for problem management and negotiation.
This negotiator believes that the parties objectives are not
mutually exclusive and tries to maintain a sound negotiating
relationship. He acknowledges the reality of facts and feelings as
an essential ingredient in the solution of the problem. High
internal control, dependable behaviour, reconciliation, and low
risk seeking are characteristics of this negotiating style.
Zand (1972) considers the exposure of facts and feelings a
harmful characteristic of any negotiating style; he maintains that
such a person would be susceptible to proposals,
The best negotiating style would probably be an interaction of
the three styles, or the employment of different styles, as the
situation demands.
ATTITUDES
In the literature that was studied, attitudes are defined in the
following ways: Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957), . . . predisposition to evaluative response; Sarnoff, (1960), . . . a
disposition to act favourably or unfavourably; Staats (1965), . . .
attitudes-reinforcer-discriminator system, OKeefe (1980), . . .
evaluative responses.
79
In these definitions an affective, cognitive and behavioural

component could be distinguished. Attitudes can therefore be
defined as relatively stable, acquired tendencies to react to
something in a certain way.
According to Bostrom (1983:53), change in attitude occurs with
difficulty owing to the affective component contained in attitudes.
Eric Berne (1972:25) also maintains that change in attitude is
difficult as a persons life-script has already been established
between three and seven years of age and this determines
attitude, Therefore a person will be a consistent winner or a
frequent loser, as a result of his attitude.
When attitudinal changes do take place, it may sometimes be

dramatic, sometimes gradual, depending on the catalyst. It is
difficult to know how much change has taken place owing to the
nature of attitudinal change.
People enter into a negotiating situation with different attitudes,
as a result of different cognitive, affective, and behavioural
components. In the process, attitudes are also formed regarding
other participants and specific issues that appear on the agenda.
Reaching an agreement often depends on change in attitude,
which takes place with difficulty. It is to the negotiatorss
advantage to be aware of the other partys attitudes, but even if
he does obtain information about their persuasions, emotions,
feelings and conduct tendencies, it still does not mean that it is
possible to predict behaviour.
To take a standpoint in negotiation and to be committed to it,
depend on attitudes (Clarke 1977: 110), The forcefulness of the
standpoint will correspondingly reinforce the attitude. The longer
one argues in favour of a position the harder it becomes to
change that position. Thus, one key to successful negotiation
probably should be avoiding commitment to issues except to
those most central to ones position . . . (Schneider 1976: 381). If
one would like to change an attitude, one should avoid arguing
about it.
80
Factors that playa role in attitudinal change in negotiations are

credibility, the pre-negotiation standpoint, self confidence, reward,
new information and self-image (Clarke 1977:112).
In order to affect a change of attitude in negotiation, it is
necessary to help the party to take a cognisant standpoint. Once
a standpoint has been taken and expressed, it is easier to
establish the affective and behavioural components. To the
extent that we express new beliefs and attitudes that we have
acquired, we make a public commitment to those beliefs and
attitudes. Research suggests that the more publicly we are
committed to something, the less likely we are to change it . . .
(McCroskey, Wheeless 1976:51).
To establish a new attitude it is necessary to expose the person

to counter arguments. He will then be inclined to reject
information which contains these counter arguments, as well as
new arguments. This technique of attitudinal modification is called
Counter Attitudinal Advocacy (CAA). In 1980, Ruth McCarthy
and Betty Williams were awarded the Nobel prize for using the
technique in Ulster (USA) to promote mixed schooling among
black and white children (Pienaar, Robinson 1983:38).
The CAA technique was developed by Kiesler, Collins and
Miller (1969) and consists of 5 steps, namely:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
get the person to present CAA to a receptive audience;

it must be done in public or in a group;
it must occur repeatedly;
it must be assigned a social reward, such as applause or
agreement; and
repeat steps one to four with a group of an opposing
standpoint.
Attitudinal negotiation is therefore a process through which a

mutually acceptable or functional relationship is developed, within
which negotiation is possible (Karass 1970: 66).
81
VERBAL AND NON-VERBAL COMMUNICATION

Communication, whether verbal or non-verbal, is an essential
prerequisite for negotiation. Negotiation cannot take place without it.
In the literature that was studied, scant research on the role of
communication in negotiation was found.
That which was found, and research that was not conducted in
the negotiating situation itself but which is relevant to an
understanding of the role of communication in negotiation, are
discussed in this section.
Verbal versus non-verbal communication

The communication of information is not restricted to verbal
channels. Considerable human science research has already
demonstrated that non-verbal communication plays an important
role in influencing social interaction, and negotiation is no
exception (Rubin, Brown 1975:98). Druckman, Rozelle and
Baxter (1982:20) found, for example, that non-verbal
communication has a more profound influence on behaviour than
verbal statements.
Hinde (1972), in an analysis of research in the field, found that
emotions and attitudes are often communicated non-verbally by
means of head nods, gesticulations, posture, facial expressions
and eye contact. Thus, a superior attitude will be reflected by an
erect posture, unfriendly and haughty facial expression, while fear
is communicated by a tense, rigid attitude and a wringing of
hands.
The best communication results, however, are achieved by
employing both verbal and non-verbal communication. Wichman
(1970) conducted a survey where people were in total isolation
(they could neither see nor hear each other); could hear but not
see each other (and vice versa); and could see and hear each
other. The results demonstrate that the greatest co-operation
82
(87%) occurred among the people who could see and hear each
other and the least (41%) among those who were isolated. Where
they could only see, the co-operation was 48% and where they
could only hear, 72%.
Vitz and Kites (1970) experiments on variation in the type and

amount of non-verbal communication among negotiators, indicate
that written messages result in less effective negotiation
communication than spoken communication.
Kleinke and Pohlen (1971) examined the effect of the
communicators command of non-verbal communication by
studying the responses to different forms of behaviour. They
tested the influence of strategy and staring at an opponent in
100% co-operative, 90% co-operative, and 100% competitive
situations. Their first hypothesis, namely that co-operation leads
to more favourable evaluation and affinity than competition does,
was confirmed. Their second hypothesis, namely that being
stared at will cause people to be inclined towards less favourable
evaluation and affectivity towards the person in competitive than
in co-operative circumstances, was rejected. The taboo on verbal
communication and the irritation of being stared at, was probably
the cause of the unfavourable evaluations in both the cooperative and competitive circumstances. This study
demonstrated that strategic behaviour is more important than
staring at, or avoiding eye contact with the other party.
Latent and manifest communication

The reality of the other person is not in what he reveals to you,
but in what he cannot reveal to you. Therefore, if you would
understand him, listen not to what he says but rather to what he
does not say. Kahlil Gibran.
In human interactions, these words are never as true as in
negotiating
communication.
Negotiators
often
conceal
information, as information in this process is a form of power.
Sometimes, the negotiator himself is unaware of the information
that he imparts by means of non-verbal communication, for
example, a nervous wringing of the hands.
83
The more the negotiator knows about latent information and

the better he can perceive it, the greater are his chances for
success.
Functions of non-verbal communication

Druckman, Rozelle and Baxter (1982:19-20) relate specific nonverbal behaviour to five functions of non-verbal behaviour:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
indication of pre-articulated feelings;

indication information assimilation activities;
emphasizing persuasive claims;
facilitation of deception and concealment of information;
and
conveying subtle messages.
According to the authors findings, non-verbal channels are

indicators of the following information assimilation and
management activities:
Assimilation activities
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Paralinguistic behaviour, such as blank pauses, is a sign of

the information assimilation process;
certain micro facial expressions demonstrate the indexing of
processes that are equal to neurophysiological changes;
body movements playa role in the process of speech
encoding (a preliminary phase to information assimilation);
visual non-verbal behaviour, such as pupil responses, is an
indicator of cognitive activities preceding decision taking.
Management activities
(a)
speech volume and tempo enhance or prevent the

conveyance of impressions or feelings;
84
(b)
(c)
(d)
controlling facial expressions aids persuasion and facilitates

perceptual breakthrough.
body movements, which give the impression of credibility,
empathy and attention, heighten the persuasion chances,
while discomfort and fear reveal intentions to mislead.
eye contact and the intimacy that people have in interaction
determine the length of gazing in communication. This,
however, varies according to the context of different
situations and with the distance between people.
The connection between different types of non-verbal

behaviour is illustrated as follows by Druckman, Rozelle and
Baxter (1982: 35):
Figure 16
STAGES OF INFORMATION ASSIMILATION AND
NON-VERBAL BEHAVIOUR
Information-seeking
Paralanguage
Higher duration of utterances,

faster reaction-time latency, more
speech interruptions
More frequent gazes in the
direction of the other actor
Shorter spacial distance in
standing or seating arrangement
More frequent head nods and
chin thrusts, more expansive
hand and feet movements, larger
postural shifts
Larger pupil size, increased eyeblinking
Reduced verbalizations
Visual
Proxemic
Pre-articulation
processing
Paralanguage
Visual
Reactions/response
selection
Paralanguage
Facial
Raised brows, eyelids opened

wider, dropped jaw
Increased pupil size, change in
eye contact
Visual
85
The literature studied gives rise to six findings regarding the

connection between types of non-verbal behaviour, namely:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
the relative effect of different channels;

the interactive effect of different behaviour;
the manifold indicators of intentions;
that multiple non-verbal indicators give a better evaluation
of the psychological condition of a person than single
channel indicators;
each of the three stages of information assimilation can be
identified by non-verbal behaviour; and
the impressions in one channel can be reinforced or
brought about by observing behaviour in another channel.
Culture
The use of personal space, in cross cultural context in particular,
was examined. Druckman, Rozelle and Baxter (1982:21) found
that the preference for spatial arrangement, distance, posture,
touch and architectural design differs among cultures. People
from different cultures interpret behaviour such as proximity, eye
contact during conversations, touch, and furniture arrangement
differently.
A knowledge of the other partys cultural preferences in
nonverbal negotiating behaviour enhances good impressions;
otherwise isolation and rejection may set in.
Research requirements
There are considerable dimensions of verbal and non-verbal
communication that have not yet been examined and that could
contribute to an understanding of, and more effective, negotiation
communication.
Aspects of communication that have not yet been thoroughly
examined but are enjoying some attention are:
86
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
the role of questions in negotiation (Adler, Rodman

1982:210);
verbal openness (Chelune 1979:28);
ritual confirmation of agreements especially among
African nations (Gulliver 1979:113);
the use of information as a rare resource to build power
(Roloff 1981:21 and Karrass 1970:61, 154);
the role of communication in conflict situations (Rubin,
Brown 1975:95); and
deadlocks in negotiation as a result of the lack of
communication (Pienaar, Robinson 1983:19).
Three aspects of non-verbal communication that enjoy a great

deal of attention in practice where there is a need for research
are:
(a)
(b)
(c)
the Zeigarnik effect incompleted action is remembered far

longer than completed action;
the Wolf effect as long as the negotiator asks questions,
he is in control of the situation; and
the influence of different aspects of body language on a
negotiating decision; for example proximity, kinesics and
touch.
Summary
Verbal and non-verbal communication is probably the most
important element in the negotiating process. Not only does it
influence the process and individuals involved in it, but it is also
the conveyor of the other elements. Without communication it is
not possible to resolve conflict, build power, establish position
and achieve goals.
Non-verbal behaviour is, however, an area of human interaction
which is sufficiently deliberate to complicate prediction.
87
George Kelly (1969) observes that, one of a persons human

problems in social interaction is that of distinguishing winks from
blinks the tactical from the benign. More research is necessary
to comprehend this problematic but key element of negotiation.
ACTIVE LISTENING
Mutual understanding is a result of maximal communication
through mutual empathy Joost A. M. Meerlo (in Gordon, 1969:1).
Without understanding for the other partys case, negotiation is

impossible. If each party is only concerned about his own gain
and does not consider the costs to the other party, the chances of
reaching an agreement are minimal. Understanding only arises
from maximal utilisation of effective verbal and non-verbal
communication (Goldstein, Sies 1974:20). Empathy grows from
the utilisation of communication.
Active listening is the empathic receiving of a message, but
especially the latent or concealed message. Active listening
consists of hearing the total communication message, paying
attention to it, forming an understanding of it, and remembering it
(Adler, Rodman 1982:92-93). It is also the willingness to defer
criticism and judgment, until more information is available (Tubbs,
Moss 1974:140).
Often, responsiveness has no part in negotiation, as a result of
message
overload,
pre-occupied
participants,
physical
interferences, too much talking, or because it has never been
mastered, but particularly, because the tempo of intra- and interpersonal communication is very fast and misunderstanding
causes erroneous assumptions.
Responsiveness is an important element in the negotiating
process and is one of the elements which suffers the most
neglect.
88
MESSAGE CONTENT
The message content, or the meaning of the message is

determined by the negotiators personalities, roles, cultures,
experience, attitudes, and other negotiating elements. The form
of the message (such as rules of behaviour laid down for the
negotiation), and the structure of the negotiation (whether it is
direct, indirect, individual, group or public negotiation) also
determine the meaning of the message. An important factor in
determining the message content is the negotiating situation
itself.
The message is expressed or transmitted in a negotiating
situation. This not only influences its meaning, but is often the
determining factor. A party may for example state that he now
wants to make a final negotiating offer, but in fact, he means that
he wants to know the other partys commitment. Edward T. Hall
(1959) calls this assignment of meaning in the negotiating
situation The Silent Language and Karrass (1970: 195) refers to
it as the hidden meaning. Other authors refer to the need for
meta-communication (communication about communication) as a
result of the latent message content which is very prominent in
the negotiating situation. The hidden message content and the
goals necessitate meta-communication, which again helps to
determine the situation.
Ways in which to clarify the message content is to ask
questions correctly formulated (Cavanaugh 1983:7). It is
essential that constantly, throughout the negotiating process,
ones own party and the other party are completely clear about
the meaning of the message. This prevents unnecessary conflict
and is especially required when the parties are from different
cultural and population groups. The perception of the message
content can easily differ under these circumstances.
Symbolic message content

Positive negotiating results depend on the commonality of the
meaning of the message content. The meaning ascribed to
communication signs and symbols can only be shared through
89
communication. According to Druckman (1973:28), the possibility

of agreement or sharing of meaning is enhanced when face-toface communication is increased.
A sound relationship can contribute to the commonality of
meaning. According to Roloff (1981:30), communication is a
symbolic process by which two people bound together in a
relationship, provide each other with resources or negotiate the
exchange of resources. The exchange of information or
resources in the negotiating relationship is a symbolic process,
where the relationship promotes the sharing of information. It is
therefore important to maintain a sound working relationship, in
order to limit the possibility of misunderstandings about the
meaning of the message content.
Communication is an essential negotiating instrument.

Symbolisation will therefore also playa large role in negotiation.
According to Crable (1979:19 and 88), symbolisation is one of the
phases of communication, and it has direct influence on the
meaning of the message that the negotiator communicates or the
other party decodes, as illustrated in Figure 17.
In a negotiating situation, the structure and participants
attitudes are often not conducive to a sound relationship. The
climate should therefore be made favourable, before the
negotiation can actually begin in order to make optimum sharing
of meaning possible see Cosmit (1986) on pre-negotiation
intercultural communication in South Africa.
The way in which negotiation takes place, namely in such a
way that the rationale behind the decision is clear, influences the
results. This promotes the sharing of meaning. The way
negotiations are carried out is almost as important as what is
negotiated, Henry Kissinger (in Zartman, Berman 1982:165).
The method that so far has produced the best results in
measuring the effectiveness of a message is Robert F. Baless
interactional process analysis. This method has been fully
discussed in chapter 4.
90
Figure 17
SYMBOLISATION AS PHASE IN THE COMMUNICATION

PROCESS
CHANNELS
A communications channel is the route along which, or the
mechanism whereby information is transmitted from a source to a
destination.
A channel may therefore be a mechanism, a medium or a
route. In a negotiating situation, the channel as mechanism or
medium is usually language sometimes directly, or alternatively,
by way of translators. According to Devito (1978:11), the channel
in face-to-face communication may be any sensory form, In fact,
everything about us communicates.
The channel can also be the written word, as in the case of
indirect negotiation. A mass medium may be used as a
communication channel in negotiation, but especially as power
building medium, or for strategic reasons.
91
The channel can also be the route of information transmission

see Katz and Kahns 1973, Communication the flow of
information. In negotiation the route of the information flow is
determined by the structure of the negotiating situation.
In interpersonal relations, the structure is usually a dyad, while
in international negotiations, it may be individual-to-individual,
individual-to-group, or group-to-group. The structure in most
negotiations is usually group-to-group. Each negotiating structure
holds certain implications for the negotiating channel and
message.
According to Clarke (1977:59), the negotiating structure

comprises the patterns of interpersonal relations that influence
the negotiating process. The negotiating structure influences, and
is influenced by, the negotiating situation (the type of conflict, the
physical set up); the negotiators function and position; the
relationships that exist between the parties; and the type of
agreement that needs to be reached (legal, contractual).
Zartman and Berman (1982:199-224) added aspects such as
the size and strength of the team, the influence of the perception
of the folks back home on the negotiation, prominence of
channels, and the cultural context.
Negotiating structure, (who negotiates with whom?) is one of
the most important issues in negotiation (Bairstow, 1980:514).
Dyads
A dyad is interpersonal interaction which occurs between two
people, where the communication content, the intimacy of the
relationship and the time lapse before feedback, are determining
factors. A dyad usually arises when agreement, a fulfilment of
needs, exchange of social resources, emotional investment and
closeness are required.
92
Dyadic communication is therefore face-to-face communication, which can occur between two spouses, friends, bloodrelations, business partners, or strangers.
If the negotiating structure takes the form of a dyad, it has a
certain influence on the process:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
a relationship is easily formed, which facilitates the

resolution of conflict. There are no other individuals to
complicate decision taking and the relationship is usually
personal or intimate.
communication can be more effective as a result of direct
communication and familiarity with the sender.
there is greater commitment to the agreement due to
shared responsibility and more than one persons
perception.
it is easy to identify tasks, and socio-emotional needs can
be met.
When the individuals who are involved have different goals,

however, or there is conflict between them, which prevents a
working relationship, it is very difficult or impossible to reach an
agreement in a negotiation that is dyadic in structure. The
potential for finding alternative solutions is also more limited than
in a group-to-group negotiating structure.
Individual-to-group
Pienaar and Robinson (1983:2) linked the type and the strategy
of negotiation to the structure of the negotiation.
As illustrated in Figure 18, negotiation that takes place between
an individual and a group on a direct and continued (sustained)
basis, would focus on the negotiation strategy rather than the
process. The strategy and factors of the negotiation (such as time
fixing, agenda setting, communication and media use) are of
great significance in this situation and not the processes such as
persuasion, influence and attitude shift. The individual cannot
afford to attempt these against a group.
93
Figure 18
STRUCTURES AND STRATEGIES OF NEGOTIATION
Individual-to-group negotiation, however, is very risky and is

seldom used nowadays, because a team has greater access to
resources, greater power and more manipulative potential than
an individual.
Group-to-group
Group-to-group is the most common form of negotiation. It is
used so often that negotiation may be seen as a group
communication process. The influence of this structure on the
negotiating process and results is better understood when the
nature and function of groups and group communication are
examined.
A group forms when the face-to-face interaction of two or more
people occurs in such a way that members of the group can
accurately recall the characteristics of every other member
(Burgoon, Heston, McCroskey 1974:2). The most important
characteristics of a group are therefore the proximity of the group
(face-to-face), the fact that interaction takes place, the number of
people involved (two or more, but not too many for interaction),
and the fact that members must be able to describe the other
participants characteristics accurately.
94
These characteristics of groups correspond, while groups differ

with regard to their structure and function. The structure of a
group is determined by the relative position of the members to
each other, their roles and their status (the prestige connected to
the position) (Marais 1979:88-89). The structure of a group is
always unique; thus peculiar only to the group. Aspects that
contribute to the uniqueness of a groups structure are the way in
which roles are interpreted, the unique communication network
that develops, the individual contributions by each member, the
norms of the group, the frequency of interaction, the group
personality, and the goals of the members of the group (Burgoon,
Heston, McCroskey 1974:2-6; Leth, Vandemark 1977:53).
It is precisely the goals of groups that cause their functions to
differ. The functions of groups can be divided into predominantly
two broad types, namely task oriented and socio-emotionally
oriented goals.
Within these two broad categories, Burgoon, Heston and

McCroskey (1974:11) also identify specific classifications of a
groups functions such as therapy, relationships, persuasion,
conflict resolution and problem solving as illustrated in Figure 19.
Apart from the groups functions, individual group members
also have a specific function in negotiation. There are four
important team functions that the members have to carry out,
namely:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
socio-emotional leadership;
task oriented leadership;
keeping record; and
analysis of the process.
It is important that group or team members are selected

carefully to carry out these functions and to complement each
other.
As the predominant goal of negotiation is problem solving,
according to the definition in chapter two, we will look at this
95
Figure 19
SMALL GROUP FUNCTIONS
group function in particular. It is accepted however that other

group functions such as influence, development of affinity, and
orientation are also carried out by the group during negotiation
(Cavanaugh 1983:2).
The question arises why the group structure in particular is used
for problem solving. Some authors are of the opinion that groups
96
are unwieldly rather than being of any value. Adler and Rodman
(1982:249-267) however state various reasons why groups are
suitable for problem solving.
Resources
For most problem solving tasks, a group has greater access to
resources than most individuals. Not only are they better
equipped physically (which is an important aspect of negotiation
according to Zartman and Berman 1982:64), but they can also
usually find a better solution. Available resources can be utilised
more effectively due to the groups interaction.
Accuracy
Another advantage of a group is that members have a better
chance to intercept mistakes. No one is without faults, and in
negotiation a mistake can cost human lives. Sometimes a
mistake is not so obvious, which makes a team effort even more
valuable, as there are more members who might be in a position
to spot it.
Commitment
Apart from effective solutions, a group structure usually leads to
greater commitment to the execution of decisions; especially if
members share in the decision taking. This phenomenon is
known as the principle of participatory decision taking, which is
now also applied in South African organisations (De Villiers
1975:5) and which leads to greater emphasis on negotiation at all
levels.
At almost every phase of problem solving, a group is more
effective than an individual; also in the identification and analysis
of problems. It is however especially in the development and
evaluation of alternative solutions (which can make or break
negotiations) where a group has greater potential and therefore
achieves better results.
97
Pienaar and Robinson (1983:29) maintain that the dynamics of

how the group functions lead to successful negotiation. They
divide group function into five phases:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
the socio-emotional phase where a leader establishes the

climate as well as the norms whereby the group functions;
the problem defining phase the problem is defined and
group cohesion is built;
The political phase roles, rules, power and authority are
discussed; a task leader emerges or is appointed by virtue
of his ability;
the constructive phase the problem is dealt with
constructively, the task leader, and not the socio-emotional
leader, is very active;
A final socio-emotional phase conclusion takes place; the
socio-emotional leader plays the dominant role and creates
a climate to resume or implement the negotiation.
A smaller group provides a better chance to obtain a

compromise than a large group who is more inclined to take
judgmental decisions.
The limitations of the group as negotiating structure should also
be pointed out.
Absence of critical information

It is essential to ensure that the negotiating team has been
assembled correctly, so that all the necessary information is
available or accessible. A group can easily assume that they
have all the information, when this is not always the case.
Domination by a minority
Unequal participation by group members diminishes the
effectiveness of a group. The quantity of a members contribution
98
does not necessarily determine its quality. It is the duty of the

leader of the team to consider all ideas before taking a decision.
Pressure to conform
No individual should be a member of a negotiating team if he has
no confidence in his problem solving abilities. If a member snows
potential, but is hesitant, it is up to the leader to encourage the
member or to omit him from the team.
Premature decision taking

During the first phase (the socio-emotional phase) of the
negotiating process, it is easy to become emotionally involved
with a problem. It is therefore essential that the members never
lose sight of their goals and negotiating strategies, so that rash
decisions are not taken before the task oriented phase.
Problem solving is not possible without communication in the

group or team. Communication in small groups will therefore be
examined next.
Small group communication is a study field in its own right
and cannot be discussed fully in this survey. Only the unique
characteristics of small group communication, and its role in
negotiation will be referred to.
Small group communication can be distinguished from dyadic
and group-to-individual communication on the base of the goals,
structure and functions that have already been discussed. Other
aspects of small groups that are also unique are the complexity,
the withdrawal ability, and the ability to influence (Marais
1979:23-24).
Complexity
There are not only one receiver and one communicator in a
group. The communicator must consider more than one receiver
when coding his message. In negotiation, receivers outside the
immediate situation should also be kept in mind.
99
Withdrawal
The dynamic combination of a group sometimes facilitates and
sometimes complicates withdrawal by a member. Specific role
expectations exist, making it difficult or easy for members to
withdraw. In a negotiating situation, the withdrawal of a team
member can have drastic results, for example, forfeiting the other
teams trust.
Influence
Recent research on various communication areas (for example
the communication of development innovations by small groups)
indicates the strong power of influence that this negotiating
structure has.
The influence and intimacy that result from group cohesion are
unique to the small group. This power of influence makes the
small group unique.
Public dimension
Negotiation visibility has an influence on negotiation behaviour.
(Clarke 1977:22). The structure of the negotiation is influenced by
visibility, whether as a result of an audience being present, or by
means of reporting by, or communication to, mass media.
According to Marais (1979:129), mass media reporting has the
same effect as the presence of an audience especially
psychological.
The most important influence of a public dimension on the
negotiating structure is the tendency displayed by negotiators to
impress the audience, and the pressure that the audience
reaction subsequently puts on the negotiator. During the Falkland
War, Jean Kirkpatricks press releases succeeded in confusing
Mrs Thatcher rather than helping her to establish Americas
standpoint. President Sadats exposure of his visit to Israel, on
the other hand, contributed to a positive attitude on the part of
100
the Israeli government and therefore to the success of the

negotiation.
Organisational negotiating structures
The negotiating structures in organisations and between

organisations are closely linked to the management ideology of
the organisation(s). The traditional, autocratic (better known as
the Machiavellian) management ideology, makes no provision for
negotiating structures. Bad communication and too few channels,
have led to inefficiency and the setting of win-lose ultimatums
between trade unions and employers (De Swardt 1979:11).
Management ideologies however are gradually being changed
to more decentralised control as a result of the socialist inspired
emphasis that is placed on quality of life. Workers are now able to
participate more in decision making, structures of authority are
beginning to change, and industrial democracy is once more part
of the scene (De Villiers 1975:5). The changed management
ideology now places the emphasis on win-win (or integrative)
negotiation. There is greater striving by both parties to co-operate
as effectively as possible in order to obtain the best possible
benefits for both parties through negotiation.
Although two parties may have the same management
ideology, there nevertheless may be a difference in negotiating
structure. The negotiation may be less or more formal. This
affects the team compilation, available channels, the
communication network or patterns, and the negotiating
behaviour. The formality of the negotiating structure is often
connected to cultural customs and recognition of the other party
(Piron 1982). According to Bairstows (1980) research on the
structure of negotiations in various countries, a universal
negotiating structure does not exist. Pure categories such as
totally centralised or totally decentralised types of bargaining are
rare (p 514). Thus, there are centralised and decentralised
negotiating structures in the USA and the United Kingdom, while
centralised structures predominantly occur in Japan and Sweden.
101
The form and place of centralisation differ however. It may for

example be a central trade union, or a central employer.
Negotiation (better known as collective bargaining in industrial

terms) is a trend that is on the increase in organisations
throughout the world irrespective of the management
philosophy. De Villiers (1975:12) names as examples countries
such as Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, the USA, Canada, Holland,
the West German Republic, France, Austria, Russia, the United
Kingdom, even developing countries such as Nigeria, and the
Filippines. The need for effective negotiating structures exists
everywhere. In 1981, during its seventy-sixth session, the
International Labour Office in Geneva, Switzerland called for a
worldwide improvement of negotiating structures (p 4). What
these structures should constitute, however, is not clear: It had
been clear at the end of the Committees work that there was no
meeting of minds on this issue (p 36).
In South Africa there is above all a need to provide for the lack
of negotiating structures for black workers: . . . should there be
opportunity for participation by means of collective bargaining at
organisational level for the non-white worker (De Villiers
1975:15). At some organisations, however, appropriate structures
are now created.
The Wiehahn Commissions (Mannekrag 1982:1) request that
communication channels between employers, employees, and
the government should be kept free, is a plea for the creation of
such negotiating structures.
Summary
Negotiating channels are mechanisms or routes to transmit the
negotiation message to the destination. Various elements of
negotiation influence the choice and form of the channel,
102
of which the negotiating structure is the most prominent. Groupto-group is the most popular negotiating structure, and knowledge
of its functioning is important for an understanding of the
dynamics of the negotiating process. In Durkheims
(1964:110-111) words:
The first origins of all social processes of any importance
should be sought in the internal constitution of the social
group, rather than in the psychology or physiology of the
members.
GOAL SETTING
Free
download
from
www.hsrcpress.ac.za
A negotiator must set goals to ensure that his message does in

fact reach the right destination through the right channel (see
Fouries Communication by Objectiveness 1975). In a negotiating
situation, where the results often involve vast amounts of money,
relations between nations, or human lives, it is of cardinal
importance that goals are set.
The general or broad goals of a negotiation can be as diverse
as the creation of relations, establishing the other partys position
or power base, reaching an agreement, and the gaining of time.
Piron (1982:5) considers the establishment of a relationship the
goal of negotiation. It is his opinion that this goal is often
neglected for the sake of the legal aspects. According to
Druckman (1973: 11), the most important objective in negotiation
is to reach an agreement: the purpose of negotiation is to
resolve a disagreement between two or more parties. The
absolute minimum goal is that there is agreement on the
necessity for negotiation.
Agreement does not have to be, and often is not, the goal of
negotiation. Unfortunately, the goal is often to gain time before an
action in order to have conditions that are more favourable, to
distribute negative propaganda against another party, to make
world opinion more favourable, or to shift the onus for a failure
(Sawyer, Guetskow 1965:468). Negotiation can also be
103
used to plan independent action as in the case of Japans

negotiation with America. While America was negotiating with
Japan for peace, Japan attacked Pearl Harbour on 7th December
1941.
The goals of the negotiation determine which type of
negotiation the negotiator is dealing with. According to Atkinson
(1980: 26), there are four types of negotiation based on the goals,
namely:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
dealing with grievances;

giving advice;
group problem solving; and
bargaining.
If, for example, the purpose of the negotiation is to reconcile

the aspirations of the organisation and the employee, it would be
advisory negotiation.
Goal settling is also necessary to obtain co-operation in a
negotiating team. Each team member should have a specific role
to play in order to obtain the common goal. The setting of goals
also motivates the party to participate and to persevere in the
negotiating process. According to Thucyclides words to the
Spartans, commonality of goals is . . . the surest of bonds,
whether between states or individuals (Sawyer, Guetskow
1965:469).
The most important objective of the setting of specific goals is
to determine negotiating techniques. In his Collective Bargaining
by Objectives, Richardson (1977:107) demonstrates how
negotiation is planned, techniques are established, and results
are evaluated according to goals illustrated in Figure 20.
Negotiation should never occur until specific goals have been
formulated carefully. Nevertheless, although goals have been
carefully planned, the negotiation may still fail if the parties goals
are incompatible, while the parties remain inflexible. Negotiation
should therefore always be considered a learning process, where
each party has to learn something from the other as well as from
the process.
104
Figure 20
NEGOTIATION BY OBJECTIVES
A GUIDELINE FOR DATA PREPARATION, STRATEGY DEFINITION
AND THE EVALUATION OF NEGOTIATING RESULTS
Bargaining *
items
Priorities
**
Range of bargaining objectives
Pessimistic
*
**
***
Realistic
Optimistic
Evaluation
Results
Initial ***
Bargaining
Position
Classify items in Two Groups, Financial and Non-financial

Relative Priority of each Bargaining Item to all Bargaining Items
st
Actual Visible Position taken 1 Opening of Negotiation (Union Initial
Proposal of Company Response of Counter Offer.)
EXPERIENCE AND LEARNING

. .negotiators are made not born... (Zartman, Berman 1982: 16).
How are negotiators made? By learning negotiators can
acquire certain required knowledge, but it is only through
experience (by participating in negotiations under actual
conditions) that a negotiator can develop the required skills.
People have different ways of learning and apply the principles
they learn differently. Learning and experience however help
negotiators to negotiate more effectively.
105
Negotiation cannot succeed if the negotiators do not constantly

learn from one another and the situation, and adjust their
positions accordingly. Zartman and Berman (1982:158-159) refer
specifically to the adjustment of a partys own action after having
taken cognisance of the communication signals as revealed by
personal as well as the other partys behaviour.
What can a negotiator learn?

A negotiator should take cognisance of the elements that are
present in negotiation and of how they function. This makes him
more aware of the importance of, inter alia, non-verbal
communication, perception, and empathy for the other party,
which in turn lead to more successful negotiation. Besides
knowledge and awareness of negotiating elements, the
negotiator should also know how to recognise the negotiating
process and how the other processes in the negotiating process
function (for example influence, power building, and non-verbal
communication manipulation). Methods, which should not only be
learnt by the negotiator, but which he should experience in an
actual situation to be able to apply them, include methods of
attitudinal and opinion shift such as Baless, which are discussed
later in this chapter. Basic tactics and strategies to prevent the
negotiation from ending in a deadlock, to avoid intimidation, or to
make concessions that are too generous, can also be learnt.
A negotiator possesses various personality characteristics that
he can develop, or new skills (such as needs identification) can
be learnt.
Adjustment and change are essential in negotiation. An
agreement will never be reached if none of the parties is
amenable to it. Change can only occur if a message is learned
and accepted. The learning process involves hearing and
understanding. A learner must have enough intelligence to learn
and enough motivation to accept if his decision behaviour is to be
changed (Karrass 1970:86).
In South Africa, as in many other countries, all parties in the
wide spectrum of negotiating situations, still have much to learn
and even more to experience. This statement is corroborated by
106
Prof. N.E. Wiehahn in his, The regulations of labour relations in a

changing South Africa and the International Labour Office (1981:
23) in Geneva. Dr W.J. de Villierss authoratative opinion on this
issue is that the non-white worker in particular should be exposed
to training opportunities by way of participation in collective
bargaining at the organisational level.
ROLES
Status is a position, while a role is the way in which people

expect a position to be filled. A role is the normative regulated
participation by a person in a concrete process of social
interaction with specified concrete co-players. (Celliers, Joubert
1966: 33).
In the negotiating process, a role is not only regulated
according to norms but is often explicitly spelled out or prescribed
to a member of the negotiating team, for example, to be
aggressive. That is why the two leadership roles in negotiation,
often are not filled by the same person. The task oriented leader
assumes the role of chief negotiator he is often more
aggressive and makes definite demands or proposals while the
socio-emotional leader has to promote goodwill and a sound
negotiating relationship as well as co-ordinate the team efforts.
These roles manifest in the interaction with the other participants
in the process.
Variation in roles sometimes necessitates negotiation (Clarke
1977:115). Rules and roles are always breaking down and
when they do not, they do not miraculously remain intact without
some effort, including negotiating effort, to maintain them
(Strauss 1978:ix).
The negotiating process and elements in their turn contribute to
the changing roles and role expectations. Karrass (1970: 110)
illustrates in his model of roles that there are eight role senders
that make demands on the negotiator (Figure 21).
107
Figure 21
MODEL OF NEGOTIATING ROLES
When they are not compatible, these role expectations obviously

lead to conflict. Role conflict creates ambiguity and tension. A
negotiator should therefore meet in certain expectations, modify
others and ignore some. How he resolves them depends on his
personality and his relationship with the different role senders.
108
Despite sound contributions to our comprehension of roles,

such as the publications and experiments by Daniel Katz and
Robert L. Kahn, there is still limited knowledge of negotiating
roles. There is however little doubt that the role of negotiator is
fraught with conflict. He must reconcile the high demands of
others in an acceptable, long term agreement. The demands are
often made by people from different cultures, with different
frames of reference.
CULTURE
According to Tylor (in Johnson 1962:82), culture is that complex

whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals law, custom
and other capabilities acquired by man as a member of society.
Culture is therefore a complex system of elements (such as
knowledge, beliefs, customs) that is learned by each member of
society and that differs from society to society.
The function of culture is to ensure the integration and survival
of society. Culture is abstract in the sense that it is manifested in
behaviour and in the results of behaviour but it is neither
behaviour itself or the tangible results . . . (Johnson 1962:82).
Culture, therefore, provides the guidelines for behaviour
including negotiating behaviour.
There is no negotiation element which is not affected by
culture. Nevertheless, scant research has been conducted on the
influence of culture on the negotiating process.
Zartman and Berman (1982:224) ask two crucial questions
about the role of culture in negotiation: Do people from different
cultures have a different conception of the function of
negotiation? Do they negotiate differently?
Inter-cultural communication literature as well as anthropological literature throw light on these questions.
Van Aswegen (1983) identifies cultural factors which have an
influence on intercultural communication and therefore also
communication in negotiation. These factors include perception,
109
philosophy, values, beliefs, attitudes (which include stereotypes,

prejudice and ethnocentrism), roles, the time concept, language,
and non-verbal communication. These factors also influence
intercultural negotiation.
Perception
Perception in intercultural situations occur selectively as a result
of prejudices, stereotypes, and a difference in the connotative
meaning assigned to concepts. Davis and Triandis (1965) found,
for example, in an investigation of world perceptions more than
100 operational definitions of attitude and personality scales in
studies among different cultures.
As perception plays a significant role in the negotiating process

and also influences beliefs, attitudes, values, and especially
communication behaviour, it is essential that negotiators should
be made aware of it.
Power, position, and inequality

These factors have long since acquired cultural connotations.
They are also closely linked to perception as previously
discussed.
Attitudes
In cultural context, attitudes are often expressed as us and
others, and owing to prejudices, ethnocentrism and stereotyping,
social distance is established. Attitudes develop from the parties
reference frameworks (which differ) and in turn influence
perception and therefore communication and behaviour.
According to Rich (1974:38), emotionally based attitudes lead to
the selection of elements in the environment and the
rearrangement of reality. An effective negotiator cannot allow
his attitude to cause inaccurate perception and therefore
ineffective negotiation.
110
Personality
Personality is also influenced by culture, as it is partially formed
by culture. Tubbs and Moss (1974:138) mention one particular
stumbling block in intercultural communication, namely a high
anxiety level. If, however, the atmosphere remains sympathetic,
and the communication is accurate and effective, cultural
differences should not create any problems regarding personality
in negotiation.
Credibility
Credibility can be a problem, depending on which cultures are

involved in the negotiation. Members of certain cultures are more
inclined to distrust each other in negotiation, for example,
Americans and Russians, or white and black Americans. Such a
situation often harbours built-in conflict. If the parties are from
different cultures, there need not necessarily be conflict, but there
is a great possibility that different attitudes, concepts of time, a
difference in goals, and in particular, those negotiating tactics that
are regarded as fair, would in fact lead to conflict.
Ritual confirmation
The ritual confirmation of an agreement is firmly imbedded in the
culture of traditional African negotiation in particular. In the past
this was done by the ritual parading of their new acquisition, for
example their wife or cattle (Gulliver 1979:163), while today it is
usually accomplished by means of announcements to the mass
media.
Code systems
The most important verbal code system used by man in
communication and interaction is language. In intercultural
situations one of the biggest problems is a difference in language.
Language is expressed in symbols, and they carry the meaning
of the message. If the two parties frames of reference regarding
111
the assignment of meaning and the system of symbols differ,

there can be no sharing of meaning.
Authors such as Zartman and Berman (1982:226) and
Mehraboan (1971:111) believe that there is a universal nonverbal communication code system. Others, such as Rich
(1974:161) and Barnlund (1968:511), maintain that the cultural
differences are so large that they overrule the resemblances. In
Barnlunds words: Differences of time and place, changes in
dress, posture, or facial expression modify and sometimes totally
override the literal meaning of a message.
A model of intercultural interaction

In his model of intercultural interaction, Rich (1974:13) attempts
to make a diagrammatic representation of all the cultural, social,
economic, and ethnic variations that influence the interaction of
individuals in a complex society.
Figure 22
RICHS MODEL FOR INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION
112
X Y and Z are different socio-economic classes.

A and B are two different cultures, while
C are people who have had extensive contact with the other
cultures (A or B) for example American negroes or urbanised
South African blacks.
1-4 are different cultural groups within a specific race.
Negotiating patterns
Gulliver (1979) reports on several African tribes amongst whom

he attended negotiating processes and dispute settlements. The
negotiating patterns of the tribes differed. Some exclusively made
use of a third party, while others negotiated directly, but in the
presence of family members. Some of the tribes used mediators,
while others had arbitrators, or a council of elders.
Negotiating patterns are influenced by group cohesion and are
also determined by culture. Gulliver (1979:31) demonstrates how
Jews in the USA, the Gunyaro in Uganda, and Chinese in
America are prevented by group cohesion to fight against
decisions. The decisions are however personal and informal.
Negotiations can occur within cultures or sub-cultures
(intracultural negotiation), or between cultures (intercultural
negotiation). Most of the studies in the examined literature
mentioned surveys on research on the negotiating process within
a specific culture. Karrass (1970:58-59) demonstrates, for
example, how the lonely and vast Arctic conditions influence the
Eskimos negotiation with a trader at a trading post. Such
information about negotiation in cultures should be of value in
establishing how the members of that culture negotiate.
Research on negotiation between cultures, however, is not as
prevalent in the literature, and is often a retrospective case study.
As yet, no underlying fundamental differences or resemblances in
negotiating principles have been exposed.
Druckman (1973:33-36), however, does point out the difference
in negotiation between Americans and some other cultures. The
Greeks regard an agreement between two positions or
113
standpoints a definite failure (Triandis, Davis 1965). The Arabs

make considerably fewer compromises than the Americans
(Summers, Stewart, Orcken 1968).
Conclusion
Communication, especially non-verbal communication, is the best
indicator of the difference that exists in meaning assignment
between communicators of different cultures. According to Rich
(1974:161), the real self is more easily exposed by non-verbal
communication. Communication, is however, also the only
Figure 23
EXPANSION OF CULTURAL EXPERIENCE
114
negotiating element that can bring about interaction. It is

therefore by means of communication that differences should be
resolved and agreements should be reached.
No member of one culture can become a member of another
culture, as he can never share in the same experience. Through
understanding, accurate perception, empathic responsiveness,
and knowledge of the other culture and value systems, the
perception of meaning may still be expanded and thus an
agreement may be reached.
Zartman and Berman (1982:227-229) make a few suggestions
how to facilitate intercultural negotiation:
(a)
(b)
(c)
Distinguish between cultural customs and individual

eccentricity. Arabs and Russians for example are generally
known as tough bargainers, while Qaddafi is labelled
irrational and unreasonable:
It is essential to concur on clear negotiating rules, but not so
strict that they hamper the communication.
Cognisance must be taken of cultural differences in
negotiations that are the result of national differences. The
Russians for example favour detail negotiation, while the
Americans first want to gain acceptance for a packet, or
formula before discussing the detail. These differences
affect the choice of channels and strategies.
A negotiator can learn to deal with certain cultural differences,

or at least to anticipate them; for example to negotiate late at
night with Russia and China. Deeper differences, such as value
structures, especially when they have been based on traditional
beliefs of what is fair, are far more difficult to cope with. It is
possible, however, to clear misunderstandings and misconception by persevering in the communication.
In the light of the complexity of the multi cultural composition of
South African society, it has become urgently necessary to
conduct systematic scientific research on intercultural
negotiations.
115
In Zartman and Bermans (1982:224) words: there are still

more questions than answers.
PROCESS, METHOD, STRATEGY AND TACTIC

Negotiating communication is a process of interaction. Within the
negotiating process there are specific methods of interaction,
strategies, and tactics that can be used.
Process
Not only is negotiation a process, but it also consists of many

processes such as communication, influence, coalition forming,
problem solving, power building, agenda setting, debating.
Process in negotiation therefore refers to a direction, or a series
of actions which is followed to obtain a specific goal according
to Druckman (1973:15): all actions or communications, by any
party to the negotiation, either made within the negotiation
situation or intended to influence its outcome.
The process of, and the processes in negotiation, are dynamic.
According to Gulliver (1979:80), each process has its own
dynamics, which develop logically, and are maintained by the
process. Interaction is sustained within the process by
contradictions and variation, for example, conflict and difference
in goals. The process of agenda setting or development is an
example of this. The agenda is compiled from a list of issues that
a party would like to discuss. Not all issues are placed on the
agenda, because . . . the choice of conflict allocates power
(Sawyer and Guetzkow 1965:469). There is, however, a hidden
agenda for all issues that are important to a party, but which they
do not want to bring up for immediate discussion. The order of
the items on the agenda is considered to be of crucial importance
by most authors, practioners and researchers. A successful
agenda setting technique is for example to place an issue that is
less important to party A, but very important to party B first on the
agenda. A concession on this point compels party B to make a
concession on the next point (which is a very important point for
116
party A). The agenda has to be adjusted and modified constantly

to adapt to the changed situation in the negotiating process.
According to Riker (1962), the eighties is the age of manoeuvre.
A process is therefore a series of actions aimed at eventually
reaching an agreement in the negotiation. Few researchers,
however, have attempted to examine the total negotiation
process.
Method
The literature on negotiation makes no distinction between the
definitions of the concept method and those of strategy or tactic.
Method can therefore be interchanged with both strategy and
tactic.
Strategies and tactics

Negotiating strategies and tactics are actions, or communication
by any party within, or outside of the negotiating situation that are
intended to influence the results (Druckman 1973: 15). They are
therefore part of the negotiating process.
Strategies and tactics can be distinguished by virtue of the type
of goal that they want to achieve. Negotiating strategy is the
overall planning aimed at obtaining long term goals or values and
can consist of a series of tactics used during the negotiating
process. Negotiating tactics constitute a method that is used, or a
tactical manoeuvre that is carried out at a specific time in the
negotiating process (Druckman 1977:13 and Karrass
1970: 149-150). This is exemplified by an integrative (win-win) or
a distributive (win-lose) negotiating strategy. Techniques that may
help a negotiator to follow an integrative strategy are for example
Baless tactic of opinion shift, and the tactic of behavioural
commitment (Pienaar, Robinson 1983:38).
Baless interactional matrix for opinion change consists of
twelve steps which are followed in a particular order.
117
Figure 24
BALESS INTERACTIONAL MATRIX
Steps 1 to 9, followed in sequence, lead to a change in opinion.

This process can also be followed from step 12 to 1 to obtain the
co-operation of an aggressive opponent.
Note that in a team context steps 1-3 are dealt with by the
socio-emotional leader and steps 4-6 by the task oriented leader.
The tactic of behavioural commitment (illustrated in Figure 25)
consists of ten steps, used in a specific order, with or without
pauses between steps.
This tactic is aimed at obtaining obligatory behaviour from a
negotiator in order to have more certainty about the successful
implementation of the agreement.
118
Figure 25
Free
download
from
www.hsrcpress.ac.za
TECHNIQUE OF BEHAVIOURAL COMMITMENT

Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
Step 5
Step 6
Step 7
Step 8
Step 9
Step 10
Can you explain it?

Wait for response.
Thus, it is your opinion. . . .(repeat,
interpret, reflect on what has been said)
Wait for response.
On what information do you base your
statement?
Wait for response. From now on DO NOT WAIT
You see, my information is . . .
Therefore, in my opinion. . . and. . .
therefore I would like to suggest.
Do you agree?
if not, why?
Two attempts at research on negotiating strategies and tactics

are those of
(a)
Hanner and Yuki (Druckman 1977:137) on the effectiveness

of different presentation strategies in negotiation (based on
the game theory), identifying a few tactics; and
(b) Donohue (1981:273-287) who developed three categories
of strategies, namely aggressive, defensive and regressing
and found that he could predict results according to the
strategies that were followed.
More strategies and tactics have been recommended in the
literature than an active negotiator could possibly try out in one
lifetime. There are strategies and tactics for each negotiating
element (such as communication tactics, power tactics, threats,
and the compilation of negotiating teams), and they are employed
differently in each situation. The strategies and tactics to be
chosen depend on the negotiating goal, situations, problems,
power base team, and various other aspects. One recipe does
not necessarily suffice in all situations.
119
Figure 26
KARRASSS PLANNING TABLE FOR NEGOTIATION
Strategic planning
(policy)
Tactical planning
(operational)
To select and negotiate with

source or sources that
optimise overall company
competitive position and
objectives
To organise people, power

and informational resources
and to optimize negotiation
performance
To optimise realisation of
negotiation potential
Decide which strategic goals

are most important, how
much is wanted and how
best to achieve major
objectives
Organisation, acquisition and

development of people,
power and informational
resources
Determination of sub-goals,
persuasive arguments and
means appropriate to
reaching strategic goals;
testing intent of opponent
Administrative
planning
Product-market mix
Make or buy mix
Constraints customer
and environment
Decision-making structure
Competition philosophy
Basic goals technical,
price, delivery, management
Trade-offs
Risk-taking and risk
identification
Power relationships
Attitude relationships
Fact-finding methods
Proposal and information control (security)
Ethical values
Selection of chief
negotiator
Worth-analysis
Organisation: Team
support, and special
assistance
Information: Fact-finding,
channels, analysis,
security and assumption
testing
Resources: Personnel,
tools, training, facilities,
third parties
Sub-goals: Issues,
problems, targets,
assumption and intent
testing
Techniques: Agenda,
questions, affirmative
statements, concessions,
listening, commitments,
moves, threats, promises,
recess, delays, deadlock,
nonverbal communications, focal points and
standards
Inoculation
Maneuvres: Timing
inspection association,
authority, amount,
brotherhood, diversion
A negotiators chances of identifying strategies and tactics

successfully are enhanced by his knowledge of the parties
position and goals, and by his ability to keep record, and to
analyse the process.
120
The authors are unanimous, however, about the necessity to

plan strategies and tactics. They must be determined in advance,
based on the above mentioned factors and the goals and
expectations of the other party. The planning of strategies and
tactics should occur during the planning phase, but can be used
in each phase of the negotiation. See Karrasss (1970:151)
planning table as illustrated in Figure 26.
Phases in the negotiating process

Authors distinguish between different phases in the negotiating
process.
Pienaar and Robinson (1983)
They divide negotiation into seven phases, see Figure 27.

During phase 1, the goal setting phase, the agreement that
should be reached is decided. During phase 2, the power phase,
a party determines his own power and that of the opposition as
well as the power positions of both. The third, or power building
phase, includes the establishment of pre-negotiating and power
building strategies, for example, applying pressure, or the
attainment of expert power. If there is disequilibrium or an
inequality in power, a strategy must be devised to rectify this.
Phase 4 is the dispute identification phase. Here, negotiating
issues, the priorities of each, points of exchange or surrender,
and problem areas are identified and the final and hidden agenda
is drawn up. During the fifth or synthesis phase, the case is
prepared and a negotiation team is assembled and trained.
These five phases constitute part of the preparation.
The face-to-face negotiation occurs during the sixth phase, the
negotiating phase. During this phase, the planning is put to use,
personalities are fathomed, the willingness of the other party to
change position is determined and ones own willingness is
concealed, tactics such as those identified by Bales are
employed, non verbal manipulation and persuasion communication are applied, and perception analysed. These are all part of
the process of negotiation.
121
Figure 27
PIENAAR AND ROBINSONS NEGOTIATING PHASES
Goal
Setting
Decide
on goals
Power
building
Identification of
issues
Deter-
Strategic
mine
position
(own and
others
Establish
power
for prenegotiation power

building
Coalition
Issues
Plan ex-
Power
Synthesis
Face-toface
negotiation
Prepara-
Proces-
Conclu-
ses
Tactics
sion
arrangements
tion of
presenchange
tation
Agenda
preparation Form of
team
122
Verification
The seventh and last phase of negotiation is the verification

phase. During this phase, negotiation is concluded, decisions are
verified, and the implementation is determined.
Pienaar and Robinson
implementation phase.
do
not
distinguish
separate
Zartman and Berman (1982)

Zartman and Berman (1982:42-202) distinguish five negotiating
phases, namely the pre-negotiation phase, a diagnostic phase, a
formulation phase, a detail phase, and a structuring phase. They
do not make a clear distinction between these phases, nor do
they describe how each phase develops.
Atkinson (1980)
Atkinson (1980:33) distinguishes four negotiating phases and the

actions that take place in them for different types of negotiation.
Figure 28
ATKINSONS NEGOTIATING PHASES
Phases
Dealing with grievances

and bargaining
Advising and problem

solving
Exploration
Position development
Joint exploration
ii
Expectation structuring
Emphasis on bargaining
Emphasis on discussion
iii
Movement and solution development
Emphasis on bartering
and movement
Emphasis on joint solution
iv
Conclusion
Finalisation of agreement
Finalisation of agreement
123
Atkinson also indicates the degree to which each tactic is used in

each phase (p. 34).
Figure 29
DEGREE OF TACTIC USE IN EACH

NEGOTIATING PHASE
NB: Atkinson defines bargaining as one type of negotiation, which

in this study, has been defined as distributive negotiation.
124
Atkinson does not specify at which stage of the negotiation a

particular phase occurs and does not consider planning part of
the negotiating process.
Summary
According to the literature, negotiation therefore consists of

phases. These phases are not always clearly distinguishable.
Authors differ on the number of phases and their content. It is
evident, however, that there are a pre-negotiation or planning
phase, a phase in which face-to-face negotiating communication
takes place, and a post-negotiating phase in which finalisation
and implementation occur.
The negotiating strategy determines what takes place in each
phase and the tactics determine how it takes place. The
negotiating process begins with the acknowledgement of conflict
or points of difference, and the will to resolve it by means of
negotiation. This includes all actions within and outside of direct
negotiation that are aimed at reaching an agreement on these
differences. The end of the negotiation is heralded when the
agreement has been successfully implemented with the approval
of both parties.
NEGOTIATION RELATIONSHIP
An important element that influences negotiation is the formation
and maintenance of relationships.
Relationships are formed when interaction occurs between two
individuals. In the negotiating situation, relationships are
established through the interaction between the participants and
influenced by personality, roles, trust, conflict, compromise, and
the contract zone.
It is desirable that a sound working relationship emerges
between individuals or parties, and within a party in a negotiating
situation to ensure successful negotiation. The situation often
determines the type of relationship. The relationship also exists
as part of the situation an element which co-influences the
negotiation. A negotiating relationship fosters trust, clears
125
alternative ways for the resolution of conflict, and in this way

contributes to the reaching of an agreement.
Individuals approach negotiation with different personalities,

roles and role expectations, attitudes, value systems, and goals.
When a relationship is formed, it follows that role expectations
and attitudes will be influenced. The forming of relationships,
encouraged by the mutual recognition of parties and the
identification of commonalities can contribute to the negotiating
success. Piron (1982:6) expatiates on recognition of negotiating
parties in South Africa in his Recognition or rejection? A primer
on recognition in South Africa. According to Piron the objective of
the recognition process is for parties to get to know one another
and to form a relationship. He describes the nature of such a
relationship as: . . . a relationship of trust, pure and simple. He
also believes that a relationship is based on training,
communication, good administration, and confidence in the other
party (p 127).
Atkinson (1980:38) also maintains that a relationship has to be
developed purposefully, based on common areas, or aspects on
which the parties agree. The more common ground there is, the
easier it is to form and maintain a relationship.
A negotiating relationship must be sustained. According to
Hamblin and Kunkel (1977:58) this is achieved by reinforcing
reciprocal behaviour. Fisher and Ury (1981:11) maintain that this
is only possible when communication is focused on the common
problem and not on individuals. It can be decided for example
that results should be measured against an objective criterion,
such as the current market value, rather than accepting the one
or other partys solution. Roloff (1981:14) contends, like other
social exchange theoreticians, that a relationship between two
parties will continue to exist as long as there is reward. This
reward can be the promotion of self interest (which needs not
necessarily be negative for the negotiation), or the exchange of
social approval such as respect, approval and esteem (Hamblin,
Kunkel 1977:94). Clarke (1977:59) argues that the nature and
survival of a relationship depend on the negotiating strategy (the
type of interaction) that is followed.
126
It is usually fruitless to try to understand the meaning of a

message apart from the significance of relationships (Mortensen
1973:241). The best insurance for a relationship to form and to
survive, so that meaning can be shared, is trust.
TRUST
Trust is the perception of a person as reliable or trustworthy.
According to Tubbs and Moss (1974:135), trust is an

expectancy . . . that the word, promise, verbal (oral) or written
statement of another individual can be relied on. If someone is
perceived as credible, he will instil trust in the perceiver. Trust will
be accomplished more easily if a sound relationship exists
between the perceiver and the person perceived.
In the negotiating process, trust is essential, at the very least to
make the negotiation possible, but especially to reach an
agreement. Successful negotiation depends on the successful
implementation of the agreement. This requires trust. Zartman
and Berman (1982:28) describe trust as a pre-condition for
successful negotiation. Ive often seen negotiations deadlock
because of emotional conflicts and distrust, says Kenneth Rush,
an American ambassador to France.
Unbridled trust however is folly. Thus, no party can be
completely trusting, since he would be at the mercy of the others
deceptions, and no party can be completely untrustworthy, since
he would destroy the possibility of any agreement. (Zartman,
Berman 1982: 28). There should be enough trust to sustain the
negotiating process, but not to the degree that a party is led up
the garden path.
Trust can be built by a good record which is verifiable among
the negotiators own as well as other parties.
The importance of sound working relations can never be over
emphasised in the building of trust. If there is a good working
relationship, and personal credibility is accepted, it is sometimes
possible to avoid conflict in negotiation. Caradon, chairman of
127
Britains security council delegation to the UN, after days of hard

work on Resolution 242, was asked for a few hours
postponement by Kuznetzov (USSRs deputy minister for foreign
affairs) before presenting this resolution to the security council. If
Caradon were to grant this postponement, the Russians could
persuade the South American countries of their standpoint and so
win the vote. Caradon, however, trusted Kuznetzov, because
they have worked together previously. After the period of
postponement had expired, Britain brought the issue up for
discussion, and it was accepted unanimously. Kuznetzov needed
time to sell the UKs case to the Kremlin (Zartman Berman
1982:40-41).
Trust is part of the negotiating process. Nevertheless, it cannot

be put to the test until it is possibly too late. The following actions,
however, may reinforce trust:
(a)
By showing understanding for the other partys problems,

while sticking to your own goals. Trust cannot be built by
threats or wild promises.
(b)
By a step-by-step fulfilment of agreements (compare the

way in which Kissinger dealt with the Middle East issues).
(c)
By free offers such as in the case of Sadat, who went to

Israel in November 1977?
(d)
If the other party accepts the action that has been offered,
and if a party can be persuaded that an action is to his
advantage. Beware of trading definite economic, political or
military goods when there is no reciprocity.
(e)
Increasing interdependency, for example, the awareness

that both parties are losing in a war.
(f)
When the negotiation yields some result early on, for

example the Israeli journalists who were allowed into Egypt.
In the process of establishing trust, personal trust may emerge,

which may help members to sell their own and other parties
proposals at home. An example of this is the work group
128
regarding the concept proposals of the NATO negotiations (see

Achilless discourse in Zartman, Berman 1982:38).
Summary
It is easy to develop trust in a sound negotiating relationship. If
trust exists, it is possible to resolve the conflict that led to a need
for negotiation, and conflict that arises from the negotiating
process. It is also easier to grant concessions, and to reach a
compromise, if there is trust between parties.
CONFLICT, COMPROMISE AND CONCESSIONS

Conflict is an expressed struggle between at least two
interdependent parties who perceive incompatible goals, scarce
rewards, and interference from the other parties in achieving their
goals (Frost, Wilmot 1978:9).
Conflict therefore occurs where:

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
at least two parties are interacting;

their goals and values are mutually exclusive, or are
perceived as such;
their interaction is aimed at beating, humiliating or
subjugating an opponent, or at joint solutions;
the parties confront each other with opposing actions and
counter actions; and
each attempts to bring about disequilibrium for the other, or
an advantageous power position for himself.
NATURE, TYPES AND SOURCES

Conflict, according to Robinson (1977:195), can be divided into
two broad methods of approach: the pathological and
behavioristic approach. According to the pathological approach,
conflict is bad and a cure should be found. In contrast, the
129
behavioristic approach considers conflict an inevitable aspect of

negotiation and does not attempt resolution, but sees the
objective as control or utilisation of the conflict. Cavanaugh
(1983) calls it creative conflict and describes this perception as
follows in the New Angles section of The Winning Negotiator of
15th July 1983: In many cases, conflict is inevitable and even
desirable. It is important to recognise the presence of a certain
level of conflict in negotiation as positive and not as something to
automatically suppress.
De Swardt (1979:33) maintains that inherent in any social
being or groupss repertoire of actions there is a combination of
elements of co-operation and conflict. Thus we find conflict within
and between groups in negotiation. Filley (1975) is also of the
opinion that conflict, as such, is not bad, but that the
consequences depend on how it is perceived and on the actions
which arise from it: . . .conflict is a process which itself is
neither good nor bad, but which has elements and outcomes
which may be judged favourably or unfavourably by those
participating in or evaluating it (p 7).
The advantages of conflict are, inter alia,

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
the defusing of more serious conflict, for example, by

means of systems to air grievances;
the stimulation of new facts and solutions, for example, from
a confrontation between trade unions and management;
an increase in group cohesion and behaviour; and
it can be a measurement of power.
Filley (1975:2-3) distinguishes four types of conflict, namely

competitive conflict, disruptive conflict, differences, and problem
solving.
Competitive conflict
In this type of conflict the resources are scarce, or are perceived
as being such, while the parties have corresponding interests.
One partys gain means the others loss.
130
Both parties strive towards incompatible goals and are

focussed on victory, but not on annihilation. Actions are aimed at
winning, and the competition ceases when both acknowledge the
results.
Disruptive conflict
Here the resources are scarce and the interests are different. The
parties have not concurred on a set of ground rules for
negotiation on the conflict, and actions are not always rational.
The goal is not to win, but to harm, vanquish, or drive out an
opponent. The atmosphere is fraught with anxiety, tension, and
fear.
Differences
When there are, or there are perceived to be, sufficient resources

and the interests of the parties differ, this type of conflict or
debate occurs.
Problem solving
If sufficient resources are available, and the parties interests
concur, it is possible to resolve the conflict. The objective here is
to obtain the most acceptable result that would allow both parties
the greatest possible benefit or gain. During this process, the skill
and knowledge of both parties are improved by a constant
striving for interaction that would benefit both.
According to Filley, conflict therefore involves incompatible
goals and different values. These differences can however be
perceived as real. If the parties can change their perception of
scarce resources to sufficient resources, and if they would
recognise common interests, it is possible to resolve conflict.
The conflict process

Before the methods for resolving conflict can be discussed, the
process itself should be examined.
131
The conflict process between two parties is visualised as

follows by Filley (1975:8):
Figure 30
THE CONFLICT PROCESS
Antecedent Conditions
Perceived
Conflict
Felt
Conflict
Manifest
Behaviour
Conflict Resolution
or Suppression
Resolution Aftermath
The process consists of six steps, namely:
Antecedent conditions
These conditions are features of the situation that may lead to
conflict, although the conditions may exist without conflict.
Conditions include ambiguous jurisdiction, conflict of interests,
communication barriers, excessive dependency of one of the
132
parties, differentiation in an organisation, association of parties, a

need for consensus, behaviour regulations, or unresolved
previous conflicts.
Perceived conflict
Perceived conflict is a set of conditions perceived to be conflicting
for the parties.
Felt or experienced conflict

This is a personalised, incompatible relationship that finds
expression in threats, animosity, fear and suspicion.
Manifest behaviour
Manifest behaviour is the perceptible action that follows conflict,
namely aggression, competition, debating or problem solving.
Conflict resolution or suppression

This step follows the actions and brings an end to the conflict
when an agreement is reached among all parties, or when one
party is victorious.
The aftermath
After the resolution follows the aftermath, or the consequences of
the conflict.
If the conflict process is considered part of human interaction
(therefore also of negotiation), methods for resolving conflict
should be examined.
Cavanaugh (1983:7) recommends that, apart from specific
methods, conditions and a general atmosphere of conciliation
should be created: . . . not in a negative sense by abusiveness
133
or telling people off, but by creating the conditions which allow the
intimidator to reflect upon, examine, question or change some
aspects of his or her behaviour.
Methods of conflict resolution

Filley (1975:22-28) and Adler and Rodman (1982:192) discuss
three methods of conflict resolution, namely win-lose, lose-lose
and win-win.
Win-lose methods
A typical example of these methods is the use of authority or
mental or physical power. Failing to react is also a method of winlose, and so is the use of a majority or minority government (by a
chairman or through pressure).
Lose-lose methods
A compromise, where neither party really achieves his goal, is a
form of the lose-lose method. A compromise however is
sometimes required, to arrive at a solution for a problem.
Payments on the sly, bribes to fake losing also in fact constitute a
loss for both parties. A neutral third party who becomes involved
as mediator or arbitrator also seldom leads to a satisfactory
resolution. Referring to rules in order to avoid a confrontation also
leads to Jose-lose results.
In the above mentioned methods there is a difference in
perception and in goals among the parties. These methods are
the most prevalent, although the third method offers the best and
most lasting resolution.
Win-win methods
Two types of strategies are found among these methods, namely
consensus and integrative decision taking. In both of these, the
focus is on the goals rather than on the differences (see Fisher
134
and Urys (1981:41) Principle Negotiating Method and Devitos

(1978:293) approach).
Consensus
As with compromise, consensus also leads to a resolution which
is not really acceptable to either party, but it is often employed to
arrive at some agreement. Thousands of soldiers had to die in
Vietnam, for example, before Hanoi or Washington decided to
grant the first concession regarding the location for the peace
negotiation Warschau or Honolulu.
Both parties have to focus on the problem. Consensus does
not include voting, an exchange, or an average, but focuses on
behaviour that is not self directed. This method includes
concessions. Concessions involve an adjustment of position until
an agreement is reached. Beaumont (1980: 116) even describes
negotiation as a process of concessions.
Integrative decision taking

The difference between this win-win method and concessions is
not a difference in type but a difference in degree. Integrative
decision taking is not as much a choice of alternatives as a series
of steps. The zero-sum conditions are changed to a positive
gain for both parties. Clarke (1977:1) maintains that an . . .
exploration of mutually profitable adjustments and gains for one
party does not mean losses for the other party. The resolution
must therefore be acceptable to both parties. One of the parties
will have to put a high premium on quality and a low premium on
acceptance and the other party just the reverse, while fairness
and equality will have to be important. The process of decision
taking should be controlled, but not its content. All the parties
must accept that it is important to be open and honest with facts,
opinions and feelings.
According to Filley (1975:94) the steps for integrative decision
taking method are as follows:
135
Figure 31
FILLEYS METHOD OF INTEGRATIVE DECISION-MAKING
Review and adjust

Relational
Conditions
Review and Adjust

Perceptions
Review and Adjust

Attitudes
Problem
Definition
Search
Process
Consensus
Summary
Potential conflict areas should be identified in advance, and plans
to counter unforeseen events should be at the ready to
136
prevent or diminish disruption. Methods to resolve conflict and to

maximise gain for both parties should be provided and improved.
According to De Vito (1978:292), effective communication
principles and channels help to resolve conflict.
COMMON GROUND
For successful negotiation, it is necessary that, in spite of conflict,
an agreement should in fact be reached. The most effective way
of reaching an agreement as soon as possible is the
establishment of common ground.
Common points, viewpoints or ground are seldom known. The
onus is on the negotiator to identify these points or areas. This
can be done by establishing the opponents negotiation base or
position and his aspirational base.
If there is no awareness of common ground on which a

contract may be based, a strategy has to be devised whereby
fundamental points of agreement (a precondition for negotiation)
can be used to establish common ground.
Although the negotiating and aspirational bases of the parties
concerned will not Concur, some overlapping has to be found. It
is in this area, the contract zone, where negotiation can take
place and a mutually acceptable resolution may be found.
A diagrammatic representation of the contract zone, a variation
of Robinsons (1977:200) contract negotiating model, is illustrated
in Figure 32.
The ability of a party to obtain information about the other partys
position, and to persuade him to agree to mutually favourable
proposals, depend on his ability to employ negotiating techniques
such as the questions technique. The information enables the
party to direct the negotiation towards a successful agreement.
137
Figure 32
THE CONTRACT ZONE
Party A
Aspiration
base
Negotiation
Base
Low
usefulness
contract zone
XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX
contract zone
Aspirational
Base
High
usefulness
Negotiation
base
Party B
COALITION FORMING
A coalition consists of two or more people or parties who work

together to achieve a common goal.
From the literature that has been studied it is evident that
parties co-operate predominantly to obtain power over others, or
to increase their power.
Thibaut and Kelley (1959:205) describe the objective of
coalition as . . . co-operation amongst individual to the end of
exercising control over others, while Rubin and Brown (1975:64)
see coalition as . . . the unification of the power or resources (or
both) of two or more parties so that they stand a better chance of
obtaining a desired outcome or of controlling others not included
in the coalition.
If the assumption is made therefore, that there is a difference in
power and resources (real or perceived) in a multi-party
negotiating relationship, and that it is usually to the advantage of
a party to utilise these resources to achieve a specific result, then
one could expect that coalitions would be formed as a
mechanism to eliminate weaknesses under such conditions.
Coalition forming is therefore a primary process in negotiation.
138
Reasons for coalition forming

Coalitions are usually formed when the self perception of a
partys weak points, disadvantages, or insufficient resources
required to affect a certain result, compels two or more parties to
combine forces in order to maintain or reinforce their individual
power, so that they will not be perceived or treated as weak by
other parties in the negotiation.
Caplow conducted research in 1956 on the reasons why
parties form coalitions. His premise is that the distribution of
relative power is the biggest determinant of coalition formation.
His predictions were based on three propositions, namely:
(a)
(b)
(c)
that power discrepancies in competitive situations leave

individuals with no alternative but to form coalitions to
prevent other parties from obtaining control over them;
that the weaker parties will be inclined to form coalitions
against the stronger parties; and
that the processes of coalition formation in triads are also
valid for more parties.
Conditions under which coalitions are formed

There are certain conditions which foster the forming of
coalitions. When power or other necessary resources are divided,
or perceived as divided, in such a way that a party sees himself
thwarted in the possibility of obtaining a result and that it would
be advantageous to join forces with others to achieve the result,
coalitions will be formed.
Studies conducted by Vinacke and Arkoff (1957), Bond and
Vinacke (1961), Uesugi and Vinacke (1963), Vinacke (1959),
Shears (1967), and Gamson (1962) demonstrate that power is
not necessarily good. The perception of weakness or vulnerability
may motivate parties towards coalition. They also found that
women form different types of coalitions than men.
139
Other conditions that lead to coalition forming include the

perception of a party as a common enemy, and when a party
interferes when two parties are already in conflict.
Conditions under which coalitions will not be formed are when:
(a)
(b)
(c)
this will not obtain any results;

parties are actively restrained from it by stronger parties, or
management;
other differences or conflict exist between potential parties.
Factors which influence the desirability of a coalition

partner
Such factors are inter alia the relative power of the other party,
the status, skills and potential which the other party has for
success, and the fulfilment of previous coalition agreements.
A possible coalition which could have been formed for the 1984
American presidential election was that between the Democratic
party (with Mondale) and black organisations such as the People
United to Serve Humanity (of Jesse Jackson), or the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference (established by Martin Luther
King). If preliminary surveys had shown that Jesse Jackson
would not get enough black Americans to register so that he
could be a contender in his own right, or if the Democratic
candidate had felt that he would not be able to defeat the
president, they probably would have formed a coalition. With the
new votes that Jackson could have gained in his campaign
(estimated at 1 million before end of August 1983) and the better
distribution of white votes that the Democrats could have had
(Time 22 (8), 22nd August 1983: 38-48), it would have helped
both parties to achieve a greater input in policy matters, had they
formed a coalition.
Conclusion
If coalition formation cannot be employed, and even in the event
of such an action, parties can try to use bluff, threats,
manipulation or force.
140
BLUFF, THREATS, COERCION AND MANIPULATION

Bluff
Bluff is the tactic whereby a misleading impression is created
through boasting. It is therefore a manipulation of the real
information, for example to create the impression that you have
nuclear weapon potential, while it is not the case.
Bluff can also include the hierarchy or priority of values. A party
can say for instance that they prefer one result, but are willing to
compromise by accepting another result, while in fact they did
indeed want the last result.
Bluff may also involve the degree of a partys commitment: for
example, aid may be promised, while it can, or will not be offered.
The success of bluff as technique is vested in its credibility to

the party concerned. The accuracy of bluff information may be
tested by an examination of the communicated information or
values (Zartman, Berman 1982: 158).
Threats
A threat may be defined as the explicit intention to behave in
such a way that it is perceived as detrimental to the interests of
the other party.
The aim with threats is to transmit information about the
negotiators preferences and intentions. If, therefore, threats
occur during the early stage or opening movements of a
negotiation, they may lead to mutual suspicion and competition
(Rubin, Brown 1975:263). By monitoring the other partys tempo,
frequency and intensity of threats or promises, his real intentions
and preferences may be determined.
Threats also reveal information about how the party who utters
them perceives the other party. If the other partys attitude is
perceived as negative, a threat, rather than a positive reaction will
141
be delivered. Raven and Kruglanski (1970), however, indicate

that threats that are too weak cause the threatened party to feel
insulted about his own power.
A promise differs from a threat in that it is the expressed
intention to act in such a way as to favour the other party. When a
promise is uttered, it expresses a positive attitude towards, and
perception of, the other party.
Threats are also used as a tactic of power building. Karrass

(1970:55-56) calls to mind the example of the warning by the
seventy three year old Czechoslovakian president, Luchvik
Svoboda, to the communist party leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, in
his office on 23rd August 1969, to release the Czech leaders.
Svoboda threatened to kill himself in Brezhnevs office, if he
should not release the leaders. Nobody, Svoboda argued quite
rightly, would believe that he was not killed by Brezhnev. The
threat worked.
Druckman (1973:30) warns, however, that threats do not
diminish conflict in general. Robinson (1977:213) maintains that
they are more successful when they have the desired effect, but
do not have to be carried out. This thin line between threats and
implementation is called the game of chicken or brinkmanship.
T.C. Schellings classic example of chicken, or who concedes
first is:
When two dynamite trucks meet on a road wide enough for
one, who backs up?
Talbot (1983:28) gives a well known example of brinkmanship.
John F. Kennedy threatened in 1962 to keep the precursors of
Pershing II in Europe, if Nikita Khrushchev did not remove the
forerunners of the SS-20 missiles from Cuba. It was in any event
the intention of the USA to remove their missiles from Europe for
military and political reasons, but Khrushchev did not know this.
Thus, he found the threat feasible, and the Soviet ships returned
home with the missiles on board. This event, however, was not
the end of this conflict and is, in the words of Andrei Gromykos
142
deputy minister, Vasily Kuznetsov, the reason for the Soviet

Unions power build up during the past 20 years, of which the
SS-20 missile program is the most dangerous manifestation. A
symbolic replay of the Cuban missile incident is not out of the
question, according to Talbot.
These are some of the questions regarding threats that still
have to be researched and about which there has not yet been
final agreement:
(a)
(b)
(c)
When is a negotiator inclined to use threats?

What use do threats have, except as influence?
How can threats be used to improve the effectiveness of the
negotiation, without causing the other party to be negative?
Coercion
If threats are carried out, or if a person is forced to do something
against his will, coercion comes into play. Force or coercion
however should be distinguished from tactics such as influence or
persuasion, where a party is indeed persuaded to change his
standpoint, but voluntarily, not against his will. Although
persuasion may therefore be acceptable and successful,
persuasive speaking is essential because it is the key to problem
solving in democracy (Adler, Rodman 1982: 370), coercion is not
acceptable and often not successful. Even though an agreement
may be reached as a result of coercion, the long term relationship
will suffer, and the decisions might not necessarily be
implemented.
Coercion can also lead to violence. Gulliver (1979:1) identifies
five categories of problem solving. The most general and most
universal of these, according to Gulliver, is negotiation and
adjudication or arbitration. The most dangerous is violent self
help such as strikes, attacks, or war. Violence usually does not
solve the problem, but escalates it.
143
Manipulation
Manipulation is the agitation and sometimes threatening of
people to achieve a goal. In this way, the partys expectations,
behaviour structure, and perception may be manipulated. This is
usually accomplished through the information that is
communicated (Young 1975:303).
Manipulation does have negative connotations, but
nevertheless is used by most negotiators to achieve their goal. If
both parties accept the agreement, manipulation is probably
justified. If, however, it is used to make a party change his
standpoint against his will, such a party needs to defend himself.
Fisher and Ury (1981:134-137) suggest various counter
mechanisms:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
recognise the technique that is employed against you;

name it;
question the fairness and acceptability of the technique; and
if this does not succeed, leave.
Possible techniques that may be applied include intentional

deceit, psychological warfare, and positional pressure. According
to Fisher and Ury, a party should not sit by and be a willing victim,
he must take positive steps against it and debunk the other team
if needs be.
Summary
Bluff, threats, coercion and manipulation do occur in negotiations,
but their effectiveness and desirability have not yet been
emperically determined.
SITUATION
The negotiating situation includes all aspects which are not
explicitly part of the process itself and the elements, but which
influence them. These are the physical and psychological
environment, time, and culture.
144
Culture has already been discussed and the physical and

psychological environments have been touched upon in the
discussion of elements such as personality, communication
channels, and non verbal communication. This section will
therefore deal with time as negotiating element.
Time
The length, tempo, and position of time influence the negotiating
process. Time affects each phase of the negotiating process, as
well as the strategies and tactics that are employed in each
phase.
Time should be taken into account as early as the planning

phase. Pienaar and Robinson (1983:31-32) recommend that a
time schedule that is relevant to the whole negotiating process
should be drawn up during the planning phase. The entire time
scale should be divided into four time units and each time unit
into two content units, as represented by Figure 33.
There are eight time content units. After the completion of each
unit, except the first and last, it is necessary to make progressive
summaries of the negotiating events.
Pienaar points out that this format is planned according to the
principles of group formation (see p. 94). During cell A and B,
parties get to know one another, and common ground is
established. Cells C to G are the work phases, which begin with a
definition of the problem. Thereafter, issues are discussed one by
one, concessions are granted and received, and this time unit
concludes with a settlement of the negotiation and the formulation
of a contract. G is an important time unit during which the
implementation of the contract is determined. The final stage is
once more a socio-emotional phase, during which pleasantries
are exchanged. The length of each phase should be planned and
carefully controlled.
145
Figure 33
TIME SCHEDULE FOR NEGOTIATING PROCESS
Content
units
Time units
1
Opening
(Socioemotional
phase)
Problem
defining
phase
Exchange
Implementation
PROGRESSIVE SUMMARY
Common
ground
Exchange
Agreement
Security
Formulation
Conclusion
(Socioemotional
phase)
PROGRESSIVE SUMMARY
Karrass (1970:205-207) confirms the advantages of careful

time planning. He mentions the example of an aeronautical
engineer who, as a result of sound time planning and strict
control, was able to fulfil contracts that eventually afforded him
special negotiating power in the business.
Time as power tactic

Time is a source of power. Events that control time in negotiation
may be actual or unreal, as long as they are perceived to be
credible. Patience is also power. The party with the least patience
places a power base into the hands of the opposition.
Karrass (1970:173-174) identifies seven time
movements that could be utilised as negotiating tactics.
146
related
Patience
Acquiescence and the maturity to live with a situation for the sake
of greater gain in the future are important in negotiation. Most
people have a strong desire to end the tension of negotiation as
soon as possible. This does not necessarily lead to good results.
Protraction
This is a special form of patience. In this case a party takes the
conscious decision to protract the negotiation for as long as
possible, until certain known or unknown aspects reveal
themselves, before the final agreement. Such a negotiation
should only be entered into after a rational consideration of its
implications.
Deadline
The use of a deadline is a powerful tactic in negotiation, as it
carries the potential for real loss to both parties. Last minute
negotiation occurs so frequently, that it has been said by Dunlop
and Jealy (1955) to be a fundamental feature of the collective
bargaining process. The cost of possible work strikes is
considerable, which place these last minute decisions under
great pressure (Young 1975:137).
Time restrictions in negotiation can be implicit or explicit, self
generated or applied from the outside, flexible (as in the case of
the SALT negotiations) or rigid, and may be seen in the same
way or differently by parties. They can also be advantageous, for
example, a cool down period, or to obtain concessions. Time
restrictions or time pressure, however, have significant
implications, as they heighten the possibility of acquiescence
against a partys wishes and diminished aspirations. The
demands and degree of bluffing also contribute to this possibility.
Speed
Shorter negotiations cost less money.
147
Surprise
Speedy action catches the other party on the wrong foot and
provides a considerable advantage.
Status quo
Static and unchanged conditions can sometimes be advantageous to a party.
Fait accompli
The fait accompli tactic is relatively unknown to business men but

well known to diplomats. Argentinas occupation of the Falklands
placed them in a strong negotiating position. Without the
occupation, Britain would not have acknowledged them as
negotiating party. They made use of the fait accompli tactic. Once
certain things have been done, they may become important
realities of negotiating power, whether they are legal or not. The
expression, possession is nine-tenths of the law, illustrates this
use of time.
Research requirements
Rubin and Brown (1975:293) indicate that the following problems
of time utilisation in negotiation still need to be researched:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
Under which circumstances do time restrictions lead to

effective negotiation, thus better decision taking?
When is the opposite true?
Which type of negotiator is more susceptible to time
pressure?
Can the introduction of a deadline by a third party increase
the effectiveness of negotiation?
At which stage of the negotiation will negotiators accept
intervention?
How can time restrictions be exploited for strategic
advantage?
148
RESULTS AND IMPLEMENTATION

Results
Negotiating results are difficult to determine and are often only
visible long after the conclusion of the process. There are also
innumerable variables in a negotiation, which complicate effective
measuring even more than the problems that are in any event
encountered in the establishment of causal relations.
Two questions that particularly highlight the problems of
measuring negotiating results, are:
(a)
(b)
from whose viewpoint should the results be considered:

from that of party A, or B, or C, or from an interested third
partys; and
when is the negotiation successful: when an agreement has
been reached, party A has achieved his goals, or party B?
In the literature, there are references to the results of

negotiations, but not to how they are measured, or to what they
should be compared.
The results obtained by parties are not independent, but have
mutual influence on each other (Sawyer, Guetskow 1965:466).
Each party, even if only partially, is dependent on the other party
for the quality of the results that they receive. Rubin and Brown
(1975:10) maintain that the result of each party is predominantly,
or wholly, dependent on that of the other party(ies). This
approach, however, implies closed resource allocation, or a zerosum viewpoint that does not provide for multi party, multi-issues
negotiation that are normally the rule.
The degree to which interdependency does exist, complicates
the measurement of results.
The attainment of acceptable results is not only a problem for
the researcher, but also for the negotiator in practice. This aim
places a party in, what Kelley (1966) calls a, dilemma of goals.
Each party desires to reach an agreement that brings him as near
149
as possible to his aspiration level. The party should therefore

design his strategy in such a way that his actions are not so
tough that the other party is daunted or dissatisfied, but neither
should he aspire too low and only gain insignificantly. Each party
must therefore decide right from the start what is the minimum
solution that he will accept.
IMPLEMENTATION
No negotiation has been completed successfully until the

agreement has been implemented. Both parties must be satisfied
with the results or agreement. If one party applies good
manipulation techniques, which cause the other party to enter
into an agreement with which they are unhappy, the possibility
exists that implementation will not take place.
During the planning and negotiating phase, it is necessary to
ensure as far as possible that implementation will indeed take
place. Specific deadlines and possibly more than one, must be
arranged, and also the penalties if they are not met. An important
aspect that contributes to the fulfilment of the implementation of
results, consists of face-saving and face restoration (Karrass
1974:64-66). A person or party whose ego or integrity has been
injured, will be willing to suffer losses (even allow the negotiation
to fail) so that the other party who sullied his esteem may also
suffer damages. It is essential to sort out misunderstandings in
order to restore communication and to ensure the implementation
of the results.
The arrangements for the implementation of the negotiation
should be finalised and ironed out in detail during the concluding
phase of the negotiation.
150
Training in negotiation
In the previous chapters, the concepts relevant to negotiation, the

theories and models on negotiation, the research methods used
to generate information on negotiation, and an overview and
integration of the knowledge available on negotiation were
discussed. It now remains to establish to what extent the
available theory (including the concepts) and the knowledge of
negotiation as a result of research, is utilised in negotiation
training programmes.
In this chapter, the points covered in negotiation training
literature and courses, the extent to which they are based on
research, and the areas that still need attention, will be
discussed.
The discussion is based on training materials and courses
reviewed and attended on a continued basis since 1983 as part
of the activities of the Programme on Negotiation of the Institute
for Communication Research of the Human Sciences Research
Council. It includes training material and programmes by
prominent negotiation trainers in South Africa, the United States
and the United Kingdom (for example by Atkinson (1980),
Contact Group (1987), Cohen (1980), Fisher and Ury (1981),
Karrass (1970, 1974), Pienaar and Robinson (1983), Levin
(1980), Nierenberg (1973), Raiffa (1982), Susskind and
Bazerman (1985), and Warschaw (1980)). The discussion will be
151
in the form of a summary and a comparison, as a detailed

discussion of each training programme does not fall within the
scope of this work.
NEGOTIATION ASPECTS COVERED BY TRAINING

MATERIALS AND COURSES
The various training materials that are available, emphasise

different areas, vary in style of presentation and in the quality of
argument. The content of all the courses is, however, successful
negotiation, and the process not the structure or the content
is mostly seen as the reason for the result or outcome.
Negotiation is therefore seen as having identifiable elements that
are interdependent, distinguishable from other forms of human
interaction, and functioning as a whole.
According to the instructors, a negotiator should master a
certain set of skills to be successful. The skills recommended by
the instructors will be summarised according to Weiss-Wiks
(1983:715-717) behaviour guidelines. It should be noted that the
instructors consider the skills learnable and the behaviour or
action of the individual negotiator crucial to the successful
execution of the negotiation. Some of the guidelines are enacted
sequentially, while others need to be heeded simultaneously (as
indicated by a *).
A win-win attitude. Win-win is an attitude towards negotiation
reflected in the negotiation strategy adopted that each party
should gain the best possible result, instead of deceiving each
other as much as possible. Fisher and Ury (1981) are the main
advocates of this attitude. They define it as a wise agreement and
stipulate the efficient proceedings in their method of Principled
Negotiation. The other instructors also support this outlook, on
the basis that the results are more likely to be implemented. It
can also enhance the working relationship between the
participants, and according to Levin (1980), minimises the
opponents desire for retaliation because he was deceived.
152
Prepare for the negotiation. Advance planning for any

negotiator in any situation is deemed important by the instructors.
The facts of the situation should be studied, the objectives set,
the priorities established and the plan of action decided upon.
Raiffa (1982: 126) mentions matters such as the negotiators
expectations regarding his counterparts objectives and
strategies, the options he will develop, his back-up positions,
bottom lines (see also Fisher and Urys (1981) BATNA), common
ground, and trade-offs, considering possible tactics, and
sketching alternative plans. Both Levin (1980) and Warschaw
(1980) recommend rehearsing.
* Concentrating on the needs and interests. During the
preparation for the negotiation, ones own needs and those of the
opponent(s) emerge. These needs are varied and should be
addressed when setting the goals and during the face-to-face
interaction. If the focus is on the positions taken by the opponent,
it is easy to reach a deadlock situation, because viable
alternatives do not seem to emerge. If, however, the focus falls
on discovering the interests behind the positions (as Fisher and
Ury put it), or on the needs of the participants, it seems easier to
find an alternative solution to manage the conflict.
* Estimating sources of power and implementing tactics. In
terms of a win-win attitude, persuasion the capacity to influence
the others behaviour is crucial in gaining the necessary cooperation to fulfill each partys needs. Power is inextricably tied to
perception (Levin and Cohen). Depending on the perceived
power, the tactics that may be employed cover a broad range:
over 100 ranging from Warschaws temporary situation based
tactics to Levins dirty tactics, Nierenbergs how and where, and
Karrass summary of tactics and counter tactics. Everyone of the
instructors urges negotiators to recognise the use of tactics and
to have a knowledge of when and how to use which tactics. Each
negotiator is a user and a target of the practice of power. In the
final analysis, to be successful, one should be willing to test the
others power.
Effective communication. Communication is the medium for
negotiation. By means of communication, information is
153
exchanged about the interests and needs of the negotiators and

their priorities. Misunderstandings can also happen through
communication, inhibiting the possibility of reaching an
agreement. As a communicator, the negotiator should strive to
formulate his needs clearly and specifically (Warschaw 1980:171)
and use questions effectively to gain information that will help him
to achieve his objectives (Nierenberg 1973:109). As a receiver,
the negotiator critically perceives non-verbal and verbal cues, is
on the look-out for latent intentions, and checks the opponents
perception of his message to minimise misunderstandings.
* Monitoring the other negotiators behaviour. The behaviour

of the team members, and even more so, of the opponent, should
influence the negotiators communication and choice of tactics.
Warschaw, for example, identifies six and Levin twelve types of
opponents, while Atkinson provides a checklist to establish the
type of opponent one has to deal with. The negotiator should be
constantly aware of the opponents characteristics and way of
behaviour, and the effect on the negotiation process (therefore
also the outcome). Signs of psychological warfare or
manipulation should be recognised.
* Demonstrating flexibility. A successful negotiator adopts and
conveys a win-win attitude. A striving towards problem-solving
must be perceived in his words or actions. Trust is very important,
but it is more often absent than present. Trust can be built by
ones behaviour and by adapting ones objectives and tactics if
they are inappropriate (Warschaw calls this midcourse
corrections). The willingness and ability to be flexible are crucial
to successful negotiation.
* Finalisation and implementation of the agreement. At the
right time during the negotiation, when a satisfactory agreement
has been reached, the agreement should be written out clearly,
explicitly, and preferably in ones own words (Levin (1980:88) and
Cohen (1980:220) recommend that one offers to do it). It is
essential that the successful negotiator minimizes misunderstandings and that the agreement is of such a nature that it
encourages commitment and implementation.
154
The guidelines given in the materials and courses that were

mentioned, should enhance the negotiators success and
heighten an awareness of the negotiation process as a whole.
THE NATURE
RESEARCH
OF
SUPPORT
BY
EMPIRICAL
The training material and courses covered here, differ little from
the general state of negotiation theory. The instructors make
certain statements or prescriptions about successful negotiation
behaviour which they illustrate with examples from negotiation
situations. The statements, however, are seldom based on
research, and only one programme has been evaluated once.
There is an abundance of available research (as reported in
Chapters four and five). It need not be necessary, therefore, for
instructors to use examples and anecdotes as if they were
scientific facts. Some trainers use the work of researchers, but do
not cite the source.
Researchers often complain that they do not have negotiators
to participate in their studies. The training programmes seem to
present an excellent opportunity of overcoming this problem,
while the results of the research can then be used in the courses.
If instructors take note of available research to emphasise their
views, and researchers develop research designs that add to the
knowledge useful to instructors, this co-operation could result in
high quality training programmes and applicable of research.
NEGOTIATION AREAS THAT STILL NEED ATTENTION

The discussions on negotiation theory, research, and training,
covered in previous chapters, indicate some areas in the field that
still need attention. The most pertinent of these areas will be
addressed here.
155
In an effort to understand negotiation and negotiators

behaviour, theorists, researchers and instructors are purposefully
or subconsciously relying on rational behaviour. Recent
negotiation literature indicates disillusionment with this perception
(Gribben 1983; Weiss-Wik 1983; Nieuwmeijer 1988b). In South
Africa in particular, negotiators who now have to start negotiating
with traditional black negotiators are experiencing tremendous
difficulty in negotiating outside all basic ground rules that were
established in Western style negotiations not that all Western
negotiators adhere to rational behaviour. It is therefore useless
to obtain results on negotiation based on unreal behaviour or
situations, or to try and train negotiators to cope in real life
situations on the basis of such knowledge.
A related problem that was also mentioned in the introduction
to this work involves the differences in concept definitions and
perspectives on negotiation. Is it possible to understand
negotiation if perceived from so many viewpoints? Is it possible to
integrate all the different ways in which negotiation is seen? And
if negotiation is theoretically so complex, is it possible for a
negotiator to attend to the process in general, and all the various
elements that influence the process, and subsequently, his
behaviour and the result of the negotiation?
While it is difficult to imagine a negotiator being able to
negotiate successfully by mastering all the aspects that are
known, it is even more of a problem when one realises how many
areas still need to be researched, for example, intercultural
factors influencing negotiations, style of verbal expression, many
aspects of planning, information gathering, and indeed
negotiation research and training.
Negotiators, however, go on negotiating successfully everyday
despite the apparent lack of knowledge of the negotiation process
and how it functions. But maybe this knowledge will enable them
to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement in the cases where
they have failed. The knowledge seems to be worth having when
one looks at the amount of time and money spent on finding
answers.
156
References
Adler, R B, Rodman, G. Understanding human communication.

New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 1982.
Archer, R L. Role of personality and the social situation. In:
Chelune, G J et al. Self-disclosure: origins, patterns and
implications of openness in interpersonal relationships. San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 1979: 28-58.
Archibald, R D. Cross-cultural communication: an interpersonal
perspective. USA: University of Utah, 1971. (Ph.D.
dissertation).
Atkinson, G M. An Introduction to negotiation. UK: Industrial

Relations Training Resource Centre. 1980.
Bacharach, S B, Lawler, E J. Bargaining: power, tactics and
outcomes. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 1981.
Bales, R F. Interaction process analysis: a method for the study
of small groups. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley.
1950.
Bairstow, Frances. The structure of bargaining: international
comparisons a story of diversity. Labor Law Journal 31,
August 1980: 514-525.
Barnlund, D C. Interpersonal communication: survey and studies.
New York: Houghton-Mifflin. 1968.
Baudhuin, S, Davis, M. Scales of the measurement of ethos:
another attempt. Speech Monographs 39, 1972: 296-301.
157
Bazerman, M H, Lewicki, R J. Negotiating in organizations.

Beverly Hills: Sage. 1983.
Bazerman, M H, Neale, Margaret A. Improving negotiation
effectiveness under final offer arbitration: the role of selection
and training. Journal of Applied Psychology 67, 1982:
543-548.
Beaumont, P B. Bargaining structure. Management decision
13(3), 1980: 103-170.
Beisecker, T. Verbal persuasive strategies in mixed-motive
interactions. Quarterly Journal of Speech 56, 1970: 149-160.
Bercovitch, J. Problems and approaches in the study of
bargaining and negotiations. Unpublished manuscript,
Department of Political Science, University of Canterbury,
Christchurch, New Zealand. 1983.
Berlo, D, Lemmert, J, Mertz, R. Dimensions for evaluating the

acceptability of message sources. Public Opinion Quarterly 33,
1969: 563-576.
Berne, E. Games people play. New York: Grove. 1964. What
do you say after you say hello? California: Corgi. 1972.
Bobbit, R A. Internal external control and bargaining behaviour
in a prisoners dilemma game. Dissertation Abstracts, 1967.
27. 3266-3267-B.
Bond, J R, Vinacke, W E. Coalitions in mixed-set triads. Sociometry 24, 1961: 61-75.
Bostrom, R N. Persuasion. Engelwood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall. 1983.
Burgoon, M, Heston, J K, McCroskey, J. Small group
communication: a functional approach. New York: Holt,
Rinehart & Winston. 1974.
Caplow, T A. A theory of coalitions in the triad. American
Sociological Review 21, 1956: 489-493.
Cavanaugh, Christine. Facilitating group
Winning Negotiator 4(5), June, 1983: 1-7.
158
negotiation.
The
Celliers, S P, Joubert, D D. Sosiologie: n sistematiese inleiding.

Stellenbosch: Kosmo. 1966.
Chelune, G J. et al. Self-disclosure: origins, patterns, and
implications of openness in interpersonal relationships. San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 1979.
Clarke, H G. The effects of constituent trust, representative
dominance and bargaining visibility on intergroup bargaining.
Pretoria: Unisa. 1977. (MBA dissertation)
Coddington, A. Theories of the bargaining process. Chicago:
Aldine. 1968.
Cohen, H. You can negotiate anything. Secaucus, New Jersey:
Lyle Stuart. 1980.
Contact Group. Effective negotiation skills. Johannesburg, 1987.
Coser, L A. Continuities in the study of social conflict. Free Press.
1967.
Crable, R E. Using communication. Boston, Massachusetts: Allyn

Bacon. 1979.
Cronkhite, G, Liska, J. A critique of factor analytic approaches to
the study of credibility. Communication Monographs 43,
1976: 91-107.
Cross, J G. A theory of the bargaining process. American
Economic Review 55, 1965: 67-94.
Cummings, L L, Harnett, D L, Schmidt, S M. International crosslanguage factor stability of personality: an analysis of the
Shure-Meeker Personality/Attitude Schedule. The Journal of
Psychology 82, 1972: 67-84.
Dahl, R A. The concept of power. Behavioural Science, 1957:
201-215.
Davis, E E, Traindis, H C. An exploratory study of intercultural
negotiations. Urbana: University of Illinois. 1965. Group
Effectiveness Research Laboratory Technical Report 26,
ARPA Contract NR 177-472, nonr-1834 (36).
159
De Koning, T L, Hall, E J. Onderhandelaars se siening van die

belang van geloofwaardigheid in onderhandeling. (Navorsingsprojek tans onderneem as deel van IKOMM se program oor
onderhandelingskommunikasie) (1988).
De Swardt, L P V. Sekere aspekte van kollektiewe
bedingingsmag in die Suid-Afrikaanse bedryfslewe n
bedryfsosiologiese ondersoek. Bloemfontein: UOVS. 1979.
(M.Soc. Sc.-verhandeling).
Deutsch, M., Krauss, R M. The effect of threat upon interpersonal
bargaining. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology
61,1960: 181-189. Studies of interpersonal bargaining.
Journal of Conflict Resolution 6, 1962: 52-76.
De Villiers, W J. Reformasie van bestuursdenke teen die
agtergrond van tydgenootlike ideologie. Johannesburg: RAU.
1975.
De Vito, J A. Communicology: an introduction to the study of

communication. New York: Harper & Row. 1978.
Donohue, W A. Analyzing negotiation tactics: development of a
negotiation interact system. Human Communication Research
7(3), Spring 1981: 273-287.
Donohue, W A, Diez, Mary E, Hamilton, M. Coding naturalistic
negotiation interaction. Human Communication Research
10(3), 1984: 403-425.
Douglas, A. A peaceful settlement of industrial and inter-group
dispute. Journal of Conflict Resolution 1, 1957: 69-81.
Drucker, P F. Interviewed by Elizabeth Hall. Psychology Today
16(2), 1982: 60-67.
Druckman, D. Human factors in international negotiations: socialpsychological aspects of international conflict. (Sage
professional paper in international studies no. 02-020, Vol. 2).
Beverly Hills: Sage. 1973.
160
Negotiations: social-psychological perspectives. Beverly Hills,

California: Sage. 1977.
Druckman, D, Rozelle, R M, Baxter, J. Non-verbal
communication: survey, theory, and research. (Sage Library of
Social Research, Vol. 139). Beverly Hills, California: Sage.
1982.
Durkheim, E. et al. Essays on Sociology and Philosophy. New
York: Harper & Row. 1964.
Emerson, R M. Power-dependence
Sociological Review 27, 1962: 31-40.
relations.
American
Operant psychology and exchange theory. In: Burgess, R,

Bushell, D Jr (Eds.) Experimental analysis of social processes:
implications for a Behavioral Sociology. New York: Columbia
University Press. 1969: 379-405.
Filley, A C. Interpersonal conflict resolution. Glenview, Illinois:
Scott, Foresman & Company. 1975.
Fischer, B. Taking combat out of labour relations. Business Week

21, September 1981: 11.
Fisher, R, Ury, W. Getting to yes: negotiating agreement without
giving in. Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin. 1981.
Foldes, L. A determinant model of bilateral monopoly. Economica
31, May, 1964: 117-131.
Fouraker, L E, Siegel, S. Bargaining behavior. New York:
McGraw-HilI. 1963.
Fourie, H P. Doelwitkommunikasie. Johannesburg: McGraw-Hill.
1975.
Fowler, H W, Fowler, F G. The concise Oxford dictionary of
current English. Oxford: Clarendon. 1964.
French, J R, Raven B. The basis of social power. In: Cartwright
D, Zandler A (Eds.) Group dynamics: research and theory (3rd
ed). London: Harper & Row. 1968.
161
Frost, J, Wilmot, W. Interpersonal conflict. Dubuque, Iowa:

Brown. 1978.
Galbraith, J K. Economic development. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University. 1962.
Gallo, P S. The effects of increased incentives upon the use of
threat in bargaining. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 4, 1966: 14-20.
Gamson, W A. Experimental studies of coalition formation. In:
Berkowitz, L. (Ed.) Advances in Experimental Social
Psychology 68, 1962: 157-171.
Goldstein, Susan B, Sies, L F. The communication contract.
Illinois: Charles C. Thomas. 1974.
Gordon, G N. The languages of communication: a logical and
psychological examination. New York: Hastings House. 1969.
Gribbin, J. The prisoners dilemma. New Scientist 97 (1345), 17

February 1983: 434.
Gulliver, P H. Disputes and negotiations: a cross-cultural
perspective. New York: Academic Press. 1979.
Hall, E T. The silent language. New York: Doubleday. 1959.
Hall, R. Decisions, decisions, decisions. Psychology Today 5,
1971: 51-58.
Hamblin, R L, Kunkel, J H. Behavioral theory in Sociology. New
Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books. 1977.
Hannah, R L. Human relations and the collective bargaining
environment, with special reference to underground coal
mining. Human Resource Management 20 (4), 1981: 2-13.
Harris, T A. Im OK youre OK. London: Pan Books. 1967.
162
Harsanyi, J C. (Ed.) Rational behavior and bargaining equilibrium

in games and social situations. London: Cambridge University.
1977.
Hatch, R. Communicating in business. USA: Science Research
Association. 1977.
Hinde, R A. Nonverbal communication. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. 1972.
Hillthrop, J M., Rubin, J. Z. Effects of Intervention Mode and
Conflict of Interest on Dispute Resolution. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 42, 1982: 665-672.
Homans, G C. The human group. New York: Harcourt & Brace
1950.
Hopmann, P T, Walcott, C. The impact of international conflict
and debate on bargaining in arms control negotiations: an
experimental analysis. International Interaction 2, 1976:
189-206.
Hovland, C, Weiss, W. The influence of source credibility on

communication effectiveness. Public Opinion Quarterly 15,
1951: 635-650.
Hunger, J, Stern, L W. Assessment of the functionality of the
supra-ordinate goal in reducing conflict. Academy of
Management Journal 19, 1976: 591-605.
Ikl, F C. How nations negotiate. New York: Harper & Row. 1964.
International Labour Conference on Promotion of collective
bargaining. The Report of the Committee on Collective
Bargaining. Geneve. 5 June 1981.
Isaacson, W S. Seeking votes and clout: Jesse Jackson
spearheads a new black drive for political power. Time 122(8),
22 August 1983: 38-46.
Johnson, H M. Sociology: a systematic introduction. London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1962.
163
Karrass, C L. The negotiating game. New York: Thomas Y.

Crowell. 1970.
Give and take: the complete guide to negotiating strategies and
tactics. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell. 1974.
Katz, D, Kahn, R. L. Communication: the flow of information. In
Mortensen, C. D. Basic reading in communication theory. New
York: Harper & Row. 1973.
Kelley, H H. A classroom study of the dilemmas in interpersonal
negotiations. In: Archibald, Kathleen (Ed.) Strategic interaction
and conflict: original papers and discussion. Berkeley,
California: Institute of International Studies. 1966.
Kelley, G. Humanistic methodology in psychological research. In:
Maher, B. (Ed.) Clinical Psychology and Personality. New
York: John Wiley. 1969.
Kiesler, C A, Collins B. E, Miller N. Attitude change: a critical

analysis of theoretical approaches. New York: John Wiley.
1969.
Kleinke, C L, Pohlen, P. D. Affective and emotional responses as
a function of other persons gaze and co-operativeness in a
two-person game. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 17, 1971: 308-313.
Kochan, T A. Collective bargaining and organizational behavior.
In: Staw, B. M, Cummings L L (Eds.) Research in organizational behavior (Volume 2), Greenwick, Connecticut: JA1.
1980.
Konetchni, V A social-psychological approach to legal decision
making, bail-setting and sentencing in California. Seminar held
at the HSRC, Pretoria on March 3, 1987.
Krippendorf, K. An epistomological foundation for communication.
Journal of Communication 34 (3), Summer 1984: 21-36.
Landsberger, H A. Interaction process analysis of the mediation
of labor-management disputes. Journal of Abnormal and
Social Psychology 51, 1955: 552-558.
164
Leaversuch, B. Arbitrators corner. The Winning Negotiator 4(6),

July 1983: 3-5.
Liska, J. Situational and topical variations in credibility criteria.
Communications Monographs 44, 1978: 85-92.
Leth, P C, Vandemark, J. F. Small group communication.
California: Cummings. 1977.
Levin, E. Levins Laws. New York: Evans. 1980.
Lewis, S A, Fry, W. R. Effects of visual access and orientation on
the discovery of integrative bargaining alternatives. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 20, 1977: 75-92.
Macmillan, I C. Aspects of manipulative and accomodative
behaviour by graduate middle managers. Pretoria: University
of South Africa, 1974 (Doctoral thesis).
Mannekrag 2 000: Inligtingsreeks 2(4), November 1982. Pretoria:
Departement Mannekrag.
Marais, H C. Kommunikasie in kleingroepe. Bloemfontein: P J de

Villiers. 1979.
Komponente van navorsing. Lesing gelewer op 13 September
1983 as deel van Module 1 van die RGN se indiensopleidingsreeks.
Maslow, A H. Motivation and personality. New York: Harper.
1954.
Mastenbroek, W F A. A model for negotiation. Training and
Development Journal 1983: 76-79.
McLaughlin, M. Recovering the structure of credibility
judgements: an alternative to factor analysis. Speech
Monographs 42, 1975: 221-228.
McClelland, D C. The achieving society. Princeton, New Jersey:
Von Nostrand. 1961.
McClelland, D C, Burnham, D. H. Power is the great motivator.
Harvard Business Review 54, March 1976.
165
McCroskey, J C, Wheeless, L. R. Introduction to human

communication. Boston: Allyn & Bacon. 1976.
McGrath, J E. A social psychological approach to the study of
negotiation. In: Bowers R V (Ed.) Studies of behavior in
organizations: a research symposium. Athens: University of
Georgia. 1966.
McGrath, J E, Julian J. W. Interaction process and task outcomes
in experimentally created negotiation groups. Journal of
Psychological Studies 14, 1963: 117-138.
McKinsey, J C. Introduction to the theory of games. New York:
McGraw-HilI. 1952.
Mehrabian, A. Silent messages. Belmont, California: Wadsworth.
1971.
Milburn, T W. The nature of threat. Journal of Social Issues 33,
1977: 126-139.
Mintzberg, H. Power in and around organizations. Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 1983.
Morley, I, Stephenson G. The social psychology of bargaining.

London: Allen & Unwin. 1977.
Mortenson, C D. Communication: the study of human interaction.
New York: McGraw-Hill. 1972.
Basic readings in communication theory. New York: Harper &
Row. 1973.
Nash, J F. The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18, 1950:
155-162.
Nierenberg, G I. Fundamentals of negotiation. New York:
Hawthorn. 1973.
Negotiating: an essential public relations skill. Tips and Tactics.
19(4), 1981: 1-2.
Nieuwmeijer, Louise J. Analyzing intercultural negotiation in
Southern Africa. Durban. Burgess. 1988a. (Ter perse).
166
Communication patterns In the SATBVC-multilateral

negotiations. (RGN-verslag) Pretoria: RGN. 1988b (Ter
perse).
Die korporatiewe Identiteit van n professionele Instelling: n

Suid-Afrikaanse gevallestudie. (Ongepubliseerde M.A.
verhandeling) Pretoria: Universiteit van Suid-Afrika. 1981.
Elemente wat n rol speel in die Interkulturele

onderhandelinge in Suider-Afrika. (RGN-verslag Komm-43)
Pretoria: RGN. 1987.
Negotiation a communication science perspective. Paper

delivered at the annual conference of the Southern African
Communication Association, Johannesburg. 2nd August
1986.
Onderhandelingskommunikasie: n literatuurstudie. (Kantoorverslag: 1983-28) Pretoria: RGN. 1983.

OKeefe, D. The relationship of attitudes and behavior: a constructivist analysis. In: Cushman, D, McPhee, R (eds.) The
message-attitude-behavior relationship: theory, methodology,
and application. New York: Academic Press. 1980.
Oliva, T A, Capdevielle, C M. Collective bargaining as a
catastrophe model. (Proceedings of the Academy of
Management) 1977: 177-181.
Oliva, T A, Leap, T L. A taxonomy of bargaining models. Human
Relations 34(11), 1981: 935-946.
Osgood, C E, Suci G J, Tannenbaum, P H. The measurement of
meaning. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 1957.
Pen, J A. A general theory of bargaining. American Economic
Review 42, 1952: 24-42.
Perrow, C. Organizational analysis: a sociological view. New
York: Wadsworth. 1970.
Peters, C. How Washington really works. Massachusetts:
Addison-Wesley. 1983.
Peterson, R, Tracy, L. Testing a behavioral theory model of labor
negotiations. Industrial Relations 16(1), 1977: 35-50.
167
Pettigrew, A M. The politics of organizational decision-making.

London: Travistock. 1973.
Pfeffer, J. Power in organizations. Boston: Pitman. 1981.
Pienaar, W D, Robinson C G. Bargaining and negotiation. (Four
day workshop. Seminar series 8, University of South Africa,
School of Business Leadership.) Pretoria. 1983.
Pigou, A C. The economics of welfare (2nd Ed.) London:
Macmillan. 1924.
Piron, J M. Theory of collective bargaining. Journal of
contemporary Roman-Dutch Law 41, March 1978: 183-196.
Recognition or rejection?: a primer on recognition in South
Africa. Johannesburg: FSA (Pty) Ltd Management Consultant.
1982.
Pottas, C D. Informele opleiding in kleingroepkommunikasie ter

bereiking van konsensus. In: Nieumeijer, Louise J (red.)
Kommunikasieprosesse ter bereiking van konsensus in kleingroeponderhandeling situasies. Pretoria: RGN. (Komm.
N-152). 1987.
Pruitt, D G. Negotiation Behavior. New York: Academic. 1981.
Trends in the scientific study of negotiation and mediation.
Negotiation Journal 2 (3), 1986: 237-244.
Putnam, Linda, L. Bargaining as organizational communication.
(Paper submitted to the Organizational Division of ICA, Hawaii
Convention). 1985.
Putnam, Linda L, Jones, Tricia S. Reciprocity in negotiations: an
analysis of bargaining interaction. Communication Monographs 49(3), September 1982: 171-191.
Rackham, N. The effective negotiator: the behavior of successful
negotiators. People and Profits. March 1979: 7-10.
Raiffa, H. The art and science of negotiation. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University. 1982.
168
Randle, C W, Wortman M S Jr. Collective bargaining: principles

and practices. In: Tucker (Ed.) Contribution to the theory
games, II. Princeton: Princeton University. 1953.
Rapoport, A. Strategy and conscience. New York: Schochen
Books. 1964.
Prisoners Dilemma: recollections and observations. In:
Rapoport, A. (Ed.) Game theory as a theory of conflict
resolution. Dordrecht: Reidel. 1974: 17-34.
Rapoport, A, Guyer, M J, Gordon, D. The 2 x 2 game. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan. 1976.
Rapoport, A, Kahan, J P. Negotiation: coalition formation in a
five-person market game. Management Science 30, 1984:
326-343.
Raven, B H, Kruglanski A W. Conflict and power. In: Swingle, P
(Ed.) The structure of conflict. New York: Academic Press.
1970.
Rich, Andrea L. Interracial communication. New York: Harper &

Row. 1974.
Richardson, R C. Collective bargaining by objectives: a positive
approach. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 1977.
Riker, W. Theory of political coalition. New Haven: Yale
University Press. 1962.
Robinson, G. Bargaining and negotiation strategy. In: Nasser M E
et al. Readings in organisational behaviour. Johannesburg:
McGraw-Hill. 1977: 193-221.
Rogers, L E, Farace, R V. Analysis of relational communication in
dyads: new measurement procedures. Human Communication
Research 1, 1975: 222-239.
Roloff, M E. Interpersonal communication: the social exchange
approach. Beverly Hills, California: Sage. 1981.
169
Rotter, J. Generalized expectancies for internal versus external

control of reinforcement. Psychological Monographs 80(1),
1966.
Rubin, J Z, Brown, B R. The social psychology of bargaining and
negotiation. New York: Academic Press. 1975.
Sarnoff, I. Psychoanalytic theory and social attitudes. Public
Opinion Quarterly 24, 1960: 251-279.
Sawyer, J, Guetzkow, H. Bargaining and negotiation in
international relations. In: Kelman H C. International Behavior.
New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 1965: 466-520.
Schelling, T C. The strategy of conflict. New York: Oxford
University. 1960.
Schmikl, E D. Corporate manpower planning a future perspective. In: Nasser, M E et al. Readings in organisational
behaviour. Johannesburg: McGraw-Hill. 1977: 175-191.
Schneider, D J. Social Psychology. Reading, Massachusetts:

Addison-Wesley. 1976.
Sermat, P G. Is game behavior related to behavior in other
interpersonal situations?: Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 16, 1970: 121-132.
Shears, L M. Patterns of coalition formation in two games played
by male tetrads. Behavioral Science 12, 1967: 130-137.
Sidowski, J B, Wycoff, L B, Tabory, L. The influence of
reinforcement and punishment in a minimal social situation.
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. 52, 1956:
115-119.
Staats, A. Social behavior and human motives: principles of the
attitude-reinforcer-discriminative system. In: Greenwald, A,
Brock, T, Ostrom, T. (Eds.) Psychological foundations of
attitudes. New York: Academic Press. 1968.
Stagner, R, Rosen, H. Psychology of union-management
relations. Belmont, California: Wadsworth. 1965.
170
Stern, L W Sternthal, B, Craig, S C. Strategies for managing

inter-organizational conflict: a laboratory paradigm. Journal of
Applied Psychology 60, 1975: 472-482.
Strauss, A. Negotiations, varieties, contents, processes, and
social order. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 1978.
Strauss, G. The study of conflict: hope for a new synthesis
between industrial relations and organizational behavior.
Proceedings of the 29th annual meeting of the Industrial
Relations Research Associations. 1977.
Summers, D A, Stewart, T R, Oncken, G R. Interpersonal conflict
in heterocultural dyads. International Journal of Psychology 3,
1968: 191-196.
Susskind, L, Bazerman, M H. Bargaining and negotiation.

(Workshop presented at Massachusetts Institute of
Technology under auspices of the Harvard Negotiation
Program) May 1985.
Susskind, L, Ozawa, C. Mediated negotiation in the public sector:
mediator accountability and the public interest problem.
American Behavioral Scientist 27(2), November/December
1983: 255-279.
Talbot, S,. Roadblocks en route to superpower summit. Time
122(8), 22 August 1983: 27-28.
Tedeschi, J T, Schlenker, B R, Bonoma, T V. Conflict, power and
games: the experimental study of interpersonal relations.
Chicago: Aldine. 1973.
Theye, L D, Seiler, W J. Interaction analysis in collective bargaining: an alternative approach to the prediction of negotiated
outcomes. In: Nimmo, D (Ed.) Communication yearbook 3.
New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction. 1979.
Thibaut, J W, Kelley, H H. The social psychology of groups. New
York: John Wiley. 1959.
Touval, Saadia. Frameworks for Arab-Israeli Negotiations What
difference do they make? Negotiation Journal 3(1), January
1987: 37-52.
171
Triandis, H C., Davis, E E. Some methodological problems

concerning research on negotiations between monolinguals.
Urbana: University of Illinois. 1965. (Group Effectiveness
Research Laboratory Technical Report 28).
Tubbs, S L. Moss, S. Interpersonal communication. New York:
Random House. 1974.
Uesugi. T K, Vinacke, W E. Strategy in a feminine game.
Sociometry 26, 1963: 75-88.
Van Aswegen, Adri H. Interkulturele kommunikasie:
literatuuroorsig. Pretoria: RGN: Kantoorverslag. 1983.
Van Leent, J A A. Sociale psychologie in drie dimensies. Utrecht:

Aula. 1968.
Vessels, R D. Negotiated rulemaking A New York State
success story. Negotiation Journal 3(1), January 1987: 53-58.
Vinacke, W E. Sex roles in a three-person game. Sociometry 22,
1959: 343-360.
Vinacke. W E, Arkoff, A. An experimental study of coalitions in

the triad. American Sociological Review 22, 1957: 406-414.
Vitz, P C. Kite, W R. Factors affecting conflict and negotiation
within an alliance. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
6, 1970: 233-247.
Von Neumann, J. Morgenstern, O. Theory of games and
economic behavior. New York: Wiley. 1944.
Walcott, C, Hopmann, P T. Interaction analysis and bargaining
behavior. Experimental Study of Politics 4, 1975: 1-19.
Walton, R E, McKersie. R B. A behavioral theory of labor
negotiations: an analysis of a social interaction system. New
York: McGraw-Hill. 1965.
Warschaw, T A. Winning by negotiation. New York: McGraw Hill.
1980.
Weber. A. The structure of collective bargaining: problems and
perspectives. New York: Free Press of Glencoe. 1961.
172
Weiss-Wik, S. Enhancing negotiators successfulness. Journal of

Conflict Resolution 27(4), 1983: 706-739.
Wichman, H. Effects of isolation and communication on cooperation in a two-person game. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology 16, 1970: 114-120.
Young, O R. Bargaining: formal theories of negotiation. Urbana:
University of Illinois Press. 1975.
Zand, D E. Trust and managerial problem solving. Administrative
Science Quarterly 17, 1972: 229-239.
Zartman, I W. The political analysis of negotiations. World Politics
26, 1974: 385-399.
Zartman, I W, Berman M R. The practical negotiator. New Haven,
USA: Yale University. 1982.
Zechmeister, K, Druckman, D. Determinants of resolving a

conflict of interest: a simulation on political decision-making.
Journal of Conflict Resolution 17, 1973: 63-88.
Zeuthen, F. Problems of monopoly and economic welfare.
London: Routledge & Sons. 1930.
173
174
Index
active listening, 88
Adler and Rodman, 46, 87, 88,
97, 134, 143
agent, 10,
analysing negotiation interaction,
41
arbitration, 10,
Archibald, 73
aspiration level, 60
Atkinson, 9, 26, 47, 60, 69, 104,
123-124, 126, 151, 154
Atkinsons negotiating phases,
123
attitudes, 79, 110
Berlo, Lemmert and Mentz, 67

Berne, 24, 77, 78, 80
bilateral monopolistic theory, 14,
15
bluff, 141
Bobbit, 49
Bond and Vinacke, 139
Boolean algebra, 24
Bostrom, 9, 10, 33, 67, 80
brinkmanship, 62, 142
Burgoon, Heston and McCroskey,
67, 94, 95
Burnham, 55
Caplow, 139
Cavanaugh, 89, 96, 130, 133
Celliers, Joubert, 107
Channels, 91
Chelune, 69, 87
Clarke, 27, 81, 92, 100, 107, 126,
135
co-operative, 8,
coalition, 55, 65
partner, 140
forming, 138
Coddington, 17, 19, 22
code systems, 111
coercion, 141, 143
coercive power, 54
Cohen, 151, 153-154
collective bargaining, 9,
commitment, 97
Bacharach and Lawler, 47, 51,

62, 65
Bairstow, 92, 101
Bales, 37, 91
interactional process analysis
category system, 38
interactional matrix, 118
bargaining, 7,
Barnlund, 112
BATNA, 153
Baudhuin and Davis, 67
Bazerman, 9,
Bazerman, Neale, 33
Bazerman and Lewickis, 2,
Beaumont, 135
Beisecker, 36
Bercovitch, 16,
175
common ground, 137

competitive, 8,
conflict, 130
compromise, 129
concessions, 129
Conference Process Analysis
Method, 37
conflict, 129
consequences of power use, 64
Contact Group, 151
contract zone, 137
contributions, 21,
Coser, 52
Cosmis, 91
Counter Attitudinal Advocacy, 81
Crable, 91
credibility, 66, 111
Cronkhite and Liska, 68
Cross, 22
cultural differences, 115
culture, 86, 109
Cummings, 77-78
Druckman, Rozelle and Baxter,

82, 84-86
Dunlop, 147
Durkheim, 103
dyads, 92
economic models, 17,
economical, 22,
Effective communication, 153
element, 19, 21, 26, 45
of power, 51
Emerson, 51, 65
exchange theory, 15,
expansion of cultural experience,
114.
experience and learning, 105
experienced conflict, 133
Filley, 77, 79, 130-132, 134-135
Filleys method of integrative
decision-making, 136
Fisher, 3,
Fisher and Ury, 47, 68, 126, 135,
144, 151-153
flexibility, 154
Foldes, 22
Fouraker & Siegel, 23,
Fourie, 103
Fowler, Fowler, 9,
French, Raven, 53
Frost, Wilmot, 129
functions of non-verbal
communication, 84
Dahl, 50-51
Davis and Triandis, 110
De Villiers, 101-102
De Swardt, 101, 130
De Koning, Hall, 39
De Vito, 137
deadline, 147
defined, 7, 8, 9,
definition
of concepts, 7,
of power, 51
Deutsch and Krauss, 36
Devito, 46, 66, 91, 135
direct observation, 40
disruptive conflict, 131
distributive negotiation, 8,
Donohue, 9, 37, 39, 119
Donohue, Diez, and Hamilton,
33, 36-37, 39, 40, 42
Douglas, 25
Drucker, 69
Druckman, 25, 30, 47, 69-70, 90,
103, 113, 116-117, 119, 142
Galbraith, 56
Gallo, 36
game
theory, 14, 23
theory models, 19
simulations, 34
Gamson, 139
goals, 49
setting, 103
Goldstein and Sies, 53, 88
Gordon, 88
Gribben, 36, 156
176
group-to-group, 94
Gulliver, 3, 9, 16, 32, 87, 113,
116, 143
Jealy, 147
Johnson,
Karrass, 25, 47, 48, 55, 58, 59,
61, 62, 72, 81, 87, 89,
106-107, 109, 113, 117, 142,
146, 150-151, 153
Karrasss planning table, 120
Katz and Kahn, 92
Kelley, 149
Kiesler, Collins and Miller, 81
Kleinke and Pohlen, 83
knowledge of negotiation, 2,
Kohan, 15, 16
Konetchni, 33
Krippendorf, 33
Hall, 76-77, 89
Hamblin and Kunkel, 65, 126
Hamilton, 9
Hammer and Uki, 119
Hannah, 68
Harris, 77
Harriss personality-ego-statuses,
78
Harsanyi, 22
Harvard program on Negotiation,
3,
Hatch, 47
Hillthrop, Rubin, 33
Hinde, 82
historical ethnography, 32
Homans, 24
Hopmann and Walcott, 37
Hovland and Weiss, 67
Human Sciences Research
Council, 3,
Hunger and Stern, 37
hybrid, 24, 27
hybrid-type models, 19,
Landsberger, 37
language, 21-27,
latent and manifest communication
Leaversuch, 73
legitimate power, 53
Leth, Vandemark, 95
Levin, 151, 153, 154
Lewicki, 9,
Lewis and Fry, 37
limitations, 19, 21-27
limits, 26
Liska, 68
lobbying, 11,
Lose-lose methods, 134
Ikls, 2,
implementation, 150, 154
implementing tactics, 153
individual-to-group, 93
inequality, 110
influence, 63
information assimilation, 85
integrated approach, 8,
integrative decision taking, 135
interaction analysis, 25
intercultural negotiation in
Southern Africa, 42, 44
intercultural interaction, 112
International Labour Office, 107
intervention, 19, 27
interviews, 40
irrationality, 63
Machiavellism, 73
manipulation, 141, 144
Marais, 9, 30, 95, 99, 100
Markov analysis, 25
Maslow, 48
hierarchy of needs, 48
mass media, 100
Mastenbroek, 24
mathematical negotiating models,
17,
maxim, 29
McClelland, 55
McCroskey, Wheeless, 81
177
McGarth, 26
McGrath and Julian, 37
McKinsey, 23
McLaughlin, 68
measurement of power, 65
Mediation, 10,
Mehrabaan, 112
message content, 89
meta-models, 20,
method, 116, 117
of conflict resolution, 134
Milburn, 47
Mintzberg, 50, 51, 60, 66
models, 16,
modes of influence, 63
monitoring, 154
Morley and Stephensons, 38
Mortensen, 46-47, 66-67, 71, 127
communication, 82
OKeefe, 79
official power, 54
Oliva and Leap, 19,
Oliva and Leap, 17
Olivia & Capdevielle, 24
organisational negotiating structures, 101
Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum,
79
Pen, 22,
perceived conflict, 133
perception, 46, 49, 110
of power, 58
Perrow, 50
personal power, 55
personality, 68, 111
traits, 68
persuasion, 9, 10,
Peters, 11,
Peterson & Tracey, 24
Pettigrew, 58
Pfeffer, 57, 66
phase, 19, 21, 25
phases in the negotiating process, 121
Pienaar and Robinson, 26, 58, 81,
87, 93, 98, 117, 121, 146, 151
Pienaar and Robinsons negotiating phases, 122
Pigou, 26
Piron, 9, 10, 101, 103, 126
position, 65, 110
Pottas, 44
power, 50, 110
goals, 59
of coalition, 54
of reward, 54
of expertise, 53
perception, 59
principles of power, 52
prisoners dilemma, 34
problem solving, 131
N-person games, 35
Nash, 22,
needs, 49
for power, 64
negotiating
base, 60
behaviour, 154
phase, 124
patterns, 113
roles, 108
styles, 77
significance, 1,
system, 45
negotiation, 1, 7, 9, 45, 125
by objectives, 105
Negotiation Cue Response, 37
Negotiation Process Analysis
Method, 37
Negotiation interaction analysis,
36
Nierenberg, 151, 154
Nieumeijer, 46
Nieumeijer, 39, 40, 42, 44, 156
no power, 62
non-mathematical, 14,
non-verbal
behaviour, 85
178
process, 3, 19, 21, 24, 116

Pruitt, 2-4, 9, 29, 33
Putnam, 9, 14
Putnam and Jones, 33, 37
Staats, 79
Stagner & Rosen, 26
state of negotiation knowledge, 3,
Stern, Sternathal, Craig, 37
strategy, 8, 116, 117
Strauss, 15,
strengths, 22-27
structures and strategies of negotiation, 94
successful negotiators behaviour,
40
Summers, Stewart, Orcken, 114
Susskind, Ozawa, 10,
Susskind and Bazerman, 10, 17,
21, 151
symbolic message content, 89
symbolisation, 90
systems theory, 15,
Rackam, 40-42, 74
Raiffa, 2-3, 151, 153
Randle & Wortman, 26
Rapoport, 14, 35
Rapoport and Kahan, 19, 33
Rapoport, Gyer, Gordon, 17, 23
Raven and Kruglanski, 142
real, 40
referred power, 54
relationship, 125
research 155
- dimensions, 30
- methods, 30
results and implementation, 149
Rich, 110, 112, 114
Richardson, 25, 104
Ritual confirmation, 111
Robinson, 26, 60, 129, 138, 142
Rogers and Farace, 41
roles, 107
Roloff, 87, 90, 126
Rotter, 49
Rubin, 3,
Rubin and Brown, 2, 9, 65, 72-73,
82, 87, 138, 141, 148-149,
tactic, 116, 117, 124

Talbot, 142
team power, 55
technique of behavioural commitment, 119
Tendeschi et al, 23
Tendeschi, Schlenker and Bonoma, 63
the conflict process, 132
theoretical
approaches, 14,
calculus, 22,
theories, 14,
Theye and Seiler, 37
Thibaut and Kelley, 138
threats, 141
time as power, 146
time schedule, 145
time, 145
Touval, 32
transaction, 41
transactional analysis, 15,
trust, 127
Tubbs and Moss, 46, 73, 88,
111, 127
two-person and n-person, 35-36
Tylor, 109
Sarnoff, 79
Sawyer and Guetskow, 2, 9, 103,
104, 116, 149
Schelling, 22, 23, 142
Schmikl, 65
Schneider, 80
self-reflective introspection, 33
Sermat, 37
Shears, 139
Sidowski, Wycoff and Tabory, 36
situational power, 53, 55
skills, 152
small group communication, 99
sources of power, 53, 153
sources of conflict, 129
179
types, 129
typology, 16, 17
of negotiation models, 18,
Walton & McKersie, 24

Warschaw, 152-154
Weber, 26
Weiss-Wik, 4, 29, 152, 156
Wichman, 82
Wiehahn Commission, 102
Win-lose methods, 134
win-win
attitude, 152
methods, 134
Wolf effect, 87
Uesugi and Vinacke, 139

underlying structure of negotiation model, 19,
use of power, 57, 61
Van Aswegen, 109
Van Leent, 30
variable-sum models, 19,
verbal, 14, 24, 82
calculus, 26
type theory, 15,
vector analysis, 26
Vessels, 32
Vinacke, 139
Vinacke and Arkoff, 139
Vitz and Kite, 83
Von Neumann and Morgenstern,
14, 19, 23
Young, 144, 147
Zand, 79
Zartman, 51
Zartman and Berman, 9, 26, 33,
40, 70-71, 91-92, 97, 105-106,
109, 112, 115-116, 123,127129, 141
Zechmeister and Druckmans, 37
Zeigarnik effect, 87
zero-sum, 19,
Zeuthen, 22
180
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
PROFESSIONAL TRAINING SERIES No. 6
Human Rights
Training
A Manual on Human Rights
Training Methodology
UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
PROFESSIONAL TRAINING SERIES No. 6
Human Rights
Training
A Manual on Human Rights
Training Methodology
UNITED NATIONS
New York and Geneva, 2000
NOTE
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this
publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of
the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country,
territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
*
*
Material contained in this publication may be freely quoted or reprinted, provided credit is given and a copy of the publication containing the reprinted material
is sent to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
United Nations, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland.
HR/P/PT6
UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION

Sales No.
ISBN 92-1-116726-4
ISSN 1020-16888
CONTENTS
Chapter
III.
HUMAN RIGHTS TRAINING METHODOLOGY ........................................................
III.
IV.
IV.
Page
1-14
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
EFFECTIVE TRAINING TECHNIQUES ....................................................................
15-38
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
Learning objectives................................................................................
Tailoring courses....................................................................................
The participatory method.......................................................................
Participatory techniques ........................................................................
Locations for training courses ...............................................................
Planning for participants needs ............................................................
15-16
17
18-20
21-36
37
38
3
3
3
4
5
5
TRAINERS ........................................................................................................
39-47
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
39-40
41
42
43
44-47
7
7
7
8
9
9
48-84
10
49-50
51
52
53-54
10
10
11
11
55
56-64
65
66-70
71-77
78
79-80
81-83
84
11
11
12
12
12
13
13
14
14
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
K.
L.
M.
III.
Paragraphs
Collegial presentations .........................................................................

Training the trainers...............................................................................
Interactive pedagogical techniques........................................................
Audience specificity ..............................................................................
A practical approach ..............................................................................
Comprehensive presentation of standards .............................................
Teaching to sensitize..............................................................................
Flexibility of design and application .....................................................
Competency-based.................................................................................
Evaluation tools .....................................................................................
The role of self-esteem ..........................................................................
Linkage to organizational policy ...........................................................
Planned follow-up..................................................................................
Selection of trainers ...............................................................................

Briefing trainers.....................................................................................
Instructions for trainers..........................................................................
Tips for making presentations ...............................................................
Key terminology ....................................................................................
Adapting courses to challenging field conditions..................................
AN INTRODUCTION TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN

RIGHTS PROGRAMME.........................................................................................
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
What is meant by human rights?........................................................

Some examples of human rights............................................................
What is development? .......................................................................
The right to development.......................................................................
How does a rights-based approach to development differ from a
needs-based approach?.......................................................................
F. Where do human rights rules come from? .........................................
G. Who makes these rules? ........................................................................
H. Where are the rules made?.....................................................................
I. Who monitors human rights? ................................................................
J. The role of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ........................
K. Institution-building and technical cooperation ......................................
L. Enforcement...........................................................................................
M. How are human rights complaints and petitions handled? ....................
ANNEX:
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ..............................................................
iii
15
CHAPTER I
HUMAN RIGHTS TRAINING METHODOLOGY
a variety of effective techniques for training adults. In particular, suggestions are made for the use of creative, interactive teaching methods, which offer the best hope for
securing the active involvement of the programme participants. OHCHR has identified the following techniques
as especially appropriate and effective in human rights
training for adults: presentation and discussion, panel discussion, working groups, case studies, problem-solving/
brainstorming, simulation/role-playing, field trips, practical exercises (including drafting), round-table discussions
and visual aids. Pointers on the use of such techniques are
provided below in chapter II.
1. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has been involved for
many years in training persons working in various professions in areas of human rights which touch on their particular field of competence. The methodological approach
developed on the basis of the experience gained is comprised of basic elements which, appropriately adapted and
modified for each target group, can provide useful guidance for the conceptualization, planning, implementation
and evaluation of human rights training programmes for
adult professionals. These elements are described below.
A. Collegial presentations
D.
2. For the selection of resource persons, OHCHR
advises drawing from a list of experts which is practical in
orientation. Rather than assembling panels composed
entirely of professors and theorists, it is better to opt for
practitioners in the relevant field. In the experience of
OHCHR, much more can be accomplished through a collegial approach, in which development professionals,
police, or judges, for example, discuss these matters with
each other, than by a professor-student model of training.
This approach allows the trainer to access the distinctive
professional culture which surrounds each particular audience. At the same time, practitioners/trainers should be
accompanied and supported by experts in human rights,
thus ensuring that the substance of international human
rights standards is fully and consistently reflected in the
course contents.
B.
5. OHCHR has learned that the mere recitation of

vague principles of general applicability offers little hope
of affecting the actual behaviour of a given audience. To
be effectiveindeed, to be at all worthwhiletraining
and education efforts must be directly targeted and appropriately addressed to a particular audience, be they police,
health-care workers, lawyers, students or development
professionals. Accordingly, the content of OHCHR teaching materials focuses more on the standards directly relevant to the daily work of the professional trainees and
less on the history and structure of United Nations
machinery.
E.
A practical approach
6. OHCHR training begins with the recognition that

professional groups in the real world want to know not
just what the human rights rules are, but also how to do
their job effectively within the confines of those rules.
Without bowing to instrumentalist approaches to human
rights, trainers must also recognize that professionals will
also want to know what is in it for them?. That is, what
value can a better understanding of human rights bring to
their work? Training efforts which ignore either of these
areas are likely to be neither credible nor effective.
Accordingly, trainers and course designers must include
practical information* on proven techniques for the performance of the actual duties of the participating professionals, as derived from the recommendations of experts
Training the trainers
3. Participants in human rights training courses

should be selected on the understanding that their responsibilities will continue after completion of the training
exercise. Each will be charged with conducting his/her
own training and dissemination efforts after returning to
his/her duty station. In this way, the impact of such
courses is multiplied as the information imparted is disseminated throughout the institutions concerned. Accordingly, in addition to substantive content, the courses
should include training methodology and capacity-building components, such as lessons and materials designed to
impart training skills to participants.
C.
Audience specificity
While practical recommendations are a key component of courses

offered under this approach, it would not be possible to provide detailed
training on technical professional skills in a human rights course.
Instead, the existence of such techniques should be highlighted and
targeted for further training as a follow-up to human rights training, and
conceptual linkages should be made between the two sets of skills.
Interactive pedagogical techniques
4. The courses developed by OHCHR and described

in these materials include a section designed to introduce
1
J.
and literature on the current best practice for the profession in question.
11. Training courses include pre- and post-training

evaluative exercises, such as testing questionnaires,
which serve three crucial purposes. Pre-course questionnaires, when properly utilized, allow a trainer to tailor his/
her course to the particular educational needs of the audience. Post-course questionnaires and evaluation sessions
will both allow trainees to gauge what they have learned,
and assist trainers in the continuous (crucial) modification
and improvement of courses and materials.
F. Comprehensive presentation of standards

7. These courses should be thorough in their presentation of the relevant international standards. To this end,
relevant instruments and simplified learning tools should
be translated and distributed to participants. In every case,
one or more persons specialized in human rights should be
involved, to control the substantive content of the courses
and workshops, and to supplement course presentations as
required.
G.
K.
Teaching to sensitize
The role of self-esteem
12. The importance of appropriate regard for the selfesteem of adult trainees cannot be overemphasized. Professionals will bring to the classroom their own professional expertise and practical experience, which should be
acknowledged and can be tapped for the benefit of the
course. The extent to which the trainer does so will largely
determine the trainees reaction to the training exercise.
Obviously, participants will not respond well to instruction which is seen as spoonfeeding; nor will a schoolteacher approach or a military approach be well
received. Instead, trainers should seek to create a collegial
atmosphere in which the exchange of expertise and
experience is facilitated, the professional knowledge of
trainees recognized and professional pride encouraged.
The goal here is to send the message that knowledge of
human rights is a key element of professionalism in the
work of the target group and that, accordingly, the trainees
have much to gain and also much to contribute in this area.
8. In addition to imparting standards and practical

skills, OHCHR courses should also include exercises
designed to sensitize trainees to their own potential for
contributing to violative behaviour, however unwitting.
For example, well-developed exercises (including roleplaying) which can make trainees aware of gender or
racial bias in their own attitudes or behaviour can be valuable. Similarly, the special import of particular standards as they apply to women, for example, is not always
obvious. Trainees should be made to understand that, for
example, the term degrading treatment, as found in various international instruments, may imply different activities and thresholds when applied to women as compared
to men, or to one cultural group as opposed to another.
H.
Evaluation tools
Flexibility of design and application

L.
9. To be universally useful, training courses must be

designed in such a way as to facilitate their flexible use,
without imposing a single rigid focus or approach on the
trainers. Courses must be adaptable to the particular cultural, educational, regional and experiential needs and
realities of a diverse range of potential audiences within
the target group. Accordingly, course materials should not
be intended to be read verbatim to trainees. Trainers
should create their own targeted presentation notes and
materials, based upon the content of prepared materials
and the particular realities on the ground. Training should
be constructed in self-contained modules, allowing appropriate selection and tailoring according to particular needs
and objectives.
I.
Linkage to organizational policy
13. If training is to produce the desired impact on

behaviour and professional performance, it must be
clearly supported by, and linked to, corresponding rules in
the trainees institutions. Institutional policy must reflect the human rights imperatives taught in the classroom, and management must be trained in and committed
to ensuring its application.
M.
Planned follow-up
14. Traditional human rights training initiatives have

often been composed of a lecture and a wave. Meaningful, competency-based and objective-oriented training, on
the other hand, requires a certain degree of sustained commitment and planned follow-up, if improved capacity is to
be achieved. This means that the training programme
should include structured follow-up plans from the formulation stage. They may include periodic return visits by
specialists for quality control, review and reinforcement
purposes, or a system of review and reporting to be carried
out by the local trainers themselves. The newly trained
trainers should be charged with implementing fullydeveloped training programmes in their own right, following from the pilot or initial programme. Of course,
periodic and final evaluation is a must.
Competency-based
10. The training courses should result in improved

competence in the relevant field. Unlike briefings and
seminars, training courses should be designed around
learning objectives, and all trainees should be required to
demonstrate competence throughout the course during
assigned exercises, and to undergo testing (in the form of
a written examination) both before, and upon completion
of the course. Comparison of pre- and post-course test
results, together with careful attention during course presentations by participants, provides a concrete measure for
evaluating improved competence.
2
CHAPTER II
EFFECTIVE TRAINING TECHNIQUES
A. Learning objectives
Strategy and policy-making aspects for managerial

personnel;
15. Human rights training should be based upon

clearly articulated objectives. The objectives of the trainer
should facilitate satisfaction of the needs of the trainee.
Three basic learning objectives should form the foundation of such programmes and mirror the following needs
of the trainees.
Pedagogical aspects for trainers;

Operational aspects for others;
Aspects of particular relevance to professionals with
specific functions, such as regional specialists,
technicians, etc.;
To receive information and knowledge of what

human rights and humanitarian standards are and what
they mean for the work of the trainees in their professions;
Basic training in only the most fundamental areas

and key concepts for support staff;
To acquire or reinforce skills, so that the functions

and duties of the professional group can be fulfilled effectively with due respect and regard for human rights. Simple knowledge of standards is not enough to enable
trainees to transfer these rules into appropriate professional behaviour. The acquisition of skills should be
viewed as a process whereby skills are fine-tuned through
practice and application. This process may need to be continued, in the light of training needs identified in specific
areas of the trainees work, including through appropriately tailored follow-up programmes;
(c) The largely practical and pragmatic orientation of adult trainees who are professionals should be
reflected in the education and training methods adopted.
This means:
Creating the opportunity to translate ideas and concepts into practice;
Enabling participants to focus on real problems of
their profession;
Responding to issues of immediate concern to participants raised by them during the programme.
To become sensitized, i.e. to undergo a change in

negative attitudes or to reinforce positive attitudes and
behaviour, so that the trainees accept, or continue to
accept, the need to promote and protect human rights
through their work, and actually do so in the course of
their professional duties. The question at issue here is the
values of the trainee. This, too, is a long-term process, to
be reinforced by further, more technical, training.
C. The participatory method

18. For maximum effect, a few basic principles
should be kept in mind in applying the participatory training method described below. Recall the 13 elements of the
OHCHR approach to training, detailed in chapter I:
16. Thus, to be effective, training should be aimed at

improving knowledge, skills and attitudes in order to
contribute to appropriate professional behaviour.
B.
Collegial presentations;
Training the trainers;
Interactive pedagogical techniques;
Tailoring courses
Audience specificity;
17. When arranging training programmes, the principles of audience specificity and relevance require that
organizers follow a few basic rules of thumb:
A practical approach;
(a) Courses and programmes should be preceded by

and based upon a consultative needs assessment involving the target institution or group to be trained;
Teaching to sensitize;
Comprehensive presentation of standards;
Flexibility of design and application;
(b) Whenever possible, separate training programmes should be arranged for different categories
within the profession, according to the particular function
and context of that sub-groups daily work. This allows
training to focus on:
Competency-based;
Evaluation tools;
The role of self-esteem;
3
in the presentation; and also enables them to consider

the practical implications of human rights standards for
their day-to-day work;
Linkage to organizational policy;

Planned follow-up.
19. This method requires an approach which is interactive, flexible, relevant and varied, as described below:
Focus and flexibilityenables participants to focus on

matters of real and current concern; and enables educators and trainers to adapt to participants needs as the
course progresses.
InteractiveThis programme implies the use of a participatory, interactive training methodology. Adult
trainees most readily absorb human rights course curricula when they are not spoonfed the material.
Rather, for effective training, they should be fully
involved in the process. As practitioners, the trainees
will bring to the course a rich pool of experience,
which must be actively drawn on in any interesting and
effective course.
D.
Participatory techniques
21. Selected participatory techniques are provided

below:
1.
FlexibleContrary to certain myths associated with adult

training, it is not advisable to adopt a military
approach, in an attempt to force trainees to participate.
The result of such techniques is, more often than not,
the sowing of resentment among trainees and, consequently, the closing of effective avenues of communication between trainer and trainees. While a certain
level of control should be maintained by the trainer, the
first rule should be flexibility. Questionseven challengesfrom the audience should be welcomed, and
should be addressed by trainers in a positive and forthright manner. Similarly, excessively rigid timekeeping
can leave participants feeling frustrated and resentful
and should be avoided.
Presentation and discussion
22. Following a presentation (as described above), an

informal discussion is useful to clarify points and facilitate the process of translating ideas into practice. Such
discussions are conducted by the presenter, who should
try to involve all participants. It is useful for presenters to
have a prepared series of questions available to initiate the
discussion.
23. At the conclusion of the presentation and discussion, the presenter should provide an overview or summary. Presentations should be supplemented with preprepared visual aids or study materials distributed in
advance to all participants.
RelevantThe unspoken question of the trainee throughout the course will be: What does this have to do with
my daily work? The extent to which the trainer continuously answers this question will be an important
measure of his/her success. Every effort must therefore
be made to ensure that all material presented is relevant
to the work of the audience, and that such relevance is
made clear where it is not self-evident. This task may
be easier when operational themes are being addressed.
It may require more careful preparation, however, with
respect to more topical themes, such as the protection
of especially vulnerable groups.
2. Panel discussion
24. The formation of a panel of presenters or experts,
possibly following a presentation by one or more of them,
has frequently been shown to be a useful training device.
Such an approach is particularly effective when presenters
have expertise in different aspects of a topic, because of
their professional backgrounds or countries of origin. Ideally, human rights experts should be included on the
panel, together with experts in the relevant professional
field.
VariedTo secure and retain the active commitment of

participants, it is best to vary the teaching techniques
used throughout the course. Most adults are not accustomed to long classroom sessions, and a tedious and
monotonous routine will leave them more conscious of
the classroom than of the subject matter. A varied
selection of techniques should be used, alternating discussion with role-playing and case studies with brainstorming, as appropriate to the subject matter.
25. One presenter should act as facilitator, to enable

the widest possible participation, to ensure that participants needs are met and to provide an overview or summary at the conclusion of the discussion. This method
should include direct exchanges between panel members
themselves, and between the panel and the audience.
3.
20. Broadly speaking, this means that the following

methods and approaches should be adopted:
Working groups
26. These are created by dividing a course into a

number of small groups of a maximum of five or six participants. Each group is given a topic to discuss, a problem
to solve or something concrete to produce, within a short
time periodup to 50 minutes. A facilitator may, where
necessary, be assigned to each group. The course is then
reconvened and the results of the deliberations of each
group are presented to the full course by a spokesperson
for the group. The course participants can then discuss the
topics and the response of each group.
Presentation of standardsa short presentation on the

human rights standards relevant to a given aspect of the
work of the profession, and on how such standards can
be effectively applied by the audience;
Application of participatory techniquesenables participants to use their knowledge and experience to
translate into practice the ideas and concepts referred to
4
vised exercise. For example, lawyers might be required to

draft an affidavit and trainers might be assigned to draft a
lesson plan or to deliver a session of the course itself.
4. Case studies
27. In addition to dealing with discussion topics,
working groups can consider case studies. These should
be based on credible and realistic scenarios which are not
too complex and which focus on two or three main issues.
Case studies should require participants to exercise their
professional skills when responding to them and to apply
human rights standards.
9.
Round-table discussions
35. Round-table discussions, like panel discussions,

necessitate the assembling of a diverse group of resource
persons, representing a variety of perspectives on the subject to be addressed. An animated discussion is the goal
here, and for this it is crucial to have a strong and dynamic
moderator skilled both in the subject matter and in the
techniques of devils advocate, and the use of hypothetical situations. The moderator should be intentionally
provocative, stimulating debate between and among the
various panellists and the audience, and should control the
direction of the discussion.
28. The scenario for a case study can be presented to

participants for consideration by them in its entirety, or
fed to them sequentially as a developing situation to
which they have to respond.
5. Problem-solving/brainstorming
29. These sessions can be conducted as intensive
exercises to seek solutions to both theoretical and practical problems. They require a problem to be analysed and
then solutions to be developed. Brainstorming encourages
and requires a high degree of participation and it stimulates those involved to maximum creativity.
10.
Visual aids
36. Adult learning can be enhanced by the use of

blackboards, overhead transparencies, posters, displayed
objects, flip charts, photographs, slides and videos/films.
As a general rule, information produced on transparencies
and charts should be concise and in outline or list form. If
more text is required, printed handouts should be circulated.
30. Following presentation of the problem, all ideas

in response to it are recorded on a board or flip chart. No
explanations are required and no interventions are judged
or rejected at this stage. The presenter then categorizes
and analyses the responsesat which stage some are
combined, adapted or rejected. Finally, the group makes
recommendations and takes decisions on the problem.
The learning or sensitization process occurs as a result of
the group discussion around each suggestion.
E. Locations for training courses

37. Ideally, the following conditions should be met in
respect of the location for a training course:
6. Simulation/role-playing
(a) Courses should be held at a location away from the

normal place of work of the participants;
(b) The room used for a course should be of sufficient
size for the number of people it is intended to accommodate;
(c) There should be a sufficient number of small ancillary rooms available to accommodate working groups, so
that participants may focus without interruption on their
assigned topics;
(d) Seating facilities should be comfortable and flexible, allowing chairs, desks and tables to be moved around
to accommodate various training techniques.
31. These exercises require participants to perform a

task or tasks in a realistic situation simulating real life.
Simulation or role-playing exercises may be used to practise a skill or to enable participants to experience hitherto
unfamiliar situations.
32. A written factual situation is distributed in
advance and each participant is allocated a particular role
(the police officer, the victim, the witness, the judge, etc.).
During the exercise, no one is allowed to leave his or her
assigned role for any reason. This technique is particularly
valuable for sensitizing participants to the feelings and
perspectives of other groups and to the importance of
certain issues.
F.
Planning for participants needs
38. The level of physical comfort of course participants will have a direct impact on the outcome of the
learning exercise. For planning purposes, keep in mind,
the following basic factors:
7. Field trips
33. Group visits to relevant institutions or sites can
provide valuable perspectives. The purpose of the visit
should be explained in advance and participants should be
instructed to pay critical attention and to record their
observations for a subsequent discussion.
(a) It should be possible to regulate the temperature

and ventilation of the room;
(b) Classrooms should never be filled beyond a comfortable capacity;
(c) Rest rooms should be easily accessible;
(d) The daily programme should include a 15-minute
coffee/rest break at mid-morning, a lunch break of at
8. Practical exercises
34. This involves the assignment of trainees to apply
and demonstrate particular professional skills in a super5
least one hour, and a 15-minute coffee/rest break at

mid-afternoon;
(f) Where possible, provide for water, coffee or juice

to be available in the classroom;
(e) Allow participants to occasionally stand and

stretch between scheduled breaks. A two or three minute
break is sufficient for this, at appropriate intervals, perhaps twice a day;
(g) Lunch breaks should be scheduled within the

period to which participants are accustomed. This will
vary from region to region, and from workplace to workplace.
CHAPTER III
TRAINERS
1.
A. Selection of trainers
What are the objectives of the course?
To provide information on international human

rights sources, systems, standards and issues relevant to the work of the target profession;
39. The selection of trainers and resource persons

should be based on the following criteria:
Expertise in the subject matter;
To encourage the development of skills, and the formulation and application of policies, necessary to
transform that information into practical professional behaviour;
Ability to apply the interactive methodology of the

programme;
Professional credibility and appropriate reputation
among other practitioners.
To sensitize participants to their particular role in

protecting and promoting human rights and their
own potential for affecting human rights in their
daily work.
40. Ideally, a panel of trainers should be primarily

composed of practitioners from the relevant profession,
accompanied by at least two experts in the field of
human rights.
2.
What is the course methodology?
A typical course session consists of a brief presentation by two team members, followed by the application of a participatory training method. Plenary discussions are open to all and are led by the resource
person delivering the session. All members of the
training team are expected to contribute to all session discussions, as necessary.
B. Briefing trainers
41. It is important that trainers are adequately briefed
on the following matters:
If the training is country-based: basic historical, geographical, demographic, political, economic, cultural and social information on the country where
the programme is to be introduced; basic information on the constitutional and legal arrangements of
that country; human rights and humanitarian law
treaties to which the State is a party; current or
planned human rights projects;
3. What is expected of the trainer with regard

to the course?
Before the course:
Organizational aspects of the professional group to

be trained;
Study the materials sent to you in advance, with

particular attention to the sessions to which you are
formally assigned;
Categories and numbers of trainees participating in

the programme;
Prepare very brief lecture notes, keeping in mind the

time limitations set out in the course programme;
Particular issues of current concern in relation to the

professional audience to be trained.
Think about what practical recommendations you

might make to the trainees, based upon your professional experience, to assist them in implementing
the relevant human rights standards in their daily
work;
C.
Instructions for trainers
Attend a pre-course briefing to be held on the day

prior to the opening of the course.
42. Whatever their previous experience or level of

expertise, the course trainers themselves should be carefully prepared for this particular assignment. As a measure of quality control, OHCHR recommends written instructions, in addition to pre-course oral briefings. The
instructions should cover the points outlined below.
During the course:

Participate in daily pre- and post-course briefings
with the rest of the training tea;.
7
information. If you must provide detailed information to

reinforce presentations, do so in a handout and review the
basic points contained in the handout with the trainees.
Provide participants with copies of visual aids for later
study and review. Finally, speak to the participants, not to
the board or chart;
Attend and participate in all course sessions;

Meet with your session co-presenter the day before
each scheduled presentation to prepare your presentations jointly;
Deliver brief presentations, adhering to specified
time limits, based on the training materials, for the
topics assigned to you as a session presenter;
(g) Do not criticizecorrect, explain and encourage;

(h) Have participants use the written materials providedfor example make them look up standards in the
source materials and then read them out to the class (this
teaches them how to find the human rights rules by
themselves when the course is finished and they have
returned to their duty stations). Materials which are not
opened during the course are likely never to be opened.
By the end of a course, each participants copy of Human
Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments
should show clear signs of wear, with folded pages, bent
bindings and marked text;
Make practical recommendations, based on your

professional experience, during discussion periods
and in working groups, including during sessions for
which you are not the session presenter;
Use concrete examples. Save newspaper clippings,
project evaluations and excerpts from reports to provide actual cases to illustrate your points. You can
also select a hypothetical exercise from the materials
or develop one of your own for each session you are
to present or for use in working groups;
(i) Be honest;
Use visual aids (overhead projector and blackboard/

whiteboard/flip chart) whenever possible;
(j) Facilitate the participation of individuals who tend

not to speak up. Draw them out with direct questions and
then acknowledge the value of their comments. Pay particular attention to ensuring equal participation from
women and members of minority groups, who may be
accustomed to discrimination within their professional
setting. A discussion dominated by males, or by the
dominant group in the society or professional group, will
be less satisfactory for women and members of minority
groups, and cannot succeed in convincing (by example)
other participants in the course of the importance of
non-discrimination in their own work;
Ensure that any comments or recommendations

made are consistent with the international standards
set out in the training materials;
Encourage active group participation and discussion;
Provide advice and comments on the training
materials;
Attend all opening and closing ceremonies and
ancillary events of the programme.
(k) Do not let discriminatory, intolerant, racist or sexist comments pass without comment. Address them as you
would address any other issue which may be encountered
during discussions, that is, calmly, tactfully, directly and
substantively. Point out the relevant standards and explain
why they are important for the effective, legal and humane
performance of the work of both the United Nations and
the relevant profession, and the role they play in fostering
professionalism within those groups. Be prepared in
advance to counter myths and stereotypes with facts.
Remember that the goals of the trainer include the
improvement of knowledge, skills and attitudes, and that
the latter goal, albeit the most difficult to achieve, is often
the most important;
After the course:

Participate in a final debriefing session with the rest
of the training team;
Review and revise your materials, on the basis of
this experience.
D.
Tips for making presentations
43. A few basic pointers are to be kept in mind:

(a) Make eye contact with participants;
(b) Encourage questions and discussion;
(c) Do not read from your notesbe conversational
and natural, speaking in a forceful and animated voice. No
matter how interesting the material, a monotone presentation, or one which cannot be heard, will dash any hopes of
engaging the audiences attention;
(d) Watch the timetime your presentation beforehand and keep a clock or watch in view while you are
making it;
(e) Move arounddo not present from your chair.
When responding to a question, approach the person who
asked it. If someone seems inattentive, approach him/her
and speak directly to him/her;
(f) Use visual aids. Transparencies and charts should
be simple, in point form and should not contain too much
(l) Structure your presentation. The old basics are best

in this regard: every presentation should have an introduction, a body, a conclusion and a summation of major
points;
(m) If you are confronted with a question which you
are not prepared to respond to, refer to one of the other
presenters, or to the audience, or to the materials (having
participants look it up), or offer to provide the answer later
(and be sure to follow up as promised);
(n) Use repetitionpeople forget;
(o) Appearance counts. A trainer must project a professional image. Obviously, it is not appropriate for the
trainer to present in a T-shirt while the course participants
are in uniform. The dress standards of the trainer should
not fall below those of the participants and should respect
their cultural and social rules;
8
F. Adapting courses to challenging field conditions
(p) Prepare in advanceknow your subject. Follow

these basic steps in preparing your session:
44. OHCHR has conducted training under widely

varying field conditions, in countries across Africa, Asia,
the Middle East, Latin America and Europe. Available
facilities have varied in terms of physical conditions,
infrastructure and technology, such that one course may
have been conducted in a state-of-the-art, climate-controlled and electronically-equipped modern conference
centre, another on the roof of a supply building and still
another in an open field.
Refer to the training materials provided and to the

programme;
Note the time available for the session;
Prioritize the subject matterbe sure to cover the
most important (must know) points;
Prepare your lesson plan;
45. Persons organizing training under the approach

set out in this guide must therefore take into account the
setting in which the training will be offered when selecting appropriate methodology and materials, determining
numbers of trainees and drafting programmes. For example, the duration of sessions will be affected by temperature and weather for outdoor courses, or courses where
fans, heaters or other appropriate climate-control devices
are not available. Where temperature is a factor, the timing of courses will also be affected. Similarly, flip charts
and handouts must be used where electric facilities are not
available for overhead transparency or slide projection.
Draft your speaking points (introduction, body, conclusion, summary of major points);
Select the exercise and questions to be used;
Select or prepare your visual aids (handouts, overhead transparencies, etc.);
Practise your presentation until you can deliver it
naturally and confidently and within the time limit.
E. Key terminology
46. If interpretation is required, the lack of facilities

for simultaneous interpretation will necessitate the use of
consecutive interpretation, which will cut the productive
time of course sessions by half. The lack of desks or tables
will mean that more printed materials will be required for
distribution, as note-taking may be impractical. Finally, if
the training has to be conducted in the workplace of the
target audience, owing to a lack of alternative facilities,
organizers should plan for additional time, as conflicting
duties will almost invariably be imposed on some of the
participants.
Briefing: A brief, cursory and introductory overview of a

single topic. The purpose is to introduce the audience
to some basic concepts with respect to a given subject.
Seminar: An organized exchange of views, ideas and
knowledge on a particular topic or set of related topics.
The purpose is to bring together various persons, usually (relatively) equal in their degree of expertise, each
of whom is to contribute to an examination of the
subject from his/her own professional, ideological
academic or official position.
47. These are only a few of the eventualities to be

taken into consideration during the planning of courses
held in the field. Such courses will rarely be conducted in
ideal training conditions and it is the duty of the course
organizers to plan in advance for all factors with a potential impact upon the objectives of the course. Course
organizers already in the field will have an advantage in
this regard, as they will be able to visit possible training
sites in order to select the most appropriate. Where this is
not possible, advance contact with people in the field is
imperative and should continue throughout the planning
process. In sum, effective planning requires answers not
only to such questions as Who is the audience? and
What are their training needs?, but also When is the
rainy season?, What is the security situation? and,
inevitably, Where are the bathrooms?.
Workshop: A training exercise in which participants work

together to study a particular subject and, in the process, create a product, such as a declaration, joint
paper, plan of action, set of rules, written policy or code
of conduct. The purpose is thus twofold: learning and
the development of a product.
Training course: An organized training exercise, designed
to allow trainers to impart knowledge and skills and
to influence the attitudes of trainees or participants. It may either be interactive (as in the OHCHR
approach described above) or follow a professorstudent lecture model, or may be a combination of
both. Whichever model they follow, training courses
are a highly intensive method of learning.
CHAPTER IV
AN INTRODUCTION TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS
HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAMME
B.
48. As outlined in the OHCHR training approach

described above, every human rights course should be
tailor-made for the particular needs of the audience to be
trained. As such, the various audience-specific human
rights training materials of the United Nations and other
organizations should be employed in identifying appropriate content for each course. As a substantive and normative starting point, however, the following section
contains a basic explanation for trainers of the international conception of human rights, and their key sources,
systems and standards.
Some examples of human rights
51. Human rights and fundamental freedoms are enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and in various treaties (also called covenants and conventions), declarations, guidelines and bodies of principles elaborated by the United Nations and by regional
organizations. They include a broad range of guarantees,
addressing virtually every aspect of human life and
human interaction. Among the rights guaranteed to all
human beings are:
The right to life;
A.
What is meant by human rights?
Freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
49. Human rights are universal legal guarantees

protecting individuals and groups against actions which
interfere with fundamental freedoms and human dignity.
Human rights law obliges Governments to do some
things and prevents them from doing others. Some of the
most important characteristics of human rights are the following:
Freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention;

The right to a fair trial;
Freedom from discrimination;
The right to equal protection of the law;
Freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy,
family, home or correspondence;
They are internationally guaranteed;

They are legally protected;
Freedom of association, expression, assembly and

movement;
They focus on the dignity of the human being;
The right to seek and enjoy asylum;
They protect individuals and groups;
The right to a nationality;
They obligate States and State actors;
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion;

The right to vote and take part in government;
They cannot be waived/taken away;
The right to just and favourable work conditions;

They are equal and interdependent;
The right to adequate food, shelter, clothing and

social security;
They are universal.
The right to health;

50. International cooperation in promoting and
encouraging respect for the human rights and fundamental
freedoms of all is one of the purposes of the United
Nations, as outlined in Article 1 of its Charter. Thus, since
the founding of the Organization in 1945, human rights
have been the business of every Member State, every constituent body, every programme and agency, and every
staff member of the United Nations.
The right to education;

The right to property;
The right to participate in cultural life; and, of
course,
The right to development.
10
C.
F.
What is development?
52. For the United Nations, sustainable human development means looking at development in an integrated,
multidisciplinary way. Human rights are central to this
concept of development, which stresses not just economic
growth, but equitable distribution, enhancement of peoples capabilities and enlargement of their choices. It
gives highest priority to the elimination of poverty, the
integration of women in the development process, selfreliance and self-determination of people and governments, including the rights of indigenous peoples. Sustainable human development places people at the centre
of development and advocates the protection of the life
opportunities of present and future generations, respecting the natural systems on which all life depends.
56. Human rights norms and standards are derived

from two principal types of international sources, namely
customary international law and treaty law:
Customary international law (or, simply, custom)
is international law which develops through a general
and consistent practice of States, followed because of a
sense of legal obligation. In other words, if over a
period of time States perform in a certain way because
they all believe that they are required to do so, that
behaviour comes to be recognized as a principle of
international law, binding on States, even if not written
in a particular agreement. Thus, for example, while the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not, in itself,
a binding treaty, certain provisions of the Declaration
are considered to have the character of customary international law;
D. The right to development
Treaty law includes the law of human rights as set

out in many international agreements (treaties, covenants, conventions) collectively (either bilaterally
or multilaterally) developed, signed and ratified by
States.
53. The right to development may be expressed this

way: Everyone has the right to participate in, contribute
to and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political
development. This right includes permanent sovereignty
over natural resources; self-determination; popular participation; equality of opportunity; and the advancement
of adequate conditions for the enjoyment of other civil,
cultural, economic, political and social rights.
57. Some of these treaties cover whole sets of rights,

such as:
The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights; and
54. The beneficiaries of the right to development are

clear as well. As with all human rights, the human person
is the subject. The right to development is claimable by
individuals and, collectively, by peoples. Importantly, the
right obligates both individual States (to ensure equal and
adequate access to essential resources) and the international community (to promote fair development policies
and effective international cooperation).
E.
Where do human rights rules come from?
The International Covenant on Economic, Social

and Cultural Rights.
58. Other treaties focus on particular types of violations, such as:
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide;
How does a rights-based approach

to development differ from a
needs-based approach?
The International Convention on the Elimination of

All Forms of Racial Discrimination; and
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
55. Development is not a simple matter of charity,

but a right. The distinction is an important one. When
something (like development) is defined as a right, it
means that someone holds a claim, or legal entitlement,
and someone else holds a corresponding duty or legal
obligation. This means that Governments, and their
agents, are accountable to people for fulfilling such obligations. The duties held (by individual States vis--vis
their own people, and collectively by the international
community of States) are in some cases positive duties (to
do or provide something) and, in others, negative duties
(to refrain from doing something). With a rights-based
approach, effective action for development moves from
the optional realm of charity into the mandatory realm of
law, with identifiable rights, obligations, claim-holders
and duty-holders. What is more, adopting a rights-based
approach opens the door for the use of a rich and growing
pool of information, analysis and jurisprudence developed in recent years by treaty bodies and other human
rights specialists on the requirements of adequate housing, health, food, childhood development, the rule of law,
and virtually all other elements of sustainable human
development.
59. Still other treaties focus on particular groups to

be protected, such as:
The Convention on the Rights of the Child;
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women;
The International Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
Their Families; and
The Convention (and Protocol) relating to the Status
of Refugees.
60. Another type of treaty focuses on particular
situations, such as armed conflict, including:
The four Geneva Conventions of 1949; and
The two Protocols of 1977 additional to those
Conventions.
11
61. All of these instruments are legally binding on

the States which are parties to them.
out the form and content of international human rights

instruments, article by article and line by line.
62. Human rights standards are also enshrined in

other types of instruments: declarations, recommendations, bodies of principles, codes of conduct and guidelines (such as the Declaration on the Right to Development; the Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging
to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities; the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary; the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials; and the Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors).
67. In United Nations forums, all States are invited to

attend and participate in the drafting so as to ensure that
the final document reflects the views and experience of all
regions of the world and all major legal systems. Whether
for a binding treaty or for an authoritative declaration,
every proposal is closely scrutinized and debated, until a
final text is at length agreed upon. Even then, in the case
of treaties, a State is not bound by the instrument until it
has signed and ratified (or acceded to) it.
63. These instruments are not legally binding on

States in and of themselves. Nevertheless, they have
moral force and provide practical guidance to States in
their conduct. The value of such instruments rests on their
recognition and acceptance by a large number of States
and, even without binding legal effect, they may be seen
as declaratory of principles that are broadly accepted
within the international community. What is more, some
of their provisions are declaratory of elements of customary international law and are thus binding.
68. Instruments of universal application are elaborated in United Nations human rights bodies (such as the
Commission on Human Rights), for submission to the
General Assembly for adoption. Additionally, expert
studies on various human rights problems which may lead
to the development of new human rights standards are
undertaken each year by the Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights.
69. Specialized instruments of universal application
are also elaborated and adopted by United Nations specialized agencies, such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
64. The Declaration on the Right to Development,

adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in
1986, is an important example of such a declaration. In the
Declaration development is recognized as:
70. Lastly, a number of important regional human

rights instruments have been developed by the major
regional organizations, including the Council of Europe,
the Organization of American States and the Organization
of African Unity.
a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and

political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of
all individuals on the basis of their active, free and
meaningful participation in development and in the fair
distribution of benefits resulting therefrom.
I.
The Declaration confirms that development is a right

which belongs to every human person and identifies as
its key elements: permanent sovereignty over natural
resources; self-determination; popular participation;
equality of opportunity; and the advancement of adequate conditions for the enjoyment of other civil, cultural,
economic, political and social rights.
Who monitors human rights?
71. Of course, merely establishing a set of rules is

not enough to ensure their application. The implementation of human rights standards is closely watched at several levels. National institutions and organizations monitoring human rights are:
Concerned government agencies and services;
G.
Paris Principles institutions, such as an independent human rights commission or an ombudsman

(these are sometimes referred to simply as national
human rights institutions);
Who makes these rules?
65. The international legal system, as outlined in the

Charter of the United Nations, is built around a community of States. The law which governs that system, therefore, is principally law for, by and about States. As such,
it is the States themselves who make the rules, through the
development of custom, through the development of treaties and through the development of declarations, bodies
of principles and other similar instruments. States agree
on the content of these sources and agree to be bound by
them. In the case of human rights law, while it is individuals and groups which are protected, it is the conduct of
States (and State actors) which is regulated.
H.
Human rights groups and other non-governmental

organizations (NGOs);
Community-based organizations;
The courts;
Parliament;
The media;
Professional associations (such as lawyers or doctors associations);
Where are the rules made?
Trade unions;
66. Human rights standards are developed and codified in various international forums, through a process in
which representatives of State members of those forums
meet, usually repeatedly over a period of years, to work
Religious organizations; and

Academic institutions.
12
72. At a second level, regional organizations have

developed mechanisms to monitor compliance with
human rights standards of countries in their respective
regions. Such mechanisms include the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights, the African Commission on Human
and Peoples Rights, the European Court of Human
Rights and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe.
mala, the International Civilian Mission to Haiti, the

United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
other such operations.
73. At the international (global) level, human rights

are monitored by a number of international NGOs, and by
the United Nations. Within the United Nations, several
types of monitoring are carried out.
J. The role of the High Commissioner for

Human Rights
77. In addition, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has established human rights
field presences with monitoring mandates in several
countries.
78. In addition to serving as the secretariat for the

United Nations human rights treaty-based and extraconventional human rights bodies, the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) implements
the High Commissioners global mandate to:
74. The first is conventional (or treaty-based)

monitoring. Some human rights treaties establish a committee of experts (a treaty body, such as the Human
Rights Committee or the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women) whose main task is to
monitor the implementation by States parties of the relevant treaty, mainly through the analysis of periodic reports
submitted by those States. Three treaty bodies also have
competence to examine individual complaints of human
rights violations, under optional complaints procedures
(the Human Rights Committee, the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Committee
against Torture).
Promote and protect the effective enjoyment by all

of all civil, cultural, economic, political and social
rights, and in particular the right to development;
Provide, through the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and other appropriate institutions, advisory services and technical and financial assistance in the field of human rights at the
request of the State concerned and regional organizations;
75. The second type of monitoring is extraconventional (or Charter-based) monitoring. It is based on procedures and mechanisms established by the Commission
on Human Rights or the Economic and Social Council,
including a confidential procedure (known as the 1503
procedure) for dealing with communications relating to
consistent patterns of gross violations of human rights and
special procedures which examine, monitor and publicly
report on human rights situations either in specific countries and territories (country mechanisms or mandates)
or concerning a specific human rights problem (thematic
mechanisms or mandates). They are entrusted to working groups composed of experts acting in their individual
capacity (such as the Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances and the Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention), to individuals designated as special
rapporteurs, representatives or independent experts (such
as the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges
and lawyers, the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral on the situation of human rights in Cambodia,
and the independent expert on the situation of human
rights in Haiti) or directly to the Secretary-General (as
is the case for the question of human rights and mass
exoduses).
Coordinate relevant United Nations education and

public information programmes in the field of
human rights;
Play an active role in removing the current obstacles
and in meeting the challenges to the full realization
of all human rights and in preventing the continuation of human rights violations throughout the
world, as reflected in the Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993;
Engage in a dialogue with all Governments with a
view to securing respect of all human rights;
Carry out the tasks assigned to her/him by the competent bodies of the United Nations system in the
field of human rights with a view to improving the
promotion and protection of all human rights.
K.
Institution-building and technical cooperation
79. The United Nations has been involved in the

delivery of human rights assistance since the 1950s. In
1955, the General Assembly established a programme of
advisory services and technical assistance in the field of
human rights (now the programme of technical cooperation in the field of human rights). Since that time, countless developing countries on all continents have benefited
from the programme, which provides advice, expertise
and other support for the strengthening of domestic institutional capacities for the promotion and protection of
human rights. The programme, which is developed and
administered by the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, focuses on human rights institution-building for key national actors and agencies.
76. The third type of monitoring is through peacekeeping and human rights field operations. Recently, the
inclusion of human rights aspects in the mandates of
United Nations peacekeeping operations has increased
dramatically. The assignment of various human rights
functions to the international personnel involved in their
implementation, has included monitoring the human
rights situation and reporting on it. Extensive human
rights mandates were assigned to the United Nations
Observer Mission in El Salvador, the United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia, the United Nations
Mission for the Verification of Human Rights in Guate13
and the former Yugoslavia, ad hoc tribunals were established by the United Nations Security Council to bring to
justice persons responsible for serious abuses in those
countries. Subsequently, as the decade and the millennium
drew to a close, the international community advanced the
cause of enforcement significantly, with the adoption, in
Rome on 17 July 1998, of the Statute of the International
Criminal Court, laying the foundation for a permanent
international tribunal to give effect to the half-centuryold affirmation of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights that:
80. Programme areas, as elaborated upon in the

annual report of the Secretary-General to the Commission
on Human Rights, today include a broad range of institutional entry points for human rights, democracy and the
rule of law. Among these are advisory services, training,
fellowships and grants directed to: constitutional assistance; legislative reform; free and fair elections; independent judiciaries; fair prosecutions; humane policing;
decent penal institutions; effective parliaments; independent national (Paris Principles) institutions; and strong,
capable and free national NGOs. As mandated by the
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, the programme also makes available direct support for the drafting of national plans of action in the field of human rights.
Complementary forms of assistance are made available by
other actors in the United Nations system, including the
United Nations Development Programme.
L.
It is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have

recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny
and oppression, that human rights should be protected
by the rule of law.
M.
Enforcement
81. International human rights law obliges States to

take all necessary measures to give force to the standards
contained in its treaties and customary principles. This
means, inter alia, ensuring redress for victims, prosecuting offenders, preventing abuses and combating impunity.
Thus, in the first instance, it is the individual States themselves which must act to enforce the standards, principally
through their domestic legal systems.
How are human rights complaints and

petitions handled?
84. The United Nations receives thousands of complaints of human rights violations every year. A variety of
mechanisms have been established by the Organization to
handle such complaints, including:
Treaty-based procedures, which provide for the consideration of communications by treaty bodies
described above;
82. Where they do not, cannot or will not do so,

States may be compelled, in certain circumstances, to
extradite, transfer or surrender an alleged offender for
prosecution elsewhere. Some treaties, like the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, expressly require States parties
to try or extradite offenders.
Extraconventional mechanisms, such as special rapporteurs and working groups of the Commission on
Human Rights, including through urgent appeals to
Governments;
The 1503 procedure (so named after the Economic
and Social Council resolution by which it was established), handles complaints confidentially, identifying patterns of gross violations of human rights.
83. At the international level, in the 1990s, in the

wake of genocide and crimes against humanity in Rwanda
Further information can be obtained from: The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights, Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland
Tel: (41-22) 917 9000

E-mail: webadmin.hchr@unog.ch
14
Fax: (41 22) 917 0212

Internet: www.unhchr.ch
ANNEX
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
[Adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly in its resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948]
Preamble
Article 2
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal

and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in

this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of
mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall
enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and
want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the

political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or
territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent,
trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have

recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and
oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of
law,
Article 3
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
Whereas it is essential to promote the development of

friendly relations between nations,
Article 4
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of
men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,
No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the

slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to

achieve, in cooperation with the United Nations, the promotion
of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
Article 5
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.
Whereas a common understanding of these rights and

freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of
this pledge,
Article 6
Now, therefore,
Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person
before the law.
The General Assembly,

Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations,
to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching
and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms
and by progressive measures, national and international, to
secure their universal and effective recognition and observance,
both among the peoples of Member States themselves and
among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.
Article 7
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to
equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this
Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.
Article 1
Article 8
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and
should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights
granted him by the constitution or by law.
15
Article 9
3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of

society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or

exile.
Article 17
Article 10
1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as

in association with others.
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge
against him.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Article 18
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
teaching, practice, worship and observance.
Article 11
1. Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to
be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a
public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for
his defence.
Article 19
2. No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on

account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal
offence, under national or international law, at the time when it
was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the
one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was
committed.
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression;

this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference
and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through
any media and regardless of frontiers.
Article 20
Article 12
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly

and association.
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his

privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his
honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection
of the law against such interference or attacks.
2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

Article 21
Article 13
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of
his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and

residence within the borders of each State.
2. Everyone has the right to equal access to public service

in his country.
2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including

his own, and to return to his country.
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority

of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and
genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.
Article 14
1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other
countries asylum from persecution.
Article 22
2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions

genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social

security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and
international cooperation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.
Article 15
1.
Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor

denied the right to change his nationality.
Article 23
Article 16
1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of

employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to
protection against unemployment.
1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due

to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to
found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage,
during marriage and at its dissolution.
2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to

equal pay for equal work.
3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable
remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence
worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by
other means of social protection.
2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full
consent of the intending spouses.
16
4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions

for the protection of his interests.
Article 27
1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the
cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in
scientific advancement and its benefits.
Article 24
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and

material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.
Article 25
Article 28
1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate

for the health and well-being of himself and of his family,
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or
other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in

which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can
be fully realized.
Article 29
2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care

and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock,
shall enjoy the same social protection.
1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone

the free and full development of his personality is possible.
2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall
be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law
solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect
for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in
a democratic society.
Article 26
1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be
free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional
education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.
3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised

contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
2. Education shall be directed to the full development of

the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations,
racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the
United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
Article 30
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying
for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity
or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights
and freedoms set forth herein.
3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education

that shall be given to their children.
17
COURSE OFFERINGS
Phoenix Training Center

Alexandria, Virginia
(703) 960-7700
www.intellpros.com
DynCorp Internationals Phoenix Training Center provides a wide variety of
exceptional training and operational support to Department of Defense (DoD)
and other U.S. government organizations. The Phoenix Training Center and
DynCorp International training personnel include career professionals from the
DoD, Military Intelligence, Special Operations Forces (SOF), Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and security and law
enforcement agencies. Training is offered at the following two venues.
PHOENIX TRAINING CENTER

The recently expanded Phoenix Training Center (PTC) located in Alexandria,
Virginia provides a variety of comprehensive training courses including several
courses certified by the DoD.
MOBILE TRAINING PROGRAM

Phoenix has the ability to provide most training courses at the customers desired
location. The course cost will be adjusted to include the additional expenses that
are incurred.
For more information on any of our courses please contact

Tiffany Wilson, Project Control Lead at 703-960-7700.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PHOENIX TRAINING CENTER
COURSE OFFERINGS
2013 2014
Advanced Debriefing and Elicitation Course.......................................................... 8
Advanced Elicitation Course.................................................................................. 9
Advanced Military Source Operations Course..................................................... 10
Advanced Operational Support Course................................................................ 11
Analyst Support to HUMINT Course..................................................................... 12
Analytical Support to Interrogation Course........................................................... 13
Asset Validation Course....................................................................................... 14
Asset Validation System Course.......................................................................... 15
Battlefield HUMINT Collection Course................................................................. 16
Competitive Assurance Seminar......................................................................... 17
CounterIED/Triage Course................................................................................... 18
Counterintelligence Awareness Seminar.............................................................. 19
Debriefing and Elicitation Course......................................................................... 20
Defense Strategic Debriefing Course Follow-On................................................. 21
Elicitation Seminar................................................................................................ 22
Elicitation/Counterelicitation Seminar................................................................... 23
Elicitation and Psychological Profiling Seminar.................................................... 24
Elicitation and Trade Shows Seminar................................................................... 25
Field Negotiations Course.................................................................................... 26
HUMINT and Critical Operations Support Course................................................ 27

HUMINT Operations Familiarization Course........................................................ 28
HUMINT Support to Tactical Operations Course/MIO.......................................... 29
Interrogation Refresher Course............................................................................ 30
Joint Interrogation (I-10) Course.......................................................................... 31
Mediations and Negotiations Course................................................................... 32
National Security Advanced Training Course....................................................... 33
Personal Emergency Medical Care Seminar/CounterIED Course....................... 34
Psychological Profiling Seminar........................................................................... 35
Source Management Course............................................................................... 36
Special Debriefing Course.................................................................................... 37
Strategic Debriefing of Law Enforcement Sources Course.................................. 38
Surveillance Detection Course............................................................................. 39
Surveillance/Countersurveilllance Course............................................................ 40
Tactical Debriefing Course................................................................................... 41
Tactical Questioning and Screening Course........................................................ 42
Tactical Questioning/Tactical Site Exploitation Course......................................... 43
Tactical Site Exploitation Course.......................................................................... 44
Travelers Course................................................................................................. 45
COURSE OFFERINGS
ADVANCED DEBRIEFING AND ELICITATION COURSE
Number of Days: 10
Maximum Number of Participants: 20
Number of CEUs Awarded: 6.5
Clearance Required: S
DESCRIPTION:
This course is designed for personnel who have attended the Debriefing and
Elicitation Course or have experience in the HUMINT world and want to improve
on the basic skills. The AD&E includes a review of basic persuasive interpersonal
communication skills as well as defensive skills such as counter elicitation,
detecting deception and congruency and legend. This course also introduces
negotiation as a tool for HUMINT collection.
ADVANCED ELICITATION COURSE
Number of Days: 5
Number of CEUs Awarded: 3
Clearance Required: No
DESCRIPTION:
Knowing how to effectively build rapport and transparently employ elicitation
techniques to gather critical information is invaluable to professionals in any
community. Advanced Elicitation will teach students to proficiently obtain the
information critical to making good decisions and solving problems. Students
will effectively determine which communication skills and elicitation techniques
to employ when engaging supervisors, peers, employees and clients. Students
will present effective, well-received consultation and advice, and advance in their
professions by correctly employing rapport building and elicitation techniques.
This seminar will build upon the basic elicitation techniques taught in the Elicitation:
Non-Intrusive Information Gathering and Elicitation & Counterelicitation. It is
designed to equip the student with techniques to quickly establish rapport with a
person you wish to engage. You will be able to select the appropriate elicitation
techniques to properly engage and disengage a person without his/her awareness.
The instruction will include advanced communication techniques and practical
exercises are used to maximize the learning experience.
ADVANCED MILITARY SOURCE OPERATIONS COURSE
Number of Days: 72
DESCRIPTION:
The Advanced Military Source Operations Course (AMSOC) is designed to
produce a qualified field collection officer with the basic knowledge and skills of
controlled human intelligence collection. Students will learn TTPs of controlled
HUMINT collection in both strategic and semi-permissive environments.
This course can be discussed in greater detail on-site once government security
clearance requirements have been met. Please contact Phoenix Training Center
at www.intellpros.com or 1-703-960-7700.
10
ADVANCED OPERATIONAL SUPPORT COURSE
Number of Days: 5
DESCRIPTION:
This two week course is aimed at personnel involved in supporting sensitive
operations abroad.
This course can be discussed in greater detail on site once government security
at www.intellpros.com or (703) 960-7700.
11
ANALYST SUPPORT TO HUMINT COURSE
Number of Days: 5
DESCRIPTION:
The Analyst Support to HUMINT course is tailored for purely analysts, purely
collectors, or a combination there-of, who leverage HUMINT information and
collection in support of Requirements Driven/Mission Oriented activities. The
course is designed to bridge the gap between all-source analysis and HUMINT
collection, aligning perspectives by providing students a common set of principles
and methodologies for use in their respective disciplines.
Through classroom instruction and hands-on practical exercises, students are
exposed to the mindsets that often keep them apart. And through practice of
established doctrine (F3EA, Target Centric Analysis, and creation of a common
Mission Mindset) students form a unity of effort that improves over all effectiveness
and interoperability.
12
ANALYTICAL SUPPORT TO INTERROGATION COURSE
Number of Days: 10
DESCRIPTION:
The Analytical Support to Interrogations training course is designed to present
intelligence professionals with both the information and hands-on experience
needed to effectively support DoD-directed intelligence interrogation operations.
The course has been specifically tailored to focus on introducing the all-source
analyst to not only the intelligence interrogation methodology as it is defined
by FM 2-22.3, but also enable all intelligence analysts to practice some of the
auxiliary skills which are inherent to all HUMINT collection activities. Additionally,
this course will provide attendees with multiple scenario-based practical
exercises that are run by a group of DoD-certified interrogators, allowing for
active participation in a simulated operational environment.
13
ASSET VALIDATION COURSE
Number of Days: 2-5

DESCRIPTION:
This course is aimed at developing an understanding of the asset validation system
in the U.S. Intelligence Community and the principles, strategies, and tools used in
the vetting of intelligence sources across all disciplines of HUMINT.
This course can be discussed in greater detail on-site once government security
clearance requirements have been met. Please contact Phoenix Training Center at
www.intellpros.com or (703) 960-7700.
14
ASSET VALIDATION SYSTEM COURSE
Number of Days: 15
DESCRIPTION:
This three week course was designed for personnel involved in supporting
sensitive operations abroad.
clearance requirements have been met. Please contact Phoenix Training Center at
www.intellpros.com or (703) 960-7700.
15
BATTLEFIELD HUMINT COLLECTION COURSE
Number of Days: 15
DESCRIPTION:
In the Battlefield HUMINT Collection Course (BHCC), students will learn to
maximize their efforts during HUMINT collection operations, while simultaneously
protecting themselves and members of their team. They learn to conduct and
support HUMINT collection operations ranging from tactical to strategic and from
deployment during pre-hostility phases to combat operations. Phoenix Course
Developers can help you assess your training needs and adapt the course of
instruction accordingly. A practical exercise follows each training module, with
succeeding modules building upon that foundation. The BHCC can be taught as
a 10-day or a 15-day course depending upon organizational requirements.
16
COMPETITIVE ASSURANCE SEMINAR
Number of Days: 2
DESCRIPTION:
Safeguarding proprietary information is perhaps one of the most fundamental
and fiduciary responsibilities that any business leader has in an information-rich
environment. As increasing numbers of companies turn to the use of valuation
models that emphasize intellectual capital over physical capital, the protection
of information takes on whole new meanings. Competitive Assurance involves
the isolation of those critical elements that are truly needful of protection and
developing the answers to the implied questions: what has to be protected and
for how long?
Companies that recognize that it takes more than standard security measures
to protect their assets have dramatically increased their reliance upon Phoenix
Training Centers Competitive Assurance professionals and practices since the
mid 1990s. Based on established principles of counterintelligence practiced in
governments around the world, the Competitive Assurance process has been
specially designed, developed and implemented for the peculiar protection needs
of businesses in an increasingly competitive environment.
17
COUNTER IED/TRIAGETRAINING COURSE
Number of Days: 5
DESCRIPTION:
IEDs are the number one threat to deployed U.S. and coalition forces in overseas
contingency operational theaters. The goal of the CounterIED/Triage Course is
to minimize the overall impact of these weapons to deploying Soldiers, Sailors,
Marines, Airmen and DOD Civilians by increasing individual situational awareness
and by making the student proficient in the principles of Tactical Combat Casualty
Care (TCCC). The CounterIED phase of the course provides an overview of
the various improvised explosive weapons, highlighting their basic components,
multiple means of employment and potential indicators of an attack. The Medical
Triage phase of the course includes dealing with; 1) Care under fire 2) Tactical field
care and 3) Casevac Care. The CounterIED/Triage Course consists of two days
of counterIED training and two days of medical training. The course culminates in
a one day field training exercise that covers both counterIED measures and the
requisite combat lifesaving medical procedures.
18
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AWARENESS SEMINAR
Number of Days: 1
DESCRIPTION:
In todays environment, the complete Intelligence organization provides not only
information collection and analysis but also a protection function. The business
intelligence professional is increasingly called upon to provide a realistic and
effective means of protecting information - particularly in those enterprises
in which the security function is unaccustomed to dealing with competitive
intelligence, industrial espionage and economic espionage threats to the
companys sensitive and proprietary information. You must ensure that your
firms countermeasures and security program are consistent with the level and
type of attacks against your sensitive information without compromising corporate
culture issues.
Provided in a highly interactive, one day format, this seminar provides
identification of the nature and types of threats to your proprietary information.
Consideration also includes legal and ethical issues, to include application,
relevance and limitation of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996. Students will
learn assessment of the approaches, competencies and skills of rival collection
activities as well as active assessment of a firms vulnerability rival collection
methods and approaches. The integration of counterintelligence awareness
activities with corporate counterintelligence activities will be taught to ensure
uniform and coherent coverage. A combination of lecture and scenario-driven
team exercises will be drawn from actual situations designed to test the
understanding of the methodologies.
19
DEBRIEFING AND ELICITATION COURSE
Number of Days: 5
DESCRIPTION:
This course trains student in the basic techniques of information/intelligence
collection. Students are taught persuasive communication skills such as elicitation
in addition to direct questioning. Through a hands on approach, students plan
and conduct debriefings and tactical screenings as well as develop proper, topical
questioning plans.
Throughout the course, students are provided with direct methods and examples
of how the techniques trained are integrated into tactical and operational
environments, greatly enhancing the collectors effectiveness.
20
DEFENSE STRATEGIC DEBRIEFING COURSE

FOLLOW-ON
Number of Days: 20
DESCRIPTION:
The Defense Strategic Debriefing Course (DSDC) Follow-On course provides
practical work and instruction in skill sets that complement those learned in the
DSDC, and augments specific skills not covered in the DSDC. The course serves
as a Phase II of DSDC to enhance the preparation for strategic debriefers
selected for assignments in DoD intelligence components. The performance
environment consists of demonstrations and practical exercises, including
role-player exercises between students and instructors against developed
requirements essential for overt HUMINT collection operations. DSDC-FO affords
the students opportunities to demonstrate their understanding of multiple aspects
of intelligence activities including surveillance detection, elicitation/counterelicitation, overt source assessment and intelligence funding.
Phoenix development personnel will meet with you to discuss course
topics, teaching and training methodologies and to adapt the course to your
organizations specific needs.
21
ELICITATION SEMINAR
Number of Days: 1
DESCRIPTION:
This seminar consists of lectures and practical exercises where students
learn elicitation techniques to obtain sensitive information from people without
them being aware that they are providing it. Instruction includes video-based
demonstrations, practical exercises and takeaway material to include an
authoritative text on elicitation techniques. Students who successfully complete
the seminar will be able to employ elicitation techniques in virtually any personal
or professional context.
22
ELICITATION/COUNTERELICITATION SEMINAR
Number of Days: 2
DESCRIPTION:
Elicitation and Counterelicitation will provide the skills needed to obtain
information from diverse sources and the skills to protect your personal
or organizations information. Students will enhance their ability to get the
information they need in any kind of professional setting or situation, recognize
which tools and techniques work best with which sources of information and
master several proven techniques that have been used by information collectors
as well as how to recognize when these techniques are being used against them.
Attendees will learn elicitation approaches as well as how to match the right
tools and techniques to the individual being dealt with, tailor the techniques,
recognize when they are being used against them and how to deflect them.
Using a combination of highly effective video-based demonstrations, challenging
small group in-class exercises and take away materials, students will be able to
immediately employ the tools and skills learned in virtually any professional or
personal setting.
23
ELICITATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILING SEMINAR
Number of Days: 1
DESCRIPTION:
Elicitation and Psychological Profiling will provide an introduction into information
gathering techniques which consist of questioning, interviewing and elicitation.
This will be followed by intelligence applications of elicitation, characteristics of
elicitation, susceptibility to elicitation and begin introductions and demonstrations
into the elicitation techniques. Students will learn to understand their own
personality type through the use of the Myers-Brigg Type Indicator (MBTI) in order
to improve communications and approaches to internal and external sources and
gain a better understanding of the primary sources of information with whom you
deal in order to maximize collection of information.
This seminar maximizes the learning experience through the use of challenging
exercises supported by classroom instruction and extensive video demonstrations
of the techniques. The combination of formal presentation, video and classroom
demonstration, off-site exercises and reporting on the results of those exercises will
be used to enhance the outcome of the seminar.
24
ELICITATION AND TRADE SHOWS SEMINAR
Number of Days: 2
DESCRIPTION:
This seminar will introduce information gathering techniques involving
questioning, interviewing and elicitation. This will be followed by intelligence
applications of elicitation, characteristics of elicitation, susceptibility to elicitation,
and begin introductions and demonstrations into the elicitation techniques.
Students will then select a conference to attend by discipline, focus and industry.
They will develop the key elements to conference presentation, complete on-site
activities and interact in a post conference assessment to evaluate their
performance and plan for future conferences.
This interactive seminar maximizes the learning experience through the use of
challenging exercises supported by classroom instruction and extensive video
demonstrations of elicitation techniques. There will be a video-based self test
as well as pre-conference organizing activities, on-site activities and interim
lessons learned.
25
FIELD NEGOTIATIONS COURSE
Number of Days: 5
DESCRIPTION:
Negotiation can be utilized by any individual but those who have been trained in
the effective and efficient methods are often able to accomplish their goals while
maintaining rapport with the source. Field Negotiations provides students with
techniques to negotiate within and without their military unit. In 40 cumulative hours
students learn methods of rapport building, non-verbal communication, elicitation
and counterelicitation. They will be taught negotiation techniques and then given
an opportunity to test their abilities through multiple practical exercises. The course
includes time for students to utilize Phoenixs Electronic Language Simulation
device to fully understand the challenges posed in using a translator.
26
HUMINT AND CRITICAL OPERATIONS SUPPORT COURSE
Number of Days: 10
DESCRIPTION:
This two week course is aimed at personnel involved in supporting sensitive
operations abroad.
at www.intellpros.com or (703) 960-7700.
27
HUMINT OPERATIONS FAMILIARIZATION COURSE
Number of Days: 20
DESCRIPTION:
For those who are just beginning in the HUMINT world or those who need
an overview of operations prior to an assigned task, the HUMINT Operations
Familiarization Course (HOFC) provides a concise synopsis of multiple aspects
of HUMINT.
HOFC provides the student familiarization in the conceptual, doctrinal, legal
and technical aspects of conducting operations within various sub-disciplines of
human intelligence. Students learn the fundamentals of intelligence operations
and are introduced to the application of these basics to human intelligence
operations. The performance environment consists of demonstrations and practical
exercises, including role-player exercises between students and instructors against
developed requirements essential for HUMINT collection operations. HOFC offers
opportunities for the students to demonstrate understanding in multiple human
intelligence activities; e.g. collection, targeting, surveillance/surveillance detection,
controlled human intelligence operations, terrorism/counterterrorism, elicitation,
counterintelligence, interrogation and debriefing.
28
HUMINT SUPPORT TO TACTICAL OPERATIONS COURSE
Number of Days: 15
DESCRIPTION:
Formerly Maritime Interdictions Operations Course
This course is designed to provide all services with training for individuals who will
by the nature of their mission or position be involved with information collection at
the tactical level. It incorporates lessons learned from current and past operations.
The course is exercise heavy and provides a very solid base for units to conduct
tactical collection. The exercises are conducted focusing on the units standard
operating procedures.
The course provides students with the necessary skills to operate effectively as a
member of HUMINT or TSE team. Working in teams students will plan and conduct
debriefings and basic personnel and site searches.
29
INTERROGATION REFRESHER COURSE
Number of Days: 5
DESCRIPTION:
Certified interrogators provide an essential skill to HUMINT Operations. The
global security environment is ever-changing and certified interrogators must
incorporate newly advanced techniques with those they already know and
apply. The Interrogation refresher course is a review of the fundamentals of
interrogation and a chance for students to revise and improve their style and
technique. Classroom instruction is followed by video-taped practical exercises
that allow instant feedback and self-evaluation. The class provides for students
to test their mental agility and interrogation skills to cope with uncooperative
sources played by experienced role players and trained interrogators.
The Interrogation Refresher course is highly recommended for interrogators
about to deploy or those who have not utilized their skills for an extended period
of time. Class is limited to Certified Interrogators only.
30
JOINT INTERROGATION (I-10) COURSE
Number of Days: 50
DESCRIPTION:
Trained interrogators are essential to the successful operation of intelligence
gathering. As the only DIA-certified interrogation course, I-10 is a comprehensive
detail-oriented course that takes students from the principles to the practical.
Instructors focus on teaching students applicable interrogation techniques and
procedures while adhering to current doctrine, FM2-22.3, Geneva Convention and
Law of Land Warfare.
The I-10 course teaches the fundamentals of human behavior and communication
as applied to interrogation in the contemporary HUMINT operating environment.
Experienced instructors/mentors work with students individually to hone their
interrogation styles and techniques. Training includes three weeks of practical
exercises culminating in a challenging final exercise.
All skill sets are reinforced with practical exercises, interrogations and mentoring.
Upon completion of the course, each student will have conducted over thirty full
interrogations to include a five-day FTX and seven graded interrogations with
certified, experienced interrogators as role players.
31
MEDIATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS COURSE
Number of Days: 5
DESCRIPTION:
This intensive course enhances the capabilities of communicators engaged in
cross-cultural communications, interpreter-assisted meetings, and negotiations in
permissive, semi-permissive, and hostile environments. The training will consist
of at least 50% practical exercises in realistic conditions and can be tailored for
specific areas. Practical application, role-playing and scenario-driven exercises
provide students the opportunity to practice the skills taught in the classroom.
This course also includes time for students to utilize Phoenixs Electronic
Language Simulation device to fully understand the challenges posed by the use
of a translator.
32
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVANCED TRAINING COURSE
Number of Days: 10
DESCRIPTION:
The National Security Advanced Training Course (NSAT) has been developed as
a comprehensive program of instruction for the Department of Homeland Security.
By integrating the previous training and experience of Special Agents into the
operational skill sets of DoD Human Intelligence Collectors, this course has been
designed to provide for optimal functionality within a Joint Terrorism Task Force
(JTTF) environment.
From a law enforcement perspective, participants will in fact become actively
familiarized with the full spectrum of Human Intelligence Operations, intended
specifically to enhance the investigation and prosecution of terrorist-related threats
to our national security. Throughout this training, NSAT focuses on the essential
considerations and methodological studies of Human Behavioral Profiling,
Intelligence Debriefing/Analysis, Custodial Interviewing, Source Management and
Surveillance, looking to add layers of proficiency upon existing skills that relate to
mission-critical aspects of Counterterrorism Operations. Additionally, because this
training is being presented at the professional level, attendees will discover via
practical exercise how to successfully recruit, control, and exploit human sources
of information, gaining both a tactical and strategic advantage over any would-be
adversary or criminal suspect. This all-inclusive introduction will equip participants
with a new perspective on interactive communication techniques, all of which will
contribute to establishing a longer term interoperability within the Joint Intelligence
and Law Enforcement Communities.
33
PERSONAL EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE SEMINAR/

COUNTERIED COURSE
Number of Days: 2-5

Number of CEUs Awarded: 1.3-3
DESCRIPTION:
Many individuals have a working knowledge of basic first aid. However, this is not
sufficient as we face the medical challenges of todays combat zones, prepare for
situations resulting from terrorist related activities in non-combat environments
or travel where personal emergency medical care may be superior to what is
locally available.
The Personal Emergency Medical Care Seminar provides medical treatment
beyond basic first aid. Students receive one day of hands-on training from
medics with experience in combat zones and other hostile environments. The
instructor to student ratio is low (1:5) to create an optimum learning environment.
The simulated medical emergencies on the second day of training teaches
students to render life-saving emergency medical treatment in a variety of
hostile environments.
This seminar is also available as a five day CounterIED Course with two days of
medical training and two days of CounterIED training. The training will culminate
with a one day field training exercise where students are immersed into a
simulated tactical environment that will utilize all practical applications learned to
include both counterIED measures and medical applications.
34
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILING SEMINAR
Number of Days: 1
DESCRIPTION:
People expose information about themselves from head to toe, but many
intelligence operatives cannot read the signs. An intelligence professional who
understands an assets needs and thought processes gains a decisive edge.
Profiling a sources personality provides such an edge.
Phoenix Training Center has expanded the applications of the Myers-Briggs
Type Indicator (MBTI) to enhance the capabilities of Intelligence professionals
beyond traditional organizational effectiveness applications. This highly effective
and predictive instrument can be used to understand personality type in order to
improve communications and approaches to internal and external clients while
gaining a better understanding of the primary sources of information in order to
maximize the collection of information. Each student will be able to employ the
MBTI as an operational framework for the collection of personality and
predictive information.
35
SOURCE MANAGEMENT COURSE
Number of Days: 5
DESCRIPTION:
The Source Management Course is designed for personnel who find themselves
responsible for managing HUMINT collection assets. This course will acquaint
students with collection management procedures, tactics, techniques and
procedures associated with HUMINT Operations at the strategic, operational
and tactical levels. This course identifies the specific roles, responsibilities
and tasks required to manage HUMINT Operations. Students identify areas of
collection and analyze the threat beyond a commanders requirement. Students
will perform a practical exercise to demonstrate their understanding of the
management process.
36
SPECIAL DEBRIEFING COURSE
Number of Days: 15
DESCRIPTION:
The Special Debriefing Course is a highly intensive, interactive course of instruction
for strategic debriefers. Students will be trained in legal considerations, including
Geneva Conventions, and the benefits of understanding and using the Myers
Brigg Type Indicator (MBTI), as well as personality assessment tools, effective
communication skills, rapport building skills, cross-cultural communications, basic
and symmetric questioning techniques, and report writing skills.
Strategic debriefers will learn to perform their mission through a combination
of platform instruction, role-playing and practical exercises (PEs). Additionally,
students will learn to write a variety of reports such as source data reports,
intelligence information reports (IIRs), contact memoranda, and knowledgeability
briefs, assessments and reports. They will receive critical after action review on
each learning objective to ensure complete comprehension of each topic.
37
STRATEGIC DEBRIEFING OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

SOURCES COURSE
Number of Days: 5
DESCRIPTION:
This course provides the ground work for individuals to participate in the
debriefing of witting law enforcement and DoD HUMINT Sources. Students learn
to conduct intelligence gathering DoD style debriefings. The course provides
additional training in skills that will enhance the law enforcement officers
effectiveness in questioning, intelligence collection, and conducting investigations.
Strategic Debriefing of Law Enforcement Sources (SDLES) recognizes that DoD
and law enforcement officers are operating in nontraditional capacities. This
course will not only provide instruction in debriefing operations but will include
practical exercises. These practical exercises will require the students to conduct
intelligence debriefings as the debriefer or subject matter expert or both. They
will employ proper questioning, elicitation, rapport building and related
interpersonal skills.
38
SURVEILLANCE DETECTION COURSE
Number of Days: 10
DESCRIPTION:
Of the many challenges facing U.S. intelligence officers, the ability to detect foreign
intelligence surveillance is a critical skill requiring as much practical hands-on
experience as traditional platform training. While the concepts of detecting foreign
surveillance are relatively easy to teach, the ability to detect surveillance is more
difficult and demands not only practice, but also a certain degree of confidence and
self-assurance that can only come from practice, failure and success, and clear,
honest critiques from experienced instructors.
The Surveillance Detection course combines classroom instruction with handson practical exercises. The course is based on a progressive learning curve
with students receiving valuable classroom instruction on the basics of detecting
surveillance before being led to conduct street runs. Each student will conduct
multiple street runs with both pre-designated and original street routes. Students
will also apply their new abilities to aid them in creating a Travel Security Plan.
The small instructor to student ratio allows each student ample time to seek
information and receive feedback from advanced instructors specializing in
surveillance detection.
39
SURVEILLANCE/COUNTERSURVEILLANCE COURSE
Number of Days: 15
DESCRIPTION:
Foreign governments and entities frequently surveil intelligence professionals,
government employees, businessmen and diplomats. These professionals
cannot afford to become an unknowing target, their every move maybe watched,
noted and reported for reasons that may range from intelligence collection to
threats to themselves or national security.
This 3-week course teaches students basic surveillance and countersurveillance
operations where students learn to identify surveillance detection techniques by
recognizing and executing mobile and static surveillance tactics and countersurveillance tactics. Intelligence professionals also learn to conduct area
familiarization for surveillance-related operations. Practical exercises are
central to the course, allowing the students to practice the skills they learned in
the classroom.
40
TACTICAL DEBRIEFING COURSE
Number of Days: 10
DESCRIPTION:
In order for HUMINT personnel to enhance their ability to perform tactical
debriefings they must be familiar with current interrogation techniques, screening
operations, and how to collect time-sensitive intelligence from non-cooperative
sources. The Tactical Debriefing course delivers all of these skills. During this
course the instruction of debriefing techniques within the confines of the Geneva
Conventions and FM 2-22.3 will enhance the students ability to collect intelligence
from sources within tactical and operational environments. The attendees will
enhance their collection skills, gain the ability to maximize cooperation from
sources, learn proven techniques and how to apply them with specific sources
and gain knowledge on how to organize and refine their information collection and
reporting approach.
Traditional platform training as well as practical exercise are used as instruction
tools during this course to reinforce the students learning ability. Each student is
trained and mentored to collect human intelligence from sources captured at the
tactical objective. Students are familiarized with current interrogation techniques,
full screening operations and hostile debriefing capabilities. An exercise scenario
used throughout the course culminates in a major screening and debriefing
exercising in which students learn to collect time-sensitive intelligence from
non-cooperative sources.
41
TACTICAL QUESTIONING AND SCREENING COURSE
Number of Days: 4
DESCRIPTION:
This course accentuates the statement Every soldier is a collector. While
focusing on direct questioning and basic screening tactics, TQ Screening
provides a basic level understanding of the benefits of immediate tactical
information collection. This course is designed for personnel with limited or no
HUMINT collection experience. In addition to TQ and Screening, the students
will learn the fine line of where TQ ends and interrogation begins. They will
understand the current laws, rules, regulations and conventions governing
tactical questioning and collection. This course will enhance the commanders
ability to identify immediate threats and will provide a timely and accurate picture
of the current situation.
42
TACTICAL QUESTIONING/TACTICAL SITE

EXPLOITATION COURSE
Number of Days: 5
DESCRIPTION:
Tactical Questioning and Tactical Site Exploitation (TQ/TSE) are combined into
an intensive course allowing students the opportunity to use both skill sets to
enhance their productivity in a tactical environment. Through tactical questioning
training, students will gain knowledge on effective questioning through enhanced
information collection. They will learn techniques on how to question and how to
apply their questions to the information they are collecting. Through tactical site
exploitation the students will use appropriate tactical debriefing skills to quickly
screen personnel for further exploitation as well as sensitive site exploitation
methods, techniques and tools to quickly identify material on personnel.
Lastly they will learn how to combine these skill sets to strengthen their overall
intelligence collection in the tactical environment.
This course will address the needs of each student through challenging practical
exercises that support classroom instruction. TQ/TSE offers an excellent
pre-deployment train-up in support of tactical and operational intelligence
requirements. This course is taught by subject matter experts with vast
experience in Human Intelligence, Intelligence Collection and Analysis and
Special Operations.
43
TACTICAL SITE EXPLOITATION COURSE
Number of Days: 3
DESCRIPTION:
The Tactical Site Exploitation Course is relevant to organizations seeking greater
fidelity, thoroughness and standardization in collecting and exploiting physical
and human information on a combat objective. In addition to learning objectiveoriented questioning skills, students discover how to maximize Time on Target
during the Tactical Debriefing of both suspected individuals and non-combatants.
Students will learn the basic techniques required to thoroughly exploit the
tactical environment.
This course consists of challenging practical exercises to maximize support from
classroom instruction. The first day teaches tactical questioning. The second
day teachers site exploitation, and the third day consists of practical exercises
designed to challenge the students to maximize time on target, collect, identify
and evaluate the material collected on site.
44
TRAVELERS COURSE
Number of Days: 5
DESCRIPTION:
The Travelers course makes students aware of the various security rules,
regulations and requirements of foreign travel in todays highly charged security
environment. Students are provided with training in specialized techniques when
dealing with foreign officials to ensure successful travel with minimal interruptions.
The attendees will learn to utilize short-term rapport building skills as well as verbal
and non-verbal techniques.
The course utilizes practical exercises and various scenarios to replicate most
common overseas travel-related difficulties and troublesome situations, and offers
the solutions to overcome them. The tools and techniques students will learn
maximize their security and safety awareness while minimizing their profile during
foreign travel.
45
CONTACT INFORMATION
For information on any of our courses please contact
Tiffany Wilson, Project Control Lead at 703-960-7700.
The Phoenix Training Center Advantage

Highly qualified instructors with diverse backgrounds in intelligence and law enforcement
Training is tailored to reflect instructors real world experience
Mobile training teams are available to deliver training throughout the US and OCONUS
Curriculums specifically developed to meet the customers needs and address limitations
Consultation services to design and implement a training program
State of the art facility specifically designed for HUMINT training
Phoenix Training Center

Alexandria, Virginia
(703) 960 -7700
www.intellpros.com
2013 DynCorp International LLC. All rights reserved. 9/13
Fact Sheet
Positive psychology
What this fact sheet covers:
What is positive psychology?
Practical strategies to increase your psychological wellbeing
Where to get more information
What is positive psychology?
Traditionally in psychology, the focus has been on identifying and treating mental health
problems such as depression. This is critically important for those facing mental illness
however, it provides an incomplete picture of mental health.
Positive psychology is a relatively new branch of psychology that shifts the focus from
what is clinically wrong, to the promotion of wellbeing and the creation of a satisfying life
filled with meaning, pleasure, engagement, positive relationships and accomplishment.
Gable and Haidt (2005) defined positive psychology as the study of the conditions and
processes that contribute to the ourishing or optimal functioning of people, groups, and
institutions .
Positive psychology is not about putting on a happy face all the time. Life can be hard and
disappointments and challenges are inevitable. However, scientific research has shown
that there are some strategies and skills that allow people to navigate the challenges of
life more effectively and enjoy life despite the upsets.
Practical strategies to increase your psychological wellbeing
1.
Enhancing pleasure
Savouring: Savouring is the awareness of pleasure and of giving deliberate conscious

attention to the experience of pleasure. Fred B. Bryant and Joseph Veroff of Loyola
University have identified five techniques that promote savouring:

Sharing with others - Seek out others to share the experience and tell others how
much you value the moment. This is the single strongest predictor of the level of
pleasure
Memory building - Take mental photographs, or even a physical souvenir of the

event, and reminisce about it later with others
Self-congratulation - Dont be afraid of pride; tell yourself how great you are and
remember how long you have waited for this to happen
Sharpening perception - Focus on certain elements and block out others, like
closing your eyes and listening to the music
Absorption - Allow yourself to become totally immersed and try not to think, just
sense
This document may be freely downloaded and distributed on condition no change is made to the content.
The information in this document is not intended as a substitute for professional medical advice, diagnosis
or treatment. Not to be used for commercial purposes and not to be hosted electronically outside of the
1
Black Dog Institute website. Updated October 2012.
Fact Sheet
Positive psychology
Avoid forming habits: Rapidly repeated indulgence in the same pleasure does not
work. Neurons are wired to respond to novel events, and not to fire if the events do not
provide new information. Seek out a variety of experiences and spread out pleasurable
events over time. Surprise yourself or others with small presents of pleasure.
2. Engagement
Mindfulness: Mindlessness pervades much of human activity. We act and interact
automatically, without much thinking. Mindful attention to the present moment can be
developed through meditation and mindfulness based therapies. Through mindfulness
we can focus our perspective and sharpen our experience of the present moment.
Nurture relationships: Your income level has a surprisingly small effect on your
psychological well-being. The most fundamental finding from positive psychology is that
strong personal relationships have the greatest impact on your satisfaction with life. Make
sure that you invest time and energy in your friends and family.
Identify and use your strengths: Think about your personal strengths and how you
might use them in your everyday life. Are you a leader, playful, fair, curious or original? Do
you have a good sense of perspective? Do you love learning? Are you genuine? Are you
good at teamwork? If you have internet access you can take an online test on Martin
Seligmans website (www.authentichappiness.org) to explore your personal strengths.
Cultivate and use your strengths at work, in family life and in your leisure time.
Seek out flow experiences: Through his research, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi sought to
understand how people felt when they most enjoyed themselves and why. He
developed the concept of flow which describes a state of joy, creativity and total
involvement. Problems seem to disappear and there is a feeling of transcendence. Flow
is the way people describe their state of mind when they are doing something for its own
sake. Some activities consistently produced flow such as sport, games, art and hobbies.
Csikszentmihalyi has identified the key ingredients to creating these optimal experiences:
The task is challenging and requires skill
We concentrate
There are clear goals
We get immediate feedback
We have deep, effortless involvement
There is a sense of control
Our sense of self vanishes
Time stops
2
Fact Sheet
Positive psychology
Csikszentmihalyi says work and family life can provide important opportunities for flow.
When people were in flow, either at work or in leisure, they reported a much more
positive experience. When challenges and skills were both high, people felt happier, more
cheerful, stronger and more active. They concentrated more, felt more creative and
satisfied.
3.
Finding meaning
Keep a gratitude diary: Take the time each day to write down three things that went
well and why. This causes psychological well-being levels to increase in a lasting way.
Thank a mentor: Write a letter of thanks to someone to whom you owe a debt of
gratitude such as a teacher or grandparent. Then visit the person and read the letter to
them. People who do this are measurably happier for more than a month.
Learn to forgive: Let go of anger and resentment by writing a letter of forgiveness to a
person who has wronged you. Inability to forgive is associated with persistent rumination.
Weigh up your life: Take time out occasionally to consider how you are going in the
major facets of your life such as family, work, finances, health and play. Reflect on the
progress you are making in working towards your major life goals. Make changes in your
life to match your priorities.
Perform small acts of kindness: Performing five kind acts a week, especially all in
one day, creates a measurable boost to levels of psychological well-being. Giving not only
makes you feel good about yourself, it enhances your connection with others and can
bring you positive feedback from others.
These and other strategies are detailed in Martin Seligmans book Authentic Happiness:
Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment.
Where to get more information:
Positive Psychology
Lyubomirsky, S (2008). The How of Happiness: A Scientific Approach to
Getting the Life You Want. Penguin Putnam
Seligman, M E P (2011). Flourish: A New Understanding of Happiness and
Wellbeing. Nicholas Brealey Publishing
Flow
Csikzentmihalyi M (1991). Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience.
Harper Perennial
3
Positive psychology
Fact Sheet
Csikzentmihalyi M (1997). Finding Flow: The Psychology of Engagement with

Everyday Life. Basic Books
Altruism
Post S, Neimark J (2007). Why Good Things Happen to Good People. Broadway
Gratitude
Emmons R (2007). Thanks!: How the New Science of Gratitude Can Make
You Happier. Houghton Mifflin
Positive Psychology Academic resources
Bryant F B, Veroff J (2006). Savoring: A New Model of Positive Experience.
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates
Gable S L, Haidt J (2005). What (and Why) Is Positive Psychology. Review of
General Psychology, Vol. 9: 103-110
Kahneman D, Diener E, Schwarz (eds) (2003). Well-Being: The Foundations of
Hedonic Psychology. Russell Sage Foundation Publications
Keyes C L M, Haidt J (eds) (2003). Flourishing: Positive Psychology and the
Life Well-Lived. American Psychological Association
Petersen C (2004) Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and
Classification. Oxford University Press
Petersen C (2006). A Primer in Positive Psychology. Oxford University Press
Snyder C R (2005) Handbook of Positive Psychology. Oxford University Press
The Journal of Positive Psychology. Published by Routledge
Useful Websites
Centre for Confidence and Well-being, Scotland www.centreforconfidence.
co.uk
Positive Psychology Institute, Sydney www.positivepsychologyinstitute.com.au
The Positivity Institute - www.thepositivityinstitute.com.au
The University of Pennsylvania, Positive Psychology Centre www.ppc.sas.upenn.
edu
Time Magazine article: The New Science of Happiness. Jan 2005 www.time.com/
time/2005/happiness
Six Part BBC Series: The Science of Happiness. April 2006 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/programmes/happiness_formula
Black Dog Institute
Hospital Road, Prince of Wales Hospital, Randwick NSW 2031
(02) 9382 4530 Email: blackdog@blackdog.org.au
www.blackdoginstitute.org.au
4
Dissecting Social Engineering Attacks

Robert Ray, Security Consultant, CHECK Team Member
A trend reported during the first half of 2012 is the increase of targeted
attacks. These attacks need time (in some cases a few years) to be detected
and are rather hard to avoid.
Spearphishing and social engineering techniques are on the rise.
Spearphishing is increasing, mainly due to the increased use of social
networking for private and business purposes.
ENISA Threat Landscape report 2013
Loss or theft of mobile devices and other equipment by staff is a major

internal threat for organisations.
Loss or theft of mobile devices and hardware are a major external threat for
corporations.
Corporations having experienced a data breach reported that one of top 3
causes is physical theft of devices containing sensitive data.
ENISA Threat Landscape report 2013
Agenda
Social engineering attack methodology
Dissecting a social engineer
Dissecting social engineering attacks
Demonstration of some tools of the trade
Prevention and mitigation advice
Social engineering methodology
Information
Gathering
Reconnaissance
Breach

Information Gathering
Corporate & personal websites, blogs etc.
Document metadata
Search engines
Whois & domain registration records
DNS records
Social media
Public records

Reconnaissance
Google Street View
Google Maps Satellite View
Physical walk or driveby
Telephone reconnaissance
Rubbish bins (A.K.A dumpster diving)

Reconnaissance
CCTV location, security guards, door entry systems etc
Unprotected entrances, fire exits, unmanned receptions etc.
Weak entry points such as open windows (usually out of scope for breach)
Times of busy or quiet periods, lunch breaks etc.
Location of smoking areas, car parking etc.
Surveillance will be mostly covert. Taking pictures of buildings, staff ID badges,
delivery points etc.

Reconnaissance

Breach
Deemed successful by reaching a set of pre-defined agreed goals
Gain network access (level of attack to be agreed)
Work at a staff unattended desk
Install a rogue access point
Remove specific equipment
Make external calls from office equipment
Reach sensitive areas of the building, server room, mail room etc.
Phish credentials or perform client exploits

Post Breach
Verbal debrief
Detailed Report
Detailed analysis of what we gained
How we gained it
Why it helped us
What we used it for
Which goals did we achieve

Our recommendations for mitigation

So who are the social engineers?

Key Characteristics
Great research skills for building solid pretexts
Great at building instant rapport
Great communication skills to allow elicitation of useful or sensitive information
Great at adopting another role or persona
Very persuasive
Very adaptable
May be a technical specialist or at least working with technical specialists
Social engineering attacks
Client Side
Attacks
Physical
Intrusions
Telephone
Attacks

A note on scoping simulated attacks
Social engineering engagements are usually very carefully scoped
Decisions on what types of attacks are in scope
Decisions on which targets are allowed to be attacked, employees, offices,
buildings and so on.
Goals to determine a successful breach to be defined
Any specific items out of scope clearly defined within rules of engagement such as
forcing open doors or using particular fire exits due to alarms.

Client Side Attacks
Exploiting browser related vulnerabilities
Phishing for credentials
Malicious attachments
Instructing users to install or run malicious software
Malicious USB sticks etc.
Screenshot evidence of successful attacks

Physical Intrusions
Unprotected entrances, fire exits, unmanned receptions etc.
Gain entry under pretext situation, i.e. electricity meter reader, health and safety
officer, important client etc.
Tailgating staff
Use of fake ID badges or uniforms etc.
Use of obtained door entry fobs or access cards
Photos taken to record goals reached.

Telephone Attacks
Eliciting useful information, i.e. internal building layout, names or job titles of staff,
additional telephone numbers for further attacks etc.
Calls into organisation under relevant pretext, i.e. impersonate staff member
calling IT helpdesk for password reset or setup a site visit.
Off-site wingman, providing off-site standby cover should the need arise. i.e. to
provide confirmation of the legitimacy of a pretext

Shaun Jones of NCC, kindly provided us with a recent real world example:

Attack Objectives
Gain physical access to customer premises and gain access to corporate network
Test customer users susceptibility to phishing attacks
Attack Plan
Steal user credentials
Launch a phishing attack against Outlook Web Access
Use compromised accounts to allow for physical breach
Create a pretext to gain access to building

Obtain physical passes and door entry fobs
Gain access to internal network point
Log into systems with stolen credentials
Data Protection Act

Guiding Principle 7 Information Security
Design and organise security to fit the nature of personal data you hold and the
harm that may result from a breach
Be clear who is responsible for ensuring information security
Make sure you have the right physical and technical security, backed up by
robust policies and procedures and reliable, well trained staff
Be ready to respond to any breach of security swiftly and effectively
Prevention and Mitigation Advice

Adopt a security culture from the top down
Top down leadership is vital
Everyone has to be encouraged to be security conscious
Ensure security policies and procedures include cover for social engineering
vectors
Implement & enforce clear desk policies
Implement & enforce visible staff ID badges (to be removed outwith buildings)
Report detected social engineering attempts to security officer
Report mistakes or suspected mistakes to security officer
Regularly audit policies and procedures
Regularly assess your controls
Prevention and Mitigation Advice

Training Staff
Train staff to increase awareness
Training to include phishing attack techniques, how to spot them, how to handle
and report attempts
Training on physical security, tailgating and social engineering etc.
Assess Staff
Assess staff through simulated social engineering attacks on a regular basis
UK Offices
North American Offices
Australian Offices
Manchester - Head Ofce
San Francisco
Sydney
Cheltenham
Atlanta
Edinburgh
New York
Leatherhead
Seattle
London
Thame
European Offices
Amsterdam - Netherlands
Munich Germany
Zurich - Switzerland
III. Lesson Delivery
Chapter 7 - Lecturing Effectively

Lectures are comprised of two components: Content and
Appropriate Uses for Lectures
Delivery. Both components are essential for creating an interesting lecture. If the beginning of a lecture captures your at-
Lectures are best suited for making information memo-
tention, the middle builds suspense or intrigue as the lecture
rable; that is, lectures provide elaboration of content,
unfolds, and the end forms a resolution, you have a lecture in
examples, and context. Also, because texts often lag
story form the age-old method for passing on information.
behind current knowledge, lectures are valuable methods
Yet, how well a story is told is dependent upon the quality of
for presenting new information.
the delivery. First, we cover the rules of content; later in the

chapter, we discuss the elements of delivery.
Contrary to popular belief, lectures are not the best

method for imparting large amounts of information. Voluminous information is better presented in text format,
where it can be made available for review whenever the
Appropriate Uses for Lectures

Use of PowerPoint to Enhance Lectures
Active Lectures
students need access to it. In fact, one of the most effective learning strategies students can employ is to read
and then re-read their text assignment.
One counterproductive lecture activity is to read the text
Organizing the Lecture
to the students. Most instructors would say, I never do
Elements of Delivery
that! But they do. A survey of U.S. Air Force Academy
Improving Your Lecturing Skills

through Microteaching
students showed that if the instructor lectures the text

material, the students do not bother to read the text.
Instructors often think students are lazy, that they do not
Lecture Skills Observation Sheet
come to class prepared or ready to learn. Yet, the instruc-
Resources on Lecturing
tors inform the students, through the lecture, what material they should have read in the text. Generally, it is not
a good idea to lecture from the text.
Page 62
Instruction at FSU Handbook 2011
Yet, it is helpful to elaborate on what is presented in the
Technology-Enhanced Classrooms (TECs) allow you
text. If your students have read the assignment, you are
to use computer consoles, DVD/VHS players, personal
providing what the text cannot provide, a context for use
response systems, wireless microphones, and other
of the information, examples of when or how that infor-
technologies to enhance your teaching. You can display
mation is used, and stories that illustrate the importance
your teaching files (PowerPoint, sound files, images), and
of the information.
your course site or other websites on an LCD projector.
Focus the message. In the words of Howard Gardner

(2000), In a lecture, less is more. It is very easy to present too much information, which quickly saturates students, causing them to drop into a passive-listening role.
They may understand what is being said, but they are not
retaining it. In fact, some research suggests that students
can only remember five to nine major points from a
lecture. It is better to teach a few things well than to teach
Using the T: Drive from your home or office allows

you to access your files without carrying around a disk
or laptop. You need only create (or renew) your TEC account and reserve one of the many TECs available across
campus to use this resource. Remember to practice with
the technology prior to your class meeting and be sure to
arrive early enough to get the equipment up and running
before class starts.
a lot of material poorly. Unless the learner can encode

the information in a rich context with good examples and
Use of PowerPoint to Enhance Lectures
reasons for remembering it, the information will not stay

in memory very long.
To aid memory, use visual illustrations during a lecture.
Visual illustrations are remembered longer than verbal
information, and they can aid the recall of information that is associated with them. Many classrooms are
equipped with technology that will help you add other
dimensions to your lecture.
Many instructors find PowerPoint useful in enhancing lectures and emphasizing key point to their students. However,
misuse and overuse of this software can lead to a room full
of bored looks and glassy stares. To avoid death by PowerPoint, consider the following tips.
PowerPoint is a visual medium. Use graphics, pictures,
models, and other images instead of bullets to make your
point whenever possible.
In PowerPoint, less can be more. Think big, bold, and
Page 63
brief. Do not put large amounts of text on the screen. Aim
Help students take notes by using the slide handout fea-
for no more than seven lines per slide and ruthlessly edit
ture. These can be passed out in class or posted on your
so that your bullets contain only the main points.
course website.
Design your visuals so students in the back row can see

them. Font sizes less than 24 pts are difficult to read. Try
Active Lectures
to choose san serif fonts such as Tahoma, Arial, or

Verdana, which are easier to read when projected.
Avoid putting large amounts of text on the screen and
then reading it to the audience. Pause for a moment and
let the students read the slide before you comment or
elaborate on it.
In Chapter 8 we discuss students as active learners. Here, we

pose the question: Can a lecture be active? If your lecture is
dynamic and interesting, students become fascinated with
the subject and want to learn more. Are the students leaning
forward in their seats trying to catch every word? With an
active lecture, students become active listeners. Or are they
Use animation events sparingly.
leaning back, thinking about what they are going to do this
Use highlighting features to focus attention on what you
weekend? If this is the case, students have become
are discussing.
Think contrast when selecting colors for the background
passive listeners.
Lectures Combined with Class Discussion
and text. Yellow or white text on a black background, for

instance, is a good high-contrast choice.
Select color combinations with care. Text and background in red and blue; red and green; or blue and black
can be difficult to read. Also, be aware that color-blind
individuals have trouble telling the difference between
red and green, or blue and purple. Avoid these color
combinations when possible.
Spend enough time on each slide to fully develop your
Penner, in his book Why Many College Teachers Cannot

Lecture (1984), cites research that shows students attention
to a lecture begins to wane after just 10 minutes, and is at
its lowest from 20 to 40 minutes into the lecture. In light of
this research, consider dividing your material into 15-minute
mini-lectures and interspersing your talk with activities that
will engage your students.
One method for making your lectures more interesting is to
explanation. Three minutes per slide is a good
combine them with class discussion. Some techniques for
general rule.
doing this are discussed in Chapter 11 Teaching Contexts.

Here, we concentrate on what makes a good lecture
discussion and some pitfalls to avoid.
Page 64
Good discussion questions get the students
Can the rest of the class hear the student asking
attention. Start by asking a question associated with
or answering a question? Have the student stand up
something they should have read not a recall question,
and speak loudly enough so everyone can hear. If neces-
but perhaps one on a controversial topic.
sary, repeat the question or answer so that the entire

class can hear.
Example
How many of you agree with _____ s position on
(topic)? When students raise their hands, choose
one and ask why he or she agrees with that position.
Or, ask the other students why they disagree. Another strategy is to divide the class in half ask one
half to take a pro position with regard to the topic,
the other, a con position. Ask how the topic could be
viewed differently from each viewpoint.
Give everyone the opportunity to talk. Spread

the questions around; do not answer them all yourself
redirect them to other students in the class. Ask for
examples from the students experiences.
Organizing the Lecture

Quality lectures contain content that is well organized. To
organize your lectures, heed the maxim - tell them what
you are going to tell them; tell them; and tell them what
you told them.
Start with a divergent question such as, What are

the criteria for evaluating good teaching? Write the first
answer on the board. Ask for another. When you have
ten or so criteria, ask the class which is the single best
criteria and why? Who has a different opinion?
Do not ask recall questions that have a single
correct answer unless you are going to do some-
Tell them what you are going to tell them

establishes an expectation of what is coming
next, and allows the learner to get into the
proper frame of mind. One way to do this is to

remind the students of the learning objectives
for the lesson.
thing with the response. Ask the question, and then

call on a student to answer it. If you identify the student
first, the rest of the class is off the hook, and they may
pay less attention.
Page 65
Tell them. Now comes the major content of the presen-
Example
Todays lecture is about the rules for establishing
tation. The body of the lecture may contain a number of

components.
normality in a relational database. When we are
1. Presentation of new information
finished, I expect you to be able to recall the three
2. Elaboration of that information
rules I will talk about, and why they are critical to

maintaining a useful database.
a. Application of that information

b. Examples and non-examples
If the students were assigned a reading, this might be a

good time for a question to get their attention.
Example
If a persons name is found in a relational database
more than once, can it still be normalized?
c. Pictures, visual images, or concrete objects

where possible
Listeners are quickly saturated with new information.
Pictures, examples, and other images help the listener to
encode the new information and make it memorable. Remember Howard Gardners advice, a few things learned
well are more valuable than a lot of information soon
An additional introductory strategy is to review what was
forgotten. In general, learners can maintain somewhere
covered in the last class. This strategy brings to mind
between five and nine ideas in mind at a single time. Aim
material that you plan to build on, and establishes a link
for the lower end of this, and you are more likely to be
among a series of lectures. This too can be done with a
effective than if you try to teach too much. Cluster things
question as well as with a presentation.
you talk about.
Example
I am going to talk about five types of data: text,
integer, floating point, images, and date/time. Can
someone give me an example of text data?
Page 66
An especially valuable opportunity is when students
Listening Skills
provide examples or apply what has been presented. This

gives you an opportunity to determine if what you are
Not all students are good listeners. But it is your responsibil-
saying is being understood. Remember, after 15 minutes
ity to grab their attention and maintain it. Your job is easier
student attention wanes, so have them engage in some
if students come to class prepared for the lecture (which,
form of activity that aids memory of what you just said.
remember, should not be a rehash of the readings, but an

expansion or elaboration of it). To do this, provide them with
strategies for arriving to class better prepared.
Tell them what you told them. Although the lowest

point for student attention is between 20 to 40 minutes
Similar to the steps in delivering a lecture is a series of
into the lecture, attention picks up again from minutes
steps in reading a text, the three S method Scan,
40 to 45. But the drawback is that now you are beginning
Study, and Summarize.
to fatigue. This would be a good time to summarize the

important concepts or information for the day. Go over
the objectives and the resolution. This strategy brings
together the information and helps hold it together.
Involve students in the final five minutes of class, rather
than lecture to them. Studies have shown that students
Scanning establishes an expectation of what the chapter

will cover.
Studying allows the text to present the new information
(with whatever elaboration is presented).
Summarizing reflects on what was read, making
are thinking about leaving, and assimilation of new in-
sense of it. Students who are unfamiliar with this system
formation is at its lowest point. Instead, have students jot
should try it out on a small chunk of reading, rather than
down the most important thing they learned, or a ques-
a whole chapter, until they become comfortable with it. A
tion they would like answered about the days lecture,
prepared listener is a motivated listener, because what is
or have them answer a single question over the lesson
being talked about makes more sense and builds on what
material.
the learner has read.
Page 67
Learners As Lecturers
Example
To teach is to learn twice. Students cannot tell you if they
In a pizza restaurant, a Jamaican man came in to
misunderstand something you may have said. They can tell
order a slice of pie. The man behind the counter was
you they do not understand. The danger is that they heard
an Italian, and had not been in the U.S. very long.
you, yet they have misinterpreted what you said. One way
The Jamaican ordered. The Italian did not catch
to prevent misinterpretation is to have the student become
what he said and asked him to repeat his request as
the lecturer, at least for small parts of the presentation. This
he listened very carefully to the heavy British accent.
method moves you away from the straight lecture and into a
He repeated the Jamaicans order and said, Oh, you
lecture/discussion presentation.
dont speak English very well either. Whereupon
When students present or participate in discussions, it is
the Jamaican replied, I am from Jamaica. I speak
important to recognize them for contributing, and give them
English perfectly.
feedback with regard to their understanding. These are two

different things. Communication is reduced if you embarrass
a student by implying that her question or answer is stupid.
To do so is to build a barrier that is difficult to overcome.
Also, other students in the class will quickly learn that they
too could become the target of ridicule and will hesitate before participating in discussion.

The first words out of our mouths form a first impression that
influences communication. Many students will accommodate
to dialects, and sometimes to less than perfect English, but
it can be a barrier that hinders learning. In these cases, it is a
good idea to use other teaching techniques frequently and to
rely on lecture as little as possible. Or, get help in becoming a
better speaker.
To reduce concerns related to language, speak slower
when lecturing so students can adjust to a different
accent and dialect. Consider writing unfamiliar words
on the chalkboard or displaying on PowerPoint so that
students do not have to struggle with terms.
Acknowledge that you may pronounce words differently
and ask students for their pronunciation.
Avoid misunderstandings by rephrasing a students
question such as I understand you are asking about.
Page 68
Also, save the last few minutes of class to have students

write a summary of the lecture, provide three main
points covered that day, or answer a question related to
the class. This technique can help you check their understanding of the material without adding to their stress.
Keep in mind that many American undergraduate classes
are considered very informal as compared to international classrooms. Use this to your advantage by engaging students in discussions about your topic. Students are
likely to appreciate your willingness to involve them and
will help offset any difficulties with the language.
Reduce students anxiety about understanding what
is important in your course by clarifying expectations
in your syllabus and at the beginning of each class.
Have clear learning outcomes of what you want your
students to know or do and organize your lectures
and assessments around achievable outcomes. Post
your outcomes on the course site so students can
easily review them.
Resource
At FSU, students and faculty can get help from the
Center for Intensive English Studies.
Page 69
Elements of Delivery
How you say something is equally as important as what you say. The three major components of delivery are: vocal elements,
body language and gestures, and in instructional situations, visuals (or artifacts).
Vocal
The basic concept is that you are communicating with each individual in the audience. You have
to speak loudly enough to be heard, clearly enough to be understood, and with enough enthusiasm to maintain attention.
Intonation
Intonation is the range of your voice. Some speakers are monotone, which tends to be boring.
On the other hand, some speakers are too histrionic, which tends to become tiresome, e.g., a Bob
Barker voice. A natural speaking voice with a good range of inflection works best.
Loudness
Too soft and the audience cannot hear you. Too loud and they will not want to. Of the two, too
loud is preferable, but somewhere in the middle is just right.
Rate
Speaking too fast does not give students time to digest what is being said. Too slow puts them to
sleep. Research has shown that students attribute more intelligence to someone who talks at a
more rapid pace; yet, it does not say how much they learn.
Stress
Stress and inflection are related to intonation but they are not the same. Stress is how you emphasize an important point or issue, which can be applied by slowing speech, stopping, spelling
a word out, repeating a phrase. Use stress to highlight important detail, but used too much, it
becomes tiresome.
Pauses
Pauses are used both to stress a point and to allow students time to think and catch up. A pause
can be used to gain attention, for transition to a new event, to give students time to catch up with
an illustration, or to take notes.
Example - You might say, Copy down what is on the board, or Look at Figure 2 on your handout, and then pause so that they can focus their attention on it.
Page 70
Body
Gestures
Two extremes of gesturing are: none and wild. Gestures and movement convey a sense of comfort
with the material. They can be used along with vocal variation to stress the importance of something, or simply to point out an important part of a visual.
Movement
Two extremes of movement are: clutching the podium and pacing the room. Both are distracting
to the communication process. Movement should be a natural flow, from the podium to the board
to the audience. Another consideration is your position in the room. Changing location causes the
students to refocus their attention, and can keep students alert.
Visuals
Chalkboard
Two extremes of chalkboard use are: Too much time spent writing information on the board,
which could have been provided in a handout; and no use of the board, when it would have been
helpful to the learners.
Graphics
The biggest problems with graphics are that they are usually too small to read and contain too
Complexity
much material. Keep graphics simple and large.
Graphics Use
Discuss the graphic in your lecture. A graphic that is not referenced during the lecture is not much
help. The graphic is an elaboration to aid recall of verbal information or propositions.
Types of Visuals
All of your visuals do not have to be PowerPoint slides. The use of real objects can increase attention, particularly if they are passed around the room. Remember to pause, giving students time to
look at them.
The Gestalt
While it is possible to break the presentation or delivery into the above-listed components analytically, the lecture is more than
the sum of its parts. All of these delivery components work together with the content to capture the attention and imagination of
the audience.
Page 71
Improving Your Lecturing

Skills through Microteaching
Microteaching is giving a short lecture, demonstration, or
leading a discussion with your peers. When first suggested,
the idea of teaching in front of ones peers strikes fear in the
Suggestions
Introduce yourself.
Speak so everyone can hear you.
heart. Microteaching, however, is a time proven method of
Tell your audience the objective you hope
learning and practicing ones lecturing skills. After participat-
they will attain.
ing, most instructors come to believe that microteaching is a

superior method for improving their lecture skills.
Your presentation is videotaped, and an evaluator gives you
Avoid standing behind or clutching the

podium during the entire lecture.
feedback on a number of different criteria. There are many
Use visuals where they might help the
different criteria for being a good lecturer, and it is probably
learner understand.
not possible to keep all the criteria in mind at one time.

Put your lecture outline, or points to present,
You can set up a video camera in your class and review the
on a few 3 x 5 cards.
tape in the privacy of your own home to improve areas where

you feel you have weaknesses. Also, it is a wonderful tech-
Have fun!
nique to use with students. Students feel amazing empathy

for instructors when they have experienced the other side of
the podium. Keep in mind:
It is an authentic experience. Pick a skill or information that you feel you can teach someone in 8 to 10
minutes. Write down the objective, so that you can determine later whether the audience thinks your objective
was reached.
Be natural. The purpose of the exercise is to improve
your present teaching skills. If you practice especially for
this presentation, and do it significantly different from
your standard lectures, you will not get the feedback you
need to improve.
Page 72
Lecture Skills Observation Sheet

Needs Improvement
Just Right
Needs Improvement
Changes volume, either increasing or
Speaks too loudly.
Verbal Communication
Speaks too softly.
decreasing, for emphasis or to regain

attention of the audience.
Articulates poorly.
Articulates precisely.
Exaggerates the articulation.
Speaks too slowly.
Speaks at a good pace.
Speaks too rapidly.
Fills pause with vocalizers (e.g., ah, um,
Uses pauses to emphasize
Does not use pauses.
okay, now, you know).
important content.
Does not vary voice pitch; speaks in
Voice replicates the natural rhythms and
Uses repetitive patterns of pitch and
monotone.
pitch changes of conversation.
emphasis (sing-song quality).
Hides behind podium, hand glued to the
Is visible to the students and uses
Is constantly moving, pacing, rocking, or
podium.
gestures when appropriate to reinforce
talking to the chalkboard.
Non-Verbal Communication
the content.
Distracts the audience by looking out
Makes good eye contact with the audi-
Reads directly from notes; makes little
the window, down the hall, etc.
ence; reads body language of
eye contact.
the students.
Uses no visuals, no handouts, or lecture
Uses visuals and handouts that will be
Hands out the complete text of the
support materials.
helpful to the students.
lecture, or reads the text.
Dress is too casual for the audience;
Personal appearance conveys the image
Personal appearance is too formal for
does not reflect professional position.
that teachers should project.
the situation.
Uses outline or visuals for organization;
Reads from text, showing little
speaks without notes.
knowledge or a lack of confidence.
Preparation/ Organization
Seems unprepared, disorganized.
Instructions
Place a check in the box that you feel most accurately provides feedback to the person you are evaluating.
Example
If a person is speaking too slowly and you feel his or her rating should be too slow, then put a check
somewhere in that box.
Page 73
Resources on Lecturing
Books/Articles
Gardner, H. (2000). The disciplined mind: Beyond facts
and standardized tests, the K-12 education that every
child deserves. Penquin Books: New York, NY.
Penner, J. G. (1984). Why many college teachers cannot
lecture: How to avoid communication breakdown in the
classroom. Charles Thomas Publishers.
Page 74

Leadership Communication

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Leadership Communication

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Module 2

To help the peer educator in the

To help the peer educator in

he word communication originates from the word "communis, which means

II How Communication Takes Place

III Types of Communication

ommunication can be categorized into four different types, depending on the

is a type of communication whereby a person

is a type of communication where there is oneto-one interaction or interaction among a small

is a type of communication where interaction

IV Verbal and Non-Verbal Communication

ommunication can be verbal and non-verbal. In verbal communication, we

normal interpersonal communication 5-10 per cent of total communication is verbal

istening is the highest form of communication. When they consider

There are 5 main forms of listening

VII Barriers to Receiving Messages

VIII Seven Steps to Effective Messages

IX Distortions in Effective Communication

ommunication can be blocked or result in undesired impacts. This may

istortions can ruin a communication, especially if you are communicating

10-15 lines of written script on any topic.

Invite the participants to sit in a circle.

Close the exercise by pointing out that in effective communication

To know the difference between seeing and looking.

Notes to the facilitator

How should I Communicate?

A shirt with the front undone.

Invite the participants to sit in a circle.

Now ask the volunteers to stand facing each other.

Whose Perception Counts?

Flip charts, markers, white board or black board, chalk.

4 square sheets of paper.

Ask for 4 volunteers.

You can involve the observers by opening up the conversation once

Left to the discretion of the users.

Ask the participants to divide into 4 groups.

Notes for the Facilitator

HELPLINE for the peer educator

Effective communication is the fundamental building block

It is important to take the time to speak

stopping at the bar or tea house

ple in the street, or even just being seen

going to the bath house or washing point

both useful places for female aid workers

attending public events, such as religious

taking advantage of minor incidents: fixing a

flat tyre or repairing a car, for instance, can

speaking with the driver and with cooks or

stopping by the road and talking with farmers in fields or

Formal communication with communities gives an opportunity for leaders

for humanitarian field workers

Involving crisis-affected people

Tips & Warnings

organised discussions with targeted audiences like

Tips & Warnings

womens groups and children

You can consider using many different

Planning meetings with groups

potential risks to your team and the

In large, formal group sessions

Planning events with the community

Tips & Warnings

for humanitarian field workers

Involving crisis-affected people