CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is a Petition for Disbarment filed by Carmelita I. Zaguirre against Atty. Alfredo Castillo on the ground of
Gross Immoral Conduct.
The facts as borne by the records are as follows:
Complainant and respondent met sometime in 1996 when the two became officemates at the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI).[1] Respondent courted complainant and promised to marry her while representing himself to be single. [2] Soon they had an
intimate relationship that started sometime in 1996 and lasted until 1997. [3] During their affair, respondent was preparing for the bar
examinations which he passed. On May 10, 1997, he was admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar. [4] It was only around the first
week of May 1997 that complainant first learned that respondent was already married when his wife went to her office and confronted
her about her relationship with respondent.[5] On September 10, 1997, respondent, who by now is a lawyer, executed an affidavit,
admitting his relationship with the complainant and recognizing the unborn child she was carrying as his. [6] On December 09, 1997,
complainant gave birth to a baby girl, Aletha Jessa. [7] By this time however, respondent had started to refuse recognizing the child and
giving her any form of support.[8]
Respondent claims that: he never courted the complainant; what transpired between them was nothing but mutual lust and desire;
he never represented himself as single since it was known in the NBI that he was already married and with children; [9] complainant is
almost 10 years older than him and knew beforehand that he is already married; [10] the child borne by complainant is not his, because
the complainant was seeing other men at the time they were having an affair.[11] He admits that he signed the affidavit dated
September 10, 1997 but explains that he only did so to save complainant from embarrassment. Also, he did not know at the time that
complainant was seeing other men.[12]
After due hearing, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Alfredo Castillo guilty of gross immoral conduct and
recommends that he be meted the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxx

xxx

xxx

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Immoral conduct has been defined as:
xxx that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members
of the community. Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.[13]
In his affidavit dated September 10, 1997, duly acknowledged before a notary public, he declared explicitly:
1. That I had a relationship with one Carmelita Zaguirre, my officemate;
2. That as a result of that relationship, she is presently pregnant with my child;
3. That I hereby voluntarily recognize the child now under (sic) her womb to be my own;

4. That I am willing to support the said child henceforth, including his/her personal and medical needs, education, housing, food,
clothing and other necessities for living, which I will give through his/her mother, Carmelita Zaguirre, until he/she becomes of legal
age and capable to live on his/her own;
5. That I undertake to sign the birth certificate as an additional proof that he/she is my child; however, my failure to sign does not
negate the recognition and acknowledgement already done herein;
6. That I am executing this affidavit without compulsion on my part and being a lawyer, I have full knowledge of the consequence of
such acknowledgment and recognition.[14]
More incriminating is his handwritten letter dated March 12, 1998 which states in part:
Ayoko ng umabot tayo sa kung saan-saan pa. All your officemates, e.g., Ate Ging, Glo, Guy and others (say) that I am the look
like(sic) of your daughter.
Heres my bargain. I will help you in supporting your daughter, but I cannot promise fix amount for monthly support of your
daughter. However it shall not be less than P500 but not more than P1,000. [15]
In the recent case of Luguid vs. Judge Camano, Jr., the Court in castigating a judge stated that:
...even as an ordinary lawyer, respondent has to conform to the strict standard of conduct demanded of members of the profession.
Certainly, fathering children by a woman other than his lawful wife fails to meet these standards. [16]
Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the standards of morality required of every lawyer. [17]
Moreover, the attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement recognizing and undertaking to support his child by
Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his part which is highly censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble
profession, tantamount to self-stultification.[18]
This Court has repeatedly held:
as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character
and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and
officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also so behave
himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. [19]
While respondent does not deny having an extra-marital affair with complainant he seeks understanding from the Court, pointing
out that men by nature are polygamous,[20] and that what happened between them was nothing but mutual lust and desire. [21] The
Court is not convinced. In fact, it is appalled at the reprehensible, amoral attitude of the respondent.
Respondent claims that he did not use any deception to win her affection. Granting arguendo that complainant entered into a
relationship with him knowing full well his marital status, still it does not absolve him of gross immorality for what is in question in a
case like this is respondents fitness to be a member of the legal profession. It is not dependent whether or not the other party
knowingly engaged in an immoral relationship with him.
We agree with the IBP that the defense of in pari delicto is not feasible. The Court held in Mortel vs. Aspiras:
In a disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial that the complainant is in pari delicto because this is not a proceeding to grant relief to
the complainant, but one to purge the law profession of unworthy members, to protect the public and the courts. [22]
The illicit relationship with Carmelita took place while respondent was preparing to take the bar examinations. Thus, it cannot be
said that it is unknown to him that an applicant for admission to membership in the bar must show that he is possessed of good moral
character, a requirement which is not dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. [23] This qualification is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain ones good standing in
the profession;[24] it is a continuing requirement to the practice of law[25] and therefore admission to the bar does not preclude a
subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning his mental or moral fitness before he became a
lawyer. This is because his admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable presumption that he has all the qualifications to become a
lawyer.
The Court held:

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess,
the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. We must stress that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during good behavior. He can be deprived of his license for
misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be heard. [26]
and in Dumadag vs. Lumaya:
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the
highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a
member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.[27]
Respondent repeatedly engaged in sexual congress with a woman not his wife and now refuses to recognize and support a child
whom he previously recognized and promised to support. Clearly therefore, respondent violated the standards of morality required of
the legal profession and should be disciplined accordingly.
As consistently held by this Court, disbarment shall not be meted out if a lesser punishment could be given.[28] Records show that
from the time he took his oath in 1997, he has severed his ties with complainant and now lives with his wife and children in Mindoro.
As of now, the Court does not perceive this fact as an indication of respondents effort to mend his ways or that he recognizes the
impact of his offense on the noble profession of law. Nevertheless, the Court deems it more appropriate under the circumstances that
indefinite suspension should be meted out than disbarment. The suspension shall last until such time that respondent is able to show,
to the full satisfaction of the Court, that he had instilled in himself a firm conviction of maintaining moral integrity and uprightness
required of every member of the profession.
The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as
long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. [29]
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent GUILTY of Gross Immoral Conduct and ordered to
suffer INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Castillos personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy thereof
be furnished the IBP and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago and Corona, JJ., on leave.
QUIRINO TOMLIN II, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR N. MOYA II, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On December 1, 2003, Quirino Tomlin II filed a complaint 1 before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Salvador N. Moya II for allegedly reneging on his monetary obligations and for having issued
bouncing checks; thereby violating the Code of Professional Responsibility2 and Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22.3
Complainant averred that respondent borrowed from him P600,000.00 partially covered by seven postdated checks. However, when
complainant tried to encash them on their respective due dates, the checks were all dishonored by the drawee bank, to wit:
Check No.
MOB 1011326
MOB 1011311
MOB 1011328
MOB 1011313
MOB 1011329
MOB 1011314
MOB 1011330

Due Date
May 16, 2001
June 11, 2001
June 17, 2001
August 12, 2001
August 16, 2001
August 19, 2001
September 18, 2001

Amount
P13,500.00
P30,000.00
P5,000.00
P50,000.00
P5,000.00
P50,000.00
P5,000.00

Reason for Dishonor

RTCOCI
RTCOCI
Account Closed
Account Closed
Account Closed
Account Closed
Account Closed

Complainant made several demands, the last being a formal letter 4 sent on September 25, 2002;5 however, respondent still failed and
refused to pay his debt without justifiable reason. Consequently, complainant instituted a case for seven counts of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 against the respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. 6 In addition, he filed the instant case for
respondents disbarment.
On December 1, 2003, respondent was directed to file his answer but instead he filed several motions for extension of time to file a
responsive pleading7 and a motion to dismiss complaint.8
Respondent alleged that the case should be dismissed outright for violation of the rule on non-forum shopping. He argued that
complainant did not inform the IBP about the cases he filed for violations of B.P. Blg. 22 against respondent pending before the
Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.9 Respondent argued that the filing of the administrative case despite the pendency of the
criminal cases is a form of harassment which should not be allowed.
On April 28, 2004, the Commission on Bar Discipline denied 10 the motion to dismiss for being a prohibited pleading under Section 2,
Rule 3 of its Rules of Procedure. Respondents motion for reconsideration 11 was likewise denied on June 16, 2004.12
Thereafter, respondent filed several motions for extension of time to file an answer. 13 His last motion for extension was however
denied for lack of merit. Consequently, the Commission on Bar Discipline declared him in default. 14
Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation with motion to terminate proceedings on the ground of prescription 15and omnibus motion
to recall the default order.16
On January 3, 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline required the parties to submit their respective verified position papers after
which the case shall be considered submitted for resolution. 17
Only the complainant submitted his position paper.18
In the Report and Recommendation dated March 31, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner noted that respondent failed to file an
answer and/or position paper despite several requests for extension, in disregard of the orders of the IBP. Moreover, it was observed
that the pending criminal action against respondent does not pose a prejudicial question to the resolution of the issues in the present
administrative case. Hence, it was recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
On October 22, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report of the Investigating Commissioner, but modified
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law from one year to two years.
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only
legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so doing, the peoples faith and
confidence in the judicial system is ensured.19 Lawyers may be disciplined whether in their professional or in their private capacity
for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor. 20 Any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his profession
or private capacity is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment because good character is an essential
qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for the continuance of such privilege. 21
In the present case, respondent admitted his monetary obligations to the complainant but offered no justifiable reason for his continued
refusal to pay. Complainant made several demands, both verbal and written, but respondent just ignored them and even made himself
scarce. Although he acknowledged his financial obligations to the complainant, respondent never offered nor made arrangements to
pay his debt. On the contrary, he refused to recognize any wrongdoing nor shown remorse for issuing worthless checks, an act
constituting gross misconduct.22Respondent must be reminded that it is his duty as a lawyer to faithfully perform at all times his duties
to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. As part of his duties, he must promptly pay his financial obligations.23
The contention that complainant violated the rule against forum shopping with the filing of this administrative complaint is bereft of
merit. There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than
by appeal or certiorari) in another24 or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.25 Forum shopping applies only to judicial cases or
proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings.26 Moreover, Criminal Case Nos. 6-367-03 to 6-373-03 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 refer
to the respondents act of making or drawing and issuance of worthless checks; while the present administrative case seeks to
discipline respondent as a lawyer for his dishonest act of failing to pay his debt in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.lavvph!1.net

Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are
distinct from and they may proceed independently of criminal cases. The burden of proof in a criminal case is guilt beyond reasonable
doubt while in an administrative case, only preponderance of evidence is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a
prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings. 27
Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted
upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless from applying the rules on admission to and continuing membership in the legal
profession during the whole period that the criminal case is pending final disposition when the objectives of the two proceedings are
vastly disparate.28
Finally, we note that respondent failed to file his answer and verified position paper despite several opportunities given him by the
IBP, that is, from the time he received on December 20, 2003 29 the Order30 of the IBP requiring him to file an answer until March 31,
2005 when the Investigating Commissioner submitted the Report and Recommendation. Instead, he filed several motions for
extension of time, motion to dismiss the complaint, motion for reconsideration, manifestation with motion to terminate proceedings,
and omnibus motion to recall the default order. Until the end, respondent offered no plausible explanation for his failure to pay his
debts. Instead, he kept on insisting, on plainly unmeritorious grounds, the dismissal of the complaint. Verily, respondents failure to
comply with the orders of the IBP without justifiable reason manifests his disrespect of judicial authorities. 31 Respondent should be
reminded that the IBP has disciplinary authority over him by virtue of his membership therein.32
In view of the foregoing, we find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years as recommended by the IBP
commensurate under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Salvador N. Moya II is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two years, effective immediately, with a warning that any
further infraction by him shall be dealt with most severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to all courts as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Asscociate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Asscociate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Asscociate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES
Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Asscociate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Asscociate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Asscociate Justice

JOHN SIY LIM, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CARMELITO A. MONTANO, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Atty. Carmelito A. Montano stands charged with gross misconduct relative to his filing of Civil Case No. C-19928 entitled Spouses
Tomas See Tuazon and Natividad See Deecho v. John Siy Lim and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City. 1
It appears that complainant John Siy Lim was the defendant in Civil Case No. C-14542 for reformation of contract, quieting of title,
with damages, then pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 131.2The subject of the dispute was a
650-square meter conjugal lot along A. del Mundo Street, 7th Avenue, Caloocan City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 860. After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of defendant (complainant herein), and declared that the deed of sale the parties executed
on July 15, 1987 was an absolute and unconditional conveyance of subject property by the plaintiff in favor of such defendant. On
motion for reconsideration, however, the trial court reversed itself and declared that the sale was in fact an equitable mortgage. It thus
ordered the cancellation of TCT No. 152621 and the reinstatement of the previous title on the subject property.
The complainant appealed the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 40167. In its Decision dated March 31,
1995, the appellate court reversed the ruling of the RTC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Order dated November 16, 1992, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the original Decision of
the trial court, dated December 2, 1991, hereby REINSTATED, with the modification that plaintiff-appellee is ordered to pay
defendant-appellant the sum of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos a month as reasonable rental for the use and occupation of
Apartment No. 161 from July 15, 1988 until the premises shall have been vacated and possession thereof peacefully turned over to
defendant-appellant.
The counterclaim for attorneys fees of defendant-appellant is DENIED. There is no clear showing that the action taken by plaintiffappellee was done in bad faith. There should be no penalty on the right to litigate. 3
The aggrieved party elevated the matter to this Court, and the petition was docketed as G.R. No. 119794. On October 3, 2000, the
Court affirmed the ruling of the CA and denied the petition.4 Entry of judgment was made of record on October 3, 2000. 5
On January 4, 2002, respondent filed a Notice of Appearance 6 as counsel of Tomas See Tuazon (the losing party) in the RTC of
Caloocan City, Branch 131 in Civil Case No. C-14542. On January 7, 2002, he filed, in behalf of his client, a "Motion to Comply to
[sic] Decision without Writ,"7 worded as follows:
1. Plaintiff is aware that pursuant to the decision of the court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, the
decision on the present case had already become final and executory.
2. In order to avoid undue inconvenience on the part of herein defendant, plaintiff shall voluntarily settle the money judgment
as stated in the decision sought to be enforced.
3. The plaintiff will be filing Eight Hundred Ten Thousand (P810,000.00) Pesos, equivalent to 162 months of rent as per
decision and the same to be covered by supersedeas bond issued by a reliable insurance company to answer for said
obligation.
4. Every month starting February 15, 2002, plaintiff shall deposit to the court the amount of P5,000.00 as monthly rent.8
On the same date, respondent, in behalf of his clients (the spouses Tomas See Tuazon) filed the Complaint 9 for nullity of TCT and
other documents, reconveyance, maintenance of physical possession before the RTC of Caloocan City, eventually raffled to Branch
121 thereof (Civil Case No. C-19928).

Meantime, on February 19, 2002, Judge Luisito C. Sardillo of Branch 126 10 issued an Order11 in Civil Case No. C-14542 granting the
Motion for Execution with Manifestation earlier filed by the prevailing party (complainant herein), and denying for lack of merit, the
"Motion to Comply to [sic] Decision without Writ" filed by respondent counsel.
This prompted the complainant to file the instant complaint for disbarment against respondent. In his Complaint-Affidavit12 dated
March 20, 2002, complainant alleged that respondent filed the complaint in Civil Case No. C-19928 out of malice, pointing out that it
involves "the same parties, the same causes of action and relief prayed for as that of Civil Case No. C-14542." Thus, the complainant
prayed that the respondent be "disbarred and/or suspended from the practice of law for his gross misconduct," on the following
allegation:
6. Evidently, I have been subjected to harassment by the antics of the respondent in filing a recycled case docketed as Civil Case No.
C-19928 on January 07, 2002. Respondent is guilty in abetting the conduct of his clients, Sps. Tuazon. He has clearly violated his
lawyers oath not to promote or sue groundless, false or unlawful suits among others. Instead of counseling his clients to abide and
obey the decision of our Supreme Court, the final arbiter of all controversies and disputes, he is showing disrespect to a final and
executory decision of our court.13
In his Comment,14 respondent denied the allegations against him. While he admitted that he filed Civil Case No. C-19928 as counsel
for the plaintiff therein, he claimed that it was not filed with malicious intent. Moreover, while the new case involved the same party,
it was for a different cause of action and relief, and, as such, the principle of res judicata did not apply. He further explained that the
complaint in Civil Case No. C-14542 was for declaratory relief or reformation of instrument, while Civil Case No. 19928 was for
annulment of title. He accepted the case based on "his professional appreciation that his client had a good case."
In his Reply,15 the complainant stressed that the respondent was guilty of forum shopping; Civil Case No. C-19928 was nothing but a
revival of the old complaint; and "the lame excuse of the respondent that the present case is an action in rem while the other case is an
action in personam" did not merit consideration.
On November 25, 2002, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.16
On September 1, 2003, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline assigned the case to Commissioner Salvador L. Pea. Only the counsel
for the respondent appeared at the mandatory conference held on September 30, 2003. Finding that there were no factual issues in the
case, Commissioner Pea terminated the mandatory conference and ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position
Papers, and, thereafter, considered the case submitted for resolution.
The case was re-assigned to Commissioner Doroteo B. Aguila who submitted his Report and Recommendation dated May 9, 2005,
finding the respondent guilty of misconduct. It was recommended that respondent be meted a two months suspension from the
practice of law.
According to the Investigating Commissioner, the elements of res judicata are present in this case as to bar the filing of Civil Case No.
C-19928 since (a) the judgment in Civil Case No. C-14542, upholding the validity of the absolute deed of sale, had attained finality;
(b) the court which rendered the decision had the required jurisdiction; and (c) the disposition of the case was a judgment on the
merits.
On October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued Resolution No. XVII-2005-108,
adopting said Report and Recommendation with the modification that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6)
months.
We agree that respondent is administratively liable.lavvph!1.net
In this case, it is clear that respondent is guilty of forum shopping. By his own admission, he was aware that Civil Case No. C-14542
was already final and executory when he filed the second case (Civil Case No. C-19928). His allegation that he "was not the original
counsel of his clients" and that "when he filed the subsequent case for nullity of TCT, his motive was to protect the rights of his clients
whom he believed were not properly addressed in the prior case for reformation and quieting of title," deserves scant consideration. As
a responsible member of the bar, he should have explained the effect of such final and executory decision on his clients rights, instead
of encouraging them to file another case involving the same property and asserting the same rights.
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in
one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the
same cause to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision. An important factor in determining its existence is the vexation

caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs. 17 Forum shopping
exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
another.18 Thus, the following requisites should concur:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. x x
x19
The fact that the parties in the first and second cases are not identical will not prevent the application of the principle of res judicata.
Mere substantial identity of parties, or a community of interests between a party in the first case and a party in the subsequent case,
even if the latter was not impleaded in the first case, is sufficient. 20 Moreover, a party cannot, by varying the form of action or
adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not
be twice litigated between the same parties or their privies. 21 This was what respondent resorted to in order to give some semblance of
merit to the complaint for annulment of title. He should have realized that the ruling of the Court in Tuazon v. Court of
Appeals22effectively determined with finality the rights and obligations of the parties under the questioned deed of sale.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. 23The filing of multiple
petitions constitutes abuse of the Courts processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the
administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to state, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious
petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for
incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts,
and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor. 24
The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice. By his actuations, respondent also violated Rule 12.0225 and Rule 12.0426 of the Code, as well
as a lawyers mandate "to delay no man for money or malice." 27
Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to
delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes such lawyers duty. Indeed, the Court has time and again warned
not to resort to forum shopping for this practice clogs the court dockets. 28
While we rule that the respondent should be sanctioned for his actions, we also note that the power to disbar should be exercised with
great caution, to be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish the
end desired.29
WHEREFORE, for violating Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Carmelito A. Montano is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. He is STERNLY WARNED that any future violation of his
duties as a lawyer will be dealt with more severely. This Decision is immediately executory. Atty. Montano is DIRECTED to inform
the Court of the date of receipt of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Asscociate Justice

On leave*
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY,
ARQUILLO, respondent.

INC.,

and

BEN

A.

NICOLAS, complainants,

vs.

Atty.

MACARIO

D.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Representing conflicting interests is prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility. Unless all the affected clients
written consent is given after a full disclosure of all relevant facts, attorneys guilty of representing conflicting interests shall as a rule
be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law.

The Case and the Facts

This administrative case stems from a sworn Letter-Complaint[1] filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Ben A. Nicolas, acting for himself and on behalf of Northwestern University, Inc. In that LetterComplaint, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo was charged with deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and/or violation of his oath as attorney
by representing conflicting interests. The material averments of the Complaint are summarized by the IBP-CBD as follows:
Herein [c]omplainants, Northwestern University, Inc. and Mr. Ben A. Nicolas, accuses (sic) herein [r]espondent, Atty. Macario D.
Arquillo, of engaging in conflicting interest in a case before the National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch
No. 1, San Fernando, La Union.
Complainant alleges that in a consolidated case, herein [r]espondent appeared and acted as counsels for both complainants (eight out
of the eighteen complainants therein) and respondent (one out of the ten respondents therein).
In a consolidation of NLRC Cases [Nos.] 1-05-1086-97, 1-05-1087-97, 1-05-1088-97, 1-05-1091-97, 1-05-1092-97, 1-05-1097-97,
1-05-1109-97, 1-05-1096-97 (consolidated cases), herein [r]espondent appeared as counsel for complainants therein, Teresita A.
Velasco, Gervacio A. Velasco, Mariel S. Hernando, Virginio C. Rasos, Bonifacio S. Blas, Ronald A. Daoang, Luzviminda T. Urcio
and Araceli Quimoyog. In the very same consolidated case, [r]espondent was also the counsel of one of the respondents therein,
Jose G. Castro.
Complainants, as their evidence, submitted the Motion to Dismiss dated August 12, 1997 filed by Jose G. Castro, represented by his
counsel, herein [r]espondent filed before the NLRC of San Fernando, La Union. Sixteen (16) days later or on August 28, 1997,
[r]espondent filed a Complainants Consolidated Position Paper, this time representing some of the complainants in the very same
consolidated case.[2] (Citations omitted)
Respondent failed to file his Answer to the Complaint despite a June 24 1998 Order [3] of the IBP-CBD directing him to do
so. Even after receiving five notices, he failed to appear in any of the scheduled hearings. Consequently, he was deemed to have
waived his right to participate in the proceedings. Thereafter, the complainants were ordered to submit their verified position paper
with supporting documents, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for decision.[4] In their Manifestation[5] dated August 30,
2004, they said that they would no longer file a position paper. They agreed to submit the case for decision on the basis of their
Letter-Affidavit dated March 16, 1998, together with all the accompanying documents.

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In his Report,[6] Commissioner Dennis B. Funa found respondent guilty of violating the conflict-of-interests rule under the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the former recommended the latters suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-415 dated October 7, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Funa, with the modification that the period of suspension was increased to two (2) years.

On December 12, 2004, the Resolution and the records of the case were transmitted to this Court for final action, pursuant to
Section 12(b) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. On January 20, 2005, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration to set aside
Resolution No. XVI-2004-415. The IBP denied the Motion.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings of the IBP Board of Governors, but reduce the recommended period of suspension to one year.

Administrative Liability of Respondent

The Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all their dealings and
transactions with their clients.[7] Corollary to this duty, lawyers shall not represent conflicting interests, except with all the concerned
clients written consent, given after a full disclosure of the facts.[8]
When a lawyer represents two or more opposing parties, there is a conflict of interests, the existence of which is determined by
three separate tests: (1) when, in representation of one client, a lawyer is required to fight for an issue or claim, but is also duty-bound
to oppose it for another client; (2) when the acceptance of the new retainer will require an attorney to perform an act that may
injuriously affect the first client or, when called upon in a new relation, to use against the first one any knowledge acquired through
their professional connection; or (3) when the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of an attorneys duty to
give undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or would invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance of
that duty.[9]
In the present case, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo, as counsel for Respondent Jose C. Castro in NLRC Case Nos. I-05-1083-97 to I05-1109-97, filed a Motion to Dismiss those cases. Shortly thereafter, a position paper was filed by Atty. Arquillo as counsel for
several complainants in consolidated NLRC Case Nos. I-05-1087-97, I-05-1088-97, I-05-1091-97, I-05-1092-97, I-05-1096-97, I-051097-97, and I-05-1109-97. All the cases in the second set were included in the first one, for which he had filed the subject Motion to
Dismiss. Furthermore, in his position paper for the complainants, Atty. Arquillo protected his other client, Respondent Jose C. Castro,
in these words:
3.
More than lack of valid cause for the dismissal of complainants, respondents, except Atty. Jose C. Castro and Atty. Ernesto
B. Asuncion, should be made accountable for not according complainants their right to due process. [10]
In his two-page Motion for Reconsideration, Atty. Arquillo claims that there was no conflict of interest in his representation of
both the respondent and the complainants in the same consolidated cases, because all of them were allegedly on the same
side. Attaching to the Motion the Decision of Labor Arbiter Norma C. Olegario on the consolidated NLRC cases, Atty. Arquillo
theorizes that her judgment absolved Castro of personal liability for the illegal dismissal of the complainants; this fact allegedly
showed that there was no conflict in the interests of all the parties concerned.
This Court does not agree. Atty. Arquillos acts cannot be justified by the fact that, in the end, Castro was proven to be not
personally liable for the claims of the dismissed employees. Having agreed to represent one of the opposing parties first, the lawyer
should have known that there was an obvious conflict of interests, regardless of his alleged belief that they were all on the same
side. It cannot be denied that the dismissed employees were the complainants in the same cases in which Castro was one of the
respondents. Indeed, Commissioner Funa correctly enounced:
As counsel for complainants, [r]espondent had the duty to oppose the Motion to Dismiss filed by Jose G. Castro. But under the
circumstance, it would be impossible since [r]espondent is also the counsel of Jose G. Castro. And it appears that it was [r]espondent
who prepared the Motion to Dismiss, which he should be opposing [a]s counsel of Jose G. Castro, Respondent had the duty to prove
the Complaint wrong. But Respondent cannot do this because he is the counsel for the complainants. Here lies the
inconsistency. The inconsistency of interests is very clear.
Thus it has been noted
The attorney in that situation will not be able to pursue, with vigor and zeal, the clients claim against the other and to properly
represent the latter in the unrelated action, or, if he can do so, he cannot avoid being suspected by the defeated client of disloyalty or
partiality in favor of the successful client. The foregoing considerations will strongly tend to deprive the relation of attorney and
client of those special elements which make it one of trust and confidence[.] (Legal Ethics, Agpalo, p. 230, 4th ed.; In re De la Rosa,
21 Phil. 258)[11]

An attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is a hornbook doctrine grounded on public policy that a lawyers
representation of both sides of an issue is highly improper. The proscription applies when the conflicting interests arise with respect to
the same general matter, however slight such conflict may be. It applies even when the attorney acts from honest intentions or in good
faith.[12]
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years. Considering,
however, prior rulings in cases also involving attorneys representing conflicting interests, we reduce the suspension to one (1) year. [13]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Macario D. Arquillo is found GUILTY of misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with a warning that a similar infraction shall be dealt with
more severely in the future.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,
Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ.,concur.
Corona, J., on official leave.
EPIFANIA Q. BANTOLO,
Adm. Case No. 6589
Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, J.,
Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
ATTY. EGMEDIO B. CASTILLON, JR.,
Respondent.
- versus -

Promulgated:
December 19, 2005
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

In a letter-complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dated 02 October 1997, [1] Epifania Q. Bantolo charged Atty.
Egmedio B. Castillon, Sr. of violating the lawyers oath and Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for having (i) wittingly or
willingly performed, promoted, or sued any groundless, false or unlawful suit, and or giving aid or consent to the same; (ii) delayed
the just execution of the suit without legal or justifiable cause and employing illegal means and unlawful force to do so; (iii) blatantly
showed disrespect to the Regional Trial Court by disobeying its lawful orders; and (iv) for employing unlawful and illegal means to
attain his ends.

According to complainant, respondent is the lawyer and one of the defendants in a case involving a parcel of land in Valderrama,
Antique.[2] The case was decided in favor of the complainant and her co-plaintiffs, and thereafter, a writ of execution was issued, by
virtue of which, defendants were ejected from the property. However, respondents, with his co-defendants subsequently entered the
disputed property and harvested the palay planted therein.[3] Plaintiffs were prompted to move for defendants to be declared in
contempt of court because of their open defiance and willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the court, which were abetted by the
acts of Atty. Egmedio Castillon who is an officer of the court. [4] On 25 January 1991, the trial court declared Atty. Castillon and his
co-defendants guilty of indirect contempt of court, with the penalty of one month imprisonment and fine. [5] Subsequently, on 26 July

1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, with the modification that instead of imprisonment, defendants
were ordered to pay a fine of P1,000.00 each. [6]

In his Answer to Complaint dated 02 March 1998, respondent denied complainants allegations and claimed that said complaint
was a form of harassment.[7] Hearings were thereafter scheduled but were cancelled and reset due to the unavailability of the
complainant. Finally, on 09 December 1998, a hearing for the reception of complainants evidence was conducted.[8] While notices
were subsequently sent to respondent setting the case for reception of his evidence, no such hearing pushed through due to
respondents failure to inform the IBP of his new office address. Thus, respondent was deemed to have waived his right to present
evidence.[9]

In the Report and Recommendation (Report) dated 17 March 2004, the investigating commissioner, Atty. Rafael Antonio M.
Santos, found that complainant failed to prove that respondents actions, with respect to his unsuccessful defense of the case were not
within the bounds of the law. Moreover, that respondent lost his case in the trial court does not necessarily support the charge of
willingly promoting or ruing any groundless, false or unlawful suit or giving aid, or consenting to the same, [10] he added. Thus,
according to the IBP, the only remaining issue to be resolved is respondents liability, if any, for his contumacious acts, as found by
the trial court and the Court of Appeals.[11]

Recognizing that the findings of the trial court and the appellate court with respect to respondents contumacious acts as final
and conclusive, it was found that respondent committed an act which constitutes a breach of his sworn promise to obey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities. Furthermore, the Report noted respondents attempts to thwart the instant
disbarment proceedings, to wit: i) attempt to mislead the Commission on Bar Discipline by representing that the proceedings relative
to the contempt charges against him are still pending when in fact they had already been terminated; ii) placing too much emphasis on
the alleged lack of personality of the complainant to file the disbarment complaint; and iii) failure to notify the Commission of his
change of address.[12]

Finding however, that the penalty of disbarment would be reasonable under the circumstances, the Commission recommended
instead the penalty of suspension for one month.[13] As explained in the Report:
A close examination of the facts of this case reveals that the basis of the act for which the court found to be
contumacious is a claim of ownership over the subject property, and thus arose from an emotional attachment to the
property which they had possessed prior to their dispossession as a consequence of the decision in Civil Case No.
1345. Respondents subsequent acts, however, including those which were found to be contumacious, as well as his
actuations in the instant case, merit disciplinary sanctions, for which is recommended that respondent be suspended
for one (1) month.[14]

On 30 July 2004, the IBP

passed a resolution adopting the Report and Recommendation, to wit:

RESOLUTION NO, XVI-2004-376

CBD Case No. 510
Epifania Q. Bantolo vs.
Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution

as Annex A; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering that respondent has been found by both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals guilty
of indirect contempt for disobeying the writ of execution and for attempting to mislead the Commission into
believing that the contempt charge is still pending by submitting an Order of the trial court which pertains to a
second contempt charge, Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon, Sr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) month.

The findings and recommendation of the IBP are well-taken.

Lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes, and this deference is underscored by the fact that willful
disregard thereof may subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. [15] Such is the
situation in the instant case. We need not delve into the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the contempt
case against respondents. Suffice it to say that respondent lawyers commission of the contumacious acts have been shown and
proven, and eventually punished by the lower courts.

A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. Thus, while he owes his entire devotion to the interest and causes of
his client he must ensure that he acts within the bounds of reason and common sense, always aware that he is an instrument of truth
and justice. More importantly, as an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of administering justice,
graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts[16] and to show respect to its
processes. Thus, any act on his part which tends visibly to obstruct, pervert or impede and degrade the administration of justice
constitutes professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him. [17]

Respondents defiance of the writ of execution is a brazen display of disrespect of the very system which he has sworn to
support. Likewise, his various attempts to delay and address issues inconsequential to the disbarment proceedings had necessarily
caused delay, and even threatened to obstruct the investigation being conducted by the IBP.

Nevertheless, the supreme penalty of disbarment is not proper in the instant case. The rule is that disbarment is meted out
only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While the
Court will not hesitate to remove an erring lawyer from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers when the evidence calls for it, it will also
not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.[18] In the case of respondent, the Court finds that a
months suspension from the practice of law will provide him with enough time to purge himself of his misconduct and will give him
the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the virtuous path of the legal profession.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Egmedio B. Castillon is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) month with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely. Respondents suspension is effective upon notice of this decision. Let notice of this decision be spread in respondents
record as an attorney in this Court, and notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
ATTY. MARTIN T. SUELTO, petitioner, vs. NELSON A. SISON, EMIL A. SISON, FRANKLIN A. SISON and SANTOS
LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
From the decision of the Court of Appeals[1] reversing that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City [2] which adjudged
herein respondents brothers Nelson, Emil and Franklin, all surnamed Sison, to pay herein petitioner Atty. Martin T. Suelto the sum
of P100,000.00 for and as notarial fees for services the latter has rendered, as well as actual litigation costs in the form of filing and
docket fees,[3] petitioner lodged the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Before January 15, 1994, respondents Sison brothers started negotiating for the sale of their three (3) parcels of land to their
herein co-respondent Santos Land Development Corporation (the corporation).
In the series of negotiations, Atty. Danilo A. Basa, one of two[4] retained counsel of the corporation,[5] was present in order to
incorporate whatever the parties agreed upon in the draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) [6] and the Deed of Absolute Sale
they were going to forge.
A Road Right-of-Way Agreement[7] between the Heirs of Bernardo D. Carpio and the Sisons reading:
xxx
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the persons composing the FIRST PARTY are the surviving heirs and successors-in-interest of the late BERNARDO D.
CARPIO, the late husband of SOL T. CARPIO, one of the signatories herein, and the father of the rest of the signatories to this
agreement;
WHEREAS, the late BERNARDO D. CARPIO, on the one hand, and C. A. SISON ENTERPRISES, INC. & CONCORDIA A.
SISON, on the other hand, executed a document called Road Right-of-Way Agreement dated May 29, 1984, consisting of three

(3) pages and entered in the Notarial Registry of Notary Public Renato B. Pagatpatan of Davao City as Doc. No. 78; Page No. 16;
Book No. 21; Series of 1984;
WHEREAS, the parties composing the SECOND PARTY are the successors-in-interests of C.A. SISON ENTERPRISES, INC. and
Concordia A. Sison;
WHEREAS, the parties herein have agreed to go on with and fulfill the aforesaid Road Right-of-Way Agreement;
NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing, the parties herein have agreed, as follows:
1.
That by this agreement, the rights and obligation of the late Bernardo D. Carpio under the aforesaid Road Right-of-Way
Agreement are deemed to have been transmitted to the FIRST PARTY[while] those rights and obligations under the same Road
Right-of-Way Agreement pertaining to C. A. SISON ENTERPRISES, INC. and Concordia A. Sison are deemed to have been
transmitted to the SECOND PARTY. A copy of the aforesaid Road Right-of-Way Agreement is attached to this agreement as
Annex A to form an integral part thereof; shall (sic)
2.
That the parties have the right to assign, transfer, or in any other way, transmit their rights and obligations under this agreement
and the aforesaid Road Right-of-Way Agreement Annex A hereof, to any party or parties provided that the party making such
assignment, or transfer shall give notice to the other;
3.
That the two (2) year period mentioned in paragraph 1 found on page 1 of the Road Right-of-Way Agreement Annex A
hereof shall be reckoned from ___________ (sic), 1994.
x x x[8] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
was in the meantime prepared and signed by the parties. It was notarized by the Sisons counsel Atty. Arturo V. Agudo on January
10, 1994.
On January 15, 1994, the parties agreed to conclude and sign the MOA prepared by Atty. Basa whereon the Sisons had in fact
affixed their signatures.[9] The parties met at the office of the corporation.
Since Atty. Basa was at the time out of the country, the corporation asked its other retained counsel, herein petitioner, to give the
MOA a final look.
On perusing the MOA prepared by Atty. Basa, petitioner inputed therein the names of the respective spouses of the Sisons. And
to paragraph 5(h) of the MOA which reads:
(h) That the FIRST PARTY shall within thirty (30) days from date of execution of this document undertake the delineation of the
Road Right of Way Agreement as stipulated in the Road Right of Way Agreement dated May 29, 1984 between Bernardo Carpio and
C.A. Sison Enterprises, Inc. and Concordia A. Sison. [10] (Underscoring supplied),
petitioner added a second sentence reading:
The delineation shall include the technical description of the exact location of the Road Right of Way which should be incorporated in
an affidavit of confirmation thereof to be executed by the parties therein and/or their duly authorized representatives and which should
be accordingly registered in the involved certificates o[f] title in the office of the Register of Deeds by and at the expense of the FIRST
PARTY.
x x x[11] (Underscoring supplied).
Aside from incorporating to the MOA the above-stated amendments, petitioner prepared a Joint Affidavit of Clarification and
Confirmation (Joint Affidavit),[12] in conformity with the immediately-quoted second sentence he introduced to paragraph 5(h) of the
MOA, executed by Sol T. Carpio as representative of Bernardo D. Carpio, and Nelson A. Sison as representative of the Sisons,
reading:
WE, SOL T. CARPIO, of legal age, widow, Filipino and a resident of Davao City, Philippines, and NELSON A. SISON, of legal age,
Filipino, married and a resident of Davao City, Philippines, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law hereby depose and
say that:

That we are both representatives of the parties to that ROAD RIGHT OF WAY AGREEMENT dated May 29, 1984 by and between
Bernardo Carpio and C.A. Sison Enterprises, Inc., and Concordia A. Sison; Sol T. Carpio being the widow of Bernardo Carpio and the
attorney-in-fact of her children who are her co-heirs of said decedent (Bernardo Carpio) while Nelson A. Sison is duly authorized
representative of C.A. Sison Enterprises, Inc., and Concordia A. Sison, as well as the registered owner himself of one of the parcels of
land involved in the aforementioned Road Right of Way Agreement;
That while the specific location and technical description of the area agreed by the parties have already been determined and in
fact actually established on the ground, the same was not properly indicated or annotated in the Certificates of Title thereof, hence,
the need of this affidavit for that purpose, and thus be duly annotated.
That the aforementioned area subject-matter of the aforementioned Road Right of Way Agreement, as now established, has the
following Technical Description, to wit:
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
A pertinent provision in the MOA prepared by Atty. Basa, which was retained in the final MOA, called for the retention by the
corporation of 10% of the total purchase price for the following purpose: [13]
(3) x x x
(b) . . . Provided, further, that the [CORPORATION] shall withhold an amount equivalent to TEN PERCENT (10%) of the total
purchase price to defray expenses for taxes, notarial and attorneys fees and other fees and charges and incidental expenses relative
to the sale of the parcels of land and the improvements thereof and to carry out the transfer thereof to the [CORPORATION].
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
There was, however, no agreement on the amount of notarial fees to be paid or taken from the 10% retained amount.[14]
On January 15, 1994, the Sisons and the corporation affixed their signatures on the MOA, as finalized by petitioner who
notarized it on even date.
The Sisons and the corporation subsequently executed three Deeds of Absolute Sale dated February 11, 1994 covering the 3
Sison properties[15] in favor of the corporation. The deeds of sale were notarized by the Sisons counsel Atty. Agudo.
On February 3, 1994, the corporation received from petitioner a Statement of Account[16] dated January 15, 1994 addressed to it,
for the account of Nelson A. Sison, Emil A. Sison and Franklin A. Sison, wherein petitioner made the following billing:
Legal fees for preparation and notarization of Memorandum of Agreement dated January 15, 1994 between Santos Land
Development Corporation and Nelson A. Sison, Emil A. Sison and Franklin A. Sison recorded as Doc. No. 06; Page No. 03, Book No.
XVI, Series of 1994 at the minimum rate of one and one-half per cent (1) of the consideration of P40,274,870.00; for
final preparation of the Deeds of Absolute Sale per stipulations therein but was notarized by another lawyer after signing thereof . .
.
P604,123.05
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
On February 7, 1994, Mrs. Sol T. Carpio and Nelson Sison signed the Joint Affidavit [17] prepared and notarized on even date by
petitioner.
It appears that petitioner sent a letter dated February 18, 1994 to the Sisons stating his fees and charges in connection with the
preparation of documents on the sale. For by letter of February 21, 1994, [18] the Sisons wrote petitioner the following:
We received your letter dated February 18, 1994, stating your fees and charges regarding the preparation of documents of the Deed
of Sale of our land to Santos Land. The families of Franklin, Emil and Nelson would like to make it clear to you that it is
our understanding with the Santos Land particularly with Mrs. Nelia Partoza (President of Santos Land) that all
documents regarding the sale of the lands to be sold will be prepared by the Sison family with their chosen lawyer/adviser which
is not you.
We made this clear to them because our family is also in the subdivision business and the preparation of the Deed of Sale and other
pertinent papers regarding its transfer to the buyers is just an ordinary thing to us and to our lawyer.

You have never been hired by us or asked your help in any matter dealing with the sale of our land to Santos Land in all our talk to
Santos Land you are always the adviser of Santos Land and not on our side. We have our own legal adviser so you have no right to
charge us with any legal fees whatsoever.
In the making of the memorandum agreement between Santos Land and Sison family, it has been our understanding with Mrs. Nelia
Partoza that they will shoulder all expenses regarding its being finalized.
We hope that this letter will clarify everything regarding the matter of fees. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
A copy of the Sisons February 21, 1994 letter was received on February 26, 1994 [19] by the corporation.
In the meantime, the Sisons requested from the corporation through its President, Nelia D. Partoza, the remittance to them of the
balance of the 10% of the purchase price retained pursuant to the earlier-quoted paragraph 3(b) of the MOA. Partoza complied with
the request, drawing the Sisons to send her a letter of April 28, 1994 [20] reading:
We thank you very much for releasing the checks covering the balance of the 10 percent retention.
We have transferred and given to you the title of the lands which you bought from us and all legal fees, taxes and incidental expenses
have already been covered by us.
As to the case of your legal adviser and retainer Atty. Martin Suelto, please refer to the letter which we wrote to him and of which you
have been copy furnished.
Enclosed herewith is the copy of the letter which we sent to him for your perusal. (Underscoring supplied).
The April 28, 1994 letter of the Sisons was received by the corporation on April 29, 1994. [21] The records do not show that this letter
drew any comment or response from the corporation.
As petitioner failed to collect his fees in connection with his finalization and notarization of the MOA and preparation and
notarization of the Joint Affidavit of Clarification and Confirmation, he filed on August 24, 1994 a complaint before the RTC of
Davao City for Collection of Sum of Money and Attorneys Fees [22] against the Sisons alleging, inter alia, that:
xxx
4.
Plaintiff prepared and notarized a MEMORAN-DUM OF AGREEMENT dated January 15, 1994 between Santos Land
Development Corporation and defendants Emil A. Sison, Franklin A. Sison, and Nelson A. Sison, the latter in his personal capacity
and as the attorney-in-fact for Franklin A. Sison, concerning the sale of certain parcels of land, recorded in his Notarial Register as
Doc. No. 06; Page No. 03; Book No. XVI, Series of 1994, copy hereto attached and made integral part hereof as Annex A.
5.

Paragraph 3 (b) of the aforementioned Memorandum of Agreement, provides:

xxxx

3.
That the total price of FORTY MILLION TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
SEVENTY (P40,274,870.00) PESOS shall be payable in accordance with the following manner:
(a) x x x x
(b) That the balance of THIRTY FOUR MILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTY NINE PESOS & 50/100 (P34,233,639.50) shall be
payable in three (3) years computed five months after the date of execution of this
Memorandum of Agreement. Provided, that payments herein shall be payable in equal
quarterly installments covered by postdated checks of the SECOND PARTY. Provided,
further, that the SECOND PARTY shall withhold an amount equivalent to TEN PERCENT
(10%) of the total purchase price to defray expenses for taxes, notarial and attorneys
fees and other fees and charges and incidental expenses relative to the sale of the parcels of
land and the improvements thereof and to carry out the transfer thereof to the SECOND
PARTY.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied by petitioner)

6.
Furthermore, he gave extensive legal advises (sic )and services to the defendants concerning the implementation of the
Memorandum of Agreement. Plaintiff likewise prepared and notarized a JOINT AFFIDAVIT OF CLARIFICATION AND
CONFIRMATION between Sol T. Carpio and Nelson A. Sison concerning a ROAD RIGHT OF WAY AGREEMENT affecting the
parcels of land subject of the Memorandum of Agreement and the deeds of Absolute Sale, to facilitate and expedite the
implementation of the said Memorandum of Agreement.
xxxx
11. For failure and refusal of the defendants to pay the just claim of plaintiff, plaintiff was constrained to engage the services of
counsel on a contingent basis equal to 25% of whatever plaintiff may recover from defendants for which defendants should be held
liable.
12. Plaintiff will spend about TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) to file and prosecute this case but the exact amount shall be
proved during the trial of this case.[23] (Underscoring supplied).
The Sisons, in their Answer with Counterclaim,[24] denied having any obligation to petitioner, they alleging that they never
engaged his legal services nor received any legal advice from him as it was the corporation, petitioners client, which retained his
services and requested him to finalize and notarize the MOA prepared by Atty. Basa; and that they had no obligation in his preparation
and notarization of the Joint Affidavit.
As special defense, the Sisons alleged that when petitioner finalized and notarized the MOA and prepared the Joint Affidavit, the
corporation assured them that it would take care of his legal fees.
By way of compulsory counterclaim, the Sisons alleged that the filing of the baseless complaint against them was malicious, as a
result of which they were compelled to engage the services of counsel to protect them and would likely incur incidental expenses of at
least P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00 each, and exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00 each.[25]
The Sisons later filed a Third Party Complaint[26] against the corporation, alleging, inter alia, as follows:
xxx
4.
Inasmuch as it was third-party defendant which retained the services of [petitioner] in connection with the notarization of the
said memorandum of agreement including the other related documents and committed to pay all the legal fees therefor, then the fees
being collected by plaintiff should be borne solely by the third-party defendant;
5.
However, third-party defendant failed to make the necessary arrangement for the payment of Atty. Sueltos attorneys fees as a
consequence of which third-party plaintiffs were unnecessarily haled to court by Atty. Suelto and was thereafter compelled to file this
third-party complaint for which they incurred expenses of P50,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees. [27] (Underscoring supplied).
The Third Party Complaint thus prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the third party defendant-corporation to indemnify
third party plaintiffs, the Sisons, for whatever they may be required to pay petitioner and to pay them P50,000.000 for attorneys
fees.[28]
To the Third Party Complaint the corporation filed their Answer, [29] alleging, inter alia, that the Sisons had no cause of action
against it, it being their agreement that the Sisons would pay the services of petitioner.
Upon the following issues, to wit:
1.
Whether or not plaintiff has been retained by, and/or rendered legal services to, either of the other parties (defendants/third-party
plaintiffs and third-party defendant) in connection with the preparation and notarization of the Memorandum of Agreement and other
documents and legal advices as to justify him to claim for such fees, and whether the fees had been agreed upon beforehand?
2.
Assuming the plaintiff is entitled to claim notarial and attorneys fees, who is liable to pay the same, and whether the amount
being claimed is fair and reasonable?
3.
On the part of the plaintiff, whether he is entitled to damages and attorneys fees from the defendant/third-party plaintiffs; on the
part of the defendants/third-party plaintiffs, whether [they are] entitled to damages and attorneys fees from the plaintiff on [their]
counterclaim and for reimbursement from the third-party defendant; and on the part of the third-party defendant, whether it is entitled
to its claim for damages and attorneys fees from defendants/third-party plaintiffs. (Underscoring supplied),

the trial court, Branch 33 of the RTC of Davao, by decision of July 28, 1997, [30] held that the participation of petitioner in the final
negotiation of the sale was not as lawyer of the Sisons but of the corporation, and if petitioner rendered some advice in connection
therewith, it should be for the account of the corporation in accordance with their Retainership Agreement.
Respecting notarial fees, the trial court found no evidence to show that the parties had any agreement beforehand on the amount
thereof.
On the 10% retention provision in the MOA, the trial court held that the same was not for attorneys and notarial fees alone, it
having stated that it was to defray expenses for taxes, notarial and attorneys fees, and other fees and charges and incidental expenses
relative to the sale . . . and to carry out the transfer [of the properties] to [the corporation].
Passing on the services of petitioner, the trial court held that with respect to the MOA, as finalized, he did some revisions
thereon, albeit the revision . . . to include the names of the wives of the Sisons is not material to the effectivity of the MOA . . . As
for the addition by petitioner of a sentence to paragraph 5(h) bearing on the Road Right-of-Way provision, the trial court held:
The clause x x x exact location of the Road Right of Way which should be incorporated in an affidavit of confirmation thereof to be
executed by the parties therein and/or their duly authorized representatives and which should be accordingly registered in the involved
certificates of title in the office of the Register of Deeds by and at the expense of the FIRST PARTY, which was added on by the
plaintiff to the MOA is but an amplification of the first clause in the paragraph, and may even be dispensed with. As a matter of
fact, the Memorandum of Agreement (Exh. 6) which was already signed by the SISONS when presented to SUELTO had this last
sentence in its paragraph 5(h): The delineation shall include the Technical Description of the road register (sic) with the Register of
Deeds whichpractically encompasses the idea suggested in the revision made by the plaintiff. If the delineation shall include the
technical description then the exact location of the road will definitely be identified. This delineation will definitely be in a public
instrument in order that it will be registered with the Register of Deeds. There is no need for the confirmation of Sol T. Carpio
because the original Road Right of Way Agreement was already embodied in a public instrument, and binding on the successors-ininterest of the contracting parties, and there is no indication that the heirs of Bernardo Carpio are reneging on that agreement. At
most, plaintiff could have refined the last sentence in paragraph 5(h) of Exh. 6 by adding a word or words between road and
register and it would have served the import of paragraph 5(h). [31] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
In other words, the trial court found that petitioners addition of the second sentence to paragraph 5(h) of the MOA was a mere
amplification of the first sentence thereof, and the execution of the Joint Affidavit was not necessary as the Road Right-of-Way
Agreement dated May 29, 1984 was embodied in a public instrument which is binding on the successors-in-interest of the parties
absent any indication that the heirs of Bernardo D. Carpio are reneging on that agreement.
In any event, the trial court held that petitioners preparation and notarization of the Joint Affidavit was done not for the benefit
of the Sisons but for the benefit of his client, the corporation, and that the argument of petitioner that the January 10, 1994 Road
Right-of-Way Agreement earlier prepared, signed by the parties, and notarized by the Sisons counsel Atty. Agudo could not be
registered in the absence of technical description of the properties covered is untenable, for the Registry of Deeds has the ministerial
duty to register deeds, conveyances, and the like, whether effecting registered or unregistered land, executed in accordance with law in
the form of public instruments.
The trial court added that the technical description of the Road Right-of-Way is needed only for purposes of issuing a separate
title and that even without the technical description, the agreement may still be annotated on the grantors certificate of title.
Be that as it may, the trial court held that since the Sisons were likewise benefited by petitioners notarization of the MOA and
of the Joint Affidavit, it is only proper that they should recompense him, pursuant to the earlier-quoted provision of the MOA on the
retention of 10% of the purchase price, citing Article 2142 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 2142. Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi contract to the end that no one shall
be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another.
Holding that the notarial services done by petitioner must be based on quantum meruit, there being no prior agreement thereon,
the trial court found petitioners bill for P604,123.05 unreasonable, unconscionable and grossly inflated, citing Section 24, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 24. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services,
with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional
standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but
may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control
the amount to be paid therefore unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. (Underscoring supplied).
The trial court, noting that petitioners services were limited to perusing the MOA (Exhibit. 6), going over what [had] already
been agreed upon and therefore, in [petitioners] own word, he could not change what [the parties thereto] had agreed upon,

and making two (2) additions in the MOA, one of which, as stated earlier, is a mere amplification of what had already been agreed
upon, [the other being the furnishing of the names of the respective spouses of the Sisons], and . . . preparing the Joint Affidavit of
Clarification and Confirmation, which to the mind of the Court benefited most his client, and which could have been prepared by
[the] SISONS lawyer just as well,[32] and taking into account the value of the properties sold P40 million plus , held that the
amount of P100,000.00 as notarial fees is reasonable and conscionable.
Accordingly, the trial court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered adjudging the defendants SISON liable to pay SUELTO the sum
of P100,000.00 for and as notarial fees for services the latter has rendered, as well as actual litigation costs in the form of filing and
docket fees.
The counterclaim of the SISONS and the counterclaim of SANTOS LAND are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[33]
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the defendants-third party- plaintiffs Sisons assigned to the trial court the following errors:
1.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING DEFENDANTS-THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFFS-APPEL-LANTS LIABLE

TO PAY THE NOTARIAL FEES OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE AS ITDOES NOT CONFORM WITH ITS FINDING
THAT IT WAS THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WHICH ENGAGED THE SERVICES OF PLAINTIFFAPPELLEE.

2.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ASSUMED
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF PAYING PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES NOTARIAL FEES WHICH FACT IS SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE.

3.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FIXING THE NOTARIAL FEES OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE AT P100,000.00, THE
SAME BEING UNCONSCIONABLE CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT HIS SERVICES CONSISTED IN MAKING
MINOR AND INCONSEQUENTIAL REVISIONS IN AN ALREADY PREPARED MEMORANDUM OF
AGREEMENT AND NOTARIZING THE SAME, AND PREPARING AND NOTARIZING A JOINT AFFIDAVIT OF
CLARIFICATION AND CONFIRMATION WHICH WAS FOUND TO BE IMMATERIAL AND BENEFICIAL TO HIS
CLIENT.[34] (Underscoring supplied).

By the assailed decision of October 30, 2002, [35] the appellate court reversed that of the trial court.
The appellate court agreed with the Sisons contention that the trial courts judgment is inconsistent with its factual findings that
it was the corporation which engaged petitioners services in connection with the finalization and notarization of the MOA and
preparation and notarization of the Joint Affidavit. It too agreed with the Sisons claim that the corporation, being in the real estate
business, agreed to assume petitioners notarial fees.
In another vein, the appellate court, noting the provision in the MOA regarding the retention of the 10% selling price by the
buyer corporation to be applied to expenses including notarial and attorneys fees and the corporations returning of the balance
thereof to the seller-Sisons in the amount of more than P600,000.00 despite the corporations previous receipt of petitioners
Statement of Account and copy of petitioners demand letter to the Sisons, held that the return of the said balance elicited the clear
and unrebutted presumption . . . that all expenses pertinent to the sale have been discharged.
Accordingly, the appellate court set aside the trial courts decision.
His motion for reconsideration[36] having been denied by Resolution of April 11, 2003 [37] by the Court of Appeals, petitioner
comes before this Court[38] raising the following issues:
I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN DISREGARDING THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MARGINAL[I]ZING THE SERVICES
OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.[39] (Underscoring supplied).

Why the Sisons are not amenable to settle petitioners billing for notarial fees is reflected in the following transcript of Nelson
Sisons testimony:
Q

Of course, when that Memorandum of Agreement was being finalized, you were very much aware of the fact that there
is that provision about the payment of the notarial fees and the attorneys fees as provided in the Memorandum of
Agreement, is it not?

Yes, sir.

And you are aware of the fact that you are the one, under the agreement, who will be paying for the notarial fees and
other fees of the lawyer?

Yes.

And of course, that provision was eventually included in the final draft that you signed the Memorandum of
Agreement, is it not?

Yes, sir.

x x x You are willing to pay for the notarial fees after it is finished to be taken out of the ten percent retention?

Yes.

But of course, your only objection is that, it should be a lawyer of your own choice?

Yes, sir.
xxx

You said that when you objected to Attorney Sueltos notarizing the Memorandum of Agreement, Mrs. Partoza, as
President of Santos Land assured you and I quote: Amin na lang yan. When she told you: AMIN NA LANG
YAN, what was your understanding when she said AMIN NA LANG YAN?

Our understanding when she said Amin na lang yan, on our objection why the name of our lawyer was changed to
Atty. Suelto is that, inasmuch as Atty. Suelto, we believe is their retainer, and there are lots of lawyers retaining them,
so, they will absorb the expenses, if there is any, on signing of the Memorandum of Agreement, for convenience of
both. x x x[40](Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

As gathered from the above-quoted transcript of Nelson Sisons testimony, the Sisons were willing to pay for the notarial
fees to be charged to the 10% retained amount of the purchase price, if the lawyer notarizing it is one of their choice. That the
Sisons wanted to have a lawyer of their choice to notarize the MOA could be on account of their desire to be able to save some
expenses, as gleaned from petitioners testimony regarding Nelson Sisons alleged reason why it should be the Sisons own lawyer
who should notarize the Deed of Sale:
[ATTY. LOREJO]:
Q

You notarized [the Deed of Absolute Sale]?

Well, it was supposed to be finalized after I made the corrections but then, the Sisons, more specially Nelson Sison,
made a request that the document, the deed of sale should be notarized by their lawyer so that they will be able to
save some expenses. . .[41] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

Why the corporation returned to the Sisons the balance of the 10% retained purchase price, despite its awareness that petitioner,
its own retained counsel, had a pending request to it to settle his notarial fees from said 10% retained purchase price spawns
conflicting versions. The corporation claims that the Sisons had told it that they would settle petitioners notarial fees. The Sisons
claim, on the other hand, that the corporation through Nelia Partoza undertook to settle the same.
What is clear, however, both in the pleadings and in the evidence of both parties, is that the notarial fees for the MOA, not to
mention the Joint Affidavit, had not been paid. The appellate courts presumption that the notarial fees had been paid with the return
by the corporation to the Sisons of the balance of the 10% retained purchase is thus incongruous with the clearly established fact that
petitioners notarial fees had not been paid.
As priorly stated, by Nelson Sisons admission, he and his siblings were willing to charge the payment of notarial fees to the
10% retained purchase price provided the lawyernotary public was one of their choice. The MOA provision that notarial fees
relative to the sale, among other expenses, would be charged to the 10% retained purchase price bears no qualification whatsoever,
however, on which lawyer whether of the Sisons or of the corporation would perform notarial services for the provision to
apply.

The Sisons, having agreed in the MOA, which is the law between them and the corporation, to charge notarial fees from the
retained 10% of the purchase price, but the balance thereof having been returned to them without petitioners notarial fees being
settled, they are under obligation to settle the same, at a reasonable amount of course.
The trial courts determination of the amount of P100,000.00 as fair and reasonable notarial fees, inclusive of actual litigation
cost, under the circumstances reflected above, merits this Courts approval. It levels the unreasonable, unconscionable billing of
petitioner-retained counsel of the corporation and the desire of the Sisons made known to the corporation and petitioner to save on
expenses by wanting a lawyer of their own choice to notarize the MOA and other documents.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of
Branch 33 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is, in light of the foregoing discussions, REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on official leave.
EPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 131966
Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING,
- versus -

Acting Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., JJ.

HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, as Ombudsman,

EDUARDO C. CONJUANGCO, JR., JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, MA. CLARA S. LOBREGAT, ROLANDO
DE LA CUESTA, JOSE C. CONCEPCION, JOSE R.
MENDOZA,
EMMANUEL
M.
ALAMEDA,
HERMENEGILDO C. ZAYCO, TEODORA A.
REGALA, AMADO C. MAMURIC, DOUGLAS LU
YM, JAIME GANDIAGA, NARCISO PINEDA and
DANILO S. URSUA,

Promulgated:
Respondents.

August 16, 2004

x----------------------------------------------------------- x

RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This resolves the motions for reconsideration filed by private respondent Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and petitioner Republic of
the Philippines.
The Courts decision dated September 23, 2002, granted the petition for certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines,
set aside the resolution of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-90-2811 dismissing the Republics complaint, and ordered the Ombudsman to
proceed with the preliminary investigation in said case.

Also on record is a Notice filed by the counsel for the late Maria Clara L. Lobregat informing the Court of respondent
Lobregats demise on January 2, 2004,[1] and praying for the dismissal of the case against her.

Respondent Cojuangco contends:

a.
It was because of lack of evidence or probable cause that the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint in
OMB-0-90-2811, not because the offense has prescribed or that LOI 926 and PD Nos. 961 and 1468 precluded
prosecution under RA No. 3019 and Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code. Since the Court in its decision of
September 23, 2002 did not overturn the Ombudsmans finding of lack of probable cause, the Ombudsmans
Resolution of June 2, 1997 may not be nullified.
b.
No evidentiary basis exists for the Courts finding that the offense had not prescribed; it was,
consequently, error for the Court to have found that the offense charged had not prescribed.

c.
It was also error for the Court to have found that PD Nos. 961 and 1468, LOI No. 926 may not be
taken into account in determining whether the respondent violated R.A. No. 3019 and Article 186 of the Revised
Penal Code.

d.
The Court, apparently, overlooked respondents contention that his constitutional right to speedy
disposition of his case has been violated warranting dismissal of OMB-0-90-2811.[2]

For its part, petitioner Republic of the Philippines assails the ruling of the Court ordering the exclusion of respondents
Teodoro D. Regala and Jose C. Concepcion as defendants in OMB-0-90-2811.[3]

The Court finds no compelling reason to reconsider the assailed Decision.

While it is true that the Ombudsman concluded that there is no sufficient evidence to engender a well-founded belief that
violation of the Anti-Graft Law was committed and that respondents are probably guilty thereof, it must be pointed out that such
conclusion is premised on its finding that the acquisition by UNICOM of the sixteen (16) oil mills was done in accordance with
existing laws,[4] and not because there was no evidence that respondent did not commit the crime at all. Thus, the Ombudsman stated,
respondents cannot be made criminally liable for implementing a government policy because there is no element of evident bad faith
or malice.[5] But, as was stated, in the assailed Decision, the validity of LOI No. 926, and Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos. 961 and
1468 will not protect private respondents from criminal prosecution for violations of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 and Article 186 of
the Revised Penal Code.[6]

It is also incorrect for respondent to say that there is no evidentiary basis for the Courts finding that the offense had not
prescribed, as it was resolved in the assailed Decision that since the ten-year prescriptive period in violation of R.A. No. 3019 is
governed by Section 2 of Act No. 3326, and applying further the ruling in Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan,[7] the complaint in this case,
which was filed on March 2, 1990, was well within the prescriptive period. [8]

At pain of being redundant, we restate our ruling in the assailed Decision that:
. . . the fact that the transactions were done pursuant to P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 will not shield the
respondents from being charged considering that prosecution for violations of R.A. 3019 involves questions as to
whether the contracts or transactions entered pursuant thereto by the private respondents were manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government; whether they caused undue injury to the government; and whether the
private respondents were interested for personal gain or had material interests in the transactions. [9]

In other words, while P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 may have sanctioned UNICOMs acquisition of the sixteen (16) oil mills, it
does not detract from the fact that such acquisition caused undue prejudice, disadvantage and injury to the government, or that private
respondents had a material and personal interest in the acquisition thereof, acts which have already been defined as corrupt practices
and declared unlawful under R.A. No. 3019.

If the Court were to adhere to private respondents argument that valid laws may not be taken into account in determining
whether there was a violation of R.A. No. 3019 and Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code, then the validity of laws would create a
blanket shield and there would be no prosecution for violations of R.A. No. 3019 and Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code, as all
acts committed by public officers will be beyond reach, despite the undue damage, injury and prejudice to the government, and the
personal gain and material interest of the public officers involved.

As regards respondents contention that the seven-year delay in the disposition of the preliminary investigation by the
Ombudsman warrants the dismissal of the case against him, the Court finds the same wanting in merit.

In the case of Dela Pea vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court had the occasion to restate the doctrine that:
The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each
case. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that
may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. [10]

Nevertheless,

despite

the

finding

that

there

was

considerable

delay

by

the

Sandiganbayan

in

the

disposition of the petitioners case, the Court

did not dismiss its case for the reason that the failure of the petitioner therein to assert its right to a speedy disposition of its case
amounts to a waiver of such right. Thus, the Court held:
Moreover, it is worthy to note that it was only on 21 December 1999, after the case was set for arraignment,
that petitioners raised the issue of the delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. As stated by them in
their Motion to Quash/Dismiss, [o]ther than the counter-affidavits, [they] did nothing. Also, in their petition, they
averred: Aside from the motion for extension of time to file counter-affidavits, petitioners in the present case did
not file nor send any letter-queries addressed to the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao which conducted the

preliminary investigation. They slept on their right a situation amounting to laches. The matter could have taken
a different dimension if during all those four years, they showed signs of asserting their right to a speedy disposition
of their cases or at least made some overt acts, like filing a motion for early resolution, to show that they were not
waiving that right. Their silence may, therefore be interpreted as a waiver of such right. As aptly stated in
Alvizo, the petitioner therein was insensitive to the implications and contingencies of the projected criminal
prosecution posed against him by not taking any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the matter, which
inaction conduces to the perception that the supervening delay seems to have been without his objection, [and]
hence impliedly with his acquiescence.[11]

In the present case, a review of the records shows that the last pleading filed prior to the Ombudsmans Resolution dated June
2, 1997 was respondents Motion to Suspend Filing of Counter-Affidavit, which was filed on May 15, 1991. [12] Between 1991 and
1997, respondent did nothing to assert his right to a speedy disposition of his case. Clearly, his silence during such period amounts to
a waiver of such right.

Moreover, respondents right to a speedy disposition of his case should not work against and preclude the people's equally
important right to public justice[13] considering that the funds used to acquire the sixteen (16) mothballed oil mills came from the
coconut levy funds, which are not only affected with public interest, but are, in fact, prima facie public funds.[14]

It is noted that the Courts decision in the Orosa case,[15] which we cited in the decision of the present case, was set aside per
Resolution dated July 7, 2004, on the ground that two (2) of the respondents therein, Ma. Clara Lobregat and Jose C. Concepcion,
were deprived of their right to file their comments on the petition, and as such, the case was not yet ripe for resolution when the Court
rendered its decision. Be that as it may, said resolution does not bear any consequence on the present case as the jurisprudence relied
upon in the Orosa case are still valid and binding precedents.

As regards petitioner Republics motion that the assailed Decision be reconsidered insofar as the exclusion of respondents
Teodoro D. Regala and Jose C. Concepcion as defendants in OMB-0-90-2811 is concerned, the Court finds the same bereft of merit.

According to petitioner, respondents Regala and Concepcion should not be excluded as respondents because they are being
charged for illegal acts committed in their official capacity as members of the Board of Directors of UNICOM and UCPB, in
conspiracy with the other private respondents. [16] Such argument, however, has already been resolved by the Court in both
the Regala[17] and Castillo[18] cases, wherein the Court found that the acts complained of were done by the respondents in connection
with the legal services they rendered to the other respondents. Thus, the Court held in the Castillo case that:
This was the same argument raised by the Republic in the case of Regala. In overruling the Republics
position, this Court ruled:
An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of attorney-client
confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings is premature and that they should wait until they are called to testify
and examine as witnesses as to matters learned in confidence before they can raise their objection. But petitioners
are not mere witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. They have
made their position clear from the very beginning that they are not willing to testify and they cannot be compelled to
testify in view of their constitutional right against self-incrimination and of their fundamental legal right to maintain
inviolate the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.[19]

Finally, during the pendency of this petition, respondent Maria Clara L. Lobregat died on January 2, 2004. [20] The death of
an accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. [21] Consequently,
the case should be dismissed with regard to her.

WHEREFORE, the Motions for Reconsideration filed by private respondent Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and petitioner
Republic of the Philippines are hereby DENIED. The Courts Decision dated September 23, 2002 is MODIFIED to the effect that the
charges against deceased respondent Maria Clara L. Lobregat in OMB-0-90-2811, pending preliminary investigation before the Office
of the Ombudsman, is ordered dismissed and any criminal as well as civil liability ex delicto that might arise from said case is declared
extinguished by reason of her death.

SO ORDERED.
MARINA Z. REYES; ALFREDO A. FRANCISCO; ANGELITA Z. GARCIA; ALFREDO Z. FRANCISCO, JR; ARMANDO
Z. FRANCISCO; ALMA C. FRANCISCO; EUGENIA Z. LUNA; CLARITA Z. ZABALLERO, LEONARDO Z.
ZABALLERO, JR, and TEODORO Z. ZABALLERO, in substitution of LEONARDO M. ZABALLERO;
AUGUSTO M. ZABALLERO; FRINE A. ZABALLERO; ELENA FRONDA ZABALLERO; VICTOR GREGORIO
F. ZABALLERO; MARIA ELENA F. ZABALLERO; LOURDES ZABALLERO-LAVA; SOCORRO EMILIA
ZABALLERO-YAP;
and
TERESITA
F.
ZABALLERO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL
HOUSING
AUTHORITY, respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 51641 dated September 29,
2000[1] affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 79 which dismissed the complaint for forfeiture of
rights filed by herein petitioners, as well as the Resolution dated March 13, 2001 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Records show that in 1977, respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed separate complaints for the expropriation of
sugarcane lands, particularly Lot Nos. 6450, 6448-E, 6198-A and 6199 of the cadastral survey of Dasmarias, Cavite belonging to the
petitioners, before the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, and docketed as Civil Case Nos. T.G.-392, T.G.-396 and T.G.-417. The
stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters
who were relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots and
the payment of just compensation. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court in a decision rendered on October 29, 1987 in the case
of NHA vs. Zaballero[2] and which became final on November 26, 1987. [3]
On February 24, 1989, the expropriation court (now Branch 18, Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City) issued an Order [4] the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, and resolving thus, let an Alias Writ of Execution be immediately issued and that:
(1) The Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite is hereby ordered to transfer, in the name of the plaintiff National Housing
Authority, the following:
(a) Transfer Certificate No. RT-638 containing an area of 79,167 square meters situated in Barrio Bangkal,
Dasmarias, Cavite;
(b) Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-55702 containing an area of 20,872 square meters situated in Barrio Bangkal,
Dasmarias, Cavite;
(c) Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-639 and RT-4641 covering Lot Nos. 6198-A and 6199 with an aggregate area
of 159,985 square meters also situated in Barrio Bangkal, Dasmarias, Cavite.
(2) Plaintiff National Housing Authority is likewise hereby ordered, under pain of contempt, to immediately pay the defendants, the
amounts stated in the Writ of Execution as the adjudicated compensation of their expropriated properties, which process was received
by it according to the records, on September 26, 1988, segregating therefrom, and in separate check, the lawyers fees in favor of Atty.
Bobby P. Yuseco, in the amount of P322,123.05, as sustained by their contract as gleaned from the records, with no other deduction,
paying on its own (NHA) account, the necessary legal expenses incident to the registration or issuance of new certificates of title,
pursuant to the provisions of the Property Registration Law (PD 1529);
(3) Defendants, however, are directed to pay the corresponding capital gains tax on the subject properties, directing them
additionally, to coordinate with the plaintiff NHA in this regard, in order to facilitate the termination of this case, put an end to this
controversy and consign the same to its final rest.
For the alleged failure of respondent NHA to comply with the above order, petitioners filed on April 28, 1992 a complaint [5] for
forfeiture of rights before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 79, in Civil Case No. Q-92-12093. They alleged that
respondent NHA had not relocated squatters from the Metropolitan Manila area on the expropriated lands in violation of the stated
public purpose for expropriation and had not paid the just compensation fixed by the court. They prayed that respondent NHA be
enjoined from disposing and alienating the expropriated properties and that judgment be rendered forfeiting all its rights and interests
under the expropriation judgment. In its Answer,[6] respondent NHA averred that it had already paid a substantial amount to herein
petitioners and that the expropriation judgment could not be executed in view of several issues raised by respondent NHA before the
expropriation court (now Branch 18, RTC, Tagaytay City) concerning capital gains tax, registration fees and other expenses for the
transfer of title to respondent NHA, as well as the claims for attorneys fees of Atty. Joaquin Yuseco, Jr., collaborating counsel for
petitioners.
Ocular inspections[7] conducted by the trial court on the subject properties show that:
1. 80% of Lot No. 6198-A with an area of 120,146 square meters is already occupied by relocatees whose houses are made of light
materials with very few houses partly made of hollow blocks. The relocatees were relocated only on (sic) March of 1994;

2. Most of the area covered by Lot No. 2075 is almost occupied by houses and structures, most of which are made of concrete
materials. These houses are not being occupied by squatters relocated to the said lot by the defendant NHA;
3. Lot No. 6199 is also occupied by concrete houses and structures but likewise there are no relocatees in said lot. A large area of the
same is still unoccupied.
On September 29, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. Finding that the failure of respondent NHA
to pay just compensation and of petitioners to pay capital gains tax are both unjustified and unreasonable, the trial court held that: (1)
respondent NHA is not deemed to have abandoned the public purpose for which the subject properties were expropriated because the
relocation of squatters involves a long and tedious process. It ruled that respondent NHA actually pursued the public purpose of the
expropriation when it entered into a contract with Arceo C. Cruz involving the construction of low cost housing on the expropriated
lots to be sold to qualified low income beneficiaries; (2) there is no condition imposed in the expropriation judgment that the subject
properties shall revert back to its original owners in case the purpose of expropriation is terminated or abandoned; (3) the payment of
just compensation is independent of the obligation of herein petitioners to pay capital gains tax; and (4) in the payment of just
compensation, the basis should be the value at the time the property was taken. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court.
Petitioners are now before us raising the following assignment of errors:
1.

The Honorable Court of Appeals had decided a question of substance not in accord with justice and equity when it
ruled that, as the judgment of the expropriation court did not contain a condition that should the expropriated
property be not used for the intended purpose it would revert to the condemnee, the action to declare the forfeiture of
rights under the expropriation judgment can not prosper;

2.

The Honorable Court of Appeals decided a question of substance not in accord with jurisprudence, justice and equity
when it ruled that the non-payment is not a ground for forfeiture;

3.

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not declaring the judgment of expropriation forfeited in light of the failure of
respondent to use the expropriated property for the intended purpose but for a totally different purpose.

The petition is not impressed with merit.

Petitioners contend that respondent NHA violated the stated public purpose for the expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement
Project when it failed to relocate the squatters from the Metro Manila area, as borne out by the ocular inspection conducted by the trial
court which showed that most of the expropriated properties remain unoccupied. Petitioners likewise question the public nature of the
use by respondent NHA when it entered into a contract for the construction of low cost housing units, which is allegedly different
from the stated public purpose in the expropriation proceedings. Hence, it is claimed that respondent NHA has forfeited its rights and
interests by virtue of the expropriation judgment and the expropriated properties should now be returned to herein petitioners. We are
not persuaded.
The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides for the exercise of the power of eminent domain over private properties upon payment
of just compensation. More specifically, section 9, Article III states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. The constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation.
Petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the contract
for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer
limited to traditional purposes. Here, as elsewhere, the idea that public use is strictly limited to clear cases of use by the public
has been abandoned. The term public use has now been held to be synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public
welfare, and public convenience.[8] The rationale for this new approach is well explained in the case of Heirs of Juancho Ardona,
et al. vs. Reyes, et al.,[9] to wit:
The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes the scope of government activities and public
concerns and which possesses big and correctly located public lands that obviate the need to take private property for public
purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines. We have never been a laissez faire State. And the necessities which impel
the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce public land or limited government resources.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a
requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise,
expropriation is not allowable. It is not anymore. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain
comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the

expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the
exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever
may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. (emphasis supplied)
The act of respondent NHA in entering into a contract with a real estate developer for the construction of low cost housing on the
expropriated lots to be sold to qualified low income beneficiaries cannot be taken to mean as a deviation from the stated public
purpose of their taking. Jurisprudence has it that the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a
public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and service
companies, and other private concerns.[10]
Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, for the common good and in cooperation with the private
sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic
services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas.[11] The expropriation of private property
for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance of the social justice provision under Section 1,
Article XIII of the Constitution which provides that:
SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the
people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing
wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall require the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of property and its increments.
It follows that the low cost housing project of respondent NHA on the expropriated lots is compliant with the public use
requirement.
We likewise do not subscribe to petitioners contention that the stated public purpose was abandoned when respondent NHA
failed to occupy the expropriated lots by relocating squatters from the Metro Manila area. The expropriation judgment declared that
respondent NHA has a lawful right to take petitioners properties for the public use or purpose of expanding the Dasmarias
Resettlement Project. The taking here is absolute, without any condition, restriction or qualification. Contrary to petitioners
submission, the ruling enunciated in the early case of Fery vs. Municipality of Cabanatuan,[12] is still good and sound doctrine, viz.:
x x x If, for example, land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned
the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner
reacquires the property so expropriated. x x x If, upon the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee
simple title, then, of course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator x x x.
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by
purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to
a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.
Petitioners further aver that the continued failure of respondent NHA to pay just compensation for a long period of time justifies
the forfeiture of its rights and interests over the expropriated lots. They demand the return of the expropriated lots. Respondent NHA
justifies the delay to pay just compensation by reason of the failure of petitioners to pay the capital gains tax and to surrender the
owners duplicate certificates of title.
In the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[13] the Court ruled that non-payment of just
compensation does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of their expropriated lots. Thus:
Thus, in Valdehueza vs. Republic where the private landowners had remained unpaid ten years after the termination of the
expropriation proceedings, this Court ruled
The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and, if so, in what amount. Said lots have been the subject of
expropriation proceedings. By final and executory judgment in said proceedings, they were condemned for public use, as part of an
airport, and ordered sold to the government. x x x. It follows that both by virtue of the judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit,
as well as the annotations upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots which
are still devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated but only to demand the market value of the same.
Said relief may be granted under plaintiffs prayer for such other remedies, which may be deemed just and equitable under the
premises.

The Court proceeded to reiterate its pronouncement in Alfonso vs. Pasay City where the recovery of possession of property taken for
public use prayed for by the unpaid landowner was denied even while no requisite expropriation proceedings were first instituted. The
landowner was merely given the relief of recovering compensation for his property computed at its market value at the time it was
taken and appropriated by the State.
The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the expropriation proceedings provides not only for the payment of just
compensation to herein respondents but likewise adjudges the property condemned in favor of petitioner over which parties,
as well as their privies, are bound. Petitioner has occupied, utilized and, for all intents and purposes, exercised dominion over
the property pursuant to the judgment. The exercise of such rights vested to it as the condemnee indeed has amounted to at
least a partial compliance or satisfaction of the 1979 judgment, thereby preempting any claim of bar by prescription on grounds of
non-execution. In arguing for the return of their property on the basis of non-payment, respondents ignore the fact that the
right of the expropriating authority is far from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy of rescission
might perhaps apply. An in rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property. After condemnation, the paramount title is
in the public under a new and independent title; thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings
provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance. (emphasis
supplied)
We, however, likewise find the refusal of respondent NHA to pay just compensation, allegedly for failure of petitioners to pay
capital gains tax and surrender the owners duplicate certificates of title, to be unfounded and unjustified.
First, under the expropriation judgment the payment of just compensation is not subject to any condition. Second, it is a
recognized rule that although the right to enter upon and appropriate the land to public use is completed prior to payment, title to the
property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. In the case
of Association of Small Landowners in the Phils., Inc., et al. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, [14] it was held that:
Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the judgment fixing just
compensation is entered and paid, but the condemnors title relates back to the date on which the petition under the Eminent Domain
Act, or the commissioners report under the Local Improvement Act, is filed.
x x x Although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry, title to the property
taken remains in the owner until payment is actually made.
In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to property does not pass to the condemnor
until just compensation had actually been made. In fact, the decisions appear to be uniformly to this effect. As early as 1838, in
Rubottom v. McLure, it was held that actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was a condition precedent to the
investment of the title to the property in the State albeit not to the appropriation of it to public use. In Rexford v. Knight, the Court
of Appeals of New York said that the construction upon the statutes was that the fee did not vest in the State until the payment of the
compensation although the authority to enter upon and appropriate the land was complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further said
that both on principle and authority the rule is x x x that the right to enter on and use the property is complete, as soon as the
property is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public use, but that the title does not pass from the owner
without his consent, until just compensation has been made to him.
Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, that:
If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively examined it will be apparent that the method of
expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably
taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid. x x x. (emphasis supplied)
With respect to the amount of the just compensation still due and demandable from respondent NHA, the lower courts erred in
not awarding interest computed from the time the property is actually taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or
deposited in court. In Republic, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[15] the Court imposed interest at 12% per annum in order to help
eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time, thus:
The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property,
broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or
the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it being fixed at the time of the actual taking
by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over
the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time
when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment,
legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking
occurred.

x x x This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking computed, being an
effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the
currency over time. Article 1250 of the Civil Code, providing that, in case of extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value of the
currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis for the payment when no agreement to the contrary is
stipulated, has strict application only to contractual obligations. In other words, a contractual agreement is needed for the effects of
extraordinary inflation to be taken into account to alter the value of the currency.
Records show that there is an outstanding balance of P1,218,574.35 that ought to be paid to petitioners. [16] It is not disputed that
respondent NHA took actual possession of the expropriated properties in 1977. [17] Perforce, while petitioners are not entitled to the
return of the expropriated property, they are entitled to be paid the balance of P1,218,574.35 with legal interest thereon at 12% per
annum computed from the taking of the property in 1977 until the due amount shall have been fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is modified as follows:
1. Ordering respondent National Housing Authority to pay petitioners the amount of P1,218,574.35 with legal interest
thereon at 12% per annum computed from the taking of the expropriated properties in 1997 until the amount due shall
have been fully paid;
2. Ordering petitioners to pay the capital gains tax; and
3. Ordering petitioners to surrender to respondent National Housing Authority the owners duplicate certificates of title of
the expropriated properties upon full payment of just compensation.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 160445

February 16, 2006

JOSE TEOFILO T. MERCADO and MA. AGNES R. MERCADO, Petitioners,

vs.
SECURITY BANK CORPORATION, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SANDOVAL GUTIERREZ, J.:
The dignity of the Court can never be protected where infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. The
people should not be given cause to break faith that a magistrate is the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court
of justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect.1
Incidental to the present petition for review on certiorari is the contempt proceedings against petitioner Jose Teofilo T. Mercado
arising from his letter dated October 18, 2004, insinuating that: (1) the ponente succumbed to the "tremendous pressure" of Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in denying his petition; (2) the Security Bank Corporation, respondent, financed the ponentes travel to
the United States; and (3) the ponente gave respondent a "go signal" to sell his property.
The facts are as follows:
On December 12, 2003, Jose Teofilo T. Mercado and Ma. Agnes R. Mercado, petitioners, filed with this Court a Petition for Review
on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals (a) Decision2 dated May 27, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 71570 dismissing their petition for
annulment of judgment; and (b) its Resolution3 dated October 23, 2003 denying their motion for reconsideration.
On January 12, 2004, we denied the petition because of petitioners failure to show that a reversible error had been committed by the
Appellate Court.4
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the Court of Appeals, in dismissing their petition for annulment of
judgment, merely relied on technical rules of procedure, thereby sacrificing the greater interest of justice and equity; and that their
former counsels gross negligence constitutes extrinsic fraud, a ground for annulling the trial courts judgment.

On March 24, 2004, we issued a Resolution granting petitioners motion for reconsideration and reinstating their petition. We likewise
required Security Bank Corporation, respondent, to comment on the petition.
In its comment, respondent averred that the issues raised in the present petition are mere rehash of the issues petitioners raised before
the Appellate Court. As to the alleged negligence of their counsel, respondent pointed out that the same cannot be considered an
extrinsic fraud since through the same counsel, they actively pursued and recovered moral damages and attorneys fees. Furthermore,
assuming that petitioners counsel refused to file a motion for reconsideration with the trial court, still, they had the option to terminate
his services and hire another; and that they should not have waited for four (4) years before filing the petition for annulment of
judgment.
On June 7, 2004, we issued a Resolution denying the petition on the ground that petitioners indeed failed to show that a reversible
error had been committed by the Appellate Court.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but we dismissed the same in our Resolution dated September 15, 2004, thus:
We find no compelling reason to grant petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that before a petition for annulment of judgment can prosper, petitioners must first file an
appeal, a motion for new trial or a petition for relief as required by the Revised Rules of Court. Having failed to do so, they cannot
avail of an action for annulment of judgment, otherwise, they would benefit from their inaction or negligence.
It bears emphasis at this point that an action for annulment of judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.
Petitioners contention that their failure to appeal from the trial courts Decision was due to the negligence of their former counsel
lacks merit. Records show that they participated actively, through their counsel, in the proceedings before the trial court. As party
litigants, they were expected to be vigilant of their interests and, therefore, should monitor the progress of the case. Thus, they should
have constantly communicated with their counsel to be advised of the status of their case. This way, they would not have lost their
opportunity to appeal.
Granting that petitioners petition for annulment of judgment is in order, still the same is dismissible. For the remedy of annulment of
judgment to prosper, either one of the following grounds must be present: (1) extrinsic fraud or (2) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due
process. Petitioner argues that their counsels negligence constitutes extrinsic fraud. We are not convinced. Extrinsic fraud can be
committed by a counsel against his client when the latter is prevented from presenting his case to the court. This situation is not
present in this case.
We reiterate that in G.R. No. 151816, we ruled that the Court of Appeals did not commit reversible error in dismissing petitioners
petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the trial courts order of execution of its Decision in favor of respondent bank.
In fine, this Resolution should now write finis to the instant case. 5
Petitioners filed a second motion for reconsideration but was denied for being prohibited.
On October 18, 2004, petitioner Mercado wrote Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. stating that:
On March 24, 2004, the Third Division, in its Resolution, granted our Motion for Reconsideration and even gave due course and
reinstated our petition.
But when I received the Resolution dated June 7, 2004 denying my Petition for Review on July 12, 2004, I immediately called my
counsel, Atty. Jose P. Villanueva, on the phone. I asked him why on earth the ponente denied again my petition on the same ground
for failure of petitioners to show that a reversible error had been committed by the appellate court? My counsel said, the ponente
informed him that she has to deny our petition on the same ground because of the tremendous pressure from the Chief Justice to favor
Security Bank Corporation (SBC). By the way, my counsel and the ponente are very close and long time friends to each other. When I
heard the bad news, I was so shocked in disbelief. It is true, what you did is unthinkable, ungodly, and malicious. It is also very
suspicious that after a few days after my conversation with Atty. Villanueva, he and his family left for London, leaving my case to the
care of one of his Associates. Later on, the ponente herself left for the U.S.A. to visit her children. Is this a coincidence? As the saying
goes, when there is smoke, there is fire. Another coincidence, before the receipt of the Resolution dated June 7, 2004, denying our
petition on the basis of SBCs unsubstantiated Comment, SBC sold our property to M. Miranda Development Corporation and
succeeded in getting a permit to demolish the four (4) building erected in our property from the Forbes Park Association, even if the
case is still pending and we have not even filed our Motion for Reconsideration with the Supreme Court, not to mention the Lis

Pendens annotated on the title of the property in the name of SBC. The person who bought our property from SBC
for P120,000,000.00 is known to my nephew and us. While the buyer is drinking with my nephew and others, not knowing that one of
them is my nephew, he bragged to them that he just bought the property of the Mercados in Forbes Park. The buyer said I paid
already the property because SBC told me that they already have the go-signal from the ponente to sell the property. Few days
thereafter, all the improvements in our property were totally demolished by a construction company owned by my provincemate in
Pampanga by the name of Mr. Bana, whom I personally met at the site while the demolition was being carried out.
Have you no conscience at all? Are you not bothered of the final judgment after life? Is this the legacy you want to impart to your
children and all the Filipino people? What you did to my family and I is unforgivable not only to God and to humanity. You have
deprived us of our precious possession without due process. This is also the abode of my wife, my children, their respective spouses,
and my 10 grandchildren, not to mention the several household members and their families.
I would like to believe that the Supreme Court is the last bulwark of true justice. If you, the Chief Justice, himself, are the first person
to make a mockery of our laws, no wonder why foreign investors do not want to invest in our country because they said, there is no
justice in our courts, the Supreme Court in particular. This is in the highest degree of injustice. You have deprived us of our basic
fundamental rights in the protection of our property without due process. There is no justice in our courts, the Supreme Court in
particular. Do you think I will bring my case to the Supreme Court by mere question of facts? From our petition for Annulment of
Judgment filed before the Court of Appeals and now the Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, my wife and I as
petitioners-movants have clearly invoked LACK OF JURISDICTION on the part of the trial court to adjudicate respondent SBCs
counterclaim for the payment of the loan. As I understand, when the ground invoked as basis for Annulment of Judgment is LACK
OF JURISDICTION, the Petition may be filed at any time before it is barred by estoppel or laches, neither of which is obtaining in
our case. Even in laymans legal point of view, this Petition of ours clearly and undoubtedly raises a question of law.
Please I beg of you, have a last hard look on our Petition and the two (2) Motions for Reconsideration and let us focus and not evade
on the real issue on LACK OF JURISDICTION on the part of the trial court and not concentrate on negligence of counsel and other
trivial reasons, etc. Or better yet, please refrain from influencing the members of the Third Division. Let them deliberate regularly on
our case or inhibit themselves on the case. Please let the Institution serve justice, and not individual pecuniary interests. SBCs
counsels are experts in fabrication of facts and in misleading the courts. I have a feeling that they might as well have led you to believe
something, which is not true. Please dont be an instrument of their wicked schemes, lest the Supreme Court itself becomes their
means to perpetrate injustice. This is the only Bank which is not interested in amicable settlement in spite of my several sincere offers
of amicable settlement since the case was filed in 1995 up to 2003, and these are all in writing and duly received by SBC.
Unfortunately, all my offers were rejected by them.
I wrote you this letter as a last resort because my family and I looked up at you before as the most honest and upright Chief Justice. As
we would like to know if you really had intervened and put pressure, as the Ponente said to Atty. Villanueva, (my counsel) to favor
SBC because if you did, then we rest our case. Please enlighten us before we seek another forum to seek redress the injustices,
sleepless nights, humiliation and embarrassment we suffered. If we are wrong about you, and I hope we really are wrong, please
accept our appeal for forgiveness and apologies. GOD is my witness, that what I have told you is the truth.
Mr. Chief Justice, the Filipino people know how religious you are. Please do what a religious man ought to do in serving justice.
Please live up to our, as well as HIS expectations. (Emphasis supplied)
On November 2, 2004, Chief Justice Davide required Mercados lawyer, Atty. Jose P. Villanueva, to comment on the letter and show
cause why he should not be held in contempt of court.6
On November 17, 2004, the Courts Third Division ordered Mercado to personally appear on November 22, 2004 and show cause
why he should not be held in contempt of court.7
On the scheduled date, Mercado, together with Atty. Pablo G. Macapagal, his new counsel, appeared before the Third Division and
swore to the truth of the letter he wrote.8 He manifested that he only stated therein what Atty. Villanueva told him that his petition
was denied for the second time "because of the tremendous pressure from the Chief Justice." He further manifested that during the
wake of Atty. Villanuevas mother, he (Atty. Villanueva) pointed to Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, bragging that she is "a very
very good, close and long time friend of his." 9However, while stating this, Mercado referred to Justice Conchita Carpio Morales as
Justice Gutierrez.10
Forthwith, the Third Division issued in open court a Resolution11 directing Atty. Macapagal to submit a written explanation why
Mercado should not be held in contempt of Court.
For his part, Atty. Villanueva submitted a comment,12 strongly denying Mercados allegations in his letter. He denied having told
petitioners that their petition had to be denied again "because there was a tremendous pressure from the Chief Justice in favor of

Security Bank Corporation." He also stressed that there was no correlation between the ponentes trip to the United States and his trip
to London. He explained that he and his family went to London to attend the graduation of his daughter, Cherriemaya Veloso
Villanueva. To substantiate this, he submitted a photocopy of "London School of Economics (LSE) and Political Science Presentation
Ceremonies" where the name of his daughter, Cherriemaya Veloso Villanueva, is listed as one of the successful graduates. He
likewise submitted a photocopy of his passport indicating his departure for London on July 14, 2004 and his arrival in the Philippines
on July 27, 2004. In addition, he said he never met anyone from respondent bank, including its lawyers, and that there is no truth to
Mercados statement regarding his nephews alleged encounter with the new owners of the subject property.
On December 13, 2004, Mercado submitted his explanation 13 why he should not be punished for contempt of court. He claimed that
the contemptuous statements in his letter merely reiterate the tenor of Atty. Villanuevas statements. He offered an apology,
explaining that he wrote the letter while he was "under the impulse of personal stress" as he was losing his residential house.
On January 26, 2005, the Third Division ordered both Mercado and Atty. Villanueva to appear on February 21, 2005 to elucidate their
respective positions.
Mercado testified that it was Atty. Villanueva who informed him that the ponente is Justice Gutierrez. Atty. Villanueva even bragged
that she is his "very, very close friend."
For his part, Atty. Villanueva testified that it was Mercado who informed him that Justice Gutierrez is the ponente. He also confirmed
that she attended the wake of his mother. But he denied Mercados claim that he pointed to Justice Gutierrez and said that she is his
close friend.14
Thereafter, the Third Division designated Court of Appeals Justice Renato C. Dacudao as Commissioner to receive evidence on the
factual issues involved in the contempt incident. 15
On May 18, 2005, Justice Dacudao submitted his Investigation, Report and Recommendation. He found Mercado "guilty of improper
conduct tending to bring the authority and the administration of justice by the Court into disrespect when he openly belittled,
degraded, and embarrassed the Highest Court of the land, particularly the Chief Justice x x x." However, he held that "there was no
showing that he acted with malice and/or in bad faith or that he was properly motivated." Thus, he recommended that Mercado be
fined in the sum of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).
We cannot sustain Justice Dacudaos finding that Mercado did not act with malice or bad faith in imputing those derogatory and
disrespectful remarks against Chief Justice Davide and the ponente.
Bad faith imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong.16 It contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes.17 Malice is of the same
genre. It connotes a sinister motive.
Mercados addressing such letter to Chief Justice Davide is a perfect illustration of bad faith and malice tending directly to degrade the
administration of justice. It transgresses the permissible bounds of fair comment and criticisms bringing into disrepute, not only the
authority and integrity of Chief Justice Davide and the ponente, but also of the entire Judiciary. While feigning to be searching for
truth on whether Chief Justice Davide indeed exerted "tremendous pressure" to the ponente, he repeatedly humiliated him and the
Judiciary in the most loutish and insolent manner. He accused him of doing an "unthinkable, ungodly, and malicious" act and of
depriving his (Mercados) family of their "basic fundamental rights in the protection of (their) property without due process." He
concluded that what Chief Justice Davide did to his family "is unforgivable not only to God and to humanity." In an insulting and
insolent tenor, he stated that "if the Chief Justice, himself, is the first person to make a mockery of our laws," then there is "no wonder
why foreign investors do not want to invest in our country."
Furthermore, he alleged that an irregularity or bribery attended the denial of his petition for review. He insinuated that the travels of
Atty. Villanueva and the ponente abroad were financed by respondent bank, stating that "when there is smoke, there is fire." He also
recklessly accused the ponente of giving respondent bank a "go-signal" to sell his property. In this backdrop, he asked Chief Justice
Davide to "refrain from influencing the members of the Third Division;" "let them deliberate regularly on the case or inhibit
themselves on the case;" and "let the Institution serve justice, and not individual pecuniary interests."
Finally, he condemned the entire Judiciary by saying "there is no justice in our courts, the Supreme Court in particular." And with
impudence, he threatened Chief Justice Davide to enlighten him before he "seeks another forum to seek redress for the injustices,
sleepless nights, humiliation and embarrassment" his family suffered.
Without doubt, Mercados letter is marked with malice, bad faith, and gross disrespect. He committed a remarkable feat of character
assassination and honor vilification. Contrary to his claim that he is just verifying the truth of Atty. Villanuevas statements, the words

in his letter are more accusatory than inquisitorial. What is disconcerting is that his accusations have no basis in fact and in law.
Obviously, they caused intense pain and humiliation on the part of Chief Justice Davide and the ponente.
The Resolution of the Third Division of this Court dated September 15, 2004 denying Mercados motion for reconsideration is well
explained. A principle almost repeated to satiety is that "an action for annulment of judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost
remedy of appeal." A party must have first availed of appeal, a motion for new trial or a petition for relief before an action for
annulment can prosper. Its obvious rationale is to prevent the party from benefiting from his inaction or negligence. Also, the action
for annulment of judgment must be based either on (a) extrinsic fraud or (b) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. 18 Having
failed to avail of the remedies and there being a clear showing that neither of the grounds was present, the petition must be dismissed.
Only a disgruntled litigant would find such legal disposition unacceptable.
Mercado bewails the denial by the Third Division of his petition through a mere Minute Resolution and afterreinstating the petition.
Apparently, he finds the Courts manner of denial and change of heart unusual and casts sinister undertone to them.
In In Re Laureta,19 we ruled that the Court is not "duty-bound" to render signed decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to
formulate decisions and/or minute resolutions, provided a legal basis is given depending on its evaluation of a case. In the same case,
we held that "the recall of a due course Order after a review of the records of the case is a common occurrence in the Court." Like the
respondents in the said case, Mercado should not think that it is only his petition which has been subjected to such recall.
The Third Division initially denied Mercados petition because it is apparent on its face that the Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error in dismissing his petition for annulment of judgment. Considering his motion for reconsideration alleging that the
Appellate Court merely relied on technical rules of procedure and that his former counsel committed gross negligence, the Third
Division took the most prudent course by reinstating the petition. Now, after considering the petition and the comment thereon, the
Third Division was convinced that, indeed, the Appellate Court did not commit any reversible error. Is this irregular? The answer is a
resounding "no." The reinstatement of a petition does not guarantee that it will be subsequently granted. Otherwise, the filing of
comment and subsequent pleadings would be an exercise in futility.
Now, in a bid to escape liability for contempt, Mercado invokes freedom of speech and privacy of communication.
We are not persuaded.
A person charged with contempt of court for his utterances which clearly constitute contempt may not ordinarily escape liability by
merely invoking the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. Liberty of speech must not be confused with abuse of such liberty.
When he attributed those contemptuous remarks to Chief Justice Davide and the ponente, Mercado abused such liberty. His statements
cast aspersions to their reputation and integrity and create a distrust to the Judiciary.
The fact that Mercados letter was addressed only to the Chief Justice does not rinse it of its contemptuous character. In In Re
Laureta,20 we ruled that letters addressed to individual Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial functions become
part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire court.
Accordingly, we hold Mercado guilty of indirect contempt of court.
Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity
given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a
person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxxxxx
d. Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
xxxxxx
As for Atty. Villanueva, while Justice Dacudao did not categorically state that he (Atty. Villanueva) told Mercado that Chief Justice
Davide exerted "tremendous pressure" on the ponente, the reason why the petition was dismissed for the second time, however, we are
inclined to believe that Atty. Villanueva gave such information to Mercado. Not only that, Atty. Villanueva also revealed the name of
the ponente; that he and the ponente have known each other since 1964; and that the ponente would be at

the wake of his mother, thus:

After a careful and conscientious examination of the evidence adduced in the instant case, the undersigned investigator is fully
convinced that it was only through Atty. Villanueva that petitioner could have learned or known the name of the ponente in the case.
As between petitioner and Atty. Villanueva, the undersigned investigator in inclined to give more credence to the testimony of
petitioner. Not only was petitioner consistent, firm, and candid and detailed in his testimony, but he was also able to corroborate his
claims, by submitting his diary which contained vital entries and by presenting the testimony of his nephew. x x x
Moreover, it was admitted by Atty. Villanueva that he and Justice Gutierrez have known each other since 1964 and that Justice
Gutierrez was in the wake of his mother. These admissions tend to strengthen the allegations of petitioner that Atty. Villanueva was
the one who told him the name of the ponente; that Atty. Villanueva told him that he and the ponente are very close; and that when
petitioner attended the wake of Atty. Villanuevas mother, he was told by Atty. Villanueva that Justice Gutierrez, the ponente, was
coming.
Rule 15.06 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to
influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body." Further, Rule 15.07 provides that "a lawyer must impress upon his client
compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness." Atty. Villanueva took the forbidden course. In informing Mercado that he
was "a very very good, close and long time friend" of the ponente, Atty. Villanueva impressed upon the former that he can obtain a
favorable disposition of his case. However, when his petition was dismissed twice, Mercados expectation crumbled. This prompted
him to hurl unfounded, malicious, and disrespectful accusations against Chief Justice Davide and the ponente.
We have repeatedly admonished lawyers from making bold assurances to their clients. A lawyer who guarantees the successful
outcome of a litigation will exert heavy pressure and employ any means to win the case at all costs. But when the case is lost, he will
blame the courts, placing them under a cloud of suspicion. As what happened in this case, Atty. Villanuevas statements led Mercado,
not only to suspect but also to believe, that the entire Court, together with Chief Justice Davide and the ponente, could be pressured or
influenced,
Responsibility enjoins lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due to courts and the judicial officers. 21 Atty. Villanuevas conduct,
no doubt, degraded the integrity and dignity of Chief Justice Davide and the ponente and this Court as well.
Thus, we find Atty. Villanueva also guilty of indirect contempt of court.
On the appropriate penalty, the general rule is that courts have inherent power to impose a penalty for contempt reasonably
commensurate with the gravity of the offense. And that the degree of punishment for contempt is said to lie within the sound
discretion of the court.22 Considering the circumstances obtaining herein, we believe that Mercado and Atty. Villanueva should be
fined P50,000.00 each and warned that a repetition of similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty.
One last word. The reason for the inherent power of courts to punish for contempt is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability
of the judicial institution. Without such guarantee, the institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation. 23 Thus, we must act to
preserve its honor and integrity from assaults of disrespect. One reason why respect of the public for the Judiciary has diminished is
because of unscrupulous lawyers who imply that judges and justices can be influenced or bribed. Such conduct has no place in the
legal profession.
WHEREFORE, Jose Teofilo T. Mercado and Atty. Jose P. Villanueva are declared GUILTY of indirect contempt of court. They
are FINED P50,000.00 each and WARNED that a repetition of similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Villanuevas personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof
be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
SPS. ANTONIO and NORMA SORIANO,

A.C. No. 4676

Complainants,
Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.
Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and

- versus -

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Promulgated:

May 4, 2006

ATTY. REYNALDO P. REYES,

Respondent.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

For alleged gross negligence in handling two civil cases, a complaint[1] for disbarment was filed by complainant spouses
Antonio and Norma Soriano against Atty. Reynaldo P. Reyes.

Complainants alleged that sometime in the latter part of 1990, they engaged the services of respondent in a case they filed
against Peninsula Development Bank entitled, Norton Resources and Development Corporation, et al. v. Peninsula Development
Bank. The case was for Declaration of Nullity with Injunction and/or Restraining Order before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Davao City, Br. 13, docketed as Civil Case No. 20-465-90.[2] While the case was pending, respondent reassured complainants that
he was diligently attending to the case and will inform them of the status of their case.

In 1994, complainants again engaged the services of respondent in a case they filed against the Technology
and Livelihood Resource Center entitled, Spouses Antonio M.Soriano and Norma Soriano v. Technology and Livelihood Resource
Center for Declaration of Nullity with Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order before the RTC ofDavao City, Br. 16, docketed
as Civil Case No. 22-674-94.[3] During the pendency of the second case, complainants inquired from respondent the status of the
earlier Civil Case No. 20-465-90, the latter informed them that the same was still pending and/or ongoing.

Later, complainants learned that Civil Case No. 20-465-90 was dismissed[4] on 16 December 1991 for failure of the
respondent to file a pre-trial brief. The dismissal reads:
On record is a pre-trial brief filed by defendant, thru counsel, Atty. Marlon B. Llauder, and this morning a
supplemental pre-trial brief was submitted by defendants counsel. Atty. Reynaldo Reyes, counsel for the plaintiffs
is present in Court but he moved for a suspension of the pre-trial conference this morning for the reason that
plaintiffs are proposing to amicably settle this case. Defendants counsel vehemently objected to the postponement
of the pre-trial conference and instead moved for a declaration of plaintiffs as non-suited for the reason that up to
this time, plaintiffs have not submitted their pre-trial brief in violation of the Order of the Court, dated October 11,
1991, wherein plaintiffs counsel was afforded five (5) days from said date within which to submit to Court
plaintiffs pre-trial brief.
The said motion is well-taken for the reason that the records failed to show that plaintiffs filed pre-trial
brief. They are thus, declared as non-suited.
This case is hereby ordered dismissed.[5] (Underscoring supplied.)

A motion[6] for reconsideration was filed but the same was denied in an Order dated 27 April 1992.

As to Civil Case No. 22-674-94, complainants likewise found out that the case was dismissed for failure to prosecute. The
order reads:
The records show that summons with a copy of the complaint have been served upon the defendant on May
11, 1994, but plaintiffs did not file the necessary pleadings in order to prosecute the same.
IN VIEW HEREOF, for failure to prosecute this case is ordered DISMISSED.
Furnish copy of this order, Atty. Reynaldo P. Reyes, plaintiffs counsel and defendants counsel, Atty.
Francisco Figura.[7] (Underscoring supplied.)

Upon filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, though, the case was reconsidered and reinstated [8] on 15 August 1995.

Claiming that the acts of respondent greatly prejudiced and damaged them, complainants filed a Complaint for disbarment
against respondent before this Court.

On 20 October 1997, the Supreme Court referred [9] the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation or decision.
In his Comment,[10] respondent admitted that he was hired by the complainants in the case against the Peninsula Development
Bank in the latter part of 1990. He averred that Peninsula Development Bank foreclosed the property of the complainants for failure
to pay monetary obligations amounting to several millions of pesos. He said that some of the properties of the complainants were

foreclosed in 1989, and the one-year redemption period was to expire in the latter part of 1990. About one week before the expiration
of the redemption period, the complainants, through the respondent, filed a case against the Peninsula Development Bank before the
RTC of Davao City, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 20-465-90. From the time of the filing of the complaint up to the present,
herein complainants are in continuous possession of the already foreclosed properties, consisting of a Ford Econovan and farm
tractors. According to respondent, complainants are still holding office in the real properties subject of the foreclosure and a portion
thereof is being rented by a big taxi company. He disclosed that at the time he was hired in 1990, the agreement was that he would be
paid the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) as attorneys fees in five years. Respondent claimed that he
assisted complainants in applying for a loan to pay off their obligations with Peninsula Development Bank but because of the
numerous estafa cases filed against complainants, said loans did not materialize. Respondent further claimed that their agreed strategy
was to arrange a settlement with regard to Civil Case No. 20-465-90. Respondent said he later realized that the complainants had no
interest in paying their obligations to Peninsula Development Bank, and his attorneys fees. Respondent added that they differed in
opinion with regard to the handling of the case and that complainants did not understand that the filing of the case had already helped
them gain time to negotiate with the bank especially on the matter of interest incurred by their loans. Finally, respondent concluded
by saying that his attorneys fees, paid in meager installments, remain outstanding and unpaid.

In their reply,[11] complainants refuted respondents allegation of the alleged numerous estafa cases filed against
them. Complainants averred that the certification attached by respondent showing that there were estafa cases filed against them has
no bearing insofar as the disbarment case is concerned. They likewise denied that respondent assisted them in their loan
application. They engaged the services of the respondent to prevent them from losing their properties to the Peninsula Development
Bank and for no other reason. Finally, complainants maintained that respondent was paid his attorneys fees.

As early as 27 June 2000, the case had already been scheduled for hearing by Commissioner Agustine V. Gonzaga of the
Commission on Bar Discipline. On 18 January 2002, after several hearings, the Commission admitted the documentary evidence
offered as part of the testimony of complainants. On 1 March 2002, the day respondent was ordered to present his defense evidence,
he failed to appear. Counsel for the complainants moved that the respondent be deemed to have waived his right to present his
evidence for failure to appear on scheduled hearing despite due notice. In the interest of substantial justice, respondent was given a
period of 10 days to comment on the complainants motion and scheduled the case for hearing on 19 April 2002. Despite due notice,
however, respondent again failed to appear, thus, the Hearing Commissioner declared that respondent was considered to have waived
his right to present his defense evidence. The parties were given 20 days from 19 April 2002 to file their respective memoranda, after
which the case will be deemed submitted for resolution.

Only complainants filed a memorandum.

On 28 May 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan found respondent negligent in handling the cases of
complainants; hence, said Investigating Commissioner recommended that he be disbarred. The pertinent portions of the report read:
There is no question that the respondent was engaged by the complainants as their counsel in two cases,
namely Civil Case No. 20-465-90 and Civil Case No. 22-674-94. The respondent accepted both cases by filing a
case of Nullity with Injunction and/or Restraining Order before the Regional Trial Court Br. 13, Davao City, against
Peninsula Development Bank and against Livelihood Resource Center for Declaration of Nullity with Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order docketed as 22-674-94, Br. 16 RTC Davao City. The failure and negligence of
respondent in handling the aforementioned cases is fully reflected in the Order of the Court re: Civil Case No. 20465-90 which reads:
On record is a pretrial brief filed by defendant thru counsel, Atty. Marlon B. Llander and this morning a
supplemental pretrial brief was submitted by defendants counsel, Atty. Reynaldo Reyes, counsel for the plaintiff is
present in court but he moved for a suspension of the pretrial conference this morning for the reason that plaintiffs
are proposing to amicably settle this case. Defendants counsel vehemently objected to the postponement of the pre
trial conference and instead moved for a declaration of plaintiffs as nonsuited for the reason that up to this time,
plaintiff have not submitted their pretrial brief in violation of the Order of the Court, dated October 11, 1991
wherein plaintiffs counsel was afforded five (5) days time from date within which to submit to court plaintiffs pre
trial brief.
The motion is well taken for the reason that the records failed to show that plaintiffs filed pretrial
brief. They are thus declared as nonsuited.
This case is hereby ordered dismissed. x x x Regarding Civil Case No. 22-674-94, Regional Trial Court
Br. 16, Davao City in the case filed against Technology and Livelihood Resource Center the court issued an Order
dated May 5, 1995 which reads:
The record show that summons with a copy of the Complaint have been served upon the defendant
on May 11, 1994, but plaintiffs did not file the necessary pleadings in order to prosecute the same.
In view hereof, for failure to prosecute this case is ordered Dismissed. x x x The records show that the real
status of the cases were kept from the complainants by respondent. Despite the dismissal of both cases due to
respondents negligence and irresponsibility he continued receiving compensation from complainants are evidenced
by the receipts and vouchers which respondent acknowledged with his signatures. (Exhibits F, G, H, H-1
and I). Likewise, the respondent deceived the complainant by giving them false hopes that everything was alright
and there was no problem regarding the cases.
All the foregoing show that there is clear violation of his oath as a lawyer particularly Canon 17 and Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, it is submitted that Atty. Reynaldo P. Reyes be meted the
penalty of Disbarment.[12]

On 21 June 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved [13] the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.

In the interregnum, a Motion to Withdraw Testimony and Evidence [14] was filed by complainant Norma B. Soriano before
this Court, stating that:

1.

That although the complainant in this case names the spouses Antonio Soriano and Norma
B. Soriano as the complainants, it is only complainant Norma B. Soriano who has testified and presented
evidence during the hearing of this case due to the untimely demise of her husband, complainant
Antonio Soriano;

2.

That subsequently to the undersigned complainants testimony and presentation of evidence, she has
come upon information and facts that need to be reviewed and re-examine[d] in the highest interests of
justice;

3.

That before going into those information and facts that she came to learn after she gave her testimony
before this Honorable Board, it is important to stress the following antecedent circumstances:

(a)

That it was undersigned complainants late husband who conferred constantly with
respondent Atty. Reynaldo P. Reyes;

(b)

That herein complainant was not present in a conference with Atty. Reyes at the time
his professional services were hired. So, it was only the deceased complainant
Antonio Soriano who was familiar with the scope of professional engagement;

(c)

That undersigned complainant did not participate in the conference between her late
husband and respondent counsel on the agreed strategy because the late husband was the
one actively managing the affairs of the family. Moreover, herein complainant was not
really knowledgeable of the facts and details involved in the cases handled by respondent
counsel;

(d)

That for example, it was only later after her testimony that she learned that respondent
was also attending to and handling the other cases of the late complainant
Antonio Soriano, especially those cases filed in Makati, Complainant herein had the
mistaken impression that the complainant-decedent had availed of the services of lawyers
in Makati. Hence, the fees that respondent Atty. Reyes received after the cases below
were for those cases in Makati;

(e)

That it was a surprise for herein undersigned complainant to also learn that
respondent Atty. Reyes went out of his way to accompany her late husband to a financier,
who was an intimate friend of respondent, in Quezon City for the purpose (sic) sourcing
the necessary funds to pay off our obligations to some creditors as the agreed strategy at
the very start. Thus, it appears that respondent counsel went out of his way to help the
late complainant Antonio Soriano solve his problems; and

(f)

That I likewise subsequently learned that when respondent counsel became a city
councilor of Davao City, he did what he can to help the late complainant
AntonioSoriano have a council clearance over a parcel of land that he was selling for a
memorial park.

4.

That the foregoing facts and information that herein undersigned complainant learned after she gave
her testimony seriously prompts her to seek the withdrawal of her testimony and her evidence in order that
she can re-evaluate the same; and

5.

That complainant herein is filing the instant motion in the interests of truth and justice as it is farthest
from her intention to have this case resolved through an inadvertent presentation of facts that do not exactly
reflect the entirety of the story and the truth, no matter how innocently and in good faith they were
presented.[15]

The above quoted motion is tantamount to a withdrawal or desistance of the complaint.

As we have previously ruled, the affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case executed by a complainant does not
automatically exonerate the respondent.

A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. [16] What matters
is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of negligence has been duly proved. This rule is premised on
the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no
redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose
of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to
the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have
in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred
despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges. [17] Accordingly, notwithstanding the motion to withdraw
evidence and testimony, the disbarment proceeding should proceed.

Looking into the merits of the complaint against respondent, we decide to modify the findings of the IBP.

As to Civil Case No. 20-465-90, records show that it was dismissed for failure of respondent to file the pre-trial brief.

Respondents failure to file the pre-trial brief constitutes inexcusable negligence.[18] The importance of filing a pre-trial brief
cannot be gainsaid. For one, the lawyers are compelled to prepare their cases in advance. They eliminate haphazard preparation. Since
pre-trial is a serious business of the court, preparation of the lawyers and parties for the pre-trial in both questions of fact and of law
cannot be overemphasized as an essential requirement for a pre-trial conference. They enable both parties to view the documentary
evidence of the other even before they are presented in court. They enable the parties to know the testimonies of each others
witnesses. Pre-trial briefs also apprise the courts of the additional points the parties are willing to stipulate upon, or the additional
points which could be inquired into for the purpose of additional stipulations. They also apprise the court of the respective demands of
the parties, thus, enabling the court to discuss more intelligently an amicable settlement between or among the parties. [19] The failure
to submit a pre-trial brief could very well, then, be fatal to the case of the client as in fact it is a ground for dismissal of the
case. [20] For this reason, respondents failure to submit the pre-trial brief to the court within the given period constitutes negligence
which entails disciplinary action. Not only is it a dereliction of duty to his client but to the court as well. Hence, this Court, in Spouses
Galen v. Atty. Paguirigan,[21] explained:
An attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. A
failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. The respondent has indeed

committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to
aid in the speedy administration of justice.

In this case, respondent did not only fail to file the pre-trial brief within the given period. Worse, he had not submitted the
required pre-trial brief even at the time he filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal several months later. Expectedly,
the motion for reconsideration was denied by the court. Respondents negligence is apparent in the trial courts denial of the motion
for reconsideration, to wit:
The court, in the exercise of sound discretion, afforded the plaintiffs who were then present, five (5) days
from October 11, 1991, within which to submit to the Court plaintiff pre-trial brief, but despite the order, and until
December 16, 1991, a period of more than two (2) months has elapsed, yet herein plaintiffs still failed to file or submit
the required pre-trial brief, which to the mind of this Court, is an obstinate refusal on the part of the plaintiffs to file
said pre-trial brief, despite counsels knowledge of the importance of the same.
The plaintiffs, even in the filing of their Motion for reconsideration did not even care to attach pre-trial brief
if indeed they are sincere in their intention to do so.

Clearly, respondent was not able to protect his clients interest through his own fault.

A lawyer is expected to be familiar with the rudiments of law and procedure and anyone who acquires his service is entitled
to, not just competent service, but also whole-hearted devotion to his clients cause. It is the duty of a lawyer to serve his client with
competence and diligence and he should exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of law, the interest of his client. A lawyer
should never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence in fulfilling his duty will render him liable for
disciplinary action.[22]

Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. In this case, by reason of Atty. Reyess
negligence, complainant suffered actual loss. He should have given adequate attention, care and time to his cases. This is why a
practicing lawyer may accept only so many cases that he can efficiently handle. Otherwise, his clients will be prejudiced. Once he
agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he should do any less, then he is not true to his
lawyers oath.[23]

Respondents excuse that complainants, from the time of filing of the complaint up to the time of filing his comment, were in
continuous possession of the foreclosed property is flimsy. It only shows the cavalier attitude which respondent took towards his
clients cause.

Anent Civil Case No. 22-624-94, the case was indeed dismissed for failure to prosecute although the said dismissal was later
on reconsidered. However, this does not detract to the conclusion that, truly, respondent failed to demonstrate the required diligence in
handling the case of complainants.[24]

Quite apart from the above, respondent also lacked candor in dealing with his clients as he omitted to apprise complainants of
the status of the two cases and even assured the complainants that he was diligently attending to said cases. [25]

In Garcia v. Atty. Manuel,[26] this Court found therein respondent lawyer in bad faith for failing to inform his client of the
status of the case. In said decision, the court has adamantly stressed that the lawyer-client relationship is highly fiduciary.[27] There is
always a need for the client to receive from the lawyer periodic and full updates on developments affecting the case. The lawyer
should apprise the client on the mode and manner that the lawyer is utilizing to defend the clients interests. [28]

In failing to inform his clients of the status of their cases, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men
of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such manners of professional employment. [29]

Time and again we have stated that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to
disbar must always be exercised with great caution for only the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the
standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be
decreed where any punishment less severe such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine would accomplish the end desired.[30]

The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts. The penalties for a lawyers failure to file the required brief or pleading range from reprimand, warning with fine, suspension
and in grave cases, disbarment. In one case,[31] the penalty for a lawyers failure to file a pre-trial brief and other pleadings such as
position papers leading to the dismissal of the case, is suspension of six months. Therefore, we find the penalty of disbarment as
recommended by the IBP to be unduly harsh and we deem it appropriate to impose the penalty of one (1) year suspension, taking into
account that this appears to be his first offense.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Reynaldo Reyes is found GUILTY of violating Canons 17 and 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective upon finality
hereof with WARNING that a repetition of the same negligent act charged in this complaint will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal records as
attorney; the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts of the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES WILLIAM ADECER
and TERESITA P. ADECER,
Complainants,

ADM. CASE No. 4809

Present:

- versus-

ATTY. EMMANUEL AKUT,

Respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.
Chairman,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for disbarment filed by Spouses William and Teresita Adecer (complainants) against Attorney
Emmanuel A. Akut (respondent).
The instant petition is an offshoot of Criminal Case No. 72790 entitled People of the Philippines v. William Adecer and
Teresita Adecer in which complainants were charged with committing a crime punishable under Article 318 of the Revised Penal
Code (Other Deceits), before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cagayan de Oro, BranchNo. 5 (MTCC). Respondent was their legal
counsel in the criminal case.

On 25 March 1997, respondent received a copy of the MTCCs Decision [1] dated 12 March 1997 convicting complainants of
Other Deceits and sentencing them to the penalty of arresto mayor[2] and a fine of not less than P30,000.00.[3] Complainants were also
ordered to pay civil liability in the form of damages and attorneys fees totalingP66,000.00 to the private respondents in the criminal
case.[4] On 26 March 1997, the Decision was promulgated in the absence of the complainants, who were accorded due
notice. Complainants received a copy of the Decision via registered mail on 4 April 1997. Respondent received an additional copy of
the Decision on even date.
Respondent had fifteen (15) days from 25 March 1997, or until 9 April 1997, to file either an appeal[5] or a petition for
probation[6] in behalf of the complainants. However, it was only on 16 May 1997 over a month after the Decision had become final
and executory that respondent filed a Petition for Probation.

The MTCC issued a Writ of Execution On 19 May 1997. The next day, a warrant of arrest was served on complainants [7] and
they were incarcerated.[8]
On 28 May 1997, respondent filed a Memorandum in Support of the Petition for Probation stating, [i]mmediately upon her
receipt of a copy of the decision, accused Teresita Adecer contacted [her] lawyer but [her] lawyer was out of town during that time
and so, while waiting for her lawyer to come home, she raised the required amount necessary to pay the civil indemnity awarded in the
decision.[9] Respondent explained that complainant Teresita Adecer raised the money in the belief that an application for probation
would not be granted unless all monetary awards are paid in full. [10] Respondent recounted that it was only on 16 May 1997, when
complainant Teresita approached him and handed to him the money for the settlement of the civil liability, that he informed her that
the application for probation should have been filed within the period for appeal.
The Petition for Probation was denied through a Resolution dated 7 June 1997. The MTCC held that the law does not permit
the grant of probation after the lapse of the period for filing an appeal. [11] With regard to respondents allegation that he was out of
town during the period for filing an appeal, the MTCC examined the calendars of various courts and ascertained that respondent had
scheduled and attended hearings before several courts in Cagayan de Oro during said period. This prompted the MTCC to comment,
[t]he court does not know if defense counsel suffered a sudden lack of vitamins to make him forget his duties towards his
clients.[12] It appears that complainants filed a Motion for Reconsideration with an Atty. Rogelio Zosa Bagabuyo as pro bono counsel
for the complainants.[13] The motion was denied through a Resolution dated 30 June 1997.
The records also reflect that complainants filed a pleading entitled Urgent Omnibus Motions to Recall Writ of Execution and for
a Second Motion for Reconsideration with Leave of Court dated 21 June 1997.[14] In answer to insinuations in said pleading,
respondent, as former counsel of the complainants, filed a Manifestation dated 30 June 1997. He claimed therein that the
complainants only had themselves to blame for failing to file a timely petition for probation. Allegedly, the complainants failed to
comply with an agreement with respondent that they would immediately go to respondents office to discuss the steps to be taken
should they receive an adverse decision. Respondent claimed that during the time complainants desisted from approaching him, he
could not make a choice in behalf of the complainants between the remedy of appeal and the benefits of probation. He recounted that
complainants came to his office only on 9 May 1997, a month after the decision had become final and executory, with money to pay
for the civil liability. He asked them to return the next day, but they returned only on 16 May 1997 after he sent somebody to fetch
them on several occasion[s].[15]
On 29 July 1997, while serving their sentence at the Lumbia Detention and Rehabilitation Center, complainants filed the instant
administrative case praying that respondent be disbarred and ordered to reimburse complainants of expenses, with interest and
damages.[16]

In his Comment dated 22 February 1998, respondent reiterated his account in the Memorandum in Support of the Petition for
Probation dated 28 May 1997 on why a timely petition for probation was not filed. However, his explanation evolved somewhat since
the last time. This time, he stated that complainants deliberately failed to meet with him seasonably for the signing of the verification
of the Petition for Probation.[17] On the MTCCs finding that respondent appeared before Cagayan de Oro courts during the period to
file an appeal, he retorted that he moved for the postponement of most of these hearings and attended only the more important
ones.[18] He explained that he was out of his office most of the time because starting February 1997, he and his wife were always out
of town looking for faith healers to cure the malignant brain tumor of his wife, who succumbed to the cancer on 1 August
1997.[19] Allegedly, after attending the important hearings, he immediately went out of town seeking faith healers. [20]

The instant case was referred by this Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation.[21] On 29 October 2003, Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes filed a Manifestation before this Court reporting that
the records of the case were lost due to a carnapping incident.
On 7 November 2003, the records of the case were reconstituted. Stipulations were made and the parties agreed that the case
would be deemed submitted for decision upon their filing of their respective Supplemental Position Papers.[22] Furthermore, despite
complainants several allusions to deceit on the part of respondent, the parties agreed on a single issue for resolution, i.e., whether
respondent is administratively liable for a violating the principles of legal ethics and the Code of Professional Responsibility in filing
the Petition for Probation beyond the reglementary period. [23]
In his Report and Recommendation dated 15 July 2005, Commissioner Reyes found that respondent failed to exercise the proper
diligence in dealing with the case of his clients and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1)
month and admonished henceforth to be more careful in the performance of his duties to his clients. The IBP Board of Governors
resolved to adopt and approve the findings of Commissioner Reyes with the modification that respondent instead be suspended for six
(6) months. The case is now on review by this Court pursuant to Section 12 (b), Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court.[24]
We affirm the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and adopt the recommendation of the Board of Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. [25] He
shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation. [26] Nor shall he neglect a legal matter entrusted to him; his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.[27]
Respondent is bound by the representations he made in his Memorandum in Support of the Petition for Probation, i.e., that a
timely petition for probation was not filed due to the fact that he was out of town and that complainants were laboring under the
misapprehension that the civil liability must be paid in full before probation could be availed of. Either of his two explanations is
enough ground to render him liable for negligence under the Code of Professional Conduct. First, despite his receipt of a copy of the
Decision and the consequent running of the fifteen (15)-day period to file a petition for probation, respondent went out of town

without contacting complainants to give them proper legal advice. Furthermore, his admission that complainants were [1] under the
impression that they first had to pay off their civil liabilities prior to filing a petition for probation and [2] unaware that they had only
fifteen (15) days from their counsels receipt of a copy of the decision to file their petition, proves that he failed to give complainants
timely legal advise.
We consider first the implications of respondents allegation that he was out of town as his justification to the MTCC for failing
to file a timely petition.
At the outset, it must be remembered that respondent was given a copy of the Decision while he was in town. Surely, he could
have addressed his clients need during that time. At the very least, he should have made room in his schedule to confer with
complainants on what course of action to take in furtherance of their cause and to prepare the necessary legal moves toward such end.
Furthermore, respondent was not away for the entirety of the crucial period and could have attended to his clients needs during
the instances he was in Cagayan de Oro. And even if respondent had left town during the entire fifteen (15)-day period, in this age of
cellular phones, long distance telephone accessibility, and even overnight mail delivery, it is highly unlikely that respondent would not
be able to attend to his clients needs were he so inclined. He could at least have found a way to speak to his clients to inform them
regarding the short window within which to file their petition. He could even have prepared a petition and mailed the same to his
clients in order that they could sign it and themselves file it in court; or as intimated by the MTCC, he could have filed a motion for
extension of time to file a petition for probation. [28]

There are many ways to provide proper representation for his clients and many things which respondent could have done that
would give this Court the impression that he had the least bit of concern for his clients cause. But nothing of the sort was presented
by respondent. Since he is primarily responsible for filing the vital pleading that would have made possible for his clients to avail of
probation, we find that respondents omission is a culpable act of negligence for which he must be held liable.

Furthermore, when the MTCC decided to take judicial notice of his scheduled hearings within Cagayan de Oro to expose his lie,
respondent explained that he was in town to attend some of the more important hearings but was out of town most of the
time. Aside from the fact that respondent had attempted to deceive the court by initially stating without qualification that he was out
of town, he later on uttered words which reveal his notion that some of his cases were more important, and therefore, given more
immediate attention than others. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, skill and competence, regardless of his
impression that one case or hearing is more important than the other. [29]
Respondent has attached a death certificate showing that his wife died from cardiac arrest close to the period in question. We
commiserate with respondent for the loss of his wife, and appreciate fully that during the period of a mans existence when the sense
of mortality and loss is most closely felt more then ever, it would appear that no responsibility is more important than tending to loved

ones. However, such is the lawyers charge that no personal consideration should stand in the way of performing a legal duty.[30] In
these situations, it is only fair that a lawyer should lighten his case load lest he prejudice his clients cases.
We have held that the failure of an attorney to file a timely motion for reconsideration or an appeal renders him liable for
negligence under the Code of Professional Responsibility. [31] In the instant case, the negligence exhibited by the respondent is made
more grievous by the fact that the Decision to be acted upon is one that subjects his clients to incarceration. The liberty of ones
clients is not to be taken lightly, whether the sentence is for destierro or reclusion perpetua. Litigants entrust their properties,
liberties, and even lives, in the hands of their lawyers, who must protect these values with utmost zeal and vigilance.
What compounds respondents negligence is his indifference to complainants plight. He abruptly dismissed his failure to
communicate with complainants by stating that, even if [complainants] house is near respondents office, yet respondent does not
know [where] their house [is] as he ha[s] never gone to said house. It has never been the practice of respondent to visit his clients in
their home. It must be the client who must go to him.[32]

Respondents choice to be oblivious to his clients place of residence is his prerogative. This, however, neither excuses nor
explains why he was unable to contact his clients by telephone or cellular phone to properly advise them of their legal
options. Furthermore, in adopting this style of dealing with clients, respondent takes the obvious risk of being incapable of contacting
his clients during crucial periods. He should, thus, be prepared to be held in the event that his manner of dealing with clients results in
the latters being deprived of remedies to which they would otherwise be entitled, for it is the duty of an attorney to advise his client
promptly whenever he has any information which is important that the client receive.[33]
To cover his own inattention, respondent even blamed his clients for their ignorance by stating that they were under the wrong
impression that the civil liability should be paid in full before they could ask for probation. The laymens lack of knowledge of
substantive and procedural law is the exact reason why they hire the services of counsel. It was counsels responsibility to look after
the welfare of his clients by communicating with them to determine whether they would take the avenue of an appeal or a petition for
probation and to thereafter prepare and file the relevant pleading.
We note the IBP Investigating Commissioners observation that complainants themselves did not show much interest in their
own case. Indeed, complainants did not attend hearings of their case; the decision was promulgated in their absence; during trial,
complainants were thrice ordered arrested for their failure to attend hearings; thrice, too, respondent had to file a motion for
reconsideration of the orders of arrest. It is true that the client must, with regard to his case, exercise that standard of case which an
ordinary prudent man bestows upon his important business. [34] However, complainants lackadaisical attitude is relevant only with

regard to the binding effect upon them of the lapse of the fifteen (15)-day period and their loss of the fight to file the petition for
probation. The instant administrative proceeding concerns respondents omission, not those of his clients.
The lawyer should serve his client in a conscientious, diligent and efficient manner and he should provide a quality of services
at least equal to that which lawyers generally would expect of a competent lawyer in the like situation.[35] By agreeing to be his
clients counsel, he represents that he will exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care and skill having reference to
the character of the business he undertakes to do, to protect the clients interests and take all steps or do all acts necessary therefor, and
his client may reasonably expect him to discharge his obligations diligently.[36] Respondent has failed to measure up to his oath.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Atty. Emmanuel A. Akut is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
six (6) months and ADMONISHED henceforth to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties to his clients, with the caveat
that commission of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
RE: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE EDMUNDO T. ACUA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, CALOOCAN
CITY, BRANCH 123.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On November 21, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received a Letter [1] dated November 3, 2003 from
Concerned citizens of the lower court reporting the alleged practices of Judge Edmundo T. Acua, Regional Trial Court,
Caloocan City, Branch 123. According to the letter, the respondent Judge conducted trials, signed orders and even sentenced accused
while on official leave from August 15, 2001 to September 15, 2001. Among the decided cases were as follows:
1. Crim. Case No. C-63250 People v. Alex Sabayan;
2. Crim. Case No. C-63261-62 People v. Renato Simo;
3. Crim. Case No. C-61323 People v. Elizabeth Canaberal;
4. Crim. Case No. C-63238 People v. Narciso Asistio, et al.; and
5. Crim. Case No. C-63238 People v. Marlon Duritan.
The letter went on to question whether the respondent had authority to impose such sentences, issue orders and conduct
hearings. Aside from listing the respondents dialogues, his favorite expressions were likewise listed, as follows:
1. Putris
2. Anak ng pating
3. Putang Ina
4. Pogi, beauty
5. Tulungan nyo naman ako, hirap na hirap na ko.
6. Mali ka na naman.
According to the unknown complainants, the respondent Judge also spends much of his energy talking and loves to berate and
embarrass people, not caring whether he speaks in open court, as long as he has an audience. The complainants further stated that the
respondents decisions usually take about seven to ten drafts, as he changes his mind so many times. It was further alleged that the
respondent loves to glorify himself, and that his behavior was weird.
In his comment, the respondent averred that the writers of the letter were actuated by improper motive, and sent the letter with no
other purpose than to harass him. Furthermore, the allegations in the letter were fabricated, exaggerated, or misquoted.

Anent the allegation that he conducted trials, signed orders and issued sentences while he was on official leave, the respondent
alleged that he was issued an Authority to Travel[2]dated August 14, 2001 duly approved and signed by then Acting Court
Administrator Zenaida Elepao allowing him to travel to Toronto, Canada to visit his brother, who unfortunately passed away before
he could leave. As evidenced by the entries in the daily time records/logbook, [3] he was not yet on leave from August 15, 2001 to
August 21, 2001. As such, he had the right and duty to come to court and conduct trials, sign orders and issue sentences. His
application[4] for a thirty-day leave was from August 21, 2001 to September 21, 2001, duly approved by Deputy Court Administrator
Jose P. Perez.
On the allegation that he exhibited weird behavior, he explained that he was still mourning the loss of his eldest son who died of
a fatal aneurism last December 21, 2002. His son, who was at the prime of his life, had just taken the 2002 bar examinations and was
employed at a law firm. The respondent Judge surmised that the unknown complainants may have seen and observed him at the
second phase of his recovery, a time when he was depressed and angry.
As to the alleged humiliating statements that he made, the respondent Judge admitted having made some of them while he was
discussing the performance ratings of his staff. He insisted, however, that he had been misquoted, and dismissed as mere fabrication
some of the statements attributed to him. He admitted, however, that putris, putang-ina, beauty andpogi were among his favorite
expressions, but clarified that he did not use them often, certainly not in open court.
In its Report dated September 17, 2004, the OCA recommended that the instant administrative case be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter, and that the respondent be reprimanded for ignorance of a policy on leave of absence expressed through the
ruling of the Court in Paz v. Tiong,[5] where it was held that a judge on leave of absence would have absolutely no authority to
discharge his duties or exercise the powers of a judge. The OCA made the following evaluation:
Official records culled from the OCA Office of Administrative Services indicate that Judge Acua had an approved application for
leave covering the period from 21 August 2001 to 21 September 2001. This application for leave of absence was approved on 3
August 2001. In view of this approved application for leave, it was a natural expectation that Judge Acua would cease from
exercising his functions during the said period.
However, per verification with the clerk-in-charge at RTC Branch 123, Caloocan City, respondent Judge Acua presided over the
following cases on 21 August 2001:
1. Criminal Case No. C-63250 entitled People v. Alex Sibayan;
2. Criminal Case No. 63261-62 entitled People v. Renato Simo; and
3. Criminal Case No. 61323 entitled People v. Canaberal.
In his Comment dated 19 January 2004, the respondent judge admitted reporting for work on 21 August 2001 and presiding over two
(2) criminal cases. He even took pride in the fact that he did not go on leave that day, pointing to the courts logbook as proof of his
attendance.
The admission by Judge Acua confirms the allegation in the anonymous letter that he performed his functions on a day when he was
already on leave of absence. The reference made by the respondent judge to the logbook only serves to establish that he indeed
performed his duties on 21 August 2001 the first day of his official leave. We state that not even his overzealousness to work can
shield him from administrative liability for ignorance of the consequences of his approved application for leave of absence.[6]
In a Resolution[7] dated December 8, 2004, the Court resolved to refer the matter to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Monina
Arevalo-Zearosa for investigation, report and recommendation. The respondent manifested that he was going to file an extended
comment, which the Investigating Justice allowed.
In his supplemental comment, the respondent alleged that he decided to defer his leave for another week as his siblings who
would be going with him to Canada had not yet secured their visas. The respondent alleged that he was even uncertain if this could be
done by amending his travel authority. Jenny Rivera-Baliton, the clerk in charge of criminal cases in the respondents sala, informed
him that this would take another week or so. Ms. Rivera-Baliton executed an affidavit attesting to the veracity of the respondents
claim. Thus, the respondent decided not to defer his leave anymore, and no longer reported for work beginning August 22, 2001. On
the issue of hearing cases on August 21, 2001 despite his approved travel authority and approved leave, the respondent claimed, thus:
I was not actuated by any evil or improper motive. Neither was I motivated by any monetary consideration or otherwise except by
my desire to discharge my sworn duty to administer justice expeditiously. I acted in good faith and in the honest belief that I had the
right to defer the effectivity of my leave chargeable against the 30-day forfeitable leave benefit. I wish to reiterate at this juncture what
I stated in my original comment that the leave I applied for in 2001 was my first full availment of the 30-day forfeitable leave.
Previously, and even after 2001, I went on forfeitable leave only for several days and never consumed the complete 30 days leave
accorded to judges. In hearing cases on August 21, 2001, I did not receive any extra remuneration for it. The public service was not
prejudiced thereby. I had in mind only the interest of the accused who were in detention. I had no intention of violating any rule, nor

was it ever my intention to prejudice anybody. On that day, as in the past, I had a heavy case load, involving detention prisoners as I
[my court is] a Drugs Court. (My court is also a commercial [law] and [Intellectual Property Law] Court, the only branch in Caloocan
City which is that). Had I not heard the cases of the accused who pleaded guilty on that day, they would have waited for my return
after 30 days.
If I committed any infraction of the rules on leave, in all sincerity, to reiterate, there was no intention at all on my part to so disregard
the rules. If I committed any infraction, I plead for the leniency of this Court with a promise that I will not commit a repetition thereof
anymore.[8]
The Investigating Justice thereafter submitted her Report, recommending that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. She
ratiocinated that while the respondent Judge admitted having performed his functions on August 21, 2001, the date of the
commencement of his approved leave, there was nothing repulsive in deferring the date of his leave. Moreover, there was no showing
that the respondent was actuated by any ulterior motive other than to lessen his workload. According to the Investigating Justice, the
respondents decision to report for work that day appears to have been motivated by his honest belief that he could defer his leave and
make the necessary adjustments later; he had no clear intent to deliberately ignore the rules regarding vacation leaves. The
Investigating Justice further pointed out that nobody was prejudiced by the respondents appearance during that day, and went on to
state:
However, respondent should bear in mind that approved leaves are filed through official documents and in the future, such act may
obliterate the validity of the issuances he made while on official leave when his orders, decisions and other promulgations reflect a
date when he is already supposed to be on leave. Thus, he should exercise utmost caution regarding these matters.
Therefore, in our consideration, the act of respondent does not constitute such a gross ignorance of the rules that will warrant an
administrative liability. In view of the lack of malice and improper motive in reporting for work and discharging his functions and
taking into account his desire to dispense justice promptly, respondent cannot be said to have been grossly ignorant of the rules as to
be deemed administratively liable.[9]
As to the use of humiliating and insensitive expressions, the Investigating Justice agreed with the OCA that the use of putris
and putang ina were unfit expressions for men of the robe. It did not matter that they were not directed to any person in particular,
as they give the impression of a persons ill manners. Considering that the respondent is not an ordinary citizen, such intemperate
language detracts from how a judge should conduct himself. The Investigating Justice made the following conclusion:
In sum, we find that the allegations in the anonymous complaint, some of which were admitted with qualifications by the respondent,
are not sufficient to warrant a penalty other than to remind him of the rules regarding official leaves and of proper conduct of judges.
As a final note, respondent is reminded that as a judge, it is paramount that a judges official conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only in the bench and in the performance of his official duties, but also in
his everyday life should be beyond reproach. This includes following simple rules as well as conducting himself in the most
respectable and honorable manner possible. Only through such kind of demeanor of the members of the judiciary that the institution
earns the respect and faith of our people in the administration of justice. [10]
The Court agrees with the Investigating Justices observation that the respondents use of such expletives is improper for the
extolled office of a magistrate of the law. By virtue of the very office he holds, the public expects more of the respondent as he
undeniably occupies an exalted yet delicate niche in the administration of justice. Those who don the judicial robe and wield the
judicial gavel ought to impress in their consciousness that appearance is an essential manifestation of reality. [11] Thus, the respondents
claim that his favorite expressions were not directed at anyone in particular is unacceptable.
Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and in language. [12] Indeed, a judge should
so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.[13] Propriety and the
appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge. [14] We recognize, of course, that judges are also
human beings, with their own burdens and private affairs. However, having accepted the esteemed position of judge, the respondent
ought to have known that more is expected of him than an ordinary citizen. As subjects of constant public scrutiny, personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen should be freely and willingly accepted by a judge. In
particular, he or she must exhibit conduct consistent with the dignity of the judicial office. [15] Indeed, a judges personal behavior, not
only while in the performance of official duties, must be beyond reproach, being the visible personification of law and of justice.[16]
Thus, while we commiserate with the respondent Judge for the loss of his brother and son, we cannot spare him from the
consequences of his unacceptable behavior.
In Ignacio v. Valenzuela,[17] a judge who heard a motion while he was on vacation was held guilty of impropriety and was meted
a fine of one months salary. To reiterate, a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all

activities.[18] Thus, in conducting hearings and promulgation of decisions on the day when his official leave of absence was to
commence, the respondent Judge was guilty of impropriety. Considering, however, that no bad faith or ill motive can be attributed to
the respondent, the Court deems it proper to reprimand him for his actuations.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Edmundo T. Acua is found GUILTY of impropriety and is REPRIMANDED therefor. He
is STERNLY WARNED that the repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
A.C. No. 6963

February 9, 2006

VICTORINA BAUTISTA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a Complaint1 filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on November 16, 2004,
complainant Victorina Bautista2 prays for the suspension or disbarment of respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe for malpractice and
unethical conduct in the performance of his duties as a notary public and a lawyer.
Complainant alleged that on January 3, 1998, respondent prepared and notarized a Magkasanib na Salaysay3purportedly executed by
Donato Salonga and complainants mother, Basilia de la Cruz.4 Both affiants declared that a certain parcel of land in Bigte,
Norzagaray, Bulacan, was being occupied by Rodolfo Lucas and his family for more than 30 years. Complainant claimed that her
mother could not have executed the joint affidavit on January 3, 1998 because she has been dead since January 28, 1961. 5
In his Answer,6 respondent denied that he falsified the Magkasanib na Salaysay. He disclaimed any knowledge about Basilias death.
He alleged that before he notarized the document, he requested for Basilias presence and in her absence, he allowed a certain
Pronebo, allegedly a son-in-law of Basilia, to sign above the name of the latter as shown by the word "by" on top of the name of
Basilia. Respondent maintained that there was no forgery since the signature appearing on top of Basilias name was the signature of
Pronebo.
On April 4, 2005, respondent filed a manifestation7 attaching thereto the affidavit of desistance8 of complainant which reads in part:
Ako na si, VICTORINA BAUTISTA CAPA, x x x matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas ay malaya at kusang loob na
nagpapahayag ng mga sumusunod:
1. Na ako ang siyang tumatayong nagrereklamo laban kay Abogado, SERGIO EXQUIVEL BERNABE, sa isang kaso sa
Tanggapan ng Integrated Bar of the Philippines na may Blg. CBD CASE NO. 04-1371;
2. Na ang nasabing habla ay hindi ko kagustuhan sapagkat iyon ay pinapirmahan lamang sa akin ni ELISEO OLOROSO at
ng kanyang Abogado na si Atty. MARCIAL MORFE MAGSINO at sa katunayan hindi ako nakaharap sa Notaryo Publiko na
si Abogado CARLITOS C. VILLARIN;
3. Na ang pagpapapirma sa akin ay isang panlilinlang at ako ay ginawang kasangkapan para sirain ang magandang pangalan
nitong si Abogado SERGIO ESQUIVEL BERNABE;
4. Na dahil sa ganitong pangyayari, aking hinihiling sa Tanggapan ng Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) na ang reklamo
ko laban sa nasabing Abogado SERGIO ESQUIVEL BERNABE ay mapawa[la]ng bisa.
In the report dated August 29, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner 9 recommended that:
1. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be suspended from the practice of the legal profession for one (1) month;
2. Any existing commission of Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe as notary public, be revoked; and

3. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be barred from being granted a notarial commission for a period of one (1) year. 10
In a resolution dated October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner with modification that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and his notarial
commission be revoked and that he be disqualified for reappointment as notary public for two years.
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
The records sufficiently established that Basilia was already dead when the joint affidavit was prepared on January 3, 1998.
Respondents alleged lack of knowledge of Basilias death does not excuse him. It was his duty to require the personal appearance of
the affiant before affixing his notarial seal and signature on the instrument.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The presence of the parties to the deed
will enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant.11
Respondents act of notarizing the Magkasanib na Salaysay in the absence of one of the affiants is in violation of Rule 1.01, 12 Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law. 13 By affixing his signature and notarial seal on the instrument, he led
us to believe that Basilia personally appeared before him and attested to the truth and veracity of the contents of the affidavit when in
fact it was a certain Pronebo who signed the document. Respondents conduct is fraught with dangerous possibilities considering the
conclusiveness on the due execution of a document that our courts and the public accord on notarized documents. Respondent has
clearly failed to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of his function as a notary public and to comply with the mandates of the
law.14
Respondent was also remiss in his duty when he allowed Pronebo to sign in behalf of Basilia. A member of the bar who performs an
act as a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed
and personally appeared before him. The acts of the affiants cannot be delegated to anyone for what are stated therein are facts of
which they have personal knowledge. They should swear to the document personally and not through any representative. Otherwise,
their representatives name should appear in the said documents as the one who executed the same. That is the only time the
representative can affix his signature and personally appear before the notary public for notarization of the said document. Simply put,
the party or parties who executed the instrument must be the ones to personally appear before the notary public to acknowledge the
document.15
Complainants desistance or withdrawal of the complaint does not exonerate respondent or put an end to the administrative
proceedings. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What
matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been
proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and
afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the
purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to
answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have
in the proper administration of justice.16
We find the penalty recommended by the IBP to be in full accord with recent jurisprudence. In Gonzales v. Ramos,17 respondent
lawyer was found guilty of notarizing the document despite the non-appearance of one of the signatories. As a result, his notarial
commission was revoked and he was disqualified from reappointment for a period of two years. In addition, he was suspended from
the practice of law for one year.
Finally, it has not escaped our notice that in paragraph 2 18 of complainants affidavit of desistance, she alluded that Atty. Carlitos C.
Villarin notarized her Sinumpaang Salaysay19 dated November 12, 2004 which was attached to the complaint filed with the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, without requiring her to personally appear before him in violation of the Notarial Law. This
allegation must likewise be investigated.
WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional Responsibility, the notarial commission of respondent Atty.
Sergio E. Bernabe, is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two years. He is
also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year, effective immediately. He is further WARNED that a repetition
of the same or of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He isDIRECTED to report the date of receipt of this Decision in order
to determine when his suspension shall take effect.

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is DIRECTED to investigate the allegation that Atty.
Carlitos C. Villarin notarized the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Victorina Bautista dated November 12, 2004 without requiring the latters
personal appearance.lavvph!1.net
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over
the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 91133. March 22, 1993.
ROMINA M. SUAREZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH LXI, ANGELES CITY, respondents.
Ranel L. Trinidad for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; LAWYERS; OBLIGATIONS. The legal difficulty petitioner finds herself in is imputable to the negligence of
her de parte counsel, Atty. Vicente San Luis, in abandoning the conduct of the case without formally withdrawing or at least informing
petitioner that he would be permanently staying in the U.S.A. so that petitioner could appoint another counsel. A lawyer owes absolute
fidelity to the cause of his client. He owes his client full devotion to his genuine interests, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense
of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability (Canon 17, Code of Professional Responsibility; Agpalo's Legal
Ethics, p. 157). A lawyer is required to exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care and skill having reference to the
character of the business he undertakes to do (Agpalo's Legal Ethics, p. 174). Among his duties to his client is attending to the
hearings of the case (People's Homesite and Housing Corp. vs. Tiongco, 12 SCRA 471 [1964]; Agpalo's Legal Ethics, p. 175).
2. ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF CLIENTS; NOT PROTECTED IN CASE AT BAR. A client may reasonably expect that his counsel will
make good his representations (Agpalo's Legal Ethics, p. 169) and has the right to expect that his lawyer will protect his interests
during the trial of his case. For the general employment of an attorney to prosecute or defend a cause or proceeding ordinarily vests in
a plaintiff's attorney the implied authority to take all steps or do all acts necessary or incidental to the regular and orderly prosecution
or management of the suit, and in a defendant's attorney the power to take such steps as he deems necessary to defend the suit and
protect the interests of the defendant (7A C.J.S. 315). Petitioner, therefore, had the right to expect that her counsel de parte, Atty. San
Luis, would protect her interests during the trial of the cases. However, as aforestated, Atty. San Luis failed to discharge his duties as
counsel for petitioner.
3. ID.; ID.; CLIENT BOUND BY HIS COUNSEL'S NEGLIGENCE; EXCEPTION. As a general rule, a client is bound by his
counsel's conduct, negligence, and mistakes in handling the case during the trial (Fernandez vs. Tan Ting Tic, 1 SCRA 1138 [1961];
Rivera vs. Vda. de Cruz, 26 SCRA 58 [1968]; Don Lino Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 61 SCRA 87 [1974]). However,
the rule admits of exceptions. A new trial may be granted where the incompetency of counsel is so great that the defendant is
prejudiced and prevented from fairly presenting his defense (People vs. Manzanilla, 43 Phil. 167 [1922]; 16 C.J. 1145; 24 C.J.S. 68).
Where a case is not tried on the merits because of the negligence of counsel rather than the plaintiff, the case may be dismissed but, in
the interest of justice, without prejudice to the filing of a new action (De Los Reyes vs. Capule, 102 Phil. 464 [1957]).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Petitioner was deprived of her right to present and prove her defense due to the negligence of
her counsel. The appearance of a certain Atty. Buen Zamar is of no moment as there was no client-attorney relationship between him
and petitioner who did not engage his services to represent her in said cases. The fact that notices of the promulgation of judgment
were sent to petitioner at her address of record produced no legal consequence because notice to a party is not effective notice in law
(Elli vs. Ditan, 5 SCRA 503 [1962]; Mata vs. Rita Legarda, Inc., 7 SCRA 227 [1963]). We rule, therefore, that under the facts of the
case, petitioner was deprived of due process of law. It is the better part of judicial wisdom and prudence to accord to petitioner the
opportunity to prove her defense. It is abhorrent to the judicial conscience to consign petitioner to the ordeals of imprisonment without
affording her full opportunity to present her evidence including, of course, the assistance of competent counselling.

DECISION
MELO, J p:
Before is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 17488 and to
direct respondent trial court to reopen the joint trial of Criminal Cases No. 7284 to 7296, 7302-7303, and 7650.
It appears from the record that on May 7, 1985 petitioner was charged in Criminal Cases No. 7284-7296, and No. 7302-7303 before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Angeles City with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the Bouncing Check Law. On August
21, 1985, petitioner was again charged in the same court with the same offense in Criminal Case No. 7650. All these cases were
consolidated for trial and decision in Branch LXI of the Regional Trial Court of the Third Judicial Region in Angeles City, at that time
presided over by the Honorable Ramon C. Tuazon who has since retired. At the arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty" to all the
informations against her. She then posted bail in all the cases and was granted provisional liberty.
At the trial of the cases, petitioner did not appear in court despite notices sent to her residence as appearing on the record and to her
bondsmen. Her counsel de parte, Atty. Vicente San Luis appeared in her behalf during the time the prosecution was presenting its
evidence up to October 20, 1987 when it was the turn of the defense to present its evidence. However, the hearing on said date was
postponed because of the absence of the private prosecutor and the continuation of the hearing was reset to November 19, 1987. On
said date, Atty. Buen Zamar entered a special appearance for Atty. San Luis as counsel for the accused without, however, the consent
of petitioner. From said date Atty. San Luis Did not appear in court as he had left for the United States of America and has not
returned since then, without informing petitioner or withdrawing his appearance. Atty. Zamar, together with the prosecution, asked for
deferment of the hearing that day as he was not conversant with the facts of the case, and the continuation of hearing was reset to
January 6, 1988, on which date Atty. Zamar again asked for postponement and the hearing was reset to February 3, 1988. However,
also on January 6, 1988, the trial court issued an order forfeiting in favor of the government the bonds posted by petitioner for her
provisional liberty in view of the failure of her bondsmen to produce her at the scheduled hearing of the cases against her. It appears
that sometime in June, 1987, petitioner got married and lived with her husband at their conjugal dwelling at the Villa Dolores
Subdivision, Angeles City.
On May 17, 1988, the trial court issued a notice in Criminal Case No. 7650 setting the promulgation of its decision on May 13, 1988
and said notice was sent by registered mail to Atty. San Luis and the petitioner's bondsmen and served by personal service by the
court's process server at her address of record upon her mother who informed the process server that petitioner had been out of the
country for almost two years already. Her mother did not forward the notice to petitioner.
On May 31, 1988, when Criminal Case No. 7650 was called for promulgation of judgment, the trial court appointed Atty. Augusto
Panlilio as counsel de oficio to represent the absent petitioner. The judgment of conviction of petitioner was promulgated by the
reading of the decision in open court by the Branch Clerk of Court and furnishing the parties through their respective counsel present
in court with copies of the decision. Likewise, copies of the decision were sent by registered mail to petitioner's bondsmen, her
attorney of record, and petitioner herself at her address of record, 1799 Burgos St., Angeles City.
On June 14, 1988, the trial court issued notices to all the parties setting the promulgation of its joint decision in Criminal Cases No.
7284-7296 and 7302-7303 for June 29, 1988. Copies of the notices were sent by registered mail to petitioner's counsel of record, Atty.
Vicente San Luis, and to her bondsmen. Copy of the notice was served upon petitioner by personal service at her given address, which
notice was received by her mother who again informed the process server that petitioner was out of the country.
On June 29, 1988, promulgation of the joint judgment of conviction of petitioner in the aforementioned was made by the Branch Clerk
of Court who read the decision. Petitioner was represented by Atty. Buen Zamar at the reading of sentence.
On December 31, 1988, petitioner was arrested and detained in the local jail of Angeles City.
On February 6, 1989, petitioner, now represented by a new counsel de parte filed three motions, namely: (1) for temporary release as
she was pregnant and allegedly suffering from a heart ailment; (2) to set aside promulgation of judgment (p. 44, Rollo); and (3) to reopen trial (p. 50 Rollo). The prosecution opposed the motions The trial court then denied the motions to set aside judgment and to reopen trial, but with regard to the motion for temporary release, directed that "should a medical examination or confinement in the
hospital be necessary, the court may allow the accused under guard to consult a physician or enter a hospital for medical treatment."
Thereupon, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with this Court which was later docketed as G.R. No. 87564-79. The petition was,
however, per our resolution dated April 24, 1989, referred to the Court of Appeals where the petition docketed as CA. G.R. SP No.
17488. On September 26 1989, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition.
Hence, the instant petition where petitioner assigns the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:

I. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR THE CHECKS
SUBJECT OF CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 7284, 7285 AND 7303 EVEN IF SHE WAS NEITHER THE DRAWER NOR MAKER OF
THE SAME;
II. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WERE VALID PROMULGATIONS OF JUDGMENTS IN
THE SAID CASES;
III. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PAYMENT OF THE OBLIGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE
CHECKS SUBJECT OF THE CRIMINAL CASES WOULD (NOT) MERIT LESS SEVERE PENALTIES IF NOT THE
EXTINGUISHMENT OF THE ENTIRE CRIMINAL LIABILITY;
IV. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NO SUFFICIENT GROUNDS EXIST TO WARRANT THE
REOPENING OF THE JOINT TRIAL OF THE CASES SUBJECT OF THE PETITION.
(pp. 7-8, Rollo.)
The resolution of this case hinges on the issue of whether or not petitioner was denied her day in court.
The legal difficulty petitioner finds herself in is imputable to the negligence of her de parte counsel, Atty. Vicente San Luis, in
abandoning the conduct of the case without formally withdrawing or at least informing petitioner that he would be permanently
staying in the U.S.A. so that petitioner could appoint another counsel.
A lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client. He owes his client full devotion to his genuine interests, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability (Canon 17, Code of Professional
Responsibility; Agpalo's Legal Ethics, p. 157). A lawyer is required to exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care
and skill having reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do (Agpalo's Legal Ethics, p. 174). Among his duties to his
client is attending to the hearings of the case (People's Homesite and Housing Corp. vs. Tiongco, 12 SCRA 471 [1964]; Agpalo's
Legal Ethics, p. 175).
Atty. Vicente San Luis, petitioner's counsel de parte in the afore-stated cases, was unquestionably negligent in the performance of his
duties to his client, herein petitioner. His negligence consisted in his failure to attend to the hearings of the case, his failure to advise
petitioner that he was going to stay abroad so that the petitioner could have secured the services of another counsel, and his failure to
withdraw properly as counsel for petitioner. This is a clear case where a party was totally abandoned by her counsel. A client may
reasonably expect that his counsel will make good his representations (Agpalo's Legal Ethics, p. 169) and has the right to expect that
his lawyer will protect his interests during the trial of his case. For the general employment of an attorney to prosecute or defend a
cause or proceeding ordinarily vests in a plaintiffs attorney the implied authority to take all steps or do all acts necessary or incidental
to the regular and orderly prosecution or management of the suit, and in a defendant's attorney the power to take such steps as he
deems necessary to defend the suit and protect the interests of the defendant (74 C.J.S. 315). Petitioner, therefore, had the right to
expect that her counsel de parte, Atty. San Luis, would protect her interests during the trial of the cases. However, as aforestated, Atty.
San Luis failed to discharged his duties as counsel for petitioner.
As a general rule, a client is bound by his counsel's conduct, negligence, and mistakes in handling the case during the trial (Fernandez
vs. Tan Ting Tic, 1 SCRA 1138 [1961]; Rivera vs. Vda. de Cruz, 26 SCRA 58 [1968]; Don Lino Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 61 SCRA 87 [1974]. However the rule admits exceptions. A new trial may be granted where the incompetency of counsel is
so great that the defendant is prejudiced and prevented from fairly presenting his defense (People vs. Manzanilla, 43 Phil. 167 [1922];
16 C.J. 1145; 24 C.J.S. 68). Where a case is not tried on the merits because of the negligence of counsel rather than the plaintiff, the
case may be dismissed but, in the interest of justice, without prejudice to the filing of a new action (De Los Reyes vs. Capule, 102
Phil. 464 [1957].
Clearly, petitioner was deprived of her right to present and prove her defense due to the negligence of her counsel. The appearance of
a certain Atty. Buen Zamar is of no comment as there was no client-attorney relationship between him and petitioner who did not
engage his services to represent her is said cases. The fact that notices of the promulgation of judgment were sent to petitioner at her
address of record produced no legal consequence because notice to a party is not effective notice in law (Elli vs. Ditan, 5 SCRA 503
[1962]; Mata vs. Rita Legarda, Inc. 7 SCRA 227 [1963]).
We rule, therefore, that under the facts of the case, petitioner was deprived of due process of law. It is the better part of judicial
wisdom and prudence to accord the petitioner the opportunity to prove her defense. It is abhorrent to the judicial conscience to consign
petitioner to the ordeals of imprisonment without affording her full opportunity to present her evidence including, of course, the
assistance of competent counselling.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 17488, the decision of the trial court in the subject criminal
cases, and the order of the trial court denying petitioner's motion to set aside the promulgation of judgment and to reopen the cases are
hereby SET ASIDE. The trial court is hereby DIRECTED to reopen Criminal Cases No. 7284-7296, 7302-7303, and 7650 for the
reception of evidence for the defense.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No.
MDD-1)
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No.
75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon)
recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration
and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the
cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a
recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys.
Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter
concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his
comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24,
1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in
amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of the integration of
the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A
(hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated and to the
provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from
the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue
the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in
such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:

SECTION 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the 'Integrated
Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll
of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of
Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that
he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay
the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and
effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said
matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative
body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come up
to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license
granted for the exercise of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No.
526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court
exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526
and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on
Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by
individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every
member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which
all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including
the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code
of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and,
upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare to such
an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and
personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally
sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege,
a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the
administration of justice as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this
privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme
Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the
exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the
State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to

discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration
of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of
the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations
of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons
and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs.
Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To
this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a
misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70
Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit
unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines,
which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect
the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the
legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the
language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional
declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which
affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as
might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he
did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in
his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to
associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar
when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the welldefined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated
Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program the lawyers. 9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is
justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void.
We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) which
power the respondent acknowledges from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee
toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed
as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due
process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being
one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the
police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to
practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose
the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether
by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the
inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys,
it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and
supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding
such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding
was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the
conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in
this court as a court appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary
power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has
limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar,
particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the
Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is
itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to
"Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article
X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly
vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is
hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ.,
concur.

CASE DIGEST
ZAGUIIRE VS. CASTILO

FACTS:
Complainant and respondent had their illicit relationship while the latter was preparing to take the bar
examinations. After the admission of the respondent to the Philippine Bar, complainant learned that he was
already married. Respondent, who by now is a lawyer, executed an affidavit, admitting his relationship with the
complainant and recognizing the unborn child she was carrying as his. After the birth of the baby, however,
respondent had started to refuse recognizing the child and giving her any form of support. After due hearing, the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Castillo guilty of gross immoral conduct and recommends that
he be meted the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty imposed is proper.

HELD:
YES. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; Canon 7 and Rule 7.03
of the same Code.
The conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the standards of morality
required of every lawyer. Moreover, the attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement recognizing
and undertaking to support his child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his part which is
highly censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble profession, tantamount to self-stultification.
The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to
his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor.