PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs., ROMEO G.

JALOSJOS
G.R. Nos. 132875-76. November 16, 200
FACTS:
Maria Rosilyn Delantar was a slim, eleven-year old lass with
long, straight black hair and almond-shaped black eyes. She grew up
in a two-storey apartment in Pasay City under the care of Simplicio
Delantar, whom she treated as her own father. Simplicio was a fiftysix year old homosexual whose ostensible source of income was
selling longganiza and tocino and accepting boarders at his
house. On the side, he was also engaged in the skin trade as a pimp.
Rosilyn first met accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos,
sometime in February 1996 at his office located near Robinsons
Galleria. Rosilyn and Simplicio were brought there and introduced
by a talent manager by the name of Eduardo Suarez. Accusedappellant promised to help Rosilyn become an actress. When he saw
Rosilyn, accused-appellant asked how old she was. Simplicio
answered, 10. She is going to be 11 on May 11. Accusedappellant inquired if Rosilyn knows how to sing. Simplicio told
Rosilyn to sing, so she sang the song, Tell Me You Love Me.
Accused-appellant then asked if Rosilyn has nice legs and
then raised her skirt up to the mid-thighs. He asked if she was
already menstruating, and Simplicio said yes. Accused-appellant
further inquired if Rosilyn already had breasts. When nobody
answered,
accused-appellant
cupped
Rosilyns
left
breast. Thereafter, accused-appellant assured them that he would
help Rosilyn become an actress as he was one of the producers of the
TV programs, Valiente and Eat Bulaga.
Simplicio and Suarez then discussed the execution of a contract for
Rosilyns movie career. Accused-appellant, on the other hand, said
that he would adopt Rosilyn and that the latter would have to live
with him in his condominium at the Ritz Towers. Before Simplicio
and Rosilyn went home, accused-appellant gave Rosilyn P2,000.00

n June 14, 1996, at about 8:30 to 9:00 p.m., Simplicio and Rosilyn
returned to accused-appellants condominium unit at Ritz Towers.
When accused-appellant came out of his bedroom, Simplicio told
Rosilyn to go inside the bedroom, while he and accused-appellant
stayed outside. After a while, accused-appellant entered the
bedroom and found Rosilyn watching television. He walked towards
Rosilyn and kissed her on the lips, then left the room
again. Simplicio came in and bid her goodbye. Rosilyn told
Simplicio that accused-appellant kissed her to which Simplicio
replied, Halik lang naman.
Rosilyn was left alone in the bedroom watching television. After
some time, accused-appellant came in and entered the bathroom. He
came out clad in a long white T-shirt on which was printed the word,
Dakak. In his hand was a plain white T-shirt. Accused-appellant
told Rosilyn that he wanted to change her clothes. Rosilyn protested
and told accused-appellant that she can do it herself, but accusedappellant answered, Daddy mo naman ako. Accused-appellant
then took off Rosilyns blouse and skirt. When he was about to take
off her panties, Rosilyn said, Huwag po. Again, accused-appellant
told her, After all, I am your Daddy. Accused-appellant then
removed her panties and dressed her with the long white T-shirt. The
two of them watched television in bed. After sometime, accusedappellant turned off the lamp and the television. He turned to
Rosilyn and kissed her lips. He then raised her shirt, touched her
breasts and inserted his finger into her vagina. Rosilyn felt pain and
cried out, Tama na po. Accused-appellant stopped. He continued
to kiss her lips and fondle her breasts. Later, accused-appellant told
Rosilyn to sleep.
The following morning, Rosilyn was awakened by accused-appellant
whom she found bent over and kissing her. He told her to get up,
took her hand and led her to the bathroom. He removed Rosilyns
shirt and gave her a bath. While accused-appellant rubbed soap all
over Rosilyns body, he caressed her breasts and inserted his finger
into her vagina. After that, he rinsed her body, dried her with a towel

and applied lotion on her arms and legs. Then, he dried her hair and
told her to dress up. Rosilyn put on her clothes and went out of the
bathroom, while accused-appellant took a shower.
Accused-appellant ate breakfast while Rosilyn stayed in the bedroom
watching television. When accused-appellant entered the room, he
knelt in front of her, removed her panties and placed her legs on his
shoulders. Then, he placed his tongue on her vagina. Thereafter, he
gave Rosilyn P10,000.00 and told his housemaid to take her
shopping at Shoemart. When she returned to the Ritz Towers,
Simplicio was waiting for her. The two of them went home. Rosilyn
narrated to Simplicio what accused-appellant did to her, and pleaded
for him not to bring her back to the Ritz Towers. Simplicio told her
that everything was alright as long as accused-appellant does not
have sexual intercourse with her.
(The same scenario happened again for several times. I
will no longer include lahat ng details since pareho-pareho naman,
the only added scene was that Jalosjos placed his penies in between
her thighs and made thrusting motions. important poi to kasi ang
nakalagay lang sa affidavit ng victim ay the penis was placed in
between her thighs and the accused made thrusting motions. )
On July 20, 1996, Simplicio again brought Rosilyn to the
Ritz Towers and same thing happened again. In the early morning of
July 21, 1996, Rosilyn felt somebody touching her sex organ, but she
did not wake up. When she woke up later, she found P5,000.00 on
the table, and she gave this to Simplicio when he came to fetch
her.On August 15, 1996, Rosilyn and Simplicio went to the Ritz
Towers at around 7:00 p.m. Accused-appellant was about to leave,
so he told them to come back later that evening. The two did not
return.
The following day, Rosilyn ran away from home with the
help of Yamie Estreta, one of their boarders. Yamie accompanied
Rosilyn to the Pasay City Police, where she executed a sworn

statement against Simplicio Delantar. Rosilyn was thereafter taken

to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD). The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an
investigation, which eventually led to the filing of criminal charges
against accused-appellant.
The medical examination revealed that Subject is in nonvirgin state physically and There are no external signs of application
of any form of violence.
Jalosjos Contention: He claimed that it was his brother,
Dominador Jun Jalosjos, whom Rosilyn had met, once at accusedappellants Dakak office and twice at the Ritz Towers. Accusedappellant insisted that he was in the province on the dates Rosilyn
claimed to have been sexually abused. He attributed the filing of the
charges against him to a small group of blackmailers who wanted to
extort money from him, and to his political opponents, particularly
Ex-Congressman Artemio Adaza, who are allegedly determined to
destroy his political career and boost their personal agenda.
The defense contends that the testimony of Rosilyn that accusedappellant ejaculated on her thighs and not in her vagina, only proves
that there was no rape
ISSUES:
1.) Whether there was consummated rape. YES
2.) (BILL of RIGHTS-related)Whether there are alleged
inconsistencies in the statement of the victim regarding the
insertion of the penis which would prove that she was
lying. NO
RULING:
1.) Excerpts from the trial records:
Q. And, when you said idinidiin po niya; to which you are
referring? What is this idinidiin niya?
A. Idinidiin niya ang ari niya sa ari ko.

Q. And what did you feel when you said: he was idinidiin niya
ang ari niya sa ari ko?
A. Masakit po.
Even the July 20, 1996 encounter between Rosilyn and
accused-appellant would not tax the sketchy visualization of the
nave and uninitiated to conclude that there was indeed penile
invasion by accused-appellant of Rosilyns labia. On that occasion,
accused-appellant was similarly ensconced between the parted legs
of Rosilyn, except that, this time, Rosilyn was conveniently rested
on, and elevated with a pillow on her back while accused-appellant
was touching, poking and pressing his penis against her
vagina. Topped with the thrusting motions employed by accusedappellant, the resulting pain felt by Rosilyn in her sex organ was no
doubt a consequence of consummated rape.
The childs narration of the rape sequence is revealing. The
act of idinikit-dikit niya was followed by itinutok niya xxx at
idiniin-diin niya. The idiniin-diin niya was succeeded by
Masakit po. Pain inside her ari is indicative of consummated
penetration.
The environmental circumstances displayed by the graphic
narration of what took place at the appellants room from June 14 to
June 16 and June 21 to June 22, 1996 are consistent with the
complainants testimony which shows that rape was legally
consummated.
Nevertheless, accused-appellant may not have fully and for a
longer period penetrated Rosilyn for fear of perpetrating his name
through a child from the womb of a minor; or because of his
previous agreement with his suking bugaw, Simplicio Delantar,
that there would be no penetration, otherwise the latter would
demand a higher price. This may be the reason why Simplicio
Delantar gave his mocking fatherly advice to Rosilyn that it is bad if
accused-appellant inserts his penis into her sex organ, while at the

same time ordering her to call him if accused-appellant would

penetrate her. Such instance of penile invasion would prompt
Simplicio to demand a higher price, which is, after all, as the
Solicitor General calls it, the peculiarity of prostitution.
2.) The defense contends that the testimony of Rosilyn that accusedappellant ejaculated on her thighs and not in her vagina, only proves
that there was no rape. It should be noted that this portion of
Rosilyns testimony refers to the June 15 and 21, 1996 charges of
acts of lasciviousness, and not the rape charges. In any event,
granting that it occurred during the twin instances of rape on June 18
and July 20, 1996, the ejaculation on the victims thighs would not
preclude the fact of rape.
There is no truth to the contention of the defense that
Rosilyn did not see the penis of accused-appellant. As can be
gleaned from the above-quoted portions of the transcripts, Rosilyn
unequivocally testified that accused-appellant held his penis then
poked her vagina with it. And even if she did not actually see
accused-appellants penis go inside her, surely she could have felt
whether it was his penis or just his finger.
In this jurisdiction, the testimony of the private
complainant in rape cases is scrutinized with utmost
caution. The constitutional presumption of innocence requires
no less than moral certainty beyond any scintilla of doubt. This
applies with more vigor in rape cases where the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and is not
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of
the defense. As an inevitable consequence, it is the rape victim
herself that is actually put on trial. The case at bar is no
exception.
Accused-appellant makes much of his acquittal in Criminal
Case Nos. 96-1991, 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-1996, 96-1997, and 961998, for acts of lasciviousness. According to him, the fact that the
trial court sustained his defense of alibi in the said cases only shows
that Rosilyn concocted her stories and the rest of her testimony ought

not to be believed. Stated differently, accused-appellant urges the

application of the doctrine of "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus (false
in part, false in everything).
The contention is without merit. Falsus in uno falsus in
omnibus is not an absolute rule of law and is in fact rarely applied in
modern jurisprudence. Thus, in People v. Yanson-Dumancas, citing
People v. Li Bun Juan, this Court held that:
... In this connection it must be borne in mind that the principle
falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not an absolute one, and that it is
perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with
respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts. In
People vs. Keller, 46 O.G. No. 7, pp. 3222-3223, the following was
quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals from 1 Moore on
Facts, p. 23:
18. Testimony may be partly credited and partly rejected. --- Trier
of facts are not bound to believe all that any witness has said; they
may accept some portions of his testimony and reject other portions,
according to what seems to them, upon other facts and
circumstances to be the truth Even when witnesses are found to
have deliberately falsified in some material particulars, the jury are
not required to reject the whole of their uncorroborated testimony,
but may credit such portions as they deem worthy of belief. (p. 945)
Being in the best position to discriminate between the
truth and the falsehood, the trial court's assignment of values
and weight on the testimony of Rosilyn should be given
credence. Significantly, it should be borne in mind that the issue
at hand hinges on credibility, the assessment of which, as oftrepeated, is best made by the trial court because of its
untrammeled opportunity to observe her demeanor on the
witness stand.

On the demeanor and manner of testifying shown by the

complainant, the trial court stated:
Guided by the foregoing principles, this court found no reason why it
should not believe Rosilyn when she claimed she was
raped. Testimonies of rape victims especially those who are
young and immature deserve full credence (People v. Liquiran,
228 SCRA 62 (1993) considering that no woman would concoct
a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts
and thereafter allow herself to be perverted in a public trial if
she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit
apprehended and punished. (People v. Buyok, 235 SCRA 622
[1996]).
When asked to describe what had been done to her, Rosilyn
was able to narrate spontaneously in detail how she was sexually
abused. Her testimony in this regard was firm, candid, clear and
straightforward, and it remained to be so even during the intense and
rigid cross-examination made by the defense counsel.
Accused-appellant next argues that Rosilyns direct and redirect
testimonies were rehearsed and lacking in candidness. He points to
the supposed hesitant and even idiotic answers of Rosilyn on cross
and re-cross examinations. He added that she was trained to give
answers such as, Ano po?, Parang po, Medyo po, and Sa
tingin ko po.
Accused-appellants arguments are far from persuasive. A
reading of the pertinent transcript of stenographic notes reveals that
Rosilyn was in fact firm and consistent on the fact of rape and
lascivious conduct committed on her by accused-appellant. She
answered in clear, simple and natural words customary of children of
her age. The above phrases quoted by accused-appellant as uttered
by Rosilyn are, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
typical answers of child witnesses like her.

At any rate, even assuming that Rosilyn, during her lengthy ordeals
on the witness stand, may have given some ambiguous answers, they
refer merely to minor and peripheral details which do not in any way
detract from her firm and straightforward declaration that she had
been molested and subjected to lascivious conduct by accusedappellant. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that even the
most candid witness oftentimes makes mistakes and confused
statements. At times, far from eroding the effectiveness of the
evidence, such lapses could, indeed, constitute signs of veracity.
(calvan)

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J.

BROOKS and KARL BECK vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE; NBI, et.al.,
G.R. No. L-19550
June 19, 1967
Concepcion, C.J.
DOCTRINE: The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the
letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a
search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of
the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the
warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should
not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the
other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not
possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence,
no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible
explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity
of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this
fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to
establish a probable cause.
FACTS: A total of 42 search warrants against petitioners
herein and/or the corporations of which they were officers, directed
to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or

the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to

seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds
or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the
means of committing the offense," which is described in the
applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the
Revised Penal Code." (Memorize, tinanong ni Sir to sa Evid)
PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:
Alleging
that
the
aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening
the Constitution and the Rules of Court because, inter alia: (1)
they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and
things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants,
were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence
against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed
against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal
manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were
not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of
in accordance with law, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court
this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and
injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present
case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from
using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in
the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course,
thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search
warrants and declaring the same null and void.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:
Respondents-prosecutors
alleged, (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have

been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said
warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in
any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against
herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the
aforementioned searches and seizures.
ISSUE:
(1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches
and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not
(2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative,
whether said documents, papers and things may be used in
evidence against petitioners herein.1wph1
HELD: (1) Search warrants were NOT VALID (2) The said
articles CANNOT be used in evidence against the petitioners
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority
of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups,
namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the
residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein
have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the
simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the
interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the
offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the
legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights
have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by
third parties.

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in

the nature of general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures
effected upon the authority thereof are null and void. In this
connection, the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional
mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the
contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications
stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other
words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications.
The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed
were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges
who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof
that
the
party
against
whom
it
is
sought
has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating
a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the
applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts
performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the
highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned

applications without reference to any determinate provision of

said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe
out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our
Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the
whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil
sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted
to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to
imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when
the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even
though by legal means.
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for
the contested search warrants was compounded by the description
therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts,
balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records
pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein,
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and
the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights that
the things to be seized be particularly described as well as
tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination
of general warrants.
It was considered that the exclusionary rule is is the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge
Learned Hand:

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence

competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is
that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass
against the offending official may have been protection
enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows
that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be
repressed.
The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but
also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for
a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause
of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the
warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should
not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the
other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not
possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence,
no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible
explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity
of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this
fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to
establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who
secure an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches
or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee
under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in
general, committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly,
those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power
they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the
minority usually but, understandably finds itself in prosecuting
agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the
psychological and moral effect of the possibility of securing their
conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for
whose benefit the illegality had been committed. (cayaban)

One (1) newspaper leaf used to wrap one (1) brick of

dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 959.291 grams.
G.R. No. 173474

August 29, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
REYNALDO BELOCURA y PEREZ, Accused-Appellant.
The Case
Reynaldo Belocura y Perez, a police officer charged with illegal
possession of 1,789.823 grams of marijuana in violation of
Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, was found guilty of the crime
charged on April 22, 2003 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Manila, and sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of P 500,000.00.1
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction on
January 23, 2006.2 Hence, this final appeal for his acquittal.
Antecedents
Belocura was charged on April 13, 1999 by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila with a violation of Section 8 of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, in the Manila
RTC through the information:
That on or about March 22, 1999, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his
custody and control one (1) plastic bag colored red and white,
with label "SHIN TON YON", containing the following:
One (1) newspaper leaf used to wrap one (1) brick of
dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 830.532 grams;

With a total weight of 1,789.823 grams, a prohibited drug.

Contrary to law.3
After Belocura pleaded not guilty,4 the State presented three
witnesses, namely: Insp. Arlene Valdez Coronel, Chief Insp.
Ferdinand Ortales Divina, and SPO1 Gregorio P. Rojas. On the
other hand, the Defense presented Belocura as its sole witness.
I
The States Evidence
On March 22, 1999, at 11 oclock in the morning, Chief Insp.
Divina was in his office in the headquarters of the Western Police
District (WPD) on United Nations Avenue in Manila when he
received a call from a male person who refused to identify himself
for fear of reprisal. The caller tipped him off about a robbery to be
staged along Lopez Street, Tondo, Manila. After relaying the tip to
his superior officer, he was immediately ordered to form a team
composed of operatives of the District Intelligence Group and to
coordinate with the Special Weapons and Attack Team (SWAT)
and the Mobile Patrol of the WPD.
After a briefing, Chief Insp. Divina and the other operatives
proceeded to Lopez Street, reaching the site before 1:00 pm.
Chief Insp. Divina and PO2 Eraldo Santos positioned themselves
along Vitas Street. At around 2:00 pm, Chief Insp. Divina spotted
an owner-type jeep bearing a spurious government plate (SBM510) cruising along Vitas Street and told the rest of the team
about it. The numbers of the car plate were painted white. The
driver was later identified as Belocura. Chief Insp. Divina signaled
for Belocura to stop for verification but the latter ignored the
signal and sped off towards Balut, Tondo. The team pursued
Belocuras jeep until they blocked its path with their Tamaraw FX

vehicle, forcing Belocura to stop. At this point, Chief Insp. Divina

and the rest of the team approached the jeep and introduced
themselves to Belocura as policemen. Chief Insp. Divina queried
Belocura on the government plate. SPO1 Rojas confiscated
Belocuras Berreta 9 mm. pistol (Serial Number M13086Z) that
was tucked in his waist and its fully loaded magazine when he
could not produce the appropriate documents for the pistol and
the government plate. They arrested him.

23, 1999. The first brick bore the marking "RB-1" and weighed
830.532 grams while the other bore the marking "RB-2" and
weighed 959.291 grams, for a total weight of 1,789.823 grams.
She conducted a chemical examination of the marijuana bricks
pursuant to the request for laboratory examination from Chief
Insp. Nelson Yabut of the WPD; and concluded as the result of
three qualitative examinations that the submitted specimen tested
positive formarijuana, a prohibited drug.9

PO2 Santos searched Belocuras jeep, and recovered a red

plastic bag under the drivers seat. Chief Insp. Divina directed
PO2 Santos to inspect the contents of the red plastic bag, which
turned out to be two bricks of marijuanawrapped in newspaper.

II
Evidence of the Defense

Afterwards, the team returned with Belocura to the WPD

Headquarters on board the Tamaraw FX. The team turned over
the jeep and the red plastic bag with its contents to the General
Assignment Section for proper disposition.5
Chief Insp. Divina said that the caller did not mention anything
about any vehicle; that he and his men were in civilian clothes at
the time; that it was PO2 Santos who recovered the red plastic
bag containing the marijuanabricks; and that SPO1 Rojas
examined the contents of the bag in his presence.6
SPO1 Rojas confirmed his part in the operation.7 He conceded
that he was not present when the red plastic bag containing the
bricks of marijuana was seized, and saw the marijuana bricks for
the first time only at the police station.8
Forensic Chemist Insp. Coronel attested that her office received
from the General Assignment Section of the WPD one red plastic
bag labeled "SHIN TON YON" containing two bricks of dried
suspected marijuana fruiting tops individually wrapped in
newspaper at about 12:30 pm of March

Belocura denied the charge. His version, which differed from that
of the Prosecution, was as follows.
On March 22, 1999, Belocura was a police officer assigned in
Police Station 6 of the WPD with a tour of duty from 3:00 pm to
11:00 pm. At 2:00 pm of that day, he was on his way to work on
board his owner-type jeep when about thirty police officers
blocked his path. He introduced himself to them as a police
officer, but they ignored him. Instead, they disarmed and
handcuffed him, and confiscated the memorandum receipt
covering his firearm, his money and his police ID card. He
recognized some of his arrestors as former members of the CIS.
They forced him into their jeep, and brought him to the WPD
headquarters, where they locked him up in a room that looked
like a bodega. They subjected him to interrogation on his alleged
involvement in a robbery hold-up. They informed him of the drugrelated charge to be filed against him only three days later.
Belocura denied owning or possessing the bricks of marijuana,
saying that he saw the bricks of marijuana for the first time only in
court. He insisted that it was physically impossible for the bricks
of marijuana to be found under the drivers seat of his jeep on
account of the clearance from the flooring being only about three
inches. At the time of his arrest, he was in Type-B uniform (i.e.,
blue pants with white side piping and blue T-shirt) because he
was reporting to work that afternoon. Belocura said that his arrest

was effected possibly because he had incurred the ire of a

superior; that it was not unusual for a policeman like him to incur
the ire of a superior officer or a fellow policeman; that he had
arrested a suspect for drug pushing and had detained him in
Police Precinct 2, but the suspect turned out to be the nephew of
Captain Sukila of Precinct 2 who admitted to him that Captain
Sukila owned the drugs; that on the day following the arrest of the
suspect, Captain Sukila called Belocura to request the release of
the suspect (ina-arbor ang huli ko); that he told Captain Sukila
that they should meet the next day so that he could turn over the
suspect; and that on the next day, he was surprised to learn that
the suspect had already been released.10
Belocura did not personally know Chief Insp. Divina prior to his
arrest,11 or the other arresting policemen. He mentioned that his
owner-type jeep had been assembled in 1995, and that he had
attached the plate number assigned to his old vehicle pending the
registration of the jeep despite knowing that doing so was a
violation of law; and that the incident involving the arrest of the
nephew of Captain Sukila was the only reason he could think of
why charges were filed against him.12

Issues
Belocura now submits that:16
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED
NOTWITHSTANDING THE PHYSICIAL IMPOSSIBILITY FOR
THE DRIED BRICKS OF MARIJUANA PLACED UNDER THE
DRIVERS SEAT (sic).
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON THE
INCONSISTENT AND CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESS.
III.

On re-direct examination, Belocura replied that he did not see the

bricks of marijuana whether at the time of his arrest, or at the
police precinct, or during the inquest proceedings. On re-cross,
he clarified that while the drivers seat were fixed to the jeep, the
bricks of marijuana could nevertheless be placed under the
drivers seat only if pressed hard enough, but in that case the
wrappings would get torn because the wirings of the car
underneath the seat were exposed. He recalled that the
wrappings of the bricks of marijuana were intact.13

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE

MARIJUANA DESPITE THE ILLEGALITY OF ITS SEIZURE DUE
TO THE ABSENSE (sic) OF A VALID SEARCH WARRANT.

On April 22, 2003, the RTC convicted Belocura of the crime

charged and sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua and to
pay the fine of P 500,000.00.14

Belocura argues that the Prosecution did not establish his guilt for
the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt; that his warrantless
arrest was unlawful considering that his only violation was only a
breach of traffic rules and regulations involving the illegal use of a
government plate on his newly-assembled jeep; that the
warrantless search of his jeep was contrary to law for violating his

As already stated, the CA affirmed the conviction.15

IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED WHEN HIS GUILT
WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

right against illegal search and seizure protected under Section

17, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution;17 and that
the bricks of marijuana supposedly seized from him, being the
fruit of a poisonous tree, were inadmissible against him.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that
Belocuras arrest and the ensuing search of the jeep were valid,
the search being incidental to a valid, albeit warrantless, arrest;
that the arresting policemen had a reasonable ground to effect his
warrantless arrest; that it became their duty following the lawful
arrest to conduct the warrantless search not only of the person of
Belocura as the arrestee but also of the areas within his reach,
which then resulted in the recovery of the dried bricks
of marijuana from under the drivers seat; and that any irregularity
attendant to the arrest was cured by Belocuras failure to object to
the validity of his arrest before entering his plea and by his
submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC when he entered his
plea and participated in the trial.18
Ruling
After a meticulous examination of the records, the Court
concludes that a reversal of the conviction is justified and called
for.
No arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid
warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. So sacred are
the right of personal security and privacy and the right from
unreasonable searches and seizures that no less than the
Constitution ordains in Section 2 of its Article III, viz:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the

complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly

describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
The consequence of a violation of the guarantees against a
violation of personal security and privacy and against
unreasonable searches and seizures is the exclusion of the
evidence thereby obtained. This rule of exclusion is set down in
Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 3. xxx
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Even so, the right against warrantless arrest, and the right against
warrantless search and seizure are not absolute. There are
circumstances in which the arrest, or search and seizure,
although warrantless, are nonetheless valid or reasonable.
Among the circumstances are those mentioned in Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court, which lists down when a warrantless
arrest may be lawfully made by a peace officer or a private
person, namely:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

On the other hand, the constitutional proscription against

warrantless searches and seizures admits of the following
exceptions, namely: (a) warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest recognized under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court;19 (b) seizure of evidence under plain view; (c) search of a
moving vehicle; (d) consented warrantless search; (e) customs
search; (f) stop-and-frisk situations (Terry search); and (g) exigent
and emergency circumstances.20 In these exceptional situations,
the necessity for a search warrant is dispensed with.
Belocura argues that his arrest and the ensuing search of his
vehicle and recovery of the incriminating bricks ofmarijuana were
in violation of his aforementioned rights under the Constitution
because he was then violating only a simple traffic rule on the
illegal use of a government plate. He claims that the arresting
policemen had no probable cause to search his vehicle for
anything.
The argument of Belocura does not persuade.
Belocura was caught in flagrante delicto violating Section 31 of
Republic Act No. 4139 (The Land Transportation and Traffic
Code).21 In flagrante delicto means in the very act of committing
the crime. To be caught in flagrante delicto necessarily implies
the positive identification of the culprit by an eyewitness or
eyewitnesses. Such identification is a direct evidence of
culpability, because it "proves the fact in dispute without the aid of
any inference or presumption."22 Even by his own admission, he
was actually committing a crime in the presence or within the
view of the arresting policemen. Such manner by which Belocura
was apprehended fell under the first category in Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest was valid, therefore, and the
arresting policemen thereby became cloaked with the authority to
validly search his person and effects for weapons or any other
article he might use in the commission of the crime or was the
fruit of the crime or might be used as evidence in the trial of the
case, and to seize from him and the area within his reach or
under his control, like the jeep, such weapon or other article. The

evident purpose of the incidental search was to protect the

arresting policemen from being harmed by him with the use of a
concealed weapon. Accordingly, the warrantless character of the
arrest could not by itself be the basis of his acquittal.23
In convicting Belocura as charged, the RTC relied on the
testimonies of Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas to establish the
fact of possession of the marijuana bricks. An evaluation of the
totality of the evidence on record indicates, however, that the
corpus delicti of the crime charged was not established beyond
reasonable doubt.
The elements of illegal possession of marijuana under Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, are that: (a) the accused is in
possession of an item or object that is identified to be marijuana,
a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law;
and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said
drug.24 What must be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the fact
of possession of the prohibited drug itself. This may be done by
presenting the police officer who actually recovered the prohibited
drugs as a witness, being the person who has the direct
knowledge of the possession.
Chief Insp. Divina who headed the team of policemen disclosed
that it was PO2 Santos, a member of the team, who had
discovered and had actually recovered the red plastic bag
containing the bricks of marijuana from the jeep. Excerpts of
Chief Insp. Divinas relevant declarations follow:
The Prosecution also presented SPO1 Rojas, another member of
the team, but he provided no direct evidence about the
possession by Belocura of the confiscated marijuana bricks, and
actually stated that he did not witness the recovery of
the marijuana bricks from Belocura, viz:
q While you were taking the gun of this accused what were your
other companion specifically Major Divina doing?

On further examination, SPO1 Rojas reiterated that he did not

actually witness the seizure of the marijuana bricks from
Belocuras possession, to wit:
The Prosecution presented no other witnesses to establish the
seizure of the marijuana bricks from Belocura.
Based on the foregoing, Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas
declarations were insufficient to incriminate Belocura, much less
to convict him. If neither of them was personally competent to be
an eyewitness regarding the seizure of the marijuana bricks from
Belocura, their testimonies could not be accorded probative
value, considering that the Rules of Court requires that a witness
could testify only to facts that he knew of his own knowledge, that
is, only to those facts derived from his own perception.31
Indeed, only PO2 Santos could reliably establish Belocuras
illegal possession of the marijuana bricks, if Chief Insp. Divinas
account was to be believed. Surprisingly, the RTC did not give
due and proper significance to the failure to present PO2 Santos
as a witness against Belocura.
Nonetheless, the OSG contends that the State had no need to
present PO2 Santos because his testimony would only be
corroborative; and that the testimonies of Chief Insp. Divina and
SPO1 Rojas sufficed to establish Belocuras guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The OSGs contention is grossly erroneous.
As the arresting officer who alone actually seized
the marijuana bricks from Belocuras vehicle beyond the viewing
distance of his fellow arresting officers, PO2 Santos was the
Prosecutions only witness who could have reliably established
the recovery from Belocura of the marijuana bricks contained in
the red plastic bag labeled as "SHIN TON YON." Without PO2
Santos testimony, Chief Insp. Divinas declaration of seeing PO2

Santos recover the red plastic bag from under the drivers seat of
Belocuras jeep was worthless. The explanation why none of the
other police officers could credibly attest to Belocuras possession
of the marijuana bricks was that they were at the time supposedly
performing different tasks during the operation. Under the
circumstances, only PO2 Santos was competent to prove
Belocuras possession.
Worse, the Prosecution failed to establish the identity of the
prohibited drug that constituted the corpus delicti itself. The
omission naturally raises grave doubt about any search being
actually conducted and warrants the suspicion that the prohibited
drugs were planted evidence.
In every criminal prosecution for possession of illegal drugs, the
Prosecution must account for the custody of the incriminating
evidence from the moment of seizure and confiscation until the
moment it is offered in evidence. That account goes to the weight
of evidence.32 It is not enough that the evidence offered has
probative value on the issues, for the evidence must also be
sufficiently connected to and tied with the facts in issue. The
evidence is not relevant merely because it is available but that it
has an actual connection with the transaction involved and with
the parties thereto. This is the reason why authentication and
laying a foundation for the introduction of evidence are
important.33
Yet, no such accounting was made herein, as the following
excerpts from the testimony of Chief Insp. Divina bear out, to wit:
The Prosecution thereby failed to establish the linkage between
the bricks of marijuana supposedly seized by PO2 Santos from
Belocuras jeep following his arrest and the bricks
of marijuana that the Prosecution later presented as evidence in
court. That linkage was not dispensable, because the failure to
prove that the specimens ofmarijuana submitted to the forensic
chemist for examination were the same marijuana allegedly
seized from Belocura irreparably broke the chain of custody that

linked the confiscated marijuana to the marijuana ultimately

presented as evidence against Belocura during the trial. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt demanded that unwavering exactitude
must be observed in establishing the corpus delicti the body of
the crime whose core was the confiscated prohibited substances.
Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be
established.37
1wphi 1

The chain-of-custody requirement ensures that all doubts

concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.38The
requirement has come to be associated with prosecutions for
violations of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Drugs Act of
2002),39 by reason of Section 2140 of Republic Act No. 9165
expressly regulating the actual custody and disposition of
confiscated and surrendered dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors, essential chemicals, instruments, paraphernalia, and
laboratory equipment. Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 issued by the
Dangerous Drugs Board pursuant to its mandate under Section
94 of Republic Act No. 9165 reiterates the requirement, stating:
xxx
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case
of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly

preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void

and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
xxx
That this case was a prosecution brought under Republic Act No.
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, did not matter. The chain-of-custody requirement
applied under both laws by virtue of the universal need to
competently and sufficiently establish the corpus delicti. It is basic
under the Rules of Court, indeed, that evidence, to be relevant,
must throw light upon, or have a logical relation to, the facts in
issue to be established by one party or disproved by the
other.41 The test of relevancy is whether an item of evidence will
have any value, as determined by logic and experience, in
proving the proposition for which it is offered, or whether it would
reasonably and actually tend to prove or disprove any matter of
fact in issue, or corroborate other relevant evidence. The test is
satisfied if there is some logical connection either directly or by
inference between the fact offered and the fact to be proved.42
The chain of custody is essential in establishing the link between
the article confiscated from the accused to the evidence that is
ultimately presented to the court for its appreciation. As the Court
said in Mallillin v. People:43
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule
requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what
the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about
every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up
to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every
person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from
whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next
link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the

condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the

chain to have possession of the same.
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard
because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken
chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the
item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily
identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is
critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness.
The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is
susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even
substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibits level of
susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tamperingwithout regard
to whether the same is advertent or otherwise notdictates the
level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.44
The first link in the chain of custody started with the seizure from
the jeep of Belocura of the red plastic bag said to contain
the marijuana bricks. The first link was immediately missing
because the Prosecution did not present PO2 Santos, the only
person with direct knowledge of the seizure and confiscation of
the marijuana bricks. Without his testimony, proof that
the marijuana bricks were really taken from the jeep of Belocura
did not exist. The second link was the turnover of
the marijuana bricks by PO2 Santos to another officer back at the
WPD Headquarters. As to this, Chief Insp. Divina stated that he
learned following the seizure by PO2 Santos that
the marijuana bricks were turned over to the General Assignment
Section for investigation. That was all. On the other hand, SPO1
Rojas testimony contributed nothing to the establishment of the
second link because he had immediately left after seizing the gun
from Belocura. As for the subsequent links, the records45
showed that the marijuana bricks were forwarded to the General
Assignment Section on March 22, 1999, but the Prosecution did
not prove the identities of the officer from the General Assignment
Section who received the red plastic bag containing
the marijuanabricks, and the officer from whom the receiving
officer received the marijuana bricks. Although Chief Insp. Nelson

Yabut prepared the request for laboratory examination of

the marijuana bricks,46 which were thereafter examined by
Forensic Chemist Valdez, the records did not show if Chief Insp.
Yabut was the officer who had received themarijuana bricks from
the arresting team. The request for laboratory examination was
dated March 23, 1999, or the day following Belocuras arrest and
the seizure of the marijuana bricks from his jeep; however, the
Prosecution did not identify the person from whom Chief Insp.
Yabut had received the marijuana bricks.
Sadly, the Prosecution did not establish the links in the chain of
custody. This meant that the corpus delicti was not credibly
proved. This further meant that the seizure and confiscation of
the marijuana bricks might easily be open to doubt and suspicion,
and thus the incriminatory evidence would not stand judicial
scrutiny.
Thirdly, Belocuras denial assumed strength in the face of the
Prosecutions weak incriminating evidence. In that regard,
Belocura denied possession of the marijuana bricks and
knowledge of them as well, to wit:
q Were you able to view the alleged marijuana that were
confiscated from you?
a: I saw it for the first time when it was presented in Court, Sir.
q: Now, according to Inspector Divina, it was police officer Santos
who was able to recover from your vehicle these two bricks
of marijuana. What can you say about this?
a: At first, I did not see this marijuana, Sir, that they are saying
because they immediately handcuffed me and disarmed me even
before I could board my owner type jeepney.47
The Court holds that the guilt of Belocura for the crime charged
was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Mere suspicion of his

guilt, no matter how strong, should not sway judgment against

him. Every evidence favoring him must be duly considered.
Indeed, the presumption of innocence in his favor was not
overcome. Hence, his acquittal should follow, for, as the Court
fittingly said in Patula v. People:48
xxx in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden
to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In
discharging this burden, the Prosecutions duty is to prove each
and every element of the crime charged in the information to
warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime
necessarily included therein. The Prosecution must further prove
the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense.
In doing all these, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its
own evidence, and not anchor its success upon the weakness of
the evidence of the accused. The burden of proof placed on the
Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused that no less than the Constitution has guaranteed.
Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused has no burden of
proof, that he must then be acquitted and set free should the
Prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in his
favor. In other words, the weakness of the defense put up by the
accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the
Prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof in establishing
the commission of the crime charged and in identifying the
accused as the malefactor responsible for it.49
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision
promulgated on January 23, 2006; ACQUIT accusedREYNALDO
BELOCURA y PEREZ for failure of the Prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt;DIRECT the immediate release
from detention of REYNALDO BELOCURA y PEREZ, unless he
is also detained for some other lawful cause; and ORDER the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections to forthwith implement this
decision upon receipt and to report his action hereon to this Court
within 10 days from receipt. No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 193636. July 24, 2012.]

MARYNETTE R.
GAMBOA, petitioner, vs. P/SSUPT.
MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity
as the PNP-Provincial Director of
Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT.
WILLIAM O. FANG, in his capacity
as Chief, Intelligence Division,
PNP Provincial Office, Ilocos
Norte, respondents.
Before this Court is an Appeal by Certiorari (Under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court) filed pursuant to Rule
19 1 of the Rule on the Writ
of Habeas Data, 2 seeking a review of the 9
September 2010 Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979
of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region,
Laoag City, Branch 13 (RTC Br. 13). 3 The
questioned Decision denied petitioner the privilege of
the writ of habeas data. 4
At the time the present Petition was filed,
petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa (Gamboa) was
the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. 5 Meanwhile,
respondent
Police
Senior
Superintendent
(P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was the Officer-inCharge, and respondent Police Superintendent
(P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was the Chief of the

Provincial
Investigation
and
Detective
Management Branch, both of the Ilocos Norte
Police Provincial Office. 6
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order No.
275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent
Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of
Private Armies in the Country." 7 The body, which
was later on referred to as the Zearosa
Commission, 8 was formed to investigate the
existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the
country with a view to eliminating them before the
10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them
permanently in the future. 9 Upon the conclusion of
its investigation, the Zearosa Commission released
and submitted to the Office of the President a
confidential report entitled "A Journey Towards
H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against
Private Armies' Report to the President" (the
Report). 10
cSICHD

Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in

Ilocos Norte (PNP-Ilocos Norte) conducted a series
of surveillance operations against her and her
aides, 11 and classified her as someone who keeps a
PAG. 12 Purportedly without the benefit of data
verification, PNP-Ilocos Norte forwarded the
information gathered on her to the Zearosa
Commission,13 thereby causing her inclusion in the

Report's enumeration of individuals maintaining

PAGs. 14 More specifically, she pointed out the
following items reflected therein:
(a)The Report cited the PNP as its source for the
portion regarding the status of PAGs in the
Philippines. 15
(b)The Report stated that ". . . the PNP organized
one dedicated Special Task Group (STG) for each
private armed group (PAG) to monitor and
counteract their activities." 16
(c)Attached as Appendix "F" of the Report is a
tabulation generated by the PNP and captioned as
"Status of PAGs Monitoring by STGs as of April 19,
2010," which classifies PAGs in the country according
to region, indicates their identity, and lists the
prominent personalities with whom these groups are
associated. 17 The first entry in the table names a
PAG, known as the Gamboa Group, linked to herein
petitioner Gamboa. 18
(d)Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on
data from the PNP, to wit:
The resolutions were the subject of a
national press conference held in
Malacaang on March 24, 2010 at which
time, the Commission was also asked to

comment on the PNP report that out of

one hundred seventeen (117) partisan
armed groups validated, twenty-four (24)
had been dismantled with sixty-seven
(67) members apprehended and more
than eighty-six (86) firearms
confiscated.
CASaEc

Commissioner Herman Basbao qualified

that said statistics were based on PNP
data but that the more significant fact
from his report is that the PNP has been
vigilant in monitoring the activities of
these armed groups and this vigilance is
largely due to the existence of the
Commission which has continued
communicating with the [Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP)] and PNP personnel
in the field to constantly provide data on
the activities of the PAGs. Commissioner
Basbao stressed that the Commission's
efforts have preempted the formation of
the PAGs because now everyone is aware
that there is a body monitoring the
PAGs['] movement through the PNP.
Commissioner [Lieutenant General
Edilberto Pardo Adan] also clarified that
the PAGs are being destabilized so that
their ability to threaten and sow fear
during the election has been considerably
weakened. 19

(e)The Report briefly touched upon the validation

system of the PNP:
Also, in order to provide the Commission
with accurate data which is truly reflective
of the situation in the field, the PNP
complied with the Commission's
recommendation that they revise their
validation system to include those PAGs
previously listed as dormant. In the most
recent briefing provided by the PNP on
April 26, 2010, there are one hundred
seven (107) existing PAGs. Of these
groups, the PNP reported that seven (7)
PAGs have been reorganized. 20

On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its

evening news program the portion of the Report
naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to
be maintaining a PAG. 21 Gamboa averred that her
association with a PAG also appeared on print
media. 22 Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone
who maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified
information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and
forwarded to the Zearosa Commission. 23 As a
result, she claimed that her malicious or reckless
inclusion in the enumeration of personalities
maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also
made her, as well as her supporters and other

people identified with her, susceptible to harassment

and police surveillance operations. 24
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and
her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa
filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of
a writ of habeas data against respondents in their
capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte. 25 In
her Petition, she prayed for the following reliefs: (a)
destruction of the unverified reports from the PNPIlocos Norte database; (b) withdrawal of all
information forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c)
rectification of the damage done to her honor; (d)
ordering respondents to refrain from forwarding
unverified reports against her; and (e) restraining
respondents from making baseless reports. 26
The case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 14979
and was raffled to RTC Br. 13, which issued the
corresponding writ on 14 July 2010 after finding the
Petition meritorious on its face. 27 Thus, the trial
court (a) instructed respondents to submit all
information and reports forwarded to and used by
the Zearosa Commission as basis to include her in
the list of persons maintaining PAGs; (b) directed
respondents, and any person acting on their behalf,
to cease and desist from forwarding to the Zearosa
Commission, or to any other government entity,
information that they may have gathered against her
without the approval of the court; (c) ordered

respondents to make a written return of the writ

together with supporting affidavits; and (d)
scheduled the summary hearing of the case on 23
July 2010. 28
ADEHTS

In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that

they had acted within the bounds of their mandate
in conducting the investigation and surveillance of
Gamboa. 29 The information stored in their database
supposedly pertained to two criminal cases in which
she was implicated, namely: (a) a Complaint for
murder and frustrated murder docketed as NPS DOC
No. 1-04-INQ-091-00077, and (b) a Complaint for
murder, frustrated murder and direct assault upon a
person in authority, as well as indirect assault and
multiple attempted murder, docketed as NPS
DOCKET No. 1-04-INV-10-A-00009. 30
Respondents likewise asserted that the Petition was
incomplete for failing to comply with the following
requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data: (a) the manner in which the right to privacy
was violated or threatened with violation and how it
affected the right to life, liberty or security of
Gamboa; (b) the actions and recourses she took to
secure the data or information; and (c) the location
of the files, registers or databases, the government
office, and the person in charge, in possession or in
control of the data or information. 31 They also
contended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Data,

being limited to cases of extrajudicial killings and

enforced disappearances, was not the proper
remedy to address the alleged besmirching of the
reputation of Gamboa. 32
RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9
September 2010, dismissed the Petition. 33 The trial
court categorically ruled that the inclusion of
Gamboa in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, as
published in the Report, constituted a violation of
her right to privacy, to wit:
In this light, it cannot also be disputed
that by her inclusion in the list of persons
maintaining PAGs, [Gamboa]'s right to
privacy indubitably has been violated. The
violation understandably affects her life,
liberty and security enormously. The
untold misery that comes with the tag of
having a PAG could even be
insurmountable. As she essentially alleged
in her petition, she fears for her security
that at any time of the day the unlimited
powers of respondents may likely be
exercised to further malign and destroy
her reputation and to transgress her right
to life.
By her inclusion in the list of persons
maintaining PAGs, it is likewise
undisputed that there was certainly

intrusion into [Gamboa]'s activities. It

cannot be denied that information was
gathered as basis therefor. After all,
under Administrative Order No. 275, the
Zearosa Commission was tasked to
investigate the existence of private armies
in the country, with all the powers of an
investigative body under Section 37,
Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative
Code of 1987.
xxx xxx xxx
By her inclusion in the list of persons
maintaining PAGs, [Gamboa] alleged as
she accused respondents, who are public
officials, of having gathered and provided
information that made the Zearosa
Commission to include her in the list.
Obviously, it was this gathering and
forwarding of information supposedly by
respondents that petitioner barks at as
unlawful. . . . . 34
EHaCID

Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br. 13

nevertheless dismissed the Petition on the ground
that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial
evidence that the subject information originated
from respondents, and that they forwarded this
database to the Zearosa Commission without the
benefit of prior verification. 35 The trial court also

ruled that even before respondents assumed their

official positions, information on her may have
already been acquired. 36 Finally, it held that the
Zearosa Commission, as the body tasked to gather
information on PAGs and authorized to disclose
information on her, should have been impleaded as
a necessary if not a compulsory party to the
Petition. 37
Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal
by Certiorari dated 24 September 2010,
the following assignment of errors:

38

raising

1.The trial court erred in ruling that the

Zearosa Commission be
impleaded as either a necessary or
indispensable party;
2.The trial court erred in declaring that
[Gamboa] failed to present
sufficient proof to link respondents
as the informant to [sic] the
Zearosa Commission;
3.The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit
of Habeas Data;
4.The trial court erred in pronouncing that
the reliance of the Zearosa
Commission to [sic] the PNP as
alleged by [Gamboa] is an
assumption;

5.The trial court erred in making a point

that respondents are distinct to
PNP as an agency. 39

On the other hand, respondents maintain the

following arguments: (a) Gamboa failed to present
substantial evidence to show that her right to privacy
in life, liberty or security was violated, and (b) the
trial court correctly dismissed the Petition on the
ground that she had failed to present sufficient proof
showing that respondents were the source of the
report naming her as one who maintains a PAG. 40
Meanwhile, Gamboa argues that although A.O. 275
was a lawful order, fulfilling the mandate to
dismantle PAGs in the country should be done in
accordance with due process, such that the
gathering and forwarding of unverified information
on her must be considered unlawful. 41 She also
reiterates that she was able to present sufficient
evidence showing that the subject information
originated from respondents. 42
In determining whether Gamboa should be granted
the privilege of the writ of habeas data, this Court is
called upon to, first, unpack the concept of the right
to privacy; second, explain the writ of habeas
data as an extraordinary remedy that seeks to
protect the right to informational privacy; and finally,

contextualize the right to privacy vis--vis the state

interest involved in the case at bar.

The Right to Privacy

The concept of liberty would be

emasculated if it does not likewise compel
respect for his personality as a unique
individual whose claim to privacy and
interference demands respect. . . . .
cADEIa

The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of

liberty, has long been recognized as a constitutional
right. This Court, inMorfe v. Mutuc, 43 thus
enunciated:
The due process question touching on an
alleged deprivation of liberty as thus
resolved goes a long way in disposing of
the objections raised by plaintiff that the
provision on the periodical submission of
a sworn statement of assets and liabilities
is violative of the constitutional right to
privacy. There is much to be said for this
view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the
constitutional sense must mean
more than freedom from unlawful
governmental restraint; it must
include privacy as well, if it is to be a
repository of freedom. The right to be
let alone is indeed the beginning of all
freedom." As a matter of fact, this right to
be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice
Brandeis "the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by
civilized men."

xxx xxx xxx

. . . [I]n the leading case of Griswold v.
Connecticut, Justice Douglas, speaking for
five members of the Court, stated:
"Various guarantees create zones of
privacy. The right of association contained
in the penumbra of the First Amendment
is one, as we have seen. The Third
Amendment in its prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers 'in any house' in
time of peace without the consent of the
owner is another facet of that privacy.
The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms
the 'right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its
Self-Incrimination Clause enables the
citizen to create a zone of privacy which
government may not force him to
surrender to his detriment. The Ninth
Amendment provides: 'The enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people." After

referring to various American Supreme

Court decisions, Justice Douglas
continued: "These cases bear witness that
the right of privacy which presses for
recognition is a legitimate one."
xxx xxx xxx
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The
right to privacy as such is accorded
recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is
fully deserving of constitutional
protection. The language of Prof.
Emerson is particularly apt: "The
concept of limited government has
always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of
certain intrusions into the personal
life of the citizen. This is indeed one
of the basic distinctions between
absolute and limited
government. Ultimate and pervasive
control of the individual, in all aspects of
his life, is the hallmark of the absolute
state. In contrast, a system of limited
government, safeguards a private sector,
which belongs to the individual, firmly
distinguishing it from the public sector,
which the state can control. Protection of
this private sector protection, in other
words, of the dignity and integrity of the

individual has become increasingly

important as modern society has
developed. All the forces of a
technological age industrialization,
urbanization, and organization operate
to narrow the area of privacy and
facilitate intrusion into it. In modern
terms, the capacity to maintain and
support this enclave of private life marks
the difference between a democratic and
a totalitarian society." 44 (Emphases
supplied)

In Ople v. Torres, 45 this Court traced the

constitutional and statutory bases of the right to
privacy in Philippine jurisdiction, to wit:
Indeed, if we extend our judicial
gaze we will find that the right of
privacy is recognized and enshrined
in several provisions of our
Constitution. It is expressly recognized
in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3.(1) The privacy of
communication and
correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court,
or when public safety or
order requires otherwise
as prescribed by law.

Other facets of the right to privacy are

protected in various provisions of the Bill
of Rights, viz.:
Sec. 1.No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due
process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the
equal protection of the
laws.
HATEDC

Sec. 2.The right of the

people to be secure in
their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever
nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon
probable cause to be
determined personally by
the judge after
examination under oath or
affirmation of the
complainant and the
witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing
the place to be searched

and the persons or things

to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6.The liberty of abode
and of changing the same
within the limits prescribed
by law shall not be
impaired except upon
lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to
travel be impaired except
in the interest of national
security, public safety, or
public health as may be
provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8.The right of the
people, including those
employed in the public and
private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not
be abridged.
HSIaAT

Sec. 17.No person shall be

compelled to be a witness
against himself.

Zones of privacy are likewise recognized

and protected in our laws. The Civil Code
provides that "[e]very person shall
respect the dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and
other persons" and punishes as actionable
torts several acts by a person of meddling
and prying into the privacy of another. It
also holds a public officer or employee or
any private individual liable for damages
for any violation of the rights and liberties
of another person, and recognizes the
privacy of letters and other private
communications. The Revised Penal Code
makes a crime the violation of secrets by
an officer, the revelation of trade and
industrial secrets, and trespass to
dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense
in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping
Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act
and the Intellectual Property Code. The
Rules of Court on privileged
communication likewise recognize the
privacy of certain information.
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from
the premise that the right to privacy is
a fundamental right guaranteed by
the Constitution, hence, it is the burden
of government to show that A.O. No. 308
is justified by some compelling state

interest and that it is narrowly drawn. . . .

. 46 (Emphases supplied)

Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a

fundamental right that must be protected from
intrusion or constraint. However, in Standard

Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on

Banks, 47 this Court underscored that the right to
privacy is not absolute, viz.:
With respect to the right of privacy which
petitioners claim respondent has violated,
suffice it to state that privacy is not an
absolute right. While it is true that Section
21, Article VI of the Constitution,
guarantees respect for the rights of
persons affected by the legislative
investigation, not every invocation of the
right to privacy should be allowed to
thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry.
In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the
right of the people to access information
on matters of public concern generally
prevails over the right to privacy of
ordinary financial transactions. In that
case, we declared that the right to privacy
is not absolute where there is an
overriding compelling state interest.
Employing the rational basis relationship
test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there
is no infringement of the individual's right

to privacy as the requirement to

disclosure information is for a valid
purpose, in this case, to ensure that the
government agencies involved in
regulating banking transactions
adequately protect the public who invest
in foreign securities. Suffice it to state
that this purpose constitutes a reason
compelling enough to proceed with the
assailed legislative investigation.48
ScCEIA

Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension

with a competing state objective, the courts are
required to weigh both notions. In these cases,
although considered a fundamental right, the right to
privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or
overriding state interest deemed legitimate and
compelling.

The Writ of Habeas Data

The writ of habeas data is an independent and
summary remedy designed to protect the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum
to enforce one's right to the truth and to
informational privacy. 49 It seeks to protect a
person's right to control information regarding
oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful

means in order to achieve unlawful ends. 50 It must

be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the
writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between
the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to
life, liberty or security on the other. Section 1 of the
Rule on the Writ ofHabeas Data reads:
Habeas data. The writ of habeas
data is a remedy available to any person

whose right to privacy in life, liberty or

security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data
information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.

The notion of informational privacy is still developing

in Philippine law and jurisprudence. Considering that
even the Latin American habeas data, on which our
own Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds
its origins from the European tradition of data
protection, 51 this Court can be guided by cases on
the protection of personal data decided by the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Of
particular note is Leander v. Sweden, 52 in which the
ECHR balanced the right of citizens to be free from
interference in their private affairs with the right of

the state to protect its national security. In this case,

Torsten Leander (Leander), a Swedish citizen,
worked as a temporary replacement museum
technician at the Naval Museum, which was adjacent
to a restricted military security zone. 53 He was
refused employment when the requisite personnel
control resulted in an unfavorable outcome on the
basis of information in the secret police register,
which was kept in accordance with the Personnel
Control Ordinance and to which he was prevented
access. 54 He claimed, among others, that this
procedure of security control violated Article 8 of the
European Convention of Human Rights 55 on the
right to privacy, as nothing in his personal or political
background would warrant his classification in the
register as a security risk. 56
SHcDAI

The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police

register of information relating to the private life of
Leander, coupled with the refusal to allow him the
opportunity to refute the same, amounted to an
interference in his right to respect for private
life. 57 However, the ECHR held that the interference
was justified on the following grounds: (a) the
personnel control system had a legitimate aim, which
was the protection of national security, 58 and (b)
the Personnel Control Ordinance gave the citizens
adequate indication as to the scope and the manner
of exercising discretion in the collection, recording

and release of information by the authorities.

following statements of the ECHR must be
emphasized:

59

58.The notion of necessity implies

that the interference corresponds to
a pressing social need and, in
particular, that it is proportionate to
the legitimate aim pursued (see, inter
alia, the Gillow judgment of 24 November
1986, Series A no. 109, p. 22, 55).
59.However, the Court recognises that
the national authorities enjoy a margin of
appreciation, the scope of which will
depend not only on the nature of the
legitimate aim pursued but also on the
particular nature of the interference
involved. In the instant case, the
interest of the respondent State in
protecting its national security must
be balanced against the seriousness
of the interference with the
applicant's right to respect for his
private life.
There can be no doubt as to the
necessity, for the purpose of protecting
national security, for the Contracting
States to have laws granting the
competent domestic authorities power,
firstly, to collect and store in registers not

The

accessible to the public information on

persons and, secondly, to use this
information when assessing the suitability
of candidates for employment in posts of
importance for national security.
Admittedly, the contested interference
adversely affected Mr. Leander's
legitimate interests through the
consequences it had on his possibilities of
access to certain sensitive posts within
the public service. On the other hand, the
right of access to public service is not as
such enshrined in the Convention
(see, inter alia, the Kosiek judgment of 28
August 1986, Series A no. 105, p. 20,
34-35), and, apart from those
consequences, the interference did not
constitute an obstacle to his leading a
private life of his own choosing.
In these circumstances, the Court accepts
that the margin of appreciation available
to the respondent State in assessing the
pressing social need in the present case,
and in particular in choosing the means
for achieving the legitimate aim of
protecting national security, was a wide
one.
xxx xxx xxx

66.The fact that the information

released to the military authorities
was not communicated to Mr.
Leander cannot by itself warrant the
conclusion that the interference was
not "necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national
security", as it is the very absence of
such communication which, at least
partly, ensures the efficacy of the
personnel control
procedure(see, mutatis mutandis, the
above-mentioned Klass and Others
judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 27, 58).
The Court notes, however, that various
authorities consulted before the issue of
the Ordinance of 1969, including the
Chancellor of Justice and the
Parliamentary Ombudsman, considered it
desirable that the rule of communication
to the person concerned, as contained in
section 13 of the Ordinance, should be
effectively applied in so far as it did not
jeopardise the purpose of the control (see
paragraph 31 above).
EICSDT

67.The Court, like the Commission, thus

reaches the conclusion that the
safeguards contained in the Swedish
personnel control system meet the
requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8

(art. 8-2). Having regard to the wide

margin of appreciation available to it, the
respondent State was entitled to consider
that in the present case the interests
of national security prevailed over
the individual interests of the
applicant (see paragraph 59
above). The interference to which Mr.
Leander was subjected cannot
therefore be said to have been
disproportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued. (Emphases supplied)

Leander illustrates how the right to informational

privacy, as a specific component of the right to

privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate state
interest. In similar fashion, the determination of
whether the privilege of the writ ofhabeas data,
being an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in
this case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged
intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and the
relevant state interest involved.
AIcECS

The collection and forwarding of

information by the PNP vis--vis the
interest of the state to dismantle
private armies
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling
of private armies and other armed groups not
recognized by the duly constituted authority. 60 It

also provides for the establishment of one police

force that is national in scope and civilian in
character, and is controlled and administered by a
national police commission. 61
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is
clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a
legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the
existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of
dismantling them permanently.
To enable the Zearosa Commission to achieve its
goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with the powers of an
investigative body, including the power to summon
witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony or
evidence relevant to the investigation and use
compulsory processes to produce documents, books,
and records. 62 A.O. 275 likewise authorized the
Zearosa Commission to deputize the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, the National Bureau of
Investigation, the Department of Justice, the PNP,
and any other law enforcement agency to assist the
commission in the performance of its functions. 63
Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is
empowered by law to (a) enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the protection of lives and
properties; (b) maintain peace and order and take all
necessary steps to ensure public safety; and (c)
investigate and prevent crimes. 64

Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs,

as well as the foregoing powers and functions
accorded to the Zearosa Commission and the PNP,
the latter collected information on individuals
suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and
counteracted their activities. 65 One of those
individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to
sufficiently establish that the data contained in the
Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the
PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court,
however, the forwarding of information by the PNP
to the Zearosa Commission was not an unlawful
act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in
life, liberty or security. The PNP was rationally
expected to forward and share intelligence regarding
PAGs with the body specifically created for the
purpose of investigating the existence of these
notorious groups. Moreover, the Zearosa
Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the
police force in the fulfillment of the former's
mandate, and thus had the power to request
assistance from the latter.
CAaSED

Following the pronouncements of the ECHR

in Leander, the fact that the PNP released
information to the Zearosa Commission without
prior communication to Gamboa and without
affording her the opportunity to refute the same

cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her

right to privacy since that act is an inherent and
crucial component of intelligence-gathering and
investigation. Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted
that the PNP had a validation system, which was
used to update information on individuals associated
with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the
situation on the field. 66 Thus, safeguards were put
in place to make sure that the information collected
maintained its integrity and accuracy.
Pending the enactment of legislation on data
protection, this Court declines to make any further
determination as to the propriety of sharing
information during specific stages of intelligence
gathering. To do otherwise would supplant the
discretion of investigative bodies in the
accomplishment of their functions, resulting in an
undue encroachment on their competence. However,
to accord the right to privacy with the kind of
protection established in existing law and
jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it
necessary to caution these investigating entities that
information-sharing must observe strict
confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be
released exclusively to the authorities empowered to
receive the relevant information. After all, inherent
to the right to privacy is the freedom from
"unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from

intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as

to cause humiliation to a person's ordinary
sensibilities." 67
In this case, respondents admitted the existence of
the Report, but emphasized its confidential nature.
That it was leaked to third parties and the media
was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it
must be stressed that Gamboa failed to establish
that respondents were responsible for this
unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other
reliefs available to her to address the purported
damage to her reputation, making a resort to the
extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas
data unnecessary and improper.
Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to
prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion
in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her
and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to
increased police surveillance. In this regard,
respondents sufficiently explained that the
investigations conducted against her were in relation
to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As
public officials, they enjoy the presumption of
regularity, which she failed to overcome.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the
state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the
alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa,

especially when the collection and forwarding by the

PNP of information against her was pursuant to a
lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ
of habeas data must be denied.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review
is DENIED. The assailed Decision in Special Proc.
No. 14979 dated 9 September 2010 of the Regional
Trial Court, Laoag City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies
Gamboa the privilege of the writ ofhabeas data,
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
NOLASCO v. PAO
G.R. No. L-69803 October 8, 1985
Melencio-Herrera, J.
DOCTRINE: A search warrant which authorizes the seizure of
personal properties vaguely described and not particularized is void.
The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search
warrant comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a
cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof.
FACTS: Mila Aguilar-Roque has a pending rebellion case against
her. On August 6, 1984, at around 11:30AM, she and Cynthia
Nolasco were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) in
Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not
denied by respondents. The record does not disclose that a warrant of
arrest had previously beeen issued against NOLASCO.
At 12:00 N. on August 6th, elements of the CSG searched the
premises at 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City (Aguilar-Roques
House). Earlier that day, at around 9AM, members of CSG applied

for a search warrant from respondent Judge Ernani Cruz Pao. The
ground is that after almost a month of "round the clock surveillance"
of the premises as a "suspected underground house of the
CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted by the
military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of
the Philippines, particularly connected with the MV Karagatan/Doa
Andrea cases.
The disputed Search Warrant (No. 80-84) describes the personalities
to be seized as follows:
Documents, papers and other records of the
Communist Party of the Phihppines/New Peoples
Army and/or the National Democratic Front, such as
Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these
groups, Programs, List of possible supporters,
subversive books and instructions, manuals not
otherwise available to the public, and support money
from foreign or local sources.
NOLASCO, et.als Contention: The PETITIONERS principally
assert that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant
since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the things
subject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has not
been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded
to the applicant's witness.
RESPONDENTS Contention: The respondents, represented by the
Solicitor General, contend that the search warrant was valid. They
also added that the questions raised cannot be entertained in this
present petition without petitioners first moving for the quashal of
the disputed Search Warrant with the issuing Judge.
ISSUE # 1: Whether the Search Warrant issued by Judge Pao
was valid.
HELD: NO. It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant
authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and
not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes

everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the

Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify
what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not
otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or
to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a
definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be
lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion
regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were
a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a
general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring
particular description of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings
of this Court, search warrants of similar description were considered
null and void for being too general.
The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of the
witness presented by the applicant for Search Warrant. The questions
propounded by respondent Judge to the applicant's witness are not
sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. The "probable
cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant
comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious
man to rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof. Of the 8 questions
asked, only 3 of them pertain to Identity. 2 out of the 8 questions are
leading not searching questions. And the last three questions refer to
the description of the personalities to be seized, which is Identical to
that in the Search Warrant and suffers from the same lack of
particularity. The examination conducted was general in nature and
merely repetitious of the deposition of said witness. Mere
generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements
of probable cause upon which a warrant may issue.
ISSUE # 2: Whether the things taken from the house of AguilarRoque should be returned.
HELD: NO. Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the
Search Warrant and although, ordinarily, the articles seized
under an invalid search warrant should be returned, they cannot
be ordered returned in the case at bar to AGUILAR-ROQUE.

This is because, this case falls under the circumstance of searches

without warrant under the Rules of Court.
Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court, explicitly provides: Section
12. Search without warrant of person arrested.A person charged
with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the
offense. The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined
to the search, without a search warrant, of a person who had been
arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the
place or premises where the arrest was made can also be search
without a search warrant. In this latter case, "the extent and
reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own facts and
circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the application of
general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to what
constitutes the extent of the place or premises which may be
searched. "What must be considered is the balancing of the
individual's right to privacy and the public's interest in the prevention
of crime and the apprehension of criminals."
Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with
Rebellion, which is a crime against public order; that the
warrant for her arrest has not been served for a considerable
period of time; that she was arrested within the general vicinity
of her dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling was made
within a half hour of her arrest, we are of the opinion that in her
respect, the search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did
not need a search warrant; this, for possible effective results in
the interest of public order. (quintos)

[G.R. No. 198554. July 30, 2012.]

MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS
F. GARCIA, AFP
(RET.), petitioner, vs.

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,

representing the OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT; THE SECRETARY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE VOLTAIRE T.
GAZMIN; THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, GEN. EDUARDO SL.
OBAN, JR., and LT. GEN.
GAUDENCIO S. PANGILINAN, AFP
(RET.), DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
CORRECTIONS, respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J :
p

For resolution of this Court is the Petition

for Certiorari dated September 29, 2011 under Rule
65, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
which seeks to annul and set aside the Confirmation
of Sentence dated September 9, 2011, promulgated
by the Office of the President.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the
following:
On October 13, 2004, the Provost Martial General of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Col.

Henry A. Galarpe, by command of Vice-Admiral De

Los Reyes, issued a Restriction to
Quarters 1 containing the following:
1.Pursuant to Article of War 70 and the
directive of the Acting Chief of Staff, AFP
to the undersigned dtd 12 October 2004,
you are hereby placed under Restriction
to Quarters under guard pending
investigation of your case.
2.You are further advised that you are not
allowed to leave your quarters without the
expressed permission from the Acting
Chief of Staff, AFP.
3.In case you need immediate medical
attention or required by the circumstance
to be confined in a hospital, you shall
likewise be under guard.

Thereafter, a Charge Sheet dated October 27, 2004

was filed with the Special General Court Martial NR 2
presided by Maj. Gen. Emmanuel R. Teodosio, AFP,
(Ret.), enumerating the following violations allegedly
committed by petitioner:
IEAacT

CHARGE 1: VIOLATION OF THE 96TH

ARTICLE OF WAR (CONDUCT
UNBECOMING AN OFFICER AND
GENTLEMAN).

SPECIFICATION 1: In that MAJOR

GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 05820 ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, person subject to military
law, did, on or about 16 March 2004,
knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully fail
to disclose/declare all his existing assets
in his Sworn Statement of Assets and
Liabilities and Net [Worth] for the year
2003 as required by Republic Act No.
3019, as amended in relation to Republic
Act 6713, such as the following: cash
holdings with the Armed Forces Police
Savings and Loans Association, Inc.
(AFPSLAI) in the amount of six million five
hundred [thousand] pesos
(P6,500,000.00); cash dividend received
from AFPSLAI from June 2003 to
December 2003 in the amount of one
million three hundred sixty-five thousand
pesos (P1,365,000.00); dollar peso
deposits with Land Bank of the
Philippines, Allied Banking Corporation,
Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of
Philippine Islands, United Coconut
Planter's Bank and Planter's Development
Bank; motor vehicles registered under his
and his [wife's] names such as 1998
Toyota Hilux Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr.
WRY-843, Toyota Car with Plate Nr. PEV665, Toyota Previa with Plate Nr. UDS195, 1997 Honda Civic Car with Plate Nr.

FEC 134, 1997 Mitsubishi L-300 Van with

Plate Nr. FDZ 582 and 2001 Toyota RAV 4
Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. FEV-498,
conduct unbecoming an officer and
gentleman.
SPECIFICATION 2: In that MAJOR
GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 05820 ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, person subject to military
law, did, on or about 11 March 2003,
knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully fail
to disclose/declare all his existing assets
in his Sworn Statement of Assets and
Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2002
as required by Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended in relation to Republic Act 6713,
such as the following: his cash holdings
with the Armed Forces Police Savings and
Loans Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) in the
amount of six million five hundred
[thousand] pesos (P6,500,000.00); cash
dividend received form AFPSLAI in June
2002 and December 2002 in the total
amount of one million four hundred thirtyfive thousand pesos (1,435,000.00), dollar
and peso deposits with Land Bank of the
Philippines, Allied Banking Corporation,
Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of the
Philippine Islands, United Coconut
Planter's Bank and Planter's Development
Bank; motor vehicles registered under his

and his [wife's] names such as 1998

Toyota Hilux Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr.
WRY-843, Toyota Car with Plate Nr. PEV665, Toyota Previa with Plate Nr. UDS195, 1997 Honda Civic Car with Plate Nr.
FEC-134, 1997 Mitsubishi L-300 Van with
Plate Nr. FDZ-582, and 2001 Toyota RAV
4 Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. FEV-498,
conduct unbecoming an officer and
gentleman.
ESITcH

SPECIFICATION 3: In that MAJOR

GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 05820 ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, person subject to military
law, did, while in the active military
service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, knowingly, wrongfully and
unlawfully violate his solemn oath as a
military officer to uphold the Constitution
and serve the people with utmost loyalty
by acquiring and holding the status of an
immigrant/permanent residence of the
United States of America in violation of
the State policy governing public officers,
thereby causing dishonor and disrespect
to the military professional and seriously
compromises his position as an officer
and exhibits him as morally unworthy to
remain in the honorable profession of
arms.

CHARGE II: VIOLATION OF THE 97TH

ARTICLE OF WAR (CONDUCT
PREJUDICIAL TO GOOD ORDER AND
MILITARY DISCIPLINE)
SPECIFICATION 1: In that MAJOR
GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 05820 ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, person subject to military
law, did, on or about 16 March 2004,
knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully
make untruthful statements under oath of
his true assets in his Statement of Assets
and Liabilities and Net worth for the year
2003 as required by Republic Act No.
3019, as amended in relation to Republic
Act 6713, conduct prejudicial to good
order and military discipline.
SPECIFICATION NO. 2: In that MAJOR
GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 05820 ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, person subject to military
law, did, on or about 11 March 2003,
knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully
make untruthful statements under oath of
his true assets in his Statement of Assets
and Liabilities and Net worth for the year
2002 as required by Republic Act No.
3019, as amended in relation to Republic
Act 6713, conduct prejudicial to good
order and military discipline.

Petitioner, upon arraignment on November 16, 2004,

pleaded not guilty on all the charges.
The Office of the Chief of Staff, through a
Memorandum 2 dated November 18, 2004, directed
the transfer of confinement of petitioner from his
quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo to the
ISAFP Detention Center. On the same day,
petitioner, having reached the age of fifty-six (56),
compulsorily retired from military service after
availing of the provisions of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1650, 3 amending Sections 3 and 5 of
P.D. 1638, which establishes a system of retirement
for military personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.
TCASIH

Pursuant to a Resolution 4 dated June 1, 2005 of the

Second Division of the Sandiganbayan, petitioner
was transferred from the ISAFP Detention Center to
the Camp Crame Custodial Detention Center.
After trial, at the Special General Court Martial No. 2,
on December 2, 2005, the findings or the After-Trial
Report 5 of the same court was read to the
petitioner. The report contains the following verdict
and sentence:
MGEN CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820
AFP the court in closed session upon
secret written ballot 2/3 of all the

members present at the time the voting

was taken concurring the following
findings. Finds you:
On Specification 1 of Charge 1 Guilty
except the words dollar deposits with
Land Bank of the Phils, dollar peso
deposits with Allied Bank, Banco de Oro,
Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine
Island, United Coconut Planters Bank and
Planters Development Bank.
On Specification 2 of Charge 1 Guilty
except the words dollar deposits with
Land Bank of the Phils, dollar peso
deposits with Allied Bank, Banco de Oro,
Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine
Island, United Coconut Planters Bank and
Planters Development Bank.
On Specification 3 of Charge 1 Guilty
On Specification 1 of Charge 2 Guilty
On Specification 2 of Charge 2 Guilty
And again in closed session upon secret
written ballot 2/3 all the members are
present at the time the votes was taken
concurrently sentences you to
be dishonorably [discharged] from
the service, to forfeit all pay and

allowances due and to become due

and to be confined at hard labor at
such place the reviewing authority
may direct for a period of two (2)
years. So ordered. (Emphases supplied)

Afterwards, in a document 6 dated March 27, 2006,

the Staff Judge Advocate stated the following
recommended action:
IV.RECOMMENDED ACTION:
The court, after evaluating the evidence,
found accused: GUILTY on Charge 1,
GUILTY on Specification 1 on Charge 1
except the words dollar deposits with
Land Bank of the Philippines, dollar and
peso deposits with Allied Banking
Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal
Bank, Bank of the Philippine Islands,
United Coconut Planter's Bank and
Planter's Development Bank; GUILTY on
Charge 1, Specification 2 except the
words dollar deposits with Land Bank of
the Philippines, dollar and peso deposits
with Allied Banking Corporation, Banco de
Oro Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine
Islands, United Coconut Planters Bank
and Planter's Development Bank; GUILTY
on Specification 3 of Charge 1; GUILTY on
Charge 2 and all its specifications. The
sentence imposed by the Special GCM is

to be dishonorably discharged from the

service, to forfeit all pay and allowances
due and to become due; and to be
confined at hard labor at such place the
reviewing authority may direct for a
period of two (2) years. As it is, the
sentence is proper and legal. Recommend
that the sentence be approved. The PNP
custodial facility in Camp Crame, Quezon
City, is the appropriate place of
confinement. The period of confinement
from 18 October 2004 shall be credited in
his favor and deducted from the two (2)
years to which the accused was
sentenced. Thus, confinement will expire
on 18 October 2006. Considering that the
period left not served is less than one (1)
year, confinement at the National
Penitentiary is no longer appropriate.
IDaCcS

4.To carry this recommendation into

effect, a draft "ACTION OF THE
REVIEWING AUTHORITY" is hereto
attached.

In an undated document, 7 the AFP Board of Military

Review recommended the following action:
8.RECOMMENDED ACTION:
A.Only so much of the sentence as
provides for the mandatory penalty of

dismissal from the military service and

forfeiture of pay and allowances due and
to become due for the offenses of
violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming
an Officer and a Gentleman) and for
violation of AW 97 (Conduct Prejudicial to
Good Order and Military Discipline) be
imposed upon the accused.
B.The records of the instant case should
be forwarded to the President thru the
Chief of Staff and theSecretary of National
Defense, for final review pursuant to AW
47, the Accused herein being a General
Officer whose case needs confirmation by
the President.
C.To effectuate the foregoing, attached
for CSAFP's signature/approval is a
proposed 1st Indorsement to the
President, thru the Secretary of National
Defense, recommending approval of the
attached prepared "ACTION OF THE
PRESIDENT."

After six (6) years and two (2) months of preventive

confinement, on December 16, 2010, petitioner was
released from the Camp Crame Detention Center. 8
The Office of the President, or the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP and acting as the

Confirming Authority under the Articles of War,

confirmed the sentence imposed by the Court Martial
against petitioner. The Confirmation of
Sentence, 9 reads in part:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S.
AQUINO III, the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, do hereby confirm the
sentence imposed by the Court Martial in
the case of People of the Philippines

versus Major General Carlos

Flores Garcia AFP:
HESAIT

a)To be dishonorable
discharged from the
service;
b)To forfeit all pay and
allowances due and to
become due; and
c)To be confined for a
period of two (2) years in
a penitentiary.
FURTHER, pursuant to the 48th and 49th
Articles of War, the sentence on Major
General Carlos Flores GarciaAFP shall not
be remitted/mitigated by any previous
confinement. Major General Carlos

Flores Garcia AFP shall serve the

foregoing sentence effective on this date.
DONE, in the City of Manila, this 9th day
of September, in the year of our
Lord, Two Thousand and Eleven.

Consequently, on September 15, 2011,

respondent Secretary of National Defense Voltaire T.
Gazmin, issued a Memorandum 10 to the Chief of
Staff, AFP for strict implementation, the Confirmation

of Sentence in the Court Martial Case of People of

the Philippines Versus Major General Carlos
Flores Garcia AFP.

On September 16, 2011, petitioner was arrested and

detained, and continues to be detained at the
National Penitentiary, Maximum Security, Bureau of
Corrections, Muntinlupa City. 11
Aggrieved, petitioner filed with this Court the present
petition for certiorari and petition for habeas corpus,
alternatively. However, this Court, in its
Resolution 12 dated October 10, 2011, denied the
petition for habeas corpus. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration 13 dated November 15, 2011, but
was denied 14 by this Court on December 12, 2011.
Petitioner enumerates the following grounds to
support his petition:

GROUNDS

C.

A.

EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF

ARGUMENT THAT THE PENALTY OF
TWO (2) YEARS CONFINEMENT MAY BE
IMPOSED IN ADDITION TO THE
PENALTIES OF DISMISSAL AND
FORFEITURE, THE SENTENCE HAD
BEEN FULLY SERVED IN VIEW OF
PETITIONER'S PREVENTIVE
CONFINEMENT WHICH EXCEEDED THE
2-YEAR SENTENCE, AND THE OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT HAS NO
AUTHORITY TO REPUDIATE SAID
SERVICE OF SENTENCE, FOR WHICH
REASON PETITIONER'S ARREST AND
CONFINEMENT DESPITE FULL SERVICE
OF SENTENCE IS ILLEGAL, THUS
WARRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS. 15

THE JURISDICTION OF THE GENERAL

COURT MARTIAL CEASED IPSO
FACTO UPON THE RETIREMENT OF
PETITIONER, FOR WHICH REASON THE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ACTED
WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ISSUING
THE CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE,
AND PETITIONER'S ARREST AND
CONFINEMENT PURSUANT THERETO IS
ILLEGAL, THUS WARRANTING THE
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
DaHSIT

B.
EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF
ARGUMENT THAT PETITIONER
REMAINED AMENABLE TO COURT
MARTIAL JURISDICTION AFTER HIS
RETIREMENT, THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN IMPOSING THE
SENTENCE OF TWO (2) YEARS
CONFINEMENT WITHOUT ANY LEGAL
BASIS, FOR WHICH REASON
PETITIONER'S ARREST AND
CONFINEMENT IS ILLEGAL, THUS
WARRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS.

In view of the earlier resolution of this Court denying

petitioner's petition for habeas corpus, the above
grounds are rendered moot and academic. Thus, the
only issue in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which was
properly filed with this Court, is whether the Office of
the President acted with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing
the Confirmation of Sentence dated September 9,
2011.

In its Comment 16 dated October 27, 2011, the

Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) lists the
following counter-arguments:
I.
PETITIONER'S DIRECT RECOURSE TO
THE HONORABLE COURT VIOLATES
THE DOCTRINE OF HIERARCHY OF
COURTS; HENCE, THE PETITION
SHOULD BE OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSED.
II.
THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL
RETAINED JURISDICTION OVER
PETITIONER DESPITE HIS RETIREMENT
DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HIM SINCE
THE SAID TRIBUNAL'S JURISDICTION
HAD ALREADY FULLY ATTACHED PRIOR
TO PETITIONER'S RETIREMENT.
ECSaAc

III.
THE CONFIRMATION ISSUED BY THE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT DIRECTING
PETITIONER TO BE CONFINED FOR
TWO (2) YEARS IN A PENITENTIARY IS
SANCTIONED BY C.A. NO. 408
AND EXECUTIVEORDER NO. 178,
PURSUANT TO THE PRESIDENT'S

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY AS THE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE AFP.
IV.
PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY
DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE WAS NOT
VIOLATED IN THIS CASE.
V.
THE IMPOSITION OF THE PENALTY OF
TWO (2) YEARS CONFINEMENT ON
PETITIONER BY THE GCM, AND AS
CONFIRMED BY THE PRESIDENT OF
THE PHILIPPINES, IS VALID.
VI.
ACCORDINGLY, PUBLIC RESPONDENTS
DID NOT ACT WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN ISSUING AND
IMPLEMENTING THE CONFIRMATION
OF SENTENCE. 17

Petitioner, in his Reply 18 dated January 20, 2012,

disagreed with the arguments raised by the OSG due
to the following:
(A)

THE CONFIRMATION OF THE COURT

MARTIAL SENTENCE IS AN ACT BY THE
PRESIDENT, AS THE COMMANDER-INCHIEF, AND NOT MERELY AS THE HEAD
OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.
THEREFORE, THE HONORABLE COURT
IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE COURT
WHERE HIS ACT MAY BE IMPUGNED,
AND NOT IN THE LOWER COURTS, I.E.,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ("RTC") OR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ("CA"), AS
THE OSG ERRONEOUSLY POSTULATES.
(B)
ALTHOUGH THE GENERAL COURT
MARTIAL ("GCM") RETAINED
JURISDICTION "OVER THE PERSON" OF
PETITIONER EVEN AFTER HE RETIRED
FROM THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES ("AFP"), HOWEVER, HIS
RETIREMENT, CONTRARY TO THE
STAND OF THE OSG, SEVERED HIS
"JURAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH THE
MILITARY, THEREBY PLACING HIM
BEYOND THE SUBSTANTIVE REACH OF
THE AFP'S COURT MARTIAL
JURISDICTION.
ISaTCD

(C)

UNDER ART. 29, REVISED PENAL CODE

("RPC"), PETITIONER'S COURT
MARTIAL SENTENCE OF TWO (2)
YEARS INCARCERATION HAD ALREADY
BEEN SERVED IN FULL SINCE HE HAD
ALREADY SUFFERED PREVENTIVE
IMPRISONMENT OF AT LEAST SIX (6)
YEARS BEFORE THE SENTENCE COULD
BE CONFIRMED, WHICH MEANS THAT
THE PRESIDENT HAD NO MORE
JURISDICTION WHEN HE CONFIRMED
IT, THEREBY RENDERING THE
"CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE" A
PATENT NULLITY, AND,
CONSEQUENTLY, INVALIDATING THE
OSG'S POSITION THAT THE PRESIDENT
STILL HAD JURISDICTION WHEN HE
CONFIRMED THE SENTENCE. 19

Petitioner raises the issue of the jurisdiction of the

General Court Martial to try his case. According to
him, the said jurisdiction ceased ipso facto upon his
compulsory retirement. Thus, he insists that the
Office of the President had acted without jurisdiction
in issuing the confirmation of his sentence.
This Court finds the above argument bereft of merit.
Article 2 of the Articles of War 20 circumscribes the
jurisdiction of military law over persons subject
thereto, to wit:

Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law.

The following persons are subject to
these articles and shall be understood as
included in the term "any person subject
to military law" or "persons subject to
military law," whenever used in these
articles:
(a)All officers and soldiers in the
active service of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines or of the
Philippine Constabulary; all
members of the reserve force,
from the dates of their call to
active duty and while on such
active duty; all trainees undergoing
military instructions; and all other
persons lawfully called, drafted, or
ordered into, or to duty or for
training in, the said service, from
the dates they are required by the
terms of the call, draft, or order to
obey the same;
aDcEIH

(b)Cadets, flying cadets, and

probationary second lieutenants;
(c)All retainers to the camp and all
persons accompanying or serving
with the Armed Forces of the
Philippines in the field in time of
war or when martial law is declared

though not otherwise subject to

these articles;
(d)All persons under sentence
adjudged by courts-martial.
(As amended by Republic Acts 242
and 516).

It is indisputable that petitioner was an officer in the

active service of the AFP in March 2003 and 2004,
when the alleged violations were committed. The
charges were filed on October 27, 2004 and he was
arraigned on November 16, 2004. Clearly, from the
time the violations were committed until the time
petitioner was arraigned, the General Court Martial
had jurisdiction over the case. Well-settled is the rule
that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the
instance of the parties but continues until the case is
terminated. 21 Therefore, petitioner's retirement on
November 18, 2004 did not divest the General Court
Martial of its jurisdiction. In B/Gen. (Ret.) Francisco

V. Gudani, et al. v. Lt./Gen. Generoso Senga, et

al., 22 this Court ruled that:
This point was settled against Gen.
Gudani's position in Abadilla v. Ramos,
where the Court declared that an officer
whose name was dropped from the
roll of officers cannot be considered
to be outside the jurisdiction of

military authorities when military

justice proceedings were initiated
against him before the termination
of his service. Once jurisdiction has
been acquired over the officer, it
continues until his case is terminated.
Thus, the Court held:
The military authorities had
jurisdiction over the person of
Colonel Abadilla at the time of the
alleged offenses. This jurisdiction
having been vested in the military
authorities, it is retained up to the
end of the proceedings against
Colonel Abadilla. Well-settled is the
rule that jurisdiction once acquired
is not lost upon the instance of the
parties but continues until the case
is terminated.
Citing Colonel Winthrop's treatise
on Military Law, the Court further
stated:
cDTIAC

We have gone through the treatise

of Colonel Winthrop and We find
the following passage which goes
against the contention of the
petitioners, viz.

3.Offenders in general Attaching

of jurisdiction. It has further been
held, and is now settled law, in
regard to military offenders in
general, that if the military
jurisdiction has once duly attached
to them previous to the date of the
termination of their legal period of
service, they may be brought to
trial by court-martial after that
date, their discharge being
meanwhile withheld. This principle
has mostly been applied to cases
where the offense was committed
just prior to the end of the term. In
such cases the interests of
discipline clearly forbid that the
offender should go unpunished. It
is held therefore that if before the
day on which his service legally
terminates and his right to a
discharge is complete, proceedings
with a view to trial are commenced
against him as by arrest or the
service of charges, the military
jurisdiction will fully attach and
once attached may be continued
by a trial by court-martial ordered
and held after the end of the term
of the enlistment of the accused . .
.

Thus, military jurisdiction has fully

attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch
as both the acts complained of and
the initiation of the proceedings
against him occurred before he
compulsorily retired on 4 October
2005. We see no reason to unsettle
the Abadilla doctrine. The OSG also
points out that under Section 28 of
Presidential Decree No. 1638, as
amended, "[a]n officer or enlisted
man carried in the retired list [of
the Armed Forces of the
Philippines] shall be subject to the
Articles of War . . ." To this
citation, petitioners do not offer
any response, and in fact have
excluded the matter of Gen.
Gudani's retirement as an issue in
their subsequent memorandum. 23

It is also apt to mention that under Executive Order

No. 178, or the Manual for Courts-Martial, AFP, the
jurisdiction of courts-martial over officers, cadets,
soldiers, and other military personnel in the event of
discharge or other separation from the service, and
the exceptions thereto, is defined thus:
AEIcTD

10.COURT-MARTIAL Jurisdiction in
general Termination General Rules
The general rule is that court-martial

jurisdiction over officers, cadets, soldiers

and others in the military service of the
Philippines ceases on discharge or other
separation from such service, and that
jurisdiction as to any offense committed
during a period of service thus terminated
is not revived by a reentry into the
military service.
Exceptions To this general rule there
are, however, some exceptions, among
them the following:
xxx xxx xxx
In certain case, where the person's
discharge or other separation does
not interrupt his status as a person
belonging to the general category
of persons subject to military law,
court-martial jurisdiction does not
terminate. Thus, where an officer
holding a reserve commission is
discharged from said commission
by reason of acceptance of a
commission in the Regular Force,
there being no interval between
services under the respective
commissions, there is no
terminating of the officer's
military status, but merely the
accomplishment of a change in his

status from that of a reserve to

that of a regular officer, and that
court-martial jurisdiction to try him
for an offense (striking enlisted
men for example) committed prior
to the discharge is not terminated
by the discharge. So also, where a
dishonorable discharged
general prisoner is tried for an
offense committed while a
soldier and prior to his
dishonorable discharge, such
discharge does not terminate
his amenability to trial for the
offense. (Emphases supplied.)

Petitioner also asserts that the General Court

Martial's continuing jurisdiction over him despite his
retirement holds true only if the charge against him
involves fraud, embezzlement or misappropriation of
public funds citing this Court's ruling in De la Paz v.
Alcaraz, et al. 24 and Martin v. Ver. 25 However, this
is not true. The OSG is correct in stating that in De la
Paz, 26 military jurisdiction over the officer who
reverted to inactive status was sustained by this
Court because the violation involved
misappropriation of public funds committed while he
was still in the active military service, while
inMartin, 27 military jurisdiction was affirmed
because the violation pertained to illegal disposal of
military property. Both cited cases centered on the

nature of the offenses committed by the military

personnel involved, justifying the exercise of
jurisdiction by the courts-martial. On the other hand,
in the present case, the continuing military
jurisdiction is based on prior attachment of
jurisdiction on the military court before petitioner's
compulsory retirement. This continuing jurisdiction is
provided under Section 1 of P.D. 1850, 28 as
amended, thus:
Section 1.Court Martial Jurisdiction over

Integrated National Police and Members

of the Armed Forces. Any provision of

law to the contrary notwithstanding (a)

uniformed members of the Integrated
National Police who commit any crime or
offense cognizable by the civil courts shall
henceforth be exclusively tried by courtsmartial pursuant to and in accordance
with Commonwealth Act No. 408, as
amended, otherwise known as the Articles
of War; (b) all persons subject to military
law under article 2 of the aforecited
Articles of War who commit any crime or
offense shall be exclusively tried by
courts-martial or their case disposed of
under the said Articles of War; Provided,
that, in either of the aforementioned
situations, the case shall be disposed
of or tried by the proper civil or
judicial authorities when court-

martial jurisdiction over the offense

has prescribed under Article 38 of
Commonwealth Act Numbered 408,
as amended, or court-martial
jurisdiction over the person of the
accused military or Integrated
National Police personnel can no
longer be exercised by virtue of their
separation from the active service
without jurisdiction having duly
attached beforehand unless
otherwise provided by law: Provided
further, that the President may, in the
interest of justice, order or direct, at any
time before arraignment, that a particular
case be tried by the appropriate civil
court. (Emphasis supplied.)
cCESTA

Having established the jurisdiction of the General

Court Martial over the case and the person of the
petitioner, the President, as Commander-in-Chief,
therefore acquired the jurisdiction to confirm
petitioner's sentence as mandated under Article 47
of the Articles of War, which states:
Article 47.Confirmation When
Required. In addition to the approval
required by article forty-five, confirmation
by the President is required in the
following cases before the sentence of a

court-martial is carried into execution,

namely:
(a)Any sentence respecting a
general officer;
(b)Any sentence extending to the
dismissal of an officer except that
in time of war a sentence
extending to the dismissal of an
officer below the grade of brigadier
general may be carried into
execution upon confirmation by the
commanding general of the Army
in the field;
(c)Any sentence extending to the
suspension or dismissal of a cadet,
probationary second lieutenant;
and
(d)Any sentence of death, except
in the case of persons convicted in
time of war, of murder, mutiny,
desertion, or as spies, and in such
excepted cases of sentence of
death may be carried into
execution, subject to the provisions
of Article 50, upon confirmation by
the commanding general of the
Army in the said field.

When the authority competent to

confirm the sentence has already
acted as the approving authority
no additional confirmation by him
is necessary. (As amended by
Republic Act No. 242). (Emphasis
supplied.)

In connection therewith, petitioner argues that the

confirmation issued by the Office of the President
directing him to be confined for two (2) years in the
penitentiary had already been fully served in view of
his preventive confinement which had exceeded two
(2) years. Therefore, according to him, the Office of
the President no longer has the authority to order his
confinement in a penitentiary. On the other hand,
the OSG opines that petitioner cannot legally
demand the deduction of his preventive confinement
in the service of his imposed two-year confinement
in a penitentiary, because unlike our Revised Penal
Code 29 which specifically mandates that the period
of preventive imprisonment of the accused shall be
deducted from the term of his imprisonment, the
Articles of War and/or the Manual for Courts-Martial
do not provide for the same deduction in the
execution of the sentence imposed by the General
Court Martial as confirmed by the President in
appropriate cases.
IcCDAS

On the above matter, this Court finds the argument

raised by the OSG unmeritorious and finds logic
in the assertion of petitioner that Article 29 of
the Revised Penal Code can be made applicable in th
e present case.
The OSG maintains that military commissions or trib
unals are not courts within the Philippine judicial syst
em, citingOlaguer, et al. v. Military Commission No. 4
, 30 hence, they are not expected to apply criminal la
w concepts in theirimplementation and execution of
decisions involving the discipline of
military personnel. This is misleading. In Olaguer,the
courts referred to were military commissions create
d under martial law during the term of
former PresidentFerdinand Marcos and was declared
unconstitutional by this Court, while in the present c
ase, the General Court Martialwhich tried it, was crea
ted under Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended,
and remains a valid entity.
In Marcos v. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of
the Philippines, 31 this Court ruled that a courtmartial case is a criminalcase and the General Court
Martial is a "court" akin to any other courts. In the s
ame case, this Court clarified as towhat constitutes t
he words "any court," used in Section 17 32 of
the 1935 Constitution prohibiting members of
Congressto appear as counsel in any criminal case in
which an officer or employee of

the Government is accused of

an offensecommitted in relation to his office. This Co
urt held:
We are of
the opinion and therefore hold that it is a
pplicable, because the words "any cour
t" includes theGeneral CourtMartial, and a courtmartial case is a criminal case within
the meaning of theabovequoted pro
visions of our Constitution.
It is obvious that the words "any court," u
sed in prohibiting members of
Congress to appear ascounsel "in anycrimi
nal case in which an officer or employee o
f the Government is accused of
an offense committed inrelation to his offi
ce," refers, not only to a civil, but als
o to a military court or a CourtMartial.Because, in construing a Constitu
tion, "it must be taken as established that
where words are used which haveboth a
restricted and a general meaning, the gen
eral must prevail over the restricted unles
s the nature of thesubject matter of
the context clearly indicates that the limit
ed sense is intended." (11 American Juris
prudence,pp. 680-682).

In the case of Ramon Ruffy vs. Chief of

Staff of
the Philippine Army, 43 Off. Gaz., 855, w
*

e did not hold thatthe word "court" in gen

eral used in our Constitution does not incl
ude a CourtMartial; what we held is that thewords "in
ferior courts" used in connection with the
appellate jurisdiction of
the SupremeCourt to "review onappeal ce
rtiorari or writ of
error, as the law or rules of court may pro
vide, final judgments of
inferior courts inall criminal cases in which
the penalty imposed is death or life impri
sonment," as provided for in section 2,Arti
cle VIII, of
the Constitution, do not refer to CourtsMartial or Military Courts.
EAIcCS

Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, q

uoted by the petitioners
and by this Court in the case of RamonRu

ffy et al. vs. Chief of Staff of

the Philippine Army, supra, has to say in t
his connection the following:

Notwithstanding that the courtmartial is only an instrumentality of

the executive power having norelat
ion or connection, in law, withthe j
udicial establishments of

the country, it is yet, so far as it is

acourt at all, and within its field of
action, as fully a court of
law and justice as is any civil tribun
al. As acourt of
law, it is bound, like any court, by t
he fundamental principles of
law, and, in the absence ofspecial
provision of
the subject in the military code, it o
bserves in general the rules of
evidence asadopted in the common
-law courts. As a court of
justice, it is required by the terms o
f
its statutoryoath, (art. 84.) to adju
dicate
between the U.S. and the accused
"without partiality, favor, or affecti
on,"and according, not only to the l
aws and customs of
the service, but to its "conscience,"
i.e., its sense of
substantial right and justice unaffe
cted by technicalities. In the words
of the Attorney General, courtmartial are thus, "in the stricte
st sense courts of
justice. (Winthrop's Military Law a
ndPrecedents, Vols. 1 and 2, 2nd E
d., p. 54.)

In re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas., 796, 801, citing

6 Op. Attys. Gen. 425, with approval, the
court said:
In the language of
Attorney General Cushing, a court
martial is a lawful tribunal exis
ting by thesame authority that
any other exists by, and the la
w military is a branch of
law as valid asany other, and it
differs from the general law of
the land in authority only in thi
s: that itapplies to officers and
soldiers of
the army but not to other mem
bers of
the body politic,and that it is li
mited to breaches of
military duty.
And in re Davison, 21 F. 618, 620, it was
held:
That courtsmartial are lawful tribunals existing
by the same authority as civil cour
ts of
the UnitedStates, have the same pl
enary jurisdiction in offenses by the
law military as the latter courts ha

ve incontroversies within their cogn

izance, and in their special and mor
e limited sphere are entitled to asu
ntrammelled an exercise of
their powers.
EHTADa

And lastly, American Jurisprudence says:

SEC. 99.Representation by Counsel
. It is the
general rule that one accused of
the crime has theright to be repres
ented before the court by counsel,
and this is expressly so declared by
the statutescontrolling the procedu
re in courtmartial. It has been held that a con
stitutional provision extendingthat r
ight to one accused in any trial in a
ny court whatever applies to a cour
t-martial and gives the
accused the undeniable right to def
end by counsel, and that a courtmartial has no power to refuse ana
ttorney the right
to appear before it if
he is properly licensed to practice i
n the courts of
the state.(Citing the case of State e
x rel Huffaker vs. Crosby, 24 Nev.
115, 50 Pac. 127; 36 AmericanJuris
prudence 253)

The fact that a judgment of

conviction, not of
acquittal, rendered by a courtmartial must beapproved by the revi
ewing authority before it can be exec
uted (Article of
War 46), does notchange or affect th
e character of a courtmartial as a court. A judgment of
the Court of
First Instanceimposing death penalty mus
t also be approved by the Supreme Court
before it can be executed.
That courtmartial cases are criminal cases within the
meaning of Section 17,Article VI, of
the Constitution isalso evident, because th
e crimes and misdemeanors forbidden or
punished by the Articles of War are
offensesagainst the Republic of
the Philippines. According to section 1, Ru
le 106, of the Rules of
Court, a criminalaction or case is one whic
h involves a wrong or injury done to the R
epublic, for the punishment of
which theoffender is prosecuted in the na
me of the People of
the Philippines; and pursuant to Article of
War 17, "thetrial advocate of
a general or special court-

martial shall prosecute (the accused) in th

e name of the People of the Philippines."
Winthtrop, in his well known work "Militar
y Law and Precedents' says the following:
In regard to the class of
courts to which it belongs, it is
lastly to be noted that the cour
tmartial is strictly a criminal co
urt. It hasno civil jurisdiction what
ever; cannot enforce a contract,coll
ect a debt, or award damages in fa
vor of an individual. . .
. Its judgment is a criminal sen
tencenot a civil verdict; its pro
per function is to award punish
ment upon the ascertainment
of
guilt. (Winthrop's Military Law and
Precedents, Vols. 1 & 2, 2nd Ed.,
p. 55.)
ITSCED

In N. Y. it was held that the term "

criminal case," used in the clause,
must be allowed some meaning,an
d none can be conceived, other tha
n a prosecution for a criminal offen
se. Ex parte Carter. 66 S. W.540, 5
44, 166 No. 604, 57 L.R.A. 654, qu
oting People vs. Kelly, 24 N.Y. 74;

Counselman vs.Hitchcock, 12 S. Ct.

195; 142 U.S. 547, L. Ed. 111o. (

Words and Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 485
.)
Besides, that a courtmartial is a court, and the prosecutio
n of
an accused before it is a criminaland
not an administrative case, and there
fore it would be, under certain condit
ions, a bar toanother prosecution of
the defendant for the same offense,
because the latter would place theac
cused in jeopardy, is shown by the deci
sion of the Supreme Court of
the United States in the case ofGrafton vs
. United States, 206 U.S. 333; 51 Law. Ed.
, 1088, 1092, in which the following was h
eld:
If a courtmartial has jurisdiction to try an off
icer or soldier for a crime, its judg
ment will be accordedthe finality an
d conclusiveness as to the issues in
volved which attend the judgments
of a civil court in acase of
which it may legally take cognizanc
e; . .
. and restricting our decision to the
above question of

double jeopardy, we judge that, co

nsistently with the above act of
1902, and for the reasons stated, t
heplaintiff in error, a soldier in the
Army, having been acquitted of
the crime of
homicide, alleged to havebeen com
mitted by him in the Philippines, by
a military court of
competent jurisdiction, proceeding
under the authority of
the United States, could not be sub
sequently tried for the same offens
e in a civilcourt
exercising authority in that territory
. 33 (Emphasis supplied.)

Hence, as extensively discussed above, the General

Court Martial is a court within the strictest sense of
the word andacts as a criminal court. On that premis
e, certain provisions of
the Revised Penal Code, insofar as those that are not
provided in the Articles of
War and the Manual for CourtsMartial, can be supplementary. Under Article 10 of
theRevised Penal Code:
Art. 10. Offenses not subject to the provis
ions of this Code.
Offenses which are or in the future may b
epunishable under special laws are not su

bject to the provisions of

this Code. This Code shall be supplementa
ryto such laws, unless the latter should sp
ecially provide the contrary.

A special law is defined as a penal law which punishe

s acts not defined and penalized by the Revised Pena
l Code. 34 Inthe present case, petitioner was charged
with and convicted of
Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman (96t
hArticle of War) and Violation of the 97th Article of
War, or Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Milita
ry Discipline,both of
which are not defined and penalized under the Revis
ed Penal Code. The corresponding penalty imposed
by theGeneral Court Martial, which is two (2) years o
f
confinement at hard labor is penal in nature. Therefo
re, absent anyprovision as to the application of
a criminal concept in the implementation and executi
on of
the General Court Martial'sdecision, the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code, specifically Article 29 should
be applied. In fact, the deduction of
petitioner's period of confinement to his sentence ha
s been recommended in the Staff
Judge Advocate Review, thus:
aDIHCT

..
. Recommend that the sentence be appr

oved. The PNP custodial facilityin Camp

Crame, Quezon City, isthe appropriate pl
ace of confinement. The period of
confinement from 18 October 2004
shall becredited in his favor and de
ductedfrom the two (2) years to wh
ich the accused was sentenced.Thus
, confinement will expire on 18 October
2006. Considering that the period left no
t served is less thanone (1) year, confin
ement at the National Penitentiary is no
longer appropriate. 35 (Emphasis supplie
d.)

The above was reiterated in the Action of

the Reviewing Authority, thus:
In the foregoing General CourtMartial case of People of

the Philippines versus MGEN. CARLOS F.

GARCIA 05820 AFP (now Retired), the verdict of
GUILTY is hereby approved.

The sentence to be dishonorably discharg

ed from the service; to forfeit all pay and
allowances due and tobecome due; and t
o be confined at hard labor at such place
as the reviewing authority may direct for
a periodof two (2) years is also approved.

Considering that the Accused has be

en in confinement since 18 October 2
004, the entire periodof
his confinement since 18 October 20
04 will be credited in his favor. Conse
quently, his two (2)year sentence of
confinement will expire on 18 October 20
06.
The proper place of
confinement during the remaining unserv
ed portion of
his sentence is an official militarydetention
facility. However, the Accused is presentl
y undergoing trial before the Sandiganbay
an which hasdirected that custody over hi
m be turned over to the civilian authority
and that he be confined in a civilian jailor
detention facility pending the disposition o
f
the case(s) before said Court. For this rea
son, the Accused shallremain confined at t
he PNP's detention facility in Camp Crame
, Quezon City. The Armed Forces of
thePhilippines defers to the civilian authori
ty on this matter.
Should the Accused be released from conf
inement upon lawful orders by the Sandig
anbayan before theexpiration of
his sentence adjudged by the military cou
rt, the Provost Marshal General shall imm

ediately takecustody over the Accused, w

ho shall be transferred to and serve the re
maining unserved portion thereof
at theISAFPdetention facility in Camp Gen
eral Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City. 36 (E
mphasis supplied.)
AcTHCE

Nevertheless, the application of Article 29 of

the Revised Penal Code in the Articles of
War is in accordance with theEqual Protection Clause
of the 1987 Constitution. According to a long line of
decisions, equal protection simply requiresthat all per
sons or things similarly situated should be treated ali
ke, both as to rights conferred and responsibilitiesim
posed. 37 It requires public bodies and institutions to
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manne
r. 38 Thepurpose of
the equal protection clause is to secure every person
within a state's jurisdiction against intentional andar
bitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express te
rms of
a statute or by its improper execution through thesta
te's dulyconstituted authorities. 39 In other words, the conce
pt of
equal justice under the law requires the state togove
rn impartially, and it may not draw distinctions betw
een individuals solely on differences that are irreleva
nt to alegitimate governmental objective. 40 It, howe

ver, does not require the universal application of

the laws to all personsor things without distinction.
What it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a validclassification. Indeed,
the equal protection clause permits classification. Su
ch classification, however, to be valid
mustpass the test of reasonableness. The test has fo
ur requisites: (1) the classification rests on substanti
al distinctions; (2)it is germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions onl
y; and (4) it applies equally to allmembers of
the same class. 41 "Superficial differences do not ma
ke for a valid classification." 42 In the present case,p
etitioner belongs to the class of those who have bee
n convicted by any court, thus, he is entitled to the ri
ghtsaccorded to them. Clearly, there is no substantia
l distinction between those who are convicted of
offenses which arecriminal in nature under military c
ourts and the civil courts. Furthermore, following the
same reasoning, petitioner isalso entitled to the basi
c and timehonored principle that penal statutes are construed s
trictlyagainst the State and liberally in favor of
the accused. 43 It must be remembered that the
provisions of the Articles of
War which thepetitioner violated are penal in nature.
The OSG is correct when it argued that the power to
confirm a sentence of

the President, as Commander-inChief,includes the power to approve or disapprove th

e entire or any part of
the sentence given by the court martial. Asprovided i
n Article 48 of the Articles of War:
Article 48.Power Incident to Power to Con
firm.
The power to confirm the sentence of
a court-martialshall be held to include:
(a)The power to confirm or disappr
ove a finding, and to confirm so m
uch only of a finding of guilty of
a particular offense as involves a fi
nding of guilty of
a lesser included offense when, in t
heopinion of
the authority having power to confi
rm, the evidence of
record requires a finding of only th
elesser degree of guilt;
(b)The power to confirm or dis
approve the whole or any part
of the sentence; and
(c)The power to remand a case for
rehearing, under the provisions of
Article 50. (Emphasissupplied.)
ISADET

In addition, the President also has the powerto mitig

ate or remit a sentence. Under Article 49 of
the Articles of War:
Article 49.Mitigation or Remission of
Sentence.
The power to order the execution of
the sentenceadjudged by a courtmartial shall be held to include, inter alia,
the power to mitigate or remit the whole
orany part of the sentence.
Any unexpected portionof
a sentence adjudged by a courtmartial may be mitigated or remitted by t
hemilitary authority competent to appoint,
for the command, exclusive of
penitentiaries and Disciplinary Barracksof
the Armed Forces of
the Philippines or Philippine Constabulary,
in which the person under sentence is hel
d,a court of
the kind that imposed the sentence, and t
he same power may be exercised by supe
rior militaryauthority; but no sentence app
roved or confirmed by the President shall
be remitted or mitigated by any otherauth
ority, and no approved sentence of loss of
files by an officer shall be remitted or miti
gated by anyauthority inferior to the Presi
dent, except as provided in Article 52.

When empowered by the President to do

so, the commanding general of
the Army in the field or the areacommand
er may approve or confirm and commute
(but not approve or confirm without com
muting),mitigate, or remit andthen order
executed as commuted, mitigated, or rem
itted any sentence which underthose Artic
les requires the confirmation of
the President before the same may be ex
ecuted. (As amended by
Republic Act No. 242).

Thus, the power of

the President to confirm, mitigate and remit a senten
ce of erring military personnel is a clearrecognition of
the superiority of
civilian authority over the military. However, althoug
h the law (Articles of
War) whichconferred those powers to the President i
s silent as to the deduction of the period of
preventive confinement to thepenalty imposed, as di
scussed earlier, such is also the right of
an accused provided for by Article 29 of the RPC.
As to petitioner's contention that his right to a speed
y disposition of his case was violated, this Court find
s the same tobe without merit.
No less than our Constitution guarantees the rightno
t just to a speedy trial but to the speedy disposition

of
cases. 44However, it needs to be underscored that s
peedy disposition is a relative and flexible concept. A
mere mathematicalreckoning of
the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard
must be taken of
the facts and circumstances peculiarto each case. 45
In determining whether or not the right to the speed
y disposition of
cases has been violated, this Courthas laid down the
following guidelines: (1) the length of
the delay; (2) the reasons for such delay; (3) the ass
ertion orfailure to assert such right by the accused; a
nd (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. 46
AHEDaI

In this case, there was no allegation, whatsoever of

any delay during the trial. What is being questioned
by petitioner isthe delay in the confirmation of
sentence by the President. Basically, the case has alr
eady been decided by the GeneralCourt Martial and
has also beenreviewed by the proper reviewing auth
orities without any delay. The only thing missingthen
was the confirmation of
sentence by the President. The records do not show
that, in those six (6) years from thetime the decision
of
the General Court Martial was promulgated until the
sentence was finally confirmed by thePresident, petit
ioner took any positive action toassert his right to a

speedy disposition of
his case. This is akin to whathappened in Guerrero v.
Court of Appeals, 47 where, in spite of the lapse of
more than ten years of delay, the Court stillheld that
the petitioner could notrightfully complain of delay vi
olative of his right to speedy trial or disposition of
hiscase, since he was part of
the reason for the failure of
his case to move on towards its ultimate resolution.
The Courtheld, inter alia:
In the case before us, the petitioner merel
y sat and waited after the case was submi
tted for resolution in 1979.It was only in 1
989 when the case below was reraffled fr
om the RTC of
Caloocan City to the RTC of NavotasMalabon and only after respondent trial ju
dge of
the latter court ordered on March 14, 199
0 the parties tofollowup and complete the transcript of
stenographic notes that matters started to
get moving towards aresolution of
the case. More importantly, it was only aft
er the new trial judge reset the retaking o
f thetestimonies to November 9, 1990 bec
ause of
petitioner's absence during the original se
tting on October 24,1990 that the accused
suddenly became zealous of

safeguarding his right to speedy trial and

disposition.
xxx xxx xxx
In the present case, there is no question t
hat petitioner raised the violation against
his own right to speedydisposition only w
hen the respondent trial judge reset the c
ase for rehearing. It is fair to assume that
hewould have just continued to sleep on
his right
a situation amounting to laches
had the respondentjudge not taken the i
nitiative of determining the noncompletion of
the records and of ordering the remedypr
ecisely so he could dispose of
the case. The matter could have taken a d
ifferent dimension if
during all thoseten years between 1979 w
hen accused filed his memorandum and 1
989 when the case was reraffled, theaccu
sed showed signs of
asserting his right which was granted him
in 1987 when the new constitution tookeff
ect, or at least made some overt act (like
a motion for early disposition or a motion
to compel thestenographer to transcribe s
tenographic notes) that he was not waivin
g it. As it is, his silence would have tobe i
nterpreted as a waiver of such right.

While this Court recognizes the right to sp

eedy disposition quite distinctly from the r
ight to a speedy trial, andalthough this Co
urt has always zealously espoused protect
ion from oppressive and vexatious delays
notattributable to the party involved, at th
e same time, we hold that a party's indivi
dual rights should not workagainst and pr
eclude the
people's equally important right to public j
ustice. In the instant case, three peopledi
ed as a result of the crash of
the airplane that the accused was flying. I
t appears to us that the delay in thedispos
ition of
the case prejudiced not just the accused b
ut the people as well. Since the accused h
ascompletely failed to assert his right seas
onably and inasmuch as the respondent j
udge was not in a position todispose of
the case on the merits due to the absence
of factual basis, we hold it proper and eq
uitable to givethe parties fair opportunity t
o obtain(and the court to dispense) subst
antial justice in the premises. 48
EHTISC

Time runs against the slothful and those who neglect

their rights. 49 In fact, the delay in the confirmation
of
hissentence was to his own advantage, because with

out the confirmation from the President, his sentenc

e cannot beserved.
Anent petitioner's other arguments, the same are alr
eady rendered moot and academic due to the above
discussions.
Grave abuse of
discretion means such capricious and whimsical exer
cise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.
It must be grave abuse of
discretion, as when the power isexercised in an arbit
rary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent
and sogross as to amountto an evasion of
a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all incontemplation of law.
50 Thus, applying, the earlier disquisitions, this Court
finds that the Office of
the President did notcommit any grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the Confirmation of
Sentence in question.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari dated Sept
ember 29, 2011 of
Major General Carlos F. Garcia, AFP (Ret.) ishereby
DISMISSED. However, applying the provisions of
Article 29 of
the Revised Penal Code, the time within whichthe pe

titioner was under preventive confinement should be

credited to the sentence confirmed by the Office of
thePresident, subject to the conditions set forth by t
he same law.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 198589. July 25, 2012.]
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
FOURTH DIVISION and JULIETA
G. ANDO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J :
p

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the

Rules of Court filed by private complainant Willie Tee
(Tee) from the Decision 1 dated July 28, 2011 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32680,
the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant petition is GRANTED. The
November 6, 2008 and May 2, 2008

Decisions of the Regional Trial Court of

Manila, Branch 34, and the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26,
respectively, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the petitioner
is ACQUITTED of the offenses charged.
SO ORDERED.

Respondent Julieta G. Ando (Ando) was convicted by

the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC),
Branch 26 of three (3) counts of Falsification of
Public Documents under Article 172 (1) in relation to
Article 171 (2) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In a
Decision 3 rendered on May 2, 2008, the MeTC found
Ando guilty beyond reasonable doubt of making it
appear that Tee's father, Tee Ong, who was the
owner of To Suy Hardware, signed, executed and
sworn a Deed of Sale, an Affidavit, and a Transfer of
Rights on January 31, 1996. Ando's conviction was
premised on the following factual findings: (i) Tee
Ong was already dead at the time the allegedly
falsified documents were executed and notarized on
January 31, 1996; (ii) Ando was in possession of the
allegedly falsified documents, giving rise to the
presumption that she was responsible therefor; and
(iii) Ando used the allegedly falsified documents to
cause the transfer in her favor of the rights to the
business name "TO SUY HARDWARE". 4
aDCIHE

On appeal, Branch 34 of the Regional

Trial Court (RTC) of Manila affirmed the MeTC's
findings. In a Decision 5 dated November 6, 2008,
the RTC predicated Ando's guilt on the falsity of the
subject documents as being undisputed and
stipulated upon by the parties. 6
The CA gave due course to Ando's appeal and
reversed the RTC Decision dated November 6, 2008.
According to the CA, Ando deserves to be acquitted
of the charges against her in view of the
prosecution's failure to prove that the subject
documents were indeed falsified. Specifically, the
prosecution did not present any expert witness or
caused the examination of the subject documents to
determine whether Tee Ong's thumb mark and
signature were indeed forged. The CA found the
lower courts to have erred in sweepingly concluding
that the signatures on the Deed of Sale, Affidavit,
and Transfer of Rights were forged on the basis of
the undisputed fact that Tee Ong was already dead
at the time that such documents were notarized on
January 31, 1996. According to the CA the
prosecution did not eliminate the possibility that Tee
Ong may have signed the said documents before he
died on December 15, 1995, thus, clouding Ando's
supposed guilt with moral uncertainty. What the CA
found as certain from the evidence of the
prosecution is the notarization of the subject

documents after Tee Ong's death and not the

impossibility of Tee Ong's voluntary execution
thereof before his death. Accordingly, it is the notary
public who notarized the subject documents, not
Ando, who should be held liable for any irregularities
that may have attended the notarization. The
execution and notarization of the subject documents
are two (2) different acts and the irregularities
attending their notarization do not necessarily affect
the validity of their execution.
In this petition, Tee attributes grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CA, alleging that the
latter has no reason to reverse the MeTC's and RTC's
finding of guilt as the inconsistencies in Ando's
statements and her possession and use of the
subject documents prove beyond reasonable doubt
that she was the one who forged Tee Ong's thumb
mark and signature. There was likewise no necessity
to produce an expert witness to determine if Tee
Ong's thumb mark and signature were forged. That
Tee Ong was already dead at the time the subject
documents were executed and notarized coupled
with Ando's use thereof to her benefit sufficed to
conclude that there was forgery and that Ando was
responsible therefor. 7
Tee claimed that he filed this Petition under the
authority and supervision of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG). 8Tee had also dispensed

with the filing of a motion for reconsideration,

claiming that the same has been rendered futile by
the immediately executory nature and finality of an
acquittal. 9
The OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion 10 dated
October 6, 2011, stating that it is adopting Tee's
petition as its own.

This petition does not allege a mistrial and the sole

challenge posed by Tee and the OSG against the
validity of the CA's disposition is the latter's
supposed misappreciation of the evidence, which is
an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction or a
manifestation of grave abuse of discretion, hence,
not correctible by a writ of certiorari. 13

caAICE

Dismissal of this petition is inevitable in view of the

principle of double jeopardy, making it unnecessary
to address and extrapolate on the numerous factual
issues raised by Tee against the CA's Decision dated
July 28, 2011 and the procedural lapses Ando
attributes to Tee. The mere fact that the decision
being brought for this Court's review is one for
acquittal alerts one's attention to a possible violation
of the rule against double jeopardy.
In People v. Hon. Tria-Tirona, 11 this Court reiterated
that mistrial is the only exception to the well-settled,
even axiomatic, principle that acquittal is
immediately final and cannot be appealed on the
ground of double jeopardy. ThisCourt was
categorical in stating that a re-examination of the
evidence without a finding of mistrial will violate the
right to repose of an accused, which is what is
protected by the rule against double jeopardy. 12

In People of the Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan

(Third Division), 14 this Court clarified that for an
acquittal to be considered tainted with grave abuse
of discretion, there must be a showing that the
prosecution's right to due process was violated or
that the trial conducted was a sham.
Although the dismissal order is not
subject to appeal, it is still reviewable
but only through certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. For the writ to
issue, the trial court must be shown to
have acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity
to present its case or where the trial
was a sham thus rendering the assailed
judgment void. The burden is on the
petitioner to clearly demonstrate that
the trial court blatantly abused its
authority to a point so grave as to

deprive it of its very power to dispense

justice. 15 (Citations omitted)

The petition is bereft of any allegation, much less,

evidence that the prosecution's right to due process
was violated or the proceedings before the CA were
a mockery such that Ando's acquittal was a foregone
conclusion. Accordingly, notwithstanding the alleged
errors in the interpretation of the applicable law or
appreciation of evidence that the CA may have
committed in ordering Ando's acquittal, absent any
showing that the CA acted with caprice or without
regard to the rudiments of due process, the CA's
findings can no longer be reversed, disturbed and
set aside without violating the rule against double
jeopardy. As ruled in the abovecited Sandiganbayan case:
TEHIaA

Nonetheless, even if
the Sandiganbayan proceeded from an
erroneous interpretation of the law and its
implementing rules, the error committed
was an error of judgment and not of
jurisdiction. Petitioner failed to establish
that the dismissal order was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion such as the
denial of the prosecution's right to due
process or the conduct of a sham trial. In
fine, the error committed by
theSandiganbayan is of such a nature that
can no longer be rectified on appeal by

the prosecution because it would place

the accused in double
jeopardy. 16 (Citation omitted)

In fine, this petition cannot be given due course

without running afoul of the principle against double
jeopardy.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
DR. ERNESTO I. MAQUILING vs. PHILIPPINE
TUBERCULOSIS SOCIETY, INC..
G.R. No. 143384, February 4, 2005
FACTS:
On 16 April 1968, petitioner Dr. Maquiling was employed by
respondent Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc. (PTS). On 8 June
1991, Dr. Maquiling, then earning a monthly salary of thirteen
thousand nine hundred pesos (P13,900.00) was dismissed from
service as Deputy Executive Director after serving PTS for twentythree (23) years. Dr. Maquiling filed a complaint against PTS for
reinstatement or, in the alternative, for payment of full backwages
and separation pay in accordance with Article 279 of the Labor
Code, as well as moral damages in the amount of five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) and exemplary damages in the amount
of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00).
The complaint was assigned to Labor Arbiter Salimathar V. Nambi.
After PTS failed to appear despite having requested for several
postponements, Dr. Maquiling was allowed to present his
evidence ex parte.

The records disclose that Dr. Maquiling received a memo dated 2

April 1991 from the PTS OIC-Executive Director Andres B. Soriano
(Soriano) directing him to submit within five (5) days from notice a
written explanation on the following matters:
1. The delayed GSIS remittances;
2. The reported deficit of P7.3 million appearing in our
financial statement for 1990;
3. The expenses you approved and incurred in connection
with the Dale Carnegie and Silva Mind Control Seminar;
4. The P3.7 million miscellaneous expenses appearing in our
financial statement; and
5. Your reasons for renewing our service contract with Ultra.
Despite Sorianos instruction for him not to report for work, Dr.
Maquiling manifested, through a letter to the OIC-Executive
Director, his intention to continue performing his duties as Deputy
Executive Director. Dr. Maquiling continued to report for work at
the PTS daily. In the meantime, he elevated his case to the PTS
Board of Directors. Dr. Maquiling, protesting non-payment of his
salary for the period of 15 July 1991, wrote the OIC Finance
Department and formally demanded the release of his earned wages.
PTS reacted through Soriano by informing Dr. Maquiling that there
are no wages forthcoming. Dr. Maquiling wrote the President of PTS
and explained that should they opt not to comply with their duty, the
issue shall be forwarded to a proper outside forum. Dr. Maquiling
stopped reporting for work at the PTS in the last week of September
1991. Then, on 10 October 1991, Dr. Maquiling filed his complaint
with the Labor Arbiter. LA decided in his favor. NLRC on appeal by
PTS affirmed LAs decision of reinstatement and monetary awards.
But CA reversed.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
1. Dr. Maquiling argues that the appellate court should have
applied the case of Serrano v. NLRC.

2. Dr. Maquiling raised in his petition that the appellate court,

which agreed with the findings of the labor arbiter and the
NLRC that the twin requirements of notice and hearing are
wanting, erred in adopting an abandoned doctrine by merely
imposing a fine of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) against
PTS and in disregarding the present doctrine on termination
of employment and monetary benefits accorded by law to
Dr. Maquiling, and in concluding with grave abuse of
discretion that the dismissal of Dr. Maquiling, who had
served PTS for twenty-three (23) years, was for just cause.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:
1. PTS contends that the dismissal of Dr. Maquiling was based
on a just cause, supported as it was by the evidence, law and
jurisprudence. The termination of Dr. Maquilings
employment was allegedly due to loss of trust and
confidence. It avers that for gross mismanagement, for acts
inimical to the interest of PTS, and also for reason that PTS
has lost its trust and confidence in him, PTS terminated his
services without any retirement benefit.
2. Alleges that it complied with the two-notice rule required for
termination of employment. According to PTS, the first
notice was sent by Soriano to Dr. Maquiling by means of
confidential memorandum26 dated 2 April 1991 requiring
him to explain in writing, within five days from notice, the
matters stated therein. Dr. Maquiling honored the first notice
by submitting on 11 April 1991 a written reply to Soriano.
The second notice which allegedly informed Dr. Maquiling
of the decision to terminate his employment, stating reasons
therefor, was sent to him by Soriano on 8 June 1991.
ISSUE:
Whether PTS complied with the twin notice requirement
prescribed in reference to termination of employment of
employees which may render Dr. Maquilings dismissal
nullified?

HELD:
NO, by virtue of the Agabon doctrine.
The following defines the extent of the power and responsibility
attached to the position he occupied:
1. Directs, supervises, coordinates, and controls the general
administrative, finance and regional operations of PTS.
2. Formulates and executes plans and policies for operations
activities under his charge.
3. Signs corresponden[ce] and other documents relative to
operational activities under his charge, within specified limits.
4. Authorizes the hiring, promotion, transfer and termination of
all PTS personnel below the supervisory level in accordance
with the policies prescribed by the Board of Directors.
5. Reports regularly to the Executive Director on the individual
operations and activities of departments and branches under
his charge.
6. Executes and administers directives issued by the Executive
Director.
7. Assists the Executive Director in the preparation of the
[annual] budget and operational plan of the Society.
8. Prepares and submits reports required by the Board of
Directors, government entities and other interested parties.
9. Performs related functions as may be assigned by the
Executive Director.
He failed miserably in satisfying all requirements from him. This
serves the first requirement in termination of employment, the
ground which may be a just or authorized cause. In the case at bar,
loss of confidence and trust is a just cause for termination of
employment. However, PTS was remiss in its duty to observe
procedural due process in effecting the dismissal of Dr. Maquiling.
The court explained, the notices required before an employee may be
validly dismissed are: (a) a written notice served on the employee

specifying the grounds for termination and giving the employee

reasonable opportunity to explain his/her side; (b) a hearing or
conference wherein the employee, with the assistance of counsel if
so desired, is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his
evidence or rebut evidence presented against him/her; and (c) written
notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon
due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify termination. The twin requirements of notice
and hearing constitute elements of due process in cases of
employees dismissal; the requirement of notice is intended to
inform the employee concerned of the employers intent to
dismiss and the reason for the proposed dismissal; upon the other
hand the requirement of hearing affords the employee an opportunity
to answer his employers charges against him and accordingly to
defend himself therefrom before dismissal is effected.
This notice will afford the employee an opportunity to avail all
defenses and exhaust all remedies to refute the allegations hurled
against him for what is at stake is his very life and limb his
employment. Otherwise, the employee may just disregard the notice
as a warning without any disastrous consequence to be anticipated.
Absent such statement, the first notice falls short of the requirement
of due process. Ones work is everything, thus, it is not too exacting
to impose this strict requirement on the part of the employer before
the dismissal process be validly effected.
It must be noted that the first notice is a mere instruction to explain
the matters enumerated therein. It did not apprise Dr. Maquiling of
any investigation to be conducted or being conducted that will
warrant his dismissal from service if found guilty of charges
specified therein. Thus, such notice fell short of the requirement of
law that an employee must be afforded the benefit of the two-notice
rule in dismissal cases that will allow the employee to substantiate
the charges specified in the notice with full knowledge at the outset
that the investigation to be conducted may result in his dismissal or
suspension from employment.

The Serrano ruling awarded full backwages and separation pay to

the employee who was dismissed for just cause but without the
observance of the procedural due process requirement.
The Agabon doctrine enunciates the rule that if the dismissal is for
just cause but statutory due process was not observed, the dismissal
should be upheld. While the procedural infirmity cannot be cured, it
should not invalidate the dismissal. However, the employer should
be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements
of due process.
Where the dismissal is for just cause, as in the instant case, the
lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or
render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should
indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights.
The indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer to discourage the
abhorrent practice of "dismiss now, pay later," which we sought
to deter in the Serrano ruling. The sanction should be in the
nature of indemnification or penalty.
No other damages shall be paid as the records fail to show that Dr.
Maquiling suffered pecuniary loss by reason of his dismissal from
service. Neither will an award for moral damages nor exemplary
damages prosper. The instant controversy fails to show that the
dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith, fraud, or was
done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy,
or that the employer committed an act oppressive to labor to warrant
an award for moral damages.
Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, we deem
it proper to fix it at thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00). This is in the
form of damages would serve to deter employers from future
violations of the statutory due process rights of employees. At the
very least, it provides a vindication or recognition of this right
granted to employees. (sta.ana)

U.S v. FELIPE BUSTOS et al.

GR no. L-12592 March 3, 1918
Malcom, J.
Doctrine: The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include
the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law
is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or
badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the
people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as
any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively
suppressed. It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the
State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is
further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the
part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring
the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and
punish them.
Facts: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of
Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the
Executive Secretary (privileged communication) through the law
office of Crossfield and O'Brien. Five individuals signed affidavits,
charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and
Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his
removal. The specific charges against the justice of the peace include
the solicitation of money from persons who have pending cases
before the judge. Now, Punsalan alleged that accused published a
writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and
libelous against him.
Issue: Whether or not accused is entitled to constitutional protection
by virtue of his right to free speech and free press.
Ruling: YES. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press
include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of
the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely
or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If
the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same
as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively
suppressed. It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the

State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is

further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the
part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring
the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and
punish them.
.
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly
administration of government have demanded protection for public
opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the
development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. All persons
have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and
of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is
sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good
faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is
mistaken. Although the charges are probably not true as to the justice
of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good
faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that
malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends
and the motives of these citizens to secure the removal from office
of a person thought to be venal were justifiable. In no way did
they abuse the privilege. (Valencia)

[G.R. No. 197788. February 29, 2012.]

RODEL LUZ y
ONG, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, 1 respondent.
DECISION

SERENO, J :
p

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule

45 seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18 February
2011 2 and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.

Statement of the Facts and of the Case

The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), which sustained the version of the
prosecution, are as follows:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then
assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga
City Police Station as a traffic enforcer,
substantially testified that on March 10,
2003 at around 3:00 o'clock in the
morning, he saw the accused, who was
coming from the direction of Panganiban
Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga
City, driving a motorcycle without a
helmet; that this prompted him to flag
down the accused for violating a
municipal ordinance which requires all
motorcycle drivers to wear
helmet (sic) while driving said motor
vehicle; that he invited the accused to
come inside their sub-station since the
place where he flagged down the accused
is almost in front of the said sub-station;

that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante

were issuing a citation ticket for violation
of municipal ordinance, he noticed that
the accused was uneasy and kept on
getting something from his jacket; that he
was alerted and so, he told the accused
to take out the contents of the pocket of
his jacket as the latter may have a
weapon inside it; that the accused obliged
and slowly put out the contents of the
pocket of his jacket which was a nickellike tin or metal container about two (2)
to three (3) inches in size, including two
(2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors
and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing
the said container, he asked the accused
to open it; that after the accused opened
the container, he noticed a cartoon cover
and something beneath it; and that upon
his instruction, the accused spilled out the
contents of the container on the table
which turned out to be four (4) plastic
sachets, the two (2) of which were empty
while the other two (2) contained
suspected shabu. 3

Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by

counsel, entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the charge
of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was
terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial
ensued.

During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza

and a forensic chemist testified for the prosecution.
On the other hand, petitioner testified for himself
and raised the defense of planting of evidence and
extortion.
In its 19 February 2009 Decision, 4 the RTC
convicted petitioner of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs 5 committed on 10 March 2003. It
found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show
that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic
violation and then subjected to a valid search, which
led to the discovery on his person of two plastic
sachets later found to contain shabu. The RTC also
found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be
weak, self-serving and unsubstantiated. The
dispositive portion of its Decision held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y
ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime of violation of Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and
sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from twelve (12) years and (1)
day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years,
as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).

The subject shabu is hereby confiscated

for turn over to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency for its proper
disposition and destruction in accordance
with law.
SO ORDERED.

Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTC's Decision.

On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule
45 the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari dated
1 September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12 October
2011, this Court required respondent to file a
comment on the Petition. On 4 January 2012, the
latter filed its Comment dated 3 January 2012.
Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of
his Petition:
(i)THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE
ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS
INVALID.
(ii)THE PRESUMPTION OF
REGULARITY IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF
THE POLICE OFFICER CANNOT
BE RELIED UPON IN THIS
CASE.

(iii)THE INTEGRITY AND

EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE
ALLEGED SUBJECT SPECIMEN
HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.
(iv)THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSEDPETITIONER WAS NOT
PROVEN BEYOND THE
REASONABLE DOUBT (sic). 7

Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and

seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He
claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest
was erroneous, since he was not even issued a
citation ticket or charged with violation of the city
ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest,
he claims that he had never consented to the search
conducted upon him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been
lawfully arrested, the RTC held thus:
It is beyond dispute that the accused was
flagged down and apprehended in this
case by Police Officers Alteza and Brillante
for violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012,
an ordinance requiring the use of crash
helmet by motorcycle drivers and riders
thereon in the City of Naga and
prescribing penalties for violation thereof.
The accused himself admitted that he was

not wearing a helmet at the time when he

was flagged down by the said police
officers, albeit he had a helmet in his
possession. Obviously, there is legal basis
on the part of the apprehending officers
to flag down and arrest the accused
because the latter was actually
committing a crime in their presence, that
is, a violation of City Ordinance No. 98012. In other words, the accused, being
caught in flagrante delicto violating the
said Ordinance, he could therefore be
lawfully stopped or arrested by the
apprehending officers. . . . . 8

We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but

not for the particular reasons alleged. In criminal
cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open
for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct
errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment,
or even reverse the trial court's decision based on
grounds other than those that the parties raised as
errors. 9

First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner.

When he was flagged down for committing a traffic

violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this
reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order
that he or she may be bound to answer for the

commission of an offense. 10 It is effected by an

actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by
that person's voluntary submission to the custody of
the one making the arrest. Neither the application of
actual force, manual touching of the body, or
physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest,
is required. It is enough that there be an intention
on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other,
and that there be an intent on the part of the other
to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary. 11
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with
a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender,
but the confiscation of the driver's license of the
latter:
SECTION 29.Confiscation of Driver's
License. Law enforcement and peace
officers of other agencies duly deputized
by the Director shall, in apprehending a
driver for any violation of this Act or any
regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of
local traffic rules and regulations not
contrary to any provisions of this Act,
confiscate the license of the driver
concerned and issue a receipt prescribed
and issued by the Bureau therefor which
shall authorize the driver to operate a
motor vehicle for a period not exceeding

seventy-two hours from the time and date

of issue of said receipt. The period so
fixed in the receipt shall not be extended,
and shall become invalid thereafter.
Failure of the driver to settle his case
within fifteen days from the date of
apprehension will be a ground for the
suspension and/or revocation of his
license.

Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP)

Operations Manual 12 provides the following
procedure for flagging down vehicles during the
conduct of checkpoints:
SECTION 7.Procedure in Flagging Down

or Accosting Vehicles While in Mobile

Car. This rule is a general concept and
will not apply in hot pursuit operations.
The mobile car crew shall undertake the
following, when applicable: . . .

m.If it concerns traffic violations,

immediately issue a Traffic Citation
Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation
Report (TVR). Never indulge in
prolonged, unnecessary
conversation or argument with the
driver or any of the vehicle's
occupants;

At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to

write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said
to have been "under arrest." There was no intention
on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him
of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the
issuance of the ticket, the period during which
petitioner was at the police station may be
characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as
found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified
that the only reason they went to the police substation was that petitioner had been flagged down
"almost in front" of that place. Hence, it was only for
the sake of convenience that they were waiting
there. There was no intention to take petitioner into
custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty, 13 the United States (U.S.)
Supreme Court discussed at length whether the
roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant
to a routine traffic stop should be considered
custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such
questioning does not fall under custodial
interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal
arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the
expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the
length of time the procedure is conducted. It ruled
as follows:
It must be acknowledged at the outset
that a traffic stop significantly curtails the

"freedom of action" of the driver and the

passengers, if any, of the detained
vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is
a crime either to ignore a policeman's
signal to stop one's car or, once having
stopped, to drive away without
permission. . . .
However, we decline to accord talismanic
power to the phrase in the Miranda
opinion emphasized by respondent.
Fidelity to the doctrine announced in
Miranda requires that it be enforced
strictly, but only in those types of
situations in which the concerns that
powered the decision are implicated.
Thus, we must decide whether a traffic
stop exerts upon a detained person
pressures that sufficiently impair his free
exercise of his privilege against selfincrimination to require that he be warned
of his constitutional rights.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop
mitigate the danger that a person
questioned will be induced "to speak
where he would not otherwise do so
freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S., at
467. First, detention of a motorist
pursuant to a traffic stop is
presumptively temporary and
brief. The vast majority of roadside

detentions last only a few minutes. A

motorist's expectations, when he sees a
policeman's light flashing behind him, are
that he will be obliged to spend a short
period of time answering questions and
waiting while the officer checks his license
and registration, that he may then be
given a citation, but that in the end he
most likely will be allowed to continue on
his way. In this respect, questioning
incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite
different from stationhouse interrogation,
which frequently is prolonged, and in
which the detainee often is aware that
questioning will continue until he provides
his interrogators the answers they seek.
See id., at 451.
Second, circumstances associated
with the typical traffic stop are not
such that the motorist feels
completely at the mercy of the
police. To be sure, the aura of authority
surrounding an armed, uniformed officer
and the knowledge that the officer has
some discretion in deciding whether to
issue a citation, in combination, exert
some pressure on the detainee to respond
to questions. But other aspects of the
situation substantially offset these forces.
Perhaps most importantly, the typical

traffic stop is public, at least to some

degree. . . .
In both of these respects, the usual
traffic stop is more analogous to a
so-called "Terry stop," seeTerry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), than to a
formal arrest. . . . The comparatively
nonthreatening character of detentions of
this sort explains the absence of any
suggestion in our opinions that Terry
stops are subject to the dictates of
Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect
of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to
hold that persons temporarily detained
pursuant to such stops are not "in
custody" for the purposes of Miranda.
xxx xxx xxx
We are confident that the state of affairs
projected by respondent will not come to
pass. It is settled that the safeguards
prescribed by Miranda become applicable
as soon as a suspect's freedom of action
is curtailed to a "degree associated with
formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463
U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a
motorist who has been detained pursuant
to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to
treatment that renders him "in custody"
for practical purposes, he will be entitled

to the full panoply of protections

prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per
curiam). (Emphasis supplied.)

The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the

motorist therein was only subjected to modest
questions while still at the scene of the traffic stop,
he was not at that moment placed under custody
(such that he should have been apprised of
his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this
sort be fairly characterized as the functional
equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can
petitioner here be considered "under arrest" at the
time that his traffic citation was being made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No.
98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure
to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is
penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a
warrant of arrest need not be issued if the
information or charge was filed for an offense
penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a
corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be
made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no
arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is
an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive
the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into

custody, the former may be deemed to have

arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the
officer's issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation
ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the
same violation.
Even if one were to work under the
assumption that petitioner was deemed
"arrested" upon being flagged down for a
traffic violation and while awaiting the
issuance of his ticket, then the requirements
for a valid arrest were not complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is
arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer
to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and
must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any.
Persons shall be informed of their constitutional
rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement they might make could be used against
them. 14 It may also be noted that in this case,
these constitutional requirements were complied
with by the police officers only after petitioner had
been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs.
In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that
the Miranda warnings must also be given to a person
apprehended due to a traffic violation:

The purposes of the safeguards

prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that
the police do not coerce or trick captive
suspects into confessing, to relieve the
"inherently compelling pressures"
"generated by the custodial setting itself,"
"which work to undermine the individual's
will to resist," and as much as possible to
free courts from the task of scrutinizing
individual cases to try to determine, after
the fact, whether particular confessions
were voluntary. Those purposes are
implicated as much by in-custody
questioning of persons suspected of
misdemeanors as they are by questioning
of persons suspected of felonies.

If it were true that petitioner was already deemed

"arrested" when he was flagged down for a traffic
violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then
there would have been no need for him to be
arrested for a second time after the police officers
allegedly discovered the drugs as he was already
in their custody.

Second, there being no valid arrest, the

warrantless search that resulted from it was

likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless
search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental

to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in "plain

view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv)
consented warrantless search; (v) customs search;
(vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and
emergency circumstances. 15 None of the abovementioned instances, especially a search incident to
a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although
alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in
"plain view." It was actually concealed inside a metal
container inside petitioner's pocket. Clearly, the
evidence was not immediately apparent. 16
Neither was there a consented warrantless search.
Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but
shown by clear and convincing evidence. 17 It must
be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal
search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal,
specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by
any duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims
that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3
Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to
prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC
found that petitioner was merely "told" to take out
the contents of his pocket.18
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary
is a question of fact to be determined from the
totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this

determination are the following characteristics of the

person giving consent and the environment in which
consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2)
whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded
location; (3) whether the defendant objected to the
search or passively looked on; (4) the education and
intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of
coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief
that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7)
the nature of the police questioning; (8) the
environment in which the questioning took place;
and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of
the person consenting. It is the State that has the
burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony,
that the necessary consent was obtained, and was
freely and voluntarily given. 19 In this case, all that
was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the
police station at three in the morning, accompanied
by several police officers. These circumstances weigh
heavily against a finding of valid consent to a
warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and
frisk" rule. While the rule normally applies when a
police officer observes suspicious or unusual
conduct, which may lead him to believe that a
criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is
merely a limited protective search of outer clothing
for weapons. 20

In Knowles v. Iowa, 21 the U.S. Supreme Court held

that when a police officer stops a person for
speeding and correspondingly issues a citation
instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does
not authorize the officer to conduct a full search of
the car. The Court therein held that there was no
justification for a full-blown search when the officer
does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers
may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as
ordering the motorist to alight from the car or doing
a patdown:
In Robinson, supra, we noted the two
historical rationales for the "search
incident to arrest" exception: (1) the need
to disarm the suspect in order to take him
into custody, and (2) the need to preserve
evidence for later use at trial. . . . But
neither of these underlying rationales for
the search incident to arrest exception is
sufficient to justify the search in the
present case.
We have recognized that the first
rationale officer safety is "'both
legitimate and weighty,'" . . . The threat
to officer safety from issuing a traffic
citation, however, is a good deal less than
in the case of a custodial arrest. In
Robinson, we stated that a custodial
arrest involves "danger to an officer"

because of "the extended exposure which

follows the taking of a suspect into
custody and transporting him to the police
station." 414 U.S., at 234-235. We
recognized that "[t]he danger to the
police officer flows from the fact of the
arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress,
and uncertainty, and not from the
grounds for arrest." Id., at 234, n. 5. A
routine traffic stop, on the other
hand, is a relatively brief encounter
and "is more analogous to a socalled 'Terry stop' . . . than to a
formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty,
468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp
v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973)
("Where there is no formal arrest . . . a
person might well be less hostile to the
police and less likely to take conspicuous,
immediate steps to destroy incriminating
evidence").
This is not to say that the concern
for officer safety is absent in the
case of a routine traffic stop. It plainly
is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110;
Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while the
concern for officer safety in this
context may justify the "minimal"
additional intrusion of ordering a
driver and passengers out of the car,
it does not by itself justify the often

considerably greater intrusion

attending a full fieldtype
search. Even without the search
authority Iowa urges, officers have other,
independent bases to search for weapons
and protect themselves from danger. For
example, they may order out of a vehicle
both the driver, Mimms, supra, at 111,
and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at
414; perform a "patdown" of a driver and
any passengers upon reasonable
suspicion that they may be armed and
dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968); conduct a "Terry patdown" of the
passenger compartment of a vehicle upon
reasonable suspicion that an occupant is
dangerous and may gain immediate
control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even
conduct a full search of the passenger
compartment, including any containers
therein, pursuant to a custodial
arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,
460 (1981).
Nor has Iowa shown the second
justification for the authority to search
incident to arrest the need to discover
and preserve evidence. Once Knowles
was stopped for speeding and issued a
citation, all the evidence necessary to
prosecute that offense had been

obtained. No further evidence of

excessive speed was going to be found
either on the person of the offender or in
the passenger compartment of the car.
(Emphasis supplied.)

The foregoing considered, petitioner must be

acquitted. While he may have failed to object to the
illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a
waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not,
however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during the illegal warrantless
arrest. 22
The Constitution guarantees the right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures. 23 Any evidence obtained in violation
of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding. While the power to search and seize
may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still
it must be exercised and the law implemented
without contravening the constitutional rights of
citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of
sufficient importance to justify indifference to the
basic principles of government. 24
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are
inadmissible. 25 The drugs are the very corpus
delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous

drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes

conviction and calls for the acquittal of the
accused. 26
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18
February 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming the judgment of
conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional
Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Naga City, Branch
21, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is
hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. *Petitioner
RodelLuz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED. The bail
bond posted for his provisional liberty
is CANCELLED and RELEASED.
SO ORDERED.
DOMINADOR C. BALDOZA vs. HON. JUDGE RODOLFO B.
DIMAANO
A.M. No. 1120-MJ May 5, 1976
Antonio, J.
DOCTRINE:
The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized, Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis
for policy development shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
A municipal mayor has the right to examine judicial records
subject to reasonable rules and conditions.
The Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charges Municipal Judge

Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the same municipality, with abuse of

authority in refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to
examine the criminal docket records of the Municipal Court to
secure data in connection with their contemplated report on the peace
and order conditions of the said municipality.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:
Respondent, in answer to the complaint, stated that there has never
been an intention to refuse access to official court records; that
although court records are among public documents open to
inspection not only by the parties directly involved but also by other
persons who have legitimate interest to such inspection, yet the same
is always subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where
and how they may be inspected. He further asserted that a court has
unquestionably the power to prevent an improper use or inspection
of its records and the furnishing of copies therefrom may be refused
where the person requesting is not motivated by a serious and
legitimate interest but acts out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or
to gratify private spite or to promote public scandal.
In his answer, the respondent significantly observed: Restrictions are
imposed by the Court for fear of an abuse in the exercise of the right.
For fear that the dirty hands of partisan politics might again be at
play, Some of the cases filed and decided by the Court after the
declaration of Martial Law and years after the election still bore the
stigma of partisan politics as shown in the affidavits and testimonies
of witnesses. Without casting aspersion on any particular individual,
it is worth mentioning, that the padlocks of the door of the Court has
recently been tampered by inserting papers and matchsticks. Under
the circumstances, to allow an indiscriminate and unlimited exercise
of the right to free access, might do more harm than good to the
citizenry of Taal. Disorder and chaos might result defeating the very
essence of their request. The undersigned is just as interested as Mr.
Baldoza in the welfare of the community and the preservation of our
democratic principles.

Issue:
Did the judge abuse his authority in restricting the petitioner from
examining judicial records?

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION

(SSSEA) v. THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989

Ruling:
No. The respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the
docket books of respondent certain conditions and under his control
and supervision. It has not been shown that the rules and conditions
imposed by the respondent were unreasonable. The access to public
records predicated on the right of the people to acquire information
on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in a democracy, the
public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political
significance.

DOCTRINE:

The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are
entitled to information on matters of public concern and thus are
expressly granted access to official records, as well as documents of
official acts, or transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations
imposed by law. The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is
a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of
information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by
the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic
decision making if they are denied access to information of general
interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to
cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed:
"Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for
both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is
interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases. " However, restrictions on
access to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access
restrictions imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted
upon a showing of immediate and impending danger that renders
ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain order.
WHEREFORE, the case against respondent is hereby dismissed.
(zulueta)

By reason of the nature of the public employer and the peculiar

character of the public service, it must necessarily regard the right to
strike given to unions in private industry as not applying to public
employees and civil service employees. It has been stated that the
Government, in contrast to the private employer, protects the interest
of all people in the public service, and that accordingly, such
conflicting interests as are present in private labor relations could not
exist in the relations between government and those whom they
employ.
FACTS:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9,
1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike
and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing nonstriking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from
transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the
Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the
strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work;
and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The
complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to
enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work;
that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages;
and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act
on the union's demands, which included: implementation of the
provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime

pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary

or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into
regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same
salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of
the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and
after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the
employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair
labor practices.

Department of Labor and Employment on January 25, 1989 and to

maintain the status quo.

The court a quo, on June 11, 1987, issued a temporary restraining

order pending resolution of the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction. In the meantime, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
alleging the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
To this motion, the SSS filed an opposition, reiterating its prayer for
the issuance of a writ of injunction. On July 22,1987, in a four-page
order, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss and converted the
restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after
finding that the strike was illegal. As petitioners' motion for the
reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also denied on August 14,
1988, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction before this Court. Their petition was docketed
as G.R. No. 79577. In a resolution dated October 21, 1987, the
Court, through the Third Division, resolved to refer the case to the
Court of Appeals. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
thereof, but during its pendency the Court of Appeals on March
9,1988 promulgated its decision on the referred case. Petitioners
moved to recall the Court of Appeals' decision. In the meantime, the
Court on June 29,1988 denied the motion for reconsideration in G.R.
No. 97577 for being moot and academic. Petitioners' motion to recall
the decision of the Court of Appeals was also denied in view of this
Court's denial of the motion for reconsideration. Hence, the instant
petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to issue the
restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction, as
jurisdiction lay with the Department of Labor and Employment or
the National Labor Relations Commission, since the case involves a
labor dispute.

Upon motion of the SSS on February 6,1989, the Court issued a

temporary restraining order enjoining the petitioners from staging
another strike or from pursuing the notice of strike they filed with the

Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have

the right to strike.

The Court, taking the comment as answer, and noting the reply and
supplemental reply filed by petitioners, considered the issues joined
and the case submitted for decision.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:
The SSS advances that the RTC has jurisdiction, on the ground that
the employees of the SSS are covered by civil service laws and rules
and regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they do not have the
right to strike. Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has
jurisdiction over the dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the
employees from striking.
In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction filed by petitioners, the Court of Appeals held
that since the employees of the SSS, are government employees, they
are not allowed to strike, and may be enjoined by the Regional Trial
Court, which had jurisdiction over the SSS' complaint for damages,
from continuing with their strike.
ISSUE:

RULING:

No. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies
of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also
Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are
denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one
such government-controlled corporation with an original charter,
having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of
the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295,
November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service
Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case,
the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to
petitioner union being prohibited by law, an injunction may be issued
to restrain it.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, vs. FILEMON
REMIGIO and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 78508 March 21, 1994
FACTS:
On 25 August 1967, private respondent obtained from
petitioner a P65,000.00 loan secured by a real estate mortgage
covering five (5) parcels of land in Isabela.
Private respondent defaulted; hence on 17 November 1970,
petitioner bank extrajudicially foreclosed on the mortgage, and it
acquired the encumbered assets for the sum of P87,082.00.
On February 15, 1971, petitioner bank invited private
respondent to repurchase the foreclosed property for P87,082.00 plus
interest and other charges. Before that, or on 18 November 1970 (or
one day after the foreclosure sale), private respondent already had
paid an initial P10,000.00 to redeem the property. Subsequently,
additional payments were made by private respondent.
On 21 October 1972, Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 27
was enacted into law that mandated an agrarian reform. Pursuant
thereto, an "Operation Land Transfer Program" was launched;

among the areas it covered were the parcels of land subject of the
dispute.
On 17 April 1974, private respondent offered to buy the
foreclosed property for P284,000.00 which was the market and
appraised value thereof fixed by petitioner bank. On 24 December
1974, the Deed of Promise to Sell was executed between petitioner
bank and private respondent.
On 25 August 1978, private respondent inquired why he was
still being made to buy the property for P284,000.00 when, in truth,
he had already paid P40,000.00 of the P87,082.00 previously offered
by petitioner for the redemption of the property. There was no reply
or response from petitioner. As of 02 November 1977, private
respondent had paid petitioner the total sum of P207,243.85.
On 20 September 1978, instituted an action for "Annulment
of Foreclosure Deed, Breach of Contract, Sum of Money and
Damages" at the CFI, Echague, Isabela, against petitioner bank and
its Branch Manager Leuterio Genato.
On 19 March 1980, while the case was yet pending with the
trial court, petitioner bank additionally received from the Land Bank
of the Philippines P26,348.12 in cash and P160,000.00 worth of
Land Bank Bonds in payment of the foreclosed parcels covered.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner bank
declaring the foreclosure sale as valid and dismissing the complaint.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court
decision and ordered the defendant bank to release the properties and
the plaintiff to transfer the rights to the tenants-beneficiaries in favor
of the Land Bank of the Philippines.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether P.D. No. 27 (where lands covered by the decree
may not be the object of the foreclosure proceedings after its
promulgation) had the effect of impairing the obligation of the duly
executed mortgage contracts affecting said lands. NO
HELD:

When Presidential Decree No. 27, "Decreeing the Emancipation of

Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil, Transferring to them the
Ownership of the Land They Till and Providing the Instruments and
Mechanism therefor," was enacted on 21 October 1972, the parcels
of land in dispute were clearly still subject to private respondent's
right of redemption. Thus the "title to the land sold under a mortgage
foreclosure remains with the mortgagor or his grantee until the
expiration of the redemption period . . ." Although the land was sold
in 1970, the sheriff's sale was registered only on October 11, 1972
and the one year redemption period begins to run from this date and
not from the date of sale.
The opinion of the Secretary of the Department of Justice has
likewise deserves respect, to wit:
I am aware that a ruling that lands covered by P.D. No. 27
may not be the object of the foreclosure proceedings after the
promulgation of said decree on October 21, 1972, would
concede that P.D. No. 27 had the effect of impairing the
obligation of the duly executed mortgage contracts affecting
said lands. There is no question, however, that the land
reform program of the government as accelerated under P.D.
No. 27 and mandated by the Constitution itself (Art. XIV,
Sec. 12), was undertaken in the exercise of the police power
of the state. It is settled in a long line of decisions of the
Supreme Court that the Constitutional guaranty of nonimpairment of obligations of contract is limited by the
exercise of the police power of the state (citations omitted).
One limitation on the contract clause arises from the police
power, the reason being that public welfare is superior to
private rights (citation omitted). The situation here, is like
that in eminent domain proceedings, where the state
expropriates private property for public use, and the only
condition to be complied with is the payment of just
compensation. Technically, the condemnation proceedings
do not impair the contract to destroy its obligations, but
merely appropriate or take for public use (citation omitted).
As the Land Bank is obliged to settle the obligations secured

by the mortgage, the mortgagee is not left without any

compensation.

G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Petitioner, vs. HON.
JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Presiding over Branch 6, Regional
Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Baguio City, and FELIPE
RAMOS, Respondents.
DOCTRINE: Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. It
should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets
of rights, dealt with in the section, namely:
1) the right against self-incrimination - i.e., the right of a person
not to be compelled to be a witness against himself - set out in the
first sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of Section 18,
Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and is similar to that
accorded by the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution,
12
and chanrobles virtual law library
2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights
of every suspect "under investigation for the commission of an
offense."

FACTS: Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk

of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station.
It having allegedly come to light that he was involved in
irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management
notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the matter of
February 9, 1986. That investigation was scheduled in accordance
with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective
Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines
Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained.
On the day before the investigation, February 8,1986, Ramos gave to
his superiors a handwritten notes reading as follows:
2-8-86 chanrobles virtual law library

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: chanrobles virtual law library

THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT HE IS
WILLING TO SETTLE IRREGULARITIES ALLEGEDLY
CHARGED VS. HIM IN THE AMT. OF P 76,000 (APPROX.)
SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AS MAY BE IMPOSED BY PAL
ON OR BEFORE 1700/9 FEB 86.
(s) Felipe Ramos chanrobles virtual law library
(Printed) F. Ramos
At the investigation of February 9, 1986, conducted by the
PAL Branch Manager in Baguio City, Edgardo R. Cruz, in the
presence of Station Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk
Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward Cristeta Domingo,
Felipe Ramos was informed "of the finding of the Audit Team."
Thereafter, his answers in response to questions by Cruz, were taken
down in writing. Ramos' answers were to the effect inter alia that he
had not indeed made disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the Audit
Team's findings, that the proceeds had been "misused" by him, that
although he had planned on paying back the money, he had been
prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by) shame," that he was still
willing to settle his obligation, and proferred a "compromise x x to
pay on staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known in the next
investigation;" that he desired the next investigation to be at the same
place, "Baguio CTO," and that he should be represented therein by
"Shop stewardees ITR Nieves Blanco;" and that he was willing to
sign his statement (as he in fact afterwards did). How the
investigation turned out is not dealt with the parties at all; but it
would seem that no compromise agreement was reached much less
consummated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe
Ramos charging him with the crime of estafa.
The accused pleaded not guilty. At the close of the people's
case, the private prosecutors made a written offer "the (above
mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on
February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office," which had

been marked as Exhibit A, as well as his "handwritten admission

x x given on February 8, 1986," also above referred to, which
had been marked as Exhibit K.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
The defendant's attorneys filed "Objections/Comments to
Plaintiff s Evidence." 7Particularly as regards the peoples' Exhibit A,
the objection was that "said document, which appears to be a
confession, was taken without the accused being represented by a
lawyer." Exhibit K was objected to "for the same reasons interposed
under Exhibits 'A' and 'J
By Order dated August 9, 1988, 8 the respondent judge
admitted all the exhibits "as part of the testimony of the
witnesses who testified in connection therewith and for whatever
they are worth," except Exhibits A and K, which it rejected. His
Honor declared Exhibit A "inadmissible in evidence, it
appearing that it is the statement of accused Felipe Ramos taken
on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office, in an
investigation conducted by the Branch Manager x x since it does
not appear that the accused was reminded of this constitutional
rights to remain silent and to have counsel, and that when he
waived the same and gave his statement, it was with the
assistance actually of a counsel." He also declared inadmissible
"Exhibit K, the handwritten admission made by accused Felipe
J. Ramos, given on February 8, 1986 x x for the same reason
stated in the exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since it does not appear that
the accused was assisted by counsel when he made said
admission.
ISSUE: whether or not it was grave abuse of discretion for
respondent Judge to have excluded the People's Exhibits A and K.
YES
RULING:
At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, 11 to which respondent Judge has given a

construction that is disputed by the People. The section reads as

follows:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and
to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall
be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets
of rights, dealt with in the section, namely:
1) the right against self-incrimination - i.e., the right of a person
not to be compelled to be a witness against himself - set out in the
first sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of Section 18,
Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and is similar to that
accorded by the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution,
12
and chanrobles virtual law library
2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights
of every suspect "under investigation for the commission of an
offense."
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more
clearly the individuality and disparateness of these rights. It has
placed the rights in separate sections. The right against selfincrimination, "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself," is now embodied in Section 17, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The lights of a person in custodial interrogation, which
have been made more explicit, are now contained in Section 12 of
the same Article III. chanrobles virtual law library
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and
subsequently charged with its commission in court, has the
following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing
evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the
public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after
having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his

liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the

police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and
to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence,
threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free
will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights
rejected; and chanrobles virtual law library
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT a) to refuse to be a witness; chanrobles virtual law library
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such
refusal; chanrobles virtual law library
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the
prosecution; chanrobles virtual law library
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question
which tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that
for which he is then prosecuted.
It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent
Judge has misapprehended the nature and import of the disparate
rights set forth in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He
has taken them as applying to the same juridical situation, equating
one with the other. In so doing, he has grossly erred. To be sure, His
Honor sought to substantiate his thesis by arguments he took to be
cogent and logical. The thesis was however so far divorced from the
actual and correct state of the constitutional and legal principles
involved as to make application of said thesis to the case before him
tantamount to totally unfounded, whimsical or capricious exercise of
power. His Orders were thus rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
They should be as they are hereby, annulled and set aside.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe
Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation, as the
term should be properly understood, prior to and during the
administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales
in which he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of
a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no
relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had

voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the

administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the
proceedings should be recorded, the record having thereafter been
marked during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed
against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later
marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on February
8,1986, the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his
liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous
act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the socalled "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.
His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the "greater
danger x x (of) the violation of the right of any person against selfincrimination when the investigation is conducted by the
complaining parties, complaining companies, or complaining
employers because being interested parties, unlike the police
agencies who have no propriety or pecuniary interest to protect, they
may in their over-eagerness or zealousness bear heavily on their
hapless suspects, whether employees or not, to give statements under
an atmosphere of moral coercion, undue ascendancy and undue
influence." It suffices to draw attention to the specific and
peremptory requirement of the law that disciplinary sanctions may
not be imposed on any employee by his employer until and unless
the employee has been accorded due process, by which is meant that
the latter must be informed of the offenses ascribed to him and
afforded adequate time and opportunity to explain his side. The
requirement entails the making of statements, oral or written, by the
employee under such administrative investigation in his defense,
with opportunity to solicit the assistance of counsel, or his colleagues
and friends. The employee may, of course, refuse to submit any
statement at the investigation, that is his privilege. But if he should
opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation against him, it would be
absurd to reject his statements, whether at the administrative
investigation, or at a subsequent criminal action brought against him,
because he had not been accorded, prior to his making and
presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and
to be informed thereof, etc.) which, to repeat, are relevant only in

custodial investigations. Indeed, it is self-evident that the employee's

statements, whether called "position paper," "answer," etc., are
submitted by him precisely so that they may be admitted and duly
considered by the investigating officer or committee, in negation or
mitigation of his liability.
Of course the possibility cannot be discounted that in certain
instances the judge's expressed apprehensions may be realized, that
violence or intimidation, undue pressure or influence be brought to
bear on an employee under investigation - or for that matter, on a
person being interrogated by another whom he has supposedly
offended. In such an event, any admission or confession wrung from
the person under interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence, on
proof of the vice or defect vitiating consent, not because of a
violation of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, but
simply on the general, incontestable proposition that involuntary or
coerced statements may not in justice be received against the makers
thereof, and really should not be accorded any evidentiary value at
all.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION NA BAKA TANUNGIN NI

COMMISH
Right Against Self-Incrimination chanrobles virtual law library
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section
20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to every
person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative
proceeding. The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness
against himself" law library
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled
meaning. It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating
questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a
witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refue to answer any
particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a
tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can

be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in

character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any
other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a
subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed,
or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena
must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer
questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to him,
the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense, that he
may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.
law library
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution
does not impose on the judge, or other officer presiding over a trial,
hearing or investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a
witness of his right against self-incrimination. It is a right that a
witness knows or should know, in accordance with the well known
axiom that every one is presumed to know the law, that ignorance of
the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in the very nature of things,
neither the judge nor the witness can be expected to know in advance
the character or effect of a question to be put to the latter. virtual law
library
The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing
or automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed
by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into
play. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or
impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time. law
library
Rights in Custodial Interrogation chanrobles virtual law library
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of
a second right, or better said, group of rights. These rights apply to
persons "under investigation for the commission of an offense," i.e.,
"suspects" under investigation by police authorities; and this is what
makes these rights different from that embodied in the first sentence,
that against self-incrimination which, as aforestated, indiscriminately
applies to any person testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or
administrative.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

This provision granting explicit rights to persons under

investigation for an offense was not in the 1935 Constitution. It is
avowedly derived from the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Miranda v. Arizona, 19 a decision described as an "earthquake in the
world of law enforcement." virtual law library
Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation
for the commission of an offense"-1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right,
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiates the free will shall be used against him; andvirtual law library
3) any confession obtained in violation of x x (these rights shall be
inadmissible in evidence. In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren
summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for a person in
police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the
commencement of an adversary proceeding against the suspect.
virtual law library
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and
that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him
prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise
those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation.
After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him,
the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights
and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such
warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the
trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used
against him. virtual law library
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado
interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere,
resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of
constitutional rights."
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial
interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of accused
persons.And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial

interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement

officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." The
situation contemplated has also been more precisely described by
this Court."
.. . After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a
confrontation arises which at best may be tanned unequal. The
detainee is brought to an army camp or police headquarters and there
questioned and "cross-examined" not only by one but as many
investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He
finds himself in strange and unfamiliar surroundings, and every
person he meets he considers hostile to him. The investigators are
well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the
methods and means that experience and study have taught them to
extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most
detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional
rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence
of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them
into silence. Section 20 of the Bill of Rights seeks to remedy this
imbalance.
Not every statement made to the police by a person involved
in some crime is within the scope of the constitutional protection. If
not made "under custodial interrogation," or "under investigation for
the commission of an offense," the statement is not protected. Thus,
in one case, where a person went to a police precinct and before any
sort of investigation could be initiated, declared that he was giving
himself up for the killing of an old woman because she was
threatening to kill him by barang, or witchcraft, this Court ruled that
such a statement was admissible, compliance with the constitutional
procedure on custodial interrogation not being exigible under the
circumstances.ch
anroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case chanrobles virtual law library
As Regards Giving of Testimony chanrobles virtual law library
It is pertinent at this point to inquire whether the rights just
discussed, i.e., (1) that against self-incrimination and (2) those during

custodial interrogation apply to persons under preliminary

investigation
or
already
charged
in
court
for
a
crime.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary
investigation is not under custodial interrogation. His interrogation
by the police, if any there had been would already have been ended
at the time of the filing of the criminal case in court (or the public
prosecutors' office). Hence, with respect to a defendant in a criminal
case already pending in court (or the public prosecutor's office), there
is no occasion to speak of his right while under "custodial
interrogation" laid down by the second and subsequent sentences of
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, for the obvious
reason that he is no longer under "custodial interrogation." law
library
But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing preliminary
investigation before the public prosecutor), in common with all other
persons, possesses the right against self- incrimination set out in the
first sentence of Section 20 Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, i.e.,
the right to refuse to answer a specific incriminatory question at the
time that it is put to him. law library
Additionally, the accused in a criminal case in court has other rights
in the matter of giving testimony or refusing to do so. An accused
"occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness."
Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant
is entitled among others- virtual law library
1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, and 2) to
testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a
witness he may be cross-examined as any other witness; however,
his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner
prejudice or be used against him. law library
The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from
being a witness against himself' signifies that he cannot be compelled
to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is the
accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so
even by subpoena or other process or order of the Court. He cannot
be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-

accused, or even for himself. 33 In other words - unlike an ordinary

witness (or a party in a civil action) who may be compelled to testify
by subpoena, having only the right to refuse to answer a particular
incriminatory question at the time it is put to him-the defendant in a
criminal action can refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to take
the witness stand, be sworn, answer any question. And, as the law
categorically states, "his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in
any manner prejudice or be used against him." If he should wish to
testify in his own behalf, however, he may do so. This is his right.
But if he does testify, then he "may be cross- examined as any other
witness." He may be cross-examined as to any matters stated in his
direct examination, or connected therewith . He may not on crossexamination refuse to answer any question on the ground that the
answer that he will give, or the evidence he will produce, would have
a tendency to incriminate him for the crime with which he is
charged.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal
action be asked a question which might incriminate him, not for the
crime with which he is charged, but for some other crime, distinct
from that of which he is accused, he may decline to answer that
specific question, on the strength of the right against selfincrimination granted by the first sentence of Section 20, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution (now Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution).
Thus, assuming that in a prosecution for murder, the accused should
testify in his behalf, he may not on cross-examination refuse to
answer any question on the ground that he might be implicated in
that crime of murder; but he may decline to answer any particular
question which might implicate him for a different and distinct
offense, say, estafa.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
BENITO BRAVO, accused-appellant.
[G.R. No. 135562. November 22, 1999]
GONZAGA_REYES, J.
DOCTRINE: Law enforcement agencies are required to effectively
communicate the rights of a person under investigation and to insure

that it is fully understood. Any measure short of this requirement is

considered a denial of such right. Courts are not allowed to
distinguish between preliminary questioning and custodial
investigation proper when applying the exclusionary rule. Any
information or admission given by a person while in custody which
may appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent
assistance of an independent counsel should be struck down as
inadmissible.
FACTS:On January 15, 1994 the decomposing body of a child was
found in a vacant lot along the road leading to Patul, Rosario
Santiago City. Her body was found between two concrete fences half
naked, shirtless and skirt pulled up, her panty stuffed in her
mouth. The body was identified to be that of a nine year old girl
named Juanita Antolin, a resident of Rosario, Santiago City and
known in her neighborhood as Len-len. Her body was found about
700 meters from her house putrid and in rigor mortis. The scalp on
the left side of her head was detached exposing a fracture on the left
temporal lobe of her skull. Vaginal examination showed
lacerations. The cause of death was cerebral hemorrhage.
PROSECUTION: Evelyn San Mateo an eight year old second
grader neighbor and cousin of the victim testified that she was with
the deceased the night before she disappeared. She stated that while
they stood on the roadside watching Home Along Da Riles from
an open window of a neighbors house the appellant approached
them and asked Len-Len to come with him to a birthday party and
then he will buy her Coke and balut. Len-Len asked her to go with
them but she did not want to because she was watching
television. Len-Len went alone with the accused. The following
morning Len-Lens mother told Evelyn and her mother that Len-Len
was missing. In court, Evelyn positively identified the appellant as
the person last seen with Len-len before she was found dead.
The Chief of the Intelligence Section of the Santiago Police
Department, Alexander Mico, testified that his office received a
report that a dead body was found in a vacant lot. Mico found the
appellant at his place of work at the Spring Garden Resort, Santiago

City. Upon seeing Bravo, Mico informed him that he is a suspect in

the killing of a girl in Rosario, Santiago City and asked him to come
with him for questioning. The appellant agreed. Mico further
narrated in court that at the police station the appellant admitted he
was with the girl and he carried her on his shoulder but he was so
drunk that night that he does not remember what he did to her.On
cross-examination Mico admitted that he did not inform the appellant
of his constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and of his
right against self-incrimination before the appellant made the said
admission because according to Mico he was only informally
interviewing the accused when he made the admission and that
custodial interrogation proper was conducted by the assigned
investigator.

silent and to counsel. The testimony of the policeman that the

accused admitted he was with the victim on the evening of January
12, 1994 but the latter was too drunk to remember what happened
should have been held inadmissible by the trial court in view of the
policemans own admission in court that although he informed the
accused that he is a suspect in the rape and killing of one Juanita
Antolin he did not inform the accused of his constitutional rights
before he asked him of his participation in the crime under
investigation.

DEFENSE: The appellant Benito Bravo testified in court that on his

way home after work at around five oclock in the afternoon on the
day of the incident, he was invited to go on a drinking spree where
he and four other men consumed five round bottles of gin until
evening. He then headed for home. Appellant admitted in court that
he passed by the house of Gracia Monahan but stated that he did not
see the two girls watching television along the road. At home, he
found his mother very sick and so he decided to stay home all
night. On January 15, 1994 a policeman came to his place of work
and apprehended him without a warrant of arrest and at the police
station he was forced to admit commission of the crime of rape with
homicide of Juanita Antolin. The appellant denied the accusation and
stated that the deceased was his godchild and that he has known Fely
Handoc, the mother of the child, for three years prior to this
proceedings.

HELD: YES, hence, the SC resolve to acquit Benito Bravo.

The trial court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of

the crime charged and held that abuse of confidence and treachery
attended the commission of the crime.
Both counsels for the accused-appellant and the appellee
plead for the acquittal of the accused. Both the accused-appellant
and the appellee invoke the constitutionally guarded presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused and the latters right to remain

ISSUE: Whether Micos failure to inform Bravos constitutional

rights to remain silent and to counsel during the said informal talk
is incriminating against the accused Bravo?

Section 12 of Article III (rights of the accused) of the 1987

Constitution embodies the mandatory protection afforded a person
under investigation for the commission of a crime and the correlative
duty of the State and its agencies to enforce such mandate.
The mantle of protection under this constitutional provision covers
the period from the time a person is taken into custody for
investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a
crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the
commission of a crime although not yet in custody. The exclusionary
rule sprang from a recognition that police interrogatory procedures
lay fertile grounds for coercion, physical and psychological, of the
suspect to admit responsibility for the crime under investigation. It
was not intended as a deterrent to the accused from confessing guilt,
if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires but to protect the
accused from admitting what he is coerced to admit although untrue.
Law enforcement agencies are required to effectively
communicate the rights of a person under investigation and to
insure that it is fully understood. Any measure short of this
requirement is considered a denial of such right. Courts are not
allowed to distinguish between preliminary questioning and custodial
investigation proper when applying the exclusionary rule. Any

information or admission given by a person while in custody which

may appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent
assistance of an independent counsel should be struck down as
inadmissible. It has been held, however, that an admission made to
news reporters or to a confidant of the accused is not covered by the
exclusionary rule.
The admission allegedly made by the appellant is not in the
form of a written extra-judicial confession; the admission was
allegedly made to the arresting officer during an informal talk at
the police station after his arrest as a prime suspect in the rape and
killing of Juanita Antolin. The arresting policeman testified that the
appellant admitted that he was with the victim on the evening of
January 12, 1994, the probable time of the commission of the crime
and that he carried her on his shoulder but that he was too drunk to
remember what subsequently happened. The arresting policeman
admitted that he did not inform the appellant of his constitutional
rights to remain silent and to counsel. We note that the alleged
admission is incriminating because it places the accused in the
company of the victim at the time the crime was probably
committed.
The exclusionary rule applies.
The accused was under arrest for the rape and killing of Juanita
Antolin and any statement allegedly made by him pertaining to his
possible complicity in the crime without prior notification of his
constitutional rights is inadmissible in evidence. The policemans
apparent attempt to circumvent the rule by insisting that the
admission was made during an informal talk prior to custodial
investigation proper is not tenable. The appellant was not invited to
the police station as part of a general inquiry for any possible lead to
the perpetrators of the crime under investigation. At the time the
alleged admission was made the appellant was in custody and had
been arrested as the prime suspect in the rape and killing of Juanita
Antolin. The exclusionary rule presumes that the alleged admission
was coerced, the very evil the rule stands to avoid. Supportive of
such presumption is the absence of a written extra-judicial

confession to that effect and the appellants denial in court of the

alleged oral admission. The alleged admission should be struck
down as inadmissible.
We also agree with both the appellant and the appellee that the
trial court erred in rendering judgment convicting the appellant based
on a single circumstance. Only one circumstantial evidence was
proven i.e., that the victim went with the accused to buy soda and
balut on the evening of January 12, 1994.
The prosecutions theory that the appellant is guilty of the crime
charged because he was seen with the victim a few days before she
was found dead is not tenable. The approximate time the crime was
committed was not established at all because the physician who
made the autopsy report was discharged as a witness when both
parties admitted the report. The two day interval between the
evening of January 12th when the victim was seen with the appellant
and the day when her dead body was found on January 15th presents
a wide range of possibilities as to the perpetrator of the crime. The
Rules and jurisprudence demand no less than an unbroken chain of
proven facts pointing to the appellant as the guilty person to the
exclusion of all others. This the evidence for the prosecution failed
to do. Both counsels for the appellant and the appellee are correct in
their submission that the single circumstance that the victim was
seen with the appellant two days before she was found dead is
clearly insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence in
favor of the accused.
The rape and killing of nine year old Juanita Antolin is
supported by concrete evidence undisputed by both parties. The
unpardonable assault on the child is tragic and the trial court may
have been swayed by the tide of human indignation. We must
however uphold the primacy of the presumption of innocence in
favor of the accused when the evidence at hand falls short of the
quantum required to support conviction.
GAMBOA v CRUZ
162 SCRA 642

Doctrine: The right to counsel attaches at the start of the

investigation (when investigating officers elicit information/
admission/ confession. Police line-up not part of the inquest.
Facts: Gamboa was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. During
a line-up of 5 detainees including petitioner, he was identified by a
complainant to be a companion in a robbery, thereafter he was
charged. Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground that the
conduct of the line-up, without notice and in the absence of his
counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due
process. The court denied said motion. Hearing was set, hence the
petition.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioners right to counsel and due process
violated.
Held: No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest;
hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. He
had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The moment
there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit
admissions or confessions or even plain information which may
appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he
should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the
right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived
of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly
represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the opportunities to be
heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that
he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the
prosecution had rested its case. What due process abhors is the
absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. (em)

[G.R. No. 199877. August 13, 2012.]

PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ARTURO LARA y
ORBISTA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
REYES, J :
p

This is an automatic appeal from the

Decision 1 dated July 28, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03685. The CA
affirmed the Decision 2 dated October 1, 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 268,
finding Arturo Lara (Lara) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of robbery with homicide.
aDHScI

On June 14, 2001, an

Information 3 charging Lara with robbery with
homicide was filed with the RTC:
On or about May 31, 2001, in Pasig City,
and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, armed with
a gun, conspiring and confederating
together with one unidentified person
who is still at-large, and both of them
mutually helping and aiding one another,

with intent to gain, and by means of

force, violence and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and divest from
Joselito M. Bautista cash money
amounting to P230,000.00 more or less
and belonging to San Sebastian Allied
Services, Inc. represented by Enrique
Sumulong; that on the occasion of said
robbery, the said accused, with intent to
kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot
said Joselito M. Bautista with the said
gun, thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal wounds which directly caused his
death.
Contrary to law.

Following Lara's plea of not guilty, trial ensued. The

prosecution presented three (3) witnesses: Enrique
Sumulong (Sumulong), SPO1 Bernard Cruz (SPO1
Cruz) and PO3 Efren Calix (PO3 Calix).
Sumulong testified that: (a) he was an accounting
staff of San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc. (San
Sebastian); (b) on May 31, 2001 and at around 9:00
in the morning, he withdrew the amount of
P230,000.00 from the Metrobank-Mabini Branch,
Pasig City to defray the salaries of the employees of
San Sebastian; (c) in going to the bank, he rode a

pick-up and was accompanied by Virgilio Manacob

(Manacob), Jeff Atie (Atie) and Joselito Bautista
(Bautista); (d) he placed the amount withdrawn in a
black bag and immediately left the bank; (e) at
around 10:30 in the morning, while they were at the
intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig
City, Lara suddenly appeared at the front passenger
side of the pick-up and pointed a gun at him
stating, "Akin na ang pera, iyong bag, nasaan?"; (f)
Bautista, who was seated at the back,
shouted, "Wag mong ibigay"; (g) heeding Bautista's
advice, he threw the bag in Bautista's direction; (h)
after getting hold of the bag, Bautista alighted from
the pick-up and ran; (i) seeing Bautista, Lara ran
after him while firing his gun; (j) when he had the
chance to get out of the pick-up, he ran towards
Mercedes Plaza and called up the office of San
Sebastian to relay the incident; (k) when he went
back to where the pick-up was parked, he went to
the rear portion of the vehicle and saw blood on the
ground; (l) he was informed by one bystander that
Bautista was shot and the bag was taken away from
him; (m) when barangay officials and the police
arrived, he and his two (2) other companions were
brought to the police station for investigation; (ii) on
June 7, 2001, while on his way
to Barangay Maybunga, Pasig City, he
saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil
Street, Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City; (o) he

alerted the police and Lara was thereafter arrested;

and (p) at the police station, he, Atie and Manacob
identified Laraas the one who shot and robbed them
of San Sebastian's money. 5

Sumulong, Atie, Manacob at the police station; and

(f) before Bautista died, he was able to interview
Bautista at the hospital where the latter was brought
after the incident. 7

SPO1 Cruz testified that: (a) he was assigned at the

Follow-Up Unit of the Pasig City Police Station; (b) at
around 7:55 in the evening of June 7, 2001,
Sumulong went to the police station and informed
him that he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street;
(c) four (4) police officers and Sumulong went to Dr.
Pilapil Street where they saw Lara, who Sumulong
identified; (d) they then approached Lara and invited
him for questioning; (e) at the police
station, Lara was placed in a line-up where he was
positively identified by Sumulong, Manacob and Atie;
and (f) after being identified,Lara was informed of
his rights and subsequently detained. 6

In his defense, Lara testified that: (a) he was a

plumber who resided at Dr. Pilapil Street, San
Miguel, Pasig City; (b) on May 31, 2001, he was at
his house, digging a sewer trench while his brother,
Wilfredo, was constructing a comfort room; (c) they
were working from 8:00 in the morning until 3:00 in
the afternoon; (d) on June 7, 2001 and at around
7:00 in the evening, while he was at the house of
one of his cousins, police officers arrived and asked
him if he was Arturo Lara; (e) after confirming that
he was Arturo Lara, the police officers asked him to
go with them to the BarangayHall; (f) he voluntarily
went with them and while inside the patrol car, one
of the policemen said, "You are lucky, we were able

PO3 Calix testified that: (a) he was a member of the

Criminal Investigation Unit of the Pasig City Police
Station; (b) on May 31, 2001, he was informed of a
robbery that took place at the corner of Mercedes
and Market Avenues, Pasig City; (c) he, together
with three (3) other police officers, proceeded to the
crime scene; (d) upon arriving thereat, one of the
police officers who were able to respond ahead of
them, handed to him eleven (11) pieces of empty
shells and six (6) deformed slugs of a 9mm pistol;
(e) as part of his investigation, he interviewed

to caught you in your house, if in another place we

will kill you" (sic); (g) he was brought to the police
station and not the barangay hall as he was earlier

told where he was investigated for robbery with

homicide; (h) when he told the police that he was at
home when the subject incident took place, the
police challenged him to produce witnesses; (i) when
his witnesses arrived at the station, one of the police
officers told them to come back the following day;
(j) while he was at the police line-up holding a name

plate, a police officer told Sumulong and Atie, "Ituru

nyo na yan at uuwi na tayo"; and (k) when his
witnesses arrived the following day, they were told
that he will be subjected to an inquest. 8
To corroborate his testimony, Lara presented one of
his neighbors, Simplicia Delos Reyes. She testified
that on May 31, 2001, while she was manning her
store, she saw Lara working on a sewer trench from
9:00 in the morning to 5:00 in the
afternoon. 9 Lara also presented his sister, Edjosa
Manalo, who testified that he was working on a
sewer line the whole day of May 31, 2001. 10
On October 1, 2008, the RTC convicted Lara of
robbery with homicide in a Decision, 11 the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this
Court finds the accused ARTURO LARA Y
Orbista GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Robbery with Homicide,
defined and penalized under Article 294
(1) as amended by Republic Act 7659,
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua, with all the accessory penalties
prescribed by law.
Accused is further ordered to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased the sum of

Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity and

Php230,000.00 representing the money
carted by the said accused.
SO ORDERED.

12

The RTC rejected Lara's defense of alibi as follows:

The prosecution's witness Enrique
Sumulong positively identified accused
Arturo Lara as the person who carted
away the payroll money of San
Sebastian Allied Services, Inc., on May
31, 2001 at around 10:30 o'clock in the
morning along the corner of Mercedez
and Market Ave., Pasig City and the one
who shot Joselito Bautista which caused
his instantaneous death on the same
day. As repeatedly held by the Supreme
Court, "For alibi to prosper, an

accused must show he was at some

other place for such a period of
time that it was impossible for him
to have been at the crime scene at
the time of the commission of the
crime" (People versus Bano, 419 SCRA
697). Considering the proximity of the
distance between the place of the
incident and the residence of the
accused where he allegedly stayed the
whole day of May 31, 2001, it is not
physically impossible for him to be at

the crime scene within the

samebarangay. The positive
identification of the accused which were
categorical and consistent and without
any showing of ill motive on the part of
the eyewitnesses, should prevail over
the alibi and denial of the accused
whose testimony was not substantiated
by clear and convincing evidence
(People versus Aves 420 SCRA
259). 13 (Emphasis supplied)
aHTEIA

On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that

supposedly attended his conviction. First, that he
was arrested without a warrant under circumstances
that do not justify a warrantless arrest rendered void
all proceedings including those that led to his
conviction. Second, he was not assisted by counsel
when the police placed him in a line-up to be
identified by the witnesses for the prosecution in
violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution.
The police line-up is part of custodial investigation
and his right to counsel had already attached. Third,
the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution failed
to present a witness who actually saw him commit
the alleged acts. Sumulong merely presumed that he
was the one who shot Bautista and who took the
bag of money from him. The physical description
of Lara that Sumulong gave to the police was

different from the one he gave during the trial,

indicating that he did not have a fair glimpse of the
perpetrator. Moreover, this gives rise to the
possibility that it was his unidentified companion
who shot Bautista and took possession of the
money. Hence, it cannot be reasonably claimed that
his conviction was attended with moral certainty.
Fourth, the trial court erred in discounting the
testimony of his witnesses. Without any showing
that they were impelled by improper motives in
testifying in his favor, their testimonies should have
been given the credence they deserve. While his two
(2) witnesses were his sister and neighbor, this does
not by itself suggest the existence of bias or impair
their credibility.
The CA affirmed Lara's conviction. That Lara was
supposedly arrested without a warrant may not
serve as a ground to invalidate the proceedings
leading to his conviction considering its belated
invocation. Any objections to the legality of the
warrantless arrest should have been raised in a
motion to quash duly filed before the accused enters
his plea; otherwise, it is deemed waived. Further,
that the accused was illegally arrested is not a
ground to set aside conviction duly arrived at and
based on evidence that sufficiently establishes
culpability:
Appellant's avowal could hardly wash.

It is a shopworn doctrine that

any objection involving a warrant of
arrest or the acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of an accused must be
made before he enters his plea, otherwise
the objection is deemed waived. In
voluntarily submitting himself to the court
by entering a plea, instead of filing a
motion to quash the information for lack
of jurisdiction over his person, accusedappellant is deemed to have waived his
right to assail the legality of his arrest.
Applying the foregoing jurisprudential
touchstone, appellant is estopped from
questioning the validity of his arrest since
he never raised this issue before
arraignment or moved to quash
the Information.
What is more, the illegal arrest of an
accused is not sufficient cause for setting
aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after trial free from
error. The warrantless arrest, even if
illegal, cannot render void all other
proceedings including those leading to the
conviction of the appellants and his coaccused, nor can the state be deprived of
its right to convict the guilty when all the
facts on record point to their
culpability. 14 (Citations omitted)

As to whether the identification of Lara during the

police line-up is inadmissible as his right to counsel
was violated, the CA ruled that there was no legal
compulsion to afford him a counsel during a police
line-up since the latter is not part of custodial
investigation.
Appellant's assertion that he was under
custodial investigation at the time he was
identified in a police line-up and therefore
had the right to counsel does not hold
water. Ingrained in our jurisdiction is the
rule that an accused is not entitled to the
assistance of counsel in a police line-up
considering that such is usually not a part
of custodial investigation. An exception to
this rule is when the accused had been
the focus of police attention at the start of
the investigation. In the case at bench,
appellant was identified in a police line-up
by prosecution witnesses from a group of
persons gathered for the purpose.
However, there was no proof that
appellant was interrogated at all or that a
statement or confession was extracted
from him. A priori, We refuse to hearken
to appellant's hollow cry that he was
deprived of his constitutional right to
counsel given the hard fact that during
the police line-up, the accusatory process
had not yet commenced.

Assuming ex hypothesi that appellant was

subjected to interrogation sans counsel
during the police line-up, it does not in
any way affect his culpability. Any
allegation of violation of rights during
custodial investigation is relevant and
material only to cases in which an
extrajudicial admission or confession
extracted from the accused becomes the
basis of their conviction. Here, appellant
was convicted based on the testimony of
a prosecution witness and not on his
alleged uncounseled confession or
admission. 15 (Citations omitted)
DEcITS

The CA addressed Lara's claim that the prosecution's

failure to present a witness who actually saw him
commit the crime charged as follows:
Third. Appellant takes umbrage at the
alleged failure of the prosecution to
present an eyewitness to prove that he
shot the victim and took the money.

Such posture is unpersuasive.

Contrary to appellant's assertion,
prosecution witness Sumulong actually
saw him shoot Bautista, the victim.
Sumulong vividly recounted, viz.:

"QWhen you said that "tinutukan ka",

aside from this act was there any
other words spoken by this person?
AThere was, sir.
QWhat did he say?
A"Nasaan ang bag ilabas mo yung
pera", sir.
QWhere were you looking when this
person approached you?
AI was looking at his face, sir.
QAnd upon hearing those words, what did
you do?
AI put out the money, sir, because I got
afraid at that time.
QDid you hand over the black bag
containing the money to him?
ANo, sir, because one of my
companion(s) shouted not to give
the money or the bag so I
immediately threw away the bag at
the back seat, sir.

QAnd how long approximately was that

person standing by your car
window?
AFive (5) to ten (10) minutes, sir.
QAnd after you have thrown the black
bag containing money to the back
of the vehicle, what did that person
do?
AI saw Joey alight(ed) from the vehicle
carrying the bag and ran away, sir,
and I also saw somebody shoot
a gun?
QWho was firing the gun?
AThe one who held-up us, sir.
QBy how, do you know his name?
ANo, sir.
QBut if you can see him again, (were) you
be able to recognize him?
AYes, sir.
QIf he is in the courtroom, will you be
able to recognize him?

AYes, sir.
QPlease look around and please tell this
Honorable Court whether indeed
the person you saw holding you up
at that time is in court?
AYes, sir.
QWill you please stand up and tap his
shoulder to identify him?
Interpreter:
The witness tap the shoulder of a person
sitting on the first bench of the
courtroom wearing yellow t-shirt
and black pants who when ask
identify himself as
Arturo Lara (sic).
QAnd when as you said Joey got the
bag. Alighted from the vehicle
and ran away with it, what did
the accused do? (sic)
AHe shot Joey while running around
our vehicle, sir.
QAround how many shots according
to your recollection were
fired?

AThere were several shots, more or

less nine (9) shots, sir.
xxx xxx xxx["]
"QSo, you did not personally notice what
had transpired or happened after
you stepped down from the Nissan
pick-up, that is correct?
AThere was, sir, my companion
Joselito Bautista was shot.
QWhen you heard the gunfire, you were
already proceeding towards that
store to call your office by phone,
that is correct?
ANot yet, sir, we were still inside the
vehicle.
QAnd was Joselito Bautista at the rear of
the Nissan Sentra when you heard
this gunfire?
AYes, sir.
QAnd so he was at the back, so the
shooter was also at the back of the
vehicle, that is correct?

AYes, sir, he went towards the rear

portion of the vehicle, he
followed Joselito Bautista and
shot him.
QSo, to be clear, when Joselito Bautista
ran to the rear, this alleged
holdup(p)er followed him?
AYes, sir.
QAnd that was the time(,) you heard this
gunfire?
AYes, sir.
QSo, you did not personally see who fired
that firearm?
ABecause at that time he was the one
holding the gun, sir.
QSo, you are presuming that he was the
one who fired the gun because he
was holding the gun, am I correct?
AYes, sir."
xxx xxx xxx
Under Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of
Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient

for conviction if the following requisites

concur:

3.The victim alighted from vehicle

carrying the bag.

(a)There is more than one

circumstance;

4.Appellant chased and fired several shots

at the victim.

(b)The facts from which the

inferences are derived are
proven; and

5.The victim sustained several gunshot

wounds.

(c)The combination of all the

circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Here, the following circumstantial
evidence are tellingly sufficient to prove
that the guilt of appellant is beyond
reasonable doubt, viz.:
1.While the vehicle was at the intersection
of Mercedes and Market Avenues,
Pasig City, appellant suddenly
emerged and pointed a gun at
prosecution witness Sumulong,
demanding from him to produce
the bag containing the money[.]
2.Prosecution witness Sumulong threw
the bag to the victim who was then
seated at the backseat of the
vehicle.

6.The police officers recovered from the

scene of the crime six deformed
empty shells. 16 (Citations

omitted and emphasis supplied)

Finally, the CA found that Lara's alibi failed to

convince. Specifically:
Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is
the rule that positive identification of the
accused, where categorical and
consistent, without any showing of ill
motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying, should prevail over the alibi
and denial of appellants, whose
testimonies are not substantiated by clear
and convincing evidence.
All the more, to establish alibi the accused
must prove (a) that he was present at
another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it
was physically impossible for him to be at

the scene of the crime. Physical

impossibility "refers to the distance
between the place where the accused was
when the crime transpired and the place
where it was committed, as well as the
facility of access between the two places.
Appellant miserably failed to prove the
physical impossibility of his presence at
the locus criminis at the time of the
perpetration of the felonious act. He
himself admitted that his house was just a
stone's throw (about three minutes away)
from the crime scene. 17 (Citations

omitted)
In a Resolution 18 dated February 1, 2012, this Court
accepted the appeal as the penalty imposed
was reclusion perpetua and the parties were
afforded an opportunity to file their supplemental
briefs. Both parties waived their right to do so,
stating that they would adopt the allegations in their
respective briefs that they filed with the CA.
Issues
The present review of Lara's conviction for robbery
with homicide gives rise to the following issues:
a.whether the identification made by
Sumulong, Atie and Manacob in
the police line-up is inadmissible

because Lara stood therein

without the assistance of
counsel;
b.whether Lara's supposedly illegal
arrest may be raised for the first
time on appeal for the purpose
of nullifying his conviction;
c.whether there is sufficient evidence
to convict Lara; and
d.whether Lara's alibi can be given
credence so as to exonerate him
from the crime charged.
Our Ruling
This Court resolves to deny the appeal.
I
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be
acquired through compulsory process such as a
warrant of arrest or through his voluntary
appearance, such as when he surrenders to the
police or to the court. 19 Any objection to the arrest
or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused must be made before he enters his plea,
otherwise the objection is deemed waived. An

accused submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court

upon entering a plea and participating actively in the
trial and this precludes him invoking any
irregularities that may have attended his
arrest. 20Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an
accused is not a sufficient ground to reverse and set
aside a conviction that was arrived upon a complaint
duly filed and a trial conducted without error. 21 As
Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to
allege any ground therefor. The failure
of the accused to assert any ground of a
motion to quash before he pleads to the
complaint or information, either because
he did not file a motion to quash or failed
to allege the same in said motion, shall be
deemed a waiver of any objections except
those based on the grounds provided for
in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i) of
Section 3 of this Rule.

II
Contrary to Lara's claim, that he was not provided
with counsel when he was placed in a police line-up
did not invalidate the proceedings leading to his
conviction. That he stood at the police line-up
without the assistance of counsel did not render

Sumulong's identification of Lara inadmissible. The

right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the
precise moment custodial investigation begins and
being made to stand in a police line-up is not the
starting point or a part of custodial investigation. As
this Court previously ruled in People v. Amestuzo: 22
The contention is not meritorious. The
guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the
1987 Constitution, or the socalled Miranda rights, may be invoked
only by a person while he is under
custodial investigation. Custodial
investigation starts when the police
investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular suspect
taken into custody by the police who
starts the interrogation and propounds
questions to the person to elicit
incriminating statements. Police line-up is
not part of the custodial investigation;
hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by
the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at
this stage. This was settled in the case
of People vs. Lamsing and in the more
recent case of People vs. Salvatierra. The
right to be assisted by counsel attaches
only during custodial investigation and
cannot be claimed by the accused during
identification in a police line-up because it

is not part of the custodial investigation

process. This is because during a police
line-up, the process has not yet shifted
from the investigatory to the accusatory
and it is usually the witness or the
complainant who is interrogated and who
gives a statement in the course of the
line-up. 23 (Citations omitted)
CSIcHA

III
It is apparent from the assailed decision of the CA
that the finding of guilt against Lara is based on
circumstantial evidence. The CA allegedly erred in
this wise considering that only direct and not
circumstantial evidence can overcome the
presumption of innocence.
However, well-settled is the rule that direct evidence
of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and
finding of guilt. Even in the absence of direct
evidence, conviction can be had if the established
circumstances constitute an unbroken chain,
consistent with each other and to the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty, to the exclusion of all
other hypothesis that he is not. 24
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, circumstantial evidence sufficed

to convict upon the concurrence of the following

requisites: (a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
It is not only by direct evidence that an accused may
be convicted of the crime for which he is charged.
Resort to circumstantial evidence is essential since to
insist on direct testimony would, in many cases,
result in setting felons free and denying proper
protection to the community. 25
As the CA correctly ruled, the following
circumstances established by the evidence for the
prosecution strongly indicateLara's guilt: (a) while
the vehicle Sumulong, Atie, Manacob and Bautista
were riding was at the intersection of Mercedes and
Market Avenues, he appeared at the front passenger
side thereof armed with a gun; (b) while pointing the
gun at Sumulong who was at the front passenger
seat, Lara demanded that Sumulong give him the
bag containing the money; (c) instead of giving the
bag to Lara, Sumulong gave it to Bautista who was
seated at the back of the pick-up; (d) when Bautista
got hold of the bag, he alighted and ran towards the
back of the pick-up; (e) Lara ran after Bautista and
while doing so, fired his gun at Bautista's direction;
(f) Bautista sustained several gunshot wounds; and

(g) Bautista's blood was on the crime scene and

empty shells were recovered therefrom.
Indeed, in cases of robbery with homicide, the
taking of personal property with intent to gain must
itself be established beyond reasonable doubt.
Conclusive evidence proving the physical act of
asportation by the accused must be presented by
the prosecution. It must be shown that the original
criminal design of the culprit was robbery and the
homicide was perpetrated with a view to the
consummation of the robbery by reason or on the
occasion of the robbery.26 The mere presence of the
accused at the crime scene is not enough to
implicate him. It is essential to prove the intent to
rob and the use of violence was necessary to realize
such intent.
In this case, Lara's intent to gain is proven by
Sumulong's positive narration that it was Lara who
pointed the gun at him and demanded that the bag
containing the money be turned over to him.
That Lara resorted to violence in order to actualize
his intent to gain is proven by Sumulong's testimony
that he saw Lara fire the gun at the direction of
Bautista, who was running away from the pick-up in
order to prevent Lara from taking possession of the
money.

Notably, the incident took place in broad daylight

and in the middle of a street. Thus, where
considerations of visibility are favorable and the
witness does not appear to be biased against the
accused, his or her assertions as to the identity of
the malefactor should be normally
accepted. 27 Lara did not allege, much less,
convincingly demonstrate that Sumulong was
impelled by improper or malicious motives to impute
upon him, however perjurious, such a serious
charge. Thus, his testimony, which the trial court
found to be forthright and credible, is worthy of full
faith and credit and should not be disturbed. If an
accused had nothing to do with the crime, it is
against the natural order of events and of human
nature and against the presumption of good faith
that a prosecution witness would falsely testify
against the former. 28
IV
In view of Sumulong's positive identification of Lara,
the CA was correct in denying Lara's alibi outright. It
is well-settled that positive identification prevails
over alibi, which is inherently a weak defense. Such
is the rule, for as a defense, alibi is easy to concoct,
and difficult to disapprove. 29
Moreover, in order for the defense of alibi to
prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused

was somewhere else when the offense was

committed, but it must likewise be demonstrated
that he was so far away that it was not possible for
him to have been physically present at the place of
the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission. Due to its doubtful nature, alibi must be
supported by clear and convincing proof.
In this case, the proximity of Lara's house at the
scene of the crime wholly negates his alibi. Assuming
as true Lara'sclaim and that of his witnesses that he
was digging a sewer trench on the day of the
incident, it is possible that his witnesses may not
have noticed him leaving and returning given that
the distance between his house and the place where
the subject incident took place can be negotiated,
even by walking, in just a matter of minutes. Simply
put, Laraand his witnesses failed to prove that it is
well-nigh impossible for him to be at the scene of
the crime.
In fine, the assailed decision of the CA is affirmed in
all respects.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision
dated July 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR HC No. 03685 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE v. AURELIO BANDULA

G.R. No. 89223 May 27, 1994
BELLOSILLO, J.:
DOCTRINE: Admissions obtained during custodial interrogations
without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and
signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the
Constitution. The Constitution also requires that counsel be
independent.
FACTS: At around ten o'clock in the evening, six (6) armed men
barged into the compound of Polo Coconut Plantation in Tanjay,
Negros Oriental. The armed men were identified by Security Guard
Antonio Salva of the plantation as Aurelio Bandula, Teofilo
Dionanao, Victoriano Ejan and Pantaleon Sedigo while the two
others who wore masks were simply referred to as "Boy Tall" and
"Boy Short." At gunpoint, the two (2) masked men held Salva who
was manning his post, disarmed him of his shotgun and tied his
hands behind his back. They then went up the house of Leoncio
Pastrano, Chief of Security and General Foreman of the plantation,
hog- tied him, and divested him of his driver's license, goggles,
wristwatch and .38 cal. snubnose revolver. From there, the six (6)
armed men with Salva and Pastrano in tow proceeded to the house of
Atty. Juanito Garay, Manager of the Polo Coconut Plantation.
Accused Dionanao, Ejan and Sedigo stayed downstairs while
accused Bandula and the two masked men with Salva and Pastrano
went up the house of Atty. Garay. After forcing their way into the
house, the masked men and Bandula ransacked the place and took
with them money and other valuables. Thereafter, the hooded men
who were bringing with them Atty. Garay locked Pastrano inside his
house together with Salva. A few minutes later, Pastrano and Salva
heard gunshots coming from the direction of the gate of the
compound. After succeeding in untying themselves, Pastrano and

Salva went to report the matter to the police. On their way, they
found outside the gate the lifeless body of Atty. Garay.

confessions, the prosecution is left without sufficient evidence to

convict him of the crime charged.

After hearing twelve (12) prosecution and nine (9) defense

witnesses, the trial court rendered judgment finding accused Aurelio
Bandula guilty of the crime charged. However, his three (3) coaccused were acquitted "for insufficiency of evidence."

ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial confessions of appellant is

admissible as evidence against him.

PEOPLEs Contention: Admitted in evidence were the alleged

extrajudicial confessions of accused Bandula and Dionanao that they
were merely forced to participate in the commission of the crime by
"Boy Tall" and "Boy Short." According to the trial court, these
extrajudicial confessions made by accused Dionanao and Bandula
was extracted during custodial investigation. These confessions have
all the qualities and have complied with all the requirements of an
admissible confession, it appearing from the confession itself that
accused were informed of their rights under the law regarding
custodial investigation and were duly represented by counsel (Atty.
Ruben Zerna).

BANDULAs Contention: Appellant Bandula argues that the

extrajudicial confessions he and accused Dionanao executed suffer
from constitutional infirmities, hence, inadmissible in evidence
considering that they were extracted under duress and intimidation,
and were merely countersigned later by the municipal attorney who,
by the nature of his position, was not entirely an independent counsel
nor counsel of their choice. Consequently, without the extrajudicial

HELD: NO. Admissions obtained during custodial interrogations

without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and
signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the
Constitution.
The Constitution also requires that counsel be independent.
Obviously, he cannot be a special counsel, public or private
prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose
interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. Granting that Atty.
Zerna assisted accused Dionanao and Bandula when they executed
their respective extrajudicial confessions, still their confessions are
inadmissible in evidence considering that Atty. Zerna does not
qualify as an independent counsel. As a legal officer of the
municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the
mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic
services to the people, including the maintenance of peace and
order. It is thus seriously doubted whether he can effectively
undertake the defense of the accused without running into conflict of
interests. He is no better than a fiscal or prosecutor who cannot
represent the accused during custodial investigations.
Further, it was in the record of the case that when the four (4)
accused were transferred from the Municipal Jail of Tanjay to the
Negros Oriental Provincial Rehabilitation Center in Dumaguete City,
accused Bandula asked to see a doctor. When he was brought to the
provincial hospital, he was diagnosed to have a fractured rib. Also,
when the prosecution witness Pat. Baldejera was asked in open court
if he saw any contusions or bruises on any of the four (4) accused

after their arrest, he admitted that he noticed accused Sedigo with a

"black eye." Based on this, the Court is strongly drawn to the belief
that violence indeed attended the extraction of statements from the
accused.

COURT, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XCV (95),

Quezon City, respondents.
PETITION for certiorari to review the resolution and order of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. XCV

Consequently, the prosecution is left with nothing but the alleged

positive identification of appellant Bandula by witness Salva. But
this by itself does not measure up to the required standard of moral
certainty. With the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of
accused-appellant Bandula beyond reasonable doubt, acquittal
should follow as a matter of course. We have oftentimes said that
while the alibi of the accused is easily fabricated, this claim assumes
importance when faced with the inconsistencies and the rather shaky
nature of the prosecution evidence. The prosecution must rely not on
the weakness of the defense evidence but rather on its own proof
which must be strong enough to convince this Court that the prisoner
in the dock deserves to be punished. In this, the state has utterly
failed.

Facts:

Indeed, it is unfortunate that the investigators who are sworn to do

justice to all appear to have toyed with the fundamental rights of the
accused. Men in uniform do not have blanket authority to arrest
anybody they take fancy on, rough him up and put words into his
mouth. There is a living Constitution which safeguards the rights of
an accused, a penal law which punishes maltreatment of prisoners
and a statute which penalizes the failure to inform and accord the
accused his constitutional rights.
ROGELIO ABERCA, vs. MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, COL.
FIDEL SINGSON, COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA, COL.
GERARDO B. LANTORIA, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, LT.
COL.
PANFILO
M.
LACSON,
MAJ.
RODOLFO
AGUINALDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, 1LT. PEDRO
TANGO, 1LT. ROMEO RICARDO, 1LT. RAUL BACALSO,
MSGT. BIENVENIDO BALABA, and REGIONAL TRIAL

It poses the question whether the suspension of the privilege

of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal
searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of
rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. If such action
for damages may be maintained, who can be held liable for such
violations: only the military personnel directly involved and/or their
superiors as well'
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures
and other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various
intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as
Task Force Makabansa (TFM), ordered by General Fabian Ver "to
conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT)
underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to
sow disturbances in Metro Manila." Plaintiffs allege, among others,
that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several
places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search
warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding
party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to
plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued
by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied
visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in
violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who
interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of
violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or
confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of
plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate
plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements
from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans
being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.

Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to

P39,030.00; moral damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00
each or a total of P3,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount
of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; and
attorney's fees amounting to not less than P200,000.00. AT the heart
of the complaint is ARTICLE 32 of the CIVIL CODE.
A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel,
then Solicitor-General Estelito, Mendoza, which was granted by the
RTC Judge Fortun. A motion to set aside the order dismissing the
complaint and a supplemental motion for reconsideration was filed
by the plaintiffs . Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily inhibiting
himself from further proceeding in the case and leaving the
resolution of the motion to set aside the order of dismissal to Judge
Lising, who,w ithout acting on the motion, declared Judge Fortuns
previous order as final, the plaintiffs not having filed an MR or
appeal on time. Plaintiffs filed an MR but the same was denied for
lack of cause of action except for those against Major Rodolfo
Aguinaldo, and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba. Hence, this petition.
At the heart of petitioners'complaint is Article 32 of the Civil Code
which provides:
ART. 32, Any public officer or employee, or any private individual
who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties
of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical
publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of
law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken
for public use;

(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the
Government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his
behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's
self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by
a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except
when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment,
unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute
which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the
defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the
aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and
distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if
the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of
evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages
may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge
unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or
other penal statute.

It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to

provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms
enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek
to violate those sacred rights with impunity.
Issue: Whether or not respondents are immune from the suit because
they were merely in performance of their official functions?
Held:
It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as they claim,
"to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and
subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President
Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in
pursuance of such objective, to launch pre-emptive strikes against
alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be
construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled
by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the
rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and
protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme
law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or
military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or
employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating
the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumarated
therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only
judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided
their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code
or other penal statute.
Issue: Whether or not plaintiffs cause of action is barred by the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
Held:
No. We find merit in petitioners'contention that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners'

right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention
and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension
does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is
suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from
detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of
obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of
action for damages are explicitly recognized in P.D. No. 1765 which
amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to
its text:
'However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or
for a quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of
any public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority
arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial
of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year."
Petitioners have a point in contending that even aso that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends
petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and
detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of
action for injuries suffered because of respondents' confiscation of
their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent
and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and
inhuman treatment.
However, we find it unnecessary to address the constitutional issue
pressed upon us. On March 25, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino
issued Proclamation No. 2, revoking Proclamation Nos. 2045 and
2045-A and lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. The question therefore has become moot and
academic.

Issue: May a superior officer under the notion of respondent

superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his
subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties
have been violated
Held: Doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicavle to the case.
The doctrine of respondeat superior has been generally limited in its
application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e.
employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exists
between superior officers of the military and their subordinates.
Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in
our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer
or employee or person "directly' or "indirectly' responsible for the
violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it
is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must
answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to
the aggrieved party. By this provision, the principle of accountability
of public officials under the Constitution5 acquires added meaning
and assumes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official
relax bis vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates,
secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the
transgressions committed by the latter against the oonstitutionally
protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Pait of the factors that
propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held
perception that the govrnment was callous or indifferent to, if not
actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights.
While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of
human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing
damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain
terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are
directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint
tortfeasors.
Issue: Was the trial court correct in dismissing the complaint with
respect to some plaintiffs

Held: No. It is undisputed that a timely motion to set aside said

order of November 8, 1983 was filed by "plaintiffs, through
counsel."

[A.M. No. RTJ-10-2257. July 17, 2012.]

CRISELDA
C. GACAD, complainant, vs. JUDGE
HILARION P. CLAPIS, JR.,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 3,
Nabunturan, Compostela
Valley, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM :
p

Criselda C. Gacad (Gacad) filed a Verified

Complaint 1 dated 9 June 2010 against Judge
Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr. (JudgeClapis), Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3,
Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, for Grave
Misconduct and Corrupt Practices, Grave Abuse of
Discretion, Gross Ignorance of the Law, and
violations of Canon 1 (Rule 1.01, 1.02), Canon 2
(Rule 2.01), and Canon 3 (Rule 3.05) of the Code of
Judicial Conduct relative to Criminal Case No. 6898

entitled "People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo

Comania."

According to Gacad, on 3 November 2009, she went,

together with her father Jovenciano Cardenas and
sister-in-law Agriculita Vda. De Cardenas, to the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Nabunturan,
Compostela Valley, to file criminal charges against
the suspect who gunned down her brother Gregorio
Cardenas. They met provincial prosecutor Graciano
Arafol, Jr. (Arafol), who advised them not to hire a
private counsel.
The following day, Arafol informed Gacad that he
filed a complaint for murder against the suspect but
the Provincial Governor kept on pressuring him
about her brother's case. Arafol suggested that they
see Judge Clapis so he would deny the Motion for
Reinvestigation to be filed by the accused Rodolfo
Comania (accused). Arafol, further, told Gacad to
prepare an amount of P50,000 for Judge Clapis.
On 23 November 2009, Arafol told Gacad that they
would meet Judge Clapis at the Golden Palace Hotel
in Tagum City. Thus, Gacad, together with her
husband Rene Gacad and their family driver Jojo
Baylosis (Baylosis), proceeded to the Golden Palace
Hotel. Inside the hotel, Gacad joined Arafol and his
wife at their table. After a while, Judge Clapis joined
them. Arafol told Judge Clapis, "Judge sya yong

sinasabi kong kapitbahay ko may

problema." Judge Clapis replied, "So, what do you
want me to do?" Afarol answered, "Kailangang
madeny ang reinvestigation ni Atty. Gonzaga and we
proceed to trial kasi palaging tumatawag si
Governor." Arafol paused, and continued, "Wag kang
mag-alala judge, mayron syang inihanda para sa
iyo." Gacad felt terrified because she had not yet
agreed to Arafol's demands. Hence, when Arafol
asked her, "Day, kanus a nimo mahatag ang
kwarta?" (When can you give the
money?), Gacad could only
mumble, "Paningkamutan na ko makakita ko ug
kwarta. . . basin makakita ko sir." (I will try to look
for money, maybe I can find, sir.)
Judge Clapis excitedly nodded and said, "Sige, kay
ako na bahala, gamuson nato ni sila." (Okay, leave it
all to me, we shall crush them.)
aATEDS

The following day, Arafol instructed his nephew

Baldomero Arafol (Baldomero) to go
to Gacad's house to accompany Baylosis.
In Gacad's house, Gacad gave P50,000 to Baylosis in
the presence of Baldomero. Baylosis then drove with
Baldomero to Jollibee in Tagum City. Upon their
arrival, Baldomero alighted and Arafol got into the
passenger seat. Arafol directed Baylosis to drive to
Mikos Coffee Bar. Along the way, Arafol took the
money from Baylosis. At Mikos Coffee Bar, Arafol

alighted, telling Baylosis to wait for him. Then, Arafol

went inside Mikos Coffee Bar to join JudgeClapis.
In his Sworn Affidavit dated 8 April 2010, Baylosis
stated that he went out of the vehicle and saw,
through the full window glass of the Mikos Coffee
Bar, Arafol sitting at a table together with
Judge Clapis. After Arafol left Mikos Coffee Bar, he
told Baylosis to bring him back to Jollibee in Tagum
City.
On the second week of January 2010, Arafol showed
to Gacad a copy of Judge Clapis' Order dated 4
January 2010 denying the Motion for Reinvestigation
filed by the accused. Subsequently, Arafol
told Gacad that Judge Clapis was borrowing P50,000
from her for his mother's hospitalization. Arafol
handed to Gacad a postdated BPI check allegedly
issued by Judge Clapis as assurance of payment.
However, Gacad failed to produce the P50,000.
Gacad alleged that, from then on, Arafol and
Judge Clapis began to "play different hideous
schemes" to prejudice their case. 2 Judge Clapis set
hearings on 4 February 2010, 8 February 2010, and
1 March 2010. However, the Notices for Hearings
were mailed only on 1 March 2010 and were
received by Gacad only on 3 March 2010.

Thereafter, Judge Clapis set a hearing for a petition

for bail on 29 March 2010, which Gacad came to
know only inadvertently since she received no notice
for the hearing. During the 29 March 2010 hearing,
Public Prosecutor Alona Labtic moved that the
petition for bail be put in writing. However, the
counsel for the accused manifested that he was not
prepared for a written petition because it was only
right before the hearing that the accused informed
him of Arafol's agreement to bail. Thus,
Judge Clapis calendared the case for speedy trial. He
set a continuous hearing for the petition for bail on
12 April 2010, 13 April 2010, and 14 April 2010.
On 8 April 2010, the accused filed a Petition for Bail
while Gacad filed a Motion for Inhibition of
Judge Clapis. On 18 May 2010, Judge Clapis granted
the accused's Petition for Bail. On 24 May 2010,
Judge Clapis issued a Notice of Preliminary
Conference set on 2 December 2010. On 1 June
2010, Judge Clapis inhibited himself.
AaHDSI

To bolster her case of corruption against

Judge Clapis, Gacad recounted her previous
encounter with Judge Clapis and Arafol in Criminal
Case No. 6251 against her brother. According
to Gacad, Arafol suggested that they give
Judge Clapisthe P80,000 cash bond posted in the
case so that her brother's case could be dismissed.
After conceding to Arafol's proposal,

Judge Clapis indeed dismissed the case despite the

strong evidence against her brother.
In an Indorsement letter dated 21 June 2010, the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) required
Judge Clapis to comment. In his Comment 3 dated
26 July 2010, Judge Clapis narrated the events
regarding Criminal Case No. 6898, beginning with
the arraignment set on 17 December 2009 up to his
inhibition on 1 June 2010. Judge Clapis did not
attach any documents to support his narration.
Judge Clapis claimed that notices were made
verbally because of time constraints. Nevertheless,
he stressed that both sides were given the
opportunity to be heard since in almost all
proceedings, Gacad was in court and the orders
were done in open court. He admitted that his
personnel inadvertently scheduled the preliminary
conference of the case to 2 December 2010. Finally,
he denied owning an account in BPI.
In its Resolution 4 dated 15 December 2010, this
Court's Second Division noted the recommendation
of the OCA dated 3 November 2010 and resolved to:
(1) re-docket the instant administrative complaint
OCA-IPI No. 10-3440-RTJ as regular administrative
matter A.M. No. RTJ-10-2257; and (2) refer the
matter to the Executive Justice of the Court of
Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City, for raffle among its
Justices, and direct the Justice to whom the case is

assigned to conduct an investigation on the matter

and to submit a report and recommendation within
60 days from receipt of the records of the case.
Pursuant to the Resolution of 15 December 2010,
the records of the case were forwarded to Justice
Romulo V. Borja, the Executive Justice of the Court
of Appeals, Mindanao Station, and then to the Raffle
Committee. On 10 May 2011, the case was raffled to
Justice Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles (Investigating
Justice) for investigation. Thereafter, the
Investigating Justice ordered the parties to submit
their respective evidence, and set the case for
hearing on 14 June 2011, 21 June 2011, and 28
June 2011. The 28 June 2011 hearing was
subsequently reset to 28 July 2011.
CIHAED

In its Resolution dated 6 July 2011, this Court's

Second Division granted the Investigating Justice an
extension of 60 days or until 9 September 2011 to
terminate her investigation and submit her
recommendation.
In her undated Report and Recommendation, the
Investigating Justice ruled that
Judge Clapis committed grave misconduct for acting
contrary to the prescribed standard of conduct for
judges. Although the Investigating Justice was not
convinced that Judge Clapis received P50,000, and
then tried to borrow another P50,000, from Gacad,

she foundGacad's narration of her meeting with

Judge Clapis in Golden Palace Hotel as credible. The
Investigating Justice stated:
. . . In a provincial setting such as the
place where the parties come from, it is
not difficult to imagine the considerable
power that persons of the respondent's
calibre could wield in the mind of a
litigant such as the complainant herein.
The substance and tenor of the
complainant's testimony and element of
possible motivation on the part of the
respondent given his unrefuted closeness
with Prosecutor Arafol convince this
Justice that the complainant is telling the
truth.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Respondent judge merely offered a
flat denial when he could have presented
Prosecutor Arafol to buttress his
disavowal of any imputed misconduct on
his part. . . . Respondent's reaction,
however, is regrettably lackadaisical, if
not abnormal, for one whose integrity was
shred to pieces by no less than the Trial
Prosecutor who is his partner, in an
almost daily basis, in the task of
dispensing justice. There is simply no
showing indeed that respondent herein

took umbrage at Prosecutor Arafol's

alleged brazenness and daring to sully his
name. 5

Furthermore, the Investigating Justice found

Judge Clapis liable for gross ignorance of the law.
Judge Clapis was partial in granting bail to the
accused and in failing to set the case for hearing
within a reasonable time. Accordingly, the
Investigating Justice recommended the penalties of:
(1) suspension for one year without salary and other
benefits for gross misconduct; (2) a fine of
P20,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law; and (3)
reprimand for neglect of duty.
SEHTAC

In a Memorandum dated 11 January 2012, the OCA

agreed with the findings of the Investigating Justice
but disagreed with the recommended penalties. The
OCA found that Judge Clapis violated Canon 1 (Rule
1.01 and Rule 1.02) and Canon 2 (Rule 2.01) of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. The OCA also found
Judge Clapis liable for gross ignorance of the law for
failing to observe the rules in hearing the petition for
bail and to accord the prosecution due process.
Accordingly, the OCA recommended the penalties of:
(1) suspension for six months for gross misconduct;
and (2) a fine of P40,000 for gross ignorance of the
law.

We have ruled that in administrative proceedings,

the complainant has the burden to prove his
accusations against respondent with substantial
evidence or such amount of evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. 6 This Court has consistently
ruled that charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation cannot be given credence. 7
In the present case, there is indeed no substantial
evidence that Judge Clapis received the P50,000
given by Gacad to Arafol, and that Judge Clapis tried
to borrow another P50,000 from Gacad secured by a
check allegedly signed by JudgeClapis himself. The
testimony of Gacad, stating that
Judge Clapis received P50,000 and tried to borrow
another P50,000 from her, both through Arafol,
cannot be given due weight for being hearsay
evidence. On the other hand, although Baylosis
testified based on his personal knowledge, he did
not categorically state that he saw Arafol give the
money to Judge Clapis. In addition, the check
allegedly issued by Judge Clapis was in the account
name of Arafol as attested by the BPI Business
Manager's Certification. Hence, Gacad fell short of
the required degree of proof needed in an
administrative charge of corruption.
We, however, find Judge Clapis liable for gross
misconduct. In Kaw v. Osorio, 8 the Court held that

while the respondent judge, in that case, may not be

held liable for extortion and corruption as it was not
substantially proven, he should be made accountable
for gross misconduct.
CIDTcH

In the present case, the Investigating Justice

found Gacad's narration, that she met and talked
with Judge Clapis in the Golden Palace Hotel, as
credible. Gacad categorically and unwaveringly
narrated her conversation with Judge Clapis and
Arafol. On the other hand, Judge Clapis merely
denied Gacad's allegation during the hearing
conducted by the Investigating Justice, but not in his
Comment, and without presenting any evidence to
support his denial. It is a settled rule that the
findings of investigating magistrates are generally
given great weight by the Court by reason of their
unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the
witnesses as they testified. 9 The rule which
concedes due respect, and even finality, to the
assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial judges
in civil and criminal cases appliesa fortiori to
administrative cases. 10
Thus, the acts of Judge Clapis in meeting Gacad, a
litigant in a case pending before his sala, and telling
her, "Sige, kay ako na bahala gamuson nato ni
sila" (Okay, leave it all to me, we shall crush them.),
both favoring Gacad, constitute gross misconduct.

In Sevilla v. Lindo, 11 where the respondent judge

tolerated the unreasonable postponements made in
a case, the Court held that such conduct proceeded
from bias towards the accused, rendering such acts
and omissions as gross misconduct.
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or
deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior in connection with one's performance of
official functions and duties. 12 For grave or gross
misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of
should be corrupt or inspired by the intention to
violate the law, or a persistent disregard of wellknown rules. 13 The misconduct must imply wrongful
intention and not a mere error of judgment. 14
Judge Clapis' wrongful intention and lack of judicial
reasoning are made overt by the circumstances on
record. First, the Notices of Hearings were mailed
to Gacad only after the
hearing. Second, Judge Clapis started conducting the
bail hearings without an application for bail and
granted bail without affording the prosecution the
opportunity to prove that the guilt of the accused is
strong. Third, Judge Clapis set a preliminary
conference seven months from the date it was set,
patently contrary to his declaration of speedy trial for
the case. Judge Clapis cannot escape liability by
shifting the blame to his court personnel. He ought
to know that judges are ultimately responsible for

order and efficiency in their courts, and the

subordinates are not the guardians of the judge's
responsibility. 15
cEHSTC

The arbitrary actions of respondent judge, taken

together, give doubt as to his impartiality, integrity
and propriety. His acts amount to gross misconduct
constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, particularly:
CANON 2.INTEGRITY IS ESSENTIAL NOT
ONLY TO THE PROPER DISCHARGE OF
THE JUDICIAL OFFICE BUT ALSO TO THE
PERSONAL DEMEANOR OF JUDGES.
Section 1.Judges shall ensure that not
only is their conduct above reproach, but
that it is perceived to be so in the view of
a reasonable observer.
Section 2.The behavior and conduct of
judges must reaffirm the people's faith in
the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must
not merely be done but must also be seen
to be done.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 3.IMPARTIALITY IS ESSENTIAL
TO THE PROPER DISCHARGE OF THE
JUDICIAL OFFICE. IT APPLIES NOT ONLY

TO THE DECISION ITSELF BUT ALSO TO

THE PROCESS BY WHICH THE DECISION
IS TO BE MADE.
xxx xxx xxx

Section 1.Judges shall avoid impropriety

and the appearance of impropriety in all
of their activities.
xxx xxx xxx

Section 2.Judges shall ensure that his or

her conduct, both in and out of court,
maintains and enhances the confidence of
the public, the legal profession and
litigants in the impartiality of the judge
and the judiciary.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 4.Judges shall not knowingly,
while a proceeding is before, or could
come before them, make any comment
that might reasonably be expected to
affect the outcome of such proceeding or
impair the manifest fairness of the
process. Nor shall judges make any
comment in public or otherwise that
might affect the fair trial of any person or
issue.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 4.PROPRIETY AND THE
APPEARANCE OF PROPRIETY ARE
ESSENTIAL TO THE PERFORMANCE OF
ALL THE ACTIVITIES OF A JUDGE.
TIAEac

It is an ironclad principle that a judge must not only

be impartial; he must also appear to be impartial
at all times. 16Being in constant scrutiny by the
public, his language, both written and spoken, must
be guarded and measured lest the best of intentions
be misconstrued. 17 Needless to state, any gross
misconduct seriously undermines the faith and
confidence of the people in the judiciary.
We also find Judge Clapis liable for gross ignorance
of the law for conducting bail hearings without a
petition for bail being filed by the accused and
without affording the prosecution an opportunity to
prove that the guilt of the accused is strong.
Section 8 of Rule 114 provides that "at the hearing
of an application for bail filed by the person who is in
custody for the commission of an offense punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
the prosecution has the burden of showing that
evidence of guilt is strong. . . . ." This rule
presupposes that: (1) an application for bail was
filed, and (2) the judge notified the prosecutor and

conducted a bail hearing for the prosecution to

adduce evidence to prove the guilt of the accused.

the affidavit of one prosecution witness that was

submitted earlier. Clearly, Judge Clapis failed to
observe the proper procedure in granting bail.

cDCEIA

In the present case, the records show that

Judge Clapis set the first bail hearing on 29 March
2010 yet the Petition for Bail was filed only on 8 April
2010. Furthermore, the 12, 13 and 14 April 2010 bail
hearings reveal that the prosecution was not given
the opportunity to be heard in court. During the 12
April 2010 hearing, Gacad appeared by herself
because the private prosecutor, who was to appear
in her behalf, filed a Motion to Withdraw as
Counsel. Gacadrequested for more time to secure a
new private counsel. Gacad also manifested that she
already filed a motion for Arafol to inhibit from the
case. Judge Clapis allowed her to secure a new
private counsel but the hearing proceeded with the
accused alone being given the opportunity to
present his evidence. It was only during the 14 April
2010 hearing, the last day of hearing,
that Gacad was represented by another public
prosecutor since she could not secure a new private
counsel. But immediately after the defense
completed presenting its evidence in support of its
bail application, the petition for bail was submitted
for resolution. The prosecution was not given an
opportunity to present evidence to prove that the
guilt of the accused is strong. Judge Clapis' Order
granting bail indicates that he merely used as basis

As stated in the report of the Investigating Justice:

It is true that proceedings were
conducted on April 12, 13 and 14, 2010
but nowhere in these settings was the
Prosecution given an ample opportunity to
oppose the Petition or to prove that the
evidence of guilt of the accused is strong.
There was even no inquiry from the
respondent as to the character or
reputation of the accused and the
probability of his flight during the trial.
These are important and basic questions
to be considered by a conscientious judge
whenever a Petition for Bail in a capital
offense is laid before him. Jurisprudence
clearly instructs that "in cases where (the)
grant of bail is discretionary, due process
requires that the Prosecution must be
given the opportunity to present within a
reasonable period all the evidence it may
desire to produce before the court should
resolve the Motion for Bail."
Sadly for respondent, he seemed unaware
that he was duty-bound to require the
presentation of proof of guilt of the
accused because without it, he would

have no basis for the exercise of his

discretion on whether or not bail should
be granted. It was precipitate of him to
simply consider the affidavit of one
prosecution witness and conclude
that "there was no ambush but there was

merely a shootout, as to who fired first it

cannot be determined because the
affidavit of the prosecution witness did
not state so . . . and mainly on this basis,
the Court is convinced that the
prosecution failed to establish that
evidence of guilt is strong for the Court to
deny the Petition of accused Rodolfo
Comania to be admitted to Bail." 18

Gacal v. Infante

19 is instructive on this issue. The

respondent judge in that case was held guilty of
gross ignorance of the law and the rules when he
granted bail to the accused charged with murder
without conducting a hearing and despite the
absence of a petition for bail from the accused. The
Court emphasized that bail cannot be allowed to a
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, without a hearing upon notice to the
prosecution; otherwise, a violation of due process
occurs.

Here, the act of Judge Clapis is not a mere

deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment but

a patent disregard of well-known rules. When an

error is so gross and patent, such error produces an
inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for
gross ignorance of the law. 20 If judges are allowed
to wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by
the law, there will not only be confusion in the
administration of justice but also oppressive
disregard of the basic requirements of due
process. 21
SAHITC

Under Section 8 (9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,

gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law or
procedure are both classified as serious charges, for
which the imposable penalties are any of the
following:
1.Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of
all or part of the benefits as the
Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement
or appointment to any public
office, including governmentowned or controlled
corporation: Provided,
however, that the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include
accrued leave credits;
2.Suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for more than

three (3) but not exceeding six (6)

months; or
3.A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
exceeding P40,000.00. 22

Judge Clapis had already been administratively

sanctioned in Humol v. Clapis Jr., 23 where he was
fined P30,000 for gross ignorance of the law. In this
previous case, the Court sanctioned Judge Clapis for
his failure to hear and consider the evidence of the
prosecution in granting bail to the accused. His order
relied solely on the arguments of counsel for the
accused. In Humol, 24 the Court reminded
Judge Clapis of the duties of a trial judge when an
application for bail is filed, but in the present case,
he ignored the same. Therefore, we now impose
upon him the extreme administrative penalty of
dismissal from the service. In Mangandingan v.
Adiong, 25 the Court dismissed Judge Santos Adiong
from service upon a finding of guilt for gross
ignorance of the law as well as gross misconduct
constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Again, judges are reminded that having accepted the
exalted position of a judge, they owe it to the public
to uphold the exacting standard of conduct
demanded from them. As the Court repeatedly
stressed:

The exacting standards of conduct

demanded from judges are designed to
promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary because
the people's confidence in the judicial
system is founded not only on the
magnitude of legal knowledge and the
diligence of the members of the bench,
but also on the highest standard of
integrity and moral uprightness they are
expected to possess. When the judge
himself becomes the transgressor of any
law which he is sworn to apply, he places
his office in disrepute, encourages
disrespect for the law and impairs public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary itself. It is therefore
paramount that a judge's personal
behavior both in the performance of his
duties and his daily life, be free from any
appearance of impropriety as to be
beyond reproach. 26

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS Judge Hilarion

P. Clapis, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3,
Nabunturan, Compostela Valley from the service for
Gross Misconduct and Gross Ignorance of the Law,
with forfeiture of all benefits due him, except
accrued leave credits, and disqualification from
appointment to any public office including
government-owned or controlled corporations. His

position in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3,

Nabunturan, Compostela Valley is
declared VACANT. This Decision is immediately
executory.
IAETSC

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the

Secretary of the Department of Justice for the
investigation of Provincial Prosecutor Graciano
Arafol, Jr. for possible serious misconduct in handling
Criminal Case No. 6898 entitled "People of the

Philippines v. Rodolfo Comania."

offended party just because he was married to the

deceased. In the interest of justice and in view of
the peculiar circumstances of this case, the sister
of the victim may be deemed to be an "offended
party"; hence, she has the legal personality to
challenge the void order of the trial court. Jlexj
The Case
We invoke the foregoing principles in rejecting the
Petition for Review on Certiorari before us,
assailing the February 26, 1998 Decision and the
June 29, 1998 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
(CA), which reversed and set aside the Order of
Executive Judge Pedro T. Santiago of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
101, in Criminal Case No. Q-91-24179 entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Joselito V. Narciso." S[1]

SO ORDERED.

[2]

[G.R. No. 134504. March 17, 2000]

JOSELITO V. NARCISO, petitioner, vs. FLOR
MARIE STA. ROMANA-CRUZ, respondent.

l-x

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the penalty prescribed by law is
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a
hearing must be conducted by the trial judge
before bail can be granted to the accused. Absent
such hearing, the order granting bail is void for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
In parricide, the accused cannot be considered an

The dispositive portion of the challenged CA

Decision reads: Esmmis
"WHEREFORE, the petition for
certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the
order granting bail is annulled and set
aside."
[3]

The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied

petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Lexjuris

The full text of the August 3, 1992 RTC Order,

which the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside,
reads as follows:
"Accused who is present filed thru
counsel a Motion to Allow Accused
Joselito V. Narciso to Post Bail. Me-sm
"Considering that the Presiding Judge
of Branch 83 who is hearing this case
is on leave and the Pairing Judge
Honorable Salvador Ceguerra is no
longer within the premises, there being
no objection by the City Prosecutor
Candido Rivera to the accused posting
a cashbond of P150,000.00, the
undersigned in his capacity as
Executive Judge hereby approves the
same."
[4]

The Facts of the Case

The undisputed antecedents of the case were
summarized by the Court of Appeals as
follows: Scmis
"1) After conducting a preliminary
investigation on the death of Corazon
Sta. Romana-Narciso, wife of Joselito
Narciso, Asst. City Prosecutor Myrna

Dimaranan Vidal of Quezon City

recommended and thereafter filed, the
information for parricide against
Joselito Narciso on November 13,
1991, with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. Q-91-24179. Xsc
"2) Joselito Narciso thereafter asked
for a review of the prosecutors
resolution [before] the Department of
Justice (DOJ) which was however
denied. Joselito Narciso moved for
reconsideration, which was still denied
by the DOJ.
"3) Failing before DOJ, the accused on
February 6, 1992, filed in Criminal
Case No. Q-91-24179 an "Omnibus
Motion for Reinvestigation and to Lift
the Warrant of Arrest". The Motion was
granted and the case was set for
reinvestigation by another
prosecutor. Esmso
"4) Assistant Prosecutor Lydia A.
Navarro, to whom the case was
assigned for reinvestigation, found no
reason to disturb the findings of the
previous prosecutor and

recommended the remand of the case

to the court for arraignment and trial.
"5) On August 3, 1992, accused filed
an Urgent Ex-Parte (Ex Abundanti
Cautela) to Allow Accused Joselito
Narciso to Post Bail. The Public
Prosecutor registered no objection and
said motion was granted on the same
day, allowing accused to post bail
at P150,000.00.
xxxxxxxxx
"6) On August 14, 1992, the private
prosecutor representing private
complainant Flor Marie Sta. RomanaCruz, a sister of accuseds deceased
wife, filed an "Urgent Motion to Lift
Order Allowing Accused To Post Bail.
"7) Accused objected to the aforesaid
urgent motion by filing a Motion to
Expunge 1) Notice of Appearance of
the Private Prosecutor and the 2)
Urgent Motion to Lift Order Allowing
Accused to Post Bail".
"8) Arraignment was conducted on
September 14, 1992 and the case was

set for hearing on November 9, 16, 23,

December 2, 9, 1992, January 6, 13,
20, 27, 1993, February 3, 7, 10 and 24
1993.
"9) On October 15, 1992, private
complainant through counsel filed her
opposition to the motion to expunge
[filed by] accused.
"10) On November 3, 1992 private
complainant moved for the
postponement of the trials set on
November 9, 16 and 23 and the
subsequent hearings thereon pending
the resolution of their Urgent Motion to
Lift Order Allowing Accused To Post
Bail.
"11) On November 9, 1992, the court
issued the first assailed order stating
therein to wit:
ORDER
Counsel for the accused, upon
being informed of the motion for
postponement dated November
3, 1992 filed by the private
complainant, through counsel,

offered no objection to the

cancellation of todays trial but
not the trial set on November 16,
23 and December 2 and 9, 1992
for the reason that the trial can
proceed independently of the
pending Urgent Motion to Lift
Order Allowing the Accused to
Post Bail.
WHEREFORE, the trial set for
today is hereby cancelled and
re-set on November 16, 1992 at
10:30 oclock in the morning, as
previously scheduled.
SO ORDERED.
"12) On November 16, 1992, the court
cancelled the hearing upon motion of
the public prosecutor because no
prosecution witness was available.
"13) [I]n the hearing of November 23,
1992, the private prosecutor again
moved for postponement because of
the pendency of his Motion to Lift
Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail.
On the same date, the court issued the
second assailed order which reads:

ORDER
On motion of the Asst. City
Prosecutor, for the reason that
there is no showing in the record
that the private complainant was
duly notified, hence there is no
available witness this morning,
the trial set for today is hereby
cancelled and reset on
December 2 and 9, 1992 both at
10:30 oclock in the morning, as
previously scheduled.
Let a subpoena be issued to
complainant Corazon [sic] Sta.
Romana-Narciso, the same to
be served personally by the
Deputy Sheriff/Process server of
this Court.
The accused is notified of this
Order in open court.
SO ORDERED.
"Not obtaining any resolution on her
Motion To Lift Order Allowing Accused
to Post Bail, private complainant filed
this petition [before the CA]."

As earlier mentioned, the Court of Appeals granted

private respondents Petition for Certiorari. Hence,
this recourse to us via Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
[5]

The Issues
Petitioner imputes to the Court of Appeals this
alleged error: Korte
"The Respondent Court of Appeals
has erroneously decided questions of
substance, in a manner not in accord
with law, the Rules of Court and
applicable jurisprudence, as
exemplified in the decisions of this
Honorable Court, when it reversed and
set aside the order of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City which
granted the petitioner his constitutional
right to bail, considering the absence
of strong evidence or proof of his guilt,
and more especially when the public
prosecutors, who have direct control of
the proceedings and after assessment
of the evidence, have themselves
recommended the grant of bail."

"A
Whether or not the Respondent Court
of Appeals correctly ruled that the
Order of the Regional Trial Court
which granted bail to the petitioner is
substantially and procedurally infirm
notwithstanding the absence of any
opposition from the public prosecutor.
"B
Whether or not the private respondent
has the legal personality to intervene
in the present criminal case."
To resolve this case, the Court believes that two
issues must be taken up; namely, (1) the validity of
the grant of bail and (2) private respondents
standing to file the Petition before the CA. Court
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit. Esmsc
First Issue: Validity of the Grant of Bail

[6]

Respondent, on the other hand, poses the

following issues:
[7]

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides:

"All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetuawhen evidence of

guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable

by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."
Furthermore, Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, also provides: "No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution." Rtc spped
Although petitioner was charged with parricide
which is punishable with reclusion perpetua, he
argued before the CA that he was entitled to bail
because the evidence of his guilt was not strong.
He contended that the prosecutor's conformity to
his Motion for Bail was tantamount to a finding that
the prosecution evidence against him was not
strong. Calr-ky
The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that there
was no basis for such finding, since no hearing
had been conducted on the application for bail -summary or otherwise. The appellate court found
that only ten minutes had elapsed between the
filing of the Motion by the accused and the Order
granting bail, a lapse of time that could not be

deemed sufficient for the trial court to receive and

evaluate any evidence. We agree with the CA.
Stressing in Basco v. Rapatalo that the judge had
the duty to determine whether the evidence of guilt
was strong, the Court held: Supreme
[8]

"When the grant of bail is

discretionary, the prosecution has the
burden of showing that the evidence of
guilt against the accused is strong.
However, the determination of whether
or not the evidence of guilt is strong,
being a matter of judicial discretion,
remains with the judge. This discretion
by the very nature of things, may
rightly be exercised only after the
evidence is submitted to the court at
the hearing. Since the discretion is
directed to the weight of the evidence
and since evidence cannot properly be
weighed if not duly exhibited or
produced before the court, it is obvious
that a proper exercise of judicial
discretion requires that the evidence of
guilt be submitted to the court, the
petitioner having the right of cross
examination and to introduce his own
evidence in rebuttal.

xxxxxxxxx
"Consequently, in the application for
bail of a person charged with a capital
offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, a
hearing, whether summary or
otherwise in the discretion of the court,
must actually be conducted to
determine whether or not the evidence
of guilt against the accused is
strong. A summary hearing means
such brief and speedy method of
receiving and considering the evidence
of guilt as is practicable and consistent
with the purpose of hearing which is
merely to determine the weight of
evidence for the purposes of bail. On
such hearing, the court does not sit to
try the merits or to enter into any nice
inquiry as to the weight that ought to
be allowed to the evidence for or
against the accused, nor will it
speculate on the outcome of the trial or
on what further evidence may be
therein offered and admitted. The
course of inquiry may be left to the
discretion of the court which may
confine itself to receiving such
evidence as has reference to

substantial matters, avoiding

unnecessary thoroughness in the
examination and cross examination. If
a party is denied the opportunity to be
heard, there would be a violation of
procedural due process." (Emphasis
supplied.)
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling
judges to conduct the required hearings in bail
applications, in which the accused stands charged
with a capital offense. The absence of objection
from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant
of bail in such cases, for the judge has no right to
presume that the prosecutor knows what he is
doing on account of familiarity with the case. "Said
reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the
prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion
to determine whether the guilt of the accused is
strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the
judge before whom the petition for provisional
liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to
exercise discretion has never been reposed upon
the prosecutor."
[9]

Imposed in Baylon v. Sison was this mandatory

duty to conduct a hearing despite the prosecution's
refusal to adduce evidence in opposition to the
application to grant and fix bail. We quote below
the pertinent portion of the Decision therein: Sjcj
[10]

"The importance of a hearing has been

emphasized in not a few cases
wherein the Court ruled that even if the
prosecution refuses to adduce
evidence or fails to interpose an
objection to the motion for bail, it is
still mandatory for the court to conduct
a hearing or ask searching questions
from which it may infer the strength of
the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it,
against the accused."

And in Concerned Citizens v. Elma, the Court

ruled: Chief
[12]

"It is true that the weight of the

evidence adduced is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court.
However, such discretion may only be
exercised after the hearing called to
ascertain the degree of guilt of the
accused for the purpose of
determining whether or not he should
be granted liberty."

In Gimeno v. Arcueno Sr., the Court also held:

[11]

Basco v. Rapatalo summarized several

cases that emphasized the mandatory character
of a hearing in a petition for bail in a capital case. It
enunciated the following duties of the trial judge in
such petition: Esm
[13]

"The grant of bail is a matter of right

except in cases involving capital
offenses when the matter is left to the
sound discretion of the court. That
discretion lies, not in the determination
whether or not a hearing should be
held but in the appreciation and
evaluation of the prosecutions
evidence of guilt against the accused.
x x x A hearing is plainly
indispensable before a judge can aptly
be said to be in a position to determine
whether the evidence for the
prosecution is weak or strong."

[14]

"(1) Notify the prosecutor of the

hearing of the application for bail or
require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court as amended;
"(2) Conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses
to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the

purpose of enabling the court to

exercise its sound discretion (Sections
7 and 8, supra);

considered an aspect of procedural due process

for both the prosecution and the defense; its
absence will invalidate the grant or the denial of
the application for bail.
[15]

"(3) Decide whether the evidence of

guilt of the accused is strong based on
the summary of evidence of the
prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra);
"(4) If the guilt of the accused is not
strong, discharge the accused upon
the approval of the bailbond. (Section
19, supra). Otherwise, petition should
be denied."
The Court added: "The above-enumerated
procedure should now leave no room for doubt as
to the duties of the trial judge in cases of bail
applications. So basic and fundamental is it to
conduct a hearing in connection with the grant of
bail in the proper cases that it would amount to
judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary to
disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof." Ky-calr
Additionally, the courts grant or refusal of bail
must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution, on the basis of which should be
formulated the judge's own conclusion on whether
such evidence is strong enough to indicate the
guilt of the accused. The summary thereof is

Clearly, the grant of bail by Executive Judge

Santiago was laced with grave abuse of discretion
and the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing
him. Ky-le
Second Issue: Respondent's Standing to File
the Petition
Petitioner attacks respondents legal standing to
file the Petition for Certiorari before the appellate
court, maintaining that only the public prosecutor
or the solicitor general may challenge the assailed
Order. He invokes People v. Dacudao, which
ruled:
[16]

"x x x A private prosecutor in a criminal

case has no authority to act for the
People of the Philippines before this
Court. It is the Governments counsel,
the Solicitor General who appears in
criminal cases or incidents before the
Supreme Court. At the very least, the
Provincial Fiscal himself, with the
conformity of the Solicitor General,
should have raised the issue (of

whether or not the prosecution was

deprived of procedural due process on
account of the grant of bail to the
accused without any hearing on the
motion for bail) before us, instead of
the private prosecutor with the
conformity of the Assistant Provincial
Fiscal of Cebu."
He also cites Republic v. Partisala which held as
follows: Sda adsc
[17]

"We make it known that only the

Solicitor General can bring or defend
actions on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. Henceforth actions filed in
the name of the Republic of the
Philippines if not initiated by the
Solicitor General will be summarily
dismissed." Missdaa
Citing the "ends of substantial justice," People v.
Calo, however, provided an exception to the
above doctrines in this manner:
[18]

"While the rule is, as held by the Court

of Appeals, only the Solicitor General
may bring or defend actions on behalf
of the Republic of the Philippines, or
represent the People or the State in

criminal proceedings pending in this

Court and the Court of Appeals
(Republic vs. Partisala, 118 SCRA 320
[1982]), the ends of substantial justice
would be better served, and the issues
in this action could be determined in a
more just, speedy and inexpensive
manner, by entertaining the petition at
bar. As an offended party in a criminal
case, private petitioner has sufficient
personality and a valid grievance
against Judge Adaos order granting
bail to the alleged murderers of his
(private petitioners) father.
"In Paredes vs. Gopengco, 29 SCRA
688 (1969), this Court ruled that the
offended parties in criminal cases have
sufficient interest and personality as
"person(s) aggrieved" to file the special
civil action of prohibition and certiorari
under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in
line with the underlying spirit of the
liberal construction of the Rules of
Court in order to promote their object,
thus:
Furthermore, as offended
parties in the pending criminal
case before petitioner judge, it

cannot be gainsaid that

respondents have sufficient
interest and personality as
person(s) aggrieved by
petitioner judges ruling on his
non-disqualification to file the
special civil action under
sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65.
Recently, in line with the
underlying spirit of a liberal
construction of the Rules of
Court in order to promote their
object, as against the literal
interpretation of Rule 110,
section 2, we held, overruling the
implication of an earlier case,
that a widow possesses the right
as an offended party to file a
criminal complaint for the murder
of her deceased husband." (Id.,
p. 699)
The ends of substantial justice indeed require the
affirmation of the appellate courts ruling on this
point. Clearly, the assailed Order of Judge
Santiago was issued in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. A void order is no
order at all. It cannot confer any right or be the
source of any relief. This Court is not merely a
court of law; it is likewise a court of justice. Xlaw
[19]

To rule otherwise would leave the private

respondent without any recourse to rectify the
public injustice brought about by the trial court's
Order, leaving her with only the standing to file
administrative charges for ignorance of the law
against the judge and the prosecutor. A party
cannot be left without recourse to address a
substantive issue in law.
Moreover, we agree with the Office of the Solicitor
General that "it is too late in the day for the
petitioner to challenge the legal personality of
private respondent considering that it was never
disputed by [him] during the preliminary
investigation of the case, in his appeal to the
Department of Justice and during the
reinvestigation of the case."
[20]

Corollary to the question of standing, petitioner

submits that even if the exception were made to
apply, private respondent is not an "offended
party" who is granted the right to challenge the
assailed RTC Order. He maintains that only the
compulsory heirs of the deceased, who are the
accused himself and his minor child, may file the
instant action. We disagree. Sclex
It should be remembered that the crime charged
against the private respondent is parricide; hence,
the accused cannot be regarded as an offended

party. That would be a contradiction in terms and

an absurdity in fact. Nor can one expect the minor
child to think and to act for himself. Hence, we rule
that in view of the peculiar circumstances of this
case, the sister of the deceased is a proper partylitigant who is akin to the "offended party," she
being a close relative of the deceased. There is no
closer kin who may be expected to take up the
cudgels of justice for the deceased.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the
assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner. Sclaw
SO ORDERED.
Government of Hong Kong v. Judge Felix Olalia
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
Doctrines: Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for
bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various
treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the
promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the
presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines
should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not
impaired.
It does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees
rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights
are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by
international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party.

* On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then
British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the
Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June
20, 1997.
Facts: Private respondent Juan Antonio Muoz was charged before
the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of
"accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of
the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He
also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud,
penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest
were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven
(7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong
Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of
private respondent. The RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of
Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents
arrested and detained him.
Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was
opposed by petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an
Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no
Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private
respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited
himself from further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to
Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for
bail and this was granted by respondent judge. Petitioner filed an
urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by
respondent judge. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no
provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extradite
.

Ruling: NO. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition

proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant
and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the
potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such
extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the
prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that
he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family
of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as
well as value the worth and dignity of every person. Clearly, the
right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction
must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the
Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of
human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of
human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to
liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence
of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one
that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the
escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his
return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or
punishment. It does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its
treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential
extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where
these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by
international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We
should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for
bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily
met.
Note: In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice
Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and
convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition
cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof

beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence.

The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing
evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders
and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent
presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently,
this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and
convincing evidence." (valencia)

G.R. No. 181881

October 18, 2011

BRICCIO "Ricky" A. POLLO, Petitioner,

vs.
CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID, DIRECTOR
IV RACQUEL DE GUZMAN BUENSALIDA, DIRECTOR IV
LYDIA A. CASTILLO, DIRECTOR III ENGELBERT ANTHONY
D. UNITE AND THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a
government employee who was charged administratively and
eventually dismissed from the service. The employees personal
files stored in the computer were used by the government
employer as evidence of misconduct.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision1dated
October 11, 2007 and Resolution2 dated February 29, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed the petition for
certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 98224) filed by petitioner Briccio

"Ricky" A. Pollo to nullify the proceedings conducted by the Civil

Service Commission (CSC) which found him guilty of dishonesty,
grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, and violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 and
penalized him with dismissal.
The factual antecedents:
Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the
CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-in-Charge of the
Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the
"Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na" program of the CSC.
On January 3, 2007 at around 2:30 p.m., an unsigned lettercomplaint addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson Karina
Constantino-David which was marked "Confidential" and sent
through a courier service (LBC) from a certain "Alan San
Pascual" of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, was received by the
Integrated Records Management Office (IRMO) at the CSC
Central Office. Following office practice in which documents
marked "Confidential" are left unopened and instead sent to the
addressee, the aforesaid letter was given directly to Chairperson
David.
The letter-complaint reads:
The Chairwoman
Civil Service Commission
Batasan Hills, Quezon City
Dear Madam Chairwoman,
Belated Merry Christmas and Advance Happy New Year!
As a concerned citizen of my beloved country, I would like to ask
from you personally if it is just alright for an employee of your
agency to be a lawyer of an accused govt employee having a

pending case in the csc. I honestly think this is a violation of law

and unfair to others and your office.
I have known that a person have been lawyered by one of your
attorny in the region 4 office. He is the chief of the Mamamayan
muna hindi mamaya na division. He have been helping many who
have pending cases in the Csc. The justice in our govt system will
not be served if this will continue. Please investigate this anomaly
because our perception of your clean and good office is being
tainted.
Concerned Govt employee3
Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel
with background in information technology (IT), and issued a
memo directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically
"to back up all the files in the computers found in the
Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions."4After some
briefing, the team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office at
Panay Avenue, Quezon City. Upon their arrival thereat around
5:30 p.m., the team informed the officials of the CSC-ROIV,
respondents Director IV Lydia Castillo (Director Castillo) and
Director III Engelbert Unite (Director Unite) of Chairperson
Davids directive.
The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the
PALD and Legal Services Division (LSD) was witnessed by
several employees, together with Directors Castillo and Unite who
closely monitored said activity. At around 6:00 p.m., Director
Unite sent text messages to petitioner and the head of LSD, who
were both out of the office at the time, informing them of the
ongoing copying of computer files in their divisions upon orders of
the CSC Chair. The text messages received by petitioner read:
"Gud p.m. This is Atty. Unite FYI: Co people are going
over the PCs of PALD and LSD per instruction of the
Chairman. If you can make it here now it would be better."

"All PCs Of PALD and LSD are being backed up per

memo of the chair."
"CO IT people arrived just now for this purpose. We were
not also informed about this.
"We cant do anything about it its a directive from
chair."
"Memo of the chair was referring to an anonymous
complaint"; "ill send a copy of the memo via mms"5
Petitioner replied also thru text message that he was leaving the
matter to Director Unite and that he will just get a lawyer. Another
text message received by petitioner from PALD staff also
reported the presence of the team from CSC main office: "Sir
may mga taga C.O. daw sa kuarto natin."6 At around 10:00 p.m.
of the same day, the investigating team finished their task. The
next day, all the computers in the PALD were sealed and secured
for the purpose of preserving all the files stored therein. Several
diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk
of PALD and LSD computers were turned over to Chairperson
David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSCs
Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in
the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer
assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40
to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or letters7 in connection
with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the
basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause
Order8 dated January 11, 2007, requiring the petitioner, who had
gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or counteraffidavit within five days from notice.
Evaluating the subject documents obtained from petitioners
personal files, Chairperson David made the following
observations:

Most of the foregoing files are drafts of legal pleadings or

documents that are related to or connected with administrative
cases that may broadly be lumped as pending either in the
CSCRO No. IV, the CSC-NCR, the CSC-Central Office or other
tribunals. It is also of note that most of these draft pleadings are
for and on behalves of parties, who are facing charges as
respondents in administrative cases. This gives rise to the
inference that the one who prepared them was knowingly,
deliberately and willfully aiding and advancing interests adverse
and inimical to the interest of the CSC as the central personnel
agency of the government tasked to discipline misfeasance and
malfeasance in the government service. The number of pleadings
so prepared further demonstrates that such person is not merely
engaged in an isolated practice but pursues it with seeming
regularity. It would also be the height of naivete or credulity, and
certainly against common human experience, to believe that the
person concerned had engaged in this customary practice without
any consideration, and in fact, one of the retrieved files (item 13
above) appears to insinuate the collection of fees. That these
draft pleadings were obtained from the computer assigned to
Pollo invariably raises the presumption that he was the one
responsible or had a hand in their drafting or preparation since
the computer of origin was within his direct control and
disposition.9
Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person
referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint which had no
attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer and neither is he
"lawyering" for people with cases in the CSC. He accused CSC
officials of conducting a "fishing expedition" when they unlawfully
copied and printed personal files in his computer, and
subsequently asking him to submit his comment which violated
his right against self-incrimination. He asserted that he had
protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was
on leave, citing the letter dated January 8, 2007 in which he
informed Director Castillo that the files in his computer were his
personal files and those of his sister, relatives, friends and some
associates and that he is not authorizing their sealing, copying,

duplicating and printing as these would violate his constitutional

right to privacy and protection against self-incrimination and
warrantless search and seizure. He pointed out that though
government property, the temporary use and ownership of the
computer issued under a Memorandum of Receipt (MR) is ceded
to the employee who may exercise all attributes of ownership,
including its use for personal purposes. As to the anonymous
letter, petitioner argued that it is not actionable as it failed to
comply with the requirements of a formal complaint under the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(URACC). In view of the illegal search, the files/documents
copied from his computer without his consent is thus inadmissible
as evidence, being "fruits of a poisonous tree."10
On February 26, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No.
07038211 finding prima facie case against the petitioner and
charging him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A.
No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees). Petitioner was directed to submit his
answer under oath within five days from notice and indicate
whether he elects a formal investigation. Since the charges fall
under Section 19 of the URACC, petitioner was likewise placed
under 90 days preventive suspension effective immediately upon
receipt of the resolution. Petitioner received a copy of Resolution
No. 070382 on March 1, 2007.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration, to
Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without
basis having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond
the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely
to the court. Petitioner reiterated that he never aided any people
with pending cases at the CSC and alleged that those files found
in his computer were prepared not by him but by certain persons
whom he permitted, at one time or another, to make use of his
computer out of close association or friendship. Attached to the
motion were the affidavit of Atty. Ponciano R. Solosa who
entrusted his own files to be kept at petitioners CPU and Atty.

Eric N. Estrellado, the latter being Atty. Solosas client who

attested that petitioner had nothing to do with the pleadings or bill
for legal fees because in truth he owed legal fees to Atty. Solosa
and not to petitioner. Petitioner contended that the case should
be deferred in view of the prejudicial question raised in the
criminal complaint he filed before the Ombudsman against
Director Buensalida, whom petitioner believes had instigated this
administrative case. He also prayed for the lifting of the
preventive suspension imposed on him. In its Resolution No.
07051912 dated March 19, 2007, the CSC denied the omnibus
motion. The CSC resolved to treat the said motion as petitioners
answer.
On March 14, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent
Petition13 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 98224, assailing both the January 11, 2007 ShowCause Order and Resolution No. 070382 dated February 26,
2007 as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or total absence of jurisdiction. Prior to this,
however, petitioner lodged an administrative/criminal complaint
against respondents Directors Racquel D.G. Buensalida (Chief of
Staff, Office of the CSC Chairman) and Lydia A. Castillo (CSCRO IV) before the Office of the Ombudsman, and a separate
complaint for disbarment against Director Buensalida.14
On April 17, 2007, petitioner received a notice of hearing from the
CSC setting the formal investigation of the case on April 30,
2007. On April 25, 2007, he filed in the CA an Urgent Motion for
the issuance of TRO and preliminary injunction.15 Since he failed
to attend the pre-hearing conference scheduled on April 30, 2007,
the CSC reset the same to May 17, 2007 with warning that the
failure of petitioner and/or his counsel to appear in the said prehearing conference shall entitle the prosecution to proceed with
the formal investigation ex-parte.16 Petitioner moved to defer or to
reset the pre-hearing conference, claiming that the investigation
proceedings should be held in abeyance pending the resolution of
his petition by the CA. The CSC denied his request and again
scheduled the pre-hearing conference on May 18, 2007 with

similar warning on the consequences of petitioner and/or his

counsels non-appearance.17 This prompted petitioner to file
another motion in the CA, to cite the respondents, including the
hearing officer, in indirect contempt.18
On June 12, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No.
07113419 denying petitioners motion to set aside the denial of his
motion to defer the proceedings and to inhibit the designated
hearing officer, Atty. Bernard G. Jimenez. The hearing officer was
directed to proceed with the investigation proper with dispatch.
In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the
motion of the prosecution, petitioner was deemed to have waived
his right to the formal investigation which then proceeded ex
parte.
On July 24, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 071420,20 the
dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission
hereby finds Briccio A. Pollo, a.k.a. Ricky A. Pollo GUILTY of
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service and Violation of Republic Act 6713. He is
meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with all
its accessory penalties, namely, disqualification to hold public
office, forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of civil service
eligibilities and bar from taking future civil service examinations.21
On the paramount issue of the legality of the search conducted
on petitioners computer, the CSC noted the dearth of
jurisprudence relevant to the factual milieu of this case where the
government as employer invades the private files of an employee
stored in the computer assigned to him for his official use, in the
course of initial investigation of possible misconduct committed by
said employee and without the latters consent or participation.
The CSC thus turned to relevant rulings of the United States
Supreme Court, and cited the leading case of OConnor v.

Ortega22 as authority for the view that government agencies, in

their capacity as employers, rather than law enforcers, could
validly conduct search and seizure in the governmental workplace
without meeting the "probable cause" or warrant requirement for
search and seizure. Another ruling cited by the CSC is the more
recent case of United States v. Mark L. Simons23 which declared
that the federal agencys computer use policy foreclosed any
inference of reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of its
employees. Though the Court therein recognized that such policy
did not, at the same time, erode the respondents legitimate
expectation of privacy in the office in which the computer was
installed, still, the warrantless search of the employees office was
upheld as valid because a government employer is entitled to
conduct a warrantless search pursuant to an investigation of
work-related misconduct provided the search is reasonable in its
inception and scope.
With the foregoing American jurisprudence as benchmark, the
CSC held that petitioner has no reasonable expectation of privacy
with regard to the computer he was using in the regional office in
view of the CSC computer use policy which unequivocally
declared that a CSC employee cannot assert any privacy right to
a computer assigned to him. Even assuming that there was no
such administrative policy, the CSC was of the view that the
search of petitioners computer successfully passed the test of
reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace as
enunciated in the aforecited authorities. The CSC stressed that it
pursued the search in its capacity as government employer and
that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation
involving work-related misconduct, which exempts it from the
warrant requirement under the Constitution. With the matter of
admissibility of the evidence having been resolved, the CSC then
ruled that the totality of evidence adequately supports the
charges of grave misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service and violation of R.A. No. 6713
against the petitioner. These grave infractions justified petitioners
dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties.

In his Memorandum24 filed in the CA, petitioner moved to

incorporate the above resolution dismissing him from the service
in his main petition, in lieu of the filing of an appeal via a Rule
43 petition. In a subsequent motion, he likewise prayed for the
inclusion of Resolution No. 07180025 which denied his motion for
reconsideration.
By Decision dated October 11, 2007, the CA dismissed the
petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion
committed by respondents CSC officials. The CA held that: (1)
petitioner was not charged on the basis of the anonymous letter
but from the initiative of the CSC after a fact-finding investigation
was conducted and the results thereof yielded a prima facie case
against him; (2) it could not be said that in ordering the back-up of
files in petitioners computer and later confiscating the same,
Chairperson David had encroached on the authority of a judge in
view of the CSC computer policy declaring the computers as
government property and that employee-users thereof have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in anything they create, store,
send, or receive on the computer system; and (3) there is nothing
contemptuous in CSCs act of proceeding with the formal
investigation as there was no restraining order or injunction
issued by the CA.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA,
petitioner brought this appeal arguing that
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED AND COMMITTED SERIOUS IRREGULARITY
AND BLATANT ERRORS IN LAW AMOUNTING TO
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED
THAT ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT IS ACTIONABLE
UNDER E.O. 292 WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT THE
CONTRARY IS EXPLICITLY PROVIDED UNDER 2nd
PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 8 OF CSC RESOLUTION
NO. 99-1936, WHICH IS AN [AMENDMENT] TO THE

ORIGINAL RULES PER CSC RESOLUTION NO. 940521;

II
THE HONORABLE COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED AND
COMMITTED PALPABLE ERRORS IN LAW
AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER CANNOT INVOKE
HIS RIGHT TO PRIVACY, TO UNREASONABLE
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION, BY VIRTUE OF OFFICE
MEMORANDUM NO. 10 S. 2002, A MERE INTERNAL
MEMORANDUM SIGNED SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY
BY RESPONDENT DAVID AND NOT BY THE
COLLEGIAL COMMISSION CONSIDERING
THAT POLICY MATTERS INVOLVING SUB[S]TANTIAL
RIGHTS CANNOT BE COVERED BY AN OFFICE
MEMORANDUM WHICH IS LIMITED TO PROCEDURAL
AND ROUTINARY INSTRUCTION;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN
IT RULED THAT MEMO SEARCH DATED JANUARY 3,
2007 AND THE TAKING OF DOCUMENTS IN THE
EVENING THEREOF FROM 7:00 TO 10:00 P.M. IS NOT
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION LIMITING THE
DEFINITION [OF] GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO
ONE INVOLVING AND TAINTED WITH PERSONAL
HOSTILITY. IT LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT DATA STORED IN THE GOVERNMENT
COMPUTERS ARE GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES
INCLUDING THE PERSONAL FILES WHEN THE
CONTRARY IS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 14 OF
OM. 10 s. 2002. AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED STILL
WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT DAVID BY

VIRTUE OF O.M. 10 DID NOT ENCROACH ON THE

DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF A JUDGE PURSUANT
TO ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION;
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED
TO CONSIDER ALL OTHER NEW ARGUMENTS,
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE HEREUNTO SUBMITTED AS
WELL AS ITS FAILURE TO EVALUATE AND TAKE
ACTION ON THE 2 MOTIONS TO ADMIT AND
INCORPORATE CSC RESOLUTION NOS. 07-1420
DATED JULY 24, 2007 AND CSC RESOLUTION 071800 DATED SEPTEMBER 10, 2007. IT DID NOT RULE
LIKEWISE ON THE FOUR URGENT MOTION TO
RESOLVE ANCILLARY PRAYER FOR TRO.26
Squarely raised by the petitioner is the legality of the search
conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal
files without his knowledge and consent, alleged as a
transgression on his constitutional right to privacy.
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this
jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution,27 which provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.

The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches

and seizures but only of "unreasonable" searches and
seizures.28 But to fully understand this concept and application for
the purpose of resolving the issue at hand, it is essential that we
examine the doctrine in the light of pronouncements in another
jurisdiction. As the Court declared in People v. Marti29 :
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the 1935
Charter which, worded as follows:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec. 1[3],
Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. As such, the Court may turn to
the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court
and State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this
jurisdiction.30
In the 1967 case of Katz v. United States,31 the US Supreme
Court held that the act of FBI agents in electronically recording a
conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone
booth violated his right to privacy and constituted a "search and
seizure". Because the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a personal telephone
call, the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such
area. In the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, it was
further noted that the existence of privacy right under prior
decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and

second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to

recognize as reasonable (objective).32
In Mancusi v. DeForte33 which addressed the reasonable
expectations of private employees in the workplace, the US
Supreme Court held that a union employee had Fourth
Amendment rights with regard to an office at union headquarters
that he shared with other union officials, even as the latter or their
guests could enter the office. The Court thus "recognized that
employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against
intrusions by police."
That the Fourth Amendment equally applies to a government
workplace was addressed in the 1987 case of OConnor v.
Ortega34 where a physician, Dr. Magno Ortega, who was
employed by a state hospital, claimed a violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights when hospital officials investigating charges of
mismanagement of the psychiatric residency program, sexual
harassment of female hospital employees and other irregularities
involving his private patients under the state medical aid program,
searched his office and seized personal items from his desk and
filing cabinets. In that case, the Court categorically declared that
"[i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely
because they work for the government instead of a private
employer."35 A plurality of four Justices concurred that the correct
analysis has two steps: first, because "some government offices
may be so open to fellow employees or the public that no
expectation of privacy is reasonable", a court must consider "[t]he
operational realities of the workplace" in order to determine
whether an employees Fourth Amendment rights are implicated;
and next, where an employee has a legitimate privacy
expectation, an employers intrusion on that expectation "for
noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for
investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by
the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances."36
On the matter of government employees reasonable
expectations of privacy in their workplace, OConnor teaches:

x x x Public employees expectations of privacy in their offices,

desks, and file cabinets, like similar expectations of employees in
the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office
practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation. x x x The
employees expectation of privacy must be assessed in the
context of the employment relation. An office is seldom a private
enclave free from entry by supervisors, other employees, and
business and personal invitees. Instead, in many cases offices
are continually entered by fellow employees and other visitors
during the workday for conferences, consultations, and other
work-related visits. Simply put, it is the nature of government
offices that others such as fellow employees, supervisors,
consensual visitors, and the general public may have frequent
access to an individuals office. We agree with JUSTICE SCALIA
that "[c]onstitutional protection against unreasonable searches by
the government does not disappear merely because the
government has the right to make reasonable intrusions in its
capacity as employer," x x x but some government offices may
be so open to fellow employees or the public that no
expectation of privacy is reasonable. x x x Given the great
variety of work environments in the public sector, the
question of whether an employee has a reasonable
expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case
basis.37 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
On the basis of the established rule in previous cases, the US
Supreme Court declared that Dr. Ortegas Fourth Amendment
rights are implicated only if the conduct of the hospital officials
infringed "an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to
consider as reasonable." Given the undisputed evidence that
respondent Dr. Ortega did not share his desk or file cabinets with
any other employees, kept personal correspondence and other
private items in his own office while those work-related files (on
physicians in residency training) were stored outside his office,
and there being no evidence that the hospital had established any
reasonable regulation or policy discouraging employees from
storing personal papers and effects in their desks or file cabinets
(although the absence of such a policy does not create any

expectation of privacy where it would not otherwise exist), the

Court concluded that Dr. Ortega has a reasonable expectation of
privacy at least in his desk and file cabinets.38
Proceeding to the next inquiry as to whether the search
conducted by hospital officials was reasonable, the OConnor
plurality decision discussed the following principles:

investigating the violation of criminal laws. Rather, work-related

searches are merely incident to the primary business of the
agency. Under these circumstances, the imposition of a warrant
requirement would conflict with the "common-sense realization
that government offices could not function if every employment
decision became a constitutional matter." x x x
xxxx

Having determined that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation

of privacy in his office, the Court of Appeals simply concluded
without discussion that the "searchwas not a reasonable
search under the fourth amendment." x x x "[t]o hold that the
Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by [public
employers] is only to begin the inquiry into the standards
governing such searches[W]hat is reasonable depends on the
context within which a search takes place. x x x Thus, we must
determine the appropriate standard of reasonableness applicable
to the search. A determination of the standard of reasonableness
applicable to a particular class of searches requires "balanc[ing]
the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individuals Fourth
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental
interests alleged to justify the intrusion." x x x In the case of
searches conducted by a public employer, we must balance
the invasion of the employees legitimate expectations of
privacy against the governments need for supervision,
control, and the efficient operation of the workplace.
xxxx
In our view, requiring an employer to obtain a warrant whenever
the employer wished to enter an employees office, desk, or file
cabinets for a work-related purpose would seriously disrupt the
routine conduct of business and would be unduly burdensome.
Imposing unwieldy warrant procedures in such cases upon
supervisors, who would otherwise have no reason to be familiar
with such procedures, is simply unreasonable. In contrast to other
circumstances in which we have required warrants, supervisors in
offices such as at the Hospital are hardly in the business of

The governmental interest justifying work-related intrusions by

public employers is the efficient and proper operation of the
workplace. Government agencies provide myriad services to the
public, and the work of these agencies would suffer if employers
were required to have probable cause before they entered an
employees desk for the purpose of finding a file or piece of office
correspondence. Indeed, it is difficult to give the concept of
probable cause, rooted as it is in the criminal investigatory
context, much meaning when the purpose of a search is to
retrieve a file for work-related reasons. Similarly, the concept of
probable cause has little meaning for a routine inventory
conducted by public employers for the purpose of securing state
property. x x x To ensure the efficient and proper operation of the
agency, therefore, public employers must be given wide latitude
to enter employee offices for work-related, noninvestigatory
reasons.
We come to a similar conclusion for searches conducted
pursuant to an investigation of work-related employee
misconduct. Even when employers conduct an investigation, they
have an interest substantially different from "the normal need for
law enforcement." x x x Public employers have an interest in
ensuring that their agencies operate in an effective and efficient
manner, and the work of these agencies inevitably suffers from
the inefficiency, incompetence, mismanagement, or other workrelated misfeasance of its employees. Indeed, in many cases,
public employees are entrusted with tremendous responsibility,
and the consequences of their misconduct or incompetence to
both the agency and the public interest can be severe. In contrast

to law enforcement officials, therefore, public employers are not

enforcers of the criminal law; instead, public employers have a
direct and overriding interest in ensuring that the work of the
agency is conducted in a proper and efficient manner. In our
view, therefore, a probable cause requirement for searches of
the type at issue here would impose intolerable burdens on
public employers. The delay in correcting the employee
misconduct caused by the need for probable cause rather
than reasonable suspicion will be translated into tangible
and often irreparable damage to the agencys work, and
ultimately to the public interest. x x x

Ordinarily, a search of an employees office by a supervisor

will be "justified at its inception" when there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence
that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or
that the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory workrelated purpose such as to retrieve a needed file. x x x The
search will be permissible in its scope when "the measures
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the
search and not excessively intrusive in light of the nature
of the [misconduct]." x x x39 (Citations omitted; emphasis
supplied.)

xxxx

Since the District Court granted summary judgment without a

hearing on the factual dispute as to the character of the search
and neither was there any finding made as to the scope of the
search that was undertaken, the case was remanded to said
court for the determination of the justification for the search and
seizure, and evaluation of the reasonableness of both the
inception of the search and its scope.

In sum, we conclude that the "special needs, beyond the

normal need for law enforcement make theprobable-cause
requirement impracticable," x x x for legitimate, work-related
noninvestigatory intrusions as well as investigations of
work-related misconduct. A standard of reasonableness will
neither unduly burden the efforts of government employers to
ensure the efficient and proper operation of the workplace, nor
authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the privacy of public
employees. We hold, therefore, that public employer intrusions
on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of
government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related
purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related
misconduct,should be judged by the standard of
reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this
reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope of
the intrusion must be reasonable:
"Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a
twofold inquiry: first, one must consider whether theaction was
justified at its inception, x x x ; second, one must determine
whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place," x x x

In OConnor the Court recognized that "special needs" authorize

warrantless searches involving public employees for work-related
reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test under which
government interests are weighed against the employees
reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test
implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant requirement,
which are related to law enforcement.40
OConnor was applied in subsequent cases raising issues on
employees privacy rights in the workplace. One of these cases
involved a government employers search of an office computer,
United States v. Mark L. Simons41where the defendant Simons,
an employee of a division of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), was convicted of receiving and possessing materials
containing child pornography. Simons was provided with an office
which he did not share with anyone, and a computer with Internet
access. The agency had instituted a policy on computer use
stating that employees were to use the Internet for official

government business only and that accessing unlawful material

was specifically prohibited. The policy also stated that users shall
understand that the agency will periodically audit, inspect, and/or
monitor the users Internet access as deemed appropriate. CIA
agents instructed its contractor for the management of the
agencys computer network, upon initial discovery of prohibited
internet activity originating from Simons computer, to conduct a
remote monitoring and examination of Simons computer. After
confirming that Simons had indeed downloaded pictures that
were pornographic in nature, all the files on the hard drive of
Simons computer were copied from a remote work station. Days
later, the contractors representative finally entered Simons
office, removed the original hard drive on Simons computer,
replaced it with a copy, and gave the original to the agency
security officer. Thereafter, the agency secured warrants and
searched Simons office in the evening when Simons was not
around. The search team copied the contents of Simons
computer; computer diskettes found in Simons desk drawer;
computer files stored on the zip drive or on zip drive diskettes;
videotapes; and various documents, including personal
correspondence. At his trial, Simons moved to suppress these
evidence, arguing that the searches of his office and computer
violated his Fourth Amendment rights. After a hearing, the district
court denied the motion and Simons was found guilty as charged.
Simons appealed his convictions. The US Supreme Court ruled
that the searches of Simons computer and office did not violate
his Fourth Amendment rights and the first search warrant was
valid. It held that the search remains valid under the OConnor
exception to the warrant requirement because evidence of the
crime was discovered in the course of an otherwise proper
administrative inspection. Simons violation of the agencys
Internet policy happened also to be a violation of criminal law; this
does not mean that said employer lost the capacity and interests
of an employer. The warrantless entry into Simons office was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment standard announced in
OConnor because at the inception of the search, the employer
had "reasonable grounds for suspecting" that the hard drive

would yield evidence of misconduct, as the employer was already

aware that Simons had misused his Internet access to download
over a thousand pornographic images. The retrieval of the hard
drive was reasonably related to the objective of the search, and
the search was not excessively intrusive. Thus, while Simons had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, he did not have
such legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to the files in
his computer.
x x x To establish a violation of his rights under the Fourth
Amendment, Simons must first prove that he had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the place searched or the item seized. x
x x And, in order to prove a legitimate expectation of privacy,
Simons must show that his subjective expectation of privacy is
one that society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable.
xxx
xxxx
x x x We conclude that the remote searches of Simons computer
did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights because, in light of
the Internet policy, Simons lacked a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the files downloaded from the Internet. Additionally, we
conclude that Simons Fourth Amendment rights were not
violated by FBIS retrieval of Simons hard drive from his office.
Simons did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy with
regard to the record or fruits of his Internet use in light of the
FBIS Internet policy. The policy clearly stated that FBIS
would "audit, inspect, and/or monitor" employees use of the
Internet, including all file transfers, all websites visited, and
all e-mail messages, "as deemed appropriate." x x x This
policy placed employees on notice that they could not reasonably
expect that their Internet activity would be private. Therefore,
regardless of whether Simons subjectively believed that the files
he transferred from the Internet were private, such a belief was
not objectively reasonable after FBIS notified him that it would be
overseeing his Internet use. x x x Accordingly, FBIS actions in

remotely searching and seizing the computer files Simons

downloaded from the Internet did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.

before the prosecutors office with certain offenses, have also

recognized the fact that there may be such legitimate intrusion of
privacy in the workplace.

xxxx

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the

nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which
effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves
as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the
employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement.
The employees privacy interest in an office is to a large extent
circumscribed by the companys work policies, the collective
bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and
the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to
maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy
expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced;
and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been
upheld. (Emphasis supplied.)

The burden is on Simons to prove that he had a legitimate

expectation of privacy in his office. x x x Here, Simons has
shown that he had an office that he did not share. As noted
above, the operational realities of Simons workplace may have
diminished his legitimate privacy expectations. However, there is
no evidence in the record of any workplace practices, procedures,
or regulations that had such an effect. We therefore conclude
that, on this record, Simons possessed a legitimate
expectation of privacy in his office.
xxxx
In the final analysis, this case involves an employees supervisor
entering the employees government office and retrieving a piece
of government equipment in which the employee had absolutely
no expectation of privacy equipment that the employer knew
contained evidence of crimes committed by the employee in the
employees office. This situation may be contrasted with one in
which the criminal acts of a government employee were unrelated
to his employment. Here, there was a conjunction of the conduct
that violated the employers policy and the conduct that violated
the criminal law. We consider that FBIS intrusion into Simons
office to retrieve the hard drive is one in which a reasonable
employer might engage. x x x42 (Citations omitted; emphasis
supplied.)
This Court, in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs
Board43 which involved the constitutionality of a provision in R.A.
No. 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing of candidates for
public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers
and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged

Applying the analysis and principles announced in OConnor and

Simons to the case at bar, we now address the following
questions: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his office and computer files?; and (2) Was the search
authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the
hard drive on petitioners computer reasonable in its inception
and scope?
In this inquiry, the relevant surrounding circumstances to consider
include "(1) the employees relationship to the item seized; (2)
whether the item was in the immediate control of the employee
when it was seized; and (3) whether the employee took actions to
maintain his privacy in the item." These factors are relevant to
both the subjective and objective prongs of the reasonableness
inquiry, and we consider the two questions together.44 Thus,
where the employee used a password on his computer, did not
share his office with co-workers and kept the same locked, he
had a legitimate expectation of privacy and any search of that

space and items located therein must comply with the Fourth
Amendment.45
We answer the first in the negative. Petitioner failed to prove that
he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his
office or government-issued computer which contained his
personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate
enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his
office was always locked and not open to other employees or
visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted
any means to prevent other employees from accessing his
computer files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the
public assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would
have visitors in his office like friends, associates and even
unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his computer
which to him seemed a trivial request. He described his office as
"full of people, his friends, unknown people" and that in the past
22 years he had been discharging his functions at the PALD, he
is "personally assisting incoming clients, receiving documents,
drafting cases on appeals, in charge of accomplishment report,
Mamamayan Muna Program, Public Sector Unionism, Correction
of name, accreditation of service, and hardly had anytime for
himself alone, that in fact he stays in the office as a paying
customer."46 Under this scenario, it can hardly be deduced that
petitioner had such expectation of privacy that society would
recognize as reasonable.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation
or proof of the aforementioned factual circumstances, that
petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of privacy in his
computer as he claims, such is negated by the presence of policy
regulating the use of office computers, as in Simons.
Office Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 "Computer Use Policy
(CUP)" explicitly provides:
POLICY

1. The Computer Resources are the property of the Civil

Service Commission and may be used only for legitimate
business purposes.
2. Users shall be permitted access to Computer
Resources to assist them in the performance of their
respective jobs.
3. Use of the Computer Resources is a privilege that may
be revoked at any given time.
xxxx
No Expectation of Privacy
4. No expectation of privacy. Users except the Members
of the Commission shall not have an expectation of
privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive on
the computer system.
The Head of the Office for Recruitment, Examination and
Placement shall select and assign Users to handle the
confidential examination data and processes.
5. Waiver of privacy rights. Users expressly waive any
right to privacy in anything they create, store, send, or
receive on the computer through the Internet or any other
computer network. Users understand that theCSC may
use human or automated means to monitor the use of
its Computer Resources.
6. Non-exclusivity of Computer Resources. A computer
resource is not a personal property or for the exclusive
use of a User to whom a memorandum of receipt (MR)
has been issued. It can be shared or operated by other
users. However, he is accountable therefor and must
insure its care and maintenance.

xxxx
Passwords
12. Responsibility for passwords. Users shall be
responsible for safeguarding their passwords for access
to the computer system. Individual passwords shall not be
printed, stored online, or given to others. Users shall be
responsible for all transactions made using their
passwords. No User may access the computer system
with another Users password or account.
13. Passwords do not imply privacy. Use of passwords to
gain access to the computer system or to encode
particular files or messages does not imply that Users
have an expectation of privacy in the material they create
or receive on the computer system. The Civil Service
Commission has global passwords that permit access to
all materials stored on its networked computer system
regardless of whether those materials have been
encoded with a particular Users password. Only
members of the Commission shall authorize the
application of the said global passwords.

workplace is reasonable is the existence of a workplace privacy

policy.48 In one case, the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit held
that a state university employee has not shown that he had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer files where the
universitys computer policy, the computer user is informed not to
expect privacy if the university has a legitimate reason to conduct
a search. The user is specifically told that computer files,
including e-mail, can be searched when the university is
responding to a discovery request in the course of litigation.
Petitioner employee thus cannot claim a violation of Fourth
Amendment rights when university officials conducted a
warrantless search of his computer for work-related materials.49
As to the second point of inquiry on the reasonableness of the
search conducted on petitioners computer, we answer in the
affirmative.
The search of petitioners computer files was conducted in
connection with investigation of work-related misconduct
prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to
Chairperson David regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where
the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is
supposedly "lawyering" for individuals with pending cases in the
CSC. Chairperson David stated in her sworn affidavit:

x x x x47 (Emphasis supplied.)

The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its
employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy
in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office
computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the
computer resources using both automated or human means. This
implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that
the computer resources were used only for such legitimate
business purposes.
One of the factors stated in OConnor which are relevant in
determining whether an employees expectation of privacy in the

8. That prior to this, as early as 2006, the undersigned has

received several text messages from unknown sources adverting
to certain anomalies in Civil Service Commission Regional Office
IV (CSCRO IV) such as, staff working in another government
agency, "selling" cases and aiding parties with pending cases, all
done during office hours and involved the use of government
properties;
9. That said text messages were not investigated for lack of any
verifiable leads and details sufficient to warrant an investigation;

10. That the anonymous letter provided the lead and details as it
pinpointed the persons and divisions involved in the alleged
irregularities happening in CSCRO IV;

work-related misconduct so long as any search is justified at

inception and is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
that justified it in the first place.52

11. That in view of the seriousness of the allegations of

irregularities happening in CSCRO IV and its effect on the
integrity of the Commission, I decided to form a team of Central
Office staff to back up the files in the computers of the Public
Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) and Legal Division;

Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioners

computer was justified at its inception and scope. We quote with
approval the CSCs discussion on the reasonableness of its
actions, consistent as it were with the guidelines established by
OConnor:

x x x x50

Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative

policy, there is no doubt in the mind of the Commission that the
search of Pollos computer has successfully passed the test of
reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace as
enunciated in the above-discussed American authorities. It bears
emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in its
capacity as a government employer and that it was
undertaken in connection with an investigation involving a
work-related misconduct, one of the circumstances exempted
from the warrant requirement. At the inception of the search, a
complaint was received recounting that a certain division chief in
the CSCRO No. IV was "lawyering" for parties having pending
cases with the said regional office or in the Commission. The
nature of the imputation was serious, as it was grievously
disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively
engaged in the practice of "lawyering" for parties with pending
cases before the Commission would be a highly repugnant
scenario, then such a case would have shattering repercussions.
It would undeniably cast clouds of doubt upon the institutional
integrity of the Commission as a quasi-judicial agency, and in the
process, render it less effective in fulfilling its mandate as an
impartial and objective dispenser of administrative justice. It is
settled that a court or an administrative tribunal must not only be
actually impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise the
general public would not have any trust and confidence in it.

A search by a government employer of an employees office is

justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty
of work-related misconduct.51 Thus, in the 2004 case decided by
the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit, it was held that where a
government agencys computer use policy prohibited electronic
messages with pornographic content and in addition expressly
provided that employees do not have any personal privacy rights
regarding their use of the agency information systems and
technology, the government employee had no legitimate
expectation of privacy as to the use and contents of his office
computer, and therefore evidence found during warrantless
search of the computer was admissible in prosecution for child
pornography. In that case, the defendant employees computer
hard drive was first remotely examined by a computer information
technician after his supervisor received complaints that he was
inaccessible and had copied and distributed non-work-related email messages throughout the office. When the supervisor
confirmed that defendant had used his computer to access the
prohibited websites, in contravention of the express policy of the
agency, his computer tower and floppy disks were taken and
examined. A formal administrative investigation ensued and later
search warrants were secured by the police department. The
initial remote search of the hard drive of petitioners computer, as
well as the subsequent warrantless searches was held as valid
under the OConnor ruling that a public employer can investigate

Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the

Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit any

possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same

date that the complaint was received, a search was forthwith
conducted involving the computer resources in the concerned
regional office. That it was the computers that were subjected
to the search was justified since these furnished the easiest
means for an employee to encode and store documents.
Indeed, the computers would be a likely starting point in
ferreting out incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the
ephemeral nature of computer files, that is, they could easily
be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and
immediate action. Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with
the probable cause requirement would invariably defeat the
purpose of the wok-related investigation.
Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the Commission effected
the warrantless search in an open and transparent manner.
Officials and some employees of the regional office, who
happened to be in the vicinity, were on hand to observe the
process until its completion. In addition, the respondent himself
was duly notified, through text messaging, of the search and the
concomitant retrieval of files from his computer.
All in all, the Commission is convinced that the warrantless
search done on computer assigned to Pollo was not, in any way,
vitiated with unconstitutionality. It was a reasonable exercise of
the managerial prerogative of the Commission as an employer
aimed at ensuring its operational effectiveness and efficiency by
going after the work-related misfeasance of its employees.
Consequently, the evidence derived from the questioned search
are deemed admissible.53
Petitioners claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy
must necessarily fail. His other argument invoking the privacy of
communication and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III
of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the
recognition accorded to certain legitimate intrusions into the
privacy of employees in the government workplace under the
aforecited authorities. We likewise find no merit in his contention

that OConnor and Simons are not relevant because the present
case does not involve a criminal offense like child pornography.
As already mentioned, the search of petitioners computer was
justified there being reasonable ground for suspecting that the
files stored therein would yield incriminating evidence relevant to
the investigation being conducted by CSC as government
employer of such misconduct subject of the anonymous
complaint. This situation clearly falls under the exception to the
warrantless requirement in administrative searches defined in
OConnor.
The Court is not unaware of our decision in Anonymous LetterComplaint against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila54 involving a branch clerk (Atty.
Morales) who was investigated on the basis of an anonymous
letter alleging that he was consuming his working hours filing and
attending to personal cases, using office supplies, equipment and
utilities. The OCA conducted a spot investigation aided by NBI
agents. The team was able to access Atty. Morales personal
computer and print two documents stored in its hard drive, which
turned out to be two pleadings, one filed in the CA and another in
the RTC of Manila, both in the name of another lawyer. Atty.
Morales computer was seized and taken in custody of the OCA
but was later ordered released on his motion, but with order to the
MISO to first retrieve the files stored therein. The OCA disagreed
with the report of the Investigating Judge that there was no
evidence to support the charge against Atty. Morales as no one
from the OCC personnel who were interviewed would give a
categorical and positive statement affirming the charges against
Atty. Morales, along with other court personnel also charged in
the same case. The OCA recommended that Atty. Morales
should be found guilty of gross misconduct. The Court En Banc
held that while Atty. Morales may have fallen short of the exacting
standards required of every court employee, the Court cannot use
the evidence obtained from his personal computer against him for
it violated his constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. The Court found no evidence to support the claim
of OCA that they were able to obtain the subject pleadings with

the consent of Atty. Morales, as in fact the latter immediately filed

an administrative case against the persons who conducted the
spot investigation, questioning the validity of the investigation and
specifically invoking his constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure. And as there is no other evidence, apart from
the pleadings, retrieved from the unduly confiscated personal
computer of Atty. Morales, to hold him administratively liable, the
Court had no choice but to dismiss the charges against him for
insufficiency of evidence.
The above case is to be distinguished from the case at bar
because, unlike the former which involved a personal computer of
a court employee, the computer from which the personal files of
herein petitioner were retrieved is a government-issued computer,
hence government property the use of which the CSC has
absolute right to regulate and monitor. Such relationship of the
petitioner with the item seized (office computer) and other
relevant factors and circumstances under American Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, notably the existence of CSC MO 10,
S. 2007 on Computer Use Policy, failed to establish that petitioner
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the office computer
assigned to him.
Having determined that the personal files copied from the office
computer of petitioner are admissible in the administrative case
against him, we now proceed to the issue of whether the CSC
was correct in finding the petitioner guilty of the charges and
dismissing him from the service.
Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial
agencies, like the CSC, are accorded not only respect but even
finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might
conceivably opine otherwise.55

The CSC based its findings on evidence consisting of a

substantial number of drafts of legal pleadings and documents
stored in his office computer, as well as the sworn affidavits and
testimonies of the witnesses it presented during the formal
investigation. According to the CSC, these documents were
confirmed to be similar or exactly the same content-wise with
those on the case records of some cases pending either with
CSCRO No. IV, CSC-NCR or the Commission Proper. There
were also substantially similar copies of those pleadings filed with
the CA and duly furnished the Commission. Further, the CSC
found the explanation given by petitioner, to the effect that those
files retrieved from his computer hard drive actually belonged to
his lawyer friends Estrellado and Solosa whom he allowed the
use of his computer for drafting their pleadings in the cases they
handle, as implausible and doubtful under the circumstances. We
hold that the CSCs factual finding regarding the authorship of the
subject pleadings and misuse of the office computer is wellsupported by the evidence on record, thus:
It is also striking to note that some of these documents were in
the nature of pleadings responding to the orders, decisions or
resolutions of these offices or directly in opposition to them such
as a petition for certiorari or a motion for reconsideration of CSC
Resolution. This indicates that the author thereof knowingly and
willingly participated in the promotion or advancement of the
interests of parties contrary or antagonistic to the Commission.
Worse, the appearance in one of the retrieved documents the
phrase, "Eric N. Estr[e]llado, Epal kulang ang bayad mo," lends
plausibility to an inference that the preparation or drafting of the
legal pleadings was pursued with less than a laudable motivation.
Whoever was responsible for these documents was simply doing
the same for the money a "legal mercenary" selling or
purveying his expertise to the highest bidder, so to speak.
Inevitably, the fact that these documents were retrieved from the
computer of Pollo raises the presumption that he was the author
thereof. This is because he had a control of the said computer.
More significantly, one of the witnesses, Margarita Reyes,

categorically testified seeing a written copy of one of the

pleadings found in the case records lying on the table of the
respondent. This was the Petition for Review in the case of
Estrellado addressed to the Court of Appeals. The said
circumstances indubitably demonstrate that Pollo was secretly
undermining the interest of the Commission, his very own
employer.
To deflect any culpability, Pollo would, however, want the
Commission to believe that the documents were the personal files
of some of his friends, including one Attorney Ponciano Solosa,
who incidentally served as his counsel of record during the formal
investigation of this case. In fact, Atty. Solosa himself executed a
sworn affidavit to this effect. Unfortunately, this contention of the
respondent was directly rebutted by the prosecution witness,
Reyes, who testified that during her entire stay in the PALD, she
never saw Atty. Solosa using the computer assigned to the
respondent. Reyes more particularly stated that she worked in
close proximity with Pollo and would have known if Atty. Solosa,
whom she personally knows, was using the computer in question.
Further, Atty. Solosa himself was never presented during the
formal investigation to confirm his sworn statement such that the
same constitutes self-serving evidence unworthy of weight and
credence. The same is true with the other supporting affidavits,
which Pollo submitted.
At any rate, even admitting for a moment the said contention of
the respondent, it evinces the fact that he was unlawfully
authorizing private persons to use the computer assigned to him
for official purpose, not only once but several times gauging by
the number of pleadings, for ends not in conformity with the
interests of the Commission. He was, in effect, acting as a
principal by indispensable cooperationOr at the very least, he
should be responsible for serious misconduct for repeatedly
allowing CSC resources, that is, the computer and the electricity,
to be utilized for purposes other than what they were officially
intended.

Further, the Commission cannot lend credence to the posturing of

the appellant that the line appearing in one of the documents,
"Eric N. Estrellado, Epal kulang ang bayad mo," was a private
joke between the person alluded to therein, Eric N. Estrellado,
and his counsel, Atty. Solosa, and not indicative of anything more
sinister. The same is too preposterous to be believed. Why would
such a statement appear in a legal pleading stored in the
computer assigned to the respondent, unless he had something
to do with it?56
Petitioner assails the CA in not ruling that the CSC should not
have entertained an anonymous complaint since Section 8 of
CSC Resolution No. 99-1936 (URACC) requires a verified
complaint:
Rule II Disciplinary Cases
SEC. 8. Complaint. - A complaint against a civil service official or
employee shall not be given due course unless it is in writing and
subscribed and sworn to by the complainant. However, in cases
initiated by the proper disciplining authority, the complaint
need not be under oath.
No anonymous complaint shall be entertained unless there is
obvious truth or merit to the allegation therein or supported
by documentary or direct evidence, in which case the person
complained of may be required to comment.
xxxx
We need not belabor this point raised by petitioner. The
administrative complaint is deemed to have been initiated by the
CSC itself when Chairperson David, after a spot inspection and
search of the files stored in the hard drive of computers in the two
divisions adverted to in the anonymous letter -- as part of the
disciplining authoritys own fact-finding investigation and
information-gathering -- found a prima facie case against the

petitioner who was then directed to file his comment. As this

Court held in Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals57 --

ultimate penalty of dismissal with all its accessory penalties,

pursuant to existing rules and regulations.

Under Sections 46 and 48 (1), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Book V of

E.O. No. 292 and Section 8, Rule II of Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, a complaint may be
initiated against a civil service officer or employee by the
appropriate disciplining authority, even without being subscribed
and sworn to. Considering that the CSC, as the disciplining
authority for Dumlao, filed the complaint, jurisdiction over Dumlao
was validly acquired. (Emphasis supplied.)

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

The Decision dated October 11, 2007 and Resolution dated
February 29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
98224 are AFFIRMED.

As to petitioners challenge on the validity of CSC OM 10, S. 2002

(CUP), the same deserves scant consideration. The alleged
infirmity due to the said memorandum order having been issued
solely by the CSC Chair and not the Commission as a collegial
body, upon which the dissent of Commissioner Buenaflor is partly
anchored, was already explained by Chairperson David in her
Reply to the Addendum to Commissioner Buenaflors previous
memo expressing his dissent to the actions and disposition of the
Commission in this case. According to Chairperson David, said
memorandum order was in fact exhaustively discussed, provision
by provision in the January 23, 2002 Commission Meeting,
attended by her and former Commissioners Erestain, Jr. and
Valmores. Hence, the Commission En Banc at the time saw no
need to issue a Resolution for the purpose and further because
the CUP being for internal use of the Commission, the practice
had been to issue a memorandum order.58 Moreover, being an
administrative rule that is merely internal in nature, or which
regulates only the personnel of the CSC and not the public, the
CUP need not be published prior to its effectivity.59
In fine, no error or grave abuse of discretion was committed by
the CA in affirming the CSCs ruling that petitioner is guilty of
grave misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, and violation of R.A. No. 6713. The gravity
of these offenses justified the imposition on petitioner of the

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.