CHAPTER ONE: Statutes

IN GENERAL
Laws, generally

A whole body or system of law

Rule of conduct formulated and

legitimate power of the state

Includes RA, PD, EO (president in

power), Presidential issuances
Jurisprudence, ordinances passed by
government units.

made obligatory by
the ex of legislative
(ordinance power)
sanggunians of local

Statutes, generally

An act of legislature (Philippine Commission, Phil.

Legislature, Batasang Pambansa, Congress)

PDs of Marcos during the period of martial law 1973

Constitution

EO of Aquino revolutionary period Freedom Constitution

Congress legislative power

The determination of the legislative policy and its

formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule
of conduct.

Legislative power - plenary except only to such limitations

as are found in the constitution

Public affects the public at large

general applies to the whole state and operates

throughout the state alike upon all people or all of
a class.

Special relates to particular person or things of a

class or to a particular community, individual or
thing.

Local Law operation is confined to a specific

place or locality (e.g municipal ordinance)
Private applies only to a specific person or subject.

Permanent and temporary statutes

Permanent - one whose operation is not limited in duration

but continues until repealed.

Temporary - duration is for a limited period of time fixed in

the statute itself or whose life ceases upon the happening of
an event.
o E.g. statute answering to an emergency
Other classes of statutes

Prospective or retroactive accdg. to application

Declaratory, curative, mandatory, directory, substantive,

remedial, penal accdg. to operation

According to form
o Affirmative
o Negative
Manner of referring to statutes

Public Acts Phil Commission and Phil Legislature 19011935

Commonwealth Acts 1936- 1946

Republic Acts Congress 1946- 1972, 1987 ~

Batas Pambansa Batasang Pambansa

Identification of laws serial number and/or title

ENACTMENT OF STATUTES
Legislative power, generally

Power to make, alter and repeal laws

Vested in congress 1987 Constitution

President 1973 & Freedom (PD and EO respectively)

Sangguniang barangay, bayan, panglungsod, panlalawigan

only within respective jurisdiction ordinances

Administrative or executive officer

Delegated power

Issue rules and regulations to implement a specific

law

Procedural requirements, generally

Provided in the constitution (for Bills, RA)

Provided by congress enactment of laws

Rules of both houses of congress (provided also by the

Constitution)
Passage of bill

Proposed legislative measure introduced by a member of

congress for enactment into law

Shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in

the title

Singed by authors

File with the Secretary of the House

Bills may originate from either lower or upper House

Exclusive to lower house

Appropriation

Revenue/ tariff bills

Bills authorizing increase of public debt

Bills of local application

Private bills

After 3 readings, approval of either house (see Art 6 Sec 26

(1))

Secretary reports the bill for first reading

First reading reading the number and title, referral to the

appropriate committee for study and recommendation

Committee hold public hearings and submits

report and recommendation for calendar for second
reading

Second reading bill is read in full (with amendments

proposed by the committee) unless copies are distributed
and such reading is dispensed with
o Bill will be subject to debates, motions and
amendments
o Bill will be voted on
o A bill approved shall be included in the calendar of
bills for 3rd reading

Third reading bill approved on 2nd reading will be

submitted for final vote by yeas and nays,

Bill approved on the 3rd reading will be transmitted to the

Other House for concurrence (same process as the first
passage)
o If the Other House approves without amendment
it is passed to the President
o If the Other House introduces amendments, and
disagreement arises, differences will be settled by
the Conference Committees of both houses
o Report and recommendation of the 2 Conference
Committees will have to be approved by both
houses in order to be considered pass

President
o Approves and signs
o Vetoes (within 30 days after receipt)
o Inaction

If the President vetoes send back to the House where it

originated with recommendation
o 2/3 of all members approves, it will be sent to the
other house for approval
o 2/3 of the other house approves it shall become a
law
o If president did not act on the bill with in 30 days
after receipt, bill becomes a law

Summary : 3 ways of how a bill becomes a law.

President signs

inaction of president with in 30 days after receipt

vetoed bill is repassed by congress by 2/3 votes of all its

members, each house voting separately.

Appropriations and revenue bills

Same as procedure for the enactment of ordinary bills

Only difference is that they can only originate from the

Lower House but the Senate may propose/ concur with the
amendments

Limitations of passage (as per Constitution) Art 6 Sec. 27 (2)

o congress may not increase the appropriation
recommended by the President XXX
o particular appropriation limited
o procedure for Congress is the same to all other
department/ agencies (procedure for approving
appropriations )
o special appropriations national treasurer/ revenue
proposal
o no transfer of appropriations xxx authority to
augment
o discretionary funds for public purposes
o general appropriations bills when re-enacted
o President my veto any particular item/s in an
appropriation revenue, or tariff bill.
Authentication of bills

Before passed to the President

Indispensable

By signing of Speaker and Senate President

Unimpeachability of legislative journals

Journal of proceedings

Conclusive with respect to other matters that are required by

the Constitution

Disputable with respect to all other matters

By reason of public policy, authenticity of laws should rest

upon public memorials of the most permanent character

Should be public
Enrolled bill

Bills passed by congress authenticated by the Speaker and

the Senate President and approved by the President

Importing absolute verity and is binding on the courts

o It carries on its face a solemn assurance that it was
passed by the assembly by the legislative and
executive departments.

Courts cannot go behind the enrolled act to discover what

really happened
o If only for respect to the legislative and executive
departments

Thus, if there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill
before it was certified by the officer of the assembly and
approved by the Chief Executive, the remedy is by
amendment by enacting a curative legislation not by judicial
decree.

Enrolled bill and legislative journals - Conclusive upon the

courts

If there is discrepancy between enrolled bill and journal,

enrolled bill prevails.
Withdrawal of authentication, effect of

Speaker and Senate President may withdraw if there is

discrepancy between the text of the bill as deliberated and
the enrolled bill.

Effect:
o Nullifies the bill as enrolled

o
o

Losses absolute verity

Courts may consult journals

PARTS OF STATUTES
Title of statute

Mandatory law - Every bill passed by Congress shall

embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof (Art 6, Sec 26 (1) 1987 Constitution)

2 limitations upon legislation

o To refrain from conglomeration, under one statute,
of heterogeneous subjects
o Title of the bill should be couched in a language
sufficient to notify the legislators and the public
and those concerned of the import of the single
subject.
Purposes of requirement (on 1 subject)

Principal purpose: to apprise the legislators of the object,

nature, and scope of the provision of the bill and to prevent
the enactment into law of matters which have not received
the notice, action and study of the legislators.
o To prohibit duplicity in legislation

In sum of the purpose

o To prevent hodgepodge/ log-rolling legislation
o To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature
o To fairly apprise the people, through publication of
the subjects of the legislation
o Used as a guide in ascertaining legislative intent
when the language of the act does not clearly
express its purpose; may clarify doubt or
ambiguity.
How requirement construed

Liberally construed

If there is doubt, it should be resolved against the doubt and

in favor of the constitutionality of the statute
When there is compliance with requirement

Comprehensive enough - Include general object

If all parts of the law are related, and are germane to the
subject matter expressed in the title

Title is valid where it indicates in broad but clear terms, the

nature, scope and consequences of the law and its operations

Title should not be a catalogue or index of the bill

Principles apply to titles of amendatory acts.

o Enough if it states an act to amend a specific
statute

Need not state the precise nature of the amendatory

act.

US Legislators have titles ending with the words and for

other purposes ( US is not subject to the same
Constitutional restriction as that embodied in the Philippine
Constitution)
When requirement not applicable

Apply only to bills which may thereafter be enacted into law

Does not apply to laws in force and existing at the time the
1935 Constitution took effect.

No application to municipal or city ordinances.

Effect of insufficiency of title

Statute is null and void

Where, the subject matter of a statute is not sufficiently

expressed in its title, only so much of the subject matter as is
not expressed therein is void, leaving the rest in force, unless

the invalid provisions are inseparable from the others, in

which case the nullity the former vitiates the latter
Enacting clause

Written immediately after the title

States the authority by which the act is enacted

#1 - Phil Commission By authority of the President of the

US, be it enacted by the US Philippine Commission
#2 - Philippine Legislature- by authority of the US, be it
enacted by the Philippine Legislature
#3 - When #2 became bicameral: Be it enacted by the
Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
legislature assembled and by authority of the same
#4 - Commonwealth- Be it enacted by the National
Assembly of the Philippines
#5 when #4 became bicameral: be it enacted by the Senate
and House of Representatives in congress assembled
same 1946-1972/1987-present.
#6 Batasang Pambansa: Be it enacted by the Batasang
Pambansa in session assembled
#7 PD NOW THEREFORE, I ______ President of the
Philippines, by the powers vested in me by the Constitution
do hereby decree as follows
#8 EO Now, therefore, I, ____ hereby order

Preamble

Defined prefatory statement or explanation or a finding of

facts, reciting the purpose, reason, or occasion for making
the law to which it is prefixed

Found after enacting clause and before the body of the law.

Usually not used by legislations because content of the

preamble is written in the explanatory note.

But PDs and EOs have preambles.

Purview of statute

that part which tells what the law is about

body of statute should embrace only one subject should only

one subject matter, even there provisions should be allied
and germane to the subject and purpose of the bill.

Statue is usually divided into section. w/c contains a single

proposition.

Parts
o short title
o policy section
o definition section
o administrative section
o sections prescribing standards of conduct
o sections imposing sanctions for violation of its
provisions
o transitory provision
o separability clause
o effectivity clause
Separability clause

it states that if any provision of the act is declared invalid,

the remainder shall not be affected thereby.

It is not controlling and the courts may invalidate the whole

statute where what is left, after the void part, is not complete
and workable

Presumption statute is effective as a whole

its effect: to create in the place of such presumption the

opposite of separability.

PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES, RULES AND ORDINANCES

Presidential issuances

are those which the president issues in the exercise of

ordinance power.

i.e. EO, AO (administrative orders), proclamations, MO

(memorandum orders), MC (memorandum circulars), and
general or special orders.

Have force and effect of laws.

EO
o acts of the President providing for rules of a
general or permanent character in the
implementation or execution of constitutional/
statutory powers.
o do not have the force and effect of laws enacted by
congress
o different from EO issued by the President in the ex
of her legislative power during the revolution
Presidential decree under the freedom constitution

AO
o acts of the President which relate to particular
aspects of governmental operations in pursuance of
his duties as administrative head

Proclamations
o acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a
statute or condition of public moment or interest,
upon the existence of which the operation of a
specific law or regulation is made to depend

MO
o acts of the President on matters of administrative
details or of subordinate or temporary interest
which only concern a particular officer or office of
government

MC
o acts of the president on matters relating to internal
administration which the President desires to bring
to the attention of all or some of the departments,
agencies, bureaus, or offices of the government,
for information of compliance

General or Specific Order

o Acts and commands of the President in his
capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP
Supreme Court circulars; rules and regulations

See Art 8, Sec. 5(5) 1987 Constitution

See Art. 6, Sec. 30 1987 Constitution

It has been held that a law which provides that a decision of

a quasi-judicial body be appealable directly to the SC, if
enacted without the advice and concurrence of the SC,
ineffective
o Remedy or applicable procedure go to CA

Rules of Court product of the rule-making power of the SC

o Power to repeal procedural rules
o No power to promulgate rules substantive in nature
(unlike the legislative department)

Substantive rules if it affects or takes away vested rights;

right to appeal

Procedural rules means of implementing existing right;

where to file an appeal for transferring the venue

Rules and regulations issued by the administrative or

executive officers in accordance with and authorized by law,
have the force and effect of law
o Requisites for validity

Rules should be germane to the objects

and purposes of the law

Regulations be not in contradiction with,

but conform to, the standards that the
law prescribes

The be for the sole purpose of carrying

into effect the general provisions of the
law
o Law cannot be restricted or extended
o Law prevails over regulations, if there are
discrepancies
Rule-making power of public administrative agency is a
delegated legislative power if it enlarges or restricts such
statute is invalid
Requisites for delegating a statute by legislative branch to
another branch of government to fill in details, execution,
enforcement, or administration of law. the law must be:
o Complete in itself
o Fix a standard which may be express or implied

Example of standard simplicity and

dignity; public interest; public welfare;
interest of law and order; justice and
equity and substantial merit of the case;
adequate and efficient instruction
Example:
o Change of and/or to or invalid
o Change of may(permissive) to shall
(mandatory) invalid (Grego v COMELEC pp 22)

Administrative rule and interpretation distinguished

Rule makes new law with the force and effect of a valid
law; binding on the courts even if they are not in agreement
with the policy stated therein or with its innate wisdom

Interpretation merely advisory for it is the courts that

finally determine what the law means

Administrative construction is not necessarily binding upon

the courts; it may be set aside by judicial department (if there
is an error of law, or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or
GAD grave abuse of discretion)
Barangay ordinance

Sangguniang barangay smallest legislative body; may pass

an ordinance by majority of all its members; subject to
review by Sangguniang bayan/ panglungsod

Sangguniang bayan/ panglungsod take action on the

ordinance within 30 days from submission; if theres
inaction, it is presumed to be consistent with the municipal
or city ordinance; if inconsistency is found, it will remand to
the Sangguniang barangay
Municipal ordinance

Lodged in the Sangguniang bayan

Majority of the quorum voting, ordinance is passed

Ordinance sent to Mayor within 10 days for approval or

veto; if theres mayors inaction, ordinance is presumed
approved; if vetoed and overridden by 2/3 of all members,
ordinance is approved

Approved ordinance is passed to Sangguniang panlalawigan

for review
o Within 30 days may invalidate in whole or in part
and its action is final; if theres inaction within 30
days, it is deemed valid
City ordinance

Vested in Sangguniang panglungsod

Majority of the quorum voting, ordinance is passed

Submitted to Mayor within 10 days

o Approve
o Veto 2/3 of all members approved
o Inaction deemed approved

If city or component city submit to Sangguniang

panlalawigan for review which shall take action within 30
days, otherwise, it will be deemed valid

Provincial ordinance

Sangguniang panlalawigan majority of quorum voting,

passage of ordinance

Forwarded to the Governor who within 15 days from receipt

shall
o Approve
o Veto 2/3 of all members approved
o Inaction deemed approved
VALIDITY
Presumption of constitutionality

Every statute is presumed valid

o Lies on how a law is enacted
o Due respect to the legislative who passed and
executive who approved
o Responsibility of upholding the constitution rests
not on the courts alone but on the legislative and
executive branches as well

Courts cannot inquire into the wisdom or propriety of laws

To declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of the law

to the constitution must be clear and unequivocal

All reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the

constitutionality of law; to doubt is to sustain

Final arbiter of unconstitutionality of law is the Supreme

Court EN BANC (majority who took part and voted thereon)

Nonetheless, trial courts have jurisdiction to initially decide

the issue of constitutionality of a law in appropriate cases
Requisites for exercise of judicial power

The existence of an appropriate case

Interest personal and substantial by the party raising the

constitutional question

Plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity

Necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in

order to decide the case
Appropriate case

Bona fide case one which raises a justiciable controversy

Judicial power is limited only to real, actual, earnest, and

vital controversy

Controversy is justiciable when it refers to matter which is

appropriate for court review; pertains to issues which are
inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds
recognized by law

Courts cannot rule on political questions questions which

are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom (v.
legality) of a particular act or measure being assailed
o separation of powers
o However, Constitution expands the concept of
judicial review judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there
has been GAD amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the branch or the part of any
branch/ instrumentality of the Government
Standing to sue

Legal standing or locus standi personal/ substantial interest

in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of governmental act that is being
challenged

interest an interest in issue affected by the decree

Citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he

has suffered some actual or threatened concrete injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government

E.g. taxpayer when it is shown that public funds

have been illegally disbursed
Member of the Senate or of the House has legal standing to
question the validity of the Presidential veto or a condition
imposed on an item in an appropriations bills
SC may, in its discretion, take cognizance of a suit which
does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing
o E.g. calling by the President for the deployment of
the Philippine Marines to join the PNP in visibility
patrols around the metro
o

When to raise constitutionality

xxx at the earliest possible opportunity i.e. in the pleading

it may be raised in a motion for reconsideration / new trial in

the lower court; or

in criminal cases at any stage of the proceedings or on

appeal

in civil cases, where it appears clearly that a determination of

the question is necessary to a decision, and in cases where it
involves the jurisdiction of the court below

Necessity of deciding constitutionality

where the constitutional question is of paramount public

interest and time is of the essence in the resolution of such
question, adherence to the strict procedural standard may be
relaxed and the court, in its discretion, may squarely decide
the case

where the question of validity, though apparently has

become moot, has become of paramount interest and there is
undeniable necessity for a ruling, strong reasons of public
policy may demand that its constitutionality be resolved
Test of constitutionality

is what the Constitution provides in relation to what can

or may be done under the statute, and not by what it has been
done under it.
o If not within the legislative power to enact
o If vague unconstitutional in 2 respects

Violates due process

Leaves
law
enforcers
unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions
o Where theres a change of circumstances i.e.
emergency laws

Ordinances (test of validity are):

o It must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute
o It must not be unfair or oppressive
o It must not be partial or discriminatory
o It must not prohibit but may regulate trade
o It must be general and consistent with public
policy
o It must not be unreasonable
Effects of unconstitutionality

It confers no rights

Imposes no duties

Affords no protection

Creates no office

In general, inoperative as if it had never been passed

2 views:
o Orthodox view unconstitutional act is not a law;
decision affect ALL
o Modern view less stringent; the court in passing
upon the question of unconstitutionality does not
annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict
with the Constitution; decisions affects parties

ONLY and no judgment against the statute;

opinion of court may operate as a precedent; it
does not repeal, supersede, revoke, or annul the
statute
Invalidity due to change of conditions

Emergency laws

It is deemed valid at the time of its enactment as an exercise

of police power

It becomes invalid only because the change of conditions

makes its continued operation violative of the Constitution,
and accordingly, the declaration of its nullity should only
affect the parties involved in the case and its effects applied
prospectively
Partial invalidity

General rule: that where part of a statute is void as repugnant

to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid
portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be
enforced

Exception that when parts of a statute are so mutually

dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations,
inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant
a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the
nullity of one part will vitiate the rest such as in the case of
Tatad v Sec of Department of Energy and Antonio v.
COMELEC
EFFECT AND OPERATION
When laws take effect

Art 2 CC - xxx laws to be effective must be published either

in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the country
o The effectivity provision refers to all statutes,
including those local and private, unless there are
special laws providing a different effectivity
mechanism for particular statutes

Sec 18 Chapter 5 Book 1 of Administrative Code

Effectivity of laws
o default rule 15-day period
o must be published either in the OG or newspaper
of general circulation in the country; publication
must be full

The clause unless it is otherwise provided solely refers to

the 15-day period and not to the requirement of publication
When Presidential issuances, rules and regulations take effect

The Presidents ordinance power includes the authority to

issue EO, AO, Proclamations, MO, MC and general or
specific orders

Requirement of publication applies except if it is merely

interpretative or internal in nature not concerning the public

2 types:
o Those whose purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation or to fill
in the details of a statute; requires publication
o Those which are merely interpretative in nature or
internal; does not require publication

Requirements of filing (1987 Administrative Code):

o Every agency shall file with the UP Law Center 3
certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules
in force on the date of effectivity of this Code
which are not filed within 3 months from that date
shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction
against any party/ persons

When local ordinance takes effect

Unless otherwise stated, the same shall take effect 10 days

from the date a copy is posted in a bulletin board at the
entrance of the provincial capitol or city, municipality or
barangay hall, AND in at least 2 other conspicuous places in
the local government unit concerned

The secretary to the Sangguinian concerned shall cause the

posting not later than 5 days after approval; text will be
disseminated in English or Tagalog; the secretary to the
Sangguinian concerned shall record such fact in a book kept
for that purpose, stating the dates of approval and posting

Gist of ordinance with penal sanctions shall be published in a

newspaper of general circulation within the respective
province concerned; if NO newspaper of general circulation
in the province, POSTING shall be made in all
municipalities and cities of the province where the
Sanggunian of origin is situated

For highly urbanized and independent component cities,

main features of the ordinance, in addition to the posting
requirement shall be published once in a local newspaper. In
the absence of local newspaper, in any newspaper of general
circulation
o Highly urbanized city minimum population of
200,000 and with latest annual income of at least
50M Php
Statutes continue in force until repealed

Permanent/ indefinite law once established continues until

changed by competent legislative power. It is not changed
by the change of sovereignty, except that of political nature

Temporary in force only for a limited period, and they

terminate upon expiration of the term stated or upon
occurrence of certain events; no repealing statute is needed
Territorial and personal effect of statutes

All people within the jurisdiction of the Philippines

Manner of computing time

See Art. 13 CC

Where a statute requires the doing of an act within a

specified number of days, such as ten days from notice, it
means ten calendar days and NOT ten working days

E.g. 1 year from Oct. 4, 1946 is Oct. 4, 1947

If last day falls on a Sunday or holiday, the act can still be

done the following day

Principle of exclude the first, include the last DOES NOT

APPLY to the computation of the period of prescription of a
crime, in which rule, is that if the last day in the period of
prescription of a felony falls on a Sunday or legal holiday,
the information concerning said felony cannot be filed on the
next working day, as the offense has by then already
prescribed

CHAPTER TWO: Construction and Interpretation

NATURE AND PURPOSE
Construction defined

Construction is the art or process of discovering and

expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the
law, where that intention rendered doubtfully reason of
ambiguity in its language or of the fact that the given case is
not explicitly provided for in the law.

Construction is drawing of warranted conclusions beyond

direct expression of the text expressions which are in spirit
though not within the text.
xxx inevitably, there enters into the construction of statutes
the play of JUDICIAL JUDGMENT within the limits of the
relevant legislative materials
it involves the EXERCISE OF CHOICE BY THE
JUDICIARY

Construction and interpretation distinguished

They are so alike in practical results and so are used

interchangeably; synonymous.
Construction
- process of drawing warranted
conclusions
not
always
included in direct expressions,
or determining the application
of words to facts in litigation

Interpretation
- art of finding the true
meaning and sense of any form
of words

Rules of construction, generally

Rules of statutory construction are tools used to ascertain

legislative intent.

NOT rules of law but mere axioms of experience

In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to know the

rules of statutory construction, in case of doubt, be construed
in accordance with the settled principles of interpretation.

Legislature sometimes adopts rules of statutory construction

as part of the provisions of the statute: - see examples page
49-50

Legislature also defines to ascertain the meaning of vague,

broad words/ terms
Purpose of object of construction

The purpose is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the

law.

The object of all judicial interpretation of a statute is to

determine legislative intent, either expressly or impliedly, by
the language used; to determine the meaning and will of the
law making body and discover its true interpretations of law.
Legislative intent, generally

is the essence of the law

Intent is the spirit which gives life to legislative enactment. It

must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be
consistent with the strict letter of the statute. It has been held,
however, that that the ascertainment of legislative intent
depend more on a determination of the purpose and object of
the law.

Intent is sometimes equated with the word spirit.

While the terms purpose, meaning, intent, and spirit are

oftentimes interchangeably used by the courts, not entirely
synonymous
Legislative purpose

A legislative purpose is the reason why a particular statute

was enacted by legislature.

Legislation is an active instrument and government which,

for the purpose of interpretation means that laws have ends
to be achieved
Legislative meaning

Legislative meaning is what the law, by its language, means.

What it comprehends;

What it covers or embraces;

What its limits or confines are.

Intent and Meaning synonymous

If there is ambiguity in the language used in a statute, its

purpose may indicate the meaning of the language and lead
to what the legislative intent is

Graphical illustration
Federation of Free Farmers v CA.

RA No. 809 Sec. 1 In absence of a written milling

agreements between the majority of the planters and the
millers, the unrefined sugar as well as all by-products shall
be divided between them

RA 809 Sec. 9 The proceeds of any increase in

participation granted by the planters under this act and above
their present share shall be divided between the planter and
his laborer in the proportion of 60% laborer and 40%
planter

To give literal import in interpreting the two section will

defeat the purpose of the Act

The purpose:
o Continuous production of sugar
o To grant the laborers a share in the increased
participation of planters in the sugar produce

The legislative intent is, thus to make the act operative

irrespective of whether there exists a milling agreement
between central and the sugar planters.
Matters inquired into in construing a statute

It is not enough to ascertain the intention of the statute; it is

also necessary to see whether the intention or meaning has
been expressed in such a way as to give it legal effect or
validity

Thus: The object of inquiry is not only to know what the

legislature used sufficiently expresses that meaning. The
legal act is made up of 2 elements:
o internal intention
o external- expression

Failure of the latter may defeat the former

Where legislative intent is ascertained

The primary source of legislative intent is the statute itself.

If the statute as a whole fails to indicate the legislative intent

because of ambiguity, the court may look beyond the statute
such as:
o Legislative history what was in the legislative
mind at the time the statute was enacted; what the
circumstances were; what evil was meant to be
redressed
o Purpose of the statute the reason or cause which
induced the enactment of the law, the mischief to
be suppressed, and the policy which dictated its
passage
o when all these means fail, look into the effect of
the law.

If the 3rd means (effect of the law) is first

used, it will be judicial legislation
POWER TO CONSTRUE
Construction is a judicial function

It is the court that has the final word as to what the law
means.

It construes laws as it decide cases based on fact and the law

involved

Laws are interpreted in the context of a peculiar factual

situation of each case

Circumstances of time, place, event, person and particularly

attendant circumstances and actions before, during and after
the operative fact have taken their totality so that justice can
be rationally and fairly dispensed.
Moot and academic
o Purpose has become stale
o No practical relief can be granted
o Relief has no practical effect
General rule (on mootness) dismiss the case
o Exception:

If capable of repetition, yet evading

review

Public interest requires its resolution

Rendering decision on the merits would

be of practical value

Legislative cannot overrule judicial construction

It cannot preclude the courts from giving the statute different

interpretation

Legislative enact laws

Executive- to execute laws

Judicial- interpretation and application

If the legislature may declare what a law means it will

cause confusionit will be violative of the fundamental
principles of the constitution of separation powers.

Legislative construction is called resolution or declaratory

act
Endencia v David

Explains why legislative cannot overrule Supreme Courts

decision
Perfecto v. Meer

Art. 8 Sec. 9 1935 Constitution SCs interpretation: shall

receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office
exempt from income tax

Legislative passed RA 590 Sec. 13 no salary whenever

received by any public officer of the Republic shall be
considered exempt from the income tax, payment of which is
hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation
fixed by the Constitution or by law

Source of confusion

Violative of principle on separation of powers

RA 590 Sec 13 unconstitutional

Art 8 Sec. 9 1935 repealed by Art. 15 Sec. 6 1973

Constitution no salary or any form of emolument of any
public officer or employee, including constitutional officers,
shall be exempt from payment of income tax

Thus, judiciary is not exempt from payment of tax anymore

When judicial interpretation may be set aside

Interpretations may be set aside. The interpretation of a

statute or a constitutional provision by the courts is not so
sacrosanct as to be beyond modification or nullification.

The Supreme Court itself may, in an appropriate case change

or overrule its previous construction.

The rule that the Supreme Court has the final word in the
interpretation or construction of a stature merely means that
the legislature cannot, by law or resolution, modify or annul
the judicial construction without modifying or repealing the
very statute which has been the subject of construction. It
can, and it has done so, by amending or repealing the statute,
the consequence of which is that the previous judicial
construction of the statute is modified or set aside
accordingly.

When court may construe statute

The court may construe or interpret a statute under the

condition that THERE IS DOUBT OR AMBIGUITY

Ambiguity a condition of admitting 2 or more meanings.

Susceptible of more than one interpretation.

Only when the law is ambiguous or doubtful of meaning

may the court interpret or construe its intent.
Court may not construe where statute is clear

A statute that is clear and unambiguous is not susceptible of

interpretations.

First and fundamental duty of court to apply the law

Construction very last function which the court should

exercise

Law is clear no room for interpretation, only room for

application

Courts cannot enlarge or limit the law if it is clear and free

from ambiguity (even if law is harsh or onerous

A meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected

in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein
by construction
Manikan v. Tanodbayan

Sec. 7 PD 1716-A sole police authority of EPZA

officials may not be construed as an exception to, or
limitation on, the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate
complaints for violation of the anti-graft law committed by
the EPZA officials

EPZAs power not exclusive; sole refers to police

authority not emplyed to describe other power
Lapid v. CA

Issue: whether or not the decision of the Ombudsman

imposing a penalty of suspension of one year without pay is
immediately executory

Administrative Code and LGC not suppletory to

Ombudsman Act

These three laws are related or deal with public officers, but
are totally different statutes

An administrative agency tasked to implement a statute may

not construe it by expanding its meaning where its provisions
are clear and unambiguous

Land Bank v. CA

DAR interpreted deposits to include trust accounts

SC held that deposits is limited only to cash and LBP

bonds
Libanan v. HRET

Issue: whether ballots not signed at the back by the chairman

of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) are spurious, since
it violated Sec. 24 RA 7166

Held: not spurious; only renders the BEI accountable

Rulings of Supreme Court part of legal system

Art. 8 CC Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the

laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of
the Philippines

Legis interpretato legis vim obtinet authoritative

interpretation of the SC of a statute acquires the force of law
by becoming a part thereof as of the date of its enactment ,
since the courts interpretation merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the statute thus
construed intends to effectuate

Stare decisis et non quieta novere when the SC has once

laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of

facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future

casese where the facts are substantially the same
o For stability and certainty
Supreme Court becomes, to the extent applicable, the criteria
that must control the actuations not only of those called upon
to abide thereby but also of those duty-bound to enforce
obedience thereto.
SC rulings are binding on inferior courts

Judicial rulings have no retroactive effect

Lex prospicit not respicit - the law looks forward, not

backward

Rationale: Retroactive application of a law usually divest

rights that have already become vested or impairs he
obligations of contract and hence is unconstitutional.
Peo v. Jabinal

Peo v Macarandang peace officer exempted from issuance

of license of firearms included a secret agent hired by a
governor

Peo. v. Mapa abandoned doctrine of Macarandang in 1967

The present case, Jabinal was arraigned while the

Macarandang Doctrine was still prevailing, however, the
decision was promulgated when the Mapa doctrine was in
place

The Court held that Jabinal is acquitted using stare decisis

doctrine and retroactivity doctrine
Co. v. CA

On BP 22, Co is acquitted in relying on the Circular issued;

Que doctrine, which convicted Que under BP 22, was not
given retroactive application
Roa v. Collector of Customs

Used jus soli (place of birth)

SC favored jus sanguinis (by blood)

However, the abandonment of the principle of jus soli did

not divest the citizenship of those who, by virtue of the
principle before its rejection, became of were declared
citizens of the Philippines
Benzonan v. CA

Issue: when to count the 5-year period to repurchase land

granted CA 141

Monge v Angeles (1957) and Tupas v Damaso (1984) from

the date of conveyance or foreclosure sale

Belisario v. IAC (1988) from the period after the expiration

of the 1-year period of repurchase

The SC held that the doctrine that should apply is that which
was enunciated in Monge and Tupas because the transactions
involved took place prior to Belisario and not that which was
laid down in the latter case which should be applied
prospectively
Court may issue guidelines in construing statute

In construing a statute, the enforcement of which may tread

on sensitive areas of constitutional rights, the court may
issue guidelines in applying the statute, not to enlarge or
restrict it but to clearly delineate what the law is.
Peo. v. Ferrer

What acts that may be considered liable under the AntiSubversion Act
Morales v. Enrile

Rights of a person under custodial investigation

RP v. CA/ Molina

Guidelines for ascertaining psychological incapacity of an

erring spouse in a void marriage under Art. 36 FC
LIMITATIONS ON POWER TO CONSTRUE
Courts may not enlarge nor restrict statutes

Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they
think should be in it or to supply what they the legislature
would have supplied if its intention had been called to the
omission.

They should not by construction, revise even the most

arbitrary or unfair action of the legislature, nor rewrite the
law to conform to what they think should be the law.

Neither should the courts construe statutes which are

perfectly vague for it violates due process
o Failure to accord persons fair notice of the conduct
to avoid
o Leave law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions

2 leading stars on judicial construction

o Good faith
o commonsense

an utterly vague act on its face cannot be clarified by either a

saving clause or by construction
Courts not to be influenced by questions of wisdom

Courts do not sit to resolve the merit of conflicting theories

Courts do not pass upon question of wisdom, justice or

expediency of legislation, for its not within their province to
supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of
common sense.

The court merely interpret regardless of whether or not they

wise or salutary.
CHAPTER THREE: Aids to Construction
IN GENERAL
Generally

Where the meaning of a statue is ambiguous, the court is

warranted in availing itself of all illegitimate aids to
construction in order that it can ascertain the true intent of
the statute.

The aids to construction are those found in the printed page

of the statute itself; know as the intrinsic aids, and those
extraneous facts and circumstances outside the printed page,
called extrinsic aids.
Title

It is used as an aid, in case of doubt in its language to its

construction and to ascertaining legislative will.
If the meaning of the statute is obscure, courts may resort to
the title to clear the obscurity.
The title may indicate the legislative intent to extend or
restrict the scope of law, and a statute couched in a language
of doubtful import will be constructed to conform to the
legislative intent as disclosed in its title.
Resorted as an aid where there is doubt as to the meaning of
the law or as to the intention of the legislature in enacting it,
and not otherwise.
Serve as a guide to ascertaining legislative intent carries
more weight in this jurisdiction because of the constitutional
requirement that every bill shall embrace only one subject
who shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The constitutional injunction makes the title an indispensable
part of a statute.

Baguio v. Marcos

The question raised is when to count the 40 yr period to file a

petition for reopening of cadastral proceedings (to settle and
adjudicate the titles to the various lots embraced in the
survey) as authorized by RA 931 covering the lands that
have been or about to be declared land of public domain, by
virtue of judicial proceedings instituted w/in the 40 years
next preceding the approval of this act.

The question is asked if the proceeding be reopened

originally instituted in court April 12, 1912 or November 25,
1922, the counted date form which the decision therein
rendered became final. Petition was filed on July 25, 1961

Title of the Law An Act to authorize the filing in the proper

court under certain conditions of certain claims of title to
parcels of land that have been declared public land, by virtue
of the approval of this act.

There was an apparent inconsistency between the title and

body of the law.

It ruled that the starting date to count the period is the date
the final decision was rendered.

It recites that it authorizes court proceedings of claims to

parcels of land declared public by virtue of judicial decisions
rendered within forty years next preceding the approval of
this act.

That title written in capital letters by Congress itself; such

kind of title then is not to be classed with words or titles used
by compilers of statues because it is the legislature speaking.

Words by virtue of judicial decisions rendered in the title of

the law stand in equal importance to the phrase in Sections 1
thereof by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted.

The court ruled that examining Act no. 2874 in detail was
intended to apply to public lands only for the title of the act,
always indicative of legislative intent.

No bill shall embrace more than one subject, which subject

shall be expressed in the title of the bill, the words and for
other purposes when found in the title have been held to be
without force or effect whatsoever and have been altogether
discarded in construing the Act.
Ebarle v. Sucaldito

The issue is raised whether Executive order no. 264 entitled

Outlining the procedure by which complaints charging
government officials and employees with commission of
irregularities should be guided applies to criminal actions,
to the end that no preliminary investigation thereof can be
undertaken or information file in court unless there is
previous compliance with the executive order.

EO only applies to administrative and not to criminal

complaints.

The very title speaks of commission of irregularities.

When resort to title not authorized

The text of the statute is clear and free from doubt, it is

improper to resort to its title to make it obscure.

The title may be resorted to in order to remove, but not to

create doubt.
Preamble

It is a part of the statute written immediately after its title,

which states the purpose, reason for the enactment of the
law.

Usually express in whereas clauses.

Generally omitted in statutes passed by:

Phil. Commission

Phil. Legislature

National Assembly

Congress of the Phil

Batasang Pambansa

These legislative bodies used the explanatory note to explain

the reasons for the enactment of statutes.
Extensively used if Presidential decrees issued by the
President in the exercise of his legislative power.
When the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation, much
less prevail over its text. Nor can be used as basis for giving
a statute a meaning.
When the statute is ambiguous, the preamble can be resorted
to clarify the ambiguity.
Preamble is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the
lawmakers as to the purpose is achieved, the mischief to be
remedied, and the object to be accomplished, by the
provisions of the legislature.
May decide the proper construction to be given to the statute.
May restrict to what otherwise appears to be a broad scope of
law.
It may express the legislative intent to make the law apply
retroactively in which case the law has to be given
retroactive effect.

Illustration of rule
People v. Purisima

A person was charged w/ violation of PD 9 which penalizes,

among others, the carrying outside of ones residence any
bladed, blunt or pointed weapon not used as a necessary tool
or implement for livelihood, with imprisonment ranging
from five to ten years.

Question rose whether the carrying of such weapon should

be in relation to subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless
violence, criminality, chaos or public disorder as a necessary
element of the crime.

The mere carrying of such weapon outside ones residence is

sufficient to constitute a violation of the law

Pursuant to the preamble which spelled out the events that

led to the enactment of the decree the clear intent and spirit
of the decree is to require the motivation mentioned in the
preamble as in indispensable element of the crime.

The severity of the penalty for the violation of the decree

suggests that it is a serious offense, which may only be
justified by associating the carrying out of such bladed of
blunt weapon with any of the purposes stated in its preamble.
Peo v. Echavez

Issue: whether a person who squatted on a pastoral land

could be held criminally liable for the violation of PD 772
any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or
threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the
land owner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the
property of the latter against his will for residential,
commercial or any other purposes.

The decree was promulgated to solve the squatting problem

which according to its preamble is still a major problem in
urban communities all over the country and because many
persons and entities found to have been unlawfully
occupying public and private lands belong to the affluent
class.

The court said that crime may only be committed in urban

communities and not in agricultural and pastural lands
because the preamble of the decree shows that it was
intended to apply for squatting in urban lands, more
particularly to illegal constructions.
Context of whole text

To ascertain legislative intent is the statute itself taken as a

whole and in relation to one another considering the whole

context of the statute and not from an isolated part of the

provision.
The meaning dictated by the context prevails.
Every section, provision, or clause of the statute must be
expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the
effect contemplated by the legislature.

Punctuation marks

Semi- colon used to indicate a separation in the relation of

the thought, what follows must have a relation to the same
matter it precedes it.

Comma and semi- colon are use for the same purpose to
divide sentences, but the semi colon makes the division a
little more pronounce. Both are not used to introduce a new
idea.

Punctuation marks are aids of low degree and can never

control against the intelligible meaning of written words.

An ambiguity of a statute which may be partially or wholly

solved by a punctuation mark may be considered in the
construction of a statute.

The qualifying effect of a word or phrase may be confined to

its last antecedent if the latter is separated by a comma from
the other antecedents.

An argument based on punctuation is not persuasive.

Illustrative examples
Florentino v. PNB

who may be willing to accept the same for such settlement

this implies discretion

SC held: only the last antecedent any citizen of the

Philippines or any association or corporation organized
under the laws of the Philippines

xxx pursuant to which backpay certificate-holders can

compel government-owned banks to accept said certificates
for payment of their obligations subsisting at the time of the
amendatory act was approved
Nera v. Garcia

if the charge against such subordinate or employee involves

dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of his duty

dishonesty and oppression need not be committed in

the course of the performance of duty by the person charges
Peo. v. Subido

Subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency qualifies both

non-payment of indemnity and non-payment of fine
Capitalization of letters

An aid of low degree in the construction of statute.

Headnotes or epigraphs

Secondary aids

They are prefixed to sections, or chapters of a statute for

ready reference or classification.

Not entitled too much weight, and inferences drawn there

from are of little value and they can never control the plain
terms of the enacting clauses, for they are not part of the law.

The provisions of each article are controlling upon the

subject thereof and operate as a general rule for settling such
questions as are embraced therein.

When the text of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is

neither necessity nor propriety to resort to the headings or
epigraphs of a section for interpretation of the text,
especially when they are mere reference aids indicating the
general nature of the text that follows.

Lingual text

Rule is that, unless provided, where a statute is promulgated

in English and Spanish, English shall govern but in case of
ambiguity, Spanish may be consulted to explain the English
text.

A statute is officially promulgated in Spanish or in English,

or in Filipino

In the interpretation of a law or administrative issuance

promulgated in all the official languages, the English text
shall control, unless otherwise provided.
Intent or spirit of law

It is the law itself.

Controlling factor, leading star and guiding light in the
application and interpretation of a statute.
A statute must be according to its spirit or intent.
The courts cannot assume an intent in no way expressed and
then construe the statute to accomplish the supposed
intention; otherwise they would pass beyond the bounds of
judicial power to usurp legislative power.

Policy of law

Should be given effect by the judiciary.

One way to accomplish this mandate is to give a statute of

doubtful meaning, a construction that will promote public
policy.
Tinio v. Francis

Policy of the law to conserve the land of the homesteader

xxx not be subject to encumbrance/ alienation from the date

of the approval of the application and for a term of 5 years
from and after the date of the issuance of the patent or grant
o from the ORDER for the issuance of patent
o if literal interpretation is to be used, policy will be
defeated
Cajiuat v. Mathay

policy against double pensions for the same services

a law which grants retirable employees certain gratuity in

addition to other benefits which they are entitled under
existing laws CANNOT be construed as to authorize the
grant of double gratuity

other benefits may be

o Refund of contributions
o Payment of the money value of accumulated
vacation and sick leaves

Purpose of law or mischief to be suppressed

Intended to be removed or suppressed and the causes which

induced the enactment of the law are important factors to be
considered in this construction.
o Purpose or object of the law
o Mischief intended to be removed
o Causes which induced the enactment of the law

Must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose

projected in the statute.

The purpose of the general rule is not determinative of the

proper construction to be given to the exceptions.

Purpose of statute is more important than the rules of

grammar and logic in ascertaining the meaning
Dictionaries

A statute does not define word or phrases used.

Generally define words in their natural plain and ordinary

acceptance and significance.

Consequences of various constructions

Inquired as an additional aid to interpretation.

A construction of a statute should be rejected that will cause

injustice and hardship, result in absurdity, defeat legislative
intent or spirit, preclude accomplishment of legislative
purpose or object, render certain words or phrases a
surplusage, nullify the statute or make any of its provisions
nugatory.
Presumptions

Based on logic, experience, and common sense, and in the

absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, doubts as to
the proper and correct construction of a statute will be
resolved in favor of that construction which is in accord with
the presumption on the matter.
o Constitutionality of a statute
o Completeness
o Prospective operation
o Right and justice
o Effective, sensible, beneficial and reasonable
operation as a whole
o Against inconsistency and implied repeal

unnecessary changes in law

impossibility

absurdity

injustice and hardship

inconvenience

ineffectiveness.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Generally

A statute is susceptible of several interpretations or where

there is ambiguity in the language, there is no better means
of ascertaining the will and intention of the legislature than
that which is afforded by the history of the statute.
What constitutes legislative history

History of a statute refers to all its antecedents from its

inception until its enactment into law.

Its history proper covers the period and the steps done from
the time the bill is introduced until it is finally passed by the
legislature.

What it includes:
o Presidents message if the bill is enacted in
response thereto,
o The explanatory note accompanying the bill
o Committee reports of legislative investigations
o Public hearings on the subject of the bill
o Sponsorship speech
o Debates and deliberations concerning the bill
o Amendments and changes in phraseology in which
it undergoes before final approval thereof.
o If the statute is based from a revision, a prior
statute, the latters practical application and
judicial construction,
o Various amendments it underwent
o Contemporary events at the
Presidents message to legislature

The president shall address the congress at the opening of its

regular session or appear before it at any other time.

Usually contains proposed legal measures.

Indicates his thinking on the proposed legislation, when

enacted into law, follows his line of thinking on the matter.

Explanatory note

A short exposition of explanation accompanying a proposed

legislation by its author or proponent.

Where there is ambiguity in a statute or where a statute is

susceptible of more than one interpretation, courts may resort
to the explanatory note to clarify the ambiguity and ascertain
the purpose or intent of the statute.

Used to give effect to the purpose or intent as disclosed in its

explanatory note.

A statute affected or changed an existing law and the

explanatory note to the bill which has eventually enacted into
a law states that the purpose is too simply to secure the
prompt action on a certain matter by the officer concerned
and not to change the existing law; the statute should be
construed to carry out such purpose.

It may be used as a basis for giving a statute a meaning that

is inconsistent with what is expressed in the text of the
statute.
Legislative debates, views and deliberations

Courts may avail to themselves the actual proceedings of the

legislative body to assist in determining the construction of a
statute of doubtful meaning.

There is doubt to what a provision of a statute means, that

meaning which was put to the provision during the
legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may be
adopted.

Views expressed are as to the bills purpose, meaning or

effect are not controlling in the interpretation of the law.

It is impossible to determine with authority what

construction was put upon an act by the members of the
legislative body that passed the bill.

The opinions expressed by legislators in the course of

debates concerning the application of existing laws are not
also given decisive weight, especially where the legislator
was not a member of the assembly that enacted the said laws.

When a statute is clear and free from ambiguity, courts will

not inquire into the motives which influence the legislature
or individual members, in voting for its passage; no indeed
as to the intention of the draftsman, or the legislators, so far
as it has not been expressed into the act.
Reports of commissions

Commissions are usually formed to compile and collate all

laws on a particular subject and to prepare the draft of the
proposed code.
Prior laws from which statute is based

Courts are permitted to prior laws on the same subject and to

investigate the antecedents of the statute involved.

This is applicable in the interpretation of codes, revised or

compiled statutes, for the prior law which have been
codified, compiled or revised will show the legislative
history that will clarify the intent of the law or shed light on
the meaning and scope of the codified or revised statute.
Peo. v. Manantan

Issue: whether or not justice of peace is included

Contention of Manantan, who is a justice of peace, is that the

omission of justice of peace revealed the intention of the
legislature to exclude such from its operation

Held: contention denied. In holding that the word judge

includes justice of peace, the Court said that a review of
the history of the Revised Election Code will help justify and
clarify the above conclusion

Director of Lands v. Abaya

When to count the 10-year period, either from the date the
decision was rendered or from the date judicial proceedings
instituted in cadastral cases

Held: court resolved the issue by referring to 4 older laws

which have in common that counting of the period starts
from the date of the institution of the judicial proceeding and
not from the date the judgment is rendered
Salaysay v. Castro

Actually holding ~ lastly elected

Thus, a vice mayor acting as mayor is not included in the

provision
Change in phraseology by amendments

Intents to change the meaning of the provision.

A statute has undergone several amendments, each

amendment using different phraseology, the deliberate
selection of language differing from that of the earlier act on
the subject indicates that a change in meaning of the law was
intended and courts should so construe that statute as to
reflect such change in meaning.
Commissioner of Customs v. CTA

national port (new law) not the same as any port (old
law); otherwise, national will be a surplusage
Amendment by deletion

Deletion of certain words or phrases in a statute indicates

that the legislature intended to change the meaning of the
statute, for the presumption is that the legislation would not
have made the deletion had the intention been not effect a
change in its meaning.

A statute containing a provision prohibiting the doing of a

certain thing is amended by deleting such provision.
Gloria v. CA

Issue: whether a public officer or employee, who has been

preventively suspended pending investigation of the
administrative charges against him, is entitled to his salary
and other benefits during such preventive suspension

Held: Court answered in the negative because such provision

with regard to payment of salaries during suspension was
deleted in the new law
Buenaseda v. Flavier

Ombusman and his deputy can only preventively suspend

respondents in administrative cases who are employed in his
office, and not those who are employees in other department
or offices of the government
Exceptions to the rule (of amendment by deletion)

An amendment of the statue indicates a change in meaning

from that which the statute originally had applies only when
the intention is clear to change the previous meaning of the
old law.

Rules dont apply when the intent is clear that the

amendment is precisely to plainly express the construction of
the act prior to its amendment because its language is not
sufficiently expressive of such construction.

Frequently, words do not materially affect the sense will be

omitted from the statute as incorporated in the code or
revised statute, or that some general idea will be expressed in
brief phrases.

Adopted statutes

Foreign statutes are adopted in this country or from local

laws are patterned form parts of the legislative history of the
latter.

Local statutes are patterned after or copied from those of

another country, the decision of the courts in such country
construing those laws are entitled to great weight in the
interpretation of such local statutes.
Limitations of rule

A statute which has been adopted from that of a foreign

country should be construed in accordance with the
construction given it in the country of origin is not without
limitations.
Principles of common law

Known as Anglo-American jurisprudence which is no in

force in this country, save only insofar as it is founded on
sound principles applicable to local conditions and is not in
conflict with existing law, nevertheless, many of the
principles of the common law have been imported into this
jurisdiction as a result of the enactment of laws and
establishment of institutions similar to those of the US.
Conditions at time of enactment

In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have

taken into account the existing conditions of things at the
time of its enactment.

In the interpretations of a statute, consider the physical

conditions of the country and the circumstances then obtain
understanding as to the intent of the legislature or as to the
meaning of the statute.
History of the times

A court may look to the history of the times, examining the

state of things existing when the statute was enacted.

A statute should not be construed in a spirit as if it were a

protoplasm floating around in space.

In determining the meaning, intent, and purpose of a law or

constitutional provision, the history of the times of which I
grew and to which it may be rationally supposed to bear
some direct relationship, the evils intended to be remedied
and the good to be accomplished are proper subjects of
inquiry.

Law being a manifestation of social culture and progress

must be interpreted taking into consideration the stage of
such culture and progress including all the concomitant
circumstances.

Law is not a watertight compartment sealed or shut off from

the contact with the drama of life which unfolds before our
eyes.
CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION
Generally

Are the constructions placed upon statutes at the time of, or

after their enactment by the executive, legislative or judicial
authorities, as well as by those who involve in the process of
legislation are knowledgeable of the intent and purpose of
the law.

Contemporary construction is strongest in law.

Executive construction, generally; kinds of

Is the construction placed upon the statute by an executive or

administrative officer.

Three types of interpretation

o Construction by an executive or administrative
officer directly called to implement the law.

o
o

Construction by the secretary of justice in his

capacity as the chief legal adviser of the
government.
Handed down in an adversary proceeding in the
form of a ruling by an executive officer exercising
quasi-judicial power.

Weight accorded to contemporaneous construction

Where there is doubt as to the proper interpretation of a

statute, the uniform construction placed upon it by the
executive or administrative officer charged with its
enforcement will be adopted if necessary to resolve the
doubt.

True expression of the legislative purpose, especially if the

construction is followed for a considerable period of time.
Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. CA

Reasons for why interpretation of an administrative agency

is generally accorded great respect
o Emergence of multifarious needs of a modernizing
society
o Also relates to experience and growth of
specialized capabilities by the administrative
agency
o They have the competence, expertness, experience
and informed judgment, and the fact that they
frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret
Philippine Sugar Central v. Collector of Customs

Issue: whether the government can legally collect duties as

a charge for wharfage required by a statute upon all articles
exported through privately-owned wharves

Held: the court reasoned in the affirmative by saying the

language of the Act could have been made more specific and
certain, but in view of its history, its long continuous
construction, and what has been done and accomplished by
and under it, we are clearly of the opinion that the
government is entitled to have and receive the money in
question, even though the sugar was shipped from a private
wharf
Weight accorded to usage and practice

Common usage and practice under the statute, or a course of

conduct indicating a particular undertaking of it, especially
where the usage has been acquiesced in by all the parties
concerned and has extended over a long period of time.

Optimus interpres rerum usus the best interpretation of the

law is usage.

Construction of rules and regulations

This rule-making power, authorities sustain the principle that

the interpretation by those charged with their enforcement is
entitled to great weight by the court in the latters
construction of such rules and regulations.
Reasons why contemporaneous construction is given much weight

It is entitled to great weight because it comes from the

particular branch of government called upon to implement
the law thus construed.

Are presumed to have familiarized themselves with all the

considerations pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the
law, and to have formed an independent, conscientious and
competent expert opinion thereon

When contemporaneous construction disregarded

When there is no ambiguity in the law.

If it is clearly erroneous, the same must be declared null and

void.
Erroneous contemporaneous construction does not preclude correction
nor create rights; exceptions

The doctrine of estoppel does not preclude correction of the

erroneous construction by the officer himself by his
successor or by the court in an appropriate case.

An erroneous contemporeaneous construction creates no

vested right on the part of those relied upon, and followed
such construction.
Legislative interpretation

Take form of an implied acquiescence to, or approval of, an

executive or judicial construction of a statute.

The legislature cannot limit or restrict the power granted to

the courts by the constitution.
Legislative approval

Legislative is presumed to have full knowledge of a

contemporaneous or practical construction of a statute by an
administrative or executive officer charged with its
enforcement.

The legislature may approve or ratify such contemporaneous

construction.

May also be showmen by the legislature appropriating

money for the officer designated to perform a task pursuant
to interpretation of a statute.

Legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate.

Reenactment

Most common act of approval.

The re-enactment of a statute, previously given a

contemporaneous construction is persuasive indication of the
adoption by the legislature of the prior construction.

Re-enactment if accorded greater weight and respect than the

contemporaneous construction of the statute before its
ratification.
Stare decisis

Judicial interpretation of a statute and is of greater weight

than that of an executive or administrative officer in the
construction of other statutes of similar import.

It is an invaluable aid in the construction or interpretation of

statutes of doubtful meaning.

Stare decisis et non quieta movere one should follow past

precedents and should not disturb what has been settled.

Supreme Court has the constitutional duty not only of

interpreting and applying the law in accordance with prior
doctrines but also of protecting society from the
improvidence and wantonness wrought by needless
upheavals in such interpretations and applications

In order that it will come within the doctrine of stare decisis,

must be categorically stated on an issue expressly raised by
the parties; it must be a direct ruling, not merely an obiter
dictum

Obiter dictum opinion expressed by a court upon some

question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the
case before it; not binding as a precedent

The principle presupposes that the facts of the precedent and

the case to which it is applied are substantially the same.

Where the facts are dissimilar, then the principle of stare

decisis does not apply.

The rule of stare decisis is not absolute. It does not apply

when there is a conflict between the precedent and the law.

The duty of the court is to forsake and abandon any doctrine

or rule found to be in violation of law in force
Inferior courts as well as the legislature cannot abandon a
precedent enunciated by the SC except by way of repeal or
amendment of the law itself
CHAPTER FOUR:
Adherence to, or departure from, language of statute

LITERAL INTERPRETATION
Literal meaning or plain-meaning rule

General rule: if statute is clear, plain and free from

ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation
o Verba legis
o Index animi sermo speech is the index of
intention
o Words employed by the legislature in a statute
correctly express its intent or will
o Verba legis non est recedendum from the words
of a statute there should be no departure
o Thus, what is not clearly provided in the law
cannot be extended to those matters outside its
scope

Judicial legislation an encroachment upon legislative

prerogative to define the wisdom of the law
o Courts must administer the law as they find it
without regard to consequences
National Federation of Labor v. NLRC

Employees were claiming separation pay on the basis of Art.

283 Labor Code which states that employer MAY also
terminate the employment of an employee for reasons
therein by serving notice thereof and paying separation pay
to affected employees

There was compulsory acquisition by the government of the

employers land (Patalon Coconut Estate) for purposes of
agrarian reform which forced the employer to cease his
operation

Issue: whether or not employer is liable for separation pay?

Held: NO, employer is not liable for separation pay!

o
It is a unilateral and voluntary act by the employer
if he wants to give separation pay
o This is gleaned from the wording MAY in the
statute
o MAY denotes that it is directory in nature and
generally permissive only
o Plain-meaning rule is applicable
o Ano yun, ipapasara ng government tapos
magbabayad pa ang employer ng separation pay?!?
Ang daya-daya! Lugi na nga si employer, kikita pa
si employee?!? Unfair! Cannot be! No! No!
o To depart from the meaning expressed by the
words is to alter the statute, to legislate and not
interpret
o Maledicta est exposition quae corrumpit textum
dangerous construction which is against the text
Dura lex sed lex

Dura lex sed lex the law may be harsh but it is still the law

Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent when the

language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required

When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation.

It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if

it may be harsh or onerous

Hoc quidem perquam durum est, sed ital ex scripta est it is

exceedingly hard but so the law is written

A decent regard to the legislative will shoud inhibit the court

from engaging in judicial legislation to change what it thinks
are unrealistic statutes that do not conform with ordinary
experience or practice (respeto nalang sa ating mga
mambabatas! Whatever?!? Haha joke only)
If there is a need to change the law, amend or repeal it,
remedy may be done through a legislative process, not by
judicial decree
Where the law is clear, appeals to justice and equity as
justification to construe it differently are unavailing
Philippines is governed by CIVIL LAW or POSITIVE
LAW, not common law
Equity is available only in the absence of law and not its
replacement (so, pag may law, walang equity equity! Pero
pag walang law, pwedeng mag-equity, gets?!?... important
to!)
Aequitas nunquam contravenit legis equity never acts in
contravention of the law

DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION

Statute must be capable of interpretation, otherwise inoperative

If no judicial certainty can be had as to its meaning, the court

is not at liberty to supply nor to make one
Santiago v. COMELEC

In this case, the Court adopted a literal meaning thus,

concluded that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the
power of the people to amend the Constitution (initiative on
amendments) for the following reasons:
o Does not suggest an initiative on amendments on
to the Constitution because it is silent as to
amendments on the Constitution and the word
Constitution is neither germane nor relevant to
said section
o Does not provide for the contents of a petition for
initiative on the Constitution
o Does not provide for subtitles for initiative on the
Constitution
o RA is incomplete and does not provide a sufficient
standard

Justice Puno (ano?!? Justice Tree?!) dissents:

o Legislative intent is also shown by the
deliberations on the bill that became RA 6735
(there are 4 more reasons see page 130-131,
which are not so important)

Interpretation of RA 6735 was not in keeping with the

maxim interpretation fienda est ut res magis valeat quam
pereat that interpretation as will give the thing efficacy is
to be adopted
What is within the spirit is within the law

Dont literally construe the law if it will render it

meaningless, lead to ambiguity, injustice or contradiction

The spirit of the law controls its letter

Ratio legis interpretation according to the spirit or reason

of the law

Spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter

A law should accordingly be so construed as to be in

accordance with, and not repugnant to, the spirit of the law

Presumption: undesirable consequences were never intended

by a legislative measure
Literal import must yield to intent

Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire words

ought to be more subservient to the intent and not the intent
to the words (ahhh parang intent is to woman as word is to
man so man is subservient to woman logical!)

Guide in ascertaining intent conscience and equity

So it is possible that a statute may be extended to cases not
within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come
within its spirit or intent

Limitation of rule

Construe (intent over letter) only if there is ambiguity!

Construction to accomplish purpose

PURPOSE or REASON which induced the enactment of the

statute key to open the brain of the legislature/ legislative
intent!

Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be

achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed

As between two statutory interpretations, that which better

serves the purpose of the law should prevail
Sarcos v. Castillo

This case explains why legislative purpose to determine

legislative intent

Frankfurter
o Legislative words are not inert but derived vitality
from the obvious purposes at which they are aimed
o Legislation working instrument of government
and not merely as a collection of English words

Benjamin Natham Cardozo

o Legislation is more than a composition
o It is an active instrument of government which
means that laws have ends to be achieved

Holmes
o Words are flexible
o The general purpose is a more important aid to the
meaning than any rule which grammar or formal
logic may lay down
o Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the
words of law where those words import a policy
that goes beyond them
Soriano v. Offshore Shipping and Manning Corp

A literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust

or lead to absurd results
Illustration of rule
King v. Hernandez

Issue: whether or not a Chinese (parang si RA and Serge)

may be employed in a non-control position in a retail
establishment, a wholly nationalized business under RA
1180 Retail Trade Law (btw, wala na tong law na to. It has
been repealed by the Retail Trade Liberalization Act my
thesis! )

Held: No! (kasi duduraan ka lang ng mga intsik! Joke only!)

the law has to be construed with the Anti-Dummy Law
prohibiting an alien from intervening in the management,
operation, administration or control thereof

When the law says you cannot employ such alien, you
cannot employ an alien! The unscrupulous alien may resort
to flout the law or defeat its purpose! (maggulang daw mga
intsik ultimo tubig sa pasig river, which is supposed to be
free, bottles it and then sells it! Huwat?!?)

It is imperative that the law be interpreted in a manner that

would stave off any attempt at circumvention of the
legislative purpose
Bustamante v. NLRC

Issue: how to compute for backwages to which an illegally

dismissed employee would be entitled until his actual

reinstatement (take note of this case.. its a labor case kiliti

ni Golangco)
3 ways:
o 1st before Labor Code to be deducted from the
amount of backwages is the earnings elsewhere
during the period of illegal dismissal
o 2nd Labor Code Art. 279 the amount of
backwages is fixed without deductions or
qualifications but limited to not more than 3 years
o 3rd amended Art. 279 full backwages or
without deductions from the time the laborers
compensation was withheld until his actual
reinstatement
The clear legislative intent of the amendment in RA 6715
(Labor Code) is to give more benefits to workers than was
previously given them under the Mercury Drug rule or the 1 st
way

US v. Toribio

The prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human

consumption so long as these animals are fit for agricultural
work/ draft purposes was a reasonable necessary limitation
on private ownership

Purpose or object of the law to protect large cattle against

theft and to make easy recovery and return of such cattle to
their owners, when lost, strayed or stolen

Issue: whether the slaughter of large cattle outside the

municipal slaughterhouse without a permit by the municipal
treasurer is prohibited?

Held: YES! Outside or inside without permit is prohibited

Bocobo v. Estanislao

Issue: whether the CFI and a municipal court in the capital of

a province have concurrent jurisdiction over the crime of
libel

RPC grants jurisdiction with CFI

Judiciary Act grants jurisdiction with the municipal court in

the capital of a province in offenses where the penalty is not
more than prission correctional or fine not exceeding
6,000Php (penalty for libel)

So ano na?!?
Godines v. CA

Patent Law grants the patentee the exclusive right to make,

use, and sell his patented machine, article or product xxx

Doctrine of equivalents when a device appropriates a prior

invention by incorporating its innovative concept, and albeit
with some modification and change, performs substantially
the same function in substantially the same way to achieve
substantially the same result (ano ba to?!? Puro
substantially?)
Planters Association of Southern Negros, Inc. v. Ponferrada

2 apparently conflicting provisions should be construed as to

realize the purpose of the law

The purpose of the law is to INCREASE the workers

benefits

Benefits under RA 6982 shall be IN ADDITION to the

benefits under RA 809 and PD 621

Substituted cannot be given literal interpretation

When reason of law ceases, law itself ceases

The reason which induced the legislature to enact a law is the

heart of the law

Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex when the reason of

the law ceases, the law itself ceases

Ratio legis est anima reason of the law is its soul

Peo v. Almuete

Agricultural Tenancy Act is repealed by the Agricultural

Land Reform Code

Agricultural Tenancy Act punishes prereaping or

prethreshing of palay on a date other than that previously set
without the mutual consent of the landlord and tenant
o Share tenancy relationship

Agricultural Land Reform Code abolished share tenancy

relationship, thus does not punish prereaping or prethreshing
of palay on a date other than that previously set without the
mutual consent of the landlord and tenant anymore
o Leasehold system
Commendador v. De Villa

Issue: whether PD 39, which withdrew the right to

peremptorily challenge members of a military tribunal, had
been rendered inoperative by PD 2045 proclaiming the
termination of a state of martial law

Held: YES! The termination of the martial law and the

dissolution of military tribunals created thereunder, the
reason for the existence of PD 39 ceased automatically and
the decree itself ceased
Vasquez v. Giap

Where the mischief sought to be remedied by a statute has

already been removed in a given situation, the statute may no
longer apply in such case

The law bans aliens from acquiring and owning lands, the
purpose is to preserve the nations lands for future
generations of Filipinos

A sale of land in favor of an alien, in violation of the said

law, no longer be questioned after the alien becomes a
Filipino citizen
Supplying legislative omission

xxx if it is clearly ascertainable from the CONTEXT!

May supply legislative omission to make the statute conform

to obvious intent of the legislature or to prevent the act from
being absurd

Note: differentiate from judicial legislation

Correcting clerical errors

As long as the meaning intended is apparent on the face of

the whole enactment and no specific provision is abrogated

This is not judicial legislation

Illustration rule
Rufino Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. CTA

Court change the phrase collector of customs to

commissioner of customs to correct an obvious mistake in
law

Sec 7 commissioner of customs grants the CTA

jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of
Customs

Sec 11 collector of customs refers to the decision of

the Collector of Customs that may be appealed to the tax
court

Commissioner prevails Commissioner of Customs has

supervision and control over Collectors of Customs and the
decisions of the latter are reviewable by the Commissioner of
Customs
Lamp v. Phipps

Ordinary COURTS of law to Ordinary COURSE of law

Farinas v. Barba

Issue: who is the appointing power to fill a vacancy created

by the sanggunian member who did not belong to any

political party, under the provision of the Local Government

Code
local chief executive a misnomer
It should be authorities concerned
Because the President is not a local chief executive but
under Sec. 50 of the Local Government Code, the President,
Governor, Mayor have the executive power to appoint in
order to fill vacancies in local councils or to suspend local
officials

Qualification of rule (of correcting clerical errors)

Only those which are clearly clerical errors or obvious

mistakes, omissions, and misprints; otherwise, is to rewrite
the law and invade the domain of the legislature, it is judicial
legislation in the guise of interpretation
Construction to avoid absurdity

Reason: it is always presumed that the legislature intended

exceptions to its language which would avoid consequences
of this character

Thus, statutes may be extended to cover cases not within the

literal meaning of the terms if their exact and literal import
would lead to absurd or mischievous results

Interpretation talis in ambiguis simper fienda est ut evitetur

inconveniens et absurdum where there is ambiguity, such
interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to
be adopted

Courts test the law by its results if law appears to be

arbitrary, courts are not bound to apply it in slavish
disobedience to its language

Courts should construe a statute to effectuate, and not to

defeat, its provisions; nor render compliance with its
provisions impossible to perform
Peo v. Duque

Surplusage!!!

Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 prescription of offenses

o Prescription shall begin to run from

The day of the commission of the

violation

From the time of discovery AND

institution of judicial proceedings for
investigation and punishment

But the prevailing rule is that prescriptive period is tolled

upon the institution of judicial proceedings an act of grace
by the State

Court held that the phrase institution of judicial proceedings

for its investigation and punishment may be either
disregarded as surplusage or should be deemed preceded by
the word until
Oliveros v. Villaluz

Issue: whether or not the suspension order against an elective

official following an information for violation of the AntiGraft law filed against him, applies not only to the current
term of office but also to another term if the accused run for
reelection and won

Sec 13 of the Anti-Graft Law suspension unless acquitted,

reinstated!

Held: only refers to the current term of the suspended officer

(and not to a future unknown and uncertain new term unless
supplemented by a new suspension order in the event of
reelection) for if his term shall have expired at the time of
acquittal, he would obviously be no longer entitled to
reinstatement; otherwise it will lead to absurdities

Peo v. Yu Hai

Issue: when does a crime punishable by arresto menor

prescribe?

State says 10 years as provided for in Art 90 RPC

o Art. 26 (correctional offenses) max fine of
200Php correctional penalty prescribes in 10
years (Art. 90)

Court held that this is not right!!!! It is wrong!

o Art. 9 (light offenses) not more than 200Php
light felonies 2 months
o 1Php makes a difference of 9 years and 10 months!
(huwat?!?)
o Arresto mayor (correctional penalty) prescribes in
5 years
o Less grave prescribe even shorter
o Also, prescriptive period cannot be ascertained not
until the court decides which of the alternative
penalties should be imposed imprisonment ba or
fine lang yun lang po!
Peo v. Reyes

Dangerous Drugs Act

RA 7659
o X < 200 grams max penalty is reclusion perpetua
o X > 200 grams min penalty is reclusion
perpetua

Court ruled that:

o X < 200 grams penalty ranging from prision
correctional to reclusion temporal

134-199grams reclusion temporal

66-133 prison mayor

Less than 66 grams prision correcional

StatCon duty of the court to harmonize conflicting

provisions to give effect to the whole law; to effectuate the
intention of legislature

Malonzo v. Zamora

Contention: the City Counsel of Caloocan cannot validly

pass an ordinance appropriating a supplemental budget for
the purpose of expropriating a certain parcel of land, without
first adopting or updating its house rules of procedure within
the first 90 days following the election of its members, as
required by Secs. 50 and 52 of the LGC

Court said this is absurd!!!! Contention is rejected!

o Adoption or updating of house rules would
necessarily entail work local councils hands
were tied and could not act on any other matter if
we hold the absurd contention!
o So much inconvenience! Shiox! And this could not
have been intended by the law
Construction to avoid injustice

Presumption legislature did not intend to work a hardship

or an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of
oppression, arming one person with a weapon to impose
hardship on the other

Ea est accipienda interpretation quae vitio caret that

interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or
injustice
Amatan v. Aujero

Rodrigo Umpad was charged with homicide

Pursuant to some provision in criminal procedure, he entered

into a plea bargaining agreement, which the judge approved
of, downgrading the offense charge of homicide to attempted
homicide to which Umpad pleaded guilty thereto.

Hello?!? Namatay na nga tapos attempted lang?!?

Mababaliw ako sayo, judge, whoever you are!!!
Fiat justicia, ruat coelum let the right be done, though the
heavens fall (ano daw?!?)
Stated differently, when a provision of the law is silent or
ambiguougs, judges ought to invoke a solution responsive to
the vehement urge of conscience (ahhh ano daw ulit?!?)

Peo v. Purisima

It was contended that PD 9(3) is a malum prohibitum; thus

intent to use such prohibited weapons is immaterial by
reason of public policy

Court said that use the preamble to construe such act whether
penalized or not

Moreover the court said that legislature did not intend

injustice, absurdity and contradiction

Court gave an example

o So if I borrowed a bolo then I return this to my
lender, then in the course or my journey Im
caught, Im penalized under the Decree for 5-10
years imprisonment! (ang labo naman!)

Ursua v. CA

Issue: whether or not the isolated use, at one instance, of a

name other than a persons true name to secure a copy of a
document from a government agency, constitutes violation
of CA 142 Anti-alias Law

Held: NO! (isang beses lang naman eh.. hehehe joke lang!)
o The purpose of the Anti-alias Law is to prevent
confusion and fraud in business transactions
o Such isolated use of a different name is not
prohibited by the law; otherwise, injustice,
absurdity and contradiction will result

Issue: whether the dollar bank deposit in a Philippine bank of

a foreign tourist can be attached to satisfy the moral damages
awarded in favor of the latters 12-year-old rape victim
BSP did not honor the writ of attachment pursuant to
RA6426 Sec 8 foreign currency deposits shall be exempt
from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process
of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever
Court held that: ANO BA?!? Na-rape na nga ayaw pang
magbayad ng moral damages dahil lang sa isang silly law?!?
(hehe.. joke lang.. Im so bored na eh!)
o Court applied the principles of right and justice to
prevail over the strict and literal words of the
statute
o The purpose of RA 6426 to exempt such assets
from attachment: at the time the said law was
enacted, the countrys economy was in a shambles.
But in the present time it is still in shambles... hehe
joke lang but in the present time, the country has
recovered economically. No reason why such
assets cannot be attached especially if it would
satisfy a judgment to award moral damages to a
12-year-old rape victim!

Surplusage and superfluity disregarded

Where a word, phrase or clause in a statute is devoid of

meaning in relation to the context or intent of the statute, or
where it suggests a meaning that nullifies the statute or
renders it without sense, the word, phrase or clause may be
rejected as surplusage and entirely ignored

Surplusagium non noceat surplusage does not vitiate a

statute

Utile per inutile non vitiatur nor is the useful vitated by the
non-useful

Construction to avoid danger to public interest

Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh

Sa Consti to ah! La lang hehe (yihee, Serge!)

processes in the proclamation that all laws regulations

and processes of the so-called RP during the Japanese
occupation of the country are null and void and without
legal effect MAY NOT be construed to embrace JUDICIAL
PROCESSES as this would lead to great inconvenience and
public hardship and public interest would be endangered
o Criminals freed
o Vested right, impaired
Construction in favor of right and justice

Art. 10 CC: In case of doubt in the interpretation or

application of laws, it is presumed that the law-making body
intended right and justice to prevail

Art. 9 CC: The fact that a statute is silent, obscure, or

insufficient with respect to a question before the court will
not justify the latter from declining to render judgment
thereon

In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip

the scales which the court believes will best promote the
public welfare is its probable operation as a general rule or
principle
Salvacion v. BSP

Greg Bartelli raped his alleged niece 10 times and detained

her in his apartment for 4 days

Court gave a favorable judgment of more than 1MPhp

BSP rejected the writ of attachment alleging Sec 113 of the

Central Bank Circular No. 960 (applicable to transient
foreigners)

Demafiles v. COMELEC

Issue: whether a pre-proclamation election case has become

moot because the proclaimed winner had immediately taken
his oath pursuant to Sec 2 RA 4870 which provides that the
first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the municipality
of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general elections for
local officials and shall have qualified

It was contended that shall have qualified begins

immediately after their proclamation!

Court held that this is wrong!

o The said phrase is a jargon and does not warrant
the respondents reading that the term of office of
the first municipal officials of Sebaste begins
immediately after their proclamation
o The King in Alice in Wonderland: if there is no
meaning in it, that saves a world of trouble, you
know, as we need not try to find any
o Apply the general rule when such term begin the
term of municipal officials shall begin on the 1st
day of January following their election
Redundant words may be rejected

Self-explanatory, ano buzzzz?!?

Obscure or missing word or false description may not preclude
construction

Falsa demonstration non nocet, cum de corpore constat

false description does not preclude construction nor vitiate
the meaning of the statute which is otherwise clear
Exemption from rigid application of law

Ibi quid generaliter conceditur every rule is not without an

exception

Inest haec exception, si non aliquid sit contras jus basque

where anything is granted generally, this exception is
implied
Compelling reasons may justify reading an exception to a
rule even where the latter does not provide any; otherwise
the rigor of the law would become the highest injustice
summum jus, summa injuria

Law does not require the impossible

Nemo tenetur ad impossible the law obliges no one to

perform an impossibility

Impossibilium nulla obligation est no obligation to do an

impossible thing

Impossible compliance versus Substantial compliance (as

required by law)
Lim co Chui v Posadas

Publication in the Official Gazette weekly, for three times

and consecutively, to acquire jurisdiction over naturalization
case

It was an impossibility to fulfill such requirement as the OG

was not, at the time, published weekly

Thus, Court held that compliance with the other 2

requirements would be deemed sufficient to acquire
jurisdiction over the naturalization case
Akbayan v. COMELEC

This case is about the statutory grant of stand-by power to

the COMELEC as provided for in Sec. 28 RA 8436

Petitioners were asking the respondent to exercise such

power so as to accommodate potential voters who were not
able to register for the upcoming election

COMELEC denied the petition alleging the impossibility of

late registration to accommodate potential voters

Court ruled that the provision must be given such

interpretation that is in accordance with logic, common
sense, reasonableness and practicality

Where time constraint and the surrounding circumstances

make it impossible or the COMELEC to conduct special
registration of voters, the COMELEC cannot be faulted for
refusing to do so, for the law does not require the impossible
to be done; there is no obligation to ho the impossible thing

COMELECs decision is sustained

Number and gender of words

When the context of a statute so indicates, words in plural

include the singular, and vice versa.

A plural word in a statute may thus apply to a singular

person or thing, just as a singular word may embrace two or
more persons or things

Art. 996 CC (law on succession) such article also applies

to a situation where there is only one child because
children includes child

Election Code candidate comprehends some

candidates or all candidates

On gender the masculine, but not the feminine, includes all

genders, unless the context in which the word is used in the
statute indicates otherwise
IMPLICATIONS
Doctrine of necessary implication

So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced

StatCon rule: to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary

implication

Doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a

part thereof as that which is expressed

Ex necessitate legis from the necessity of the law

Every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed

to include all incidental power, right or privilege
In eo quod plus sit, simper inest et minus greater includes
the lesser
Necessity
o includes such inferences as may be logically be
drawn from the purpose or object of the statute,
from what the legislature must be presumed to
have intended, and from the necessity of making
the statute effective and operative
o excludes what is merely plausible, beneficial, or
desirable
must be consistent with the Constitution or to existing laws
an implication which is violative of the law is unjustified or
unwarranted

Chua v. Civil Service Commission

Issue: whether a coterminous employee, or one whose

appointment is co-existent with the duration of a government
project, who has been employed as such for more than 2
years, is entitled to early retirement benefits under Sec 2 RA
6683

Court held that YES, Chua is entitled!

o A coterminous employee is no different from a
casual or temporary employee, and by necessary
implication, the inclusion of the latter in the class
of government employees entitled to the benefits
of the law necessarily implies that the former
should also be entitled to such benefits
o Wrong application of the maxim expresio
uniusest exclusion alterius
Remedy implied from a right

Ubi jus, ibi remedium - where there is a right, there is a

remedy for violation thereof

Right -> Obligation -> Remedy

The fact that the statute is silent as to the remedy does not
preclude him from vindicating his right, for such remedy is
implied from such right

Once a right is established, the way must be cleared for its

enforcement, and technicalities in procedure, judicial as well
as administrative, must give way

Where there is wrong, (deprivation or violation of a right)

there is a remedy

If theres no right, principle does not apply

Batungbakal v National Development Co

Petitioner was suspended and removed from office which

proved to be illegal and violative not only of the
Administrative Code but of the Constitution itself

Court ruled that to remedy the evil and wrong committed,

there should be reinstatement and payment of backwages,
among other things

However, there was a legal problem as to his reinstatement,

for when he was suspended and eventually dismissed,
somebody was appointed to his position

Issue: whether remedy is denied petitioner

Held: position was never vacant. Since there is no

vacancy, the present incumbent cannot be appointed
permanently. The incumbent is only holding a temporary
position. Moreover, the incumbents being made to leave the
post to give way to the employees superior right may be
considered as removal for cause
Grant of jurisdiction

Conferred only by the Constitution or by statute

Cannot be conferred by the Rules of Court

Cannot be implied from the language of a statute, in the

absence of clear legislative intent to that effect

Pimentel v. COMELEC

COMELEC has appellate jurisdiction over election cases

filed with and decided by the RTC involving municipal
elective officials DOES NOT IMPLY the grant of authority
upon the COMELEC to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus concerning said election cases
Peo v. Palana

Statute grants a special court jurisdiction over criminal cases

involving offenders under 16 at the time of the filing of the
action, a subsequent statute defining a youthful offender as
one who is over 9 but below 21 years of age may not be so
construed as to confer by implication upon said special court
the authority to try cases involving offenders 16 but below
21 years of age
What may be implied from grant of jurisdiction

The grant of jurisdiction to try actions carries with it all

necessary and incidental powers to employ all writs,
processes and other means essential to make its jurisdiction
effective

Where a court has jurisdiction over the main cause of action,

it can grant reliefs incidental thereto, even if they would
otherwise be outside its jurisdiction
o E.g. forcible entry and detainer is cognizable in
MTC MTC can order payment of rentals even
though the amount exceeds the jurisdictional
amount cognizable by them, the same merely
incidental to the principal action

Statutes conferring jurisdiction to an administrative agency

must be liberally construed to enable the agency to discharge
its assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose
o E.g. the power granted the NHA to hear and decide
claims involving refund and any other claims filed
xxx, include attorneys fees and other damages
Grant of power includes incidental power

Where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every

particular power necessary for the exercise of one or the
performance of the other is also conferred

The incidental powers are those which are necessarily

included in, and are therefore of lesser degree than the power
granted
o Examples

Power to establish an office includes

authority to abolish it, unless xxx

Warrant issued shall be made upon

probable cause determined by the judge
xxx implies the grant of power to the
judge
to
conduct
preliminary
investigations

Power to approve a license includes by

implication the power to revoke it

Power to revoke is limited by

the authority to grant license,
from which it is derived

Power to deport includes the power to

arrest
undesirable
aliens
after
investigation

Power to appoint vested in the President

includes the power to make temporary
appointments , unless xxx

Power to appropriate money includes

power to withdraw unexpended money
already appropriated

Etc see page 171-172

Grant of power excludes greater power

The principle that the grant of power includes all incidental

powers necessary to make the exercise thereof effective
implies the exclusion of those which are greater than that
conferred
o Power of supervision DOES NOT INCLUDE
power to suspend or removal
o Power to reorganize DOES NOT INCLUDE the
authority to deprive the courts certain jurisdiction
and to transfer it to a quasi-judicial tribunal
o Power to regulate business DOES NOT INCLUDE
power to prohibit
What is implied should not be against the law

Power to appoint includes power to suspend or remove

o Constitutional restriction of CIVIL SERVICE
EMPLOYEES, that it must be a cause provided for
by law precludes such implication (unless the
appointment was made outside the civil service
law

Power to appoint a public officer by the President includes

power to remove
o Provided that such removal is made with just cause
o Except is such statute provides that term of office
to be at the pleasure of the appointing officer,
power to appoint carries with it power to remove
anytime

Power to investigate officials DOES NOT INCLUDE the

power to delegate the authority to take testimony of
witnesses whose appearance may be required by the
compulsory process of subpoena. Nor does such power to
investigate include the power to delegate the authority to
administer oath
Authority to charge against public funds may not be implied

It is well-settled that unless a statute expressly so authorizes,

no claim against public funds may be allowed
o Statute grants leave privileges to APPOINTIVE
officials, this cannot be construed to include
ELECTIVE officials
o employer to pay 13th month pay, does not imply
that it includes government

Illegality of act implied from prohibition

In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis - where a

statute prohibits the doing of an act, the act done in violation
thereof is by implication null and void

Prohibited act cannot serve as foundation of a cause of action

for relief

Ex dolo malo non oritur actio no man can be allowed to

found a claim upon his own wrongdoing or inequity

Nullus coomodum capere potest de injuria sua propria no

man should be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong

Public policy requires that parties to an act prohibited by

statute be left where they are, to make the statute effective
and to accomplish its object
o Party to an illegal contract cannot come to court of
law and ask that his illegal object be carried out
o A citizen who sold his land to an alien in violation
of the constitutional restriction cannot annul the
same and recover the land, for both seller and
buyer are guilty of having violated the Constitution
Two (2) Exceptions to the rule

Pari delicto doctrine will not apply when its enforcement or

application will violate an avowed fundamental policy or
public interest

CHAPTER FIVE: Interpretation of words and phrases

Delos Santos v. Roman Catholic Church

Homestead Law to give and preserve in the homesteader

and his family a piece of land for his house and cultivation

The law prohibits the alienation of a homestead within 5

years following the issuance of the patent and provides that
any contract of a conveyance in contravention thereof shall
be null and void

The seller or his heirs, although in pari delicto, may recover

the land subject of such illegal sale
Barsobia v. Cuenco

Another exception is that when the transaction is not illegal

per se but merely prohibited and the prohibition by law is
designed for protection of one party, the court may grant
relief in favor of the latter
What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly

Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per

obliquum what cannot, by law, be done directly cannot be
done indirectly
Peo v. Concepcion

Where a corporation is forbidden from doing an act, the

prohibition extends to the board of directors and to each
director separately and individually

Where the board of directors is prohibited from granting

loans to its director, a loan to a partnership of which the wife
of a director is a partner falls within the prohibition
Peoples Bank and Trust Co. v. PNB

Where a statute prohibits the payment of the principal

obligation during a fixed period, the interest thereon during
the existence of the restriction is not demandable
Cruz v. Tantuico

Law exempts retirement benefits of a public officer or

employee from attachment, garnishment etc

Earlier law authorizes the government to withhold an amount

due such officer or employee to pay his indebtedness to the
government SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED to withhold
so much of his retirement benefits as this amount to
attachment garnishment etc.
Tantuico, Jr. v Domingo

Law exempts retirement benefits of a public officer or

employee from attachment, garnishment etc

Government cannot withhold payment of retirement benefits

of a public officer until his accountabilities with the
government shall have been cleared, as such action is doing
indirectly what the government is prohibited from doing
directly
There should be no penalty from compliance with law

A person who complies with what a statute requires cannot,

by implication, be penalized thereby

For simple logic and fairness and reason cannot

countenance an exaction or a penalty for an act faithfully
done in compliance with the law

IN GENERAL
Generally

A word or phrase used in a statute may have an ordinary,

generic, restricted, technical, legal, commercial or trading
meaning

May be defined in the statute if this is done, use such

definition because this is what the legislature intended

Task:
o ascertain intent from statute
o ascertain intent from extraneous & relevant
circumstance
o construe word or phrase to effectuate such intent

General rule in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term

used in the law:
o Review of the WHOLE law involved as well as the
INTENDMENT of law (not of an isolated part or a
particular provision alone)
Statutory definition

When statute defines words & phrase- legislative definition

controls the meaning of statutory word, irrespective of any
other meaning word have in ordinary usual sense.

Where a statute defines a word or phrase, the word or phrase,

should not by construction, be given a different meaning.

Legislature restricted meaning as it adopted specific

definition, thus, this should be used

Term or phrase specifically defined in particular law,

definition must be adopted.

No usurpation of court function in interpreting but it merely

legislates what should form part of the law itself
Victorias Milling Co. v. Social Security Commission <compensation;
RA 1161, Sec. 8(f)>

compensation to include all renumerations, except

bonuses, allowances & overtime pay

Definition was amended: deleted exceptions

Legislative Intent: the amendment shows legislative intent

that bonuses & overtime pay now included in employees
renumeration.

Principle: by virtue of express substantial change in

phraseology, whatever prior judicial or executive
construction should give way to mandate of new law.
Peo. v. Venviaje < Chiropractic>

Issue: Whether person who practiced chiropractic without

having been duly licensed, may be criminally liable for
violation of medical law.

Held: Though term practice of medicine, chiropractic may

in ordinary sense fall within its meaning; statutorily defined includes manipulations employed in chiropractic; thus, one
who practices chiropractic without license is criminally
liable.
Chang Yung Fa v. Gianzon< alien>

Issue: whether alien who comes into country as temporary

visitor is an immigrant?

Held: while immigrant in ordinary definition- an alien

who comes to the Philippines for permanent residence; The
Immigration Act makes own definition of term, which is
any alien departing from any place outside the Philippines
destined for the Philippines, other than a non-immigrant.

(so kelangan part siya nung other than a non-immigrant.) > yep yep, Serge! But more importantly, the definition
emphasizes an immigrant, who is an alien, who comes to the

Philippines either to reside TEMPORARILY

PERMANENTLY no distinction

or

definition of terms given weight in construction

terms & phrases, being part & parcel of whole statute, given
effect in their ENTIRTY, as harmonious, coordinated, and
integrated unit
words & phrases construed in light of context of WHOLE
statute.

Qualification of rule

Statutory definition of word or term controlling only as used

in the Act;

not conclusive as to the meaning of same word or term in

other statutes

Especially to transactions that took place prior to enactment

of act.

Statutory definition controlling statutory words does not

apply when:
o application creates incongruities
o destroy its major purposes
o becomes illogical as result of change in its factual
basis.
Ernest v. CA < RA 4166 & EO 900, 901>

sugarcane planter is defined as a planter-owner of

sugarcane plantation w/in particular sugar mill district, who
has been allocated export and/or domestic & reserve sugar
quotas.

Statutory definition excludes emergency, non-quota, nondistrict and accommodation planters, they having no sugar
quota. However, in 1955, quota system abolished

With change in situation, illogical to continue adhering to

previous definition that had lost their legal effect.
Amadora v. CA

However, where statute remains unchanged, interpreted

according to its clear and original mandate; until legislature
taking into account changes subjected to be regulated, sees
fit to enact necessary amendment.
Words construed in their ordinary sense

General rule: In the absence of legislative intent, words and

phrases should be given their plain, ordinary, and common
usage meaning.

Should be read and considered in their natural, ordinary,

commonly accepted, and most obvious signification,
according to good and approved usage and without resulting
to forced or subtle construction.
Central Azucarera Don Pedro v. Central Bank

A statute exempts certain importations from tax and foreign

exchange, which are actually used in the manufacture or
preparation of local products, forming part thereof.

Forming part thereof not to mean that the imported

products have to be mixed mechanically, chemically,
materially into the local product & lose its identity.

Means that the imported article is needed to accomplish the

locally manufactured product for export.
CIR v. Manila Business Lodge 761

business (if unqualified) in tax statute: plain and ordinary

meaning to embrace activity or affair where profit is the
purpose & livelihood is the motive.

In this case, a fraternal social club selling liquor at its

clubhouse in a limited scale only to its members, without
intention to obtain profit

Not engaged in business.

Philippine Association of Government Retirees v. GSIS

< present value>

Statute: for those who are at least 65 yrs of age, lump sum
payment of present value of annuity for the first 5 years, and
future annuity to be paid monthly. Provided however, that
there shall be no discount from annuity for the first 5 yrs. of
those who are 65 yrs or over, on the day the law took effect.

Vocabulary:
o lump sum - amount of money given in single
payment
o annuity - amount of money paid to somebody
yearly or at some other regular interval

Should there be discount from the present value of his

annuity?

NO. Used in ordinary sense as said law grants to the retired

employee substantial sum for his sustenance considering his
age. Any doubt in this law should be ruled in his favor.
Matuguina Integrated Wood Products Inc. v. CA

Whether transferee of a forest concession is liable for

obligations arising from transferors illegal encroachment
into another forest concessionaire, which was committed
prior to the transfer

Sec. 61 of PD 705 the transferee shall assume all the

obligations of the transferor.

Court held that the transferee is NOT liable and explained:

Obligations construed to mean obligations incurred by
transferor in the ordinary course of business. Not those as a
result of transgressions of the law, as these are personal
obligations of transferor.

Principle: Construe using ordinary meaning & avoid

absurdity.

Mustang Lumber, Inc. v CA

Statute: Sec. 68 PD 705 - penalizes the cutting, gathering &

or collecting timber or other forest products without a
license.

Is lumber included in timber

Reversing 1st ruling, SC says lumber is included in timber.

The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of timber

or lumber. Timber is included in definition of forestry
products par (q) Sec.3. Lumber - same definitions as
processing plants

Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or

combination of machine used for processing of logs & other
forest raw materials into lumber veneer, plywood etc p.
183.

Simply means, lumber is a processed log or forest raw

material. The Code uses lumber in ordinary common usage.
In 1993 ed. of Websters International Dictionary, lumber is
defined as timber or logs after being prepared for the market.
Therefore, lumber is a processed log or timber. Sec 68 of PD
705 makes no distinction between raw & processed timber.
General words construed generally

Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda - what is

generally spoken shall be generally understood; general
words shall be understood in a general sense.

Generale dictum generaliter est interpretandum - a general

statement is understood in a general sense

In case word in statute has both restricted and general

meaning, GENERAL must prevail; Unless nature of the
subject matter & context in which it is employed clearly
indicates that the limited sense is intended.
General words should not be given a restricted
meaning when no restriction is indicated.

Rationale: if the legislature intended to limit the meaning of

a word, it would have been easy for it to have done so.

Application of rule
Gatchalian v. COMELEC

foreigner- in Election Code, prohibiting any foreigner

from contributing campaign funds includes juridical person

person- comprehends private juridical person

person- in penal statute, must be a person in law, an

artificial or natural person

Words with commercial or trade meaning

Words or phrases common among merchants and traders,
acquire commercial meanings.
When any of words used in statute, should be given such trade or
commercial meaning as has been generally understood
among merchants.
Used in the following: tariff laws, laws of commerce, laws for
the government of the importer.
The law to be applicable to his class, should be construed as
universally understood by importer or trader.

Vargas v. Rillaroza

judge without any modifying word or phrase

accompanying it is to be construed in generic sense to
comprehend all kinds of judges; inferior courts or justices of
SC.

Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. CIR

No tax shall be collected on articles which, before its taking
effect, shall have been disposed of
Lay: parting away w/ something
Merchant: to sell (this must be used)

C & C Commercial Corp v. NAWASA

government - without qualification should be understood

in implied or generic sense including GOCCs.

San Miguel Corp. v. Municipal Council of Mandaue

gross value of money
Merchant: gross selling price which is the total amount of
money or its equivalent which purchaser pays to the vendor
to receive the goods.

Central Bank v. CA

National Government - refers only to central government,

consisting of executive, legislative and judiciary, as well as
constitutional bodies ( as distinguished from local
government & other governmental entities) Versus->

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines or

Philippine Government including central governments as
well as local government & GOCCs.
Republic Flour Mills v. Commissioner of Customs

product of the Philippines any product produced in the

country, e.g. bran (ipa) & pollard (darak) produced from
wheat imported into the country are products of the
Philippines
Generic term includes things that arise thereafter

Progressive interpretation - A word of general signification

employed in a statute, in absence of legislative intent, to
comprehend not only peculiar conditions obtaining at its
time of enactment but those that may normally arise after its
approval as well

Progressive interpretation extends to the application of

statute to all subjects or conditions within its general purpose
or scope that come into existence subsequent from its
passage

Rationale: to keep statute from becoming ephemeral (shortlived) and transitory (not permanent or lasting).

Statutes framed in general terms apply to new cases and

subjects that arise.

General rule in StatCon: Legislative enactments in general

comprehensive operation, apply to persons, subjects and
businesses within their general purview and scope coming
into existence subsequent to their passage.
Geotina v. CA

articles of prohibited importation - used in Tariff and

Customs Code embrace not only those declared prohibited at
time of adoption, but also goods and articles subject of
activities undertaken in subsequent laws.
Gatchalian v. COMELEC

any election - not only the election provided by law at that

time, but also to future elections including election of
delegates to Constitutional Convention

Words with technical or legal meaning

General rule: words that have, or have been used in, a technical
sense or those that have been judicially construed to have a
certain meaning should be interpreted according to the sense
in which they have been PREVIOUSLY used, although the
sense may vary from the strict or literal meaning of the
words
Presumption: language used in a statute, which has a technical or
well-known meaning, is used in that sense by the legislature
Manila Herald Publishing Co. v. Ramos
Sec 14 of Rule 59 of Rules of Court which prescribes the steps
to be taken when property attached is claimed by a person
other than the defendant or his agent
Statute: nothing herein contained shall prevent such third
person from vindicating his claim to the property by any
proper action.
Issue: proper action limits the 3rd partys remedy to intervene
in the action in which the writ of attachment is issued
Held: action has acquired a well-defined meaning as an
ordinary suit in a court of justice by which one party
prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a
right or prevent redress or wrong
While
Sec 2 Rule 2 of Rules of Court; Commencement of Action
Statute: Civil action may be commenced by filing a complaint
with the proper court
Word: commencement - indicates the origination of entire
proceeding
It was appropriate to use proper action (in 1st statute) than
intervention, since asserted right of 3rd party claimant
necessarily flows out of pending suit; if the word
intervention is used, it becomes strange.
Malanyaon v. Lising

Sec. 13 of Anti-Graft Law

Statute: if a public officer is acquitted, he shall be entitled

to reinstatement and to his salaries and benefits which he
failed to receive during the suspension

Issue: Will a public officer whose case has been dismissed

not acquitted be entitled to benefits in Sec. 13?

Held: No. Acquittal (legal meaning) - finding of not guilty

based on the merit.

Dismissal does not amount to acquittal except when, the

dismissal comes after the prosecution has presented all its
evidence and is based on insufficiency of such evidence.

Rura v. Lopena
Probation law - Disqualified from probation those: who have
been previously convicted by final judgment of an offense
punished by imprisonment of not less than 1 month & a fine
of no less than Php 200.
Issue: previously convicted
Held: it refers to date of conviction, not date of commission of
crime; thus a person convicted on same date of several
offenses committed in different dates is not disqualified.

How identical terms in the statute construed

General rule: a word or phrase repeatedly used in a statute will bear
the same meaning throughout the statute; unless a different
intention is clearly expressed.
Rationale: word used in statute in a given sense presumed to be used
in same sense throughout the law. Though rigid and peremptory,
this is applicable where in the statute the words appear so near
each other physically, particularly where the word has a
technical meaning and that meaning has been defined in the
statute.
De la Paz v. Court of Agrarian Relations <Riceland>

share tenancy - average produce per hectare for the 3

agricultural years next preceding the current harvest

leasehold - according to normal average harvest of the 3

preceding yrs

Year- agricultural year not calendar year

Agricultural year - represents 1 crop; if in 1 calendar yr 2

crops are raised thats 2 agricultural years.

Krivenko v. Register of Deeds

Statute: In Sec.1 , Art. XIII of 1935 Constitution - public

agricultural lands shall not be alienated except in favor of
Filipinos, SAME as Sec. 5 no private agricultural land shall
be transferred or assigned.

both have same meaning being based on same policy of

nationalization and having same subject.
Meaning of word qualified by purpose of statute

Purpose may indicate whether to give word, phrase,

ordinary, technical, commercial restricted or expansive
meaning.

In construing, court adopts interpretation that accords best

with the manifest purpose of statute; even disregard technical
or legal meaning in favor of construction which will
effectuate intent or purpose.
Word or phrase construed in relation to other provisions

General rule: word, phrase, provision, should not be

construed in isolation but must be interpreted in relation to
other provisions of the law.

This is a VARIATION of the rule that, statute should be

construed as a whole, and each of its provision must be given
effect.
Claudio v. COMELEC

Statute (LGC): No recall shall take place within 1 yr from

the date of the officials assumption of office or 1 year
immediately preceding a regular election

Issue: Does the 1st limitation embraces the entire recall

proceedings (e.g. preparatory recall assemblies) or only the
recall election?
Held: the Court construed recall in relation to Sec.69
which states that, the power of recall shall be exercised
by the registered voters of an LGU to which the local
elective official belongs.
Hence, not apply to all recall proceedings since power vested
in electorate is power to elect an official to office and not
power to initiate recall proceedings.
Word or provision should not be construed in isolation form
but should be interpreted in relation to other provisions of a
statute, or other statutes dealing on same subject in order to
effectuate what has been intended.

Garcia v. COMELEC

History of statute:
o In the Constitution, it requires that legislature shall
provide a system of initiative and referendum
whereby people can directly approve or reject any
act or law or part thereof passed by Congress or
local legislative body.
o Local Government. Code, a later law, defines local
initiative as process whereby registered voters of
an LGU may directly propose, enact, or amend any
ordinance.

It is claimed by respondents that since

resolution is not included in this
definition, then the same cannot be
subject of an initiative.

Issue: whether a local resolution of a municipal council can

be subject to an initiative and referendum?

Held: We reject respondents narrow and literal reading of

above provision for it will collide with the Constitution and
will subvert the intent of the lawmakers in enacting the
provisions of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 on
initiative & referendum

The subsequent enactment of the LGC did not change the

scope of its coverage. In Sec. 124 of the same code. It states:
(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which
are within the legal powers of the Sanggunians to enact.

This provision clearly does not limit the application of local

initiative to ordinances, but to all subjects or matters which
are within the legal powers of the Sanggunians to enact,
which undoubtedly includes resolutions.
Gelano v. C.A.

In Corporation Law, authorizes a dissolved corporation to

continue as a body corporate for 3 yrs. for the purpose of
defending and prosecuting suits by or against it, and during
said period to convey all its properties to a trustee for
benefits of its members, stockholders, creditors and other
interested persons, the transfer of the properties to the trustee
being for the protection of its creditors and stockholders.

Word trustee - not to be understood in legal or technical

sense, but in GENERAL concept which would include a
lawyer to whom was entrusted the prosecution of the cases
for recovery of sums of money against corporations debtors.
Republic v. Asuncion

Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan is a regular court within

the meaning of R.A. 6975?

Statute: RA 6975 which makes criminal actions involving

members of the PNP come within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the regular courts.

Used regular courts & civil courts interchangeably

Court martial - not courts within the Philippine Judicial

System; they pertain to the executive department and simply
instrumentalities of the executive power.
Regular courts - those within the judicial department of the
government namely the SC and lower courts which includes
the Sandiganbayan.
Held: Courts considered the purpose of the law which is to
remove from the court martial, the jurisdiction over criminal
cases involving members of the PNP and to vest it in the
courts within the judicial system.

Santulan v. Executive. Secretary.

Statute: A riparian owner of the property adjoining foreshore

lands, marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering
upon shores of banks of navigable lakes shall have
preference to apply for such lands adjoining his property.

Fact: Riparian - one who owns land situated on the banks of

river.

Held: Used in a more broader sense referring to a property

having a water frontage, when it mentioned foreshore
lands, marshy lands, or lands covered with water.

Molina v. Rafferty

Issue:
Whether
Agricultural
products
includes
domesticated animals and fish grown in ponds.

Statute: Phrase used in tax statute which exempts such

products from payment of taxes, purpose is to encourage the
development of such resources.

Held: phrase not only includes vegetable substances but also

domestic and domesticated animals, animal products, and
fish or bangus grown in ponds. Court gave expansive
meaning to promote object of law.

Peo. v. Ferrer

(case where context may limit the meaning)

Word: Overthrow

Statute: Anti-Subversion Act knowingly & willfully and by

overt acts.

Rejects the metaphorical peaceful sense & limits its

meaning to overthrow by force or violence.

Munoz & Co. v. Hord

Issue: Consumption limited or broad meaning

Statute: word is used in statute which provides that except

as herein specifically exempted, there shall be paid by each
merchant and manufacturer a tax at the rate of 1/3 of 1% on
gross value of money in all goods, wares and merchandise
sold, bartered, or exchanged for domestic consumption.

Held: Considering the purpose of the law, which is to tax all

merchants except those expressly exempted, it is reasonable
and fair to conclude that legislature used in commercial use
and not in limited sense of total destruction of thing sold.
Mottomul v. de la Paz

Issue: Whether the word court refers to the Court of

Appeals or the trial court?

Statute: RA 5343 Effect of Appeal- Appeal shall not stay the

award, order, ruling, decision or judgment unless the officer
or body rendering the same or the court, on motion, after
hearing & on such terms as it may deem just should provide
otherwise.

Held: It refers to the TRIAL COURT. If the adverse party

intends to appeal from a decision of the SEC and pending
appeal desires to stay the execution of the decision, then the
motion must be filed with and be heard by the SEC before
the adverse party perfects its appeal to the Court of Appeals.

Purpose of the law: the need for immediacy of execution of

decisions arrived at by said bodies was imperative.
Meaning of term dictated by context

The context in which the word or term is employed may

dictate a different sense

Verba accipienda sunt secundum materiam- a word is to be

understood in the context in which it is used.
People v. Chavez

Statute: Family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt

from execution, forced sale or attachment, except for non
payment of debts

Word debts means obligations in general.

Krivenko v. Register of Deeds

Statute: lands were classified into timber, mineral and

agricultural

Word agricultural used in broad sense to include all

lands that are neither timber, nor mineral, such being the
context in which the term is used.

Peo. v. Nazario

Statute: Municipal tax ordinance provides any owner or

manager of fishponds shall pay an annual tax of a fixed
amount per hectare and it appears that the owner of the
fishponds is the government which leased them to a private
person who operates them

Word: Owner does not include government as the

ancient principle that government is immune from taxes.
Where the law does not distinguish

Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus - where

the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.

Corollary principle: General words or phrases in a statute

should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general
significance

General term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and

one part distinguished from the other to justify its exclusion
from operation.

Corollary principle: where the law does not make any

exception, courts may not except something therefrom,
unless there a compelling reason to justify it.

Application: when legislature laid down a rule for one class,

no difference to other class.
Presumption: that the legislature made no qualification in the
general use of a term.
Robles v. Zambales Chromite Co.

Statute: grants a person against whom the possession of any

land is unlawfully withheld the right to bring an action for
unlawful detainer.

Held: any land not exclusive to private or not exclusively to

public; hence, includes all kinds of land.
Director of Lands v. Gonzales

Statute: authorizes the director of lands to file petitions for

cancellation of patents covering public lands on the ground
therein provided.

Held: not distinguished whether lands belong to national or

local government
SSS v. City of Bacolod

Issue: exempts the payment of realty taxes to properties

owned by RP

Held: no distinction between properties held in sovereign,

governmental, or political capacity and those possessed in
proprietary or patrimonial character.

Velasco v. Lopez

Statute: certain formalities be followed in order that act

may be considered valid.

Held: no distinction between essential or non-essential

formalities
Colgate-Palmolive Phils v. Gimenez

Statute: does not distinguish between stabilizer and flavors

used in the preparation of food and those used in the
manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream

Oliva v. Lamadrid

Statute: allows the redemption or repurchase of a homestead

property w/in 5 years from its conveyance

Held: conveyance not distinguished - voluntary or

involuntary.
Escosura v. San Miguel Brewery Inc.

Statute: grants employee leaves of absence with pay

Held: with pay refers to full pay and not to half or less than
full pay; to all leaves of absence and not merely to sick or
vacation leaves.
Olfato v. COMELEC

Statute: makes COMELEC the sole judge of all preproclamation controversies

Held : all covers national, provincial, city or municipal

Phil. British Assurance Co. v. Intermediate Apellate Court

Statute: A counterbond is to secure the payment of any

judgment, when execution is returned unsatisfied

Held: any judgment includes not only final and executory

but also judgment pending appeal whose execution ordered
is returned unsatisfied.
Ramirez v. CA

Statute: Act to Prohibit & Penalize Wire Tapping and Other

related Violations of Private Communications and Other
Purposes

It shall be unlawful, not being authorized by all the parties

to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any
wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement

Issue: Whether violation thereof refers to the taping of a

communication other than a participant to the
communication or even to the taping by a participant who
did not secure the consent of the party to the conversations.

Held: Law did not distinguish whether the party sought to be

penalized ought to be party other than or different from those
involved in the private communication. The intent is to
penalize all persons unauthorized to make any such
recording, underscored by any
Ligget & Myers Tobacco Co. v. CIR

Statute: imposes a specific tax on cigarettes containing

Virginia tobacco . Provided that of the length exceeds 71
millimeters or the weight per thousand exceeds 1 kilos, the
tax shall be increased by 100%.

Issue: whether measuring length or weight of cigars, filters

should be excluded therefrom, so that tax would come under
the general provision and not under the proviso?

Held: Not having distinguished between filter and non-filter

cigars, court should not distinguish.

Tiu San v. Republic

Issue: whether the conviction of an applicant for

naturalization for violation of a municipal ordinance would
disqualify him from taking his oath as a citizen.

Statute: An applicant may be allowed to take his oath as a

citizen after 2 years from the promulgation of the decision
granting his petition for naturalization if he can show that
during the intervening period he has not been convicted of
any offense or violation of government rules

Held: law did not make any distinction between mala in se

and mala prohibita. Conviction of the applicant from
violation of municipal ordinance is comprehended within the
statute and precludes applicant from taking his oath.
Peralta v. CSC

Issue: whether provision of RA 2625, that government

employees are entitled to 15 days vacation leaves of absence
with full pay and 15 days sick leaves with full pay,
exclusives of Saturday, Sundays or holidays in both cases,
applies only to those who have leave credits and not to those
who have none.

Held: Law speaks of granting of a right and does not

distinguish between those who have accumulated and those
who have none.
Pilar v. COMELEC

Statute: RA 7166 provides that Every candidate shall,

within 30 days after the day of the election file xxx true and
itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in
connection with the election.

Held: Law did not distinguish between a candidate who

pushed through and one who withdrew it.

Every candidate refers to one who pursued and even to

those who withdrew his candidacy.
Sanciagco v. Rono

(where the distinction appears from the statute, the courts

should make the distinction)

Statute: Sec 13 of BP Blg. 697 which provides that: Any

person holding public appointive or position shall ipso facto
cease in office or position as of the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy

Governors, mayors, members of various sanggunians or

barangay officials shall upon the filing of candidacy, be
considered on forced leave of absence from office

Facts: an elective Barangay. Captain was elected President of

Association of Barangay Councils and pursuant thereto
appointed by the President as member of the Sanggunian
Panlungsod. He ran for Congress but lost.

Issue: He then wants to resume his duties as member of

sangguiniang panlungsod. He was merely forced on leave
when he ran for Congress.

Held: the Secretary of Local Government denied his request;

being an appointive sanggunian member, he was deemed
automatically resigned when he filed his certificate of
candidacy.
Garvida v. Sales, Jr.

Issue: whether petitioner who was over 21 but below 22 was

qualified to be an elective SK member

Statute: Sec.424 of the LGC provides that a member of the

Katipunan ng Kabataan must not be 21 yrs old.

Sec. 428 as additional requirement provides that elective

official of Sangguniang Kabataan must not be more than 21
yrs. on the day of election

Held: the distinction is apparent: the member may be more

than 21 years of age on election day or on the day he
registers as member of Katipunan ng Kabataan. But the

elective official, must not be more than 21 years of age on

the day of election.
Disjunctive and conjunctive words

Word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and

independence of one thing from each other.
Peo v. Martin

Statute: Sec. 40 of Commonwealth Act 61, punishes any

individual who shall bring into or land in the Philippines or
conceals or harbors any alien not duly admitted by any
immigration officer

does not justify giving the word a disjunctive meaning, since

the words bring into land, conceals and harbors
being four separate acts each possessing its distinctive,
different and disparate meaning.
CIR v. Manila Jockey Club

Statute: imposes amusement taxes on gross receipts of

proprietor, lessee, or operator of amusement place

Held: or implies that tax should be paid by either

proprietor, lessee, or operator, as the case may be, single &
not by all at the same time.

Use of or between 2 phrases connotes that either phrase

serves as qualifying phrase.
or means and, WHEN THE SPIRIT OR CONTEXT OF
THE LAW SO WARRANTS

Trinidad v. Bermudez (e.g. of or to mean and)

Statute: Sec. 2, Rule 112 of Rules of Court authorizing

municipal judges to conduct preliminary examination or
investigation

or equivalent of that is to say

SMC v. Municipality of Mandaue (e.g. of or equivalent of that is to

say)

Ordinance: imposes graduated quarterly fixed tax

based on the gross value in money or actual market value

of articles; phrase or actual market value intended to
explain gross value in money.

or means successively
Statute: Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code - the offenses
of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall
not be prosecuted except upon a complaint by the offended
party or her parents, grandparents or guardian.
Although these persons are mentioned disjunctively,
provision must be construed as meaning that the right to
institute a criminal proceeding is exclusively and
successively reposed in said persons in the order mentioned,
no one shall proceed if there is any person previously
mentioned therein with legal capacity to institute the action.
And is a conjunction pertinently defined as meaning
together with, joined with, along with, added to or
linked to
o Never to mean or
o Used to denote joinder or union
and/or - means that effect should be give to both
conjunctive and disjunctive term
o term used to avoid construction which by use of
disjunctive or alone will exclude the
combination of several of the alternatives or by the
use of conjunctive and will exclude the efficacy
of any one of the alternatives standing alone.

ASSOCIATED WORDS
Noscitur a sociis

where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or

equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made clear and specific by considering
the company of words in which it is found or with which it is
associated.

to remove doubt refer to the meaning of associated or

companion words
Buenaseda v. Flavier

Statute: Sec. 13(3), Art XI of the Constitution grants

Ombudsman power to Direct the officer concerned to take
appropriate action against a public official or employee at
fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion,
fine censure or prosecution.

suspension is a penalty or punitive measure not

preventive
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.

Stat: Sec. 458 of LGC authorized local government units to

prevent or suppress Gambling & other prohibited games of
chance.

Gambling refers only to illegal gambling, like other

prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed
& not to gambling authorized by specific statutes.
Carandang v. Santiago

Issue: Whether an offended party can file a separate and

independent civil action for damages arising from physical
injuries during pendency of criminal action for frustrated
homicide.

Statute: Art. 33 of Civil Code in case of defamation, fraud,

& physical injuries

Held: Court ruled that physical injuries not as one defined

in RPC, but to mean bodily harm or injury such as physical
injuries, frustrate homicide, or even death.
Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh

Issue: Whether proceedings in civil cases pending in court

under the so called Republic of the Philippines established
during the Japanese military occupation are affected by the
proclamation of Gen. McArthur issued on October 23, 1944
that all laws, regulations and processes of any other
government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect.

Processes does not refer to judicial processes but to the

executive orders of the Chairman of the Philippine
Executive Committee, ordinances promulgated by the
President of so-called RP, and others that are of the same
class as the laws and regulations with which the word
processes is associated.

Commissioner of Customs v. Phil. Acetylene Co.

Statute: Sec. 6 of RA 1394 provides that tax provided for

in Sec. 1 of this Act shall not be imposed against the
importation into the Philippines of machinery or raw
materials to be used by new and necessary industry xxx;
machinery equipment, spare parts, for use of industries

Issue: Is the word industries used in ordinary, generic

sense, which means enterprises employing relatively large
amounts of capital and/or labor?

Held: Since industries used in the law for the 2nd time is
classified together with the terms miners, mining
industries, planters and farmers, obvious legislative intent is
to confine the meaning of the term to activities that tend to

produce or create or manufacture such as those miners,

mining enterprises, planters and farmers.
If used in ordinary sense, it becomes inconsistent and
illogical

Appeals, enumerated as follows: Court of Agrarian

Relations, Sec. of Labor, Social Security Commission
etc; From grouping, the enumeration in Sec. 5 means
Court of Agrarian Relations not CA.

Peo. v. Santiago

Issue: Whether defamatory statements through the medium

of an amplifier system constitutes slander or libel?

Libel: committed by means of writing, printing,

lithography, engraving, radio, cinematographic exhibiton.

It is argued that amplifier similar to radio

Held: No. Radio should be considered as same terms with

writing and printing whose common characteristic is the
permanent means of publication.

Ejusdem generis (or the same kind or species)

General rule: where a general word or phrase follows an

enumeration of particular and specific words of the same
class or where the latter follow the former, the general word
or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to,
persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same
kind or class as those specifically mentioned.

Purpose: give effect to both particular or general words, by

treating the particular words as indicating the class and the
general words as indicating all that is embraced in said
class, although not specifically named by the particular
words.

Principle: based on proposition that had the legislature

intended the general words to be used in their generic and
unrestricted sense, it would have not enumerated the
specific words.

Presumption: legislators addressed specifically to the

particularization

San Miguel Corp. v. NLRC

Issue: Whether claim of an employee against his employer

for cash reward or submitting process to eliminate defects
in quality & taste of San Miguel product falls within
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter of NLRC?

Held: No. Outside of jurisdiction. Not necessary that entire

universe of money claims under jurisdiction of labor arbiter
but only those to 1.) unfair labor practices, 2.) claims
concerning terms & conditions of employment 4.) claims
relating to household services 5.) activities prohibited to
employers & employees.

Statute: jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the NLRC, as

last amended by BP Blg. 227 including paragraph 3 all
money claims of workers, including hose based on
nonpayment or underpayment of wages, overtime
compensation, separation pay, and other benefits provided
by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for
employees compensation, social security, medicare and
maternity benefits.
Ebarle v. Sucaldito

Statute: EO 265 outlines the procedure which complainants

charging government officials and employees with
commission of irregularities should be guided, applies to
criminal actions or complaints.

EO 265 complaints against public officials and employees

shall be promptly acted upon and disposed of by the officials
or authorities concerned in accordance with pertinent laws
and regulations so that the erring officials and employees can
be soonest removed or otherwise disciplines and the
innocent, exonerated or vindicated in like manner, and to the
end also that other remedies, including court action, may be
pursued forthwith by the interested parties, after
administrative remedies shall have been exhausted

Held: executive order does not apply to criminal actions.

The term is closely overshadowed by the qualification After administrative remedies shall have been exhausted,
which suggest civil suits subject to previous administrative
actions.
Mottomul v. dela Paz

Issue: Whether the word court in Sec 5, Art 5434: Appeal

shall not stay the award, order, ruling, decision or judgment
unless the officer or body rendering the same or the court,
on motion after hearing, and on such terms as it may deem
just should provide otherwise. The propriety of a stay
granted by the officer or body rendering the award, order,
ruling, decision or judgment may be raised only by motion
in the main case, refers to the CA or to the Court of
Agrarian Relations?

Held: Correct construction made clear with reference to

Sec. 1 of RA 5434, where the court, officers or bodies
whose decision, award are appealable to the Court of

Illustration
Mutuc v. COMELEC

Statute: Act makes unlawful the distribution of electoral

propaganda gadgets, pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic
goods, materials and the like

Held: and the like, does not embrace taped jingles for
campaign purposes
Murphy, Morris & Co. v. Collector of Customs

Statute: Dynamos, generators, exciters, and other machinery

for the generation of electricity for lighting or for power;

Held: phrase other machinery would not include steam

turbines, pumps, condensers, because not same kind of
machinery with dynamos, generators and exciters.
Vera v. Cuevas

Statute: all condensed skimmed milk and all milk in

whatever form shall be clearly and legibly marked on its
immediate containers with words: This milk is not suitable
for nourishment for infants less than 1 year of age

Held: restricts the phrase all milk in whatever form,

excluded filled milk.
Graphilon v. Municipal Court of Cigara

Statute: the vice-mayor shall be entitled to assume the office

of the mayor during the absence, suspension or other
temporary disability

Held: anything which disables the mayor from exercising the

power and prerogatives of his office, since their temporary
disability follows the words absence and suspension
Peo. v. Magallanes

Where a law grants a court exclusive jurisdiction to hear and

decide offenses or felonies committed by public officials
and employees in relation to their office, the phrase IN
RELATION TO THEIR OFFICE qualifies or restricts the
offense to one which cannot exist without the office, or the
office is a constituent element of the crime defined in the
statute or one perpetuated in the performance, though
improper or irregular, of his official functions

Cu Unjieng Sons, Inc. v. Bord of Tax Appeals

Issue: whether losses due to the war were to be deductible

from gross income of 1945 when they were sustained, or in
1950 when Philippine War Damage Commission advised
that no payment would be made for said losses?

Statute: In the case of a corporation, all losses actually

sustained and not charged off within the taxable year and not
compensated for by insurance or otherwise.

Contention: the assurances of responsible public officials

before the end of 1945 that property owners would be
compensated for their losses as a result of the war sufficed to
place the losses within the phrase compensated xxx
otherwise than by insurance

Held: Rejected! Otherwise in the clause compensated for

by insurance or otherwise refers to compensation due under
a title analogous or similar to insurance. Inasmuch as the
latter is a contract establishing a legal obligation, it follows
that in order to be deemed compensated for xxx
otherwise, the losses sustained by a taxpayer must be
covered by a judicially enforceable right, springing from any
of the juridical sources of obligations, namely, law, contract,
quasi-contract, torts, or crimes, and not mere
pronouncement of public officials
Cebu Institute of Technology v. Ople
Issue: Whether teachers hired on contract basis are entitled to
service incentive leave benefits as against the claim that
they are not so?
Statute: Rule V of IRR of Labor Code: This rule (on service
incentive leaves) shall apply to all employees, except filed
personnel and other employees whose performance is
unsupervised by the employer including those who are
engaged on task or contract basis.
Held: those who were employed on task or contract basis
should be related with field personnel, apply the principle,
clearly teachers are not field personnel and therefore entitled
to service incentive leave benefits.
Cagayan Valley Enterprises v. CA

Issue: whether the phrase other lawful beverages which

gives protection to manufacturer with the Phil. Patent Office
its duly stamped or marked bottles used for soda water,
mineral or aerated waters, cider, milk, cream or other lawful
beverages, includes hard liquor?

Statute title: An Act to regulate the use of stamped or

marked bottles, boxes, casks, kegs, barrels, & other similar
containers.

Held: The title clearly shows intent to give protection to all

marked bottles of all lawful beverages regardless of nature of
contents.
National Power Corp. v. Angas

Issue: whether the term judgment, refers to any judgment

directing the payment of legal interest.

Statute: Central Bank Circular # 416 by virtue of the

authority granted to it under Sec. 1 of Act Number 2655, as
amended, otherwise known as Usury Law, the Monetary
Board in a resolution prescribed that the rate of interest for
loan or forbearance of any money, good or credit & the rate
allowed in judgment in the absence of express contract shall
be 12% per annum.

Held: Judgments should mean only judgments involving

loans or forbearance money, goods or credit, these later
specific terms having restricted the meaning judgments to
those same class or the same nature as those specifically
enumerated.

Republic v. Migrino

Facts: retired military officer was investigated by the PCGG

for violation of Anti-Graft Act in relation to EO # 1 & 2
authorizing the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth from the
former Presidents subordinates and close associates

Issue: Does PCGG have jurisdiction to investigate such

military officer for being in service during the administration
of the former President?

Held: Subordinates refers only to one who enjoys close

association or relation to the former President and his wife;
term close associates restricted the meaning of
subordinates
Limitations of ejusdem generis

Requisites:
o Statute contains an enumeration of particular &
specific words, followed by general word or phrase
o Particular and specific words constitute a class or
are the same kind
o Enumeration of the particular & specific words is
not exhaustive or is not merely by examples
o There is no indication of legislative intent to give
the general words or phrases a broader meaning
Rule of ejusdem generis, is not of universal application; it
should use to carry out, not defeat the intent of the law.
US v. Santo Nino

Statute: It shall be unlawful to for any person to carry

concealed about his person any bowie, knife, dagger, kris or
other deadly weapon. Provided prohibition shall not apply to
firearms who have secured a license or who are entitled to
carry the same under the provisions of this Act.

Issue: does the deadly weapon include an unlicensed

revolver?

Held: Yes! Carrying such would be in violation of statute.

By the proviso, it manifested its intention to include in the
prohibition weapons other than armas blancas therein
specified.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Social Security Commission

Issue: a religious institution invoking ejusdem generi

whether employer be limited to undertaking an activity
which has an element of profit or gain?

Statute: any person, natural or juridical, domestic or

foreign, who carried in the Philippines any trade, business,
industry. and uses the services of another person, who
under his orders as regard the employment, except the
Government, and any of its political subdivisions branches or
instrumentalities and GOCCs.

Held: No. the rule of ejusdem generis applies only when

there is uncertainty. The definition is sufficiently
comprehensive to include charitable institutions and charities
not for profit; it contained exceptions which said institutions
and entities are not included.
Expressio unius est exclusion alterius

The express mention of one person, thing or consequence

implies the exclusion of all others.

Rule may be expressed in a number of ways:

o Expressum facit cessare tacitum - what is
expressed puts an end to that which is implied
where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to
certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to other matters.
o Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis A thing not being excepted must be regarded as
coming within the purview of the general rule

Expressio unius est exclusion alterius - The

expression of one or more things of a class implies
the exclusion of all not expressed, even though all
would have been implied had none been expressed;
opposite the doctrine of necessary implication

Negative-opposite doctrine

Argumentum a contrario- what is expressed puts an end to

what is implied.
Chung Fook v. White

Statute: case exempts the wife of a naturalized American

from detention, for treatment in a hospital, who is afflicted
with a contagious disease.

Held: Court denied petition for writ of habeas corpus (filed

by the native-born American citizen on behalf of wife
detained in hospital), court resorted to negative-opposite
doctrine, stating that statute plainly relates to wife of a
naturalized citizen & cannot interpolate native-born
citizen.

Analysis: courts application results to injustice (as should

not discriminate against native-born citizens), which is not
intent of law, should have used doctrine of necessary
implication.
Application of expression unius rule
Generally used in construction of statutes granting powers,
creating rights and remedies, restricting common rights,
imposing rights & forfeitures, as well as statutes strictly
construed.
Acosta v. Flor

Statute: specifically designates the persons who may bring

actions for quo warranto, excludes others from bringing such
actions.
Escribano v. Avila

Statute: for libel, preliminary investigations of criminal

actions for written defamation xxx shall be conducted by the
city fiscal of province or city or by municipal court of city or
capital of the province where such actions may be instituted
precludes all other municipal courts from conducting such
preliminary investigations
Peo. v. Lantin

Statute: crimes which cannot be prosecuted de oficio namely

adultery, concubinage, seduction, rape or acts of
lasciviousness; crimes such as slander can be prosecuted de
oficio.

Vera v. Fernandez

Statute: All claims for money against the decedent, arising

from contracts, express or implied, whether the same be due,
not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and
expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment
for money against decedent, must be filled within the time
limit of the notice, otherwise barred forever.

Held: The taxes due to the government, not being mentioned

in the rule are excluded from the operation of the rule.
Mendenilla v. Omandia

Statute: changed the form of government of a municipality

into a city provides that the incumbent mayor, vice-mayor
and members of the municipal board shall continue in office
until the expiration of their terms.

Held: all other municipal offices are abolished.

Butte v. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.

Statute: Legislature deliberately selected a particular method

of giving notice, as when a co-owner is given the right of
legal redemption within 30 days from notice in writing by
the vendor in case the other co-owner sells his share is the
co-owned property,

Held: the method of giving notice must be deemed excusive

& a notice sent by vendee is ineffective.
Villanueva v. City of Iloilo

Statute: Local Autonomy Act, local governments are given

broad powers to tax everything, except those which are
specifically mentioned therein. If a subject matter does not
come within the exceptions, an ordinance imposing a tax on
such subject matter is deemed to come within the broad
taxing power, exception firmat regulam in casibus non
exceptis.
Samson v. Court of Appeals

Where the law provides that positions in the government

belong to the competitive service, except those declared by
law to be in the noncompetitive service and those which are
policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly
technical in nature and enumerates those in the
noncompetitive as including SECRETARIES OF
GOVERNORS AND MAYORS, the clear intent is that
assistant secretaries of governors and mayors fall under the
competitive service, for by making an enumeration, the
legislature is presumed to have intended to exclude those not
enumerated, for otherwise it would have included them in
the enumeration
Firman General Insurance Corp. v. CA

The insurance company disclaimed liability since death

resulting from murder was impliedly excluded in the
insurance policy as the cause of death is not accidental but
rather a deliberate and intentional act, excluded by the very
nature of a personal accident insurance.

Held: the principle expresssio unius est exclusio - the

mention of one thing implies the exclusion of the other thing
- not having been expressly included in the enumeration of
circumstances that would negate liability in said insurance
policy cannot be considered by implication to discharge the
petitioner insurance company to include death resulting from
murder or assault among the prohibited risks lead inevitably
to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt
itself from liability for such death

Insurance company still liable for the injury, disability and

loss suffered by the insured. (sobra to, I swear! Minurder na
nga, ayaw pang bayaran! Sobra! Hindi daw accidental eh
di mas lalo ng kailangang bayaran dahil murder! Sus! Sus!)
Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos

Issue: whether the solicitation for religious purposes, i.e.,

renovation of church without securing permit fro Department
of Social Services, is a violation of PD 1564, making it a
criminal offense for a person to solicit or receive
contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes.

Held: No. Charitable and religious specifically enumerated

only goes to show that the framers of the law in question
never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes
within its coverage.
Limitations of the rule
1. It is not a rule of law, but merely a tool in statutory
construction
2. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius, no more than
auxiliary rule of interpretation to be ignored where other

3.

circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not intended

to be exclusive.
Does not apply where enumeration is by way of example or
to remove doubts only.

Gomez v. Ventura

Issue: whether the prescription by a physician of opium for a

patient whose physical condition did not require the use of
such drug constitutes unprofessional conduct as to justify
revocation of physicians license to practice

Held: Still liable! Rule of expressio unius not applicable

Court said, I cannot be seriously contended that aside from

the five examples specified, there can be no other conduct of
a physician deemed unprofessional. Nor can it be
convincingly argued that the legislature intended to wipe out
all other forms of unprofessional conduct therefore deemed
grounds for revocation of licenses
4.

5.
6.

Does not apply when in case a statute appears upon its face
to limit the operation of its provision to particular persons or
things enumerating them, but no reason exists why other
persons or things not so enumerated should not have been
included and manifest injustice will follow by not including
them.
If it will result in incongruities or a violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
If adherence thereto would cause inconvenience, hardship
and injury to the public interest.

Doctrine of casus omissus

A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must
be held to have been omitted intentionally.
The maxim operates only if and when the omission has been
clearly established, and in such a case what is omitted in the
enumeration may not, by construction, be included therein.
Exception: where legislature did not intend to exclude the
person, thing or object from the enumeration. If such
legislative intent is clearly indicated, the court may supply
the omission if to do so will carry out the clear intent of the
legislature and will not do violence to its language
Doctrine of last antecedent

Qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or

phrases to which they are immediately associated not those
which are distantly or remotely located.

Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur

sententia relative words refer to the nearest antecedents,
unless the context otherwise requires

Rule: use of a comma to separate an antecedent from the rest

exerts a dominant influence in the application of the doctrine
of last antecedent.
Illustration of rule
Pangilinan v. Alvendia

Members of the family of the tenant includes the tenants

son, son-in-law, or grandson, even though they are not
dependent upon him for support and living separately from
him BECAUSE the qualifying phrase who are dependent
upon him for support refers solely to its last antecedent,
namely, such other person or persons, whether related to the
tenant or not
Florentino v. PNB

Issue: whether holders of backpay certificates can compel

government-owned banks to accept said certificates in
payment of the holders obligations to the bank.

Statute: obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of

this amendatory act for which the applicant may directly be
liable to the government or to any of its branches or
instrumentalities, or to corporations owned or controlled by
the government, or to any citizens of the Philippines or to
any association or corporation organized under the laws of
the Philippines, who may be wiling to accept the same for
such settlement
Held: the court, invoking the doctrine of last antecedent,
ruled that the phrase qualify only to its last antecedent
namely any citizen of the Philippines or association or
corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines
The court held that backpay certificate holders can compel
government-owned banks to accept said certificates for
payment of their obligations with the bank.

Qualifications of the doctrine.

1. Subject to the exception that where the intention of the law is
to apply the phrase to all antecedents embraced in the
provision, the same should be made extensive to the whole.
2. Doctrine does not apply where the intention is not to qualify
the antecedent at all.
Reddendo singular singuilis

Variation of the doctrine of last antecedent

Referring each to each;

Referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object,

or let each be put in its proper place, that is, the word should
be taken distributively.
Peo. v Tamani

Issue: when to count the 15-day period within which to

appeal a judgment of conviction of criminal actiondate of
promulgation of judgment or date of receipt of notice of
judgment.

Statute: Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court

Held: Should be from promulgation should be referring to

judgment, while notice refer to order.
King v. Hernandez

Issue: Whether a Chinese holding a noncontrol position in a

retail establishment, comes within the prohibition against
aliens intervening in the management, operation,
administration or control followed by the phrase whether
as an officer, employee or laborer

Held: Following the principle, the entire scope of personnel

activity, including that of laborers, is covered by the
prohibition against the employment of aliens.
Amadora v. CA

Issue: whether Art 2180 of Civil Code, which states that

lastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trade
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices so long as they remain in their
custody applies to all schools, academic as well as nonacademic

Held: teachers pupils and students; heads of

establishments of arts and trades to apprentices

General rule: responsibility for the tort committed by the

student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student
(where school is academic)

Exception: responsibility for the tort committed by the

student will attach to the head, and only he, (who) shall be
held liable (in case of the establishments of arts and trades;
technical or vocational in nature)

PROVISOS, EXCEPTIONS AND CLAUSES

Provisos, generally

to limit the application of the enacting clause, section or

provision of a statute, or except something, or to qualify or
restrain its generality, or exclude some possible ground of
misinterpretation of it, as extending to cases not intended by
legislature to be brought within its purview.

Rule: restrain or qualify the generality of the enacting clause

or section which it refers.

Purpose: limit or restrict the general language or operation of

the statute, not to enlarge it.

Location: commonly found at the end of a statute, or

provision & introduced, as a rule, by the word Provided.

Determined by: What determines whether a clause is a

proviso is its substance rather than its form. If it performs
any of the functions of a proviso, then it will be regarded as
such, irrespective of what word or phrase is used to introduce
it.
Proviso may enlarge scope of law

It is still the duty of the courts to ascertain the legislative

intention and it prevails over proviso.

Thus it may enlarge, than restrict

U.S. v. Santo Nino

Statute: it shall be unlawful for any person to carry

concealed about his person any bowie, knife, dagger, kris or
any other deadly weapon: Provided, that this provision shall
not apply to firearms in the possession of persons who have
secured a license therefore or who are entitled to same under
provisions of this Act.

Held: through the Proviso it manifested the intention to

include in the prohibition weapons other than armas blancas
as specified.
Proviso as additional legislation

Expressed in the opening statement of a section of a statute

Would mean exactly the reverse of what is necessarily

implied when read in connection with the limitation

Purpose:
o To limit generalities
o Exclude from the scope of the statute that which
otherwise would be within its terms
What proviso qualifies
General rule: qualifies or modifies only the phrase
immediately preceding it; or restrains or limits the
generality of the clause that it immediately follows.
Exception: unless it clearly appears that the legislature
intended to have a wider scope
Chinese Flour Importers Assn v. Price Stabilization Board

Statute: Sec. 15 RA 426 - Any existing law, executive order

or regulation to the contrary notwithstanding, no government
agency except the Import Control Commission shall allocate
the import quota among the various importers. Provided,
That the Philippine Rehabilitation and Trade Administration
shall have exclusive power and authority to determine and
regulate the allocation of wheat flour among importers.

Issue: whether or not the proviso excluded wheat flour from

the scope of act itself.

Held:
NO! Proviso refer to the clause immediately
preceding it and can have no other meaning than that the
function of allocating the wheat flour instead of assigning to
Import Control Commission was assigned to PRTA.

If wheat flour is exempted from the provisions of the Act,

the proviso would have been placed in the section containing
the repealing clause

Collector of Internal Revenue v. Angeles

When an earlier section of statute contains proviso, not

embodied in later section, the proviso, not embodied in a
later section thereof, in the absence of legislative intent, be
confined to qualify only the section to which it has been
appended.
Flores v. Miranda

Issue: Petitioner that approval of the Public Service

Commission of the sale of public service vehicle was not
necessary because of proviso in Sec. 20 of Commonwealth
Act No. 146

Statute: It shall be unlawful for any public service vehicle or

for the owner, lessee or operator thereof, without the
previous approval and authority of the Commission
previously had xxx to sell, alienate xxx its property,
franchise; Provided, however, that nothing herein contained
shall be construed to prevent the transaction from being
negotiated or completed before its approval or to prevent the
sale, alienation, or lease by any public service of any of its
property in the ordinary course of business

Held:
o the proviso xxx means only that the sale without
the required approval is still valid and binding
between the parties; also
o the phrase in the ordinary course of business xxx
could not have been intended to include sale of
vehicle itself, but at most may refer only to such
property that may be conceivably disposed of by
the carrier in the ordinary course of its business,
like junked equipment.
Mercado Sr. v. NLRC

Held: the proviso in par 2 of Art 280 relates only to casual

employees; not to project employees.

Applying rule that proviso to be construed with reference to

immediately preceding part of the provision which it is
attached and not to other sections thereof, unless legislative
intent was to restrict or qualify.
Exception to the rule

Proviso construed to qualify only the immediately preceding

part of the section to which it is attached; if no contrary
legislative intent is indicated.

Where intent is to qualify or restrict the phrase preceding it

or the earlier provisions of the statute or even the statute
itself as a whole, then the proviso will be construed in that
manner, in order that the intent of the law may be carried out
Repugnancy between proviso and main provision

Where there is a conflict between the proviso and the main

provision, that which is located in a later portion of the
statute prevails, unless there is legislative intent to the
contrary.

Latter provision, whether provision or not, is given

preference for it is the latest expression of the intent of the
legislation.
Exceptions, generally

Exception consists of that which would otherwise be

included in the provision from which it is excepted.

It is a clause which exempts something from the operation of

a statute by express words.

except, unless otherwise, and shall not apply

May not be introduced by words mentioned above, as long as

if such removes something from the operation of a provision
of law.
Function: to confirm the general rule; qualify the words or
phrases constituting the general rule.
Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus exceptis - A thing not
being excepted, must be regarded as coming within the
purview of the general rule.
Doubts: resolved in favor of general rule

1st clause- 2 excpetions (a) Person penalized by less than 1

yr.; and (2) Person granted an absolute pardon
2nd clause - creates exception to 1st but not to 2nd that a
person convicted of crime against property cannot vote
unless theres pardon.
Held: absolute pardon for any crime for which one year of
imprisonment or more was meted out restores the prisoner to
his political rights.
If penalty less 1 yr, disqualification not apply, except when
against property- needs pardon.
The 2nd clause creates the exception to the 1st

Exception and Proviso distinguished

Exception:

Exempts something absolutely from the operation of statute

Takes out of the statute something that otherwise would be a

part of the subject matter of it.

Part of the enactment itself, absolutely excluding from its

operation some subject or thing that would otherwise fall
within the scope.
Proviso:

Defeats its operation conditionally.

Avoids by way of defeasance or excuse

If the enactment is modified by engrafting upon it a new

provision, by way of amendment, providing conditionally for
a new case- this is the nature of proviso.
Similar: in a way since one of the functions of proviso is to except
something from an enacting clause.
Illustration of exception
MERALCO v. Public Utilities Employees Association

Statute: No person, firm, or corporation, business

establishment or place shall compel an employee or laborer
to work on Sundays& legal holidays, unless paid an
additional sum of at least 25% of his renumeration:
Provided, that this prohibition shall not apply to public
utilities performing public service, e.g. supplying gas,
electricity, power, water etc

Issue: Is MERALCO liable to pay the 25% for employees

who work during holidays and Sundays?

Held: Negative. 2nd part is an exception although introduced

by Provided. As appellant is a public utility that supplies
electricity & provides means of transportation, it is evident
that appellant is exempt from qualified prohibition
established in the enactment clause.
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

Statute: No bill shall be passed by either House shall become

a law unless it has passed 3 readings on separate days, &
printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed
to its Members 3 days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency.

Held: it qualifies only its nearest antecedent, which is the

distribution of the printed bill in its final form 3 days from its
final passage.& not the 3 readings on separate days.
Pendon v. Diasnes

Issue: whether a person convicted of a crime against

property, who was granted absolute pardon by the President,
is entitled to vote?

Statute: A person shall not be qualified to vote who has

been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more
from imprisonment, such disability not having been removed
any plenary pardon or who has been declared by final
judgment guilty of any crime against property.

Gorospe v. CA (exception need not be introduced by except or

unless)

Statute: Rule 27 of Rules of Court, service by registered

mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee; but if
fail to claim his mail from the post office within 5 days from
ate of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect
at the expiration of such time.

Issue: Whether actual receipt the date of a registered mail

after 5 day period, is the date from which to count the
prescriptive period to comply with certain requirements.

Held: Service is completed on the 5th day after the 1st notice,
even if he actually received the mail months later.

2nd part is separated by semicolon, and begins with but

which indicates exception.
Saving clause

Provision of law which operates to except from the effect of

the law what the clause provides, or save something which
would otherwise be lost.

Used to save something from effect of repeal of statute

Legislature, in repealing a statute, may preserve in the form

of a saving clause, the right of the state to prosecute and
punish offenses committed in violation of the repealed law.

Where existing procedure is altered or substituted by

another, usual to save proceedings under the old law at the
time the new law takes effect, by means of saving clause

Construed: in light of intent by legislature

Given strict or liberal meaning depending on nature of

statute.
CHAPTER SIX:
Statute Construed as Whole and in Relation to other Statutes
STATUTE CONSTRUED AS WHOLE
Generally

Statute is passed as a whole

o It should have one purpose and one intent
o Construe its parts and section in connection with
other parts
o Why? To produce a harmonious whole

Never:
o

o
o
o

Divide by process of etymological dissertation

(why? Because there are instances when the
intention of the legislative body is different from
that of the definition in its original sense)
Separate the words (remember that the whole point
of this chapter is to construe it as a whole)
Separate context
Base definitions on lexicographer (what is a
lexicographer? A person who studies lexicography.
What is lexicography then? Analyzes semantic
relationships between lexicon and language not
important. Never mind ) ang kulit!

The whole point of this part is to construe the whole statute

and its part together

Intent ascertained from statute as whole

Legislative
meaning
and
intent
should
be
extracted/ascertained from statutes as a whole (hence the
title)
o Why? Because the law is the best expositor of
itself

Optima Statuti Interpretatio est ipsum statutum - the best

interpreter of a statute is the statute itself

Do not inquire too much into the motives which influenced

the legislative body unless the motive is stated or disclosed
in the statute themselves.
Aisporna v. CA

pointed out that words, clauses, phrases should not be

studied as detached/isolated expressions
o Consider every part in understanding the meaning
of its part to produce a harmonious whole
o Meaning of the law is borne in mind and not to be
extracted from a single word
o Most important: Every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context
Aboitiz Shipping Corp v. City of Cebu

Described that if the words or phrases of statute be taken

individually it might convey a meaning different form the
one intended by the author.

Interpreting words or phrases separately may limit the extent

of the application of the provision
Gaanan v. Intermediate Appellate Court

Case of wire tapping

There is a provision which states that it shall be unlawful

for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word to tap any wire or
cable or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication
or spoken word by using such device commonly known as
dictagraph

Issue: whether the phrase device or arrangement includes

party line and extension

Statcon: it should not be construed in isolation. Rather it

should be interpreted in relation to the other words (tap, to
overhear) thus party line or telephone extension is not
included because the words in the provision limit it to those
that have a physical interruption through a wiretap or the
deliberate installation of device to overhear. (Remember the
maxim noscitus a sociis because in here they applied an
association with other words in construing the intention or
limitation of the statute)
National Tobacco Administration v. COA

Issue: whether educational assistance given to individuals

prior to the enactment of RA 6758 should be continued to be
received?

Held: Yes. Proper interpretation of section12 RA 6758

depends on the combination of first and second paragraph

First sentence states that such other additional

compensation not otherwise specified as may be determined
by the DBM shall be deemed included in the standardized
salary rates herein prescribed. The second sentence states
such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in
kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989
not integrated into the standard shall continue to be
authorized.

statcon: do not isolate or detach the parts. Construing a

statute as a whole includes reconciling and harmonizing
conflicting provisions

Purpose or context as controlling guide

construe whole statute and ascertain the meaning of the

words or phrases base on its context, the nature of the
subject, and purpose or intention of the legislative body who
enacted the statute

give it a reasonable construction

Leeway are accepted on grammatical construction, letters of

the statutes, rhetorical framework if it can provide a clear
and definite purpose of the whole statute ( as long as it can
produce a clear and definite statutes, it is sometimes affected
to be lax on the construction of grammar)

Harmonize the parts of each other and it should be consistent

with its scope and object
Giving effect to statute as a whole

Why construe a statute as a whole? - Because it implies that

one part is as important as the other

What if the provision/section is unclear by itself? - One can

make it clear by reading and construing it in relation to the
whole statute

How do you properly and intelligently construe a

provision/statute? - 3 ways: (1) Understand its meaning and
scope; (2) apply to an actual case; (3) courts should consider
the whole act itself

Why should every part of the statute be given effect? Because it is enacted as an integrated measure not a
hodgepodge of conflicting provisions

Ways on how the courts should construe a statute (according

to Republic v. Reyes):
o Interpret the thought conveyed by the statute as
whole
o Construe constituent parts together
o Ascertain legislative intent form whole part
o Consider each and every provision in light of the
general purpose
o Make every part effective, harmonious and
sensible (adopt a construction which would give
effect to every part of the of the statute)

Ut res magis valeat quam pereat - the

construction is to be sought which gives
effect to the whole of the statute - of its
every word.
Apparently conflicting provisions reconciled

included in the rule of construing statute as a whole, is the

reconciling and harmonizing conflicting provisions because
it is by this that the statute will be given effect as a whole.

Why is it a must for courts to harmonize conflicting

provision? - Because they are equally the handiwork of the
same legislature
RP v. CA

Issue: whether or not an appeal of cases involving just

compensation should be made first by DARAB before RTC
under Sec. 57

Held: SC said that the contention of the Republic and the

Land Bank in the affirmative side has no merit because
although DARAB is granted a jurisdiction over agrarian
reform matters, it does not have jurisdiction over criminal
cases.
Sajonas v. CA

Issue: what period an adverse claim annotated at the back of

a transfer certificate effective?

Held: In construing the law Sec. 70 of PD 1529 (adverse

claim shall be effective for a period of 30 days from the date
of the registration) care should be taken to make every
part effective

Special and general provisions in same statute

special would overrule the general

special must be operative; general affect only those it applies

except to general provision

Construction as not to render provision nugatory

another consequence of the rule: provision of a statute should

not be construed as to nullify or render another nugatory in
the same statute

Interpretatio fienda est et res magis valeat quam pereat - a

law should be interpreted with a view to upholding rather
than destroying
o Do not construe a statute wherein one portion will
destroy the other
o Avoid a construction which will render to
provision inoperative
Reason for the rule

because of the presumption that the legislature has enacted a

statute whose provisions are in harmony and consistent with
each other and that conflicting intentions is the same statute
are never supported or regarded
Qualification of rule

What if the parts cannot be harmonized or reconciled without

nullifying the other? - Rule is for the court to reject the one
which is least in accord with the general plan of the whole
statute

What if there is no choice? - the latter provision must vacate

the former; last in order is frequently held to prevail unless
intent is otherwise

What if the conflict cannot be harmonized and made to stand

together? - one must inquire into the circumstances of their
passage
Construction as to give life to law

provide sensible interpretation to promote the ends of which

they were enacted

construct them in a reasonable and practical way to give life

to them

Interpretatio fienda es ut res magis valeat quam pereat interpretation will give the efficacy that is to be adopted.
Construction to avoid surplusage

construe the statute to make no part or provision thereof as

surplasage

each and every part should be given due effect and meaning

do not construe a legal provision to be a useless surplusage

and meaningless

exert all efforts to provide the meaning. Why? Because of

the presumption that the legislature used the word or phrase
for a purpose
Application of rule
Mejia v.Balalong

Issue: how to constru next general election in Sec. 88 of

the City Charter of Dagupan City?

Held: the phrase refers to the next general election after the
city came into being and not the one after its organization by
Presidential Proclamation.

Niere v. CFI of Negros Occidental

Issue: does the city mayor have the power to appoint a city
engineer pursuant to Sec. 1 of the City Charter of La Carlote

Held: no, the city mayor does not have such power. The
phrase and other heads and other employees of such
departments as may be created whom the mayor can
appoint, refers to the heads of city departments that may be
created after the law took effect, and does not embrace the
city engineer. To rule otherwise is to render the first
conjunction and before the words fire department a
superfluity and without meaning at all
Uytengsu v Republic

Issue: whether the requirement the requirement for

naturalization that the applicant will reside continuously in
the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up
to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship refers
to actual residence or merely to legal residence or domicile

Held: such requirement refers to actual or physical residence

because to construe it otherwise is to render the clause a
surplusage.

An applicant for naturalization must be actually residing in

the Philippines from the filing of the petition for
naturalization to its determination by the court
Manila Lodge No. 761 v. CA

Issue: whether the reclaimed land is patrimonial or public

dominion?

Held: to say that the land is patrimonial will render nugatory

and a surplusage the phrase of the law to the effect that the
City of Manila is hereby authorized to lease or sell

A sale of public dominion needs a legislative authorization,

while a patrimonial land does not.
Statute and its amendments construed together

rule applies to the construction and its amendments

Whatever changes the legislature made it should be given

effect together with the other parts.
Almeda v. Florentino

Law the municipal board shall have a secretary who shall

be appointed by it to serve during the term of office of the
members thereof

Amendment the vice-mayor shall appoint all employees

of the board who may be suspended or removed in
accordance with law

Construction of both Law and Amendment the power of

the vice-mayor to make appointment pursuant to the
amendatory act is limited to the appointment of all
employees of the board other than the board secretary who is
to be appointed by the board itself
STATUTE CONSTRUED IN RELATION TO CONSTITUTION
AND OTHER STATUTES
Statute construed in harmony with the Constitution

Constitution- the fundamental law to which all laws are

subservient

General Rule: Do not interpret a statute independent from the

constitution

Construe the statute in harmony with the fundamental law:

Why? Because it is always presumed that the legislature
adhered to the constitutional limitations when they enacted
the statute

It is also important to understand a statute in light of the

constitution and to avoid interpreting the former in conflict
with the latter

What if the statute is susceptible to two constructions, one is

constitutional and the other is unconstitutional? A: The
construction that should be adopted should be the one that is
constitutional and the one that will render it invalid should
be rejected.
The Court should favor the construction that gives a statute
of surviving the test of constitutionality
The Court cannot in order to bring a statute within the
fundamental law, amend it by construction

Taada v. Tuvera

this is the case regarding Art. 2 of the Civil Code especially

the phrase unless otherwise provided.

Statcon: one should understand that if the phrase refers to the

publication itself it would violate the constitution (since all
laws should be made public) [if malabo, vague, eh? huh?
cherry will explain it na lang ]
Statutes in Pari Materia

pari materia - refers to any the following:

o same person or thing
o same purpose of object
o same specific subject matter

Later statutes may refer to prior laws.

What if the later law have no reference to the prior law, does
that mean they are not in pari materia? - No. It is sufficient
that they have the same subject matter.

When is a statute not in pari materia? - The conditions above

are the determinants of ascertaining if a statute is in pari
materia, thus even if two statutes are under the same broad
subject as along as their specific subjects are not the same,
they are NOT in pari material
How statutes in Pari Materia construed

Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus

interpretandi modus every statute must be so construed and
harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system
of jurisprudence (parang ganun din nung first part, construe
it as a whole. But also bear in mind that it should also be in
harmony with other existing laws)

Construe statutes in pari materia together to attain the

purpose of an express national policy

Why should they be construed together? - Because of the

assumption that when the legislature enacted the statutes
they were thinking of the prior statute. Prior statutes relating
to the same subject matter are to be compared with the new
provisions.

Again it is important to harmonize the statutes. Courts

should not render them invalid without taking the necessary
steps in reconciling them
Vda de Urbano v. GSIS

there were no facts given in the book except that it was in

this case that in pari materia was explained well. The
explanation are the same in the aforementioned

Other things to consider in constructing statutes which are in

pari materia
o History of the legislation on the subject
o Ascertain the uniform purpose of the legislature
o Discover the policy related to the subject matter
has been changed or modified
o Consider acts passed at prior sessions even those
that have been repealed
Distingue tempora et concordabis jura distinguish times
and you will harmonize laws
In cases of two or more laws with the same subject matter:

o
o

Question is usually whether the later act impliedly

repealed the prior act.
Rule: the only time a later act will be repealed or
amended is when the act itself states so (that it
supersedes all the prior acts) or when there is an
irreconcilable repugnancy between the two.
In the case of implied the doubt will be resolved
against the repeal or amendment and in favor of
the harmonization of the laws on the subject (later
will serve as a modification)

Reasons why laws on same subject are reconciled

2 main reasons:
o The presumption that the legislature took into
account prior laws when they enacted the new one
o Because enactments of the same legislature on the
same subject are supposed to form part of one
uniform system (Why? Because later statutes are
supplementary to the earlier enactments)

If possible construe the two statutes

wherein the provisions of both are given
effect
Where harmonization is impossible

Earlier law should give way to the later law because it is the
current or later expression of the legislative will

Illustration of the rule (in pari materia)

Lacson v. Roque

Issue: the phrase unless sooner removed of a statute that

states the mayor shall hold office for four years unless
sooner removed

statcon: the court held that the phrase should be construed in

relation to removal statutes. Thus the phrase meant that
although the mayor cannot be removed during his term of
office, once he violates those that are stated in removal
statutes.
Chin Oh Foo v. Concepcion

criminal case Article 12(1) exempting circumstance

(imbecile or insane)

Statcon: the phrase shall not be permitted to leave without

first obtaining permission of the same court should be
reconciled with another statute that states any patient
confined in a mental institution may be released by the
Director of Health once he is cured. The Director shall
inform the judge that approved the confinement. These two
statutes refers to a person who was criminally charged but
was proven to be an imbecile or insane, thus they should be
construed together. Their construction would mean that in
order for the patient to be release there should be an approval
of both the court and the Director of Health.
King v. Hernaez

Statcon: relation of RA 1180 (Retail Trade Nationalization

Act) to Commonwealth Act 108 (Anti Dummy Law)
Dialdas v. Percides

Facts: a alien who operated a retail store in Cebu decided to

close his Cebu store and transfer it to Dumaguete. RTL
(retail trade law) and Tax Code Sec. 199 were the statutes
taken into consideration in this case. The former authorizes
any alien who on May 15, 1954 is actually engaged in retail,
to continue to engage therein until his voluntary retirement
from such business, but not to establish or open additional
stores for retail business. The latter provides that any
business for which the privilege tax has been paid may be

removed and continued in any other place without payment

of additional tax.
Issue: whether the transfer by the alien from Cebu to
Dumaguete can be considered as a voluntary retirement from
business.
Held: No. Although the trial court affirmed the question, the
SC ruled otherwise stating that RTC overlooked the clear
provision of Sec. 199.

C & C Commercial Corp v. National Waterworks and Sewerage

Authority

Facts: R.A. 912 (2) states that in construction or repair work

undertaken by the Government, Philippine made materials
and products, whenever available shall be used in
construction or repair work.

Flag Law (Commonwealth Act 138) gives native products

preference in the purchase of articles by Government,
including government owned or controlled corporations.

Issue: interpretation of two statutes requiring that preference

be made in the purchase and use of Phil. Made materials and
products

Held: The SC relates the two statutes as in pari materia and

they should be construed to attain the same objective that is
to give preference to locally produced materials.
Cabada v. Alunan III

Issue: whether or not an appeal lies from the decision of

regional appellate board (RAB) imposing disciplinary action
against a member of the PNP under Sec. 45 of RA 6975
regarding finality of disciplinary action

The court held that the gap in the law which is silent on
filing appeals from decisions of the RAB rendered within the
reglementary period should be construed and harmonized
with other statutes, i.e. Sec 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution because the PNP is part, as a bureau, of the
reorganized DILG, as to form a unified system of
jurisprudence

Statcon: if RAB fails to decide an appealed case within 60

days from receipt of the notice of appeal, the appealed
decision is deemed final and executory, and the aggrieved
party may forthwith appeal therefrom to the Secretary of
DILG. Likewise, if the RAB has decided the appeal within
60-day reglementary period, its decision may still be
appealed to the Secretary of DILG
Manila Jockey Club Inc. v. CA

Issue: who was entitled to breakages (10% dividend of

winning horse race tickets)

Statcon: There are two statutes that should be considered.

RA 309 (amended by 6631 &6632) is silent on the matter but
the practice is to use breakages for anti bookie drive and
other sale promotions. E.O. 88 & 89 which allocated
breakages therein specified. These two should be construed
in pari materia, thus all breakages derived from all races
should be distributed and allocated in accordance with
Executive Orders because no law should be viewed in
isolation. (supplementary)
General and special statutes

General statutes- applies to all of the people of the state or to

a particular class of persons in the state with equal force.
o Universal in application

Special statutes- relates to particular persons or things of a

class or to particular portion or section of the state only

Considered as statutes in pari materia thus they should be

read together and harmonized (and given effect)

What if there are two acts which contain one general and one
special?

If it produces conflict, the special shall prevail

since the legislative intent is more clear thus it
must be taken as intended to constitute an
exception.
o Think of it as one general law of the land while the
other applies only to a particular case
What if the special law is passed before the general law? It
doesnt matter because the special law will still be
considered as an exception unless expressly repealed.

Solid Homes Inc. v. Payawal

First statute provides that National Housing Authority shall

have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
involving unsound real estate (P.D. No. 959).

Second statute grants RTC general jurisdiction over such

cases.

Issue: Which one will prevail?

Held: The first statute will prevail because it is a special law,

as compared to the latter which is general law, thus it is an
exception to the general jurisdiction of the RTC
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp

Facts: P.D. No. 1869 authorized PAGCOR to centralize and

regulate all games of chance.

LGC of 1991, a later law, empowers all government units to

enact ordinances to prevent and suppress gambling and other
games of chance.

Stacon: These two should be harmonized rather than

annulling one and upholding the other. Court said that the
solution to this problem is for the government units to
suppress and prevent all kinds of gambling except those that
are allowed under the previous law
Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court

RA 776 empowers the general manager of the Civil

Aeronautics Administration to lease real property under its
administration.

Administrative Code authorizes the President to execute a

lease contract relating to real property belonging to the
republic

How do you apply the rule? - In this case, the prior (special)
law should prevail
Reason for the rule

the special law is considered an exception to the general law

(as long as same subject)
Qualification of the rule

The rule aforementioned is not absolute.

Exceptions:
o If the legislature clearly intended the general
enactment to cover the whole subject and to repeal
all prior laws inconsistent therewith
o When the principle is that the special law merely
establishes a general rule while the general law
creates a specific and special rule
Reference statutes

a statute which refers to other statutes and makes them

applicable to the subject of legislation

used to avoid encumbering the statute books of unnecessary

repetition

should be construed to harmonize and give effect to the

adopted statute.
Supplemental statutes

Intended to supply deficiencies in existing statutes

Supplemental statutes should be read with the original statute

and construed together

Reenacted statutes

statute which reenacts a previous statute or provision.

Reproducing an earlier statute with the same or substantially

the same words.
Montelibano v. Ferrer

Issue: application of Sec. 3 fo the City Charter of Manila is

valid in the criminal complaint directly file by an offended
party in the city court of Bacolod?

Held: The court ruled that the criminal complaint filed

directly by the offended party is invalid and it ordered the
city court to dismiss it.

The provisions of the City Charter of Manila Bacolod on the

same subject are identically worded, hence they should
receive the same construction.

RULE: two statutes with a parallel scope, purpose and

terminology should each in its own field, have a like
interpretation

Adoption of contemporaneous construction

in construing the reenacted statute, the court should take into

account prior contemporaneous construction and give due
weight and respect to it.

Liberal construction, defined

Equitable construction as will enlarge the letter of a statute to

accomplish its intended purpose, carry out its intent, or
promote justice

Not to mean enlargement of a provision which is clear,

unambiguous and free from doubt

It simply means that the words should receive a fair and

reasonable interpretation, so as to attain the intent, spirit and
purpose of the law
Liberal construction applied, generally

Where a statute is ambiguous, the literal meaning of the

words used may be rejected if the result of adopting said
meaning would be to defeat the purpose of the law

Ut res magis valeat quam pereat that construction is to be

sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute its
every word
Liberal Construction
Equitable construction as will
enlarge the letter of a statute to
accomplish
its
intended
purpose, carry out its intent, or
promote justice
Legitimate exercise of judicial
power

Qualification of the rule

rule that is aforementioned is applicable only when the

statute is capable of the construction given to it and when
that construction has become a settled rule of conduct
Adopted statutes

a statute patterned after a statute of a foreign country.

Court should take into consideration how the courts of other

country construe the law and its practices

CHAPTER SEVEN: Strict or Liberal Construction

IN GENERAL
Generally

Whether a statute is to be given a strict or liberal

construction will depend upon the following:

The nature of the statute

The purpose to be subserved

The mischief to be remedied

Purpose: to give the statute the interpretation that will best

accomplish the end desired and effectuate legislative intent
Strict construction, generally

Construction according to the letter of the statute, which

recognizes nothing that is not expressed, takes the language
used in its exact meaning, and admits no equitable
consideration

Not to mean that statutes are construed in its narrowest

meaning

It simply means that the scope of the statute shall not be

extended or enlarged by implication, intendment, or
equitable consideration beyond the literal meaning of its
terms

It is a close and conservative adherence to the literal or

textual interpretation

The antithesis of liberal construction

Judicial Interpretation
Act of the court in engrafting
upon a law something which it
believes ought to have been
embraced therein

Forbidden by the tripartite

division of powers among the 3
departments of government
A statute may not be liberally construed to read into it
something which its clear and plain language rejects

Construction to promote social justice

Social justice must be taken into account in the interpretation

and application of laws

Social justice mandate is addressed or meant for the three

departments: the legislative, executive, and the judicial

Social justice (included in the Constitution) was meant to be

a vital, articulate, compelling principle of public policy

It should be observed in the interpretation not only of future

legislations, but also of laws already existing on November
15, 1935.

It was intended to change the spirit of our laws, present and

future.
Construction taking into consideration general welfare or growth
civilization

Construe to attain the general welfare

Salus populi est suprema lex the voice of the people is the
supreme law

Statuta pro publico commodo late interpretantur statutes

enacted for the public good are to be construed liberally

The reason of the law is the life of the law; the reason lies in
the soil of the common welfare

The judge must go out in the open spaces of actuality and dig
down deep into his common soil, if not, he becomes
subservient to formalism

Construe in the light of the growth of civilization and

varying conditions
o The interpretation that if the man is too long for
the bed, his head should be chopped off rather than
enlarge the old bed or purchase a new one should
NOT be given to statutes
STATUTES STRICTLY CONSTRUED
Penal statutes, generally

Penal statutes are those that define crimes, treat of their

nature and provide for their punishment

Acts of legislature which prohibit certain acts and

establish penalties for their violation
Those which impose punishment for an offense committed
against the state, and which the chief executive has the
power to pardon
A statute which decrees the forfeiture in favor of the state of
unexplained wealth acquired by a public official while in
office is criminal in nature

Mala in se
Criminal intent, apart from the
act itself is required
RPC

Penal statutes, strictly construed

Penal statutes are strictly construed against the State and

liberally construed in favor of the accused
o Penal statutes cannot be enlarged or extended by
intendment, implication, or any equitable
consideration
o No person should be brought within its terms if he
is not clearly made so by the statute
o No act should be pronounces criminal which is not
clearly made so
Peo v. Atop

Sec. 11 of RA 7659, which amended Art. 335 of the RPC,

provides that the death penalty for rape may be imposed if
the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the 3rd civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim

Is the common-law husband of the girls grandmother

included?

No! Courts must not bring cases within the provisions of the
law which are not clearly embraced by it.
o No act can be pronounced criminal which is not
clearly within the terms of a statute can be brought
within them.
o Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of
the accused

Strict construction but not as to nullify or destroy the

obvious purpose of the legislature
o If penal statute is vague, it must be construed with
such strictness as to carefully SAFEGUARD the
RIGHTS of the defendant and at the same time
preserve the obvious intention of the legislature
o Courts must endeavor to effect substantial justice

Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos

PD 1564, which punishes a person who solicits or receives

contribution for charitable or public welfare purposes
without any permit first secured from the Department of
Social Services, DID NOT include religious purposes in
the acts punishable, the law CANNOT be construed to
punish the solicitation of contributions for religious
purposes, such as repair or renovation of the church
Reason why penal statutes are strictly construedg

The law is tender in favor of the rights of the individual;

The object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to

which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court
limited

Purpose of strict construction is NOT to enable a guilty

person to escape punishment through technicality but to
provide a precise definition of forbidden acts
Acts mala in se and mala prohibita

General rule: to constitute a crime, evil intent must combine

with an act

Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea the act itself does not
make a man guilty unless his intention were so

Actus me invite factus non est meus actus an act done by

me against my will is not my act
Mala prohibita
The only inquiry is, has the law
been violated
Special penal laws

However, if special penal laws use such words as willfully,

voluntarily, and knowingly intent must be proved; thus
good faith or bad faith is essential before conviction

Application of rule
Peo v. Yadao

A statute which penalizes a person assisting a claimant in

connection with the latters claim for veterans benefit, does
not penalize one who OFFERS to assist

Suy v. People

Where a statute penalizes a store owner who sells

commodities beyond the retail ceiling price fixed by law, the
ambiguity in the EO classifying the same commodity into 2
classes and fixing different ceiling prices for each class,
should be resolved in favor of the accused
Peo v. Terreda

Shorter prescriptive period is more favorable to the accused

Peo v. Manantan

The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is

not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws

Instead, the rule merely serves as an additional single factor

to be considered as an aid in detrmining the meaning of
penal laws
Peo v. Purisima

The language of the a statute which penalizes the mere

carrying outside of residence of bladed weapons, i.e., a knife
or bolo, not in connection with ones work or occupation,
with a very heavy penalty ranging from 5-10 years of
imprisonment, has been narrowed and strictly construed as to
include, as an additional element of the crime, the carrying
of the weapon in furtherance of rebellion, insurrection or
subversion, such being the evil sought to be remedied or
prevented by the statute as disclosed in its preamble
Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan

Issue: whether a private person can be considered a public

officer by reason if his being designated by the BIR as a
depository of distrained property, so as to make the
conversion thereof the crime of malversation

Held: NO! the BIRs power authorizing a private individual

to act as a depository cannot include the power to appoint
him as public officer

A private individual who has in his charge any of the public

funds or property enumerated in Art 222 RPC and commits
any of the acts defined in any of the provisions of Chapter 4,
Title 7 of the RPC, should likewise be penalized with the
same penalty meted to erring public officers. Nowhere in
this provision is it expressed or implied that a private
individual falling under said Art 222 is to be deemed a public
officer
Limitation of rule

Limitation #1 Where a penal statute is capable of 2

interpretations, one which will operate to exempt an accused

from liability for violation thereof and another which will

give effect to the manifest intent of the statute and promote
its object, the latter interpretation should be adopted

US v. Go Chico

A law punishes the display of flags used during the

insurrection against the US may not be so construed as to
exempt from criminal liability a person who displays a
replica of said flag because said replica is not the one used
during the rebellion, for to so construe it is to nullify the
statute together

Go Chico is liable though flags displayed were just replica of

the flags used during insurrection against US

Limitation #2 strict construction of penal laws applies only

where the law is ambiguous and there is doubt as to its
meaning

Peo v. Gatchalian

A statute requires that an employer shall pay a minimum

wage of not less than a specified amount and punishes any
person who willfully violates any of its provisions

The fact that the nonpayment of the minimum wage is not

specifically declared unlawful, does not mean that an
employer who pays his employees less than the prescribed
minimum wage is not criminally liable, for the nonpayment
of minimum wage is the very act sought to be enjoined by
the law
Statutes in derogation of rights

Rights are not absolute, and the state, in the exercise of

police power, may enact legislations curtailing or restricting
their enjoyment

As these statutes are in derogation of common or general

rights, they are generally strictly construed and rigidly
confined to cases clearly within their scope and purpose

Examples:
o Statutes authorizing the expropriation of private
land or property
o Allowing the taking of deposition
o Fixing the ceiling of the price of commodities
o Limiting the exercise of proprietary rights by
individual citizens
o Suspending the period of prescription of actions

When 2 reasonably possible constructions, one which would

diminish or restrict fundamental right of the people and the
other if which would not do so, the latter construction must
be adopted so as to allow full enjoyment of such
fundamental right
Statutes authorizing expropriations

Power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature

May be delegated to the President, LGUs, or public utility

company

Expropriation plus just compensation

A derogation of private rights, thus strict construction is

applied

Statutes expropriating or authorizing the expropriation of

property are strictly construed against the expropriating
authority and liberally in favor of property owners
Statutes granting privileges

Statutes granting advantages to private persons or entities

have in many instances created special privileges or
monopolies for the grantees and have thus been viewed with
suspicion and strictly construed

Privilegia recipient largam interpretationem voluntati

consonam concedentis privileges are to be interpreted in
accordance with the will of him who grants them
And he who fails to strictly comply with the will of the
grantor loses such privileges

Butuan Sawmill, Inc. v. Bayview Theater, Inc

Where an entity is granted a legislative franchise to operate

electric light and power, on condition that it should start
operation within a specified period, its failure to start
operation within the period resulted in the forfeiture of the
franchise
Legislative grants to local government units

Grants of power to local government are to be construed

strictly, and doubts in the interpretation should be resolved in
favor of the national government and against the political
subdivisions concerned

Reason: there is in such a grant a gratuitous donation of

public money or property which results in an unfair
advantage to the grantee and for that reason, the grant should
be narrowly restricted in favor of the public
Statutory grounds for removal of officials

Statutes relating to suspension or removal of public officials

are strictly construed

Reason: the remedy of removal is a drastic one and penal in

nature. Injustice and harm to the public interest would likely
emerge should such laws be not strictly interpreted against
the power of suspension or removal
Ochate v. Deling

Grounds for removal neglect of duty, oppression,

corruption or other forms of maladministration in office
o in office a qualifier of all acts.
o Must be in relation to the official as an officer and
not as a private person
Hebron v Reyes

Procedure for removal or suspension should be strictly

construed

Statute: local elective officials are to be removed or

suspended, after investigation, by the provincial board,
subject to appeal to the President

President has no authority on his own to conduct the

investigation and to suspend such elective official
Naturalization laws

Naturalization laws are strictly construed against the

applicant and rigidly followed and enforced

Naturalization is statutory than a natural right

Statutes imposing taxes and customs duties

Tax statutes must be construed strictly against the

government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer

Power to tax involves power to destroy

Taxing act are not to be extended by implication

Tax statutes should be clearly, expressly, and unambiguously

imposed

Reason for strict construction: taxation is a destructive power

which interferes with the personal property rights of the
people and takes from them a portion of their property for
the support of the government
Statutes granting tax exemptions

Law frowns against exemption from taxation because taxes

are the lifeblood of the nation

Laws granting tax exemptions are thus construed strictissimi

juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing
authority
Burden of proof on the taxpayer claiming to be exempted
Basis for strict construction to minimize the different
treatment and foster impartiality, fairness, and equality of
treatment among taxpayers
Tax exemptions are not favored in law, nor are they
presumed.

diminution thereof with respect to its mode or its rate must

be strictly construed
Phil. Telegraph and Telephone Corp. v. COA

On most favored treatment clause

2 franchisee are not competitors

The first franchisee is will not enjoy a reduced rate of tax on

gross receipts

CIR v. CA

Issue: whether containers and packaging materials can be

credited against the millers deficiency tax

BIR claimed that there should be no tax credit

Held: proviso should be strictly construed to apply only to

raw materials and not to containers and packing materials
which are not raw materials; hence, the miller is entitled to
tax credit

Restriction in the proviso is limited only to sales, millers

excise taxes paid on raw materials used in the milling
process

Qualification of rule

Strict construction does not apply in the case of tax

exemptions in favor of the government itself or its agencies

Provisions granting exemptions to government agencies may

be construed liberally in favor of non-tax liability of such
agencies

The express exemption should not be construed with the

same degree of strictness that applies to exemptions contrary
to policy of the state, since as to such property exemption is
the rule and the taxation is the exemption

E.g. tax exemption in favor of NAPOCOR whether direct

or indirect taxes, exempted

Benguet Corporation v. Cenrtral Board of Assessment Appeals

PD 1955 withdrew all tax exemptions, except those

embodied in the Real Property Code, a law which grants
certain industries real estate tax exemptions under the Real
Estate Code

Courts cannot expand exemptiom

Statutes concerning the sovereign

Restrictive statutes which impose burdens on the public

treasury or which diminish rights and interests are strictly
construed.

Unless so specified, the government does not fall within the

terms of any legislation

Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v Acting Commissioner of Customs

Where a statute exempts from special import tax, equipment

for use of industries, the exemption does not extend to
those used in dispensing gasoline at retail in gasoline stations

Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment

PD 851 requires employers to pay a 13th month pay to

their employees xxx

employers does not embrace the RP, the law not having
expressly included it within its scope

CIR v. Manila Jockey Club, Inc.

Statute: racing club holding these races shall be exempt

from the payment of any municipal or national tax

Cannot be construed to exempt the racing club from paying

income tax on rentals paid to it for use of the race tracks and
other paraphernalia, for what the law exempts refers only to
those to be paid in connection with said races
Lladoc v. CIR

Statute: exemption from taxation charitable institutions,

churches, parsonages or covenants appurtenant thereto,
mosques, and non-profit cemeteries, and all lands buildings,
and improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used
for religious or charitable purposes

Exemption only refer to property taxes and not from all

kinds of taxes
La Carlota Sugar Central v. Jimenez

Statute: tax provided shall not be collected on foreign

exchange used for the payment of fertilizers when imported
by planters or farmers directly or through their cooperatives

The importation of fertilizers by an entity which is neither a

planter nor a farmer nor a cooperative of planters or farmers
is not exempt from payment of the tax, even though said
entity merely acted as agent of planter or farmer as a sort of
accommodation without making any profit from the
transaction, for the law uses the word directly which
means without anyone intervening in the importation and the
phrase through their cooperatives as the only exemption
CIR v. Phil. Acetylene Co.

Power of taxation if a high prerogative of sovereignty, its

relinquishment is never presumed and any reduction or

Statutes authorizing suits against the government

Art. XVI, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution The State may not be

sued without its consent
o General rule: sovereign is exempt from suit
o Exception: in the form of statute, state may give its
consent to be sued

Statute is to be strictly construed and

waiver from immunity from suit will not
be lightly inferred

Nullum tempus occurrit regi there can be no legal right as

against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends

Reason for non-suability not to subject the state to

inconvenience and loss of governmental efficiency
Mobil Phil. Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Services

The law authorizing the Bureau of Customs to lease arrastre

operations, a proprietary function necessarily incident to its
governmental function, may NOT be construed to mean that
the state has consented to be sued, when it undertakes to
conduct arrastre services itself, for damage to cargo

State-immunity may not be circumvented by directing the

action against the officer of the state instead of the state itself
o The states immunity may be validly invoked
against the action AS LONG AS IT CAN BE
SHOWN that the suit really affects the property,
rights, or interests of the state and not merely those
of the officer nominally made party defendant
Even if the state consents, law should NOT be interpreted to
authorize garnishment of public funds to satisfy a judgment
against government property
o Reason:

Public policy forbids it

Disbursement of public funds must be
covered
by
a
corresponding
appropriation as required by law
Functions and service cannot be allowed
to be paralyzed or disrupted by the
diversion of public funds from their
legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law

Statutes prescribing formalities of the will

Strictly construed, which means, wills must be executed in

accordance with the statutory requirements, otherwise, it is
entirely void

The court is seeking to ascertain and apply the intent of the

legislators and not that of the testator, and the latters
intention is frequently defeated by the non-observance of
what the statute requires
Exceptions and provisos

Should be strictly but reasonably construed

All doubts should be resolved in favor of the general

provision rather than the exceptions
o However, always look at the intent of legislators if
it will accord reason and justice not to apply the
rule that an express exception excludes all others

The rule on execution pending appeal must be strictly

construed being an exception to the general rule

Situations which allows exceptions to the requirement of

warrant of arrest or search warrant must be strictly
construed; to do so would infringe upon personal liberty and
set back a basic right

A preference is an exception to the general rule

A proviso should be interpreted strictly with the legislative

intent
o Should be strictly construed
o Only those expressly exempted by the proviso
should be freed from the operation of the statute
STATUTES LIBERALLY CONSTRUED
General social legislation

General welfare legislations

o To implement the social justice and protection-tolabor provisions of the Constitution
o Construed liberally
o Resolve any doubt in favor of the persons whom
the law intended to benefit
o Includes the following labor laws, tenancy laws,
land reform laws, and social security laws
Tamayo v. Manila Hotel

Law grants employees the benefits of holiday pay except

those therein enumerated

Statcon all employees, whether monthly paid or not, who

are not among those excepted are entitled to the holiday pay

Labor laws construed the workingmans welfare should be

the primordial and paramount consideration
o Article 4 New Labor Code all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions
of the Labor Code including its implementing rules
and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor
Liberal construction applies only if statute is vague,
otherwise, apply the law as it is stated

General welfare clause

2 branches
o One branch attaches to the main trunk of municipal
authority relates to such ordinances and
regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect
and discharge the powers and duties conferred
upon local legislative bodies by law
o Other branch is much more independent of the
specific functions enumerated by law authorizes
such ordinances as shall seem necessary and
proper to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace,
good order xxx of the LGU and the inhabitants
thereof, and for the protection of the property
therein

Construed in favor of the LGUs

To give more powers to local governments in promoting the

economic condition, social welfare, and material progress of
the people in the community

Construed with proprietary aspects, otherwise would cripple

LGUs

Must be elastic and responsive to various social conditions

Must follow legal progress of a democratic way of life

Grant of power to local governments

Old rule: municipal corporations, being mere creatures of

law, have only such powers as are expressly granted to them
and those which are necessarily implied or incidental to the
exercise thereof

New rule: RA 2264 Local Autonomy Act

o Sec 12 implied power of a province, a city, or a
municipality shall be liberally construed in its
favor. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the power should be interpreted in
favor of the local government and it shall be
presumed to exist
Statutes granting taxing power (on municipal corporations)

Before 1973 Constitution inferences, implications, and

deductions have no place in the interpretation of the taxing
power of a municipal corporation

New Constitution Art. X, Sec 5 1987 Constitution each

local government unit shall have the power to create its own
sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges
subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress
may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomy
o Statutes prescribing limitations on the taxing
power of LGUs must be strictly construed against
the national government and liberally in favor of
the LGUs, and any doubt as to the existence of the
taxing power will be resolved in favor of the local
government
Statutes prescribing prescriptive period to collect taxes

Beneficial for both government and taxpayer

o To the government tax officers are obliged to act
promptly in the making of the assessments
o To the taxpayer would have a feeling of security
against unscrupulous tax agents who will always
find an excuse to inspect the books of taxpayers

Laws on prescription remedial measure interpreted

liberally affording protection to the taxpayers

Statutes imposing penalties for nonpayment of tax

liberally construed in favor of government and strictly

construed against the taxpayer

intention to hasten tax payments or to punish evasions or

neglect of duty in respect thereto

liberal construction would render penalties for delinquents

nugatory
Election laws

Election laws should be reasonably and liberally construed to

achieve their purpose

Purpose to effectuate and safeguard the will of the

electorate in the choice of their representatives

3 parts
o Provisions for the conduct of elections which
election officials are required to follow
o Provisions which candidates for office are required
to perform
o Procedural rules which are designed to ascertain,
in case of dispute, the actual winner in the
elections
Different rules and canons or statutory construction govern such
provisions of the election law

Part 1:
o
o

Part 2:
o
o
Part 3:
o

Rules and regulations for the conduct of elections

Before election mandatory (part 1)

After election directory (part 3)

Generally the provisions of a statute as to the
manner of conducting the details of an election are
NOT mandatory; and irregularities in conducting
an election and counting the votes, not preceding
from any wrongful intent and which deprives no
legal voter of his votes, will not vitiate an election
or justify the rejection of the entire votes of a
precinct

Against disenfranchisement

Remedy against election official who did

not do his duty criminal action against
them
Provisions which candidates for office are required
to perform are mandatory
Non-compliance is fatal

Procedural rules which are designed to ascertain,

in case of dispute, the actual winner in the
elections are liberally construed
o Technical and procedural barriers should not be
allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle in
the choice of their elective officials
For where a candidate has received popular mandate,
overwhelmingly and clearly expressed, all possible doubts
should be resolved in favor of the candidates eligibility, for
to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the electorate

Amnesty proclamations

Amnesty proclamations should be liberally construed as to

carry out their purpose

Purpose to encourage to return to the fold of the law of

those who have veered from the law

E.g. in case of doubt as to whether certain persons come

within the amnesty proclamation, the doubt should be
resolved in their favor and against the state

Same rule applies to pardon since pardon and amnesty is

synonymous

Statutes prescribing prescriptions of crimes

Liberally construed in favor of the accused

Reason time wears off proof and innocence

Same as amnesty and pardon

Peo v. Reyes

Art. 91 RPC period of prescription shall commence to run

from the day the crime is discovered by the offended,
authorities, xxx

When does the period of prescription start day of discovery

or registration in the Register of Deeds?

Held: From the time of registration

Notice need not be actual for prescription to run;

constructive notice is enough

More favorable to the accused if prescriptive period is

counted from the time of registration
Adoption statutes

Adoption statutes are liberally construed in favor of the child

to be adopted

Paramount consideration child and not the adopters

Veteran and pension laws

Veteran and pension laws are enacted to compensate a class

of men who suffered in the service for the hardships they
endured and the dangers they encountered in line of duty
o Expression of gratitude to and recognition of those
who rendered service to the country by extending
to them regular monetary benefit

Veteran and pension laws are liberally construed in favor of

grantee

Del Mar v. Phil. Veterans Admin

Where a statute grants pension benefits to war veterans,

except those who are actually receiving a similar pension
from other government funds

Statcon government funds refer to funds of the same

government and does not preclude war veterans receiving
similar pensions from the US Government from enjoying the
benefits therein provided

Board of Administrators Veterans Admin v. Bautista

Veteran pension law is silent as to the effectivity of pension

awards, it shall be construed to take effect from the date it
becomes due and NOT from the date the application for
pension is approved, so as to grant the pensioner more
benefits and to discourage inaction on the part of the officials
who administer the laws
Chavez v. Mathay

While veteran or pension laws are to be construed liberally,

they should be so construed as to prevent a person from
receiving double pension or compensation, unless the law
provides otherwise
Santiago v. COA

Explained liberal construction or retirement laws

Intention is to provide for sustenance, and hopefully even

comfort when he no longer has the stamina to continue
earning his livelihood

He deserves the appreciation of a grateful government at best

concretely expressed in a generous retirement gratuity
commensurate with the value and length of his service

Ortiz v. COMELEC

Issue: whether a commissioner of COMELEC is deemed to

have completed his term and entitled to full retirement
benefits under the law which grants him 5-year lump-sum
gratuity and thereafter lifetime pension, who retires from
the service after having completed his term of office, when
his courtesy resignation submitted in response to the call of
the President following EDSA Revolution is accepted

Held: Yes! Entitled to gratuity

Liberal construction

Courtesy resignation not his own will but a mere

manifestation of submission to the will of the political
authority and appointing power
In Re Application for Gratuity Benefits of Associate Justice Efren I
Plana

Issue: whether Justice Plana is entitled to gratuity and

retirement pay when, at the time of his courtesy resignation
was accepted following EDSA Revolution and establishment
of a revolutionary government under the Freedom
Constitution, he lacked a few months to meet the age
requirement for retirement under the law but had
accumulated a number of leave of credits which, if added to
his age at the time, would exceed the age requirement

Held: yes, entitled to gratuity! Liberal construction applied

In Re Pineda

Explained doctrine laid down in the previous case

The crediting of accumulated leaves to make up for lack of

required age or length of service is not done discriminately

xxx only if satisfied that the career of the retiree was marked
by competence, integrity, and dedication to the public
service
In Re Martin

Issue: whether a justice of the SC, who availed of the

disability retirement benefits pursuant to the provision that
if the reason for the retirement be any permanent disability
contracted during his incumbency in office and prior to the
date of retirement he shall receive only a gratuity equivalent
to 10 years salary and allowances aforementioned with no
further annuity payable monthly during the rest of the
retirees natural life is entitled to a monthly lifetime pension
after the 10-year period

Held: Yes! 10-year lump sum payment is intended to assist

the stricken retiree meeting his hospital and doctors bills
and expenses for his support

The retirement law aims to assist the retiree in his old age,
not to punish him for having survived
Cena v. CSC

Issue: whether or not a government employee who has

reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but who
has rendered less than 15 years of government service, may
be allowed to continue in the service to complete the 15-year
service requirement to enable him to retire with benefits of
an old-age pension under Sec 11(b) PD 1146

However, CSC Memorandum Circular No 27 provides that

any request for extension of compulsory retirees to
complete the 15-years service requirement for retirement
shall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career
service who are regular members of the GSIS and shall be
granted for a period not exceeding 1 year

Held: CSC Memorandum Circular No 27 unconstitutional! It

is an administrative regulation which should be in harmony
with the law; liberal construction of retirement benefits

Rules of Court

RC are procedural to be construed liberally

Purpose of RC the proper and just determination of a

litigation

Procedural laws are no other than technicalities, they are

adopted not as ends in themselves but as means conducive to
the realization of the administration of law and justice

RC should not be interpreted to sacrifice substantial rights at

the expense of technicalities
Case v. Jugo

Lapses in the literal observance of a rule of procedure will

be overlooked when they do not involve public policy; when
they arose from an honest mistake or unforeseen accident;
when they have not prejudiced the adverse party and have
not deprived the court of its authority

Literal stricture have been relaxed in favor of liberal

construction
o Where a rigid application will result in manifest
failure or miscarriage of justice
o Where the interest of substantial justice will be
served
o Where the resolution of the emotion is addressed
solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the
court
o Where the injustice to the adverse party is not
commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the
prescribed procedure

Liberal construction of RC does not mean they may be

ignored; they are required to be followed except only for the
most persuasive reasons
Other statutes

Curative statutes to cure defects in prior law or to validate

legal proceedings which would otherwise be void for want of
conformity with certain legal requirements; retroactive

Redemption laws remedial in nature construed liberally

to carry out purpose, which is to enable the debtor to have
his property applied to pay as many debtors liability as
possible

Statutes providing exemptions from execution are interpreted

liberally in order to give effect to their beneficial and
humane purpose

Laws on attachment liberally construed to promote their

objects and assist the parties obtaining speedy justice

Warehouse receipts instrument of credit liberally

construed in favor of a bona fide holders of such receipts

Probation laws liberally construed

o Purpose: to give first-hand offenders a second
chance to maintain his place in society through the
process of reformation

Statute granting powers to an agency created by the

Constitution should be liberally construed for the
advancement of the purposes and objectives for which it was
created
CHAPTER EIGHT: Mandatory and Directory Statutes
IN GENERAL
Generally

Mandatory and directory classification of statutes

importance: what effect should be given to the mandate of a
statute

Mandatory and directory statutes, generally

Mandatory statute commands either positively that

something be done in a particular way, or negatively that
something be not done; it requires OBEDIENCE, otherwise
void

Directory statute permissive or discretionary in nature and

merely outlines the act to be done in such a way that no
injury can result from ignoring it or that its purpose can be
accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed and
substantially the same result obtained; confer direction upon
a person; non-performance of what it prescribes will not
vitiate the proceedings therein taken
When statute is mandatory or directory

No absolute test to determine whether a statute is directory

or mandatory

Final arbiter legislative intent

Legislative intent does not depend on the form of the statute;

must be given to the entire statute, its object, purpose,
legislative history, and to other related statutes

Mandatory in form but directory in nature possible

Whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends on

whether the thing directed to be done is of the essence of the
thing required, or is a mere matter of form, what is a matter
of essence can often be determined only by judicial
construction
o Considered directory compliance is a matter of
convenience; where the directions of a statute are
given merely with a view to the proper, orderly
and prompt conduct of business; no substantial
rights depend on it
o Considered mandatory a provision relating to the
essence of the thing to be done, that is, to matters
of substance; interpretation shows that the
legislature intended a compliance with such
provision to be essential to the validity of the act or
proceeding, or when some antecedent and
prerequisite conditions must exist prior to the
exercise of the power, or must be performed before
certain other powers can be exercised
Test to determine nature of statute

Test is to ascertain the consequences that will follow in case

what the statute requires is not done or what it forbids is
performed

Does the law give a person no alternative choice? if yes,

then it is mandatory

Depends on the effects of compliance

o If substantial rights depend on it and injury can
result from ignoring it; intended for the protection
of the citizens and by a disregard of which their
rights are injuriously affected mandatory
o Purpose is accomplished in a manner other than
that prescribed and substantially the same results
obtained - directory

Statutes couched in mandatory form but compliance is

merely directory in nature
o If strict compliance will cause hardship or injustice
on the part of the public who is not at fault
o If it will lead to absurd, impossible, or mischievous
consequences

If an officer is required to do a positive

act but fails because such actions will
lead to the aforementioned, he will only
be subject to administrative sanction for
his failure to do what the law requires

Language used

Generally mandatory command words

o Shall or Shall not
o Must or Must not
o Ought or Ought not
o Should or Should not
o Can or Cannot

Generally directory permissive words

o May or May not
Use of shall or must

Generally, shall and must is mandatory in nature

If a different interpretation is sought, it must rest upon

something in the character of the legislation or in the context
which will justify a different meaning

The import of the word ultimately depends upon a

consideration of the entire provision, its nature, object and
the consequences that would follow from construing it one
way or the other
Loyola Grand Villa Homeowners (South) Assn., Inc. v. CA

must construed as directory

Corporation Code Sec 46 reads every corporation formed

under this Code MUST within one month after receipt of
official notice of the issuance of its certification of
incorporation with the SEC, adopt a code of by-laws for its
government not inconsistent with this Code

PD 902-A which is in pari material with the Corporation

Code states that the non-filing of the by-laws does not imply
the demise of the corporation; that there should be a notice
and hearing before the certificate of registration may be
cancelled by the failure to file the by-laws

One test whether mandatory or directory compliance must be

made whether non-compliance with what is required will
result in the nullity of the act; if it results in the nullity, it is
mandatory

Director of Land v. CA

Law requires in petitions for land registration that upon

receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial
hearing to be published in the OG and once in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines

Law expressly requires that the initial hearing be published

in the OG AND in the newspaper of general circulation
reason: OG is not as widely read of the newspaper of general
circulation

shall is imperative/ mandatory

Without initial hearing being published in a newspaper of

general circulation is a nullity
Use of may

An auxiliary verb showing opportunity or possibility

Generally, directory in nature

Used in procedural or adjective laws; liberally construed

Example: Sec 63 of the corporation Code shares of stock

so issued are personal property and MAY be transferred by
delivery of the certificate or certificated endorsed by the
owner
o may is merely directory and that the transfer of
the shares may be effected in a manner different
from that provided for in law
When shall is construed as may and vice versa

Rule: may should be read shall

o where such construction is necessary to give effect
to the apparent intention of the legislature

where a statute provides for the doing os some act

which is required by justice r public duty
o where it vests a public body or officer with power
and authority to take such action which concerns
for the public interest or rights of individuals
Rule: shall should be read may
o When so required by the context or by the
intention of the legislature
o When no public benefit or private right requires
that it be given an imperative meaning

Diokno v. Rehabilitiation Finance Corp

Sec. 2 RA 304 reads banks or other financial institutions

owned or controlled by the Government SHALL, subject to
availability of funds xxx accept at a discount at not more
than 20% for 10 years of such backpay certificate

Shall implies discretion because of the phrase subject to

availability of funds
Govermnent v. El Hogar Filipino

Corporation Codes reads SHALL, upon such violation

being proved, be dissolved by quo warranto proceedings

Shall construed as may

Berces, Sr. v. Guingona

Sec. 68 Ra 7160 (LGC) provides that an appeal from an

adverse decision against a local elective official to the
President SHALL not prevent a decision from becoming
final and executor

Shall is not mandatory because there is room to construe

said provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials
to stay the execution of the appealed decision
Use of negative, prohibitory or exclusive terms

A negative statute is mandatory; expressed in negative words

or in a form of an affirmative proposition qualified by the
word only

only exclusionary negation

Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be

discretionary

MANDATORY STATUTES
Statutes conferring power

Generally regarded as mandatory although couched in a

permissive form

Should construe as imposing absolute and positive duty

rather than conferring privileges

Power is given for the benefit of third persons, not for the
public official

Granted to meet the demands of rights, and to prevent a

failure of justice

Given as a remedy to those entitled to invoke its aid

Statutes granting benefits

Considered mandatory

Failure of the person to take the required steps or to meet the

conditions will ordinarily preclude him from availing of the
statutory benefits

Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt the laws

aid the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights

Potior est in tempoe, potior est in jure he who is first in

time is preferred in right
Statutes prescribing jurisdictional requirements

Considered mandatory

Examples
o Requirement of publication
o Provision in the Tax Code to the effect that before
an action for refund of tax is filed in court, a
written claim therefore shall be presented with the
CIR within the prescribed period is mandatory and
failure to comply with such requirement is fatal to
the action

Statutes prescribing time to take action or to appeal

Generally mandatory

Held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of

needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge or
business, and are necessary incident to the proper, efficient,
and orderly discharge of judicial functions

Strict not substantial compliance

Not waivable, nor can they be the subject of agreements or

stipulation of litigants
Reyes v. COA

Sec. 187 RA 7160 process of appeal of dissatisfied

taxpayer on the legality of tax ordinance
o Appeal to the Sec of Justice within 30 days of
effectivity of the tax ordinance
o If Sec of Justice decides the appeal, a period of 30
days is allowed for an aggrieved party to go to
court
o If the Sec of Justice does not act thereon, after the
lapse of 60 days, a party could already proceed to
seek relief in court

Purpose of mandatory compliance: to prevent delays and

enhance the speedy and orderly discharge of judicial
functions

Unless the requirements of law are complied with, the

decision of the lower court will become final and preclude
the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction to review it
Interest reipiciae ut sit finis litium public interest requires
that by the very nature of things there must be an end to a
legal controversy

Gachon v. Devera, Jr

Issue: whether Sec 6 of the Rule on Summary Procedure,

which reads should the defendant fail to answer the
complaint within the period above provided, the Court, motu
proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, SHALL render
judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein, is
mandatory or directory, such that an answer filed out of time
may be accepted

Held: mandatory
o Must file the answer within the reglementary
period
o Reglementary period shall be non-extendible
o Otherwise, it would defeat the objective of
expediting the adjudication of suits
Statutes prescribing procedural requirements

Construed mandatory

Procedure relating to jurisdictional, or of the essence of the

proceedings, or is prescribed for the protection or benefit of
the party affected

Where failure to comply with certain procedural

requirements will have the effect of rendering the act done in
connection therewith void, the statute prescribing such
requirements is regarded as mandatory even though the
language is used therein is permissive in nature

De Mesa v. Mencias

Sec 17, Rule 3 RC after a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper
notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and
to be substituted xxx. If legal representative fails to appear
xxx, the court MAY order the opposing party to produce the
appointment of a legal representative xxx

Although MAY was used, provision is mandatory

Procedural requirement goes to the very jurisdiction of the

court, for unless and until a legal representative is for him is
duly named and within the jurisdiction of the trial court, no
adjudication in the cause could have been accorded any
validity or the binding effect upon any party, in
representation of the deceased, without trenching upon the
fundamental right to a day in court which is the very essence
of the constitutionally enshrined guarantee of due process
Election laws on conduct of election

Construed as mandatory

Before election mandatory

After election directory, in support of the result unless of a

character to affect an obstruction to the free and intelligent
casting of the votes, or to the ascertainment of the result, or
unless it is expressly declared by the statute that the
particular act is essential to the validity of an election, or that
its omission shall render it void (whew, and haba!)

When the voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same
should not be nullified simply because the officers appointed
under the law to direct the elections and guard the purity of
the ballot have not done their duty

For where a candidate has received popular mandate,

overwhelmingly and clearly expressed, all possible doubts
should be resolved in favor of the candidates eligibility, for
to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the electorate
Delos Reyes v. Rodriguez

The circumstance that the coupon bearing the number of the

ballot is not detached at the time the ballot is voted, as
required by law, does not justify the court in rejecting the
ballot
Election laws on qualification and disqualification

The rule of before-mandatory and after-directory in

election laws only applies to procedural statutes;

Not applicable to provisions of the election laws prescribing

the time limit to file certificate of candidacy and the
qualifications and disqualifications of elective office
considered mandatory even after election
Statutes prescribing qualifications for office

Eligibility to a public office is of a continuing nature and

must exist at the commencement of the term and during the
occupancy of the office

Statutes prescribing the eligibility or qualifications of

persons to a public office are regarded as mandatory

Example in the book lawyer-judge; judge-disbarment as

lawyer
Statutes relating to assessment of taxes

Intended for the security of the citizens, or to insure the

equality of taxation, or for certainty as to the nature and
amount of each others tax MANDATORY
o E.g. Statutes requiring the assessor to notify the
taxpayer of the assessment of his property within a
prescribed period

Those designed merely for the information or direction of

officers or to secure methodical and systematic modes of
proceedings - DIRECTORY

Statutes concerning public auction sale

Construed mandatory

Procedural steps must be strictly followed

Otherwise, void
DIRECTORY STATUTES
Statutes prescribing guidance for officers

Regulation designed to secure order, system, and dispatch in

proceedings, and by a disregard of which the rights of parties
interested may not be injuriously affected directory
o Exception unless accompanied by negative
words importing that the acts required shall not be
done in any other manner or time than that
designated
Statutes prescribing manner of judicial action

Construed directory

Procedure is secondary in importance to substantive right

Generally, non-compliance therewith is not necessary to the

validity of the proceedings
Statutes requiring rendition of decision within prescribed period

Sec 15(1) Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution the maximum

period within which a case or matter shall be decided or
resolved from the date of its submission shall be
o 24 months SC
o 12 months lower collegiate courts
o 3 months all other lower courts

Sec 7 Art. IX-A, 1987 Constitution

o 60 days from the date of its submission for
resolution for all Constitutional Commissions

Before the Constitution took effect - Statutes requiring

rendition of decision within prescribed period Directory
o Except

intention to the contrary is manifest

time is of the essence of the thing to be

done

language of the statute contains negative

words

designation of the time was intended as a

limitation of power, authority or right

always look at intent to ascertain whether to give the statute

a mandatory or directory construction
o basis: EXPEDIENCY less injury results to the
general public by disregarding than enforcing the
little of the law and that judges would otherwise
abstain from rendering decisions after the period to
render them had lapsed because they lacked
jurisdiction tot do so
Querubin v. CA

Statute: appeals in election cases shall be decided within 3

months after the filing of the case in the office of the clerk of
court

Issue: whether or not CA has jurisdiction in deciding the

election case although the required period to resolve it has
expired

Held: yes, otherwise is to defeat the administration of justice

upon factors beyond the control of the parties; would defeat
the purpose of due process; dismissal will constitute
miscarriage of justice; speedy trial would be turned into
denial of justice
o Failure of judge to take action within the said
period merely deprives him of their right to collect
their salaries or to apply for leaves, but does not
deprive them of the jurisdiction to act on the cases
pending before them

Constitutional time provision directory

Marcelino v. Cruz

Sec 15(1) Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution the maximum

period within which a case or matter shall be decided or
resolved from the date of its submission shall be
o 24 months SC
o 12 months lower collegiate courts
o 3 months all other lower courts

Sec 15(1) Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution directory

Reasons:
o Statutory provisions which may be thus departed
from with impunity, without affecting the validity
of statutory proceedings, are usually those which
relate to the mode or time of doing that which is
essential to effect the aim and purpose of the
legislature or some incident of the essential act
thus directory
o Liberal construction departure from strict
compliance would result in less injury to the
general public than would its strict application
o Courts are not divested of their jurisdiction for
failure to decide a case within the 90-day period
o Only for the guidance of the judges manning our
courts
o Failure to observe said rule constitutes a ground
for administrative sanction against the defaulting
judge

A certification to this effect is required

before judges are allowed to draw their
salaries
CHAPTER NINE: Prospective and Retroactive Statutes
IN GENERAL
Prospective and retroactive statutes, defined

Prospective
o operates upon facts or transactions that occur after
the statute takes effect
o looks and applies to the future.

Retroactive
o Law which creates a new obligation, imposes a
new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to
a transaction already past.
o A statute is not made retroactive because it draws
on antecedent facts for its operation, or part of the
requirements for its action and application is drawn
from a time antedating its passage.
Umali vs. Estanislao

A law may be made operative partly on facts that occurred

prior to the effectivity of such law without being retroactive.

Statute: RA 7167- granting increased personal exemptions

from income tax to be available thenceforth, that is, after
said Act became effective and on or before the deadline for
filing income tax returns, with respect to compensation
income earned or received during the calendar year prior to
the date the law took effect.
Castro v. Sagales

A retroactive law (in a legal sense)

o one which takes away or impairs vested rights
acquired under existing laws
o creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty
o attaches a new disability in respect of transactions
or considerations already past

Laws operate prospectively, generally

It is a settled rule in statutory construction that statutes are to

be construed as having only prospective operation, unless the
intendment of the legislature is to give them a retroactive
effect, expressly declare or necessarily implied from the
language used.

No court will hold a statute to be retroactive when the

legislature has not said so.

Art. 4 of the Civil Code which provides that Laws shall

have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.

Lex prospicit, non respicit the law looks forward, not

backward

Lex de future, judex de praeterito the law provides for the

future, the judge for the past.

If the law is silent as to the date of its application and that it

is couched in the past tense does not necessarily imply that it
should have retroactive effect.
Grego v. Comelec

A statute despite the generality of its language, must not be

so construed as to overreach acts, events, or matters which
transpired before its passage

Statute: Sec.40 of the LGC disqualifying those removed

from office as a result of an administrative case from running
for local elective positions cannot be applied retroactively.

Held: It cannot disqualify a person who was administratively

removed from his position prior to the effectivity of said
Code from running for an elective position.

Rationale: a law is a rule established to guide actions with no

binding effect until it is enacted.

Nova constitution futuris formam imponere debet non

praeteretis A new statute should affect the future, not the
past.

Prospectivity applies to:

o Statutes
o Administrative rulings and circulars
o Judicial decisions

The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or

amendatory, has been applied in many cases. These include:
Buyco v. PNB

Statute: RA 1576 which divested the PNB of authority to

accept back pay certificates in payment of loans

Held: does not apply to an offer of payment made before

effectivity of the act.
Lagardo v. Masaganda

Held: RA 2613, as amended by RA 3090 ON June 1991,

granting inferior courts jurisdiction over guardianship cases,
could not be given retroactive effect in the absence of a
saving clause.
Larga v. Ranada Jr.

Held: Sec. 9 & 10 of E.O. 90 amending Sec 4 of P.D. 1752

could have no retroactive application.
Peo v. Que Po Lay

Held: a person cannot be convicted of violating Circular 20

of the Central Bank, when the alleged violation occurred
before publication of the Circular on the Official Gazette.
Baltazar v. CA

Held: It denied retroactive application to PD 27 decreeing

the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, &
PD 316, prohibiting ejectment of tenants from rice & corn
farmholdings pending promulgation of rules & regulations
implementing PD 27

Nilo v CA

Held: removed personal cultivation as the ground for

ejectment of a tenant cant be given retroactive effect in
absence of statutory statement for retroactivity.

Applied to administrative rulings & circulars:

ABS-CBN Broadcasting v. CTA

Held: a circular or ruling of the CIR cannot be given

retroactive effect adversely to a taxpayer.
Sanchez v. COMELEC

Held: the holding of recall proceedings had no retroactive

application
Romualdez v. CSC

Held: CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29 cannot be given

retrospective effect so as to entitle to permanent appointment
an employee whose temporary appointment had expired
before the Circular was issued.

Applied to judicial decisions for even though not laws, are

evidence of what the laws mean and is the basis of Art.8 of
the Civil Code wherein laws of the Constitution shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines.
Presumption against retroactivity

Presumption is that all laws operate prospectively, unless the

contrary clearly appears or is clearly, plainly and
unequivocally expressed or necessarily implied.

In case of doubt: resolved against the retroactive operation of

laws

If statute is susceptible of construction other than that of

retroactivity or will render it unconstitutional- the statute will
be given prospective effect and operation.

Presumption is strong against substantive laws affecting

pending actions or proceedings. No substantive statute shall
be so construed retroactively as to affect pending litigations.
Words or phrases indicating prospectivity

Indicating prospective operation:

o A statute is to apply hereafter or thereafter
o from and after the passing of this Act
o shall have been made
o from and after a designated date

Shall implies that the law makes intend the enactment to

be effective only in future.

Statutes have no retroactive but prospective effect:

o It shall take effect upon its approval
o Shall take effect on the date the President shall
have issued a proclamation or E.O., as provided in
the statute
Retroactive statutes, generally

The Constitution does not prohibit the enactment of

retroactive statutes which do not impair the obligation of
contract, deprive persons of property without due process of
law, or divest rights which have become vested, or which are
not in the nature of ex post facto laws.

Statutes by nature which are retroactive:

o Remedial or curative statutes
o Statutes which create new rights
o Statute expressly provides that it shall apply
retroactively
o Where it uses words which clearly indicate its
intent

Problem in construction is when it is applied retroactively, to

avoid frontal clash with the Constitution and save the law
from being declared unconstitutional.

STATUTES GIVEN PROSPECTIVE EFFECT

Penal statutes, generally

Penal laws operate prospectively.

Art. 21 of the RPC provides that no felony shall be

punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its
commission.

Provision is recognition to the universally accepted principle

that no penal law can have a retroactive effect, no act or
omission shall be held to be a crime, nor its author punished,
except by virtue of a law in force at the time the act was
committed.

Nullum crimen sine poena, nulla poena sine legis there is

no crime without a penalty, there is no penalty without a law.
Ex post facto law

Constitution provides that no ex post facto law shall be

enacted. It also prohibits the retroactive application of penal
laws which are in the nature of ex post facto laws.

Ex post facto laws are any of the following:

o Law makes criminal an act done before the
passage of the law and which was innocent when
done, and punishes such act
o Law which aggravates a crime, makes it greater
than it was, when committed
o Law which changes the punishment & inflicts a
greater punishment than that annexed to the crime
when committed
o Law which alters the legal rules of evidence,
authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense
o Law which assumes to regulate civil rights and
remedies only, but in effect imposes penalty or
deprivation of a right for something which when
done was lawful
o Law which deprives a person accused of a crime of
some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as protection of a former conviction
or acquittal, or proclamation of amnesty.

Test if ex post facto clause is violated: Does the law sought

to be applied retroactively take from an accused any right
vital for protection of life and liberty?

Scope: applies only to criminal or penal matters

It does NOT apply to laws concerning civil proceedings

generally, or which affect or regulate civil or private rights or
political privilege
Alvia v. Sandiganbayan

Law: as of the date of the effectivity of this decree, any case

cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not an ex post facto law
because it is not a penal statute nor dilutes the right of appeal
of the accused.
Bill of attainder

Constitution provides that no bill of attainder shall be

enacted.

Bill of attainder legislative act which inflicts punishment

without judicial trial

Essence: substitution of a legislative for a judicial

determination of guilt

Serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by

confining the legislature to rule-making & thereby
forestalling legislative usurpation of judicial functions.

History: Bill of Attainder was employed to suppress

unpopular causes & political minorities, and this is the evil
sought to be suppressed by the Constitution.

How to spot a Bill of Attainder:

o
o
o
o

When penal laws applied retroactively

Penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect, except when

they are favorable to the accused.

Art.22 of RPC penal laws shall have a retroactive effect

insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not
a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 Art 62
of the Code , although at the time of the application of such
laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is
serving the same.

This is not an ex post facto law.

Exception to the general rule that all laws operate

prospectively.

Rule is founded on the principle that: the right of the state to

punish and impose penalty is based on the principles of
justice.

Favorabilia sunt amplianda, adiiosa restrigenda

Conscience and good law justify this exception.

Exception was inspired by sentiments of humanity and

accepted by science.

2 laws affecting the liability of accused:

o In force at the time of the commission of the crime
during the pendency of the criminal action, a
statute is passed

reducing the degree of penalty

eliminating the offense itself

removing subsidiary imprisonment in

case of insolvency to pay the civil
liability

prescription of the offense

such statute will be applied

retroactively and the trial court
before the finality of judgment
or the appellate court on appeal
from such judgment should
take
such
statute
in
consideration.
o Enacted during or after the trial of the criminal
action
Director v. Director of Prisons

When there is already a final judgment & accused is serving

sentence, remedy is to file petition of habeas corpus,
alleging that his continued imprisonment is illegal pursuant
to said statute & praying that he be forthwith released.

Singling out of a definite minority

Imposition of a burden on it
A legislative intent
retroactive application to past conduct suffice to
stigmatize
Bill of Attainder is objectionable because of its ex post facto
features.
Accordingly, if a statute is a Bill of Attainder, it is also an ex
post facto law.

Exceptions to the rule:

o When accused is habitual delinquent
o When statute provides that it shall not apply to
existing actions or pending cases
o Where accused disregards the later law & invokes
the prior statute under which he was prosecuted.
General rule: An amendatory statute rendering an illegal act
prior to its enactment no longer illegal is given retroactive
effect does not apply when amendatory act specifically
provides that it shall only apply prospectively.

Statutes substantive in nature

Substantive law

creates, defines or regulates rights concerning life,

liberty or property, or the powers of agencies or
instrumentalities for administration of public
affairs.
o that part of law which creates, defines & regulates
rights, or which regulates rights or duties which
give rise to a cause of action
o that part of law which courts are established to
administer
o when applied to criminal law: that which declares
which acts are crimes and prescribe the
punishment for committing them
o Cannot be construed retroactively as it might affect
previous or past rights or obligations
Substantive rights
o One which includes those rights which one enjoys
under the legal system prior to the disturbance of
normal relations.
Cases with substantive statutes:

Tolentino v. Azalte

In the absence of a contrary intent, statutes which lays down

certain requirements to be complied with be fore a case can
be brought to court.
Espiritu v. Cipriano

Freezes the amount of monthly rentals for residential houses

during a fixed period
Spouses Tirona v. Alejo

Law: Comprehensive Land Reform Law granting

complainants tenancy rights to fishponds and pursuant to
which they filed actions to assert rights which subsequently
amended to exempt fishponds from coverage of statute

Held: Amendatory law is substantive in nature as it exempts

fishponds from its coverage.

Test for procedural laws:

o if rule really regulates procedure, the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized
by substantive law & for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of
them
o If it operates as a means of implementing an
existing right
Test for substantive laws:
o If it takes away a vested right
o If rule creates a right such as right to appeal

Fabian v. Desierto

Where to prosecute an appeal or transferring the venue of

appeal is procedural

Example:
o Decreeing that appeals from decisions of the
Ombudsman in administrative actions be made to
the Court of Appeals
o Requiring that appeals from decisions of the
NLRC be filed with the Court of Appeals

Generally, procedural rules are retroactive and are applicable

to actions pending and undermined at the time of the passage
of the procedural law, while substantive laws are prospective
Effects on pending actions

Statutes affecting substantive rights may not be given

retroactive operation so as to govern pending proceedings.

Iburan v. Labes

Where court originally obtains and exercises jurisdiction, a

later statute restricting such jurisdiction or transferring it to
another tribunal will not affect pending action, unless statute
provides & unless prohibitory words are used.
Lagardo v. Masagana

Where court has no jurisdiction over a certain case but

nevertheless decides it, from which appeal is taken, a statute
enacted during the pendency of the appeal vesting
jurisdiction upon such trial court over the subject matter or
such case may not be given retroactive effect so as to
validate the judgment of the court a quo, in the absence of a
saving clause.
Republic v. Prieto

Where a complaint pending in court is defective because it

did not allege sufficient action, it may not be validated by a
subsequent law which affects substantive rights and not
merely procedural matters.

Rule against the retroactive operation of statutes in general

applies more strongly with respect to substantive laws that
affect pending actions or proceedings.

Qualification of rule

A substantive law will be construed as applicable to pending

actions if such is the clear intent of the law.

To promote social justice or in the exercise of police power,

is intended to apply to pending actions

As a rule, a case must be decided in the light of the law as it

exists at the time of the decision of the appellate court, where
the statute changing the law is intended to be retroactive and
to apply to pending litigations or is retroactive in effect

This rule is true though it may result in the reversal of a

judgment which as correct at the time it was rendered by the
trial court. The rule is subject to the limitation concerning
constitutional restrictions against impairment of vested rights
Statutes affecting vested rights

A vested right or interest may be said to mean some right or

interest in property that has become fixed or established and
is no longer open to doubt or controversy

Rights are vested when the right to enjoyment, present or

prospective, has become the property of some particular
person or persons, as a present interest

The right must be absolute, complete and unconditional,

independent of a contingency

A mere expectancy of future benefit or a contingent interest

in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing
laws does not constitute a vested right

Inchoate rights which have not been acted on are not vested

A statute may not be construed and applied retroactively

under the following circumstances:
o if it impairs substantive right that has become
vested;
o as disturbing or destroying existing right embodied
in a judgment;
o creating new substantive right to fundamental
cause of action where none existed before and
making such right retroactive;
o by arbitrarily creating a new right or liability
already extinguished by operation of law

Law creating a new right in favor of a class of persons may

not be so applied if the new right collides with or impairs
any vested right acquired before the establishment of the new
right nor, by the terms of which is retroactive, be so applied
if:

o
o
o

it adversely affects vested rights

unsettles matter already done as required by
existing law
works injustice to those affected thereby

Benguet Consolidated Mining Co v. Pineda

While a person has no vested right in any rule of law

entitling him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his
benefit, nor has he a vested right in the continued existence
of a statute which precludes its change or repeal, nor in any
omission to legislate on a particular matter, a subsequent
statute cannot be so applied retroactively as to impair his
right that accrued under the old law.

Statutes must be so construed as to sustain its

constitutionality, and prospective operation will be presumed
where a retroactive application will produce invalidity.
Peo v. Patalin

The abolition of the death penalty and its subsequent reimposition. Those accused of crimes prior to the reimposition of the death penalty have acquired vested rights
under the law abolishing it.

Courts have thus given statutes strict constriction to prevent

their retroactive operation in order that the statutes would not
impair or interfere with vested or existing rights. Accusedappellant s rights to be benefited by the abolition of the
death penalty accrued or attached by virtue of Article 22 of
the Revised Penal Code. This benefit cannot be taken away
from them.
Statutes affecting obligations of contract

Any contract entered into must be in accordance with, and

not repugnant to, the applicable law at the time of execution.
Such law forms part of, and is read into, the contract even
without the parties expressly saying so.

Laws existing at the time of the execution of contracts are

the ones applicable to such transactions and not later statutes,
unless the latter provide that they shall have retroactive
effect.

Later statutes will not, however, be given retroactive effect if

to do so will impair the obligation of contracts, for the
Constitution prohibits the enactment of a law impairing the
obligations of contracts.

Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes

the intention of the parties necessarily impairs the contract
itself

A statute which authorizes any deviation from the terms of

the contract by postponing or accelerating the period of
performance which it prescribes, imposing conditions not
expressed in the contract, or dispensing with those which are
however minute or apparently immaterial in their effect upon
the contract, impairs the obligation, and such statute should
not therefore be applied retroactively.

As between two feasible interpretations of a statute, the court

should adopt that which will avoid the impairment of the
contract.

If the contract is legal at it inception, it cannot be rendered

illegal by a subsequent legislation.

A law by the terms of which a transaction or agreement

would be illegal cannot be given retroactive effect so as to
nullify such transactions or agreement executed before said
law took effect.
U.S. Tobacco Corp. v. Lina

The importation of certain goods without import license

which was legal under the law existing at the time of
shipment is not rendered illegal by the fact that when the
goods arrived there was already another law prohibiting

importation without import license. To rule otherwise in any

of these instances is to impair the obligations of contract.
Illustration of rule
People v. Zeta

Existing law: authorizing a lawyer to charge not more than

5% of the amount involved as attorneys fees in the
prosecution of certain veterans claim.

Facts: A lawyer entered into a contract for professional

services on contingent basis and actually rendered service to
its successful conclusion. Before the claim was collected, a
statute was enacted.

New statute: Prohibiting the collection of attorneys fees for

services rendered in prosecuting veterans claims.

Issue: For collecting his fees pursuant to the contract for

professional services, the lawyer was prosecuted for
violation of the statute.

Held: In exonerating the lawyer, the court said: the statute

prohibiting the collection of attorneys fees cannot be
applied retroactively so as to adversely affect the contract for
professional services and the fees themselves.

The 5% fee was contingent and did not become absolute and
unconditional until the veterans claim had been collected by
the claimant when the statute was already in force did no
alter the situation.

For the distinction between vested and absolute rights is not

helpful and a better view to handle the problem is to declare
those statutes attempting to affect rights which the courts
find to be unalterable, invalid as arbitrary and unreasonable,
thus lacking in due process.

The 5% fee allowed by the old law is not unreasonable.

Services were rendered thereunder to claimants benefits.
The right to fees accrued upon such rendition. Only the
payment of the fee was contingent upon the approval of the
claim; therefore, the right was contingent. For a right to
accrue is one thing; enforcement thereof by actual payment
is another. The subsequent law enacted after the rendition of
the services should not as a matter of simple justice affect the
agreement, which was entered into voluntarily by the parties
as expressly directed in the previous law. To apply the new
law to the case of defendant-appellant s as to deprive him of
the agreed fee would be arbitrary and unreasonable as
destructive of the inviolability of contracts, and therefore
invalid as lacking in due process; to penalize him for
collecting such fees, repugnant to our sense of justice.
Repealing and amendatory acts

Statutes which repeal earlier or prior laws operate

prospectively, unless the legislative intent to give them
retroactive effect clearly appears.

Although a repealing state is intended to be retroactive, it

will not be so construed if it will impair vested rights or the
obligations of contracts, or unsettle matters that had been
legally done under the old law.

Repealing statutes which are penal in nature are generally

applied retroactively if favorable to the accused, unless the
contrary appears or the accused is otherwise not entitled to
the benefits of the repealing act.

While an amendment is generally construed as becoming a

part of the original act as if it had always been contained
therein , it may not be given a retroactive effect unless it is
so provided expressly or by necessary implication and no
vested right or obligations of contract are thereby impaired.

The general rule on the prospective operation of statutes also

applies to amendatory acts

San Jose v. Rehabilitation Finance Corp

RA 401 which condoned the interest on pre-war debts from

January 1, 1942 to December 31, 1945 amended by RA 671
on June 16, 1951 by virtually reenacting the old law and
providing that if the debtor, however, makes voluntary
payment of the entire pre-war unpaid principal obligation on
or before December 31, 1952, the interest on such principal
obligation corresponding from January 1, 1946 to day of
payment are likewise condoned

Held: a debtor who paid his pre-war obligation together with

the interests on March 14, 1951 or before the amendment
was approved into law, is not entitled to a refund of the
interest paid from January 1, 1946 to March 14, 1951 the
date the debtor paid the obligation.

Reason:
o makes voluntary payment denotes a present or
future act; thereby not retroactively
o unpaid principal obligation and condone
imply that amendment does not cover refund of
interests paid after its approval.
CIR v. La Tondena

Statute: imposes tax on certain business activities is amended

by eliminating the clause providing a tax on some of such
activities, and the amended act is further amended, after the
lapse of length of time, by restoring the clause previously
eliminated, which requires that the last amendment should
not be given retroactive effect so as to cover the whole
period.
Imperial v. CIR

An amendment which imposes a tax on a certain business

which the statute prior to its amendment does not tax, may
not be applied retroactively so as to require payment of the
tax on such business for the period prior to the amendment
Buyco v. Philippine National Bank

Issue: can Buyco compel the PNB to accept his backpay

certificate in payment of his indebtedness to the bank

April 24, 1956- RA 897 gave Buyco the right to have said
certificate applied in payment of is obligation thus at that
time he offered to pay with his backpay certificate.

June 16, 1956, RA 1576 was enacted amending the charter

of the PNB and provided that the bank shall have no
authority to accept backpay certificate in payment of
indebtedness to the bank.

Held: The Court favored Buyco. All statutes are construed as

having prospective operation, unless the purpose of the
legislature is to give them retroactive effect.

This principle also applies to amendments. RA 1576 does

not contain any provision regarding its retroactive effect. It
simply states its effectivity upon approval. The amendment
therefore, has no retroactive effect, and the present case
should be governed by the law at the time the offer in
question was made

The rule is familiar that after an act is amended, the original

act continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had
accrued prior to such amendment.
Insular Government v. Frank

Where a contract is entered into by the parties on the basis of

the law then prevailing, the amendment of said law will not
affect the terms of said contract.

The rule applies even if one of the contracting parties is the

government

litigant can acquire a vested right to be heard by one

particular court.

STATUTES GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT

Procedural laws

The general law is that the law has no retroactive effect.

Exceptions:
o procedural laws
o curative laws, which are given retroactive
operation

Procedural laws
o adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms of
procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress
for their invasion
o they refer to rules of procedure by which courts
applying laws of all kinds can properly administer
injustice
o they include rules of pleadings, practice and
evidence
o Applied to criminal law, they provide or regulate
the steps by which one who commits a crime is to
be punished.
o Remedial statutes or statutes relating to modes of
procedure- which do not create new or take away
vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the
remedy or confirmation of the rights already
existing, do not come within the legal conception
of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the
retroactive operation of statutes.
o A new statute which deals with procedure only is
presumptively applicable to all actions those
which have accrued or are pending.
o Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will
be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage.

The retroactive application of procedural laws is not:

o violative of any right of a person who may feel that
he is adversely affected;
o nor constitutionally objectionable.

Rationale: no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,

procedural laws.

A person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a

litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his
case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing
rules of procedure
Alday v. Camillon

Provision: BP 129- nor record or appeal shall be required to

take an appeal. (procedural in nature and should be applied
retroactively)

Issue: Whether an appeal from an adverse judgment should

be dismissed for failure of appellant to file a record on
appeal within 30 days as required under the old rules.

Such question is pending resolution at the time the BP Blg

took effect, became academic upon effectivity of said law
because the law no longer requires the filing a of a record on
appeal and its retroactive application removed the legal
obstacle to giving due course to the appeal.
Castro v. Sagales

A statute which transfers the jurisdiction to try certain cases

from a court to a quasi-judicial tribunal is a remedial statute
that is applicable to claims that accrued before its enactment
but formulated and filed after it took effect.

Held: The court that has jurisdiction over a claim at the time
it accrued cannot validly try to claim where at the time the
claim is formulated and filed, the jurisdiction to try it has
been transferred by law to a quasi-judicial tribunal.

Rationale: for even actions pending in one court may be

validly be taken away and transferred to another and no

An administrative rule: which is interpretative of a preexisting statue and not declarative of certain rights with
obligations thereunder is given retroactive effect as of the
date of the effectivity of the statute.

Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corp. v. CA

Issue: whether a trial court has been divested of jurisdiction

to hear and decide a pending case involving a mining
controversy upon the promulgation of PD 1281 which vests
upon the Bureau of Mines Original and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide mining controversies.

Held: Yes. PD 1281 is a remedial statute.

It does not create new rights nor take away rights that are
already vested. It only operates in furtherance of a remedy or
confirmation of rights already in existence.

It does not come within the legal purview of a prospective

law. As such, it can be given retrospective application of
statutes.

Being procedural in nature, it shall apply to all actions

pending at the time of its enactment except only with respect
to those cases which had already attained h character of a
final and executor judgment.

Were it not so, the purpose of the Decree, which is to

facilitate the immediate resolution of mining controversies
by granting jurisdiction to a body or agency more adept to
the technical complexities of mining operations, would be
thwarted and rendered meaningless.

Litigants in a mining controversy cannot be permitted to

choose a forum of convenience.

Jurisdiction is imposed by law and not by any of the parties

to such proceedings.

Furthermore, PD 1281 is a special law and under a wellaccepted principle in stat con, the special law will prevail
over a stature or law of general application.
Subido, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan

Court ruled that RA 7975, in further amending PD 1606 as

regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, mode of appeal,
and other procedural matters, is clearly a procedural law, i.e.
one which prescribes rules and forms of procedure enforcing
rights or obtaining redress for their invasion, or those which
refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of
all kinds can properly administer justice.

The petitioners suggest that it is likewise curative or

remedial statute, which cures defects and adds to the means
of enforcing existing obligations.

As a procedural and curative statute, RA 7975 may validly

be given retroactive effect, there being no impairment of
contractual or vested rights.
Martinez v. People

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be

construed as applicable to actions pending and undermined
at the time of their passage.

Where at the time the action was filed, the Rules of Court: a
petition to be allowed to appeal as pauper shall not be
entertained by the appellate court

The subsequent amendment thereto deleting the sentence

implies that the appellate court is no longer prohibited from
entertaining petitions to appear as pauper litigants, and may
grant the petition then pending action, so long as its
requirements are complied with.
Exceptions to the rule

The rule does not apply where:

o
o

the statute itself expressly or by necessary

implication provides that pending actions are
excepted from it operation, or where to apply it to
pending proceedings would impair vested rights
Courts may deny the retroactive application of
procedural laws in the event that to do so would
not be feasible or would work injustice.
Nor may procedural laws be applied retroactively
to pending actions if to do so would involve
intricate problems of due process or impair the
independence of the courts.

Tayag v. CA

Issue: whether an action for recognition filed by an

illegitimate minor after the death of his alleged parent when
Art 285 of the Civil Code was still in effect and has
remained pending Art 175 of the Family Code took effect
can still be prosecuted considering that Art 175, which is
claimed to be procedural in nature and retroactive in
application, does not allow filing of the action after the death
of the alleged parent.

Held: The rule that a statutory change in matters of

procedure may affect pending actions and proceedings,
unless the language of the act excludes them from its
operation, is not so pervasive that it may be used to validate
or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effect,
since procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at
the time the question of procedure arises especially where
vested rights maybe prejudiced.

Accordingly, Art 175 of the Family Code finds no proper

application to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect
adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially,
of the minor child she represents, both of which have been
vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial
court is, therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Art
285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private
respondents cause of action has not yet prescribed.
Curative statutes

curative remedial statutes are healing acts

they are remedial by curing defects and adding to the means

of enforcing existing obligations

the rule to curative statutes is that if the thing omitted or

failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect sought to
be removed or made harmless, is something which the
legislature might have dispensed with by a previous statute,
it may do so by a subsequent one

curative statutes are intended to supply defects, abridge

superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils. They
are designed and intended, but has failed of expected legal
consequence by reason of some statutory disability or
irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which,
before the enactment of the statute, was invalid.

Their purpose is to give validity to acts done that would have

been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have
been complied with
Frivaldo v. COMELEC

(rested the definition of curative statutes)

Tolentino
o those which undertake to cure errors&
irregularities, thereby validating judicial judicial or
administrative proceedings, acts of public officers,
or private deeds or contracts which otherwise
would not produce their intended consequences by
reason of some statutory disability or failure to
comply with some technical requirement

Agpalo
o

curative statutes are healing acts curing defects and

adding to the means of enforcing existing
obligations
o and are intended to supply defects abridge
superfluities in existing laws& curb certain evils
o by their very nature, curative statutes are
retroactive and reach back to the past events to
correct errors or irregularities & to render valid &
effective attempted acts which would be otherwise
ineffective for the purpose the parties intended
Curative statutes are forms of retroactive legislations which
reach back on past events to correct errors or irregularities &
to render valid & effective attempted acts which would be
otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended.

Erectors, Inc. v. NLRC (hahhha for the petitioner)

Statute: EO 111, amended Art 217 of the Labor Code to

widen the workers, access to the government for redress of
grievances by giving the Regional Directors & the Labor
Arbiters concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving money
claims

Issue: Amendment created a situation where the jurisdiction

of the RDs and LAs overlapped.

Remedy: RA 6715further amended Art 217 by delineating

their respective jurisdictions. Under RA 6715, the RD has
exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving claims, provided:
o the claim is presented by an employer or person
employed in domestic or household services or
household help under the Code.
o the claimant no longer being employed does not
seek reinstatement
o the aggregate money claim of the employee or
househelper doesnt exceed P5,000.
All other cases are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter.

Held: EO 111 & RA 6715 are therefore curative statutes.

A curative statute is enacted to cure defects in a prior law or

to validate legal proceedings, instruments or acts of public
authorities which would otherwise be void for want of
conformity with certain existing legal requirements
Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee

Statutes intended to validate what otherwise void or invalid

marriages, being curative, will be given retroactive effect.
Santos v. Duata

Statute which provides that a contract shall presumed an

equitable mortgage in any of the cases therein enumerated,
and designed primarily to curtail evils brought about by
contracts of sale with right of repurchase, is remedial in
nature & will be applied retroactively to cases arising prior
to the effectivity of the statute.
Abad v. Phil American General Inc.

Where at the time action is filed in court the latter has no

jurisdiction over the subject matter but a subsequent statute
clothes it with jurisdiction before the matter is decided.

The statute is in the nature of a curative law with retroactive

operation to pending proceedings and cures the defect of lack
of jurisdiction of the court at the commencement of the
action.
Legarda v. Masaganda

Where a curative statute is enacted after the court has

rendered judgment, which judgment is naturally void as the
court has at the time no jurisdiction over the subject of the
action, the enactment of the statute conferring jurisdiction to

the court does not validate the void judgment for the
legislature has no power to make a judgment rendered
without jurisdiction of a valid judgment.
Frivaldo v. COMELEC

(an example considered curative & remedial as well as one

which creates new rights & new remedies, generally held to
e retroactive in nature- PD 725, which liberalizes the
procedure of repatriation)

Held: PD 725 & the re-acquisition of the Filipino citizenship

by administrative repatriation pursuant to said decree is
retroactive.
De Castro v. Tan

Held: what has been given retroactive effect in Frivaldo is

not only the law itself but also Phil. Citizenship re-acquired
pursuant to said law to the date of application for
repatriation, which meant that his lack of Filipino citizenship
at the time he registered as a voter, one of the qualification is
as a governor, or at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy for governorship, one of the qualification is as a
governor, was cured by the retroactive application of his
repatriation.
Republic v. Atencio

Curative statute: one which confirms, refines and validate the

sale or transfer of a public land awarded to a grantee, which
a prior law prohibits its sale within a certain period &
otherwise invalid transaction under the old law.
Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez

Statute: Sec. 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991,

provides that municipal districts organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive orders & which have their
respective sets of elective municipal officials holding at the
time of the effectivity of the code shall henceforth be
considered as a regular municipalities

This is a curative statute as it validates the creation of

municipalities by EO which had been held to be an invalid
usurpation of legislative power.
Tatad v. Garcia Jr.

Issue: Where there is doubt as to whether government

agency under the then existing law, has the authority to enter
intoa negotiated contract for the construction of a
government project under the build-lease-and transfer
scheme

Held: The subsequent enactment of a statute which

recognizes direct negotiation of contracts under such
arrangement is a curative statute.

As all doubts and procedural lapses that might have attended

the negotiated contract have been cured by the subsequent
statute
Limitations of rule

remedial statutes will not be given retroactive effect if to do

so would impair the obligations of contract or disturb vested
rights

only administrative or curative features of the statute as will

not adversely affect existing rights will be given retroactive
operation

the exception to the foregoing limitations of the rule is a

remedial or curative statute which is enacted as a police
power measure

Statutes of this type may be given retroactive effect even

though they impair vested rights or the obligations of
contract, if the legislative intent is to give them retrospective
operation

Rationale: The constitutional restriction against impairment

against obligations of contract or vested rights does not
preclude the legislature from enacting statutes in the exercise
of its police power

Police power legislations

as a rule, statutes which are enacted in the exercise of police

power to regulate certain activities, are applicable not only to
those activities or transactions coming into being after their
passage, but also to those already in existence

Rationale: the non-impairment of the obligations of contract

or of vested rights must yield to the legitimate exercise of
power, by the legislature, to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and
general welfare of the people

Any right acquired under a statute or under a contract is

subject to the condition that it may be impaired by the state
in the legitimate exercise of its police power, since the
reservation of the essential attributes of sovereign power is
deemed read into every statute or contract as a postulate of
the legal order
Statutes relating to prescription

General rule: a statute relating to prescription of action,

being procedural in nature, applies to all actions filed after its
effectivity. In other words, such a statute is both:
o prospective in the sense that it applies to causes
that accrued and will accrue after it took effect,
and
o retroactive in the sense that it applies to causes that
accrued before its passage

However, a statute of limitations will not be given

retroactive operation to causes of action that accrued prior to
its enactment if to do so will remove a bar of limitation
which has become complete or disturb existing claims
without allowing a reasonable time to bring actions thereon
Nagrampa v. Nagrampa

Statute: Art. 1116 of the Civil Code: prescription already

running before the effectivity of this Code shall be governed
by laws previously in force; but if since the time this Code
took effect the entire period herein required for prescription
should elapse, the present Code shall be applicable even
though by the former laws a longer period might be
required.

Held: The provision is retroactive since it applied to a cause

that accrued prior to its effectivity which when filed has
prescribed under the new Civil Code even though the period
of prescription prescribed under the old law has not ended at
the time the action is filed in court

The fact that the legislature has indicated that the statute
relating to prescription should be given retroactive effect will
not warrant giving it if it will impair vested rights

Statute of limitations prescribing a longer period to file an

action than that specified under the law may not be construed
as having retroactive application if it will revive the cause
that already prescribed under the old statute for it will impair
vested rights against whom the cause is asserted.

Statute which shorten the period of prescription & requires

that causes which accrued prior to its effectivity be
prosecuted or filed not later than a specific date may not be
construed to apply to existing causes which pursuant to the
old law under which they accrued, will not prescribe until a
much longer period than that specified in the later enactment
because the right to bring an action is founded on law which
has become vested before the passage of the new statute of
limitations

Apparently conflicting decisions on prescription

Billones v. CIR

Issue: whether Sec. 7A of Common wealth Act 144,

amended by RA 1993, to the effect that any action to
enforce an cause (i.e. non payment of wages or overtime
compensation) under this Act shall be commenced within 3
years after such cause of action accrued, otherwise it shall be
forever barred. Provided, however, that actions already
commenced before the effective day of this Act shall not be
affected by the period herein prescribed.

As statute shortened the period of prescription from 6 to 3

yrs. from the date the cause of action accrued, it was
contended that to give retroactive effect would impair vested
rights since it would operate to preclude the prosecution of
claims that accrued more than 3 but less than 6 yrs.

Held: a statute of limitations is procedural in nature and no

vested right can attach thereto or arise therefrom.

When the legislature provided that actions already

commenced before the effectivity of this Act shall not be
affected by the period herein prescribed, it intended to
apply the statute to all existing actions filed after the
effectivity of the law.

Because the statute shortened the period within which to

bring an action & in order to violate the constitutional
mandate, claimants are injuriously affected should have a
reasonable period of 1 yr. from time new statute took effect
within which to sue on such claims.
Corales v. Employees Compensation Commission

Same issue on Billones but Court arrived at a different

conclusion.

Issue: Whether a claim for workmens compensation which

accrued under the old Workmens Compensation Act (WCA)
but filed under after March 31, 1975 is barred by the
provision of the New Labor Code which repealed the WCA.

WCA requires that workmens compensation claims

accruing prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be filed
with the appropriate regional offices of the Department of
Labor not later than March 31, 1975, otherwise shall be
barred forever.

Held: Provision doesnt apply to workmens compensation

that accrued before Labor Code took effect, even if claims
were not filed not later than March 31, 1975.

Rationale: prescriptive period for claims which accrued

under WCA as amended 10 yrs. which is a right found on
statute & hence a vested right, that cannot be impaired by
the retroactive application of the Labor Code.

Comparison of Billones and Corales

Billones

Corales

While Court said that such right

to bring an action accrued under
the old law is not vested right, it
did not say that the right is one
protected by the due process
clause of the Constitution.

Court considered the right to

prosecute the action that accrued
under the old law as one founded
on law & a vested right.

For BOTH cases: In solving how

to safeguard the right to bring
action whose prescriptive period
to institute it has been shortened
by law?
Gave the claimants whose rights
have been affected, one year

Court construed the statute of

limitations as inapplicable to the
action that accrued before the
law took effect.
(It is generally held that the court
has no power to read into the law
something which the law itself

from the date the law took effect

within which to sue their claims.

did not provide expressly or

impliedly. Corales case seems to
be on firmer grounds.

Prescription in criminal and civil cases

General rule: laws on prescription of actions apply as well to

crimes committed before the enactment as afterwards. There
is, however, a distinction between a statute of limitations in
criminal actions and that of limitations in civil suits, as
regards their construction.

In CIVIL SUIT- statute is enacted by the legislature as an

impartial arbiter, between two contending parties. In the
construction of such statute, there is no intendment to be
made in favor of either party. Neither grants right to the
other; there is therefore no grantor against whom no ordinary
presumptions of construction are to be made.

CRIMINAL CASES: the state is the grantor, surrendering by

act of grace its right to prosecute or declare that the offense
is no longer subject of prosecution after the prescriptive
period. Such statutes are not only liberally construed but are
applied retroactively if favorable to the accused.
Statutes relating to appeals

The right to appeal from an adverse judgment, other than that

which the Constitution grants, is statutory and may be
restricted or taken away

A statute relating to appeals is remedial or procedural in

nature and applies to pending actions in which no judgment
has yet been promulgated at the time the statute took effect.

Such statute, like other statutes, may not however be

construed retroactively so as to impair vested rights. Hence,
a statute which eliminates the right to appeal and considers
the judgment rendered in a case final and unappealable,
destroys the right to appeal a decision rendered after the
statute went into effect, but NOT the right to prosecute an
appeal that has been perfected before the passage of the law,
for in the latter case, the right of the appellant to appeal has
become vested under the old law and may not therefore be
impaired.

Stature shortening the period for taking appeals is to be

given prospective effect and may not be applies to pending
proceedings in which judgment has already been rendered at
the time of its enactment except if theres clear legislative
intent.
Berliner v. Roberts

Where a statute shortened the period for taking appeals form

thirty days to fifteen days from notice of judgment, an appeal
taken within thirty days but beyond fifteen days from notice
of judgment promulgated before the statute took effect is
deemed seasonably perfected.
CHAPTER TEN:
Amendment, Revision, Codification and Repeal
AMENDMENT

Power to Amend

The legislature has the authority to amend, subject to

constitutional requirements, any existing law.

Authority to amend is part of the legislative power to enact,

alter and repeal laws.

The SC in the exercise of its rule-making power or of its

power to interpret the law, has no authority to amend or
change the law, such authority being the exclusive to the
legislature.

How amendment effected

Amendment the change or modification, by deletion,

alteration, of a statute which survives in its amended form.

The amendment of a statute is effected by the enactment of

an amendatory act modifying or altering some provisions of
a statute either expressly or impliedly.

Express amendment done by providing in the amendatory

act that specific sections or provisions of a statute be
amended as recited therein or as common indicated, to read
as follows.
Amendment by implication

Every statute should be harmonized with other laws on the

same subject, in the absence of a clear inconsistency.

Legislative intent to amend a prior law on the same subject is

shown by a statement in the later act that any provision of
law that is inconsistent therewith is modified accordingly.

Implied Amendment- when a part of a prior statute

embracing the same subject as the later may not be enforced
without nullifying the pertinent provision of the latter in
which event, the prior act is deemed amended or modified to
the extent of repugnancy.

Quimpo v. Mendoza

Where a statute which requires that the annual realty tax on

lands or buildings be paid on or before the specified date,
subject to penalty of a percentage of the whole amount of tax
in case of delayed payment, is amended by authorizing
payment of the tax in four equal installments to become due
on or before specified dates.

The penalty provision of the earlier statute is modified by

implication that the penalty for late payment of an
installment under the later law will be collected and
computed only on the installment that became due and
unpaid, and not on the whole amount of annual tax as
provided in the old statute.

Legislative intent to change the basis is clear when the later

law allowed payment in four installments.
People v. Macatanda

A statute punishing an act which is also a crime under the

RPC provides a penalty as prescribed in the said Code, such
statute is not a special law but an amendment by implication.

When amendment takes effect

15 days following its publication in the Official Gazette or

newspaper of general circulation, unless a date is specified
therein after such publication.
How amendment is construed, generally

Statute and amendment read as a whole

Amendment act is ordinarily construed as if the original

statute has been repealed and a new independent act in the
amended form had been adopted.

Amended act is regarded as if the statute has been originally

enacted in it amended form.

Read in a connection with other sections as if all had been

enacted in the same statute.

Where an amendment leaves certain portions of an act

unchanged, such portions are continued in force, with the
same meaning and effect they have before the amendment.

Where an amendatory act provides that an existing statute

shall be amended to read as recited in the amendatory act,
such portions of the existing law as are retained either
literally or substantially

Estrada v. Caseda

Where a statute which provides that it shall be in force

for a period of four years after its approval, the four
years is to be counted from the date the original statute
was approved and not from the date the amendatory act
was amended.

Meaning of law changed by amendment

An amended act should be given a construction different

from the law prior to its amendment, for its is presumed that
the legislature would not have amended it had not it not
wanted to change its meaning.

Prior to the introduction of the amendment, the statute had a

different meaning which the amendment changed in all the
particulars touching which a material change in the language
of the later act exists.

Deliberate selection of language in the amendatory act

different from that of the original act indicates that the
legislature intended a change in the law or in its meaning.

Victorias Milling Co. v. SSS

A statutory definition of term containing a general rule

and an exception thereto is amended by eliminating the
exception, the legislative intent is clear that the term
should now include the exception within the scope of
the general rule.
Parras v. Land Registration Commissions

Section of a statute requiring the exact payment of

publication fees in land registration proceedings, except
in cases where the value of the land does not exceed
P50,000 is amended by deleting the excepting clause, it
means that the statute as amended now requires
payment of the publication fees regardless of the value
of the land involved

Suppression of the excepting clause amount to the

withdrawal of the exemption allowed under the original
act.

Amendment Operates Prospectively

An amendment will not be construed as having a retroactive

effect, unless the contrary is provided or the legislative intent
to give it a retroactive effect is necessarily implied from the
language used and only if no vested right is impaired.

Imperial v. Collector of Internal Revenue

A statute amending a tax law is silent as to whether it

operates retroactively, the amendment will not be
giving retroactive effect so as to subject to tax past
transactions not subject to tax under the original act.
Diu v. Court of Appeals

Statutes relating to procedure in courts are applicable to

actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage.

Effect of Amendment on Vested Rights

After a statute is amended, the original act continues to be in

force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to the
amendment or to obligations that were contracted under the
prior act and such rights and obligations will continue to be
governed by the law before its amendment.

Not applied retroactively so as to nullify such rights.

Effect of amendment on jurisdiction

Jurisdiction of a court to try cases is determined by the law

in force at the time the action is instituted.

Jurisdiction remains with the court until the case is finally

decided therein.

Rillaroza v. Arciaga

Absence of a clear legislative intent to the contrary, a

subsequent statute amending a prior act with the effect
of divesting the court of jurisdiction may not be
construed to operate but to oust jurisdiction that has
already attached under the prior law.
Iburaan v. Labes

Where a court originally obtains and exercises

jurisdiction pursuant to an existing law, such
jurisdiction will not be overturned and impaired by the
subsequent amendment of the law, unless express
prohibitory words or words of similar import are used.

Applies to quasi-judicial bodies

Erectors, Inc v. NLRC

PD 1691 and 1391 vested Labor Arbiters with original

and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving
employer-employee relations, including money claims
arising out of any law or contract involving Filipino
workers for overseas employment

Facts: An overseas worker filed a money claim against

his recruiter, and while the case is pending, EO 797 was
enacted, which vested POEA with original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money
claims, arising out of law or contract involving Filipino
workers for overseas employment.

Issue: whether the decision of the labor arbiter in favor

of the overseas worker was invalid

Held: the court sustained the validity of the decision and

ruled that the labor arbiter still had the authority to
decide the cease because EO 797b did not divest the
labor arbiter his authority to hear and decide the case
filed by the overseas worker prior to its effectivity.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the

law in force at the time of the commencement of the
action; laws should only be applied prospectively unless
the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is
expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the
language used.

Effect of nullity of prior or amendatory act

Where a statute which has been amended is invalid, nothing

in effect has been amended

The amendatory act, complete by itself, will be considered as

an original or independent act.

Government v. Agoncillo

Where the amendatory act is declared unconstitutional,

it is as if the amendment did not exist, and the original
statute before the attempted amend remains unaffected
and in force.
REVISION AND CODIFICATION

Generally

Purpose: to restate the existing laws into one statute and

simply complicated provisions, and make the laws on the
subject easily found.

Construction to harmonize different provisions

Presumption: author has maintained a consisted philosophy

or position.

The different provisions of a revised statute or code should

be read and construed together.

Rule: a code enacted as a single, comprehensive statute, and

is to be considered as such and not as a series of
disconnected articles or provisions.

Lichauco & Co. v. Apostol

A irreconcilable conflict between parts of a revised

statute or a code, that which is best in accord with the
general plan or, in the absence of circumstances upon
which to base a choice, that which is later in physical
position, being the latest expression of legislative will,
will prevail.

What is omitted is deemed repealed

all laws and provisions of the old laws that are omitted in the
revised statute or code are deemed repealed, unless the
statute or code provides otherwise

Reason: revision or codification is, by its very nature and

purpose, intended to be a complete enactment on the subject
and an expression of the whole law thereon, which thereby
indicates intent on the part of the legislature to abrogate
those provisions of the old laws that are not reproduced in
the revised statute or code.

Possible only if the revised statute or code was intended to

cover the whole subject to is a complete and perfect system
in itself.

Rule: a subsequent statute is deemed to repeal a prior law if

the former revises the whole subject matter of the former
statute.

When both intent and scope clearly evince the idea of a

repeal, then all parts and provision of the prior act that are
omitted from the revised act are deemed repealed.

Mecano v. Commission on Audit

Claim for reimbursement by a government official of

medical and hospitalization expenses pursuant to
Section 699 of the Revised Administration Code of
1917, which authorizes the head of office to case a
reimbursement of payment of medical and hospital
expenses of a government official in case of sickness or
injury caused by or connected directly with the
performance of his official duty.

CoA denied the claim on the ground that AC of 1987

which revised the old AC, repealed Sec. 699 because it
was omitted the revised code.

SC ruled that the legislature did not intend, in enacting

the new Code, to repeal Sec. 699 of the old code.

All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or

portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.

New code did not expressly repeal the old as the new
Code fails to identify or designate the act to be repealed.

Two categories of repeal by implication

Provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter

that are in irreconcilable conflict.
Later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an
implied repeal of the earlier

If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier

one and is clearly intended as a statute, it will operate to
repeal the earlier law.

There is no irreconcilable conflict between the two codes on

the matter of sickness benefits because the provision has not
been restated in the New Code.

Change in phraseology

It is a well settled rule that in the revision or codification of

statutes, neither an alteration in phraseology nor the
admission or addition of words in the later statute shall be
held necessarily to alter the construction of the former acts.

Words which do not materially affect the sense will be

omitted from the statute as incorporated in the revise statute
or code, or that some general idea will be expressed in brief
phrases.

If there has been a material change or omission, which

clearly indicates an intent to depart from the previous
construction of the old laws, then such construction as will
effectuate such intent will be adopted.
Continuation of existing laws.

A codification should be construed as the continuation of the

existing statutes.

The codifiers did not intend to change the law as it formerly

existed.

The rearrangement of sections or parts of a statute, or the

placing of portions of what formerly was a single section in
seprate sections, does not operate to change the operation,
effect of meaning of the statute, unless the changes are of
such nature as to manifest clearly and unmistakably a
legislative intent to change the former laws.

REPEAL

Power to repeal

Power to repeal a law is as complete as the power to enact

one.

The legislature cannot in and of itself enact irrepealable laws

or limit its future legislative acts.

Repeal, generally

Repeal: total or partial, express or implied

Total repeal revoked completely

Partial repeal leaves the unaffected portions of the statute

in force.

A particular or specific law, identified by its number of title,

is repealed is an express repeal.

All other repeals are implied repeals.

Failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the

intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the
terms of the new and old laws, latter situation falls under the
category of an implied repeal.

Repealed only by the enactment of subsequent laws.

The change in the condition and circumstances after the

passage of a law which is necessitated the enactment of a
statute to overcome the difficulties brought about by such
change does not operate to repeal the prior law, nor make the
later statute so inconsistent with the prior act as to repeal it.

The whereas clause is the intent to cover only those aspects

of government that pertain to administration, organization
and procedure, and understandably because of the many
changes that transpired in the government structure since the
enactment of the old code.

Repeal by implication

Where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on

the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the
subject, that intention must be given effect.

There must be a sufficient revelation of the legislative intent

to repeal.

Intention to repeal must be clear and manifest

General rule: the latter act is to be construed as a

continuation not a substitute for the first act so far as the two
acts are the same, from the time of the first enactment.
Two categories of repeals by implication

Where provisions in the two acts on the same subject

matter are in an irreconcilable conflict and the later act
to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal
of the earlier.

If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier

one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will
operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act.

Irreconcilable inconsistency

Implied repeal brought about by irreconcilable repugnancy

between two laws takes place when the two statutes cover
the same subject matter; they are so clearly inconsistent and
incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled
or harmonized and both cannot be given effect, once cannot
be enforced without nullifying the other.

Implied repeal earlier and later statutes should embrace the

same subject and have the same object.

In order to effect a repeal by implication, the later statute

must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the
existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand
together.

It is necessary before such repeal is deemed to exist that is be

shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the
same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with
the former.

the fact that the terms of an earlier and later provisions of

law differ is not sufficient to create repugnance as to
constitute the later an implied repeal of the former.
Agujetas v. Court of Appeals

Fact that Sec 28 of RA 7166 pertaining to canvassing

by boards of canvassers is silent as to how the board of
canvassers shall prepare the certificate of canvass and
as to what will be its basis, w/c details are provided in
the second paragraph of Sec231 of the Omnibus
Election Code, an earlier statute, respective boards of
canvassers shall prepare a certificate of canvass duly
signed and affixed with the imprint of the thumb of the
right hand of each member, supported by a statement of
the votes and received by each candidate in each polling
place and on the basis thereof shall proclaim as elected
the candidates who obtained the highest number of
votes coast in the provinces, city, municipality or
barangay, and failure to comply with this requirement
shall constitute an election offense

Did not impliedly repeal the second paragraph of Sec

231 of OEC and render the failure to comply with the
requirement no longer an election offense.

Irreconcilable inconsistency between to laws embracing the

same subject may also exist when the later law nullifies the
reason or purpose of the earlier act, so that the latter law
loses all meaning and function.

Smith, Bell & Co. v. Estate of Maronilla

A prior law is impliedly repealed by a later act where

the reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure
removed.

Repeal by implication based on the cardinal rule that in the

science of jurisprudence, two inconsistent laws on the same
subject cannot co-exist in one jurisdiction.
There cannot be two conflicting law on the same subject.
Either reconciled or later repeals prior law.

Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant (a later law

repeals the prior law on the subject which is repugnant
thereto)

Mecano v. Commission on Audit

Issue: whether Sec. 699 of the Revised Administrative

Code has been repealed by the 1987 Administrative
Code.

1987 Administration Code provides that: All laws,

decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions
thereof, inconsistent with this code are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly

Court ruled that the new Code did not repeal Sec 699:
o Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency
takes place when two statutes cover the same
subject matter, they are so clearly inconsistent and
incompatible with each other that they cannot be
reconciled or harmonized, and both cannot be
given effect, that one law cannot be enforced
without nullifying the other.
o The new Code does not cover not attempt to the
cover the entire subject matter of the old Code.
o There are several matters treated in the old Code
that are not found in the new Code. (provisions on
notary public; leave law, public bonding law,
military reservations, claims for sickness benefits
under section 699 and others)
o CoA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of
the two Codes on the matter of the subject claim
are in an irreconcilable conflict.
o There can no conflict because the provision on
sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by
petitioner has not been restated in old Code.
o The contention is untenable.
o The fact that a later enactment may relate to the
same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is
not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of
the prior act new statute may merely be cumulative
or a continuation of the old one.
o Second Category: possible only if the revised
statute or code was intended to cover the whole
subject to be a complete and perfect system in
itself.
Rule: a subsequent is deemed to repeal a prior
law if the former revises the whole subject
matter of the former statute.
o When both intent and scope clearly evince the idea
of a repeal, then all parts and provisions of the
prior act that are omitted from the revised act are
deemed repealed.
o Before there can be an implied repeal under this
category, it must be the clear intent of the
legislature that later act be the substitute of the
prior act.
o Opinion 73 s.1991 of the Secretary of Justice: what
appears clear is the intent to cover only those
aspects of government that pertain to
administration, organization and procedure,
understandably because of the many changes that
transpired in the government structure since the
enactment of RAC.
o Repeals of statutes by implication are not favored.
Presumption is against the inconsistency and
repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know
the existing laws on the subject and not to have
enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.

Ty v. Trampe

Issue: whether PD 921 on real estate taxes has been

repealed impliedly by RA 7160, otherwise know as the
Local Government Code of 1991 on the same subject.

Held: that there has been no implied repeal

Court: it is clear that the two law are not coextensive

and mutually inclusive in their scope and purpose.
o RA 7160 covers almost all governmental functions
delegated to local government units all over the
country.
o PD 921 embraces only Metropolitan Manila Area
and is limited to the administration of financial
services therein.
o Sec.9 PD921 requires that the schedule of values
of real properties in the Metropolitan Manila Area
shall be prepared jointly by the city assessors states
that the schedules shall be prepared by the
provincial, city and municipal assessors of the
municipalities within Metropolitan Manila Area
for the different classes of real property situated in
their respective local government units for
enactment by ordinance of the sanggunian
concerned.
Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole

Sec.19 RA 6670, the Ombudsman Act grants

disciplinary authority to the Ombudsman to discipline
elective and appointive officials, except those
impeachable officers, has been repealed, RA 7160, the
Local Government Code, insofar as local elective
officials in the various officials therein named.

Held: both laws should be given effect because there is

nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that
it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly.
o The two statutes on the specific matter in question
are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as
to compel us to uphold one and strike down the
other.
o Two laws must be incompatible, and a clear
finding thereof must surface, before the inference
of implied repeal may be drawn.
o Interpretare et concordare leges legibus, est
optimus interpretandi modus, i. e (every statute
must be so construed and harmonized with other
statutes as to form uniform system of
jurisprudence.
o the legislature should be presumed to have known
the existing laws on the subject and not to have
enacted conflicting statutes.
Initia, Jr v. CoA

implied repeal will not be decreed unless there is an

irreconcilable inconsistency between two provisions or
laws is RA 7354 in relation to PD 1597.
o RA 7354 in part of the Postmaster General,
subject to the approval of the Board of Directors of
the Philippines Postal Corporation, shall have the
power to determine the staffing pattern and the
number of personnel, define their duties and
responsibilities, and fix their salaries and
emoluments in accordance with the approved
compensation structure of the Corporation.
o Sec.6 PD 1597 exemptions notwithstanding,
agencies shall report to the President, through the
Budget
Commission,
on
their
position
classification and compensation plans, policies,
rates and other related details following such
specifications as may be prescribed by the
President.

Issue: whether Sec6 of PD1597, the two laws being

reconcilable.
While the Philippine Postal Corporation is allowed to
fix its own personnel compensation structure through its
board of directors, the latter is required to follow certain
standards in formulating said compensation system, and
the role of DBM is merely to ensure that the action
taken by the board of directors complies the
requirements of the law.

Cebu Institute of Technology v. Ople

Sec. 3(a) PD 451 and Sec. 42 of BP 232 illustrates

repeal by implication.
o Sec 3(a) provides: no increase in tuition or other
school fees or charges shall be approved unless
60% of the proceed is allocated to increase in
salaries or wages of the member of the faculty.
o BP 232: each private school shall determine its
rate of tuition and other school fees or charges.
The rates or charges adopted by schools pursuant
to this provision shall be collectible, and their
application or use authorized, subject to rules and
regulations promulgated by the Ministry of
Education, Culture and Sports.

Issue: whether Sec. 42 of BP 232 impliedly repealed

Sec. 3(a) of PD 451

Held: there was implied repeal because there are

irreconcilable differences between the two laws.

Implied repeal by revision or codification

Revised statute is in effect a legislative declaration that

whatever is embraced in the new statute shall prevail and
whatever is excluded there from shall be discarded.

Must be intended to cover the whole subject to be a complete

and perfect system in itself in order that the prior statutes or
part thereof which are not repeated in the new statute will be
deemed impliedly repealed.

People v. Benuya

Where a statute is revised or a series of legislative acts

on the same subject are revised or consolidated into
one, covering the entire field of subject matter, all parts
and provisions of the former act or acts
o that are omitted from the revised act are deemed
repealed.

Tung Chin Hui v. Rodriguez

Issue: whether Sec.18 Rule 41 of the pre-1007 Rules of

Court, which provided the appeal in habeas corpus
cases to be taken within 48 hours from notice of
judgment, has been replaced by the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides in Sec. 3 Rule 41 thereof,
that appeal from judgment or final order shall be taken
within 15 days from receipt thereof, in view of the fact
that the Sec. 18 was repealed, in accordance with the
well-settled rule of statutory construction that
provisions of an old law that were not reproduced in
the revision thereof covering the same subject are
deemed repealed and discarded

Held: SC in this case to abrogate those provisions of the

old laws that are not reproduced in the revised statute or
Code.

People v. Almuete

Revision of the Agricultural Tenancy Act by the

Agricultural Land Reform Code.

Sec 39 of ATC (RA 1199) it shall be unlawful for

either the tenant or landlord without mutual consent, to
reap or thresh a portion of the crop at any time previous
to the date set, for its threshing.

An action for violation of this penal provision is

pending in court, the Agricultural Land Reform Code
superseded the Agricultural Tenancy Act, abolished

Repeal by reenactment

Where a statute is a reenactment of the whole subject in

substitution of the previous laws on the matter, the latter
disappears entirely and what is omitted in the reenacted law
is deemed repealed.

Parras v. Land Registration Commission

Where a law amends a specific section of a prior act by

providing that the same is amended so as to read as
follows, which then quotes the amended provision, what
is not included in the reenactment is deemed repealed.

The new statute is a substitute for the original section

and all matters in the section that are omitted in the
amendment are considered repealed.

Joaquin v. Navarro

Where a new statute is intended to furnish the exclusive

rule on a certain subject, it repeals by implication the
old law on the same subject,

Where a new statute covers the whole subject matter of

an old law and adds new provisions and makes changes,
and where such law, whether it be in the form of an
amendment or otherwise, is evidently intended to be a
revision of the old act, it repeals the old act by
implication.

share tenancy, was not reproduced in the Agricultural

Land Reform Code.
The effect of such non-reenactment is a repeal of
Section 39.
It is a rule of legal hermeneutics that an act which
purports to set out in full all that it intends to contain,
operates as a repeal of anything omitted which was
contained in the old act and not included in the act as
revised.
A substitute statute, and evidently intended as the
substitute for it, operates to repeal the former statute.

Other forms of implied repeal

The most powerful implication of repeal is that which arises

when the later of two laws is expressed in the form of a
universal negative.

There is a clear distinction between affirmative and negative

statutes in regard to their repealing effects upon prior
legislation.

Affirmative statute does not impliedly repeal the prior

law unless an intention to effect a repeal is manifest,

A negative statute repeals all conflicting provisions

unless the contrary intention is disclosed.

Legislative intent to repeal is also shown where it enacts

something in general term and afterwards it passes another
on the same subject, which though expressed in affirmative
language introduces special conditions or restrictions

The subsequent statute will usually be considered as

repealing by implication the former regarding the matter
covered by the subsequent act.

The express repeal of a provision of law from which an

executive official derives his authority to enforce another
provision of the same law operates to repeal by implication
the latter and to deprive the official of the authority to
enforce it.

The enactment of a statute on a subject, whose purpose or

object is diametrically opposed to that of an earlier law on
the same subject which thereby deprives it of its reason for
being, operates to repeal by implication the prior law, even
though the provisions of both laws are not inconsistent.

All laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Act are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly, construed.

Nature of repealing clause

Not express repealing clauses because it fails to identify

or designate the act or acts that are intended to be
repealed.

A clause, which predicates the intended repeal upon the

condition that a substantial conflict must be found on
existing and prior acts of the same subject matter.

The presumption against implied repeal and the rule on

strict construction regarding implied repeal apply ex
proprio vigore.

Legislature is presumed to know the existing law so that

if repeal of particular or specific law or laws is
intended, the proper step is to so express it.

Valdez v. Tuason

such a clause repeals nothing that would not be equally

repealed without it.

Either with or without it, the real question to be

determined is whether the new statute is in fundamental
and irreconcilable conflict with the prior statute on the
subject.

Significance of the repealing clause: the presence of such

general repealing clause in a later statute clearly indicates the
legislative intent to repeal all prior inconsistent laws on the
subject matter whether or not the prior law is a special law.

A later general law will ordinarily not repeal a prior

special law on the same subject, as the latter is generally
regarded as an exception to the former.

With such clause contained in the subsequent general

law, the prior special law will be deemed repealed, as
the clause is a clear legislative intent to bring about that
result.

Repeal by implication not favored

Presumption is against inconsistency or repugnancy and,

accordingly, against implied repeal

Legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the

subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting
statutes.

A construction which in effect will repeal a statute altogether

should, if possible, be rejected.

In case of doubt as to whether a later statute has impliedly

repealed a prior law on the same subject, the doubt should be
resolved against implied repeal.

US v. Palacio

Repeals by implication are not favored, and will not be

decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so
intended.

As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation

and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the
subject

It is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute

it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any
former law relating to some matter

Unless the repugnancy between the two is not only

irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and
flowing necessarily form the language used, the later act
fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or

unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond

peradventure removed.
Every effort must be used to make all acts stand and if,
by any reasonable construction, they can be reconciled,
the later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier.

NAPOCOR v. Angas

Illustrates the application of the principle that repeal or

amendment by implication is not favored.

Issue: whether Central Bank Circular 416 has impliedly

repealed or amended Art 2209 of the Civil Code

Held: in answering the issue in the negative, the court

ruled that repeals or even amendments by implication
are not favored if two laws can be fairly reconciled. The
statutes contemplate different situations and apply to
different transactions involving loan or forbearance of
money, goods or credits, as well as judgments relating
to such load or forbearance of money, goods, or credits,
the Central Bank Circular applies.

In cases requiring the payment of indemnities as

damages, in connection with any delay in the
performance of an obligation other than those involving
loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, Art
2209 of the CC applies

Courts are slow to hold that one statute has repealed another
by implication and they will not make such adjudication if
they can refrain from doing so, or if they can arrive at
another result by any construction which is just and
reasonable.

Courts will not enlarge the meaning of one act in order to

decide that is repeals another by implication, nor will they
adopt an interpretation leading to an adjudication of repeal
by implication unless it is inevitable and a clear and explicit
reason thereof can be adduced.

As between two laws, one passed later prevails

Leges posteriors priores contrarias abrogant (later statute

repeals prior ones which are not repugnant thereto.)

Applies even if the later act is made to take effect ahead

of the earlier law.

As between two acts, the one passed later and going into
effect earlier will prevail over one passed earlier and going
into effect later.

Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor Union

an act passed April 16th and in force April 21st was held
to prevail over an act passed April 9th and in effect July
4th of the same year.

And an act going into effect immediately has been held

to prevail over an act passed before but going into effect
later.

Whenever two statutes of different dates and of contrary

tenor are of equal theoretical application to a particular case,
the statute of later date must prevail, being a later expression
of legislative will.
Philippine National Bank v. Cruz

As between the order of preference of credit set forth in

Articles 2241 to 2245 of the CC and that of Article 110
of the Labor Code, giving first preference to unpaid
wages and other monetary claims of labor, the former
must yield to the latter, being the law of the later
enactment.

The later law repeals an earlier one because it is the later

legislative will.

Presumption: the lawmakers knew the older law and

intended to change it.

In enacting the older law, the legislators could not have

known the newer one and could not have intended to
change what they did not know.
CC: laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, not the
other way around.

David v. COMELEC

Sec. 1 of RA 6679 provides that the term of barangay

officials who were to be elected on the second Monday
of May 1994 is 5 years

The later act RA 7160 Sec 43 (c) states that the term of
office of barangay officials who were to be elected also
on the 2nd Monday of May 1994 is 3 years.

There being a clear inconsistency between the two laws,

the later law fixing the term barangay officials at 3
years shall prevail.

General law does not repeal special law, generally

A general law on a subject does not operate to repeal a prior

special law on the same subject, unless it clearly appears that
the legislature has intended by the later general act to modify
or repeal the earlier special law.

Presumption against implied repeal is stronger when of two

laws, one is special and the other general and this applies
even though the terms of the general act are broad enough to
include the matter covered by the special statute.

Generalia specialibus non derogant a general law does not

nullify a specific or special law

The legislature considers and makes provision for all the

circumstances of the particular case.

Reason why a special law prevails over a general law: the

legislature considers and makes provision for all the
circumstances of the particular case.

General and special laws are read and construed together,

and that repugnancy between them is reconciled by
constituting the special law as an exception to the general
law.

General law yields to the special law in the specific law in

the specific and particular subject embraced in the latter.

Applies irrespective of the date of passage of the special law.

Application of rule

Sto. Domingo v. De los Angeles

The court invariably ruled that the special law is not

impliedly repealed and constitutes an exception to the
general law whenever the legislature failed to indicate
in unmistakable terms its intent to repeal or modify the
prior special act.
NAPOCOR v. Arca

Issue: whether Sec. 2 of Com. Act 120 creating the

NAPOCOR, a government-owned corporation, and
empowering it to sell electric power and to fix the rates
and provide for the collection of the charges for any
services rendered: Provided, the rates of charges shall
not be subject to revision by the Public Service Act has
been repealed by RA 2677 amending the Public Service
Act and granting the Public Service Commission the
jurisdiction to fix the rate of charges of public utilities
owned or operated by the government or governmentowned corporations.

Held: a special law, like Com. Act 120, providing for a

particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a
subsequent statute, general in its terms, like RA 2677,
although the general statute are broad enough to include
the cases embraced in the special law, in the absence of
a clear intent to repeal.

There appears no such legislative intent to repeal or

abrogate the provisions of the earlier law.
The explanatory note to House Bill 4030 the later
became RA 2677, it was explicit that the jurisdiction
conferred upon the Republic Service Commission over
the public utilities operated by government-owned or
controlled corporations is to be confined to the fixing of
rates of such public services
The harnessing and then distribution and sale of electric
power to the consuming public, the contingency
intended to be met by the legal provision under
consideration would not exist.
The authority of the Public Service Commission under
RA 2677 over the fixing of rate of charges of public
utilities owned or operated by GOCCs can only be
exercised where the charter of the government
corporation concerned does not contain any provision to
the contrary.

Philippine Railway Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue

PRC was granted a legislative franchise to operate a

railway line pursuant to Act No. 1497 Sec. 13 which
read: In consideration of the premises and of the
operation of this concession or franchise, there shall be
paid by the grantee to the Philippine Government,
annually, xxx an amount equal to one-half of one per
centum of the gross earnings of the grantee xxx.

Sec 259 of Internal Revenue Code, as amended by RA

39, provides that there shall be collected in respect to
all existing and future franchises, upon the gross
earnings or receipts from the business covered by the
law granting a franchise tax of 5% of such taxes,
charges, and percentages as are specified in the special
charters of the corporation upon whom suc franchises
are conferred, whichever is higher, unless the provisions
hereof preclude the imposition of a higher tax xxx.

Issue: whether Section 259 of the Tax Code has

repealed Section 13 of Act 1497, stand upon a different
footing from general laws.

Once granted, a charter becomes a private contract and

cannot be altered nor amended except by consent of all
concerned, unless the right to alter or repeal is expressly
reserved.

Reason: the legislature, in passing a special charter, has

its attention directed to the special facts and
circumstances in the particular case in granting a special
charter, for it will not be considered that the legislature,
by adopting a general law containing the provisions
repugnant to the provisions of the charter, and without
any mention of its intention to amend or modify the
charter, intended to amend, repeal or modify the special
act.

The purpose of respecting the tax rates incorporated in

the charters, as shown by the clause.
LLDA v. CA

Issue: which agency of the government, LLDA or the

towns and municipalities compromising the region
should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and
its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for
fishery privileges is concerned.
The LLDA statute specifically provides that the LLDA
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the
use of all surface water for any projects in or affecting
the said region, including the operation of fish pens.
RA 7160 the LGC of 1991 grants the municipalities the
exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in
municipal waters.

Garcia v. Pascual

Clerks of courts municipal courts shall be appointed by

the municipal judge at the expense of the municipality
and where a later law was enacted providing that
employees whose salaries are paid out of the municipal
funds shall be appointed by the municipal mayor, the
later law cannot be said to have repealed the prior law
as to vest in the municipal mayor the power to appoint
municipal cleck of court, as the subsequent law should
be construed to comprehend only subordinate officials
of the municipality and not those of the judiciary.
Gordon v. CA

A city charter giving real estate owner a period of one

year within which to redeem a property sold by the city
for nonpayment of realty tax from the date of such
auction sale, being a special law, prevails over a general
law granting landowners a period of two years to make
the redemption.
Sto. Domingo v. Delos Angeles

The Civil Service law on the procedure for the

suspension or removal of civil service employees does
not apply with respect to the suspension or removal of
members of the local police force.

When special or general law repeals the other.

There is always a partial repeal where the later act is a

special law.

Valera v. Tuason

A subsequent general law on a subject has repealed or

amended a prior special act on the same subject by
implication is a question of legislative intent.

Intent to repeal may be shown in the act itself the

explanatory note to the bill before its passage into law,
the discussions on the floor of the legislature,

exemptions or incentives granted to or presently

enjoyed by all persons, except local water districts,
cooperatives, and non-stock and non-profit hospitals
and educational institutions, are withdrawn upon the
effectivity of the Code.

Held: two laws should be harmonized, and that the LLA

statute, being a special law, must be taken as an
exception to RA 7160 a general law,

Intent to repeal the earlier special law where the later general
act provides that all laws or parts thereof which are
inconsistent therewith are repealed or modified accordingly
If the intention to repeal the special law is clear, then the rule
that the special law will be considered as an exception to the
general law does not apply; what applies is the rule that the
special law is deemed impliedly repealed.
A general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special
law by mere implication admits of exception.

City Government of San Pablo v. Reyes

Sec. 1 PD 551 provides that any provision of law or

local ordinance to the contrary, the franchise tax
payable by all grantees of franchise to generate,
distribute, and sell electric current for light, heat, and
power shall be 25 of their gross receipts.

Sec. 137 of the LGC states: Notwithstanding any

exemption granted by any law or other special law, the
province may impose a tax on business enjoying a
franchise at a rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of the gross
annul receipts.

Held: the phrase is all-encompassing and clear that the

legislature intended to withdraw all tax exemptions
enjoyed by franchise holders and this intent is made
more manifest by Sec. 193 of the Code, when it
provides that unless otherwise provided in this code tax

Gaerlan v. Catubig

Issue: whether Sec. 12 of RA 170 as amended, the City

Charter of Dagupan City, which fixed the minimum age
qualification for members of the city council at 23 years
has been repealed by Sec.6 of RA 2259

Held: there was an implied repeal of Sec. 12 of the

charter of Dagupan City because the legislative intent to
repeal the charter provision is clear from the fact that
Dagupan City, unlike some cities, is not one of those
cities expressly excluded by the law from its operation
and from the circumstance that it provides that all acts
or parts thereof which are inconsistent therewith are
repealed.

The last statute is so broad in its terms and so clear and

explicit in its words so as to show that it was intended
to cover the whole subject and therefore to displace the
prior statute.
Bagatsing v. Ramirez

A charter of a city, which is a special law, may be

impliedly modified or superseded by a later statute, and
where a statute is controlling, it must be read into the
charter, notwithstanding any of its particular provisions.

A subsequent general law similarly applicable to all

cities prevails over any conflicting charter provision, for
the reason that a charter must not be inconsistent with
the general laws and public policy of the state.

Statute remains supreme in all matters not purely local.

A charter must yield to the constitution and general

laws of the state.

Philippine International Trading Corp v. CoA

CoA contended that the PITC charter had been

impliedly repealed by the Sec. 16 RA 6758

Held: that there was implied repeal, the legislative

intent to do so being manifest.

PITC should now be considered as covered by laws

prescribing a compensation and position classification
system in the government including RA 6758.

Effects of repeal, generally

Appeal of a statute renders it inoperative as of the date the

repealing act takes effect.

Repeal is by no means equivalent to a declaration that the

repealed statute is invalid from the date of its enactment.

The repeal of a law does not undo the consequences of the

operation of the statute while in force, unless such result is
directed by express language or by necessary implication,
except as it may affect rights which become vested when the
repealed act was in force.

Ramos v. Municipality of Daet

BP 337 known as the LGC was repealed by RA 7160

known as LGC of 1991, which took effect on January 1,
1992.

Sec. 5 (d) of the new code provides that rights and

obligations existing on the date of the effectivity of the
new code and arising out of contracts or any other
source of prestation involving a local government unit
shall be governed by the original terms and conditions

of said contracts or the law in force at the time such

rights were vested.

On jurisdiction, generally

Neither the repeal nor the explanation of the law deprives the
court or administrative tribunal of the authority to act on the
pending action and to finally decide it.

General rule: where a court or tribunal has already acquired

and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its
jurisdiction to proceed to final determination of the cause is
not affected by the new legislation repealing the statute
which originally conferred jurisidiction.

Rule: once the court acquires jurisdiction over a controversy,

it shall continue to exercise such jurisdiction until the final
determination of the case and it is not affected by subsequent
legislation vesting jurisdiction over such proceedings in
another tribunal admits of exceptions.

Repeal or expiration of a statute under which a court or

tribunal originally acquired jurisdiction to try and decide a
case, does not make its decision subsequently rendered
thereon null and void for want of authority, unless otherwise
provided.

In the absence of a legislative intent to the contrary, the

expiration or repeal of a statute does not render legal what,
under the old law, is an illegal transaction, so as to deprive
the court or tribunal the court or tribunal of the authority to
act on a case involving such illegal transaction.

Where a law declares certain importations to be illegal,

subject to forfeiture by the Commissioner of Customs
pursuant to what the latter initiated forfeiture proceedings,
the expiration of the law during the pendency of the
proceedings does not divest the Commissioner of Customs of
the jurisdiction to continue to resolve the case, nor does it
have the effect of making the illegal importation legal or of
setting aside the decision of the commissioner on the matter.
On jurisdiction to try criminal case

Once a jurisdiction to try a criminal case is acquired, that

jurisdiction remains with the court until the case is finally
determined.

A subsequent statute amending or repealing a prior act under

which the court acquired jurisdiction over the case with the
effect of removing the courts jurisdiction may not operate to
oust jurisdiction that has already attached.

On actions, pending or otherwise

Rule: repeal of a statute defeats all actions and proceedings,

including those, which are still pending, which arose out of
or are based on said statute.

The court must conform its decision to the law then existing
and may, therefore, reverse a judgment which was correct
when pronounced in the subordinate tribunal, if it appears
that pending appeal a statute which was necessary to support
the judgment of the lower court has been withdrawn by an
absolute repeal.

On vested rights

repeal of a statute does not destroy or impair rights that

accrued and became vested under the statute before its
repeal.

The statute should not be construed so as to affect the rights

which have vested under the old law then in force, or as
requiring the abatement of actions instituted for the
enforcement of such rights.

Rights accrued and vested while a statute is in force

ordinarily survive its repeal.

The constitution forbids the state from impairing, by

enactment or repeal of a law, vested rights or the obligations
of contract, except in the legitimate exercise of police power.

Buyco v. PNB

Where a statute gives holders of backpay certificates the

right to use said certificates to pay their obligations to
government financial institutions, the repeal of the law
disallowing such payment will not deprive holders
thereof whose rights become vested under the old law
of the right to use the certificates to pay their
obligations to such financial institutions.
Un Pak Leung v. Nigorra

A statute gives an appellant the right to appeal from an

adverse decision, the repeal of such statute after an
appellant has already perfected his appeal will not
destroy his right to prosecute the appeal not deprive the
appellate court of the authority to decide the appealed
case.
Republic v. Migrino

Issue: whether prosecution for unexplained wealth

under RA 1379 has already prescribed.

Held: in his pleadings, private respondent contends

that he may no longer be prosecuted because of the
prescription.

It must be pointed out that Sec. 2 RA 1379 should be

deemed amended or repealed by Art. XI, Sec. 15 of the
1987 Constitution.

On contracts

Where a contract is entered into by the parties on the basis of

the law then obtaining, the repeal or amendment of said law
will not affect the terms of the contract nor impair the right
of the parties thereunder.

Effect of repeal of tax laws

Rule favoring a prospective construction of statutes is

applicable to statutes which repeal tax laws.

Such statute is not made retroactive, a tax assessed before the

repeal is collectible afterwards according to the law in force
when the assessment or levy was made.

Effect of repeal and reenactment

Simultaneous repeal and reenactment of a statute does not

affect the rights and liabilities which have accrued under the
original statute, since the reenactment neutralizes the repeal
and continues the law in force without interruption.

The repeal of a penal law, under which a person is charged

with violation thereof and its simultaneous reenactment
penalizing the same act done by him under the old law, will
not preclude the accuseds prosecution, nor deprive the court
of the jurisdiction to try and convict him.

People v. Almuete

Where the reenactment of the repealed law is not

simultaneous such that the continuity of the obligation
and the sanction for its violation form the repealed law
to the reenacted law is broken, the repeal carries with it
the deprivation of the court of its authority to try,
convict, and sentence the person charged with violation
of the old law to its repeal.

Effect of repeal of penal laws

Where the repeal is absolute, so that the crime no longer

exists, prosecution of the person charged under the old law
cannot be had and the action should be dismissed.

Where the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute and the
act which was penalized by a prior law ceases to be criminal
under the new law, the previous offense is obliterated.
That a total repeal deprives the courts of jurisdiction to try,
convict, and sentence, persons, charged with violations of the
old law prior to the repeal.
Repeal of a statute which provides an indispensable element
in the commission of a crime as defined in the RPC likewise
operates to deprive the court of the authority to decide the
case, rule rests on the same principle as that concerning the
effect of a repeal of a penal law without qualification.
Reason: the repeal of a penal law without disqualification is
a legislative act of rendering legal what is previously decreed
as illegal, so that the person who committed it is as if he
never committed an offence
Exception:

where the repealing act reenacts the statute and

penalizes the same act previously penalized under the
repealed law, the act committed before reenactment
continues to be a crime, and pending cases are not
thereby affected.

Where the repealing act contains a saving clause

providing that pending actions shall not be affected, the
latter will continue to be prosecuted in accordance with
the old law.

Distinction as to effect of repeal and expiration of law

In absolute repeal, the crime is obliterated and the stigma of

conviction of an accused for violation of the penal law
before its repeal is erased.

Effect of repeal of municipal charter

The repeal of a charter destroys all offices under it, and puts
an end to the functions of the incumbents.

The conversation of a municipality into a city by the passage

of a charter or a statute to that effect has the effect of
abolishing all municipal offices then existing under the old
municipality offices then the existing under the old
municipality, save those excepted in the charter itself.

Repeal or nullity of repealing law, effect of

When a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself

repealed, the law first repealed shall not thereby revived
unless expressly so provided

Where a repealing statute is declared unconstitutional, it will

have no effect of repealing the former statute, the former or
old statute continues to remain in force.
CHAPTER ELEVEN: Constitutional Construction

Constitution defined

fundamental law which sets up a form of government and

defines and delimits the powers thereof and those of its
officers, reserving to the people themselves plenary
sovereignty

written charter enacted and adopted by the people by which a

government for them is established

permanent in nature thus it does not only apply to existing

conditions but also to future needs

basically it is the fundamental laws for the governance and

administration of a nation

absolute and unalterable except by amendments

all other laws are expected to conform to it

Origin and history of the Philippine Constitutions

1935 Constitution

People v. Linsangan explained as to how this Constitution came

about:

Tydings-Mcduffie Law- allowed the Filipinos to adopt a

constitutions but subject to the conditions prescribed in the
Act.
o Required 3 steps:

drafting and approval of the constitution

must be authorized

it must be certified by the President of

the US

it must be ratified by the people of the

Philippines at a plebiscite

1973 Constitution
o adopted in response to popular clamor to meat the
problems of the country
o March 16, 1967: Congress passed Resolution No.2,
which was amended by Resolution No. 4, calling a
convention to propose amendments to
the
Constitution

1987 Constitution
o after EDSA Revolution
o also known as the 1987 Charter
Primary purpose of constitutional construction

primary task of constitutional construction is to ascertain the

intent or purpose of the framers of the constitution as
expressed in its language

purpose of our Constitution: to protect and enhance the

peoples interests
Constitution construed as enduring for ages

Constitution is not merely for a few years but it also needs to

endure through a long lapse of ages

WHY? Because it governs the life of the people not only at

the time of its framing but far into the indefinite future

it must be adaptable to various crisis of human affairs but it

must also be solid permanent and substantial

Its stability protects the rights, liberty, and property of the

people (rich or poor)

It must be construed as a dynamic process intended to stand

for a great length of time to be progressive and not static

What it is NOT:
o It should NOT change with emergencies or
conditions
o It should NOT be inflexible
o It should NOT be interpreted narrowly

Words employed should not be construed to yield fixed and

rigid answers because its meaning is applied to meet new or
changed conditions as they arise

Courts should construe the constitution so that it would be

consistent with reason, justice and the public interest
How language of constitution construed

primary source in order to ascertain the constitution is the

LANGUAGE itself

The words that are used are broad because it aims to cover
all contingencies

Words must be understood in their common or ordinary

meaning except when technical terms are employee
o WHY? Because the fundamental law if essentially
a document of the people

Do not construe the constitution in such a way that its

meaning would change

What if the words used have both general and restricted

meaning?

Rule: general prevails over the restricted unless the contrary

is indicated.

Ordillo v. COMELEC

Issue: whether the sole province of Ifugao can be validly

constituted in the Cordillera Autonomous Region under
Section 15, Article 10

Held: No. the keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and

geographical areas connotes that a region consists of more
than one unit. In its ordinary sense region means two or more
provinces, thus Ifugao cannot be constituted the Cordillera
Autonomous Region
Marcos v. Chief of Staff

Issues:
o the meaning or scope of the words any court in
Section 17 Article 17 of the 1935 Constitution
o Who are included under the terms inferior court in
section 2 Article 7

Held: Section 17 of Article 17 prohibits any members of the

Congress from appearing as counsel in any criminal case x x
x. This is not limited to civil but also to a military court or
court martial since the latter is also a court of law and justice
as is any civil tribunal.

Inferior courts are meant to be construed in its restricted

sense and accordingly do not include court martials or
military courts for they are agencies of executive character
and do not belong to the judicial branch unlike the term
inferior court is.

Another RULE: words used in one part are to receive the

same interpretation when used in other parts unless the
contrary is applied/specified.

Lozada v COMELEC

the term Batasang Pambansa, which means the regular

national assembly, found in many sections of the 1973
Constitution refers to the regular, not to the interim Batasang
Pambansa

words which have acquired a technical meaning before they

are used in the constitution must be taken in that sense when
such words as thus used are construed

Aids to construction, generally

apart from its language courts may refer to the following in

construing the constitution:
o history
o proceedings of the convention
o prior laws and judicial decisions
o contemporaneous constructions
o consequences of alternative interpret-tations

these aids are called extraneous aids because though their

effect is not in precise rules their influence describes the
essentials of the process
Realities existing at time of adoption; object to be accomplished

History basically helps in making one understand as to how

and why certain laws were incorporated into the constitution.

In construing constitutional law, the history must be taken

into consideration because there are certain considerations
rooted in the historical background of the environment at the
time of its adoption (Legaspi v. Minister of Finance)
Aquino v. COMELEC

Issue: what does the term incumbent president in sec. 3 of

Article 17 of the 1973 Constitution refer to?

Held: History shows that at that time the term of President

Marcos was to terminate on December 30, 1973, the new
constitution was approved on November 30, 1972 still during
his incumbency and as being the only incumbent president at

the time of the approval it just means that the term

incumbent president refers to Mr. Marcos
Justice Antonio concurring opinion states: the only rational
way to ascertain the meaning and intent is to read its
language in connection with the known conditions of affairs
out of which the occasion for its adoption had arisen and
then construe it.

In re Bermudez

incumbent president referred to in section 5 of Article 18 of

the 1987 constitution refers to incumbent President Aquino
and VP Doy Laurel
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary

issue: whether EO 284, which authorizes a cabinet member,

undersecretary and assistant secretary to hold not more than
two positions in the government and GOCCs and to receive
corresponding compensation therefore, violates Sec. 13, Art.
7 of the 1987 Constitution

court examined the history of the times, the conditions under

which the constitutional provisions was framed and its object

held: before the adoption of the constitutional provision,

there was a proliferation of newly-created agencies,
instrumentalities and GOCCs created by PDs and other
modes of presidential issuances where Cabinet members,
their deputies or assistants were designated to head or sit as
members of the board with the corresponding salaries,
emoluments, per diems, allowances and other prerequisites
of office

since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987

Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President, Vice President, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple
government offices or employment in the Government
during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be
read with equal severity

on its face, the language of Sec 13 Art. 7 is prohibitory so

that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and
unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
government offices or employment
Proceedings of the convention

RULE: If the language of the constitutional provision is plain

it is not necessary to resort to extrinsic aids

EXCEPTION: when the intent of the framer doesnt appear

in the text or it has more than one construction.

Intent of a constitutional convention member doesnt

necessarily mean it is also the peoples intent

The proceedings of the convention are usually inquired into

because it sheds light into what the framers of the
constitution had in mind at that time. (refers to the debates,
interpretations and opinions concerning particular
provisions)
Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR

Whether the term agriculture as used in the Constitution

embraces raising livestock, poultry and swine

Transcript of the deliberations of the Constitutional

Commission of 1986 on the meaning of agriculture clearly
shows that it was never the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the
coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform
program of the Government

Agricultural lands do not include commercial industrial, and

residential lands

Held: it is evident in the foregoing discussion that Sec 2 of

RA 6657 which includes private agricultural lands devoted
to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising in the

definition of commercial farms is INVALID, to the extent

of the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be
covered by the agrarian reform program of the State
Montejo v. COMELEC

Whether the COMELEC has the power to transfer, by

resolution, one or more municipalities from one
congressional district to another district within a province,
pursuant to Sec 2 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution

The Court relied on the proceedings of the Constitutional

Commission on minor adjustments which refers only to
the instance where a municipality which has been forgotten
is included in the enumeration of the composition of the
congressional district and not to the transfer of one
municipality from one district to another, which has been
considered a substantive or major adjustment
Contemporaneous construction and writings

may be used to resolve but not to create ambiguities

In construing statutes, contemporaneous construction are

entitled to great weight however when it comes to the
constitution it has no weight and will not be allowed to
change in any way its meaning.

Writings of delegates has persuasive force but it depends

on two things:
o if opinions are based on fact known to them and
not established it is immaterial
o on legal hermeneutics, their conclusions may not
be a shade better in the eyes of the law.
Previous laws and judicial rulings

framers of the constitution is presumed to be aware of

prevailing judicial doctrines concerning the subject of
constitutional provisions. THUS when courts adopt
principles different from prior decisions it is presumed that
they did so to overrule said principle
Changes in phraseology

Before a constitution is ratified it undergoes a lot of revisions

and changes in phraseology (ex. deletion of words) and these
changes may be inquired into to ascertain the intent or
purpose of the provision as approved

HOWEVER mere deletion, as negative guides, cannot

prevail over the positive provisions nor is it determinative of
any conclusion.

Certain provisions in our constitution (from 1935 to the

present) are mere reenactments of prior constitutions thus
these changes may indicate an intent to modify or change the
meaning of the old provisions.
Galman v. Pamaran

the phrase no person shall be x x x compelled in a criminal

case be a witness against himself is changed in such a way
the words criminal cases had been deleted simply means that
it is not limited to criminal cases only.
Consequences of alternative constructions

consequences that may follow from alternative construction

of doubtful constitutional provisions constitute an important
factor to consider in construing them.

if a provision has more than one interpretation, that

construction which would lead to absurd, impossible or
mischievous consequences must be rejected.

e.g. directory and mandatory interpretation: Art. 8 Sec 15(1)

requires judges to render decision within specific periods
from date of submission for decision of cases (construed as

directory because if otherwise it will cause greater injury to

the public)
Constitution construed as a whole

provision should not be construed separately from the rest it

should be interpreted as a whole and be harmonized with
conflicting provisions so as to give them all force and effect.

sections in the constitution with a particular subject should

be interpreted together to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution.
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

VAT Law, passage of bill

involved are article 6 Sec. 24 and RA 7716 (VAT Law)

contention of the petitioner: RA 7716 did not originate

exclusively from the HOR as required by the Constitution
because it is the result of the consolidation of two distinct
bills.

Court: rejected such interpretation.

Mandatory or directory

RULE: constitutional provisions are to be construed as

mandatory unless a different intention is manifested.

Why? Because in a constitution, the sovereign itself speaks

and is laying down rules which for the time being at least are
to control alike the government and the governed.

failure of the legislature to enact the necessary required by

the constitution does not make the legislature is illegal.
Prospective or retroactive

RULE: constitution operates prospectively only unless the

words employed are clear that it applies retroactively
Magtoto v. Manguera

Sec 20 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution: no person

shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. x x x Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence

Court held that this specific portion of the mandate should be

given a prospective application
Co v. Electric Tribunal

Sec. 1(3) Art. 4 of the 1987 Constitution states that those

born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are
citizens of the Philippines has a retroactive effect as shown
to the clear intent of the framers through the language used
Applicability of rules of statutory construction

Doctrines used in Sarmiento v. Mison is a good example in

which the SC applied a number of rules of statutory
construction.

Issue: whether or not the appointment of a Commissioner of

Customs is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
appointments
Generally, constitutional provisions are self-executing

RULE: constitutional provisions are self executing except

when provisions themselves expressly require legislations to
implement them.

SELF EXECUTING PROVISIONS- provisions which are

complete by themselves and becomes operative without the
aid of supplementary legislation.

Just because legislation may supplement and add or

prescribe a penalty does not render such provision
ineffective in the absence of such legislation.

In case of Doubt? Construe such provision as self executing

rather than non-self executing.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

Issue: w/n the sale at public bidding of the majority

ownership of the Manila Hotel a qualified entity can match
the winning bid of a foreigner

Held: resolution depends on whether the issue is self

executing or not. The court ruled that the qualified Filipino
entity must be given preference by granting it the option to
match the winning bid because the provision is self
executing.
- The End

LEGAL METHOD
Prof. Molo

SESSION 1: WHY LAW

SESSION 2: BRIEFS AND DIGESTS
SESSION 3: ORDER OUT OF CHAOS
Stare Decisis
o Judgment reached in 1 case should be applied to successive
ones in which the facts are substantially applied (Villena v.
Chavez)
o That for the sake of certainty in one case should be applied to
those that follow if the facts are substantially the same even
though the parties may be different (Villena v. Chavez)
o AGPALO:

The decision of the SC applying or interpreting a statute

is controlling with respect to the interpretation of that
statute and is of greater weight than that of an executive
or administrative officer in the construction of other
statutes of similar import.

Past decisions of the court must be followed in the

adjudication of cases: Stare decisis et non quieta
movere, one should follow past precedents and should
not disturb what has been settled.

Where the court resolved a question merely sub

silencio, its decision does not come within the maxim of
stare decisis

Nor does an opinion expressed by the way, not up to the

point in the issue, fall within the maxim; it is merely an
obiter dictum

The rule of stare decisis is not absolute. If found

contrary to law, it must be abandoned.
o Notes from Sir:

Used to be the corner stone of the civil legal system.

Decision of 1 case must be applied to all

General application because what is at stake is the

whole legal system

For cases handled by the SC

FOR STARE DECISIS TO WORK: Laws and

decisions must always be consistent & black letter law
must be applied

SYSTEM INTEGRITY

Res Judicata
o It is the holding in the latter case which is now a bar to the
present proceeding under the same doctrine invoked by them
(Veloso jr. v. CA)
o Notes from Sir:

Product of laziness and inefficiency

For the mundane, small claims handled by lower courts

only

Having only 1 trial for cases with the same material

points saves time and money

Retail arm of Stare Decisis

CONSISTENCY BETWEEN CASES

Law of the Case
o A term applied to an established rule that when an appellate
court passes on a question and remands the cause to the
lower court for further proceedings, the question there settled
becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal
(Augustin v. CA)
o Whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling
legal decision continues to be the law case between the same
parties in the same case, whether correct on general
principles or not, so long as the facts which such decision
was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the
courts (Veloso jr. v. CA)

Notes from Sir:

Very technical and is an interlocutory matter

CONSITENCY IN 1 CASE

SESSION 4 PARTS OF A DECISION

Ponente The justice writing the majority opinion
Syllabus NOT part of the actual decision
Dispositive The legally binding portion of the case usually
beginning with wherefore
Ratio The reasoning and legal basis behind the decision
Obiter Dictum FLUFF! An opinion expressed by a court upon
some question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the
case before it. It is a remark, by the way; it is not binding as a
precedent. (Agpalo)
Separate Opinions (Concurring and Dissenting) Opinions written
by the other justices of the court which deviates partly or wholly
from the majority opinion.
SESSION 5 TESTING, TESTING
Political Question - A question, the determination of which a
prerogative of the legislative or executive branch of the government,
so as not be appropriate for judicial inquiry or adjudication.(20 am
J2d Cts Sec.80 citizen law dictionary)
Rational Basis Test
o
concerns constitutional issued on due process and equal
protection
o lowest level of scrutiny
o tests whether a government action employs reasonable
means to an end that may be legitimately pursued by
government
o government action must be RATIONALLY RELATED to a
LEGITIMATE government interest
Compelling State interest test
o Compelling state interest
o Narrowly tailored to achieve interest
o Must be least restrictive means employed
SESSION 6 FOUNDATIONS OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM, MY
BRANCH IS BIGGER THAN YOURS
Tripartite system of Government
o Three branches of government, co-equals and co-extensive.
o Created for protection against abuse and not for efficacy
Power to Construe
o AGPALO: A condition sine qua non before the court may
construe or interpret a statute, is that there be doubt or
ambiguity in its language. The province of construction lies
wholly within the domain of ambiguity. Where there is no
ambiguity in the words of a statute, there is no room for
construction.

A statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being

understood by reasonably well-informed persons in
either of two senses.

Where the law is free from ambiguity, the court may not
introduce exceptions or conditions where none is
provided.

A meaning that does not appear nor is intended or

reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be
placed therein be construction.

Where the two statutes that apply to a particular case,

that which was specifically designed for the said case
must prevail over the other.

When the SC has laid down a principle of law as

applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to
that principle and apply it to all future cases where the
facts are substantially the same.
Judicial rulings have no retroactive effect.
The court may issue guidelines in applying the statute,
not to enlarge or restrict it but to clearly delineate what
the law requires. This is not judicial legislation but an
act to define what the law is.

Limitations to Construction
o Court may not construe when there is no ambiguity
o Courts may not enlarge nor restrict statutes.
o Courts may not be influenced by questions of
wisdom.
SESSION 7 LAWS, LAWS AND MORE LAWS
Presumption of Constitutionality
o All laws are presumed valid and constitutional unless clear
proof is presented to the contrary stems from the
presumption of regularity of the functions performed by the
legislature
When Laws take effect
o
15 days after publication in 2 newspapers of general
circulation or in the official gazette
o Administrative agencies also need to file 3 copies with the
UP law center
Repeal - Laws are presumed to be valid until repealed (express,
implied, sunset provision.) Repeal will result in revocation of legal
effect and existence of law.
Computation of time time span in days count calendar days not
working days
o A week 7 consecutive days, A day 24 hours, a year 365
days
Notes from sir:
o Presumptions in Law

The court will recognize it as true and will not require

proof

If there is no constitutional presumption of validity then

the SOLGEN has to defend laws and prove their
validity each and every case too tedious and
expensive!

The burden of proof is on whoever asserts contrary to a

presumption
SESSION 8 A CONSTITUTION
o

Constitutional interpretation v. constitutional construction (Fr.

Ferrer)
o Interpretation art of finding the true meaning and
sense of any form of words
o Construction

process of drawing warranted conclusions

respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct
expressions or determining the application of
words to facts in litigation

It is the art of discovering and expounding the

meaning and intention of the authors of the
law, where the intention is rendered doubtful
by reason of the ambiguity in its language or
the fact that the given case is not explicitly
provided for in the law.

Theories on Constitutional Interpretation (Notes from Sir)

o Textualist

Looks at plain words

Weakness takes away words

Strengths uniformity, words consistent,

black and white
o Strict Construism/ Constructionist

A short step down from textualism

Interpret words within their context

o Originalism Biased

Looks at the social context when a law was

drafted looks at the intent of the times

Weakness bound by what the law means in

the time it was drafted
o Structuralists

Looks at placements and frameworks

How does the text uphold the actual

framework?

Interprets the text

Schools of thought consistent within the

various schools
o Pragmatic liberal

Looks at it in the context of what will happen

given the interpretation

Idea of a living constitution

Looks at effects
o Functionalist

Motherhood statements (ex. social justice)

Looks at effects
o Formalist

Preserve the separation draws clear lines

Rigid always strict and looks at legal basis

and text
o NOTE: CONSITENCY in PHILOSOPHY is important
because it makes the JUSTICE handed down through
decisions consistent

SESSION 9 RULES OF CONSTRUCTION

Self-executory provision a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs not further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. It does not need
legislation to be able to be put into operation. (TANADA v.
ANGARA)

3.

4.

5.
6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

Non-self executing provisions

o Notes from sir:

Does not provide relief in court.

Needs another law to invoke the legal

right or cause of action

11.

SESSION 10 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

12.

AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION- To ascertain the true intent of the statute,

the court may avail of intrinsic aids, or those found in the printed page
of the statute, and extrinsic aids, those extraneous facts and
circumstances outside the printed page.
1. Title

The title may indicate the legislative extent or restrict

the scope of the law, and a statute couched in a
language of doubtful import will be construed to
conform to the legislative intent as disclosed in its title.

When the text of the statute is clear and free form

doubt, it is improper to resort to its title to make it
obscure.
2. Preamble

That part of the statute written immediately after its

title, which states the purpose, reason or justification for

13.

the enactment of a law. It is usually expressed in the

form of whereas clauses.

It is not an essential part of the statute. But it may, when

the statute is ambiguous, be resorted to clarify the
ambiguity, as a key to open the minds of the lawmakers
as to the purpose of the statute.
Context of the whole text

The best source from which to ascertain the legislative

intent is the statute itself the words, the phrases, the
sentences, sections, clauses, provisions taken as a
whole and in relation to one another.
Punctuation marks

Punctuation marks are aids of low degree; they are not

parts of the statute nor the English language.

Where there is, however, an ambiguity in a statute

which may be partially or wholly solved by a
punctuation mark, it may be considered in the
construction of a statute.
Capitalization of letters

An aid of low degree in the construction of statutes.

Headnotes or epigraphs

These are convenient index to the contents of the

provisions of a statute; they may be consulted in case of
doubt in interpretation.

They are not entitled to much weight.

Lingual text

Unless otherwise provided, where a statute is officially

promulgated in English and Spanish, the English text
shall govern, but in case of ambiguity, omission or
mistake, the Spanish may be consulted to explain the
English text.

The language in which a statute is written prevails over

its translation.
Intent or spirit of law

Legislative intent or spirit is the controlling factor, the

influence most dominant if a statute needs construction.

The intent of the law is that which is expressed in the

words thereof, discovered in the four corners of the law
and aided if necessary by its legislative history.
Policy of law

A statute of doubtful meaning must be given a

construction that will promote public policy.
Purpose of law or mischief to be suppressed

The purpose or object of the law or the mischief

intended to be suppressed are important factors to be
considered in its construction.
Dictionaries

While definitions given by lexicographers are not

binding, courts have adopted, in proper cases, such
definitions to support their conclusion as to the meaning
of the particular words used in a statute.
Consequences of various constructions

Construction of a statute should be rejected if it will

cause injustice, result in absurdity or defeat the
legislative intent.
Presumptions

Based on logic, common sense; eg. Presumption of

constitutionality, completeness, prospective application,
right and justice, etc.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY - Where a statute is susceptible of several

interpretations, there is no better means of ascertaining the will and
intention of the legislature than that which is afforded by the history of
the statute. The history of a statute refers to all its antecedents from its
inception until its enactment into law.
1. Presidents message to the legislature

This usually contains proposed legislative measures and

indicates the Presidents thinking on the proposed

legislation which, when enacted into law, follows his

line of thinking into the matter.
2. Explanatory note

A short exposition of explanation accompanying a

proposed legislation by its author or proponent. It
contains statements of the reason or purpose of the bill,
as well as arguments advanced by its author in urging
its passage.
3. Legislative debates, views and deliberations

Where there is doubt as to what a provision of a statute

means, that meaning which was put to the provision
during the legislative deliberation or discussion on the
bill may be adopted.
4. Reports of commissions

In construing the provisions of the code as thus enacted,

courts may properly refer to the reports of the
commission that drafted the code in aid of clarifying
ambiguities therein.
5. Prior laws from which the statute is based

Legislative history will clarify the intent of the law or

shed light on the meaning and scope of the codified or
revised statute.
6. Change in phraseology by amendments

Courts may investigate the history of the provisions to

ascertain legislative intent as to the meaning and scope
of the amended law.
7. Amendment by deletion

The amendment statute should be given a construction

different from that previous to its amendment.
8. Adopted statutes

Where local statutes are patterned after or copied from

those of another country, the decisions of courts in such
country construing those laws are entitled to great
weight in the interpretation of such local statutes.
9. Principles of common law

Courts may properly resort to common law principles in

construing doubtful provisions of a statute, particularly
where such a statute is modeled upon Anglo-American
precedents.
10. Conditions at the time of the enactment

It is proper, in the interpretation of a statute, to consider

the physical conditions of the country and the
circumstances then obtaining which must of necessity
affect its operation in order to understand the intent of
the statute.
11. History of the times

The history of the times out of which the law grew and
to which it may be rationally supposed to bear some
direct relationship.
CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION

The constructions placed upon statutes at the time of, or

after, their enactment by the executive, legislature or judicial
authorities, as well as those who, because of their
involvement in the process of legislation, are knowledgeable
of the intent and purpose of the law, such as draftsmen and
bill sponsors.

The contemporary construction is the strongest in law.

1. Construction by an executive or administrative officer
directly called to implement the law

May be express interpretation embodied in a circular,

directive or regulation.

May be implied a practice or mode of enforcement of

not applying the statute to certain situations or of
applying it in a particular manner; interpretation by
usage or practice.
2. Construction by the Sec. of Justice as his capacity as the
chief legal adviser of the government

3.

In the form of opinions issued upon request of

administrative or executive officials who enforce the
law.

President or Executive Secretary has the power to

modify or alter or reverse the construction given by a
department secretary.
Interpretation handed down in an adversary proceeding in
the form of a ruling by an executive officer exercising quasijudicial power

Such rulings need not have the detachment of a judicial,

or semi-judicial decision, and may properly carry basis.

The contemporaneous construction is very probably the true

expression of the legislative purpose, especially if the construction
is followed for a considerable period of time. It is thus entitled to
great weight and respect by the courts in the interpretation of the
ambiguous provisions of law, and unless it is shown to be clearly
erroneous, it will control the interpretation of statutes by the
courts.

The best interpreter of law is usage.

Interpretation by those charged with their enforcement is

entitled to great weight by the courts.

Contemporaneous construction is entitled to great weight

because it comes from a particular branch of government
called upon to implement the laws thus construed.

Respect is due the government agency or officials charged

with the implementation of the law for their competence,
expertness, experience and informed judgment, and the fact
that they are frequently the drafters of the law they interpret.
The court may disregard contemporaneous construction when
there is no ambiguity in the law, where the construction is clearly
erroneous, where strong reason to the contrary exists, and where
the court has previously given the statute a different
interpretation.

If through the misapprehension of the law an executive or

administrative officer called upon to implement it has
erroneously applied and executed it, the error may be
corrected when the true construction is ascertained.

Erroneous contemporaneous construction creates no vested

right on the part of those who relied upon, and followed such
construction. The rule is not absolute and admits exceptions
in the interest of justice and fair play.
Legislative interpretation
Legislative interpretation of a statute is not controlling, but
the courts may resort to it to clarify ambiguity in the
language thereof.

Legislative approval
The legislature is presumed to have full knowledge of a
contemporaneous or practical construction of a statute.
Legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate.
Reenactment
The most common act of legislative approval; the
reenactment of a statute, previously given a
contemporaneous construction, is a persuasive indication of
the adaptation by the legislature of the prior construction.

SESSION 11 AND 12- INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND

PHRASES (AGPALO)
IN GENERAL- Which meaning should be given to a word or phrase in
a statute depends upon what the legislature intended.
o Statutory definition

o
o

o
o

o
o

The legislative definition controls the meaning of

the statutory word, irrespective of any other
meaning the word or phrase may have in its
ordinary or usual sense.
o When the term pr phrase is specifically defined in
a particular law, the definition must be adopted in
applying and enforecing such law.
o While definitions in a statute must be given all the
weight due them, the terms must be given effect in
their entiretyas a harmonious, coordinated whole.
o Statutory definitions are controlling in so far as the
said act is concerned.
o A statutory definition does not apply where its
application creates incongruities.
o Words construed in their ordinary sense
o In the absence of legislative intent to the contrary,
they should be given their plain, ordinary and
common usage meanings.
General words construed generally - A word of general
significance in a statute is to be taken in its ordinary and
comprehensive sense, unless the word is intended to be given
a different or restricted meaning.
General words shall be understood in the general sense The general must prevail over the restricted unless the nature
and the context indicates that the limited sense is intended
Generic term includes things that arise thereafter
o Progressive interpretation extends by
construction the application of a statute to all
subjects or conditions within its general purpose or
scope that come into existence subsequent to its
passage; keeps legislation from becoming
ephemeral and transitory
Words with commercial or trade meaning - Words and
phrases which are in common use among traders and
merchants, acquire trade or commercial meanings which are
generally accepted in the community in which they have
been in common use. In absence of intent to contrary, trade
and commercial terms in a statute are presumed to have been
used in their trade and commercial sense.
Words with technical or legal meaning - Should be
interpreted according to the sense in which they have been
previously used, although the sense may vary from the strict
or literal meaning of the words.
How identical terms in the same statute are construed - A
word or phrase repeatedly used will bear the same meaning
throughout the statute; presumed to be used in the same
sense throughout the law.
Meaning of word qualified by purpose of statute - The
meaning of a word may be qualified by the purpose which
induced the legislature to enact the statute.
Words or phrases construed in relation to other provisions A word or phrase should not be construed in isolation but
must be interpreted in relation to other provisions of law;
construed as a whole, each provision given effect.
Meaning of term dictated by context - The context in which
the word or term is employed may dictate a different sense.
A word is to be understood in the context in which it is used.
Disjunctive and conjunctive words
o OR is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation
and independence of one thing from each of the
other things enumerated
o AND is a conjunction meaning together with
joined with added to, linked to
o The term AND/OR means that effect shall be
given to both conjunctive and disjunctive

ASSOCIATED WORDS
o Nosictur a Sociis
o Where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in
itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings,
its correct construction may be made clear and
specific by considering the company of words in
which it is found and in which it is associated.
o Where the law does not define a word used therein,
it will be construed as having a meaning similar to
that of words associated with or accompanied by it.
o Where most of the words in an enumeration are
used in their generic sense, the rest of the words
should be so similarly construed.
o Ejusdem Generis
o While general words or expressions in a statute are
accorded their full, natural and generic sense, they
will not be given such meaning if they are used in
association with specific words or phrases.
o Where a statute describes things of particular class
or kind accompanied by words of a generic
character, the generic words will usually be limited
to things of a kindred nature with those particularly
enumerated, unless there be something in the
context of the statute to repel such inference.
o Limitations:

A statute contains an enumeration of

particular and specific words, followed
by a general word or phrase

The particular and specific words

constitute a class or are of the same kind

The enumeration of a particular and

specific words is not exhaustive or is not
merely by example

There is no indication of legislative

intent to give the general words or
phrases a broader meaning
o Expressio Unius Est Exclusion alterius
o The express mention of one person, thing or
consequence implies the exclusion of all others.
Limitation: not applicable if there is some special
reason for mentioning one thing and none for
mentioning another which is otherwise within the
statute, so that the absence of any mention of such
will not exclude it. Also, must be disregarded if :

It will cause inconvenience

Where the legislative intent shows that

the enumeration is not exclusive
o Negative-Opposite - What is expressed puts an end to what is
implied.
o Causus Omissus
o A person, object or thing omitted from an
enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. ONLY when the omission has been
clearly established.
o Does not apply where it is shown that the
legislature did not intend to exclude the person,
thing or object from the enumeration.
o Doctrine of as Antecedence
o Qualifying words restrict or modify only the words
or phrases to which they are immediately
associated, and not those to which they are
distantly or remotely associated.
o Does not apply when the intention is not to qualify
the antecedent at all
o Redendo singular singulis
o
Antecedents and consequences should be read
distributive to the effect that each word is to be
applied to the subject to which it appears by

context most appropriately related and most

applicable.
PROVISO
o Its office is to limit the application of the enacting
clause, section or provision of a statute; introduced
by the word Provided
o It may enlarge the scope of the law
o It may assume the role of an additional legislation
o It modifies only the phrase immediately preceding
it or restrains or limit the generality of the clause
following it
o It should be construed to harmonize, and not to
repeal or destroy the main provision of the statute
o Exception introduced by except, unless
otherwise and shall not apply is a clause which
exempts something from the operation of a statute
by express words.
o An exception exempts something absolutely from
the operation of a statute; a proviso defeats its
operation conditionally.
o An exception takes out of the statute something
that otherwise would be a part of the subject matter
of it. A proviso avoids them by way of an excuse.
o One of the functions of a proviso is to except
something from an enacting clause. In this sense is
it similar with exception.
SAVING CLAUSE
o A clause in the provision of law which operates to
except from the effect of law what the clause
provides, or to save something which would
otherwise be lost. Must be construed in the light of
the legislative intent.

Citizen Law Dictionary

o Dissimulum Dissimilis est ration Of things dissimilar the
rules is dissimilar
o Ubi lex non distinuit nec nos distinguere debmos Where
the law does not distinguish, we ought not to distinguish
o Doctrine of Necessary implication A meaning derived
from language as a matter of actual necessity or of so strong
a probability of the intent of the writer or speaker that a
contrary intent is not reasonably to be inferred.
STATUTES CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE (AGPALO)
o
A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or
sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent.
o
The intent or the meaning of the statute should be
ascertained from the statute taken as a whole.
o
Statutes must receive a reasonable construction,
reference being had to their controlling purpose.
o
One part is as important as the other.
o
Where a statute is susceptible of more than one
interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable and
beneficial construction as will render the provision operative
and harmonious. Constructions that would render it
inoperative must be avoided; must be reconciled, parts must
be a coordinated and harmonious whole.
o
Conflicting provisions should be reconciled and
harmonized; they must be reconciled instead of declaring
them invalid.
o
Where there is a particular or special provision and a
general provision in the same statute and the latter in its most
comprehensive sense would overrule the former, the
particular or special provision must be taken to affect only
the other parts of the statute to which it may properly apply.
o
A law should be interpreted with a view to upholding it
rather than destroying it.
o
All laws are presumed to be consistent with each other.

o
o
o

If provisions cannot be reconciled despite efforts, the

courts should choose one that will best effectuate the
legislative intent.
The interpretation that will give the thing efficacy is to
be adopted; legislative did not do a vain thing in its
enactment.
Construction should avoid surplusage.

Statutes Construed in relation to Constitution and Other Statutes

(AGPALO)
o Statutes must be construed in harmony with the Constitution.
o Statutes in pari materia (relating to the same specific subject
matter) must be construed together to attain national policy.
o Legislature is presumed to be aware of prior law.
o Where there are two acts, one of which is special and
particular and the other general which, if standing alone,
would include the same subject matter and thus conflicting
with the special act, the special must prevail since it evinces
the legislative intent more clearly than that of a general
statute and must be taken as intended to constitute an
exception to the general rule. A special law is considered an
exception to the general law on the same subject; the
legislature is passing a law of special character has its
attention directed to the special facts and circumstances
which the special act is intended to meet.
o Reference statutes - Refers to other statutes and makes them
applicable to the subject of legislation.
o Supplemental statutes - Intended to supply deficiencies in an
existing statute and to add, complete or extend the statute
without changing or modifying its original text.
o Reenacted statutes
o One in which the provisions of an earlier statute
are reproduced in the same or substantially the
same words.
o In construing reenacted statutes, court should take
into account prior contemporaneous construction.
o Adopted statutes - Statute patterned after, or copied from a
statute of a foreign country.
SESSION 13 STRICT AND LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
STRICT CONSTRUCTION: Construction according to the letter; scope
of statute is not extended or enlarged.
1. Penal statutes
2. Statutes in derogation of rights
3. Statutes authorizing expropriations
4. Statutes granting privileges
5. Legislative grants to local government units
6. Statutory grounds for removing officials
7. Naturalization laws
8. Statutes imposing taxes and custom duties
9. Statutes granting tax exemptions
10. Statutes concerning the sovereign
11. Statutes authorizing suits against the government
12. Statutes prescribing formalities of will
13. Exceptions and provisos
LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION - Giving a liberal interpretation to save
from obliteration; reading into its something which its clear and plain
language rejects.
1. General social legislation
2. General welfare clause
3. Grant of power to local governments
4. Statutes granting taxing power
5. Statutes prescribing prescriptive period to collect taxes
6. Statutes imposing penalties for nonpayment of taxes
7. Election laws
8. Amnesty proclamations
9. Statutes prescribing prescriptions of crimes

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Adoption statutes
Veteran and pension laws
Rules of Court
Other statutes
Curative statutes
Redemption laws
Instruments of credit
Probation law

5.

Statutes relating to appeals

AMENDMENT - Change or modification by addition or

deletion, or alteration of a statute which survives in its
amended form.
REVISION- Purpose is to restate existing laws into one
statutes, simplify complicated provisions, and make the laws
on the subject easily found.
REPEAL - A statute repealed is rendered revoked completely

o
o

MANDATORY STATUTES - A statute which commands either

positively that something be done, or performed in a particular way, or
negatively that something not be done, leaving the person concerned
no choice on the matter except to obey. Contains words of command or
prohibition. Uses: shall, must, ought, should; prohibitions such as
cannot, shall not, ought not
1. Statutes conferring power
2. Statutes granting benefits
3. Statutes prescribing jurisdictional requirements
4. Statutes prescribing time to take action or appeal
5. Statutes prescribing procedural requirements
6. Election laws on conduct of election
7. Election laws on qualification and disqualification
8. Statutes prescribing qualifications for office
9. Statutes relating to assessment of taxes
10. Statutes concerning public auction sale
DIRECTORY STATUTES - Permissive or discretionary in nature and
merely outlines the act to be done in such a way that no injury can
result from ignoring it or that its purpose can be accomplished in a
manner other than that prescribed and substantially the same result
obtained. Uses: may
1. Statutes prescribing guidance for officers
2. Statutes prescribing manner of judicial action
3. Statutes requiring rendition of decisions within prescribed
period
Prospectivity and Retroactivity
o Statutes are to be construed as having only prospective
application, unless the intendment of the legislature to give
them a retroactive effect is expressly declared or is
necessarily implied from the language used. Presumption is
prospectivity.
o Prospectivity words/in futuro: hereafter, thereafter, shall
have been made, from and after, shall take effect upon its
approval
o The Constitution does not prohibit the enactment of
retroactive statutes which do not impair the obligation of
contracts, deprive persons of property without due process of
law, or divest rights that have become vested, or which are
not in the nature of ex post facto laws.
PROSPECTIVE STATUTES - Operates upon facts or transactions that
occur after the statute takes effect, one that looks and applies to the
future.
1. Penal statutes, generally
2. Ex post facto law
3. Bill of attainder
4. Statutes substantive in nature
5. Statutes affecting vested rights
6. Statutes affecting obligations of contracts
7. Repealing an amendatory acts
RETROACTIVE STATUTES - Creates a new obligation, imposes a
new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already
past.
1. Procedural laws
2. Curative statutes
3. Police power legislations
4. Statutes relating to prescription

SESSION 14 LEGAL METHOD FOR LAW SCHOOL

SESSION 15 LEGAL METHOD AFTER LAW SCHOOL
SESSION 16 BALANCE AND OPTION

COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS

Cases in the 2011-2012 Syllabus
Topic: Stare Decisis, Res Judicata, and Law of the Case

Doctrine: When a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a

certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future
cases in which the facts are substantially the same; stare decisis simply means
that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied
to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the
parties may be different. Like cases ought to be decided alike.

VILLENA v. SPOUSES CHAVEZ

Facts:
(1) Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
(2) Initial complaint was by lot owners Chavez etc. (herein Respondents). A
Complaint for Illegal Detainer with Damages filed Oct. 15, 1998 in MTC
against occupants (herein Petitioners) of 4 parcels of land that are part of
Bagong Silang Phase III-C.
(3) Respondents allowed Petitioner to occupy land and ultimately acquire
ownership in consideration of a certain amount to be paid as Equity.
(4) Respondents alleged other members of the Homeowners Assoc. paid their
Equities but Petitioners upon repeated demands did not pay, hence, Petitioners
forfeited their to occupy lots in question.
(5) Respondents prayed for court order to vacate and removal of houses. With
damages of P25,000 and rent until houses are removed, and appearance fees,
exemplary damages.
(6) Petitioners answer: Respondents have no cause of action because properties
in question are under community mortgage program implemented by National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation.
(7) They allege they have been paying to Urban Land Development Foundation,
until the Foundation refused without reason.
(8) They allege they are qualified beneficiaries of RA 7279 (Urban
Development Housing Act 1992)
(9) They pray the complaint be dismissed.
(10) MTC dismissed complaint AND counter-claim on the ground that filing
of ejectment case based on alleged violation of the parties agreement which has
not yet been rescinded is premature, and that it is beyond the competence of the
said court to act on the case RTC affirmed in toto.
(11) CA reversed decision of MTC/RTC: occupation is hinged upon payment of
equity, if no payment then vacate the premises.
(12) CA said they are not protected by RA 7279, the parcels are not declared to
be used for socialized housing, no proof that they applied for community
mortgage program, lot owners have cause of action because they own the land
DUH
Issues:
(1) Whether CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in reversing MTC and RTC
(2) Whether MTC has jurisdiction over the case
(3) Whether non-inclusion of the Bagong Silang Homeowners Assoc. is fatal to
respondents cause of action
(4) Whether ejectment is the proper case
(5) Whether absence of contractual relations between parties BARS filing of
action by Respondents
Held:
(1) CA is wrong. They say Petitioners (occupants) occupancy and possession of
the lots were by MERE tolerance of Respondents (lot owners); then they also
say that Petitioners failed to pay the AGREED amount The fact that CA was
able to say that there was failure to pay indicates there was an agreement, and
not mere tolerance of lot owners.
(2) Respondents (lot owners), in their complaint to the Municipal Trial Court,
themselves alleged the presence of an agreement between the parties proof of
agreement
(3) Respondents Special Power of Attorney annexed to their complaint
instructs their attorneys to collect and receive amount or amounts as
EQUITY from occupants proof of agreement
(4) Respondents, then, explicitly admit to entering contract with occupants.
(5) Real issue is interpretation, enforcement, and/or rescission of the contract, a
matter that is beyond the the jurisdiction of MTC
(6) Proof of violation of contract in a detainer suit is needed before rescission,
rescission of contract is needed before illegality of realty is established.
(7) Declaration of rescission of contract is within power of RTC
(8) Another CASE is similar: ruling is that proper action should be a complaint
for rescission or specific performance, not for illegal detainer
(9) They are the same plaintiffs, same charges, but different defendants
(10) NOTE: relationship between the parties is not lessor/lessee; hence
ejectment case is not proper but rescission of contract
(11) Having ruled that MTC has no jurisdiction, SC no need to address other
issues raised.
(12) Petition GRANTED, CA overturned

VELOSO v. CA
Facts:
(1) Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA (respondent court),
seeking its reversal
(2) CA dismissed Petitioners (The Velosos) petition to annul judgment of RTC
for lack of merit, and that decision of RTC on 1992 is flawed because the issues
had already been resolved in an earlier case involving same parties and subject
matter, and RTC cant countermand a decision of a co-equal court
(3) Private Respondents (The Miraflors) filed a complaint for quieting of title
with damages against Velosos, since the lot 8422 in question is under the name
of the Miraflors mother.
(4) RTC found the title of the lot to be authentic, so the Miraflors are the
owners, and are entitled to physical and material possession of lot with the
improvements thereon, and orders petitioners to pay P25,000 attorneys fees
and reimbursement of litigation expenses P2,000
(5) Petitioners elevated it to CA, which affirmed RTC
(6) Then, Petitioners came to SC, but was denied because issues were of a
factual nature, and no error committed by CA
(7) Petitioners again went to CA to seek annulment of RTC, again CA ruled
against them
(8) Petitioners refer to 1951 case, 1969 case, and 1974 CA case, which settled
the issue of their ownership of the lot in their favor
(9) The decisions on these cases were brought by Petitioners themselves to the
RTC which eventually resolved the ownership of the Lot 8422 against them on
1992; this decision was affirmed by CA and SC
Issue: Whether CA erred in refusing to declare decision of the trial court void
for having been rendered ALLEGEDLY in violation of the doctrines of res
judicata and the law of the case
Held:
(1) Petition is denied, no reversible error
(2) Petitioners are filing petition under guise of annulment of judgment but are
actually asking for second cycle of review of a subject matter already resolved
and fairly adjudicated. NOT ALLOWED.
(3) Petitioners invoke res judicata to annul judgment of RTC on 1992, citing the
earlier cases, but the same doctrine of res judicata bars the annulment that
they are seeking since it has already been resolved by the RTC
Doctrine: Res Judicata: Material Facts or questions which were in issue in a
former action and were there admitted or judicially determined are conclusively
settled by a judgment rendered therein and that such facts or questions become
res judicata and may not again be litigated in a subsequent action between the
same parties or their privies, regardless of the form the issue may take in the
subsequent action, whether the subsequent action involves the saem or a
different form of proceeding, or whether the second action is upon the same or a
different cause of action, subject matter, claim or demand, as the earlier action.
In such cases, it is also immaterial that the two actions are based on different
grounds or tried on different theories, or instituted for different purposes, and
seek different reliefs. Law of the Case: Whatever is once irrevocably
established as the controlling legal principle or decision continues to be the law
of the case between the same parties in the same case, whether correct on
general rpinciples or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was
predicated continue to be thas facts of the case before the court.

AGUSTIN v. CA
Facts:
(1) Appeal by certiorari from decision of CA (respondent court) which affirmed
RTC Manila Case
(2) Unpaid promissory note amounting to P43,480.80 dated October 28,1970 by
Leovillo Agustin (herein Petitioner), chattel mortgage over an Isuzu diesel truck
(3) Installment to be paid to Filinvest Finance Corporation (Private Respondent)
(4) When petitioner defaulted on installment, respondent demanded payment in
full or else repossession of the truck

(5) Respondent filed a complaint in RTC praying for writ of replevin or

alternatively P32,723,97 plus interest 14%. Writ of replevin was granted, truck
was repossessed.
(6) But truck had missing parts, so respondent had to replace it themselves.
Truck was then foreclosed and sold at public auction. Respondent filed
supplemental complaint to reimburse replacement parts, transportation
expenses.
(7) Petitioner moved to dismiss supplemental complaint claiming RTC had
already lost jurisdiction because of foreclosure of vehicle
(8) Private respondents elevated matter to CA, which granted them right to
reimbursement
(9) Case was remanded back to RTC for determination of costs to be
reimbursed.
(10) Initial reimbursable amount was P18,547.38, but upon reconsideration,
lowered to original amount sought which is P8,852.76
(11) Petitioner still appeals this amount stating Civil Code Article 1484 , that
repossession expenses have been covered by foreclosure of truck, and that he is
no longer liable (another appeal regarding propriety of reimbursement)
Issue: Whether subsequent appeal by Petitioner against the reimbursement
established by CA and remanded to RTC as to the costs IS meritorious
Held:
(1) Petition is DENIED for lack of merit, CA is affirmed
(2) CA already settled that private respondent is entitled to reimbursements,
decision has already acquired finality (law of this case)
(3) RTC decision is only to determine amount only
(4) Subsequent appeal is not allowed because reimbursement is already law of
the case
(5) EVEN IF: SC were to brush aside the law of the case, reimbursement of
repossession expenses is still proper as in the case Filipinas Investment &
Finance Corporation v. Ridad.
(6) The cited case recognizes exception to rule in Article 1484(3): if mortgagee
incurs expenses in the repossession, mortgagor shall cover it
Doctrine: Decision in the lower court, in a case between same parties and same
issues, is established and controlling rule [the law of the case]; judgments of
courts should attain finality at some point

Topic: Parts of a Decision

VELARDE v. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY
Facts:
(1) SJS filed Petition for Declaratory Relief: sought the interpretation of several
constitutional provisions specifically on "whether or not the act of a religious
leader like any of the herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a
candidate for elective office or in urging or requiring the members of his flock
to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the letter or spirit of the
constitutional provisions.
(2) Respondents all sought the dismissal of the Petition because it did not state a
cause of action and there is was no justiciable controversy
(3) RTC denied motions to dismiss and motions for reconsideration
(4) RTC opined in its decision that endorsement of specific candidates in an
election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause.
(5) However, its decision failed to contain a statement of facts and a dispositive
portion and herein petitioners question the validity of such a decision
Issue: (Fundamental Requirements of a Decision) Did the RTCs decision
adhere to constitutional and legal requirements?
Held:
(1) No decision shall be ordered by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law which it is based. No petition for review or
motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course
or denied without stating the basis therefore.
(2) Parts of a decision:
1. Statement of the Case: legal definition of the nature of the action (civil case,
criminal case-charge, quoted information, proceedings of plea, detention), court
of origin and case number, decretal portion of the assailed decision
2. Statement of Facts: facts of the case, decision of the lower court
a. Objective Method: summarize without comment the testimony of
each witness
b. Synthesis Method: plaintiffs and defendants testimonies
summarized in the judges best light

c. Subjective Method: version of facts accepted by the judge;

combination of objective and subjective
3. Issues or Assignment of Errors: both factual and legal issues; other issues
may be included even if not raised by parties if substantially important; may be
reproduced in toto and tackled seriatim; may be restated in clearer and more
coherent terms
4. Courts Ruling: Each issue must be discussed separately;
full discussion of the specific errors or issues raised
5. Disposition or Dispositive Portion: what ought to be done and the courts
judgment
(3) RTCs decision cannot be upheld for its failure to express clearly and
distinctly the facts on which it was based. Thus, the trial court clearly
transgressed the constitutional directive. Failure to comply with the
constitutional injunction is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of the
constitutional mandate are a patent nullity and must be struck down as void.
Judgment: Petition is granted. Decision and Order of RTC is null and void.
Petition for Declaratory Relief is dismissed.
Lesson Learned: Elementary due process demand that the petitioners to a
litigation be given information on how the case was decided as well as an
explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusion of the
court
Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of the constitutional mandate
are a patent nullity and must be struck down as void

WILSON ONG CHING KIEN CHUNG v.

DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL LIBRARY
Facts:
(1) Sept. 16, 1993. Ong filed complaint for infringement of copyright and
prayer for writ of injunction against Lorenzo Tan; court issued TRO
(2) Oct. 13, 1993. QC RTC set the case for pre-trial on Nov. 12, 1993
(3) Jan. 5, 1994. Ceroilfood filed complaint for Annulment/Cancellation of
Copyrighted Certificate No. 0-93-491 and praying for restraining order/writ of
preliminary injunction before Manila RTC against Ong
(4) Jan. 7, 1994. Manila court issued TRO against Ong; 20 days later, Manila
court issued Order granting writ of preliminary injunction
(5) Jan. 31, 1994. Ong filed before CA seeking for annulment; petition is
granted; Order by Manila RTC is annulled and set aside (litis pendentia,
multiplicity of suits and forum shopping)
(6) Nov. 21, 1994. Ong prayed for dismissal of Manila case on the ground of
forum shopping; Manila court did not dismiss case because CA dispositive
portion did not order dismissal of the case
(7) Manila court admitted petitioners motion to dismiss as answer
(8) Nov. 20, 1997. Manila court rendered judgment in favor of respondents and
ruled that litis pendentia, multiplicity of suits and forum shopping were not
present
Issue: Whether or not there are deficiencies in the dispositive portion of the
decision.
Held:
(1) The ruling of CA is clear from the body of the decision that the case before
Manila court should be dismissed on grounds of litis pendentia, and fourm
shopping
(2) The exceptions where the dispositive part of the judgment does not always
prevail over the body of the opinion are:
- Where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of the opinion
may be referred to for purposes of construing the judgment because the
dispositive part of a decision must find support from the decisions ratio
decidendi
- Where extensive and explicit discussion and settlement of the issue
is found in the body of the decision
(3) Exception to the general rule applies to the case. Manila court should have
referred to the body of the decision for purposes of construing the issue of
whether or not the complaint should be dismissed because the dispositive part
of a decision must find support from the decisions ratio decidendi.
Judgment: Manila RTC decision is annulled and set aside

Topic: The Dissent

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. IAC
MERALCO v. CASTRO-BARTOLOME
Facts:
(1) Land possessed by Climpia Ramos before Pacific War and sold to spouses
Rafael Piguing and Minerva Inocencio in 1947
(2) Piguing spouses constructed a house but since Meralco installed an anchor
guy for the posts, Piguing sold the lots to Meralco
(3) Meralco prayed for the confirmation of its title to 2 lots with a total area of
165 sq.m. located at Tanay Rizal with assessed value of P3270
(4) Rizal opposed application on the ground that one of the lots would be
needed for the widening and improvement of Jose Abad Santos and E. Quirino
streets
(5) Land declared for realty tax purposes since 1945 and taxes has been paid
thereon up to 1977
(6) RTC: Meralco not allowed to own land because not a natural person (sec
48(b) of Public Land Law); trial court assumed that the land is a public land
(7) CA: Land is not private because Meralco and predecessors-in-interest have
neither composition title nor possessory information title
Issue: Whether or not Meralco is allowed to own lots in Tanay
Held:
(1) Land is still a public land and would cease to be public only upon the
issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under sec
48(b). Until the certificate of title is issued, a piece of land, over which an
imperfect title is sought to be confirmed remains public land.
(1) Meralco, a judicial person, is disqualified from applying for its registration
(3) Relies on Susi vs. Razon et. al.: but it is not applicable because land
involved was possessed before 1880. Meralco does not pretend that the spouses
and their predecessor had been in possession of the land since time immemorial
Judgment: Decision appealed from is affirmed.
Dissents and Separate Opinions
Fernando, C.J.:

Concurs that the Court is disqualified as a juridical person to apply for

registration

Dissents: insofar the Court finds the jurisdictional defect as an

insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought
Abad Santos, J., concurring:

Lands have ceased to be a public land; already public lands because of

acquisitive prescription by predecessors

Petitioner relies on sec 48(b) for the confirmation of its title and J. Aquino
is correct in holding that the provision cannot be availed by juridical
entities
De Castro, J.:

Cannot subscribe to the view that the land has become private land

Prescribe procedure known as judicial confirmation (no limit) or

administrative legislation (24 ha)

A corporation may not apply for judicial confirmation of public land even
if it had been possession from the very beginning.

If the possession is not from the beginning but has commenced only upon
transfer to it by prior possessor, the corporation may still not apply.
Teehankee, J., dissenting:

Dissents due to the failure of the majority to adhere to established

doctrines since the 1909 case of Carino and the 1925 case of Susi down to
1909 case of Herico pursuant to Public Land Act

What Meralco and Iglesia have acquired had already ceased to be part of
the public domain and had become private property at the time of sale

Long possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since
1894 gave rise to the conclusive presumption that the occupant had
complied with all the conditions essential to a Government grant and thus
entitled to a certificate title.

Ruling in Susi has been affirmed and reaffirmed by the Court in a long
unbroken line of cases.

Meralcos predecessors-in-interest had possessed and occupied as owners

the land in question for at least over 35 years.

J. Holmes: The effect of the proof whenever made was not to confer title
but simply to establish it as already conferred by the decree if not by an
earlier law.

Judicial persons: There is no prohibition against their sale of the land to

Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the application being
refilled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and
vendors (as such natural person) with the end result of their application
being granted because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by
operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their
favor.

Facts:
(1) Acme acquired real properties from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both
members of the Dumagat tribe. Possession of Infiels dates back before the
Philippines was discovered by Magellan (time immemorial). Possession of
Acme is continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to present.
(2) Land sought to be registered is a private land (RA 3872). Acme has
introduced several improvements; ownership of Acme has been recognized by
the government; Acme donated a part of the land to Maconacon, Isabela.
Issue: Whether the title of the land could be confirmed by ACME despite the
proceedings occurred under the 1973 Constitution.
Held:
(1) The court upheld Justice Teehankees dissenting opinion in the case of
Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome.
(2) Alienable public land held by possessor, personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest openly, continuously, and exclusively for the
prescribed statutory (Public Land Act: 30 years) is CONVERTED TO
PRIVATE PROPERTY BY THE MERE LAPSE OR COMPLETION OF THE
SAID PERIOD, ipso jure (by law).
(3) Therefore, the land subject of this appeal WAS ALREADY PRIVATE
PROPERTY at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by ACME (since the
Infiels had already a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29,
1962).
(4) The objection that Acme as a juridical person is not qualified to apply for
judicial confirmation of title under the Public Land Act is technical, rather than
substantial.
(5) The Constitution and subsequent laws cannot impair vested rights.
(6) To hold otherwise would also result in a multiplicity of court actions and is
thus impractical.
Lesson Learned: This opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of
comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only
reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines of soundness of which has
passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many past cases. The
Meralco decision was only tangential and limited to a brief paragraph in the
opinion, and may be considered an obiter in that context.
- Dissent may be a better and correct view
- Court may hold that what was once a majority opinion must be
reconsidered and no longer deemed to be a binding precedent
- The Supreme Court is supreme because it can change its mind; The
Supreme Court is never wrong if it reverses itself it makes new law

Topic: Ratio and Obiter Dictum

MERCADO v. PEOPLE
Facts:
(1) Bhagwani parked an Isuzu Trooper (owned by Zamora but used by
Bhagwani as a service vehicle) in front of his house and the next day saw it was
gone. Bhagwanis neighbor said that he learned from his daughter (common law
wife of one of the accused) that they stole the car. The accused persons
confessed they took the car but said that it was with Bhagwanis consent.
Mercado was absent during the accused persons confession but they said he
participated in the act.
(2) Mercado, together with Flores, Cummins, Vasques, and Bertumen, were
charged and convicted with violating the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 and
were sentenced for 12 years and one day (minimum) to 17 years and 4 months
(maximum) prison term. CA increased the term to 17 years and 4 months
(minimum) to 30 years (maximum).
Issue: Whether the increase in prison term is valid, and whether they are guilty
of carnapping
Held:
(1) SC disagreed with the petitioner and sustained CA saying that Sec 13, Rule
12 was only applicable when the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua or
higher as a single indivisible penalty as the SC held in the Omotoy Footnote
(People vs. Omotoy). *Although the Omotoy footnote is not part of the ratio
decidendi and is in fact a footnote, the substance still constitutes and important
part of the decision (obiter dictum)*
(2) Penalty imposed in Mercado is 30 years and a lower penalty, and the AntiCarnapping Act is a special law and not covered by the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, even if 30 years is within the reclusion perpetua, it still does not fall

under reclusion perpetua since such term is applied only in penalties covered in
the Revised Penal Code and not special acts like the Anti-Carnapping Act.
(3) Also the petitioners claim regarding the issue of whether they are guilty of
carnapping cannot be reviewed by the SC since the petition is a review on
certiorari wherein only questions of law, not of fact, can be entertained.

- 1 point shouldnt be denied authority even if it was dwelt with less

- Minor/supporting arguments not necessarily obiter

Topic: Tools and Tests

Lesson Learned:
- Footnotes may be relied upon in a decision
- May not be the ratio decidendi of the case, still constitutes an important part of
the decision, when it enunciates a fundamental rule; that the rule is states in a
footnote is of no consequence since it is only a matter of style
- Any discussion necessary to resolve controversy is part of the ratio

VILLANUEVA v. CA
Facts:
(1) Villanueva filed complaint for illegal dismissal against several parties which
included IBC 13. Labor arbiter ruled in favor of Villanueva. IBC 13 appealed to
NLRC and as an appeal bond filed two documents (Surety Bond issued by BF
General Insurance Company, Inc. and Confirmation Letter signed by BFs vicepresident) which were found out to be falsified.
(2) Two complaints for falsification of public document were filed before the
Manila Prosecutors Office which found probable cause against respondents but
not Villadores (and Diaz). Upon a petition for review, the Department of Justice
ordered the re-inclusion of Villadores. Accordingly, the original information
were amended to include respondent Villadores among those charged.
(3) Villanueva, filed a Motion to Admit Amended Informations alleging
damages sustained by Villanueva as a result of the crimes committed by the
accused. The Motion was granted by the Trial Court. Villadores filed a motion
for reconsideration but was denied.
(4) In his petition for certiorari with the CA, Villadores sought to annul the trial
courts Order to Admit Amended Informations as well as the Order denying his
motion for reconsideration. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
(5) Villadores moved, before the RTC of Manila, for the disqualification of
Rico and Associates based on the pronouncement of the CA (in
abovementioned decision) which found no reason how Villanueva could have
sustained damages as a result of the falsification of the documents. The RTC
denied the motion for disqualification reasoning that the quote was a mere
obiter dictum- merely an expression of opinion of the court upon some question
of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case at hand.
(6) Villadores filed another motion for reconsideration with a trial court but was
again denied thus he filed anew a petition for certiorari with the CA which later
reversed the decision of the RTC as regards the denial of the disqualification of
Rico and Associates as well as the denial the motion for reconsideration filed by
Villadores. Moreover, the CA directed that the name of petitioner Villanueva,
Jr., appearing as the offended party in the falsification case be stricken out from
the records.
(7) Hence, Villanueva now challenges this CA decision
Issue: Whether or not the pronouncement of the CA (which questioned
Villanuevas inclusion as an offended party) is obiter dictum or not.

SHERBERT v. VERNER
Facts: The Appellant, Sherbert (Appellant), a Seventh-Day Adventist was
denied unemployment benefits by South Carolina because she refused to work
on Saturdays, the Sabbath Day of her faith. Specifically, her claim for
unemployment benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment
Compensation Act but was denied because the state compensation law barred
benefits to workers who failed, without good cause, to accept suitable work
when offered. She refused to take a job that required her to work Saturdays.
The highest state court sustained the denial of benefits.
Issues: (1) Whether the disqualification for benefits imposes any burden on the
free
exercise
of
Appellants
religion?
(2) Whether some compelling state interest justifies the substantial infringement
of Appellants First Amendment constitutional right?
Held: The Supreme Court in a 7-2 decision reversed the Commission and the
lower courts, finding that denying Sherbert's claim was an unconstitutional
burden on the free exercise of her religion.
Supreme Court held that South Carolina may not constitutionally
apply the eligibility provisions of its unemployment compensation scheme in
order to deny unemployment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist because she
refused to work on Saturday.
A state may not constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions of its
unemployment compensation scheme so as to constrain a worker to abandon
her religious convictions respecting the day of rest.
The consequences of such a disqualification to religious principles
and practices may be only an indirect result of welfare legislation within the
states general competence to enact. Here, not only is it apparent that
Appellants declared ineligibility for benefits solely derives from the practice of
her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that practice is unmistakable.
Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon
the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against Appellant for her
Saturday worship. Therefore, the disqualification for benefits imposes a burden
on
the
free
exercise
of
Appellants
religion.
No. Judgment of the highest state court reversed and remanded for further
proceedings. The states asserted interest is no more than a possibility of the
filing of fraudulent claims by people feigning religious objections to Saturday
work. Here, no justifications underlie the determination of the state court that
Appellants religion makes her ineligible to receive benefits. South Carolina
may not constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions of its unemployment
compensation scheme in order to deny unemployment benefits to a SeventhDay Adventist because she refused to work on Saturday. Therefore, there are no
compelling state interests that justify the substantial infringement of Appellants
First Amendment constitutional right.
The Sherbert Test

Held:
(1) It was held that the pronouncement was not an obiter dictum as it touched
matters clearly raised by the respondent assailing the admission of Amended
Information which resulted to the inclusion of Villanueva as an offended party.
(2) An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed by a court upon
some question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before
it. It has been held that an adjudication on any point within the issues presented
by the case cannot be considered as obiter dictum, and this rule applies to all
pertinent questions, although incidentally involved, which are presented and
decided in the regular course of the consideration of the case, and led up to the
final conclusion, and to any statement as to the matter on which the decision is
predicated.
Lesson Learned:
- Obiter dictum: an opinion expressed by court upon some question of law w/c
is not necessary to the decision of the case
- by the way, remark/ opinion expressed incidentally/ collaterally
- Not binding as precedent
- Adjudication on any point within the issues cannot be considered as obiter
dictum; Even only incidentally involved
- Not obiter if it was necessary to consider another question/an additional reason
for the decision
- Not obiter when a case presents 2/more points
- None of the points can be regarded as obiter

The Sherbert Test consists of four criteria that are used to determine if an
individual's right to religious free exercise has been violated by the government.
The test is as follows:
For the individual, the court must determine
whether the person has a claim involving a sincere religious belief,
and
whether the government action is a substantial burden on the
persons ability to act on that belief.
If these two elements are established, then the government must prove
that it is acting in furtherance of a "compelling state interest," and
that it has pursued that interest in the manner least restrictive, or
least burdensome, to religion.

MINERSVILLE v. GOBITIS
Facts: Lillian Gobitis, aged twelve, and her brother William, aged ten, were
expelled from the public schools of Minersville, Pennsylvania, for refusing to
salute the national flag as part of a daily school exercise. While the words of the
pledge were spoken, the children and their teachers extended their right hands
in a salute to the flag. The local board of education required teachers and pupils

to participate in this ceremony. The Gobitis family was Jehovah's Witness. This
church teaches that the Bible is the word of God and is the highest authority.
Church members held that the schools pledge constituted the honoring of a
graven image contrary to the biblical teachings of the Book of Exodus, chapter
20. The Gobitis children were of an age for which Pennsylvania makes school
attendance compulsory. Thus they were denied a free education, and their
parents had to put them into private schools. Walter Gobitis, father of Lillian
and William, filed suit to enjoin local school authorities from imposing
participation in the flag salute ceremony as a condition of receiving a public
education. The district and court of appeals courts ruled in favor of the Gobitis
family, and the school district requested Supreme Court review.
Held: In an 81 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and ruled in favor of
the school district. Writing for the Court, Justice Felix Frankfurter said the case
was a battle between the freedom of religion and the power of government.
Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote the majority decision; in doing so, he
relied primarily on the "secular regulation" rule, which weighs the secular
purpose of a concededly nonreligious government regulation against the
religious practice it makes illegal or otherwise burdens the exercise of religion.
He identified the Pennsylvania flag-salute requirement as an intrinsically
secular policy enacted to encourage patriotism among school children.
Frankfurter wrote that the school district's interest in creating
national unity was enough to allow them to require students to salute the flag.
According to Frankfurter, the nation needed loyalty and the unity of all the
people. Since saluting the flag was a primary means of achieving this legitimate
goal, an issue of national importance was at stake.
The Court held that the state's interest in "national cohesion" was "inferior to
none in the hierarchy of legal values".
National unity is the basis of national security. To deny the
legislature the right to select appropriate means for its attainment presents a
totally different order of problem from that of the propriety of subordinating the
possible ugliness of littered streets to the free expression opinion through
handbills.
Weighing the circumstances in this case, he argued that the social
need for conformity with the requirement was greater than the individual liberty
claims of the Jehovah's Witnesses. He emphasized that
Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle
for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law
not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs
Frankfurter further wrote that the recitation of a pledge advanced the
cause of patriotism in the United States. He said the country's foundation as a
free society depends upon building sentimental ties.
The flag, the Court found, was an important symbol of national unity
and could be a part of legislative initiatives designed "to promote in the minds
of children who attend the common schools an attachment to the institutions of
their country
Justice Frankfurter agreed that the freedom of religion is important,
and is protected by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which says
that the federal government "shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise
[of religion]." State and local governments have to obey the First Amendment
freedom of religion under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Due Process Clause prevents states from unlawfully taking
away a person's life, liberty (or freedom), and property. School boards, such as
the Minersville school district, are part of local government. Therefore, they
must obey the freedom of religion.
Justice Frankfurter also agreed that the freedom of religion includes
the right to choose one's religious beliefs and to reject others. He said that the
First Amendment prevents the government from interfering with a person's
religious beliefs.
Justice Frankfurter said, however, that the freedom of belief does not
excuse people from obeying laws that relate to their duties as American
citizens. One of those duties is to have a sense of national unity, which is
respect for America as a country of people dedicated to freedom. Justice
Frankfurter said that national unity is the government's most important goal. He
went so far as to say that without national unity, America would fall apart and
be unable to protect the freedom of religion.
When balancing the freedom of religion against the government's
interest in creating national unity, the Court decided in favor of national unity.
The Court said that school boards could force students to say the pledge of
allegiance without violating their freedom of religion.

WEST VIRGINA v. BARNETT

Facts: Following the Minersville School District v. Gobitis decision, the West
Virginia Legislature amended its statutes to require all schools in the state to
conduct courses of instruction in history, civics, and in the Constitutions of the
United States and of the State "for the purpose of teaching, fostering and

perpetuating the ideals, principles and spirit of Americanism, and increasing the
knowledge of the organization and machinery of the government." The West
Virginia State Board of Education was directed to "prescribe the courses of
study covering these subjects" for public schools.
The Board of Education on January 9, 1942, adopted a resolution
containing recitals taken largely from the Court's Gobitis opinion and ordering
that the salute to the flag become "a regular part of the program of activities in
the public schools," that all teachers and pupils "shall be required to participate
in the salute honoring the Nation represented by the Flag; provided, however,
that refusal to salute the Flag be regarded as an Act of insubordination, and
shall be dealt with accordingly." The resolution originally required the
"commonly accepted salute to the Flag" which it defined. Objections to the
salute as "being too much like Hitler's" were raised by the Parent and Teachers
Association, the Boy and Girl Scouts, the Red Cross, and the General
Federation of Women's Clubs. Some modification appears to have been made in
deference to these objections, but no concession was made to Jehovah's
Witnesses. What was required after the modification was a "stiff-arm" salute,
the saluter to keep the right hand raised with palm turned up while the following
is repeated: "I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America and
to the Republic for which it stands; one Nation, indivisible, with liberty and
justice for all."
Failure to comply was considered "insubordination" and dealt with
by expulsion. Readmission was denied by statute until the student complied.
This expulsion, in turn, automatically exposed the child and their parents to
criminal prosecution; the expelled child was considered "unlawfully absent" and
could be proceeded against as a delinquent, and their parents or guardians could
be fined as much as $50 and jailed up to thirty days. On the advice of an early
attorney, the Barnettes had avoided the further complications by having their
expelled girls return to school each day, though the school would send them
home.
The Barnettes brought suit in the United States District Court for
themselves and others similarly situated asking its injunction to restrain
enforcement of these laws and regulations against Jehovah's Witnesses. The
Witnesses taught and still teach that the obligation imposed by law of God is
superior to that of laws enacted by temporal government. Their religious beliefs
include a literal version of Exodus, Chapter 20, verses 4 and 5, which says:
'Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything
that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water
under the earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them nor serve them.' They
consider that the flag is an 'image' within this command. For this reason they
refused to salute the flag. Children of Jehovah's Witnesses had been expelled
from school and were threatened with exclusion for no other cause. Officials
threatened to send them to reformatories maintained for criminally inclined
juveniles. Parents of such children had been prosecuted and were being
threatened with prosecutions for causing delinquency.
Issues: Does this rule compelling a pledge violate the First Amendment of the
Constitution?
Held: In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court overruled its decision in Minersville
School District v. Gobitis and held that compelling public schoolchildren to
salute the flag was unconstitutional. The Court found that salutes of the type
mandated by the West Virginia State Board of Education were forms of
utterance and thus were a means of communicating ideas. "Compulsory
unification of opinion," the Court held, was doomed to failure and was
antithetical to the values set forth in the First Amendment. Writing for the
majority, Justice Jackson argued: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." To underscore its
decision, the Supreme Court announced it on Flag Day.
The opinion that Justice Felix Frankfurter had authored three years
earlier in Gobitis rested on four arguments. In Barnette Justice Jackson
addressed each element of Frankfurters Gobitis decision. Jackson began with
Frankfurters designation of the flag as a national symbol. He did not question
Frankfurters designation of the flag as a national symbol; instead, he criticized
the pedestal on which Frankfurter put such national symbols. Jackson called
symbols a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas, and explained
that a person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and what is one
mans comfort and inspiration is anothers jest and scorn.
Next Jackson denied Frankfurters argument that flag-saluting
ceremonies were an appropriate way to build the cohesive sentiment that
Frankfurter believed national unity depended on. Jackson rejected Frankfurters
argument, citing the Roman effort to drive out Christianity, the Spanish
Inquisition of the Jews and the Siberian exile of Soviet dissidents as evidence of
the ultimate futility of efforts to coerce unanimous sentiment out of a
populace. Jackson warned that [t]hose who begin coercive elimination of

dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification

of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.
Then Jackson dealt with Frankfurters assertion that forcing students
to salute the flag, and threatening them with expulsion if they chose not to, was
a permissible way to foster national unity. Jacksons rejection of this section of
Frankfurters argument has proved the most quoted section of his opinion. In
his Gobitis opinion Frankfurters solution was for the dissenters to seek out
solutions to their problems at the ballot box. Jackson responded that the conflict
in this case was between authority and the individual and that the founders
intended the Bill of Rights to put some rights out of reach from majorities,
ensuring that some liberties would endure beyond political majorities. Jackson
wrote
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be
applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a
free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may
not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.
The last leg of Frankfurters Gobitis opinion reasoned that matters
like saluting the flag were issues of school discipline that are better left to
local officials rather than federal judges. Justice Jackson rejected this argument
as well:
The case is made difficult not because the principles of its decision
are obscure but because the flag involved is our own. Nevertheless, we apply
the limitations of the Constitution with no fear that freedom to be intellectually
and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the social organization.
To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary
and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering
estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds. We can have intellectual
individualism and the rich cultural diversities that we owe to exceptional minds
only at the price of occasional eccentricity and abnormal attitudes. When they
are so harmless to others or to the State as those we deal with here, the price is
not too great. But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter
much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the
right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an
exception, they do not now occur to us.

BRANDENBURG v. OHIO
Facts: Clarence Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan leader in rural Ohio, contacted a
reporter at a Cincinnati television station and invited him to come and cover a
KKK rally in Hamilton County in the summer of 1964. Portions of the rally
were filmed, showing several men in robes and hoods, some carrying firearms,
first burning a cross and then making speeches. One of the speeches made
reference to the possibility of "revengeance" [sic] against "niggers," "Jews," and
those who supported them. One of the speeches also claimed that
"our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the
white, Caucasian race," and announced plans for a march on Washington to take
place on the Fourth of July. Brandenburg was charged with advocating violence
under Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute for his participation in the rally and
for the speech he made. In relevant part, the statute - enacted in 1919 during
the First Red Scare - proscribed "advocat[ing] .. . the duty, necessity, or
propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a
means of accomplishing industrial or political reform" and "voluntarily
assembl[ing] with any society, group or assemblage of persons formed to teach
or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism."
Convicted in the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County,
Brandenburg was fined $1,000 and sentenced to one to ten years in prison. On
appeal, the Ohio First District Court of Appeal affirmed Brandenburg's
conviction, rejecting his claim that the statute violated his First
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment right to freedom of speech.
The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed his appeal without opinion.
Held: The U.S. Supreme Court reversed Brandenburg's conviction, holding that
government cannot constitutionally punish abstract advocacy of force or law
violation. The unanimous majority opinion was per curiam (issued from the
Court as an institution rather than as authored and signed by an individual
justice).
The per curiam majority opinion overturned the Ohio Criminal
Syndicalism statute, overruled Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), and
articulated a new test the "imminent lawless action" test for judging what
was then referred to as "seditious speech" under the First Amendment:

Whitney has been thoroughly discredited by later decisions. See Dennis v.

United States, 341 U.S. 494, at 507 (1951). These later decisions have
fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.
In Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), the Court had
adopted a "clear and present danger" test that Whitney v.
California subsequently expanded to a bad tendency test: if speech has a
"tendency" to cause sedition or lawlessness, it may constitutionally be
prohibited. Dennis v. United States, a case dealing with prosecution of alleged
Communists under the Smith Act for advocating the overthrow of the
government, used the clear and present danger test while still upholding the
defendants' convictions for acts that could not possibly have led to a speedy
overthrow of the government.
Interestingly, the per curiam opinion cited to Dennis v. United
States as though it were good law and amenable to the result reached
in Brandenburg. In point of fact, Brandenburg completely did away
with Dennis's central holding and held that "mere advocacy" of any doctrine,
including one that assumed the necessity of violence or law violation, was per
se protected speech. It may be that principles of stare decisis figured in the
Court's decision to avoid overruling the relatively recent Dennis, but the
distance between the two cases' approach is obvious and irreconcilable
The Brandenburg Test (The Imminent Lawless Action Test)
Intent, Imminence, Likelihood

NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN

Facts: On March 29, 1960, the New York Times carried a full-page
advertisement titled "Heed Their Rising Voices", which solicited funds to
defend Martin Luther King, Jr. against an Alabama perjury indictment. The
advertisement described actions against civil rights protesters, some of them
inaccurately, some of which involved the police force of Montgomery,
Alabama. Although the Montgomery Public Safety commissioner, L. B.
Sullivan, was not named in the advertisement, the inaccurate criticism of the
actions by the police were considered as defamation against him as well by
virtue of his position and duty to supervise the police department.
Alabama law denied a public officer recovery of punitive damages
in a libel action brought on account of a publication concerning their official
conduct unless they first make a written demand for a public retraction and the
defendant fails or refuses to comply, so Sullivan sent such a request.
The Times did not publish a retraction in response to the demand. Instead it
wrote a letter stating, among other things, that "we ... are somewhat puzzled as
to how you think the statements in any way reflect on you," and "you might, if
you desire, let us know in what respect you claim that the statements in the
advertisement reflect on you". Sullivan did not respond but instead filed this
suit a few days later. He also sued four black ministers mentioned in the ad,
specifically Ralph Abernathy, S.S. Seay, Sr., Fred Shuttlesworth, and Joseph
Lowery. Sullivan won $500,000 in an Alabama court judgment.
The Times did, however, subsequently publish a retraction of the
advertisement upon the demand of Governor John Patterson of Alabama, who
asserted that the publication charged him with "grave misconduct and ...
improper actions and omissions as Governor of Alabama and exofficio chairman of the State Board of Education of Alabama." When asked to
explain why there had been a retraction for the Governor but not for Sullivan,
the Secretary of the Times testified: "We did that because we didn't want
anything that was published by the Times to be a reflection on the State of
Alabama and the Governor was, as far as we could see, the embodiment of the
State of Alabama and the proper representative of the state and, furthermore, we
had by that time learned more of the actual facts which the ad purported to
recite and, finally, the ad did refer to the action of the state authorities and the
Board of Education presumably of which the Governor is the ex-officio
chairman...." On the other hand, he testified that he did not think that "any of
the language in there referred to Mr. Sullivan."
Issue: Did the advertisement forfeit its otherwise constitutional protection
because some of its statements were false?
Held: The United States Constitution (Constitution) delimits a States power to
award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of
their official conduct. The case before the Supreme Court of the United States
(Supreme Court) was such an action. As a result, the rule requiring proof of
actual malice is applicable. As there was no evidence of actual malice in this
action, the trial court judgment must be vacated and remanded for a new trial.
Furthermore, in the name of judicial administration, the Supreme Court found

that the evidence on the record could not sustain a verdict in favor of the
Respondent,
were
a
new
trial
to
be
ordered.
Concurrence. The idea of malice is a difficult term to understand and even
more difficult to apply. The current policy of absolute immunity to the press
for critical comments about the way public officials do their public duty is the
best way to protect the press without eroding their freedoms.
The rule of law applied by the Alabama courts was found
constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of
speech and of the press that are required by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his
official conduct. The decision further held that under the proper safeguards the
evidence presented in this case is constitutionally insufficient to support the
judgment for Sullivan.
The Court held that a public official suing for defamation must
prove that the statement in question was made with actual malice, which in this
context refers to knowledge or reckless lack of investigation, rather than the
ordinary meaning of malicious intent. In his concurring opinion, Justice
Black explained that "'[m]alice,' even as defined by the Court, is an elusive,
abstract concept, hard to prove and hard to disprove. The requirement that
malice be proved provides at best an evanescent protection for the right
critically to discuss public affairs and certainly does not measure up to the
sturdy safeguard embodied in the First Amendment."
The term "malice" was not newly invented for the case, but came
from existing libel law. In many jurisdictions, including Alabama (where the
case arose), proof of "actual malice" (actual knowledge of falsity, or reckless
disregard for the truth) was required in order for punitive damages to be
awarded, or for other increased penalties. Since proof of the writer's malicious
intentions is hard to provide, proof that the writer knowingly published a
falsehood was generally accepted as proof of malice, under the assumption that
only a malicious person would knowingly publish a falsehood. In Hoeppner v.
Dunkirk Printing Co., 254 N.Y. 95 (1930), similarly, the court said: "The
plaintiff alleges that this criticism of him and of his work was not fair and was
not honest; it was published with actual malice, ill will and spite. If he
establishes this allegation, he has made out a cause of action. No comment or
criticism, otherwise libelous, is fair or just comment on a matter of public
interest if it be made through actual ill will and malice." (p. 106)
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court adopted the
term "actual malice" and gave it constitutional significance, at the same time
defining it in terms of the proof which had previously been usual.

MORSE v. FREDERICK
Facts: At a school-supervised event, Joseph Frederick held up a banner with the
message "Bong Hits 4 Jesus," a slang reference to marijuana smoking. Principal
Deborah Morse took away the banner and suspended Frederick for ten days.
She justified her actions by citing the school's policy against the display of
material that promotes the use of illegal drugs. Frederick sued under 42 U.S.C.
1983, the federal civil rights statute, alleging a violation of his First Amendment
right to freedom of speech. The District Court found no constitutional violation
and ruled in favor of Morse. The court held that even if there were a violation,
the principal had qualified immunity from lawsuit. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Ninth Circuit cited Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District, which extended First Amendment
protection to student speech except where the speech would cause a
disturbance. Because Frederick was punished for his message rather than for
any disturbance, the Circuit Court ruled, the punishment was unconstitutional.
Furthermore, the principal had no qualified immunity, because any reasonable
principal would have known that Morse's actions were unlawful.
Issues: 1) Does the First Amendment allow public schools to prohibit students
from displaying messages promoting the use of illegal drugs at schoolsupervised events?
2) Does a school official have qualified immunity from a damages lawsuit
under 42 U.S.C. 1983 when, in accordance with school policy, she disciplines a
student for displaying a banner with a drug reference at a school-supervised
event?
Held: Yes and not reached. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit by a 5-4 vote,
ruling that school officials can prohibit students from displaying messages that
promote illegal drug use. Court concluded that the school officials did not
violate the First Amendment by confiscating the pro-drug banner and
suspending the student responsible for it. After reciting the background in Part I
of the opinion, in Part II he determined that "school speech" doctrine should
apply because Frederick's speech occurred "at a school event"; Part III
determined that the speech was "reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug
use"; and Part IV, inquired whether a principal may legally restrict that speech,

concluding that she couldunder the three existing First Amendment school
speech precedents, other Constitutional jurisprudence relating to schools, and a
school's "importantindeed, perhaps compelling interest" in deterring drug use
by students.
First, Court should analyze Frederick's speech under the
comparatively strict doctrine of "school speech" -- rejecting "at the outset"
Frederick's contention that the case should instead be considered under ordinary
free-speech jurisprudence. While conceding that past precedent reflects "some
uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when courts should apply schoolspeech precedents", Roberts added: "but not on these facts." Roberts reiterated
the circumstances, then explained: "Under these circumstances, we agree with
the superintendent that Frederick cannot 'stand in the midst of his fellow
students, during school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity and claim he is not
at school.'"
Next, Roberts determined that the principal's conclusion that
Frederick's banner "advocated the use of illegal drugs" was reasonable.
Acknowledging that the banner's message was "cryptic", nevertheless it was
undeniably a "reference to illegal drugs".In reaching this conclusion, Roberts
contrasted "the paucity of alternative meanings the banner might bear" against
the fact that the two immediately available interpretations of the words support
this conclusion:

First, the phrase could be interpreted as an imperative: [Take] bong

hits a message equivalent, as Morse explained in her
declaration, to smoke marijuana or use an illegal drug.
Alternatively, the phrase could be viewed as celebrating drug use
bong hits [are a good thing], or [we take] bong hits.

And even if that second interpretation does not support the principle's
conclusions that the banner advocated the use of illegal drugs,

we discern no meaningful distinction between celebrating illegal

drug use in the midst of fellow students and outright advocacy or
promotion. See Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F. 3d 320, 328 (CA2 2006)
(discussing the present case and describing the sign as a clearly
pro-drug banner)

Wrapping up this discussion, Roberts rejected the two alternative

accounts for Frederick's speech provided in the dissent: first, the dissent noted
that Frederick "just wanted to get on television," which it characterized as a
credible and uncontradicted explanation for the message." Roberts rejoined:
"But that is a description of Fredericks motive for displaying the banner; it is
not an interpretation of what the banner says." Second, the dissent emphasized
the importance of political speech and the need to foster national debate about
a serious issue. Roberts rejoined that "not even Frederick argues that the
banner conveys any sort of political or religious message;" "this is plainly not a
case about political debate over the criminalization of drug use or possession."
Finally, Roberts inquired whether a principal may restrict such speech. He
concluded that she can.
He began by reviewing the court's school speech jurisprudence:
First, Roberts recapitulated that student expression may be
suppressed only if school officials reasonably conclude that it will "materially
and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school" -- observing
however that this doctrine came from a case (Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School Dist.) in which the students were engaging in "political
speech" in "a silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any
disorder or disturbance" (wearing armbands, to express disapproval of the
Vietnam hostilities and their advocacy of a truce, to make their views known,
and, by their example, to influence others to adopt them. Id., at 514), and in
which "[t]he only interest the Court discerned underlying the schools actions
was the mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint, or an urgent wish to avoid the
controversy which might result from the expression." Roberts commented on
this opinion with a quote from Virginia v. Black -- that political speech is at the
core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect. 538 U. S. 343, 365
(2003).
Second, Roberts cited Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser. The
jurisprudence of Fraser is controversial, but Roberts declining to apply or
resolve the disputed holding of that case ("We need not resolve this debate to
decide this case"); instead, he explained that "[f]or present purposes, it is
enough to distill from Fraser two basic principles":
1. that the constitutional rights of students in public school are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings
(in light of the special characteristics of the school environment).
2. that the substantial disruption analysis prescribed by Tinker "is not
absolute" (i.e. it is flexible/optional).
Third, Roberts cited the most recent student speech case, Hazelwood
School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier. In that case, the Court permitted a school to

"exercise editorial content over the style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities" (declining to publish articles in the
school paper that "the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur
of the school) "so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns". Robert found that this case, though factually distinct,
was "nevertheless instructive because it confirms both principles cited above".
Roberts then cited cases that cited Tinker in the course of
interpreting the qualified status that other Constitutional rights acquire in
schools -- Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, New Jersey v. T. L. O., Board of
Ed. of Independent School Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls. In light
of these concerns, Roberts devoted his lengthiest analysis to the government's
"importantindeed, perhaps compelling interest" in deterring drug use by
students. To this point, the opinion cited statistics illustrating the problems of
youth drug abuse. It further noted that part of a school's educational mission "to
educate students about the dangers of illegal drugs and to discourage their use".
The District Court also noted "peer pressure is perhaps 'the single most
important factor leading school children to take drugs.'" The Court's
interpretation of Frederick's banner deemed the banner as a type of peer
pressure. Based on these concerns, the opinion concluded that the principal's
actions were motivated by a "serious and palpable" danger of drug abuse quite
different from the amorphous fears of anti-war sentiment at play in Tinker
In Tinker, the school principal had punished students for wearing
black anti-war armbands based on his "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance" or "mere desire to avoid... discomfort and unpleasantness." Here,
however, the concern about student drug abuse "extends well beyond an
abstract desire to avoid controversy." Principal Morse's failure to act against the
banner "would send a powerful message to the students in her charge, including
Frederick, about how serious the school was about the dangers of illegal drug
use." The First Amendment, concluded the opinion, "does not require schools to
tolerate at school events student expression that contributes to those dangers."

Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirmed his election. However, on

December 8, Ynsua filed his motion of protest.
On December 9, The Electoral Commission, stated that December 9,
1935 would be the last day for the presentation of protests against the
election of any member of the National Assembly Angara argued that he was
already confirmed as a member of the National Assembly through the
Resolution No. 8 therefore filing of protest ended upon the resolutions
proclamation. Ynsua was therefore late in filing for protest. Ynsua argues that
there was no constitutional or legal provision which stated that members of the
national assembly could not be contested after confirmation via Res No. 8.
After Electoral Commission denies Angaras petition to dismiss the
protest, Angara petitions to the Supreme court to review the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Commission.
Issue: A. WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the controversy. (Issue A is the focus of
Molo discussion on Power to Construe Limitations)
B. WON the Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in accepting protests despite the proclamation of elected officials by
the National Assembly
Held: A. Yes, The Electoral Commission is under the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Commission. Despite clear separation of powers between the
legislative (where the Electoral Commission is located), the executive, and the
judiciary, check and balances exist to maintain coordination between all. In
cases of controversy, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ
which can be called upon to determine proper allocation of powers between
several departments through judicial supremacy.
B. Yes, the Electoral Commission had jurisdiction. The National
Assembly created the Electoral Commission to be an INDEPENDENT,
QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY of powers specific to election concerns. Regulation
of Rules and protests if election related are within their jurisdiction regardless
of proclamations made by the National Assembly.

Topic: Power to Construe Limitations and Scope of Laws

ENDENCIA v. DAVID
Facts: The Court of First Instance of Manila declared section 13 of R.A. 590,
which states in part that no salary wherever received by any public officer of
the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered exempt from the income
tax, as unconstitutional and ordered appellant Saturnino David, Collector of
Internal Revenue, to refund certain sums of money representing the income tax
collected from the salaries of plaintiffs and appellees Justice Pastor M.
Endencia and Justice Fernando Jugo.
Issue: WON Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13, can justify and
legalize the collection of income tax on the salary of judicial officers.
Held: YES
(a) The Constitution is the fundamental law. When there is a conflict
between the Constitution and a law, the law will have to give way and has to be
declared invalid and unconstitutional.
(b) The duty to interpret the law rests on the judiciary and not on the
legislative branch of the government (separation of powers). The legislature
only has the power to make and enact laws. Through section 13 of R.A. 590,
Congress says that payment of income tax is not to be treated as a diminution of
the salaries of justices, which is a clear example of interpretation.
(c) Considering the practical side of the case, the Court believes that
that the collection of income tax on a salary is an actual and evident diminution
thereof. When computed, the official does not actually receive his salary in full.
(d) The exemption of judicial officers from paying taxes on their
salaries promotes the independence of the Judiciary.
Decision: The decision appealed from is affirmed.

ANGARA v. ELECTORAL COMMISSION

Facts: Petitioner Angara, filed for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to
prohibit the Electoral Commission from recognizing the motion of protest
filed by Pedro Ynsua, his election rival.
On October 7, 1935, The provincial board proclaimed Angara
winner after which he took his oath on November 15. By December 3,

Topic: Separation of Powers

YOUNGSTOWN v. SAWYER
Facts: To avert a nationwide strike of steel workers in April 1952, which he
believed would jeopardize national defense, the President issued an Executive
Order directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate most of the
steel mills. The Order was not based upon any specific statutory authority, but
was based generally upon all powers vested in the President by the Constitution
and laws of the United States and as President of the United States and
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The Secretary issued an order
seizing the steel mills and directing their presidents to operate them as operating
managers for the United States in accordance with his regulations and
directions. The President promptly reported these events to Congress; but
Congress took no action. It had provided other methods of dealing with such
situations, and had refused to authorize governmental seizures of property to
settle labor disputes. The steel companies sued the Secretary in a Federal
District Court, praying for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The
District Court issued a preliminary injunction, which the Court of Appeals
stayed.
Issue: Whether the president had the power under these circumstances to seize
the steel mills of the country.
Held: No. There is no express power in the Constitution supporting the
presidents actions. The government claims that the power should be implied
from the aggregate of the presidential powers under the Constitution. However,
the order cannot be sustained under the power of the Commander in Chief of
the armed forces because that power is reserved for military commanders in the
theater of war and is not broad enough to cover the situation here. This is a job
for the nations lawmakers, not the military authorities. Also, the presidents
power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be
a lawmaker. Congress has the exclusive constitutional power to make laws
necessary and proper to carry out the powers vested by the constitution in any
officer thereof. Thus, this order is unconstitutional.
Mills say this act should've been done by the legislature. The
Government says they were trying to avoid a national crisis. There is no
explicit statute or act (of Congress) which authorizes the President to act in such
a manner. The only 2 statutes which authorize acquiring personal and real
property are not met here. Not only are they unauthorized, but Congress
refused to act in such a manner to begin with, in regards to Taft-Hartley's
legislative history. Congress wanted to ensure a process of mediation and
investigation of claims, and their issue in public reports.

If the President could do this, it would have to found somewhere explicitly in

the Constitution, or implicitly in some historical context or foundation. The
reliance is the rule stated (below), but has nothing to do with the "war powers."
It would not be faithful to the constitutional system. Nor is there any
constitutional provision which grants such an action either. Article I, however,
clearly spells out who has such responsibility: Congress.
The President cannot order policy; he can only suggest it, to which Congress
can then legislate upon it. Congress can approve any proposal for regulation,
policy, settlement of disputes, wages, and working conditions. None of this is
delegated to the President. This may have happened in this past, but this doesn't
mean the right to limit this extension of authority is not available. A textual
approach of the Constitution says the President's powers are curbed in this
extension.
Section 1 of Article II. The executive power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America.
Section 2 of Article II of Constitution: "The President shall be
commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the
militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United
States; he may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of
the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their
respective offices, and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for
offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment."
Concurrence Reasoning: [Frankfurter] felt that the situation was more
complicated and flexible. However, in view of the Taft-Hartley act, congress
has expressed its will to withhold this power from the president in cases like
this. In effect, the Congress has said, ask for seizure power from us if you feel
it is needed in a specific situation. [Jackson] felt that the presidential powers
were not fixed, but rather fluctuate, depending on their congruence with
Congress. There are three categories: 1. where the president is acting pursuant
to an express or implied authorization of Congress - broadest powers, limited
only by the Constitution, 2. where the president is acting in the face of
Congressional silence - more narrow powers limited by the zone of twilight
where there may be overlap with congressional powers, and 3. where the
president is acting in opposition to Congress - most narrow powers, supported
only by his expressly granted constitutional powers, and then still limited by
any overlap Congress may have [Congress will is dominant in case of overlap].
This order falls into the third category, and since there is no express authority, it
must fall, even when it may be otherwise justified by emergency.
Dissent Reasoning: The president has some power under the constitution to
meet a critical situation in the absence of express statutory authorization.
Looking at history (particularly WWII), there were several instances when the
president made similar orders. The fact that Congress and the courts have
consistently recognized and given their support to such executive action
indicates that such a power of seizure has been accepted throughout our history.

BUSH v. GORE
Facts: The election in question took place on November 7, 2000. Under the
Electoral College system, each state votes for the president separately: a victor
is then declared in each state, and the victor in the state wins a number of
"electoral votes" equal to the state's number of representatives in the House of
Representatives and the Senate. At the end of the nationwide ballot count, Gore
led Bush 266 - 246 in the electoral vote. 270 votes were required for victory:
Florida, with 25 electoral votes, did not have an official victor because the
result was within the margin of error for machine counting; Bush had the lead
following the machine count, by a very small margin.
Gore sought a manual recount of votes in several Florida counties.
This was supported by Florida Attorney General Bob Butterworth, a Democrat
and chairman of the Florida Gore campaign, and opposed by Florida Secretary
of State Katherine Harris, a Republican and co-chair of the Florida Bush
campaign. On November 14, while the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board
was recounting its ballots by hand, Harris officially certified the election for
Bush.
Gore and Palm Beach filed suit against Bush and Harris in the Florida Supreme
Court (Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris), and won a judgment
on November 21 stating that Harris had abused her discretion and that the
recount should go forward.
On November 22, Bush appealed to the United States Supreme
Court in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, stating that the
decision was in violation of a federal statute requiring electors to be finalized at
a given point before the Electoral College met. The two parties delivered oral
arguments to the Court on December 1. On December 4, the Court temporarily
nullified the decision of the Florida state supreme court pending clarification of
the legal basis for their rulings, and remanded the case to Florida.

The Gore team subsequently filed four more suits on other legal
issues: all four were struck down by lower courts, but the Florida Supreme
Court reversed the decision in the last case, Gore v. Harris, on December 9,
stating that Harris could not halt the recount of potential undervotes in the
targeted counties. The Bush team filed for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court
on the basis that the Florida court's opinion was contrary to the U.S.
Constitution.
Oral arguments in Bush v. Gore were brought before the court on
December 11 by lawyers representing both sides. Due to the nature of the case,
the U.S. Supreme Court gave its opinion just 16 hours after hearing arguments.
The Florida Supreme Court provided the requested clarifications on Bush v.
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board while the U.S. Supreme Court was
deliberating Bush v. Gore, and the two cases were then combined.
Bush, represented by Theodore Olson, charged that the recounts in
Florida violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. Because the votes were being counted unevenly,
with standards varying from county to county and recounts in counties where he
could have been likely to have gained votes not even being conducted, Bush
argued, the decision went against the language in the Constitution stating "nor
shall any State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."
Gore, represented by David Boies, responded that the Florida
Supreme Court had done everything it could do to ensure equal treatment of
both parties, and that requiring all ballots to be treated in the same fashion
would require a uniform federal standard for counting votes, something that had
never been established. Gore also claimed that ending the recounts was not an
equitable way to settle the dispute: instead, the Court needed to establish a
standard by which the votes should be counted, and then let the ballots be
counted by that standard.
Held: A 7-2 majority ruled that the Florida recount was being conducted
unconstitutionally, and the majority opinion noted significant problems in the
uneven way the votes were being recounted. Furthermore, a narrower 5-4
majority ruled that no constitutionally-valid recount could be completed by the
December 12 deadline set in statute, effectively ending the recounts. The court
cited differing vote-counting standards from county to county and the lack of a
single judicial officer to oversee the recount, both of which violated the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution. The court also ruled that
under the Electoral College system, "The individual citizen has no federal
constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the United States."
The case was shrouded in controversy as the majority versus
minority opinion on the remedy was split along the lines of the more
conservative justices voting in favor of Bush and the more liberal justices
voting in favor of Gore. Additionally, part of the reason recounts could not be
completed was due to various stoppages ordered by the various branches and
levels of the judiciary. Opponents argued that it was improper for the court (by
the same 5-4 majority) to grant an injunction stopping the recounts pending the
outcome of the ruling based on the possibility of "irreparable harm" to 'George
Bush's reputation as the legitimate winner'. Injunctions for irreparable harm
cannot usually be granted if doing so would do equal or greater harm to another
party - in this case Al Gore.
The minority dissents noted these issues and others including the
principle of fairness, and the conflicting laws which could be interpreted as
invalidating the December 12 deadline. It appears the minority would have
wished to allow the recount to continue up until the college of electors were
mandated to meet on December 18. The dissenting opinion written by Justice
Stevens concluded with what many consider to be a scathing indictment:
What must underlie petitioners' entire federal assault on the Florida
election procedures is an unstated lack of confidence in the impartiality and
capacity of the state judges who would make the critical decisions if the vote
count were to proceed. Otherwise, their position is wholly without merit. The
endorsement of that position by the majority of this Court can only lend
credence to the most cynical appraisal of the work of judges throughout the
land. It is confidence in the men and women who administer the judicial system
that is the true backbone of the rule of law. Time will one day heal the wound to
that confidence that will be inflicted by today's decision. One thing, however, is
certain. Although we may never know with complete certainty the identity of
the winner of this year's Presidential election, the identity of the loser is
perfectly clear. It is the Nation's confidence in the judge as an impartial
guardian of the rule of law.
I respectfully dissent.
Also notable was the dissent of Justice Ginsburg, which after a
rather scathing opinion concluded with I dissent rather than the standard I
respectfully dissent, a rare breach of convention observers took to highlight the
stark and bitter division within the court regarding this case.
The decision was widely criticized for a special provision in the
majority opinion, stating that the case did not set precedent in any way, and

could not be used to justify any future court decision. It was seen by many as a
departure from the stare decisis principle.
In brief the breakdown of the decisions were;
The remedy of ceasing all recounts was approved by 5 to 4.
(Kennedy, O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas in support Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter and Stevens opposed)
The finding that using different standards of counting in different
areas without a single overseer violated equal protection was
approved by 7 to 2. (Breyer, Kennedy, O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia,
Souter, and Thomas in support - Ginsburg and Stevens opposed)
The view that the Florida Supreme Court acted contrary to the intent
of the Florida legislature was rejected by 6 to 3. (Rehnquist, Scalia
and Thomas in support - Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, O'Connor,
Souter, and Stevens opposed)

HAMDAN v. RUMSFELD
Facts: The plaintiff in this case is Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a citizen
of Yemen and a bodyguard and chauffeur for Osama bin Laden, who had been
formerly employed to work on an agricultural project that Osama Bin Laden
had created to support the people of Afghanistan. Hamdan was captured by
militia forces during the invasion of Afghanistan and turned over to the United
States, then sent to the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba. In July 2004, he
was charged with conspiracy to commit terrorism, and the Bush administration
made arrangements to try him before a military commission authorized
under Military Commission Order No. 1 of March 21, 2002. Hamdan filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the military commission
convened to try him was illegal and lacked the protections required under the
Geneva Conventions and United States Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Following the Supreme Court ruling on another case, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
Hamdan was granted a review before the Combatant Status Review Tribunal,
which determined that he was eligible for detention by the United States as
an enemy combatant or person of interest.
The defendants in this case include many United States government
officials allegedly responsible for Hamdan's detention; as is customary, the
short name of the case includes only the first-named defendant, then-Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
Held: Associate Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the opinion for the Court,
which commanded a majority only in part.
The Stevens opinion began with the issue of jurisdiction, denying the U.S.
government's motion to dismiss under Section 1005 of the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005 (DTA), which gave the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals "exclusive"
jurisdiction to review decisions of cases being tried before military
commissions. Congress did not include language in the DTA that might have
precluded Supreme Court jurisdiction, making the government's argument to the
Court unpersuasive. The government's argument that Schlesinger v.
Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975), precludes Supreme Court review was
similarly rejected. Councilman applied to a member of the U.S. military who
was being tried before a military "court-martial." In contrast, Hamdan is not a
member of the U.S. military, and would be tried before a military
"commission," not a court-martial. To the court, the more persuasive precedent
was Ex parte Quirin, in which the court recognized its duty to enforce relevant
Constitutional protections by convening a special Term and expediting review
of a trial by military convention. The opinion explicitly stated that, because
DTA did not bar it from considering the petition, it was unnecessary to decide
whether laws unconditionally barring habeas corpus petitions would
unconstitutionally violate the Suspension Clause.
The opinion then addressed the substantive issues of the case. It
explicitly did not decide whether the President possessed the Constitutional
power to convene military commissions like the one created to try Hamdan.
Even if he possessed such power, those tribunals would either have to be
sanctioned by the "laws of war," as codified by Congress in Article 21 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), or authorized by statute. As to
the statutory authorization, there is nothing in the Authorization for Use of
Military Force (AUMF) "even hinting" at expanding the President's war powers
beyond those enumerated in Art. 21. Instead, the AUMF, the UCMJ, and the
DTA "at most acknowledge" the President's authority to convene military
commissions only where justified by the exigencies of war, but still operating
within the laws of war.
As to the laws of war, to the majority these necessarily include the
UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions, each of which require more protections
than the military commission provides. The UCMJ, Art. 36 (b), which requires
that rules applied in courts-martial and military commissions be "uniform
insofar as practicable." Stevens found several substantial deviations, including:

The defendant and the defendant's attorney may be forbidden to

view certain evidence used against the defendant; the defendant's
attorney may be forbidden to discuss certain evidence with the
defendant;
Evidence judged to have any probative value may be admitted,
including hearsay, unsworn live testimony, and statements gathered
through torture; and
Appeals are not heard by courts, but only within the Executive
Branch (with an exception not here relevant).
These deviations made the commissions violate the UCMJ.
The majority also found that the procedures in question violate the "at least"
applicable Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. It found that the D.C.
Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the Conventions did not apply:
1. It erroneously relied on Johnson v. Eisentrager, which does not
legally control in Hamdan's case because there was then no deviation
between the procedures used in the tribunal and those used in courtsmartial;
2. It erroneously ruled that the Geneva Conventions do not apply
because Art. 3 affords minimal protection to combatants "in the
territory of" a signatory; and
3. Those minimal protections include being tried by a "regularly
constituted court," which the military commission is not.
Because the military commission does not meet the requirements of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice or of the Geneva Convention, it violates
the laws of war and therefore cannot be used to try Hamdan.
The Court did not hear the question that had decided the district
court opinion, namely that Hamdan was entitled to a GCIII Art. 5 hearing
instead of a Combatant Status Review Tribunal.
Hamdan observes that Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention
requires that if there be any doubt whether he is entitled to prisoner-of-war
protections, he must be afforded those protections until his status is determined
by a competent tribunal. . Because we hold that Hamdan may not, in any
event, be tried by the military commission the President has convened pursuant
to the November 13th Order and Commission Order No. 1, the question
whether his potential status as a prisoner of war independently renders illegal
his trial by military commission may be reserved.

BOUMEDIENE v. BUSH
Facts: In 2002 Lakhdar Boumediene and five other Algerian natives were
seized by Bosnian police when U.S. intelligence officers suspected their
involvement in a plot to attack the U.S. embassy there. The U.S. government
classified the men as enemy combatants in the war on terror and detained them
at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, which is located on land that the U.S.
leases from Cuba. Boumediene filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging violations of the Constitution's Due Process Clause, various statutes
and treaties, the common law, and international law. The District Court judge
granted the government's motion to have all of the claims dismissed on the
ground that Boumediene, as an alien detained at an overseas military base, had
no right to a habeas petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
affirmed the dismissal but the Supreme Court reversed in Rasul v. Bush, which
held that the habeas statute extends to non-citizen detainees at Guantanamo.
In 2006, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). The
Act eliminates federal courts' jurisdiction to hear habeas applications from
detainees who have been designated (according to procedures established in the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005) as enemy combatants. When the case was
appealed to the D.C. Circuit for the second time, the detainees argued that the
MCA did not apply to their petitions, and that if it did, it was unconstitutional
under the Suspension Clause. The Suspension Clause reads: "The Privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."
The D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of the government on both points. It cited
language in the MCA applying the law to "all cases, without exception" that
pertain to aspects of detention. One of the purposes of the MCA, according to
the Circuit Court, was to overrule the Supreme Court's opinion in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, which had allowed petitions like Boumediene's to go forward. The
D.C. Circuit held that the Suspension Clause only protects the writ of habeas
corpus as it existed in 1789, and that the writ would not have been understood
in 1789 to apply to an overseas military base leased from a foreign government.
Constitutional rights do not apply to aliens outside of the United States, the
court held, and the leased military base in Cuba does not qualify as inside the
geographic borders of the U.S. In a rare reversal, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari after initially denying review three months earlier.

Held: The majority found that the constitutionally guaranteed right of habeas
corpus review applies to persons held in Guantanamo and to persons designated
as enemy combatants on that territory. If Congress intends to suspend the right,
an adequate substitute must offer the prisoner a meaningful opportunity to
demonstrate he is held pursuant to an erroneous application or interpretation of
relevant law, and the reviewing decision-making must have some ability to
correct errors, to assess the sufficiency of the government's evidence, and to
consider relevant exculpating evidence. The court found that the petitioners had
met their burden of establishing that Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 failed to
provide an adequate substitute for habeas corpus.
Kennedy's majority opinion begins with an over-twenty page review
of the history of habeas corpus in England from its roots in the due process
clause of Magna Carta of 1215 to the nineteenth century. Next, the opinion
surveys American historical jurisprudence on the writ from 1789 until shortly
after World War II, concentrating on the application of habeas corpus to aliens
and territories outside of the borders of the United States that still fall under
United States control, comparing these areas to the Channel Islands, where the
writ did apply. While noting that habeas corpus did not apply in Scotland, a
country under the control of the English crown (as the same monarch held the
crown of Scotland), the Court distinguished that fact by stating that Scotland
kept its unique system of laws even after union with England in 1707. The
Court turned to Ireland for a more amenable historical example, pointing out
that while it was nominally a sovereign country in the eighteenth century,
English habeas corpus review did apply there since Ireland was under de
facto English control and shared the English legal system.
The majority opinion rejected the government's argument comparing
the habeas corpus restriction under the MCA to those affected by
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which were ruled
constitutional after a suspension clause challenge. The Court explained the
restrictions of AEDPA on habeas review were not a complete suspension on
habeas corpus, but simply procedural limitations, such as limiting the number of
successive habeas petitions a prisoner can file, or mandating a one-year time
limit for the filing of federal habeas review that begins when the prisoner's
judgment and sentence become final.
The main distinction between the MCA and AEDPA, the Court went
on to explain, was that AEDPA applies in practice to those prisoners serving a
sentence after having been tried in open court and whose sentences have been
upheld on direct appeal, whereas the MCA suspends the application of the writ
to those detainees whose guilt has not yet been legally determined. In other
words, the comparison to AEDPA was found by the majority to be misplaced in
that AEDPA's limitations on habeas review stemmed from cases that had
already been to trial, whereas the cases involving MCA had not been to trial and
therefore habeas review would have been appropriate.
The Court also concluded that the detainees are not required to
exhaust review procedures in the court of appeals before pursuing habeas
corpus actions in the district court. The majority distinguished between de jure
and de facto sovereignty, finding that the United States had in effect de facto
sovereignty over Guantanamo. Distinguishing Guantanamo base from historical
precedents, this conclusion allowed the court to conclude that Constitutional
protections of habeas corpus run to that to U.S. Military base at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba.
In the majority ruling, Justice Kennedy called section 7 "not
adequate". He explained, "to hold that the political branches may switch the
constitution on or off at will would lead to a regime in which they, not this
court, 'say what the law is'." The decision struck down section 7 of the MCA,
but left intact the remainder of the MCA and the Detainee Treatment Act. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Souter stressed the fact that the prisoners involved
have been imprisoned for as many as six years. Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Scalia each wrote opinions for the four dissenters.

Topic: Presumption of Constitutionality

ALBA v. EVANGELISTA
Nature of the Case: original action in the Supreme Court; Certiorari with
preliminary injunction
Facts:
1) January 1, 1954: president of the Phils. Appointed Vicencio Alajar
as Vice-Mayor of City of Roxas
2) January 6, 1954: took his oath of office and assumed office
3) March 31appointed confirmed by Commission of Appointments
and continued holding office until November 1955
4) He received a communication from Asst Exec Sec Enrique C.
Quema: informing his President designated Juliano Alba in his stead
as acting Vice-Mayor of the city of Roxaz

5)
6)
7)
8)

November 23, 1955: This was confirmed by a telegram received by

Alajar from the president
Exec Secretary Fred Ruiz Castro addressed Juliano Alba informing
him that he was designated by pres as acting vice-mayor
November 19, 1955: Juliano Alba took his oath and assumed office
Vicencio Alajar instituted quo warranto proceedings in the CFI of
CApiz against JUliano Alba

CLAIMS of ALAJAR:
1) He was appointed VM on January 1, 1954, confirmed by CA and
Alba usurped his office as VM
2) There existed no vacancy in the position at the time of designation of
Alba
3) There existed no legal cause or reason whatsoever for his removal
and disqualification
ISSUE: Whether the alleged removal of the petitioner and the designation in his
place of respondent as VM of Roxas City was legal or illegal
LOWER COURT: petitioner is entitled to remain in office as VM with all the
emoluments, rights and privileges appurtenant thereto until he resigns, dies or is
removed for cause
-

Appeal by ALBA- notice of appeal filed February 3, 1956

Petition filed (4 days later) by Alajar praying for immediate
execution of judgment and despite the strong opposition of appellant
Motion granted by Court on February 18, 1956
Decision not executed because Alba, brought the matter to SC
praying:
a) Pending determination of the validity of the order of immediate
execution
b) Declaring null and void the order of respondent, Hon, Jose
Evangelista (feb 18, 1956) for the immediate execution of his
decision
c) Such relief as may be just and equitable in the premise

SOLICITOR GENERAL INTERVENED:

1) Order of immediate execution deprived him of the opportunity to be
heard and defend the constitutionality of RA 603
2) Proceed to determine the constitutionality of section 8 of RA 603
3) Constitutionality of RA 603: declaring certain positions to be
terminable at the pleasure of the appointing authoritysection 2545
of RAC, Commonwealth Acts nos. 39, 52, 520, 547 and 592, RA
162, 170 as amended etc

Motion for intervention of the SG was granted

Hearing for decision held on August 3, 1956:
APPELLANTs CLAIMS: trial court erred:
1) Mistaken assumption that petitioner-appellee belongs to unclassified
civil service
2) Not declaring Section 8 of RA to exclude the office of VM of Roxas
City from persons belonging to unclassified CS
3) Not declaring that the SC passed upon the validity of section 8 RA
603
4) Holding that the office of VM is neither primarily confidential nor
policy-determining
5) Not holding sec 8 RA 603 as a valid exercise of the broad legislative
powers vested in the Congress of the Philippines by our constitution
SECTION 8 of RA NO 603
creating the city of Roxas provides that the VM shall be appointed by the Pres
of the Phils with the consent of the CA and shall hold office at the pleasure of
the President.

In view of this provision of the law, could the president of the

Phils legally replace respondent Vicencio Alajar, with or
without cause by petitioner Alba?
Section 2545: Appointment of City Officials: the President of the Phils shall
appoint, with the consent f the CA of the Congress of the Phils, the mayor, the
VM..and he may REMOVE at pleasure any of the said officers

These two provisions are incompatible with constitutional

prohibition that no officer or employee of the CS shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law
DECISION: The provisions of Section 8 RA 603 empowering the Pres of the
Phils to appoint, with the consent of CA, the VM of Roxas City, the latter to
hold office at the pleasure of the president can not be by any stretch of
imagination be considered unconstitutional and void.

SC RULING:
1) Declared that order issued on February 18, 1956 (writ for the
advance execution of its judgment) null and
void and of no force or effect
2) Dismissed the quo warranto proceedings for Vicencion Alajar has no
right to continue occupying the office of VM of Roxas City after the
president in the exercise of his power of allowing said respondent to
hold office at his pleasure, displaced him from said office and
designated petitioner Juliano Alba as acting VM of Roxas city.
3) Costs against Alajar
REASONS:
4)

the act of Congress creating a public office, defining its powers and
functions and fixing the term or the period during which the
officer may claim to hold the office as of right and the tenure or
term during which the incumbent actually holds office is a valid and
constitutional exercise of legislative power
5) therefore RA 603 sec 8 is constitutionalproviding that position
VM and its tenure and period during which the incumbent VM holds
office at the pleasure of the President
6) pervading error of the respondents is the fact they insist on the act of
the president designating petitioner Alba in the place of respondent
Alajar as one of removalthe replacement is not removal, but an
expiration of its tenure, which is one of the ordinary modes of
terminating official relations
7) What is involved here is not the question of removal, or whether
legal cause should precede or not that removal. What is involved
here is the creation of an office and the tenure of such office, which
has been made expressly dependent upon the pleasure of the
president
8) Provided that the replacing constitutes removal, the act itself is valid
and lawful since in sec 8 of RA 603no fixity of tenure has been
provided for and the pleasure of the president has been exercised in
accordance with the policy laid down by congress thereinonly
fixity of tenure destroys the power or removal at pleasure
9) It is only in those cases in which the office is held at the pleasure of
the appointing power and where the power of removal is exercisable
at its mere discretion that the officer may be removed without notice
or hearing.
10) It is an established rule that when the law authorizes a superior
officer to remove a subordinate at pleasure his discretion in the
exercise of power of removal is absoluteas long as the removal is
effected in accordance with the procedures prescribed by law, it may
not be declared invalid by the courts, no matter how reprehensible
and unjust the motives of the removal might be
11) The court presumes constitutionality of statutesseparation of
powers which makes the enactment and repeal of laws exclusively a
legislative function

MORFE v. MUTUC
Facts:
1)

Congress in 1960 enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

to deter public officials and employees from committing acts of
dishonesty and improve the tone of morality in public service
2) One specific provision: every public officer, either within thirty (30)
days after its approval or after his assumption of office and within
the month of January of every other year thereafter as well as upon
termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the head of
office a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities
3) The provision stating the filing of statement of assets and liabilities
within the month January of every other year is challenged to be
violative of due process and oppressive exercise of police power of
the state,unlawful violation of privacy, implicit in the ban against
illegal search and seizures construed togtehr with the prohibition
against self-incrimination
DECISION OF LC: sustained plaintiffthis provision exceeds permissible
limit of police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause; declaring
null and void, and unconstitutional Sec 7 RA no 3019
DECISION SC: reversed decision of lower court; decision on July 19, 1962 of
LC declaring unconstitutional, null and void Section 7 of RA 3019, in so far as
it requires periodical submittal of sworn statements of financial conditions,
assets and liabilities of an official or employee of the government after he had
once submitted such sworn statementis REVERSED. Without costs.

REASONS:
1) Absence of evidence to rebut the presumption of validity
allegation that it assumes that public officials are corruptinsult to
the integrity and official dignity of officialsno need for such
provision since tax census law provides for that and income tax
lawno factual foundation on which the nullification of the section
of the stature could be based

When a person accepts a public office he is deemed to have

voluntarily assumed the obligation to give information about
his personal affairthe private life of an employee cannot be
segregated from his public life

Provision merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of

insuring the interest or general welfare in honest and clean
public service and therefore a legitimate exercise of power
2) Invasion of liberty protected by the due process clause issue

Enumeration of graft and corrupt practicesaimed at

curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official
corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public
service

Intended to promote further morality in PA

While in the attainment of such public good, no infringement

of constitutional rights is permissible, there must be a showing
clear, categorical and undeniable that what the constitution
condemns the statute allows

Is this a valid exercise of police power?yes.. if police power

extends to regulatory action affecting persons in public or
private lifefor promotion of health, morals, education, goo
order safety etc.

Libertyright to exist and be free from arbitrary personal

restraint or servitude

It cannot be denied that under the Constitution such a

restriction is allowable as long as due process is observedto
belong to society is to sacrifice some measure of liberty

Accepted the requirement having done so upon assuming

office

There was no unconstitutional exercise of police power

3) Issue of deprivation of libertyviolative of constitutional rights to
privacy

NO disclosure of information which infringes on the right of a

person to privacy is being required

It only emphasizes that in subjecting him to such a further

compulsory revelation of assets and liabilities there is no
constitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a private
sphere.
4) Violative against guarantees of illegal search and seizures?

Guarantee against unreasonable search and seizures does not

give freedom from testimonial compulsionsubject to familiar
qualifications every man is under obligation to give testimony

It appears clear that no violation of the guarantee against

unreasonable searches and seizures has been shown by such
requirement
5) Self-incrimination issue?

Prevention of compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts

There is no pressing need to pass upon the validity of the fear

sincerely voiced that there is an infringement of the nonincrimination clause
6) It constitutes an insult to the personal integrity and official dignity of
public officials

Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of

the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute
invalid

Courts only decide on constitutionality issue , courts merely

interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are
wise and salutary

Topic: When Laws Take Effect

TANADA v. TUVERA
Nature of the Case: Move fore reconsideration/ clarification of that decision
Questions raised:
1) What is meant by law of public nature or general applicability
2) Distinction between laws of general application and which are not
3) publication
4) Where publication is to be made
5) When is publication to be made?

Topic: Continue to be in Force Until Repealed

Issues:
1)

2)
3)
4)
5)

6)

7)
Facts:
1)

Effectivity of laws, prior publication of law before they become

effective; this applies to all laws including laws of general
application and laws of local applications
Includes all statutes (local application and private laws): PDs and
Eos, city charters, circulars issued by monetary board
Excluded are those interpretative regulations which are internal in
nature, municipal ordinances which are covered by LGC
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all
Effective is days after publication unless a different activity date is
fixed by the legislature

If not followed, denies due process and denies the public the
right to information
Publication must be in full in the official gazette and not elsewhere
(repeal/ modify if needed)but function of the legislature not the
courts
Laws must be published as soon as possible

CO KIM CHAN v. VALDEZ TAN KEH

Issue:
1)

2)

3)

Facts:
1)

Petitioners are invoking due process in demanding the disclosure of

a number of PDs which they claim had not been published as
requreid by law
Government argued that while publication is necessary as a rule, it is
not so because of the phrase otherwise provideddecrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately
upon their approval

2)

SOLICITOR GENERALs COMMENT:

Only request for an advisory opiniondismissed
Art 2 Civil code: publication required is not always imperative (as otherwise
provided by law); publication did not have to be made in the official gazette
NEW SOLICITOR GENERAL:
Issuances intended for internal administration did not have to be published and
or for particular persons
Publication must be made in full in the official gazette

3)
4)

2)

DECISION:
Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees. The
Court ordered respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished
PDs/Issuances which are of general application and unless so published, they
shall have no binding force and effect.

5)

6)

7)
REASONS:
1) Unless it is otherwise provided by lawrefers to date of effectivity
not the requirement of publication itself
2) Publication is indispensable in every casebut legislature can
shorten/extend the usual 15-day period
3) If publication is omittedwould offend due process
4) Sec 6 of bill of rights: right of people to information on matters of
public concerns
5) Term Law should refer to all laws not only to those of general
application
6) All statutes, including those of local applications and private laws
shall be published as condition for effectivity
7) Publications must be in full since its purpose to inform the public of
the contents of the law
8) Publication be made in the official Gazette as stated in Art 2 of CC
9) be made as soon as possible
10) DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY: acts of government subject to public
scrutiny; full disclosure and give proper notice to people
CONCURRING OPINION:
A. Fernan J. 2 PDs bearing the same nos, with different subject
matters (PD 1686 and PD 1686 A)Prevent abuses of lawmakers ensure constitutional right to due
process and information on matters of public concern
Feliciano, J.
Obstacle posed by due process clause (coming into effect
immediately)
Negation of fundamental principle of legality
Publication in the OG is just a statutory norm and not a
constitutional command, therefore it can be changed without
creating constitutional problems (eg. OG or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the country)
But until amendedCC must be obeyed and publication effected in
the OG and not in any other medium

8)

9)

Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts existing in

the Phils under the PEC and RP were good and valid and remained
so even after the liberation and reoccupation of the Phils?
Whether the proclamation issued on Oct 23, 1944 by McArthur has
invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the
said courts?
If the said judicial acts and proceedings have not been invalidated by
said proclamation, whether the present courts of the Commonwealth,
which were the same courts existing prior to and continued during
the JMA may continue proceedings pending in said courts?

Petition for mandamus petitioner prays that respondent judge of the

lower court be ordered to continue the proceedings in civil case No.
3012 initiated under the regime of the so called Republic of the
Philippines established during the military occupation of these
Islands
Respondent judge refused to take cognizance and continue the
proceedings (ground: proclamation issued October 23, 1944 by
Douglas McArthurinvalidating and nullifying all judicial
proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines under the
Philippine Executive Commission and RP established during the
Japanese military administrationif there is absence of an enacting
law granting authority to lower courts to take cognizance of and
continue judicial proceedings pending in these courts
January 2, 1942Imperial Japanese forces occupied city of Manila
Military Administration began the next day stated all the laws now
in forced in the commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial
institutions shall continue to be effective
January 23, 1942Phil Exec Comm organized under order No. 1
(Jorge B. Vargas)proceed with immediate coordination of the
existing central administrative organs and of judicial courts
Chairman of comm.- issued exec order nos. 1 and 4 (January 30 and
Feb 5) in which the Supreme Court, CA, CFI and justices of peace
and municipal courts under the Commonwealth were continued
with same jurisdiction
October 14, 1943- so called RP was inauguratedno substantial
change was effected in the organization and jurisdiction of the
different courts that functioned during the PEC
October 23, 1944: general Douglas McArthur issued a proclamation:
a) Commonwealth government under the sovereignty of the US
sole and only government having legal and valid jurisdiction
over the people of Phil
b) Laws now existing and statute books of the Commonwealth are
in full force and effect and legally binding
c) All laws, regulations and processes of any other government in
the Phil than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void
and without legal effect in areas of Phil
February 27, 1945: restoration of the Commonwealth

ANSWERS TO ISSUES
1) Whether or not under the rules of international law the judicial acts
and proceedings were good and valid even after liberation

Legal truism in political and international law that all acts and
proceedings of the executive, legislative and judicial
departments of a de facto government are good and valid
Question: are the governments established during the PEC and RP
considered de facto governments?

Kinds of de facto government:

1) Government that gets possession and control of or usurps
by force or by the voice of the majority the rightful legal
government and maintains itself against the will of the
latter
2) That which is established and maintained by military
forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in
the course of war and is denominated by a government of
paramount force
3) Established as an independent government by the
inhabitants of the country who rise in insurrection against
the parent state

The powers and duties of de facto governments of this

description (2)are regulated in Section III of Hague
Conventions of 1907 (revision of Hague Conventions of

1899)--- states that the occupant shall take all steps in his
power to reestablish and insure as far as possible , public order
and safety, while respecting unless absolutely prevented, the
laws in force in the country

He possesses all the powers of a de facto government and he

can suspend old laws and promulgate new ones and make such
changes in the old as he may see fit

Municipal laws are maintained and laws of political nature

are considered suspended

Although the local and civil administration of justice is

suspended as a matter of course as soon as a country is military
occupied, it is not usual for the invader to take the whole
administration into his own hands

In practice, the local ordinary tribunals are authorized to

continue administering justice and the judges and other judicial
officers are kept in their posts if they accept the authority of
the belligerent occupant or are required to continue in their
positions
IN view of the foregoing:

It is evident the Philippine Exec Commission was a civil

government established by the Japanese military forces of
occupation and therefore de facto government of the second
kind

The so called RP apparently established and organized as a

sovereign state independent from any other government by the
Filipino people was in truth and reality a government
established by the belligerent occupant forces of occupation
it was merely a scheme by japan to delude the people into
believing in the apparent magnanimity of Japanese gesture of
transferring or turning over the rights of government into the
hands of Filipinosto gain Fil support and loyalty

The government of PEC and RP being de facto governments,

necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the
courts of justice of those governments, which are not of
political complexion, were good and valid and by virtue of the
well-known principle of POSTLIMINY (Postliminium) in
international law, remained good and valid after the liberation
and reoccupation of the Phils by the American and Filipino
forces under the leadership of McArthur

Both judicial and legislative acts of de facto governments

which are not of political complexion are and remain valid
confirmed by proclamation by McArthur, for it would not have
been necessary for said proclamation to abrogate them if they
were invalid ab initio
2)

3)

Interpretation of the phrase processes of any other

government- was it the intention of McArthur to annul and
avoid thereby all judgments and juridical proceedings of the
courts established in the Phils during the Japanese Military
Occupation

Too broad, but taking into consideration the principles of

international law it would mean all judgments and
proclamations which are not of political complexion, of the de
facto governments remain valid and good before and remained
so after reoccupation of the territory

It was not intention to refer to all judicial processes in violation

of principles of international law (statutory construction set
forth in 25 RCL p 1028) a statute ought never to be construed
to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains

This would paralyze social life of the occupied territory

litigants will not submit to litigation courts whose judgments
and decisions may afterwards be annulled

Proclamation of McArthur has not invalidated all the

judgments and proceedings of the courts of justice during the
Japanese regime (EO no. 37)abolished the CA

It is therefore evident that the proclamation of McArthur on

Oct 23, 1944 has not invalidated the judicial acts and
proceedings which are not of political complexion of the courts
of justice in the Phils and that said judicial acts and
proceedings were good and valid before and are now good and
valid after the reoccupation or liberation of the Phils by
American and Filipino forces.
Whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth which are the same
as those existing prior to and continued during the JMA, PEC and
RP have jurisdiction to continue now the proceedings in actions
pending in said courts?

Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial

administration is suspended as soon as military occupation
occurs, in practice the invader does not usually take the
administration of justice into his own hands but continues the
ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the
country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented to
respect
Municipal laws are not abrogated but allowed to remain in
force and to be administered by ordinary tribunals substantially
as they were before occupation
PEC and RP stands to reason that the same courts which have
become reestablished and conceived of as having been in
continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the
Phils by virtue of the principle of postliminy, MAY
CONTINUE with the proceedings in cases then pending in said
courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring
jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings
Furthermore, it is a legal maxim, that excepting that of a
political nature, law once established continues until
changed by some competent legislative power
It is not changed merely by change of sovereignty
As courts are creatures of statutes and their existence depends
upon that of the laws which create and confer upon them their
jurisdiction , it is evident that such laws, not being of a
political nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty
and continue in force ex proprio vigore unless and until
repealed by legislative acts
As a consequence, enabling laws or acts providing that
proceedings pending in one court be continued by or
transferred to another court, are not required by mere change of
government or sovereignty. They are necessary only in case
the former courts are abolished or their jurisdiction so changed
that they can no longer continue taking cognizance of the case
and proceedings commenced therein, in order that the new
courts or the courts having jurisdiction over that the new courts
or the courts having jurisdiction over said cases may continue
the proceedings
That the present courts are the same courts which had been
functioning during the Japanese regime and therefore can
continue the proceedings in cases pending therein prior to the
restoration of the Commonwealth of the Phils
It is therefore obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction
to continue to final judgment, the proceedings in cases, not of
political complexion, pending therein at the time of the
restoration of the commonwealth government

Decision:
1) The CFI of Manila has jurisdiction to continue to final judgment the
proceedings in civil case No. 3012, which involves the civil rights of
the parties under the laws of the commonwealth government,
pending in said court at the time of the restoration of the said
government
2) That the respondent judge of the court having refused to act and
continue the said proceedings, which the law specifically enjoins
him to do as a duty resulting from his office as presiding judge of the
court, mandamus is the speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
courses of law especially taking into consideration the fact that the
question of jurisdiction herein involved does affect not only this
particular case but many other cases now pending in all the courts
of these islands
3) WRIT of MANDAMUS is ISSUED, directed to respondent judge of
the CFI of Manila ordering him to take cognizance and continue to
final judgment the proceedings in the civil case no 3012 of
said court. NO pronouncements as to cost.

Topic: Computation of Time

PNB v. CA
Note:
1)

Notices of sale under Section 3 Act No. 3135 as amended by Act

No. 4118 on extra judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage are
required to be posted for not less that twenty days in at least three
public places of the municipality or city where the property is
situated

2)

If property is worth more than 400, such notices shall be published

once a week for atleast three consecutive weeks in a news paper of
general circulation in the municipality or city

Facts:
1)

Epifanio dela Cruz mortgaged to PNB 2 parcels of land and PNB

allegedly unlawfully foreclosed the property
2) PND consolidated ownership unto himself and sold the parcels to a
third party
3) PNB claims that the foreclosure, consolidation of ownership and sale
to third party were all valid
4) PNB counterclaims for damages and other equitable remedies
5) 3 promissory notes were signed in exchange for the 2 parcels located
at Bunlo, Bocaue Bulacan with Torrens titles (no. 16743 area of
3,109 sqm.; no. 5787 around 610 sqm.)stood a residentialcommercial building
6) Lots were under the common names of the Epifanio dela Cruz, his
brother Delfin and his sister Maria
7) Promissory notes were as follows:
a) For P12,000 dated September 2, 1958 payable within 69 days
(date of maturityNov. 10, 1958)
b)
For P4000,dated Sept. 22, 1958 payable within 49 days (date
of maturityNov. 10, 1958)
c) For P4000 dated June 30, 1958 and payable within 120 days
(date of maturityNov, 10, 1958)
8) Sept 6, 1961-Atty Ramon delos Reyes (PNB) presented under ACT
NO. 3135 a foreclosure petition (sheriffs office, malolos Bulacan)
9) October 20, 1961two lots were sold or auctioned off with PNB as
the highest bidder for P28,908.46
10) March 7, 1963sheriff leopoldo Palad executed Final Deed of Sale
11) January 15, 1963certificate of sale in favor of PNB executed by
Palad
12) March 19, 1963final Deed of Sale registered in the Bulacan
Registry of Property
13) Plaintiff did not buy back the landJune 4, 1970land was sold to
Conrado de Vera and Marina de Vera in a deed of conditional sale
LOWER COURT: dismissed instant complaint against PNB. Counterclaim
against Epifanio dela cruz was also dismissed for the Court does not believe
that the complaint had been made in bad faith.

Not satisfied with judgment plaintiff appealed the case presenting

alleged errors in the decision of the lower court
Decision of CA: construed the publication of the notices on March 28, April 11
and 12, 1969 as a fatal announcementreversed the judgment appealed from
declared void, inter alia, the auction sale of the foreclosed pieces of realty, the
final deed of sale and the consolidation of ownership
Reasons:
1) The notices of sale requirements were not metpublished on March
28 (Friday) , april 11 (Friday) and April 12, 1969(Saturday)
(requirement: notice of auction sale be published once a week for at
least three consecutive weeks)
2) Rule is that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of
mortgage foreclosure must be strictly complied with, and that even
the slight deviations from therefrom will invalidate the notice and
render the sale atleast null and void
3) It has been held that failure to advertise a mortgage foreclosure sale
in compliance with statutory requirements constitutes a jurisdictional
defect invalidating the sale and that a substantial error or omission in
a notice of sale will render the notice insufficient and vitiate the sale
4) Therefore, the court had no choice but to declare the auction sale as
absolutely void in view of the fact that the highest bidder and
purchaser in said auction sale was defendant-appellee bank.
5) The Certificate of Sale, the Final deed of sale and affidavit of
consolidation are likewise of no legal effect
COMPUTATION OF TIME
ACCORDING TO PNB: There was no breach of the proviso since after the first
publication on March 28, 1969, the second notice was published on April 11,
1969 (last day of the second week) while the third publication on April 12, 1969
(announced as first of next week)
It is enough that the second publication be made on the day within
the second week and the third publication, on any day within the
third week
This refers only to the dates of publication and not that there was
non-compliance with the publication requirement
PRIVATE RESPONDENT:
Believes that the period between each publication must never be less
than seven consecutive days

COURT:
Erroneous impression that the day on which the first publication was
made, or on MArch 28, 1969, should be excluded pursuant to the
third paragraph of Article 13 of the New Civil Code
Conceded that Article 13 is completely silent as to the definition of
what a week is
Term was interpreted to mean a period of time consisting of seven
consecutive days (Moreno, Philippine Law dictionary)
A WEEK MEANS SEVEN DAYS INLCUSIVE OF DAY OF
PUBLICATION
Therefore first week must cover March 28-April 3, second week
april 4-april 10 and third week from april 11-16.cannot be equated
with compliance with law
DECISION OF SC: The petition for certiorari and intervention are hereby
dismissed and the decision of the CA dated April 17, 1991 is hereby affirmed

VIR-JEN v. NLRC

Petition for certiorari seeking the annulment or setting aside, on the

grounds of excess jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion of the
decision of NLRC
NSB DECISION: VirJen shipping and Marine Services Inc, to pay the
following complainant seamen who have not withdrawn the case:
a) Earned wages from 16 to 19 April 1979
b) Wages corresponding to unexpired portion of their contract as
adjusted by the company on 1 mar 1979
c) Adjusted representation allowances
d) Vacation pay- months pay after 6 months of service and
months pay after completion of 1 year contract
e) Tanker service bonus1/2 months pay
f)
Earned overtime pay for 1 to 19 april 1979

Secretariat of NSB directed to issue within 5 days from receipt of

decision the necessary clearances to the suspended seamen.
Facts:
1) Private respondents have a manning contract for 1 year with
petitioner (representing principal Kyoei Tanker Co Ltd.)
2) Manning contract approved by NSB
3) Petitioner and respondents executed side contract to pay ITF rates
when it calls on any ITF controlled foreign port , private respondents
would return to petitioners the amount paid to them (just to satisfy
TF requirements)
4) March 23, 1979: one of private respondents sent a cable to petitioner
demanding 50% increase in wages as the best and only solution to
solve ITF problems (while in Australia, ITF controlled port)
5) Due to threat and intimidation petitioner replied on March 24,
1979 proposing an increase of 25% on basic pay plus special
compensation for the particular voyage
6) March 26, 1979: petitioner wrote to NSB denouncing the conduct of
private respondentsdemands amounting to $3,096.50/ month
7) Because of conduct and breach of contract Kyoei Tanker Co Ltd.
Terminated the manning contract in a letter dated April 4, 1979
effective April 17, 1979
8) April 6, 1979: petitioner wrote to NSB to ask permission to cancel
manning contract with petitioner on April 17, 1979
9) April 10, 1979: NSB through Exec Dir. Cresencio C. Dayao, wrote
petitioner authorizing it to cancel the manning contract
10) Seamen disembarked in Japan and repatriated to the Phils
11) Seamen filed complaint with NSB for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of wages
12) NSB found the termination justified
13) Seamen appealed to NLRC and it reversed the decision of NSB and
required payments demanded by seamentermination without valid
cause
Thus this petition:
Issues:
1)

Respondent NLRC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction with

grave abuse of discretion in said NSB case nos. 2250-79 and 225279 in the following reasons:
a) When it adjudged the petitioner Vir-jen liable to the
respondents-seamen for terminating its employment contracts
despite authority from NSB
b) When it concluded that there is nothing on record to show that
seaman made any threat that they would complain or report to

c)

d)

e)
f)
g)

ITF their low wage rates if their demand or proposal was not
met
When it concluded that the respondent-seamen acted within
their rights when they imposed upon their employer their
demands for salary and wage increase in disregard of existing
manning contracts
When it failed and refused to admit and take into account the
Addendum agreement dated December 27, 1978-to enlighten
NLRC on the ITF problem
When it ordered the petitioner to pay the respondents their
wages and other bonuses
In still including ROMEO ACOSTA as beneficiary when in
fact he already signed statement of satisfaction of judgment
Because the NSB decision became final and executor for
failure of said respondents to serve on the petitioner a copy
of their APPEAL AND MEMORANDUM OF APPEAL
within ten (10) days reglementary period for appeal and even
after the expiration of said period

SOLICITOR GENERALs CLAIMS

1) Private respondents conduct was uncalled for, while workers are
free to ask for wage increase, they should not use threat or such
nature and in such situation as to put the employer at their complete
mercy and with no choice but to accede to their demands
2) There was a valid justification of the part of the petitioner and or its
principal to terminate the manning contract
SC RULINGS
July 9, 1980: said decision received by respondents
July 23, 1980- filed memorandum of appeal (14 days after)

Article 223 of Labor Code: appeals should be made within 10 days

from receipt of decisionthis meaning calendar days and not
working days

The law has commanded that labor cases be promptly if not

preemptorily dispose of

Verily, the Minister of Labor has no legal power to amend or alter in

any material sense whatever the law
itself unequivocally specifies or fixes

Acosta should not have been included as beneficiary since he

already signed satisfaction of judgment

Article 12 of Labor code- duty of the state to protect the good name
of the Philippines abroad and duty of the NSB to secure the best
possible terms and conditions of employment for seamen

All manning contracts should be approved by the NSB and it cannot

be altered without approval of NSB

recognizes rights of seamen to seek high wages but it could not

however use threat and intimidation or force

Powers of NLRC in relation to the works and actuations of the NSB

is only appellate according to Article 20 read in relation to Article
223, over questions of law, since as to factual matters, it may
exercise such appellate jurisdiction only if errors in the findings of
fact are raised which would cause grave or irreparable damage or
injury to the appellant.

General practice is to have side contracts(issue of bad faith)the

said contracts are not meant at all to alter or modify the contracts
approved by the NSBthey are purported to enforce them to the
letter, making it clearer that even if the ships have to call at ITF
controlled ports, the same shall remain to be the real and binding
agreement between the parties in intentional disregard of whatever
the ITF may extract.
WHEREFORE: petition herein is GRANTED. Decision of the NLRC
complained hereby is SET ASIDE, the decision of the NSB should STAND. No
costs.

Topic: Purpose, Objective, of a Constitution

NITAFAN v. CIR
Facts:
Nitafan, Polo, and Savellano are duly appointed and qualified judges
of the RTC.
They seek to prohibit/perpetually enjoin the CIR and Financial
Officer of the SC from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their
salaries.

They
argue
that
any
tax
withheld
from
their
emoluments/compensation constitutes a decrease/diminution of their salaries,
contrary to the provision of Art. VIII, Sec. 10 of the 1987 Constitution which
says: The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During
their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.
On June 4, 1987, the court en banc affirmed the directive of the
Chief Justice to continue with the deduction.
Issue: WON The salaries of judges are subject to income tax
Held: Yes
The clear intent of the constitutional commission is to delete the
express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the
judiciary to give substance to equality among the three branches of
government.
The payment of such income tax by justices and judges does not fall
within the constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries during their
continuance in office.
Perfecto v Meer and Endencia v David cases discarded.
Doctrine:
Intent
- Comparison of constitutional provisions
- Debates, interpellations, opinions (ConCon)
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect
The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people
in the adoption of the Constitution
- People in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers (assumption)
- Framers of the fundamental law = alter ego of the people
- Salaries of judges may be subject to income tax not a dimunition
Notes:
- Determine the intent deliberations of the ConCon
- In this case: absence of intent

FILOTEO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: Filoteo, a police investigator was charged with and found guilty of
violating the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law. He was arrested on
May 30, 1982 (1973 Constitution was in force then). He issued a certification
that he was voluntarily surrendering the checks they acquired and a waiver of
the RPC and that he understood his rights and that he was not hurt or maltreated
nor was anything taken from him that was not duly accounted for and that he
was appraised of his constitutional rights under Section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution which states that:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. No force,
violence, threat and intimidation, or any other means which vitiate freewill shall
be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section is
inadmissible in evidence
Whereas, the 1987 Constitution states that:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to remain silent and to have a competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
a counsel, he must ne provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing in the presence of a counsel.
Issue: The issue is WON the extrajudicial confession is admissible.
Held: Yes.
The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory,
applies to judicial decisions The prospective application of judge-made
laws was underscored in Co vs. Court of Appeals where the Court ruled thru CJ
Narvasa that in accordance with Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall

form part of the legal system of the Philippines, and Article 4 of CC which
states that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
provided, the principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory,
shall apply to judicial decisions, which although in themselves are not laws, are
nevertheless evidence of what the law means.
Doctrine:
The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory
applies to judicial decisions
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws of the
constitution shall form part of the legal system (art 8 of the CC)
Laws shall have no retroactive effect unless contrary is proved (Art
4, CC)
The principle of prospectivity if statutes, original or amendatory
shall apply to judicial decisions although in themselves are not laws, are
nevertheless evidence of what the law means
The specific provision of the 1987 constitution requiring that a
waiver by an accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must
be made w/ the assistance of counsel may not be applied retroactively or in
cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of the
said constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during custodial
investigation w/o the benefit of counsel during the effectivity
of the 1973 constitution should by such argumentation , be admissible
While Art 22 of the RPC provides that penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a
habitual criminal, what is being construed here is a constitutional provision
specifically contained in the Bill of Rights which is obviously not a penal
statute
Penal law is different with bill of rights

Topic: Language of a Constitution

JM TUASON AND CO INC. v. LTA
Facts:
3 Aug 1959, RA 2616, a statute made applicable to land owned by
J.M. Tuason & Co. took effect without executive approval
The ninety-six hectare Tatalon Estate was occupied by 1,500 heads
of families, mostly veterans of the WW2 who wanted to purchase lots at a
minimum cost
Petitioners led the occupants to believe that they were dealing with
the representatives of the owners, the Veterans Subdivision
Petitioners allowed the construction of roads, office, and
advertisement of the sale of lots, after which they claimed ownership of the
estate
15 Nov 1960 LTA was directed by the Exec. Sec. to institute the
proceeding for the expropriation of the Tatalon State
17 Nov 1960 Petitioner filed before the lower court praying that the
act be declared unconstitutional and restrain the expropriation proceedings
18 Nov 1960, lower court granted prayer for preliminary injunction
10 Jan 1963 lower court held RA 3616 unconstitutional

Issue: WON Congress went beyond its constitutional power in its enactment of
RA 2616, making the act unconstitutional
Held: Decision of lower court of 10 Jan 1963, holding RA 2616 as amended by
RA 3453 is unconstitutional is REVERSED.
Ratio:
Art XIII sec 4 of 1935 Constitution considered the small individual
land tenure to be so important to the maintenance of general welfare that it not
only provided for the expropriation and subdivision of lands but also opened the
way for the limitation of private landholdings
Constitutional grant of power to expropriate lands is without limit,
but with explicit requirement of the payment of just compensation
Prerequisite for the valid exercise of this congressional power is that
the taking be for public use
To assure the general welfare be promoted, a regulatory measure
may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Equal protection clause may not
be invoked if prerequisite is present.
The petitioner was unable to sustain the burden of demonstrating a
denial of equal protection
Contractual rights of vendors and vendees could be accorded
constitutional protection

Social justice principle

It is left to the legislative will to determine what lands may be
expropriated so that they could be subdivided for resale to those in need of
them.
POINTS/TERMS/LAWS
o
Presumption of validity. In case of doubt of the validity of a
challenged statute, the doubt is resolved in favor of its
constitutionality.
o
Historical interpretation. Not necessarily decisive. It may render the
law incapable of being responsive to future needs.
o
Property right must yield to power of expropriation of the state.
Doctrine:
The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people
in the adoption of the Constitution.
Ordinary meaning to be given to provisions: exception:
ascertainment of meaning of provisions of constitution begins with the
language of the document itself. The words used in the constitution are to be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in
which case the significance thus attachd to them prevails
As the constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the
peoples consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood
in the sense they have in common use.
What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to later it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say
HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION: NEED OF CONSTITUTION
TO RESPOND TO FUTURE NEEDS: historical discussion while valuable is
not necessarily decisive. Social and economic conditions are not static, they
change with the times. To identify the text of a written constitution with the
circumstances that inspired its inclusion my render it incapable of being
responsive to future needs.
It is assumed to be one of the virtues of a written constitution that it
suffices to govern the life of the people not only at the time of its framing but
far into the indefinite future. It is not to be considered as so lacking in flexibility
and suppleness that it may be a bar to measures, novel and unorthodox as they
may appear to some, but nevertheless, imperatively called for.
PROVISIONS NOT TO BE CONSTRUED NARROWLY: the
constitution is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically for the prescriptions
therein contained are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their
form, but organic living institutions , the significance of which is vital not
formal. There must be an awareness not only of what has been, but of what may
be. The words employed by it are not to be construed to yield fixed and rigid
answers but as impressed with necessary attribute of flexibility and
accommodation to enable them to meet adequately whatever problems the
future has in store. It is not in brief, a printed finality of a dynamic process
PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY: in case of doubt of the validity of
a challenged statute, the doubt is resolved in favor of its constitutionality
Look into the language itself in our search for meaning
But this is only the beginning, we do not stop there; it is assumed
that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the
objective sought to be attained
EXTRINSIC AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION: historical basis along
with contemporaneous understanding and the consideration of the consequences
that flow from the interpretation under considerationyields additional light to
the matter
Flexibility of a constitution: gives a character of permanency to a
constitution
Need for the constitution to have the capacity for growth and ever be
adaptable to changing social and economic conditions all argue against its
restrictive construction
Social justice principle-enshrined in the fundamental law
Promotion of social justice
To assure that general welfare is promoted (implement land for the
landless program)
The historical background as made clear during the deliberation for
the COnCOn and the cardinal postulate underlying constitutional construction
that its provisions are not to be interpreted to preclude their being responsive to
future needs, the fundamental law being intended to govern the life of the nation
as it unfolded through the ages, the challenged statute can survive the test of
validity
Better life for the massessocial justice principle

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts:
Petitioner Anti Graft League of the Philippines
Public Respondents Officials Listed and Executive Secretary
*Definition of ex-officio: from office by virtue of office.. It refers to an
authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon
the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position. It also
denotes an act done on official character, or as a consequence of office and
without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office. An
ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a
certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. (e.g. Secretary of
Transportation and Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the Board of
the Philippine Ports Authority and the Light Rail Transit)
*July 25, 1987: President Corazon C. Aquino declares Executive Order No.
284. The provisions relevant to this case are as follows:
Section 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a
member of the Cabinet; undersecretary or assistant secretary or other
appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary
position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided,
that his limitations shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards
councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.
Section 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or
other appointive official of the Executive Department holds more than what is
allowed Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must relinquish the excess position in favor
of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official
hold more than two positions other than his primary position.
Section 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in governmentowned or controlled corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the
boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or
assistant secretary.
*Petitioners basically attest that Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional as
it allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries
to hold other government offices in addition to their primary positions and
because of this, the order directly runs counter to Article VII Section 13 of the
1987 constitution which states:
Sec.13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during
said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in
any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest
in the conduct of their office.
Petitioners ask for extraordinary writs of prohibitions and mandamus as well as
temporary restraining order directing public respondents to release their
positions other than those that are authorized by the 1987 Constitution, and that
they return and refund any benefit or compensation they received in the course
of their fulfilling such positions.
*Respondents reply that Executive Order No. 284 is indeed constitutional
because the phrase contained in Article VII Section 13 that reads unless
otherwise provided in the Constitution should be read relative to Article IX-B
Section 7 par.2 which states:
Sec. 7. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Respondents attest that since Article VII Section 13 should be read relative to
Article IX-B Section 7, it therefore follows that the President, Vice-President,
the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants can indeed hold an
office apart from their primary one, because Article IX-B Section 7 provides
that they are allowed because of the primary functions of their positions.
Therefore, Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional since it doesnt violate
Article VII Section 13.

Respondents also cite DOJ Opinion No. 73 as support to their view. This
opinion declares that Cabinet members, their deputies (undersecretaries) and
assistant secretaries may hold other public office, including membership in the
boards of government corporations: (a) when directly provide for in the
Constitution as in the case of the Secretary of Justice who is made an ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council under Article VIII, Section 8,
paragraph 1; or (b) if allowed by law; or (c) if allowed by the primary functions
of their respective positions. Incidentally this opinion is the main basis for
President Aquinos Executive Order No. 284.
*Petitioners then rebut by saying that the phrase In Article VII Section 13 that
reads unless otherwise provided in this Consitution.. does not pertain to
Article IX-B Section 7 but to the other provisions provided namely: (1) The
Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Article VII,
Section 3, par.2 and that (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of
the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Article VIII. Section 8.
Petitioners further argue that Article IX-B Section 7 pertains to officers and
employees of the Civil Service in general and Article VII Section 13 applies
specifically to the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants.
ISSUES:
The threshold question or main issue here in this case is whether the
prohibitions made on Article VII Section 13, fall under the broad exceptions
made for appointive officials on Article IX-B Section 7.
HELD
The courts rule in the negative. The prohibitions in Article VII Section 13,
dont fall under the broad exceptions for appointive officials in Article IX-B
Section 7.
The courts rule Executive Order No. 284 null and void. Regarding the received
compensations, the courts rule that those officials who fulfilled the positions de
facto should keep if any, the benefits he/she received during their tenure.
Denying the benefits and compensation would unjustly enrich the public at the
expense of the officials who rendered service.
RATIO
In making this decision, it is paramount to evaluate what the intention of the
framers were. Inevitably, in the pursuit to find the true intention, one has to
consider that the 1987 Constitution was made after martial law. One of the main
reasons why these provisions were put in place is due to the fact that during
martial law, the practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the
government led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials. Therefore, the
framers intention was one to prohibit this type of situation from happening
again.
Article IX-B Section 7 is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all
elective and appointive pubic officials and employees, while Article VII Section
13 is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
This view is supported by the statement of Commissioner Vicente Foz of the
1986 Constitutional Commission which states: We actually have to be stricter
with the President and the Members of the Cabinet because they exercise more
powers, and therefore, more checks and restraints on them are called for
because there is more possibility of abuse in their case.
Moreover, the language itself of the Constitution further supports this view. In
other prohibitory provisions, they are always classified by the phrase in the
government. (e.g. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
hold other office or employment in the Government.) In contrast, Article VII
Section 13, the phrase in the government is absent and the disqualification is
absolute as proven by phrase any other office.
The respondents bring to light the fact that if Article VII Section 13 is adhered
to strictly, it would lead to impractical consequences. (e.g. Secretary of Finance
not being able to be part of the Monetary Board) And it is by virtue of Article
IX-B Section 7 that this practice is followed now.
The courts rule that it is not by virtue of the fact that Article VII Section 13 is
under Article IX-B Section 7 that instances like the one mentioned is allowed. It
is because Article VII Section 13, does not apply to ex-officio positions. Such
additional ex-officio functions or positions should be required by the primary

functions of the officials concerned, without receiving any additional

compensation because it is inferred that since it is already part of the primary
position, it is already paid for. Therefore, President, Vice-President, Members
of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants can have additional positions
provided that they are required by their primary positions.
Furthermore, following the respondents view would render certain provisions in
the Constitution inoperable especially regarding the provision that the VicePresident can become a member of the Cabinet. If its true that the phrase in
Article VII Section 13 unless otherwise provided in this Constitution refers to
Article IX-B Section 7, the provision giving the Vice-President the ability to
become a member of the Cabinet loses its meaning because the Vice-President
is not an appointive official but an elective one. One should always lean in
favor of a construction which will render every word operative, and the court
must harmonize them.
Wherever the language used in the Constitution is prohibitory, it is to be
understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation. The phrase
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution.. must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution.
(e.g. the provision for the Vice-President, and the Secretary of Justice)
Doctrine:
EO no 284: the court in construing a constitution should bear in
mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption and the evils if any
sought to be prevented or remedied
A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of
the times and the condition and circumstances under which the constitution was
formed
The YARDSTICK in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision under consideration
The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of
the constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought
The intent of the framers of the constitution was to impose a stricter
prohibition on the pres and his official family so far as holding other offices or
employment in the government or elsewhere in concerned
The all embracing prohibition imposed on the pres and his official
family are proof of the intent of the 1987 constitution to treat them as a class by
itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions
It is well established rule in constitutional construction that no one
provision of the constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be
considered alone, but that all provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to
be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes
of the instrument. Sections bearing a particular subject should be considered
and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the constitution
and no one section should not be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
construction the two can be made to stand together
The court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in
favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one
which may make the words idle and nugatory
WHEREVER the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it
is to be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation
The phrase as otherwise provided in this constitution must be
given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in
the constitution itself
A constitution viewed as a continuously operative charter of the
government, is not to be interpreted as demanding the impossible and the
impracticable; and unreasonable or absurd consequences, if possible should be
avoided
It safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face.
The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how its was understood by
the people adopting it than the framers understanding thereof.

Topic: Rules of Construction: Text Matters

SARMIENTO v. MISON
Facts:
1)
2)

3)

Petitioners are taxpayers, lawyers and members of the IBP

Seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador mison from performing the
functions of the Office of Commissioner of Bureau of Customs and
the respondent Guillermo Carague (sec of DBM) from effecting
disbursements in payment of Misons salaries and emoluments
Ground: Misons appointment as Commissioner of Bureau of
Customs is unsconstitutional by reason of its not being confirmed by
the commission of Appointments

Respondent maintains the constitutionality of Misons appointment

w/o the confirmation of Commission of Appointments
5) The court allowed the commission of Appointments to intervene and
file a petition in intervention
6) This case involves conflict between two departments: the Executive
and Legislative departments

Four groups that of officers whom the president shall appoint

a) Heads of executive departments, ambassadors and public
ministers of consuls, officers of AFP from the rank of colonel
or naval captain and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him by the Constitution
b) All other officers of the government who appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law
c) Those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint
d) Officers lower in rank who appointments the Congress may by
law vest in the President alone
( 1st group appointed by Pres with confirmed by Comm of Appointments)
7) The second, third and fourth groups are being contested in this case
4)

ISSUE: Should they be appointed by the President with or w/o consent

(confirmation) of the CA
Should we follow the ACCEPTED RULE IN CONSTITUTIONAL
and STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION that an express enumeration
of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only
those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group
require the consent of the CA
We can refer to historical background as well to records of 1986
Constitutional Commission to determine with more accuracy, if not
precision, the intention of the framers of the 1987 Consti and people
adopting it

NOTE: FOR STAT CON

The fundamental principle of constitutional instruction is to

give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of
the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be
given is that which is embodied and expressed in the
constitutional provisions themselves

The court will thus construe the applicable constitutional

provisions, not in accordance with how the executive or the
legislative department may want them construed, but in
accordance with what they say and provide

Sec 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a

constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed
and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and
existing laws and with reference to them. Courts are bound to
presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar
with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which
its provisions relate and upon which they express their
judgment and opinions in its adoption
8)
9)

10)

11)
12)

13)

14)

In the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments

required the consent (confirmation) of the CA
1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in w/c it
was molded and remolded by successive amendments, placed the
absolute power of appointment in the pres w/ hardly any check on
the part of the leg
1987 Consti: struck a middle ground by requiring the consent of
the CA for the first group of appointments and leaving to the Pres
w/o such confirmation, the appointment of other officers (those in
the 2nd and third groups as well as the 4th groups)
It is therefore clear that appointments to the 2nd and 3rd groups of
officers can be made by Pres w/o the consent of CA
1st sentence speaks of nomination by the pres and appointment by
the Pres with the consent of the CA whereas the second sentence
speaks only of appointment by the pres
Purposive intention and deliberate judgment of the framers of the
1987 consti that except as to those officers whose appointments
require the consent of the CA by express mandate of the 1st sentence
in Sec 16 Art VII, appointments of other officers are left to the Pres
w/o need for confirmation of CAwe are to presume that the
framers of the 1987 consti were knowledgeable of what they are
doing and of the foreseeable effects thereof
The clear and expressed content of the framers of the 1987 consti
was to EXCLUDE presidential appointments from confirmation by

the CA except appointments of offices expressedly mentioned in the

first sentence of Sec 16 Art VII of the Consti
15) The Pres is expressly authorized by law to appoint the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (original text of Sec 601
RA No 1937 amended by PD no 34- tariff and Customs Code
these were later repealed by the new constidevolving the power to
appoint to the pres and no longer needs the confirmation of CA
DECISION OF SC: The petition and petition for intervention should be, as they
are , hereby DISMISSED.

The president acted with her constitutional authority and power

in the appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner
of Bureau of Customs w/o submitting nomination to CA for
confirmation He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority
and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and
emoluments pertaining thereto

IBP v. ZAMORA

a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the
constitution
Those questions which under the constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of government
6) The question is not a political question: problem being one of
legality or validity not its wisdom
INTENT OF FRAMERS: In view of the constitutional intent to give the
president full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the
armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the decision of
the Presidents decision is totally bereft of the factual basis
THE INTENT is to grant the president the widest leeway and broadest
discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser
and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial lawboth of which
involve the curtailment and suspension of certain basic civil rights and
individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review
by the courts

Facts:
1)

Praying for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking

to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of the Pres joseph
Estrada commanding the deployment of the Phil Marines to
join the PNP in visibility patrols around the metropolisfor
crime prevention and suppression
2) LOI 02/2000 formulated by Edgar Aglipay
3) Pres. Confirmed previous directive (January 2000)
4) Sec 18 Art VIII of Constitution (power as Commander-in-chief
of Armed forces)
5) January 17, 2000: IBP filed instant petition to annul LOI
2/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Phil Marines, null
and void and unconstitutional since:
a) No emergency situation in metro manila
b) Insidious incursion by the military in a civilian function
of government (against Art XVI of Consti)
c) Said deployment creates a dangerous tendency to rely on
the military to perform the civilian functions of the
government
d) Making the military more powerful than what it should
really be under the consti
SOLICITOR GENERALs COMMENTS:
1) Vigorously defends the constitutionality of the act of the Pres
2) Petitioner has no legal standing
3) Case is a political question
4) Conduct of police visibility patrols which feature the team up
of one police officer and one pHil marine soldier, does not
violate the civilian supremacy clause in the constitution
ISSUES:
1) WON petitioner has legal standing
2) WON the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of
calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review
3) WON the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint
visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on
civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character
of PNP
DECISION OF SC: Petition has no merit
1) Petitioner has failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession
of the requisites of standing to raise the issues in the petition
(issue of transcendental significance
2) The Pres did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit violation of
the civilian supremacy clause of the Constitution
3) Power of judicial review- Sec 1 Art VIII of the Constitution
when the ff requisites are met: the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; 2) a personal and substantial interest of the
party raising the constitutional question; 3) the exercise of
judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity and 4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case
4) The underlying issues are the scope of presidential powers and
limits and the extent of judicial review
5) POLITICAL QUESTION: concerns issues that dependent
upon wisdom, not the legality of a particular act or measure
being assailed. The political question being a function of
sepration of powers the courts will not normally interfere with
the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows

ISSUE II ANSWER: The president has already determined the necessity and
factual basis for calling the armed forces. Considering all these facts, we hold
that the president has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law
enforcement and in the exercise of constitutional power
ISSUE III ANSWER: The deployment of marines does not constitute a breach
of the civilian supremacy clause. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are
the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority
belonging to PNP. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that
military authority is supreme over the military. There are also instances in the
Phils when assistance of the military to civilian authorities persists like in
elections; admin of the Phil NAtl Red cross; conservation of natural resources;
relief and rescue operations etc.this is mutual support and cooperation not
derogation of civilian supremacy
PROOFS:
a) Soldiers do not control or direct the operation
b) Also have no power to prohibit and to condemn
c) These soldiers do not apply coercive force
DECISION: This Court is not inclined to overrule the presidents determination
of the factual basis for the calling of the mArines to prevent or suppose lawless
violence. Premises considered the petition is hereby DISMISSED
NOTE FOR STAT CON:

Unlike in the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of

habeas corpus or the power to proclaim martial law in relation
to which the Consti has empowered Congress to revoke such
suspension or proclamation and the SC to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis thereof, there no such
equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of
the presidents action to call out the armed forces, a distinction
which places the calling out power in a different category from
the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus

The proceedings of Con CON are less conclusive on the proper

construction of the fundamental law than are legislative
proceedings of the proper construction of a statutethe
conventional wisdom is that the Consti does not derive its
force from the convention which framed it, but from the people
who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the people

Given the light of our consti history, the express grant of

power to the SC to review the sufficiency of the factual bases
used by the pres in the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus and the declaration of martial law merely
means that the Court cannot decline the exercise of its power
because of the political question doctrine as it did in the past

MARCELINO v. CRUZ
Facts:
1)

Petition for prohibition and writ of habeas corpus to enjoin

respondent Judge Fernando Cruz Jr. promulgating his decision
in Criminal Case No C-5910 people of the phils vs
Bernardino Marcelino and for release from detention of
petitionerground of loss of jurisdiction of respondent trial

2)
3)
4)

court over the case for failure to decide the same within the
period of ninety days from submission thereof
Petitioner charged with rapedecision was dated Nov 28,
1975
Notices were received by the respective addresses on Dec 8
and 9, 1975
Notices were sent to the Prov Fiscal of Pasig and to prov
warden of pasig, rizal who both received on dec 2, 1975

PETITIONER CLAIMS: The three-month period prescribed by section 11 (1)

of art X of the 1973 constitution being a constitutional directive, is
MANDATORY in character and that non observance thereof results in the loss
of jurisdiction of the court over the unresolved case

PETITIONERS CLAIMS:
a) Amendment No. 6 was promulgated despite the fact that under
the Constitution the leg power is vested to BP
b)

c)

d)

Amendment no 6 is not one of the powers granted the president

by the consti as amended in the plebiscite of April 7, 1981
re-confirmation does not include leg power of pres
PD 1840 is null and void having been passed w/o the
concurrence of the BP and it is likewise of public interest and
of the nation that the question of whether the Pres retained his
leg power after the lifting of Martial law and after the consti
was amended on April 7, 1981
Amendements bring to test the validity of the exercise of
standby emergency powers invoked in Amendement no 6

ISSUES;
a)
b)

Loss of jurisdiction due to failure to decide within the 90 day

period
What date to follow in deciding the 90 days

DECISION OF SC: The petition is hereby DISMISSED and the TRO dated
January 16, 1976 issued by the court is lifted. Since respondent Judge is already
deceased, his successor is hereby ordered to decide on criminal case no-5910 on
the basis of the record thereof within 90 days from time the case is raffled to
him
REASONS:
1)
2)

3)

4)

In this case, the statute under examination was construed

merely to be directory
It was ruled that the legal distinction between directory and
mandatory laws is applicable to fundamental as it is to
statutory laws
This court had at various times, upon proper application and
for meritorious reasons, allowed judges of inferior courts
additional time beyond the 3-month period w/in w/c to decide
cases submitted to them. The reason is that a departure from
said provision would result in less injury to the general public
than would its strict application
An absurd situation could not have been intended by the
framers of our fundamental lawto hold that non compliance
by the courts w/ the aforesaid provision would result in loss of
jurisdiction, would make the courts, through which conflicts
are resolved, the very instruments to foster unresolved causes
by reason merely of having failed to render a decision w/In the
allotted time

NOTE FOR STAT CON:

Rules of statutory interpretation apply to the Constitution

The legal distinction between directive and mandatory laws is

applicable to fundamental as it is to statutory law

The constitutional provisions requiring that trial judges shall

decide a case w/in 90 days from submission is merely a
procedural rule and is not mandatory but only directory

COstitutional provisions are to be construed as mandatory,

unless by express provision o r by necessary implication a
different intention is manifest

The difference between a mandatory anda directory provision

is often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being
that less injury results to he general public by disregarding than
by enforcing the letter of the law

In the construction and interpretation of the laws: the

constitutional provision in question should be held merely as
directorythus where the contrary construction would lead to
absurd, impossible or mischievous consequences, it should not
be followed

LEGASPI v. MINISTER OF FINANCE

Facts:
1)

Hon Valentino Legaspi incumbent member of the interim BP

praying that this court declare PD 1840 granting tax amnesty
and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some other
purposes unconstitutional

ISSUE: WON the 1973 Constitution is amended by Plebiscite Referendum of

1976, retained the same amendements more particulary Amendment no 6 after
it was again amended in the plebiscite held April 7,. 1981
Is amendment no 6 of the 1973 constitution as approved in 1976
reproduced or unaffected by the April 7, 1981 amendment? Or is it
considered repealed by Omission?
PETITIONER: maintained that AMENDMENT NO 6 is rendered inoperable.
Deleted and/ or repealed by the amendments of April 7, 1981 (after april 7 no
longer exists a president (prime minister) but a president and a prime minister)
Two different offices canot be handled by one person
OTHER CLAIMS:
1) The constitutional provisions of the presidency do not restate
the provisions of Amendment no 6 w/c grants the president
limited powers to legislate
2) Provisions w/ reference to the powers of the presidency is
deemed foreclosed by Art VII of the newly amended consti
to construe the 1976 Amendments are still applicable, other
than that referring to the interim BP would be an
incompatibility to the application of the present constitutional
provisions
3) In so far as the office of the Pres or the prime minister is
concerned they have ceased to be governed by the transitory
provisions but under the newly amended consti
4) The intent of the 1981 constitutional amendments could not be
interpreted any other way except that after the amendment it
would no longer be proper to exercise those reposed upon the
prime ministerpowers previously reposed upon the PM were
expressly removed from him and given to the pres and
amendment no 6 is not one of those
5) The original intent to set out the original act or action as
amended is most commonly indicated by a statement in the
amendatory act that the original law is amended to read as
follows The new statute is a substitute for the original act or
section. Only those provisions of the original act or section
repeated in the amendment are retained the adoption of the
new constitution repeals and supersedes all the provisions of
the older one not continued in force by the new instrument
COURTS DECISION: petitioners conclusion lacks sufficient merit; petition is
DISMISSEDConstitution of 1973 has not been in anyway altered or modified
much less repealed by constitutional amendments of 1981
Court held that petitioner is laboring under a misconception of facts
and of the principles of constitutional construction
1) Constitutional law is not simply the literal application of the
words of the charter. The ancient and familiar rule of
constitutional construction that has consistently maintained its
intrinsic and transcendental worth is that the meaning and
understanding conveyed by the language of any of its
provisions do not only portray the influence of current events
and developments but likewise the inescapable imperative
considerations rooted in historical background and
environment at the time of the adoption and thereby caused
their being written
2) The BP referred to here is still the interim BP- it follows that
its legislative authority cannot be more exclusive now after the
1981 amendments than when it was originally created in 1976
3) Power that Amendment no 6 vests upon the President (PM) are
to be exercised only on two specified occasions a) when in
grave emergency (in pres judgment) or threat is existing and
b) whenever the interim BP pr the regular NA fails to or is
unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in
his judgment requires immediate action----therefore, it is a

4)

5)

power that is in its nature of the other powers w/c the

constitution directly confers upon the pres or allows to be
delegated to him by the Batasan in times of crises and
emergencies
The power conferred upon the pres thereby was not for pres
marcos alone but for whoever might be rpesident of the phils
in the future
Solicitor General points that it is neither sound nor in
consonance w/ well and long settled principles of
constitutional construction to recognize amendments or repeals
of constitutional provisions by implications specially in regard
to a transcendental matterAmendment no 6 not submitted for
ratification in 1981 plebisciteit is safe to conclude that it
would be deceiving the people themselves and depriving them
of something they had decided in 1976 to be part of te
fundamental law of the land to now eliminate power
conferered by them upon the executive of sharing leg authority
w/ batasan on appropriate occasion

NOTE FOR STAT CON

Constitutional provisions are to be interpreted not only on the

basis of current events but also on the basis of the historical
background of their enactmentunderstanding beyond its
language but likewise the inescapable imperent events and
developments but likewise the inescapable imperative
considerations rooted in the historical background and
environment at the time of its adoption and thereby caused
their being written a part and parcel thereof

Amendment no 6 was intended to give the President the

powers therein given even after the lifting of martial law
intended to give to the president the power to issue decrees
subject to conditions specified therein even after the lifting of
martial law

Amendment no 6 was not repealed by the 1981 amendments of

the Constitution petitoners interpretation is simplistic and does
not justice to the objectives of the amendments

VERA v. AVELINO

2.

3.

Issue:
1.
2.
3.

Held:

Petitioners (Vera, Diokno, Romero) were among the sixteen

candidates for senator who received the most number of votes
proclaimed by the COMELEC
Senate approved a resolution, called the Pendatun Resolution,
ordering that, pending the termination of the protest lodged against
their election, the petitioners shall not be sworn, nor seated, as
members of the chamber.

WON the Court has jurisdiction over the case

WON a writ of prohibition can be issued to the Senate
WON the Senate acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
issuing the Pendatun Resolution
(1) NO
(2) NO
(3) NO

Ratio:
(1) The petition cannot be entertained based on the principles enunciated in the
Alejandrino case. "As was explained in the Alejandrino case, we could not
order one branch of the Legislature to reinstate a member thereof. To do so
would be to establish judicial predominance, and to upset the classic pattern of
checks and balances wisely woven into our institutional setup."
Alejandrino vs. Quezon: Senator Jose Alejandrino assaulted a fellow member
in the Senate. After investigation, the Senate adopted a resolution suspending
him from office for one year. Petitioner applied for mandamus and injunction to
nullify the resolution. The Court believed that the Senate was legally wrong for
he was a senator appointed by the Governor-General and that he cannot be
disciplined by the body. However, the Court denied his petition due to the
separation of powers of the three branches of government.
(1) Angara vs. National Assembly does not apply in this case. There is no
antagonism between the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate and the Senate itself,
for it is not suggested that the former has adopted a rule contradicting the
Pendatun Resolution.
(1) There are wrongs, such as political questions, which the judiciary may not
correct.

Nature: Original action in the Supreme Court. Preliminary injunction.

Short version: COMELEC reported that, by reason of certain specified acts of
terrorism and violence in the Provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and
Tarlac, the voting in the said region did not reflect the true and free expression
of the popular will. The Senate passed a resolution stating that, pending the
termination of the election protest against them, Vera, Diokno, and Romero
(petitioners) shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members the chamber.
Petitioners instituted an action against the respondents, ordering them to annul
the resolution and permit them to occupy their seats. The court, however,
dismissed the case.
Facts:
1.

Pursuant to Section 4, Article X (1935 Constitution), the COMELEC

submitted a report (May) on the national elections held the preceding
month (April) stating that the voting in the provinces of Pampanga,
Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac do not reflect the true and free
expression of the popular will due to certain specified acts of
terrorism and violence in the said Provinces.
a.
Armed bands saw to it that their candidates were voted
for
b. Great majority of voters suffered from a paralysis of
judgment in the matter of exercising the right of suffrage
c.
COMELEC said that it is without jurisdiction, to
determine whether or not the votes cast in the said
provinces are valid or invalid
d. Judge Vicente de Vera (COMELEC) said that many
residents of the four provinces have voluntarily banished
themselves from their home towns in order not to be
subjected to the prevailing oppression and to avoid being
victimized or losing their lives. After the election, dead
bodies were found with notes attached to their necks,
reading, "Bomoto kami kay Roxas."
e.
Terrorism by the lawless elements to insure the election
of the candidates of the Conservative wing of the
Nationalist Party is of public knowledge

(2) Supposing that the Court indeed has jurisdiction, prohibition refers only to
proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, exercising functions
judicial or ministerial
(3) Supposing that the question lies within the limits of prohibition and is within
the Court's jurisdiction, the Senate did not exceed its powers in passing the
Pendatun Resolution. "The discussions in the Constitutional Convention
showed that instead of transferring to the Electoral Commission all the powers
of the House or Senate as "the sole judge of the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly," it was given only
jurisdiction over "all contests" relating to the election."
(3) Based on the discussions of the CONCON, election contests "relates only to
statutory contests in which the contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder, but
also have himself inducted into the office."
(3) The Electoral Tribunal of the Senate cannot order the Senate to defer the
admission of any member whose election has been contested. It follows,
therefore, that the Pendatun Resolution was exercised within the Senate's
power.
(3) The Senate, as a branch of the legislative department, had the constitutional
power to adopt the rules for its proceedings, and by legislative practice it is
conceded the power to promulgate such orders as may be necessary to maintain
its prestige and to preserve its dignity. There are reasons to believe that the
Pendatun Resolution was prompted by the dictates of ordinary caution, or of
public policy. To avoid the undesirable results flowing from the participation of
disqualified members in its deliberations, it was prudent for it to defer the
sitting of the respondents
* Justices in the Electoral Tribunals: The Constitution, establishing no
incompatibility between the two roles, naturally did not contemplate, nor want,
justices opining one way here, and thereafter holding otherwise in the electoral
tribunals. There should be no diversity of thought in a democratic country, at
least, on the legal effects of the alleged rampant lawlessness, root and basis of
the Pendantun resolution.

* Doubt and presumption: It should be presumed that official duty has been
performed regularly and in the right manner. In any case, the sovereign people,
ultimately the offending party, will render the fitting verdict at the polling
precincts.

10. Three versions of a sentence:

a.
COMELEC: It is believed that the election in the
provinces aforesaid did not reflect the true and free
expression of the popular will.
b. Pendatun Resolution: This Commission believes that
the election in the provinces aforesaid did not reflect the
true and free expression of the popular will.
c.
Majority Opinion: The Commission on Elections
stated that the voting in said region did not reflect the
true and free expression of the popular will.
d. However, the alleged suppression of popular will in the
said provinces is mentioned by the Commission only as
hearsay.
11. The very words sole judge imply necessarily contests, because if
there is no contest, there is nothing to be judged (As opposed to the
majority opinion that electoral contests relate only to statutory
contests in which the contestants seek not only to oust the intruder,
but also to have himself inducted into the office).

* Membership in the Constitutional Convention: Their conclusions may not,

simply on account of membership in the Convention, be a shade better, in the
eyes of the law.
* Alleged duty of the respondents: It does not imply (in the text) that if, for any
reason, he is disqualified, the House is powerless to postpone admissions.
* Parliamentary Privileges: Section 15, Article VI provides that for any speech
or debate in Congress, Senators and Congressmen shall not be questioned in
any other place.
Disposition: Case dismissed. No costs.
Arguments:
* Justices in the Electoral Tribunals: Several justices subscribing to the majority
opinion, belong to the electoral tribunals wherein protests connected with the
Central Luzon polls await investigation.
* Doubt and presumption: Senate's power, or lack of power, to approve the
resolution is not entirely clear.

Text:
1.

2.

* Membership in the Constitutional Convention: The dissenting members of

this Court who were delegates to the Constitutional Convention and were "coauthors of the Constitution" "are in a better position to interpret" the same
Constitution.
* Alleged duty of the respondents: It was respondents' duty to permit petitioners
to assume office by virtue of Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 725
Dissenting Opinion (Perfecto):
1. By the Pendatun Resolution, respondents exercised, in effect, the
power to judge the election, returns, and qualifications of
petitioners as senators of the Philippines. This is against Section 11
of Article VI, which confers the power of the Electoral Tribunal to
judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of senators and representatives, as emphasized by the
word sole.
2. Of the Justices who declared the resolution, two were former
members of the constitutional convention and its committee on style
while one was a former member of the Second National Assembly
(created the present Senate and the Electoral Tribunals by
constitutional amendment). It is only logical that these three must be
in a better position to interpret their own will, intention, and
purposes as they expressed them in the fundamental law.
3. The Pendatun Resolution was adopted when there was no quorum
in the Senate. This is against the Constitutional provision stated in
Section 10 (2) of Article VI.
4. Senators are duty bound to assume office under Section 12 of the
Commonwealth Act No. 725. Otherwise, they shall incur criminal
liability.
5. No one may prevent them from performing the duties of the office
without being criminally guilty of a violation of parliamentary
immunity, a criminal offense punished by the Penal Code with
prision mayor.
6. It is evident that respondents encroached upon, invaded, and usurped
the ancillary powers to suspend the petitioners in relation to the
power to judge electoral contests concerning senators, a power
which the Constitution specifically assigns to the Senate Electoral
Tribunal. The Resolution is a flagrant violation of the principle of
separation of powers.
7. Senate lacks the power of suspension, not only as ancillary remedy
in senatorial election contests, but even in the exercise of the Senate
judicial power to punish its members for disorderly conduct.
Malcolm: Suspension deprives the electoral district of representation
without that district being afforded any means by which to fill the
vacancy.
8. The principle of separation of powers cannot be invoked to deny the
Supreme Court jurisdiction in this case, because to decide the
question of validity or nullity of the Pendatun Resolution is a
function judicial in nature and, not having been assigned by the
Constitution to other departments, is logically within the province of
the judiciary.
9. The case at hand is similar to Angara vs. Electoral Commission.

3.

Section 4, Article X (1935 Constitution): The Commission on

Elections shall submit to the President and the Congress, following
each election, a report on the manner in which such election was
conducted.
Pendatun Resolution: Now, THEREFORE, be it resolved by the
Senate of the Philippines in session assembled, as it hereby resolves,
to defer the administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vergara,
Ramon Diokno, and Jose Romero, pending the hearing and decision
on the protests lodged against their elections, wherein the terrorism
averred in the report of the Commission on Elections and in the
report of the Provost Marshall constitutes the ground of said protests
and will therefore be the subject of investigation and determination."
Section 12, Commonwealth Act No. 725: "The candidates for
Member of the House of Representatives and those for Senator who
have been proclaimed elected by the respective Board of Canvassers
and the Commission on Elections shall assume office and shall hold
regular session for the year nineteen hundred and forty-six on May
twenty-five, nineteen hundred and forty-six."

Topic: Policy Matters and Self-Executing Provisions

TANADA v. ANGARA
Petition for certiorari: State action to enter into WTO
April 15 1994 DTI Sec signed in Morocco the final act embodying the results
of multilateral negotiations regarding the WTO
o
Aug 12 Senate receives letter from President submitting the
Uruguay Final Act
o
Aug 13 president letter submitting the Agreement establishing
the WTO, Ministerial Declarations, etc
o
Dec 9 PS 1083, immediate adoption of the Agreement
Establishing the WTO
o
Dec 14 Senate Resolution No. 97, senate concurring in the
ratification by the president of the agreement establishing the WTO
o
Dec 29 present petition was filed
Petitioner argues for the unconstitutionality of the WTO:
o
WTO requires the Philippines to place nationals and products of
member-countries at par with each other
o
WTO limits, intrudes, impairs the constitutional powers of both
Congress and the SC
o
WTO violates the constitutional mandate: to develop a self-reliant
and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos, to give preference to qualified Filipinos and to promote
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods
Petitioner specifically seeks:
o
For the nullification of the concurrence of the Senate with the
Presidents agreement to join the WTO
o
For the prohibition of the enforcement and implementation of the
WTO
ISSUE/s:

WON the petition presents a political question

WON the members of the Senate who participated in the
deliberations and voting leading to the Senate Reso No. 97 are
estopped from impugning the validity of the same, or the
Agreement

WON the provisions of the Agreeement violate the provisions

of Sec19, Art 2, and Secs 10 and 12, Art 12 of the 1987 Consti
WON the provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict,
and impair the sovereignty of the Phil Legislature
WON provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of
judicial power
WON Senate acted with a grave abuse of discretion in
concurring only in the agreement establishing the WTO

SC RULING:
ISSUE # 1: MATTER OF JURISDICTION: political or justiciable
o
JUSTICIABLE because it seeks the nullity of a senate resolution
on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution
o
An act of legislature is alleged to have infringed the Constitution:
judicial review not just a matter of right but a duty (within the
courts expanded jurisdiction)
o
Application of a constitutional provision
o
Judiciary as final arbiter on GADLEJ
o
Judicial review for GADLEJ, not review of the wisdom of a
legislative or executive policy, not upon the merits nor propriety
of govt policies, ONLY to determine WON there has been
GADLEJ
WTO AGREEMENT AND ECONOMIC NATIONALISM
o
Economic nationalism: violated by the parity provisions and
national treatment clauses in the WTO Agreement
o
Economic nationalism in Sec 19, Art 2, Secs 10 and 12, Art 12 of
the Consti
o
WTO: places nationals and foreign products on the same footing
as Filipino and domestic products in contravention of the
FILIPINO FIRST POLICY
Render meaningless effectively
controlled by Filipinos
WTO: ensures conformity of national economic laws, regulations, and
administrative procedures with its annexed agreements and imposed obligations
o
Negate the preferential treatment accorded to Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods
RESPONDENTS:
o
Constitutional provisions are not self-executing, merely policies
o
Such nationalistic provisions must be read in relation to: Art 12,
Sec 1 and 13.
o
Read properly, the cited WTO provisions do not violate the
Consti
o
WTO agreement contains sufficient safeguards for developing
countries

Declaration of Principles NOT SELF-EXECUTING

o
Article 2 is a mere declaration of principles and
state policies basic political creed of the nation
o
Not intended to be self-executing
o
Used as aids by the judiciary in adjudication, or
legislature in lawmaking
o
Not self-executing provisions, a disregard of which
cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts
o
Kilosbayan, Inc v. Morato: Do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines
for legislation
o
Basco v. Pagcor: broad constitutional principles
need legislative enactments to implement them
WHY? Because of basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial
authority to wade into the unchartered ocean of social and economic policy
making (READ OPOSA- Felicianos concurring)
ISSUE # 2: ECONOMIC NATIONALISM SHOULD NOT BE READ WITH
OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATES TO ATTAIN BALANCED
DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMY
o
Sec 10 and 12 of Article 12 should be read with
relation to Sec 1 and 13 of the same Article: ideals of
economic nationalism does not espouse an isolationist
economy but a self-reliant and competent economy, able
to compete in foreign markets, and trade policies that
uphold equality and reciprocity, protection of Filipino
enterprises from unfair trade practices and overbearing
foreign competitions
o
AND FURTHER, there are enough balancing
provisions in the Constitution that allow the Senate to
ratify the concurrence with the WTO agreement

Need fore business exchange on the

bases of equality and reciprocity

Protectionist policy only against unfair

trade practices

Does not encourage entry of foreign

goods services, but does not prohibit
them either
WTO RECOGNIZES NEED TO PROTECT WEAK ECONOMIES
o
WTO has some built-in advantages to protect weak and
developing countries
o
Each vote by a member is equal to one, equal to any others vote,
unlike in the Security Council where major states have permanent
seats and veto powers
o
Poor countries can protect their economies through one-on-one
negotiations with developed countries
o
Not mere practical alliances, but real negotiations rooted in law
SPECIFIC PROVISOS TO PROTECT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
o
Amount of tariff reduction, period within which the reduction is
to be spread out (page 61)
o
Export subsidy for agricultural production (GATT)
o
Anti-dumping measures, countervailing measures and safeguards
against import surges
CONSTITUTION DOES NOT RULE OUT FOREIGN COMPETITION
o
Policy of self-reliance does not necessarily mean no foreign
exchange allowed
o
Not economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international
community
o
Independence refers to freedom from undue foreign control of the
national economy
o
WTO rules on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade
without discrimination rules of equality and reciprocity
applying to all members
CONSITUTION FAVORS CONSUMERS NOT INDUSTRIES OR
ENTERPRISES
o
WON the WTO/GATT will favor consumers is a political
question; wisdom of legislative policy
CONSITUTION DESIGNED TO MEET FUTURE EVENTS AND
CONTINGENCIES
ISSUE # 3: WTO AGREEMENT AND LEGISLATIVE POWER
o
Petitioners: because each member-country is required to conform
to the laws and regulations of the WTO, the lawmaking body of
Congress is limited to this conformity
o
Especially as WTO infringes on the taxation power of Congress:
when WTO fixes tariff rates
SOVEREIGNTY LIMITED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATISES
o
All government authority is inherently limited by the fact that it is
a member of a family of nations
o
Doctrine of incorporation: the country is bound by generally
accepted principles of international law, which are considered to
be automatically part of the countrys laws
o
Authority limited by principles of international law and treaty
stipulations
UN CHARTER AND OTHER TREATIES LIMIT SOVEREIGNTY
ISSUE # 4: WTO AND JUDICIAL POWER:
o
In question: WTO TRIPS Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights intrudes on the power of the SC to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures
o
Burden of proof on proving the authenticity of a patent similar to
something else by another country
o
SC upholds said TRIPS, similar to RA 165, Patent Law
ISSUE#5: CONCURRENCE ONLY IN THE WTO
AGREEMENT AND NOT IN OTHER DOCUMENTS
CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT
o
Assailed Senate Resolution expressed concurrence in what the
Final Act required, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO
agreement
o
Ministerial Declarations were deemed accepted without being
ratified, by virtue of Article 25: Sec 1 of GATT
JUDGMENT: The validity of the assailed resolution is upheld.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS

FACTS:
Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS chose to award
during bidding in September 1995 the 51% outstanding shares of the respondent
Manila Hotel Corp. (MHC) to the Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, for the
amount of Php 44.00 per share against herein petitioner which is a Filipino
corporation who offered Php 41.58 per share. Pending the declaration of
Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner of MHC, petitioner
matched the formers bid prize also with Php 44.00 per share followed by a

managers check worth Php 33 million as Bid Security, but the GSIS refused to
accept both the bid match and the managers check.
One day after the filing of the petition in October 1995, the Court issued a TRO
enjoining the respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the
Renong Berhad. In September 1996, the Supreme Court En Banc accepted the
instant case.
ISSUE:

in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and
other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

Whether or not the GSIS violated Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of
the 1987 Constitution
COURT RULING:

Topic: Definition, Concept, and Purpose of Statutory Construction

The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist
from selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad,
and instead to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.
According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second
paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a
positive command which is complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in
question.
The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of the
equity of said hotel to fall within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it
emprises the majority and controlling stock. The Court also reiterated how
much of national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage will fall on
the hands of foreigners.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should
be interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself
because it does not prohibit the State from granting rights, privileges and
concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also argued
that the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad
because the former knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are
qualified, too.

OPOSA v. FACTORAN
Facts: The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed
before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the
principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and
alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines,
taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was
filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the
preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to
bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they
"represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." Consequently, it
is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in
his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises."
Issue:
Whether or not minor petitioners have legal standing (locus standi) to file
complaint.
Ruling:
Yes, minor petitioners have legal standing (locus standi) to file complaint. This
case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that
they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Supreme
Court finds no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of
their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world

CALTEX v. PALOMAR
Facts: In 1960, Caltex conceived of a promotional scheme entitled Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest, where the participants are to estimate the actual
number of liters a hooded gas pump will dispense within a specified period.
Except for employees, dealers and advertisers with their immediate families,
participation is to be open indiscriminately to all motor vehicle owners and/or
licensed drivers. No fee or consideration is required to be paid, not even any
purchase of any Caltex products. Entry forms are to be made available upon
request at each Caltex station, which will be subsequently stored in sealed cans
in every station. Since there will be a regional and national level of the contest,
Caltex has foreseen extensive use of the mails for publication and transmission
of communications relative thereto. In view of sections 1954(a), 1982, and
1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, representations were made by Caltex
with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing,
attached in the letter is a copy of their contest rules to justify that it was not in
violation of the ant-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. These provisions
condemns as absolutely non-mailable and empowers the PG to issue fraud
orders against any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or
scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot,
chance, or drawing of any kind. The Postmaster General denied their request
the first time, opining that the scheme falls within the purview of the provisions.
Caltex sought a reconsideration stressing that no consideration was involved
and was therefore not condemnable as a lottery. The PG maintained, that it
even if it did not involve any consideration, it was a gift enterprise
nonetheless and was equally banned by the Postal Law. In addition, PG
threatened with a fraud order against Caltex if the contest was conducted. As
such, a declaratory relief was sought by the latter and was ruled in their favor to
which the former appealed.
Issues:
1) Whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief?
2) Whether the proposed Caltex Hooded Pump Contest violates the Postal
Law?
Held:
1) YES. Section 1 of Rule 66 makes available a declaratory relief for any
person whose rights are affected by a statute. The Court ruled that the case at
bar met the conditions sine qua non laid down. Since Caltex was denied
advance clearance against its unquestioned right to avail of all legitimate and
appropriate media to advertise and stimulate increased patronage for its
products. Furthermore, unless their differences are settled and stabilized by a
tranquilizing declaration, litigation is foreseen to be inevitable.
2) NO. Based on jurisprudence (El Debate, Inc. vs. Topacio), lottery was
established to have three essential elements: consideration, prize, and chance.
Undeniably the Caltex Contest involves the two latter elements, but the element
of consideration was absent. As presented earlier, the prospective contestant
need not do anything but request for an entry form and accomplish the same to
be raffled. It is therefore nothing more than a gratuitous distribution of property
by chance.
Even with the contention that it falls within the gift enterprise
which is equally proscribed, the court held otherwise. A gift enterprise is
construed to involve inducement upon a purchaser by giving him/her a chance
to win a prize upon purchase. By applying the principle of noscitur a sociis, if
lottery is prohibited only if it involves the tripartite elements of prize, chance
and consideration, so also must the term gift enterprise be construed since it is
associated with lottery. Since the participant is eligible irrespective of whether
or not they buy the appellants products, the term is likewise inapplicable.
Doctrine: CONSTRUCTION: is the art or process of discovering and
expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to

the application to a given case where that intention is rendered doubtful by

reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself and
until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become to the extent they are
applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those
called upon to abide thereby but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience
thereto
Every case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the
applicable statutory provision

GENERAL v. BARRAMEDA
Facts: Barrameda mortgaged his land containing an area of 594,687 hectares
situated in barrio Taban, Minalabac, Camarines Sur to DBP to secure a loan of
Php 22,000.00. Respondent-mortgagor was able to pay Php 14,728.78 but failed
to pay in full the remaining installments as they fall due. This caused the
mortgagee to foreclose the property extra-judicially. On April 23, 1962, the
provincial sheriff conducted an auction sale in which the mortgagee, as the
highest bidder, bought the mortgaged for Php 7,271.22 (Php 22,000.00 Php
14,728.78), which was simply the unpaid balance. On May 13, 1963, the sheriff
and DBP executed a final deed of sale and affidavit of consolidation of
ownership, respectively. However, it was only on September 2, 1963 that the
sale and affidavit was registered in the name of DBP. The next day, September
3, 1963, defendants Rodolfo General and Carmen Gontang, purchased the land
from DBP. It has to be noted that the sale was not yet annotated in their favor.
On November 20, 1963 plaintiff ordered to redeem the land. DBP
refused to allow the redemption (repurchase price = Php 7,271.22). In view of
the refusal, plaintiff filed a complaint in court on November 23, 1963. Then on
November 26, 1963, the property was annotated in favor of General and
Gontang. On November 12, 1964, plaintiff deposited with the clerk of court the
sum of Php 7,271.22.
RTC DECISION- General and Carmen were legitimate purchasers
for value. The offer to redeem and deposit of redemption price were made
beyond the redemption period (April 23, 1962 to April 24, 1963).
CA DECISION- RTC Decision was reversed. Sale by DBP to
General and Carmen was declared null and void. Barrameda was allowed to
redeem the property since the one year redemption period should start from the
date of registration. Clerk of lower court was ordered to deliver the Php
7,271.22 to General and Carmen. The costs of both instances were also declared
to be charged against them.
Issues:
1. WON the one year period of redemption start from the date of
auction sale or the date of the registration of the sale in the register of deeds in
the interpretation and application of Section 31, Commonwealth Act 4592 (Law
that created DBP).
2. WON the petitioners were under obligation to look beyond what
appeared in the certificate of title of their vendor and investigate the validity of
its title before they could be classified as purchasers in good faith.
Held: CA Decision affirmed
1. The one year period of redemption should start from the date of
the registration of the sale in the register of deeds. The petitioners main
contention that there is a great deal of difference in legislative intent in the use
of the words auction sale in Sec. 31 of Commonwealth Act 459 and the word
sale in Sec. 32 of Act 2938, and Sec. 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
pales into insignificance in the light of our stand that those words used
interchangeably refer to one thing, and that is the public auction sale required
by law in the disposition of properties foreclosed or levied upon. This is
premised on the fact that registration of the deed of conveyance for properties
brought under the Torrens System is the operative act to transfer title to the
property and registration is also the notice to the whole world that a transaction
involving the same had taken place.
2. It is no longer necessary to determine whether the petitioner are
purchasers in good faith of the land involved, since the respondent Barrameda
redeemed the mortgaged property within the legal period of redemption and
consequently the sale of the property by DBP to the petitioners is null and void.
Doctrine: A determination of the legislative intent which is quite a task to
achieve as it depends more on the determination of the purpose or objective of
the law
Differences in words check the intent or purpose for the use of
words

Topic: Aids to Construction

EBARLE v. SUCALDITO
Facts: Anti-Graft league (respondent) filed four cases with the City Fiscal of
Zamboanga del Sur against Bienvenido Ebarle (petitioner) for several violations
stated below:
o
Violation of Anti-Graft Law and Art. 171 of RPC: simulated and
falsified documents for bidding on gravel and sand for Zamboanga del
Sur to favor Tabiliran trucking, and said trucking contract collected
advances which were not reported to provincial auditor and made under
subsisting contract with Teason trucking.
o
Violation of RA 3019 and Art. 171 of RPC: that bidding for
construction on right wing of capitol building was made to favour
brother in law of petitioner.
o
Violation of Art. 182, 183, and 318 of RPC: that petitioner testified
falsely on Cadastral case claiming he bought land from a certain
Brigido Sanchez when said land is owned by provincial government
where provincial jail was located.
o
Violation of RA 3019 and Art. 171 and 213 of RPC: that bidding for
supply of gravel and sand was conducted without publication and
qualified bidder was disqualified to favour associate of petitioner.
o
Petitioner moved to dismiss investigation but was denied and went to
CFI of Zamboanga del Sur for prohibition and mandamus and writ of
preliminary injunction. Writ was granted but respondent filed motion to
lift injunction. Judge Sucaldito (respondent) handed down first of two
challenged orders granting AGL motion.
Petitioner came to SC on certiorari and prayer for TRO which was
then issued.
Three criminal cases were then filed in the circuit court of Pagadian
for violation of various provisions of RA 3019 and Art. 171 (4) of RPC.
o
Appointment of relatives to certain posts in the provincial government
despite falling within prohibition of nepotism and lack of qualification.
Petitioner went to CFI on special civil action for prohibition and
certiorari with preliminary injunction. Court issued restraining order where
AGL moved to lift order and dismiss case. Court dismissed case after which
petitioner went to SC for certiorari with preliminary injunction where SC
sustained implementation of dismissal order
Issues:
WoN Fiscal and AGL failed to comply with requirements for filing
cases against public officials
WoN AGL has standing
WoN Fiscal committed grave abuse of discretion in continuing
investigation on second criminal case despite restraining order issued by SC
WoN complaints against petitioner are tainted with political color
Held:
Plain from wording that EO has exclusive application to
administrative not criminal complaints. There is no mention even of implication
of criminal offenses as word used is irregularities. It could have very well
referred to the more specific term had it intended to make itself applicable to
criminal offenses. EO clearly consolidates existing rules and streamlines
administrative apparatus in matter of complaints against public officials. If it
were intended to apply to criminal prosecutions it would have employed such
technical terms such as accuses, convicted or acquitted. Constitutional
implication of petitioners argument would lead to constitutional anomaly as
agreeing with petitioner would mean that EO is an amendment to the law on
preliminary investigations.
Complaint for purpose of preliminary investigation by the fiscal
need not be filed by the offended Party. The rule is : unless the offense is one
that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the same may be filed for preliminary
investigation by any competent person. A complaint filed with the fiscal prior to
judicial action may be filed by any person.
Though cases involved both violations of RA 3019 and the RPC, this
does not make charges identical. Complaints involved in one set of case is on
nepotism while the other set focuses on simulating and manipulating bids with
respect to supply and construction contracts.
It is not within the scope of the SC to decide such issues as for this
case it falls within jurisdiction of fiscal. Also as a general rule injunction does
not lie to enjoin criminal prosecutions. Exemptions are: 1)for orderly
administration of justice, 2) prevent use of strong arm of law in oppressive and
vindictive manner, 3) avoid multiplicity of actions, 4) afford adequate
protection to constitutional rights, 5) statute relied on is constitutionally infirm.
None of such situations exist.

PEOPLE v. PURISIMA
Facts: There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the
Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila,
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor
General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic
question of law. Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the
respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three
Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before them the
details of which will be recounted below an Order quashing or dismissing
the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege
facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9
because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.
Issue:
Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and
substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon"
penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9?
There are two elements to the offense: first, the carrying outside
one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a
necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of
carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection
with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or
public
disorder.
The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying of any dangerous
weapon outside of the residence w/o regard to motive or intent makes this a
case of statutory construction.
Held: COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER
AND AFFIRMS ALL DECISIONS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT
JUDGES. The Supreme Court says that the intention of PD No. 9 (3) is to
penalize the acts which are those related to the desired result of Proc. No. 1081
and Gen. Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are to suppress those who commit or abet
lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts and the like. The preamble of PD No. 9
also clearly concurs to that, though the preamble is not a part of the statute, it is
the key to determine what is the intent and spirit of the decree and determine
what acts fall within the purview of a penal statute.
The problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of a
statute, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree
and this can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which
enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and
the
stiff
sanctions
stated
therein.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid
presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative
measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is
favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible,
wrongful, evil, and injurious consequence
Doctrine: Penal statutes are to be construes strictly against the state and liberally
in favor of the accused
Repeal by implication is not favored
Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation, or
non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the
contrary
It becomes a judicial task to interpret the meaning and scope of a
statute when an ambiguity in its implementation presents itself
Legislative intent is the controlling factor
Principle on construction of penal statutes
Primary rule: search for the intent and spirit of the law
Whatever is within the spirit of the statute is within the statute and
this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity,
injustice and contradictions
The preamble of the statute may be referred to determine what acts
fall within n the purview of the penal statute (whereas clauses)
The results and effects of a statute must be within its reason and
intent
It is presumed that undesirable consequences or oppressive results
were never intended by the legislative measure
Construction of a statute that is fairly susceptible is favored which
will avoid objectionable, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious
consequences

Topic: Legislative History

SONG KIAT CHOCOLATE FACTORY v. CA
Facts: Petitioner imported sun-dried cocoa beans from Jan. 8, 1953 to Oct. 9,
1953 for which it paid the foreign exchange tax of 17% totaling P74,671.04.
They claimed exemption from tax under Sec. 2 of Republic Act No. 601 as
amended.
The particular provision provides that the tax collected or foreign
exchange used for the payment of costs transportation and/or other charges
incident to importation into the Philippines of rice, flour***soya beans,
butterfat, chocolate, malt syrup***shall be refunded to any importer making
application therefore, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation***.
Petitioner filed suit in CFI Manila but it was dismissed. Defendants
contend that the complaint stated no cause of action because cocoa beans were
not chocolate. The petitioner filed an appeal on SC contending that the term
chocolate includes sun-dried cocoa beans.
Issue: WON cocoa beans may be considered chocolate for exemption? (NO)
Held: The exemption in sec. 2 does not include cocoa beans. The Court strictly
construes statutes exempting from taxation.
Petitioner quotes from dictionaries that the terms chocolate and
cocoa are used interchangeably. But the Court observed that the legal
exemption refers to chocolate and not the bean, nut or tree. Chocolate is a
manufactured or finished product made out of cocoa beans. Cocoa beans do not
become chocolate unless and until they have undergone the manufacturing
processes.
In August 1954, Congress approved RA 1197 amending section 2 by
substituting cocoa beans for chocolate. Cong. Roces proposed to insert the
words cocoa beans in parentheses to clarify any doubts of the past Congress
regarding the words.
Respondents contend that Cong. Roces did not spoke of the intent of
the past Congress because he was not a member of it. He could only state his
own interpretation. Courts do not usually give decisive weight to one
legislators opinion, expressed in Congressional debates concerning the
application of existing laws.
However, the major impression that prevailed was that chocolate
candy or chocolate bar was exempted but not cocoa beans. In the Senate,
confusion arose as to why cocoa beans were not exempted. To alleviate the
public of the confusion, they decided that the term cocoa beans be removed and
deleted.
Other parts of the record show that in approving the House Bill, the
Congress agreed exempt cocoa beans with a view of favoring local
manufacturers. The respondents contend that it as a change of legislative policy
and not a declaration or clarification of previous Congressional purpose.
Presidents proclamation No. 62 of Sept. 2, 1954 specified that
exemption of cocoa beans shall operate from and after Sept. 3, 1954. Statutes
operate prospectively. The petitioner imported cocoa beans from Jan to Oct
1953 which was not covered by the exemption decree.
Appeal is denied. Order of CFI affirmed.
Doctrine: Exemptions are never presumed
Congressional debates concerning the application of existing laws
Congressional purpose

FRANCISCO v. BOSIER
Facts: Petitioner Adalia Francisco and three of her sisters were co-owners of
four parcels of registered lands on which stands the Ten Commandments
Building in Caloocan City.
They sold 1/5 of their undivided share of said land to their mother,
Adela, making her a co-owner to the extent of the shares sold. This share was
sold by Adela, unknown to the others, to respondent Zenaida Boiser, another
sister of Adalia.
Adalia then received a summons filed by Zenaida, demanding her
share in the rentals. Adalia informed Zenaida that she was exercising her right
of redemption as co-owner.
Adalia instituted a civil case before RTC Caloocan alleging that the
30-day period of redemption under Art 1623 CC had not begun to run since
Adela never informed her of the sale of her share. Zenaida claims that Adalia
already knew of said sale since she sent the latter a letter informing her of such.
RTC dismissed Adalias complaint for legal redemption and ruled
that Art 1623 does not prescribe any form of notifying co-owners about a sale to
enable them to exercise their right of legal redemption, the said letter was
sufficient. CA affirmed the RTC decision upon appeal.

Issue: WON the letter sent to the petitioner by respondent notifying her of the
sale can be considered sufficient compliance with the notice requirement in Art
1623
Held: NO. Art 1623 is clear in requiring that the written notification should
come from the vendor or prospective vendor, not from any other person. There
is, therefore, no room for construction.
Principal difference between Art 1524 OCC and Art 1623 NCC is
that the former did not specify who must give the notice, whereas the present
one expressly says that it must be from the vendor. Effect must be given to this
change in statutory language.
Thus, by not immediately notifying the co-owner, a vendor can
delay or even effectively prevent the meaningful exercise of the right of
redemption.
Receipt of the summons amounted to actual knowledge in this case
from which the 30-day redemption period commenced to run, not from the
receipt of the letter by Zenaida. Since Adalias exercise of such right was
timely, the same should be given effect.
Doctrine: To construe the intent of a provision, effect must be given to the
change in statutory language
Here, Art 1524 of the former CC was compared to Art 1623 of the
new CC: in the former, it was immaterial who gave notice while in the new, it
expressly specifies notice must be given by the vendor

Topic: Contemporary Construction

NESTLE PHILIPPINES v. CA
Facts: Sometime in February 1983, the authorized capital stock of petitioner
Nestle Philippines Inc. (Nestle) was increased (from P300M divided into 3M
shares for P100/share, to P600M divided into P600M divided into 6M shares
with for P100/share). With the required processes done by the Nestle, the
respondent SEC authorized the increase. Nestle also paid P50K as filing fee in
accordance with the Corporation Code.
Nestle has only 2 principal stockholders: San Miguel Corp.(SMC)
and Nestle S.A.(NSA)
On December 1983 the Board of Directors and stockholders of
Nestle approved resolutions authorizing the issuance of 344,500 shares out of
the previously authorized but unissued capital stock of Nestle, exclusively to
SMC and NSA. SMC and NSA then paid these shares.
Nestle then filed with the SEC seeking exemption of its proposed
issuance of additional shares to its existing principal shareholders from the
registration requirement of Sec. 4 of the Revised Securities Act and from
payment of the fee referred to in Section 6(c)of the Act. Nestle referred to Sec.
6(a) (4) of the Revised Securities Act (RSA) which they say embraces not only
an increase in the authorized capital stock but also the issuance of additional
shares to existing stockholders of the unissued portion of the unissued capital
stock. Nestle contends that the term increased capital stock should be
interpreted to refer to additional capital stock or equity participation of the
existing stockholders as a consequence of either an increase of the authoritized
capital stock or the issuance of unissued capital stock.
SEC denied Nestle's request stating that the propose issuance is not
what is contemplated in Sec. 6 (a) (4) of the RSA since that specific provision is
applicable only where there is an increase in the authorized capital stock of a
corporation. SEC contends that the transaction actually falls in Sec 6 (b) of the
RSA. CA affirmed SEC decision.
Issue: WoN the phrase issuance of additional stock could mean issuance of
already authorized but still unissued capital stock.
Held: No. that phrase could only mean issuance of capital stock as part of and
in the course of increasing the authorized capital stock of a corporation. In the
case at bar, since the 344,500 shraes of Nestle capital stock are proposed to be
issued from already authorized but still unissued capital stock and since the
present authorized capital stock (the 6M shares) is not proposed to be further
increased, the SEC and CA rejected the Nestle's petition. SC upheld SEC and
CA position.
It is a principle too well established to require extensive documentation that the
contruction given to a statute by an administrative agency charged with the
interpretation and application of that statute is entitled to geat respect and
should be accorded great weight by the courts, unless such construction is
clearly hoen to be in sharp conflict with the governing statute or the
Constitution and other laws. This relates to the accumulation of experience and
growth of apecialized capabilities by the admin agency charged with
implementing a particular statute.

The interpretation of the SEC is also based on the statutrory objective of

protecting the investing public by requiring proposed issuers of capital stock to
inform such public of the true financial conditions and prospects of the
corporation. The SEC is enabled to examineissuances by a corporation of
previously authorized but theretofore unissued capital stock, on case-to-case
basis under Sec. 6 (b).
Doctrine: Interpretation given by administrative agencies entitled to great
respect
The construction given to a statute by an administrative agency
charged with the interpretation and application of that statute is entitled to great
weight by the courts, unless such construction is clearly shown to be in sharp
conflict with the governing statute or the constitution and other laws
Accumulation of experience and growth of specialized capabilities
by the admin agency charged with implementing a particular statute

PHILIPPINE SCOUT VETERANS SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION

AGENCY, INC. v. NLRC
Facts: Worked as security guard since Sept. 1963 and retired on March 20,
1989 with a monthly salary of P1,480. Regalado requested for payment of
retirement pay but the petitioner refused.
May 11, 1989. Regalado filed complaint in NLRC. Petitioner alleged
that private respondent was not entitled to retirement pay since there was no
company policy which provided for or any collective bargaining agreement.
Labor arbiter: in favor of Regalado quoted Art. 283 and 284 of the
Labor Code.
NLRC rendered judgment that an employee is entitled to retirement
benefits in the absence of a company retirement plan or CBA. Quoted Rule 1,
Section 13 and 14, Book 6 of the Rules of Implementing the Labor Code.
Issue: WON the private respondent is legally entitled to retirement benefits?
(NO)
Held: Applicable provisions are Art. 287 and 1, Section 13 and 14(a), Book 6 of
the Rules of Implementing the Labor Code
In making the award of retirement pay, Labor arbiter was confronted
by the lack of contractual or statutory basis for it.

Abaquin: Provisions do not purport to impose any obligation upon

employers to set up a retirement scheme for their employees over
and above the already established under existing laws.

Llora: Difference in the concept of termination pay and retirement

benefits. Termination pay must be paid won an additional retirement
plan has been set up under an agreement with the employer or under
an established employer policy. Sec. 14 and Art. 287 doe not
purport to require termination pay to be paid to an employee who
may want to retire but for whom no additional retirement plan had
been set up by prior agreement with employer.
RA 7641 amending Art. 287: entitled to retirement benefits despite
absence of prior agreements But this cannot be applied because private
respondent retired on March 20, 1989, three years before RA 7641 was enacted.
It is a rule of statutory construction that all statutes are to be
construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and
intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly
declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In every case of
doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect.
Although it may be true that the contemporaneous construction of a
statute by executive officers tasked to enforce and implement statutes should be
given great weight by the courts, nevertheless, if such construction is erroneous
or is clearly shown to be in conflict with the governing statute or the
Commission or other laws, the same must be declared null and void.
Petition Granted. Assailed decision set aside.
Doctrine: All statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation
unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective
effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.
In every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the
retrospective effect
Although it may be true that contemporaneous construction of a
statute by executive officers tasked to enforce and implement said statute
should be given great weight by the courts, nevertheless, if such construction is
erroneous, or is clearly shown to be in conflict with the governing statute if the
commission or other laws, the same must be declared null and void

11. TC issued petitioners prayer for a writ of injunction but respondent

CA reversed this.

It is the role of the judiciary to refine and when necessary to correct

constitutional or statutory interpretation in the context of the interactions of the
three branches of government

Issues:
(1)
Topic: Statutory Directives
(2)
VALDERAMA v. NLRC
Facts: Saavedra respondent filed a complaint against COMMODEX where
petitioner is the owner. Labor arbiter rendered a decision finding that Saavedra
was illegally dismissed and holding COMMODEX liable. Saavedra was
apparently dismissed due to her pregnancy and not due to retrenchment.
COMMODEX ceased operation and the writ be enforced upon the
Petitioner.
Petitioner argued that the decision of the Labor Arbiter had become
final and executory and could no longer be amended. Private respondent argued
that there was no amendment of a final decision but only a correction of mistake
or clarification of ambiguity in the dispositive portion.
Saavedra quoted A.C. Ransome Labor Union stating that the
president could be held liable for payment of backwages. Labor Arbiter
declared petitioner liable for the payment of the monetary awards.
Petitioner appealed to NLRC. NLRC affirmed Labor Arbiters order.
Issue: WON the petitioner is liable for backwages?
Held: The rule once final is not an inflexible one. The modification of the
decision may be sought by the interested party and the court will modify and
alter the judgment to harmonize it with justice and the facts.
Modification is appropriate because COMMODEX was no longer
operational.
The text repeatedly mentions respondents in assessing liability for
the illegal dismissal of private respondent.
To get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion
thereof should be resorted to but same must be considered in its entirety.
Doctrine: To get the true intent and meaning of a decision no specific portion
thereof should be resorted to but same must be considered in its entirety
The rule that NLRC may disregard technical rules of procedure in
order to give life to the constitutional mandate for the protection of labor is well
settled
General rules of procedure are merely suppletory in character
All doubts in the implementation and interpretation (ex labor code)
including its IRR shall be rendered in favor of labor

Held:
(1) Yes
-

(2)

No
-

WON petitioner was denied due process when it was held to be

liable with MLE for encroaching upon the timber concession of
DAVENCOR in the respondent Ministers Order of Execution
WON petitioner is a transferee of MLEs interest, as to make it
liable for the latters illegal logging operations in DAVENCORs
timber concession (Is MIWPI a successor of MLE?)

The decision of the Minister of natural Resources only includes

MLE whereas the Writ of execution includes both MLE and MIWPI
writ of execution must conform to the judgment which is to be
executed. Thus, there is no basis for the issuance of the Order of
Execution against petitioner MIWPI.
MIWPI was not even part of the hearing and pleadings.
a corporation is clothed with a personality separate and distinct
from that of the persons composing it. It may not generally be held
liable for that of the persons composing it.
Insufficient basis for the appellate courts ruling that MIWPI is as
the same as Matuguina.
Having the same major stockholder does not make the subsequent
company MIWPI the alter ego of MLE, not enough to disregard the
legal fiction of separate personality.
MIWPI, likewise, is not the successor of MLE by reason of transfer
of interest.
Sec. 61, PD 705 on transfers: transferee shall assume all the
obligations of the transferor this does not mean that all
obligations are assumed indiscriminately.
obligations as used in the final clause of paragraph 2 of Sec. 61 of
PD 705 obligations incurred by the transferor in the ordinary
course of business; cannot be construed as to mean those liabilities
incurred by the transferor as transgressions of law, as these are
personal obligations of the transferor.

Disposition:
Petition granted
Order of Execution of Minister of Natural Resources is declared NULL and
VOID

TAN v. PEOPLE
Topic: General and Particular Use of Words
Facts:
MATUGUINA INTEGRATED WOOD PRODUCTS, INC v. CA
Facts:
1.

Milagros Matuguina is the sole proprietor of Matuguina Logging

Enterprise (MLE).
2. 1973: MLE had logging operations on 5000 hectares of land, a
portion of which encroached the land of DAVENCOR who had a
timber concession on said portion of land.
3. July 1974: Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. (MIWPI) was
incorporated; majority shareholder is Milagros Matuguina, owning
70% of the stocks.
4. July 1975: deed of transfer of rights, obligations, participation, and
interests of Milagros Matuguina to MIWPI
5. Pending approval of the said transfer, DAVENCOR filed a
complaint regarding MLEs encroachment on their land.
6. 1986: Milagros Matuguina disposed of her shares in MIWPI, thereby
ceasing to be a stockholder of MIWPI
7. October 1, 1986: Minister of natural resources rendered a decision
stating that MLE guilty of encroaching upon DAVENCOR land.
8. October 30, 1986: issued a writ of execution against MLE and/or
MIWPI
9. Feb. 1987: MIWPI filed a complaint for prohibition, damages, and
injunction because Minister of Natural Resources included it
(MIWPI) in the Order of Execution (upon the assumption that
MIWPI is the alter ego or one and the same as MLE).
10. Petitioner asserts that it has a distinct and separate personality from
MLE. In fact, petitioner did not even participate in the proceedings
(not heard nor impleaded) or in the complaint filed by DAVENCOR
against MLE.

On October 26, 1989, in Cajidiocan, Sibuyan Island, Romblon,

Forest Guards Panadero and Rabino intercepted a dump truck, driven by Fred
Moreno (an employee of A & E Construction), loaded with narra and white
lauan lumber.
On October 30, 1989, in Cambajao, Forest Guards Panadero and
Rabino apprehended another dump truck, this time driven by Crispin Cabudol
(also an employee of A & E Construction), loaded with tanguile lumber.
Both motor vehicles, as well as the construction firm (A & E), were
owned by Alejandro Tan. And in both instances, no documents showing legal
possession of the lumber were, upon, demand, presented to the forest guards;
thus, pieces of lumber were confiscated.
On March 16, 1990, Tan and Moreno (driver), together with Ismael Ramilo
(caretaker and timekeeper of A & E), were charged by First Assistant
Prosecutor Rocero with violation of Sec. 68, PD 705, as amended by EO 277.
In another Information, Tan, Ramilo, and Cabudol (the other driver),
were also charged the same violation in connection with the Oct. 30, 1989
incident.
During the trial, defense presented Prisco Marin, who claimed to
have been officer-in-charge of the Bureau of Forest Development of Sibuyan to
testify. He stated that the seized pieces of lumber were bought by Tans (same
owner of A & E) Cajidiocan Trading from Matzhou Development Corporation
in March 19, 1987. Marin, who was then director of forestry, had granted
Matzhou a Tree Recovery Permit covering the entire island of Sibuyan.
Procedural History:
Trial court brushed aside the version of the defense and ruled that
the confiscated pieces of lumber which were admittedly owned by accused Tan
were not legitimate deliveries but aborted nocturnal haulings. It stated that all

the accused failed to comply with the Forestry Reform Code, requiring the
following legal documents: (1) auxiliary invoice; (2) certificate of origin; (3)
sales invoice; (4) scale/tally sheets; and (5) lumber dealer permit.
Accused appealed the decision, assigning 10 errors. Court of
Appeals held the following: (1) To construe that sawn lumber as not covered
by sawn timber would defeat the evident intent and purpose of the law; (2)
Prisco Marins testimony is anything but credible because of the major
inconsistencies in his testimony; (3) corpus delicti does not refer literally to the
object of the crime, i.e., forest products possessed without required legal
documents, because the crime charged were perpetrated by the petitioners was
credibly and amply proven by detailed testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
(4) Tan was involved in the conspiracy as evidenced by Ramilos (co-accused)
admission.
Accused moved for reconsideration, but the CA found no cogent
reason for this reversal or modification of its decision. Hence, the petition to
the Supreme Court.

III.
The supposed sale of lumber by Matzhou to Cajidiocan Trading
occurred in March 1987, which is more than 2 years prior to the
apprehensions; making it doubtful if the confiscated lumbers were really the
same lumbers sold in 1987.
Therefore, it cannot be claimed that EO 277 was retroactively applied to the
case.

Issue:

Disposition:
Wherefore, the petition is denied for utter lack of merit. The
questioned Decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed. Cost against the petitioners.

1. WON Sec. 68 of EO 277 is constitutional.

2. WON the treatment by the lower courts of lumber as timber and/or forest
product within the contemplation of PD 705 as amended (Main Issue).
3. WON EO 277 is retroactively applied.

IV.
Assuming they were the same lumbers, the petitioners still failed to
comply with forest laws and regulations requiring legal documents.
Therefore, petitioners were still liable.
I.
Petitioners unlawful possession of the subject lumber occurred in
October 1989.
II.
EO 277 had already been issued in 1987.
Therefore, petitioners were punishable by EO 277 at the time they were caught
by the forest guards.

Doctrines:
Held:
1. Yes
2. Yes
3. No
Reasoning:
1. On the Constitutionality of Sec 68 of PD 705 as amended by EO
277
I.
Petitioners argue that Sec. 68, PD 705 is violative of substantive due
process as it requires the possession of legal documents to justify mere
possession of forest products and penalizes failure to present such required
documents.
II.
One of the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into
the constitutionality of a law is the existence of an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible to judicial determination
(Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority)
III.
CA correctly pointed out that petitioners were not charged with the
[unlawful] possession of any of these forest products in accordance with Sec
3(q).
Therefore, petitioners failed to assert a legal right for which they are entitled to
a judicial determination.

(1) A statute is always presumed to be constitutional, and one who

attacks it on the ground of unconstitutionality must convincingly prove its
invalidity.
(2) It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to be contrary,
words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and
common usage meaning.
(3) The prohibited act is a malum prohibitum, and absence of malice
or criminal intent will not save the day for the perpetrators.

BERNARDO v. BERNARDO

I.
A statue is always presumed to be constitutional unless convincingly
proven otherwise.
II.
Petitioners did not present any convincing evidence of a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution that would justify the statutes
nullification.
Therefore, Sec. 68 of PD 705 as amended by EO 277 remains constitutional.

Facts: On December 1947, the Republic of the Philippines bought from the
Roman Catholic Church an estate under the provisions of Sec 1of CA 539,
which authorizes purchase of private lands and its subdivision into lots for
resale at reasonable prices to their bona fide tenants or occupants. Crisostomo
Bernardo applied to the Rural Progress Administration for the purchase of the
lot in question. It was contested by Enrique Bernardo, his wife and children,
stating that they have the right to acquire the land. RPA ruled in favor of
petitioners, while trial court upheld the claim of Crisostomo and was affirmed
by CA. CA found the following facts:
That Crisostomo acquired the land through inheritance, his parents
being the lessees of the land in question
The house standing in the lot had been sold by Enrique to
Crisostomo
Because of family relationship, Enrique and his family were able to
remain in the land
Respondent already required the petitioner to vacate the premises

2. On the consideration of lumber as timber or forest product (Main

Issue: WON Enrique Bernardo and his family are bona fide occupants of the
land in question

Issue)
I.
In Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court
ruled that lumber is included in the term timber.
II.
In that decision, it was stated that timber was included in forest
products, while lumber is found in the paragraph defining Processing plant.
III.
This simply means lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw
material.
Therefore, lumber is a processed log or timber.
I.
Sec. 68 of PD 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw
or processed timber.
II.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus (where the law
does not distinguish, we ought not to distinguish)
Therefore, possession of lumber (processed timber) without required legal
documents is punishable by PD 705.
3. On the retroactive application of EO 277 (Corollary Issue)
I.
Petitioners insist that EO 277, which was issued only on July, 1987
was not applicable to them because the lumber seized was lawfully possessed by
Cajidiocan Trading since March 1987.
II.
During the apprehensions (seizure of the logs), petitioners failed to
claim that the lumber belonged to Cajidiocan Trading. It was only raised during
the testimony of Marin.

Held/Ratio: NO. A person who has gratituously occupying a lot by mere

tolerance of the lessee and who does not own the house erected on such lot is
not a bona fide occupant entitled to its acquisition.
1. The term bona fide occupant refers to the one who supposes he
has a good title and knows of no adverse claim.
2. The essence of bona fides or good faith lies in the honest belief in
the validity of ones right, ignorance of a superior claim, and
absence of intention to overreach another. Enrique falls short of this
standard.
3. The petitioner seeks to justify his stand by claiming that the policy
of the government was for the benefit of the actual occupants as
exemplified by Homesite Acts and Acts 1170 and 1933 (Friar
Lands Acts). This is not the case.
a.
Section 7 of A1170 employs the terms actual and bona
fide occupants, plainly indicating that actual and
bona fide are not synonymous; CAs deleted the terms
actual and solely used the words bona fide occupants
emphasizing the requirement that the prospective
beneficiaries should be endowed with legitimate tenure.
b. Government could not simply lay aside moral standards
and aim to favor usurpers, squatters, and intruders,
unmindful of the lawful or unlawful origin and character
of their occupancy. Such would perpetuate conflicts

4.

instead of attaining their just solution. It is safe to say

that the term bona fide occupants was not designed to
cloak and protect violence, strategy, double meaning,
and breach of trust.
The underlying motive behind the Homesite Acts is the desire that
the heads of the families be given opportunity to become owners of
their homes and residential lots in which they and their forebears
have been raised and born.

MALANYAON v. LISING
Facts: Mayor Pontanal was accused of violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Upon filing and upon hearing he was suspended. During the
pendency of the case, he died causing the case to be dismissed. Cesario Goleta,
in his capacity as Municipal Treasurer, disburses funds in favour of the heirs of
the late Mayor for salaries corresponding to the period he was under suspension
plus other benefits. Petitioner contends that such was illegal and contrary to Sec
13 because the late Mayor was not acquitted. Trial court held that dismissal
amounted to acquittal.
Issue:
WON Mayors heirs can claim salary given that he was not acquitted from the
suit
Held: No
Held: Dismissal does not amount to acquittal. Acquittal is merit based. One is
acquitted when evidence is sufficient to prove his/her innocence. Dismissal is
not merit based. A case can be dismissed by either 1) court not having
jurisdiction or 2) information is not valid or sufficient in substance. (People vs.
Saliico) Dismissal means the same as acquittal, only when all evidence has
been presented and such doesnt establish guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt as such finding is based on the merit of the evidence.

Topic: Noscitur A Sociis

AISPORNA v. CA
Doctrine:

Meaning of the word agent used in paragraph 1 of Sec. 189 of the

Insurance Act should be understood taking into context paragraph 2
of the same section which defines that word

Noscitur a sociis: it is necessary to determine whether or not the

agent mentioned in paragraph 1 of the aforesaid section is governed
by the definition of an insurance agent found on its second
paragraph (p.463)

The doctrine of associated words (noscitur a sociis) provides that

where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in
itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning
may be made clear and specific by considering the company in
which it is found or with which it is associated. (467)
Facts:
1. Petitioner Mapalad Aisporna is the wife of Rodolfo Aisporna, who is
legally authorized to serve as an insurance agent for Perla Compania
de Seguros, Inc., a duly organized insurance company.
2. Insurance agents should be duly licensed by the Insurance
Commission.
3. Petitioner solicited the insurance application of Eugenio Isisdro after
his wife, the original beneficiary of the insurance policy, died during
the lifetime of the policy.
4. Petitioner states that since her husband was absent at the office at
that time, she decided to manage the matter since she has always
helped her husband as a clerk in the office.
5. TC and CA both found the petitioner guilty for violating Sec. 189
(1) of the Insurance Act.
6. CA further claimed that the receipt of compensation for an insurance
policy is irrelevant in order to constitute a violation of paragraph 1,
Sec. 189 of the Insurance Act.
7. OSG contend that petitioner is not guilty of the violation.
Issue:
WON a person can be convicted of having violated paragraph 1 Section 189 of
the Insurance Act without reference to the second paragraph of the same section
Held:
No

Paragraph 2 defines the word agent used in Paragraph 1 and

within the intent of the Section
The definition of agents is any person who for compensation solicits
or obtains insurance on behalf of any insurance company. Thus,
a person will only becme an agent as defined by paragraph 2 if he
solicits the insurance for compensation. (compensation is an
essential element)
Petitioner did not receive any compensation (i.e. a fee) for her
services in fixing the insurance policy of Isidro

Disposition: accused acquitted

DAI-ICHI ELECTRONICS MANUFACTURING CORP

v. VILLARAMA
Law:
Article 217, as amended by Section 9 of RA 6715 (which provides that the
jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and Commission shall include claims for actual,
moral, exemplary, and other forms of damages arising from the employeremployee relations)
Facts:
Petitioner alleged that Adonis C. Limjuco violated paragraph 5 of
their Contract of Employment. Petitioner claimed that Limjuco became an
employee of Angel Sound Philippines Corporation, a corporation engaged in
the same line of business as that of petitioner, within two years from January
30, 1992, the date of Limjucos resignation from petitioners employ.
Petitioner further alleged that Limjuco is holding the position of
Head of Material Management Control Department, the same position he held
while in the employ of petitioner.
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against
Limjuco.
Procedural History:
RTC, respondent court, in its Order ruled that it had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the controversy because the complaint was for
damages arising from employer-employee relations. It cited Article 217 (4) of
the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by RA 6715, stating that it is the
Labor Arbiter which had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Hence, the petition seeking the reversal of respondent courts dismissal
of the civil case arguing that the cause of action did not arise from employeremployee relations.
Issues:
1. WON the petitioners claim for damages arises from employer-employee
relations.
2. WON respondent court has jurisdiction over the controversy.
3. WON petitioner committed forum shopping.
Held:
1. No, petitioners claim for damages does not arise from employer-employee
relations.
2. Yes, respondent court has jurisdiction over the controversy.
3. No, petitioner did not commit forum shopping.
Reasoning:
For Issues 1 and 2:
I.
Petitioner seeks to recover damages agreed upon in the contract as
redress for private respondents breach of his contractual obligation to its
damage and prejudice.
Therefore, petitioners claim for damages does not arise from employeremployee relations.
II.
Such cause of action is within the realm of Civil Law.
Therefore, jurisdiction over the controversy belongs to regular courts.
Precedents:
Singapore Airlines Limited vs. Pao, where the Court held that the action for
breach of a contractual obligation, which is intrinsically a civil dispute, belongs
to the jurisdiction of civil courts.
San Miguel Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, SC had
occasion to construe Article 217, as amended by BP 227. Article 217 then
provided that the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over all money claims of
workers but, the phrase arising from employer-employee relation was deleted.
Here SC ruled that:

While par. 3 above refers to all money claims of workers, it is not

necessary to suppose that the entire universe of money claims that might be
asserted by workers against their employers has been absorbed into the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters. In the first place, par. 3 should be
read not in isolation from but rather within the context formed by par 1
(relating to unfair labor practices), par 2 (relating to claims concerning terms
and conditions of employment), par 4 (claims relating to household services, a
particular species of employer-employee relations), and par 5 (relating to
certain activities prohibited to employees or employers).
It is evident that there is a unifying element which runs through
paragraphs 1 to 5 and that is, that they all refer to cases or disputes arising out
of or in connection with an employer-employee relationship. Hence, paragraph
3 should be understood in relation to paragraphs 1, 2, 4, and 5. (Rule of noscitur
a sociis, a word is known by the company it keeps).
Ocheda vs. Court of Appeals, where the Court held that when the cause of
action is based on a quasi-delict or tort, which has no reasonable causal
connection with any of the claims provided for in Art 217, jurisdiction over the
action is with the regular courts.
Pepsi-Cola Distributors of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Galang, where an action
filed by employees against an employer for damages for the latters malicious
filing of a criminal complaint for falsification or private documents against
them came under the jurisdiction of regular courts.
For Issue 3:
I.
Limjuco filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter against the
petitioner to which petitioner, through its counsel, logically raised as one of its
several counterclaims against Limjuco the liquidated damages mentioned in the
contract of employment between parties.
II.
Petitioner set up its counter-claim for liquidated damages merely as
a defense against private respondents complaint before the Labor Arbiter.
Therefore, petitioner did not commit forum shopping.
Disposition:
Accordingly, the Orders of the RTC dated September 20, 1993 and
November 29, 1993 are set aside. The RTC is ordered to continue with the
proceedings in Civil Case 63448.
Doctrines:
(1)Jurisprudence has evolved the rule that claims for damages under par 4 of
Art 217, to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, must have a reasonable causal
connection with any of the claims provided for in that article. Only if there is
such a connection with the other claims can the claim for damages be
considered as arising from employer-employee relations.
(2)This is [referring to San Miguel Corporation], in other words, a situation
where the rule of noscitur a sociis may be usefully invoked in clarifying the
scope of par 3, and any other paragraph of Art 217 of the Labor Code, as
amended.
(3)The rationale behind the holdings in these cases [precedents] is that the
complaint for damages was anchored not on the termination of the employees
services per se, but rather on the manner and consequent effects of such
termination.

Topic: Ejusdem Generis

MAGTAJAS v. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC
FACTS

In 1992, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de

Oro City.
o
It leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce
Properties Corp., Inc.
There was instant opposition to the opening of the casino;
demonstrations were led by Mayor Pablo Magtajas and city
legislators
On Dec. 7, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro
enacted Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business
permits for the operation of casinos and the use of existing business
permits for the operation of casinos and other gambling activities.
On Jan. 4, 1993, it enacted Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the
operation of casinos.
Pryce Properties assailed the ordinances before the Court of
Appeals, and the COA held these to be invalid and issued a writ of
prohibition with preliminary injunction.

Mayor Magtajas and the City of Cagayan de Oro appealed to the

Supreme Court.

ISSUE
WON the Sangguniang Panlungsod Ordinance 3353 and Ordinance 3375-93 are
valid
HOLDING
No, Ordinance 3353 and Ordinance 3375-93 are invalid
PAGCOR was created directly by PD 1869 to help centralize and regulate
all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines.
Petitioners contend that Cagayan de Oro City is empowered to enact
ordinances under the Local Government Code (Sec. 16 and Sec. 458)
o
By virtue of these provisions, the Sangguniang Panlungsod may
allegedly prohibit the operation of casinos because they involve
games of chance gambling is not allowed by general law.
o
Petitioners claim that the Local Government Code meant that all
forms of gambling be suppressed, without distinction, otherwise it
would have expressly excluded casinos and other forms of gambling
authorized by special law, as it could have easily done.
An ordinance must conform to the following requirements:
o
It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
o
It must not be unfair or oppressive.
o
It must not be partial or discriminatory.
o
It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
o
It must be general and consistent with public policy.
o
It must not be unreasonable.
Under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are
authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, gambling and other
prohibited games of chance.
o
This provision obviously excludes games of chance which are not
prohibited by law.
o
Noscitur a sociis a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation
to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated
o
Since gambling is associated with and other prohibited games of
chance, the word should be read as referring to only illegal
gambling, which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be
prevented or suppressed.
The ordinances contravene PD 1869.
o
Petitioners claim that the Local Government Code, being enacted
later than PD 1869, prevails.

If this were so, then PAGCOR would have no more

games of chance to regulate or centralize, as they must be
prohibited by the local government units as mandated by
the Local Government Code.
o
PD 1869 was not repealed by the Local Government Code; it is not
in the list of laws expressly modified or repealed by it.

Implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence

of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention.
o
Courts must exert every effort to reconcile statutes by harmonizing
them if possible.

The proper resolution is to hold that under the Local

Government Code, local government units may (and
indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling
within their territories except only those allowed by
statutes like PD 1869.

This approach would also affirm that there are two kinds
of gambling, the illegal and those authorized by law.

The petitioners suggestion that the Code authorizes them

to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the
distinction between the two forms without a clear
indication that this is the will of the legislature.
o
The ordinances violate PD 1869, which has the character and force
of a statute, as well as the public policy expressed in the decree
allowing the playing of certain games of chance despite the
prohibition of gambling in general.

Local councils only exercise delegated legislative powers

from Congress.

Local government units cannot undo the acts of

Congress; ordinances cannot undo legislative statutes.

PBA v. CA
Facts:
-

Petitioner received assessment letter from Commissioner on Internal

Revenue for payment of deficiency amusement tax (P5, 864, 260.84)
Petition of petitioner with Respondent Commissioner, Court of Tax
Appeals and Court of Appeals denied.
In the Supreme Court, petitioner contended that:
o
Amusement taxes subject to local jurisdiction, not
national jurisdiction (Sec. 13 of Local Tax Code of 1973)
o
Revocation of Revenue Regulations 8-88 (BIR Ruling)
cannot be retroactively applied
o
Cession of advertising and streamer spaces to private
company is not subject to payment of amusement tax
Material statute 1: Local Tax Code of 1973 (PD 231)
o
Power and authority to levy and collect amusement taxes
of admission tickets - local governments
o
BIR Ruling No. 231-86 jurisdiction to levy amusement
taxes on gross receipts of admission tickets on local
governments under PD 231 (its revocation later on cannot
be given retroactive effect, accdg to petitioner)
o
Section 13 says: The province shall impose tax on
admission totheaters, cinematographs, concert halls,
circuses, and other places of amusement.
Material statute 2: PD 1456, amended by PD1959
o
Authority to tax professional basket ball fames
o
Sec 44 Sec 268 (4) says: There shall be collecteda
tax equivalent to: 15% in the case of professional
basketball games.

The terms religious and charitable, though sometimes coincide are not
synonymous and have been enumerated separately when both are involved.
2. The government can regulate religious acts to protect public welfare and to
protect its citizens from injury. In the given case, no one was gravely affected
and need not be regulated as it does not fall as a case against PD 1564
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and petitioner Martin Centeno is ACQUITTED of the offense charged,
with costs de oficio

MALINIAS v. COMELEC
Doctrine:
Was not stated that Sec. 25 and Sec. 232 of BP 881 are part of criminal election
offenses in the Electoral Reforms Law (RA 6646) <expression unius est
exclusion alterius>
Facts
1.
2.
3.
4.

Held:
-

Principle of ejusdem generis

o
Other places of amusement do not include professional
basketball games
o
The prior enumeration refer to amusement activities with
artistic expression
Legislative Intent
o
PD 871: 5% on gross receipts of admission tickets of
professional basketball games
o
PD 1456: Increase to 10%
o
PD 1959: Increase to 15%
For the contention that revocation of BIR ruling cannot be
retroactively applied: government can never be in estoppels,
particularly in matters involving taxes
For the contention on payment of advertising space, Section 1 of
PD1456 expressly states that gross receipts (all receipts of
proprietor) shall be taxed

5.
6.
Held:

Petitioner filed a complaint against private respondents for violating

Sec. 25 and Sec. 232.
Sec. 25 BP 881: Right to be present and to counsel during the
canvass
No sufficient evidence that Maliniass supporters were denied access
by the checkpoints.
Checkpoints were established pursuant to the firearms ban during
election period.
Pilando, Maliniass running mate, was present in the canvassing.
Sec. 232 BP 881: persons not allowed inside the canvassing room
any policeman or peace officer
RA 6646 does not punish a violation of Sec. 25 and Sec. 232 of the
law as a criminal election offense merely has an administrative
sanction
Sec. 27 of RA 6646 does not include Sec. 25 and Sec. 232 of BP 881
in its enumeration of election offenses punishable by law. Thus,
private respondents cannot be held liable for violation of Sec. 25 and
232.
Insufficient evidence to prove allegations

Disposition
Petition dismissed.
GARVIDA v. SALES

Topic: Expressio Unius Est Exclusion Alterius

CENTENO v. VILLATON-PORNILLOS
Facts: Centeno and company were soliciting money as members of Samahang
Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay were soliciting funds for the reconstruction of
chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. They tried to solicit 1,500 pesos from
Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, resident of the same barrio. Centeno and co.
admitted that they did not have a permit to solicit funds. Judge Angeles filed a
complaint against herein petitioners for violation of of Presidential Decree No.
1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law. RTC found the herein petitioners guilty.
Fined each of them to pay 200 but gave them pardon for acting in good faith.
Petitioners filed for appeal. Court affirmed first decision but made fine 1,000 +
6 months imprisonment for perversity of the act committed
Issue:

WON Presidential Decree No. 1564 is applicable to solicitations for

contributions intended for religious purposes, No
WON petitioners could be penalized for religious practice

Ratio
1. No, PD 1564 strictly enumerated the types of solicitations that it could
penalize as those solicitations which are for charitable or public welfare
purposes.
Applying Expressio unius est exclusio alterius the framers of the law clearly
enumerated the types of solicitation and therefore the law cannot be extended to
those not stated therein.

Sales sought to have Garvida disqualified from the SK post because of age. The
court ruled that while the Local Govt Code provided that SK members should
be 21 years old, it added a qualification that should officials should be 21 years
old on the date of election. Garvida was disqualified because she was more than
21 years old, although she was less than 22 years old.

Topic: Casus Omissus

COA - CEBU v. PROVINCE OF CEBU
This case is about the effects of a new law on an old law. The Special Education
Fund (SEF) allowed the use of part of the realty and cigarette taxes for
extension programs and scholarships. When the Cebu provincial office used it
to pay for salaries of teachers and scholars, COA said those were not chargeable
to the SEF since RA 5447, which created the SEF, was deemed repealed by the
Local Govt Code. Because the two retained sections in the LGC omitted the
scholarship grants, the court ruled that what was omitted must have been
omitted intentionally, and so may not be included.
Topic: Ubi Lex Non Distinguit Nec Nos Distinguere Debmos
RAMIREZ v. CA
Facts: Socorro Ramirez files for a case for damages against private respondent,
Ester Garcia. The latter allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a
hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners dignity and
personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. To support the
claim, Ramirez presented a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral
damages and other fees. This transcript was culled from a tape recording of the

confrontation made by the petitioner. As a result, Garcia filed a criminal case

against petitioner because the said confrontation was secretly recorded.
According to Garcia, such recording was done without her knowledge. Thus, it
violates Section 1 of RA 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law which states that It
shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using
any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the complaint
citing that the Act refers to the taping of a communication by a person other
than a participant to the communication.
Issue: WON RA 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by
one of the parties of the conversation
Held/Ratio: NO. Petitioner argues that the provision only applies to a person
other than the parties of the conversation. However, the Court held that the Act
clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person to record such
communication by a means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as
to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party
other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The
statutes intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier any. To further concretize their
holding, the Court looked into the Senate proceeding pertaining to this Act. It
has been found that the unambiguity if the express words of the provision, taken
together with the deliberations from the Senate, supports the view held by the
CA that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
distinguish.

CEBU INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE v. CIMEU-NFL

Other benefits may refer to SSS, Medicare, Pagibig and may be taken from
the 70% tuition increase since the law only says that money from this may be
given to employees in the form of salaries and other benefits. Since the law did
not distinguish between other benefits and SSS, etc, these may be deducted
from the 70% increase in tuition charged by the school.

o When the order of denial of motion was registered in mail on July 13,
appellant only has 1 day to file notice of appeal and not 11 days, as what his
counsel has contended
o Thus, when he filed his notice of appeal on Sept. 10, 1963, it was 58 days late
- But, because his right to seek a review of this case was lost by reason of his
counsels mistake, the Court decided to review his case
NOTES:
- two versions of the story was presented, but the court upheld the trial courts
accepted facts:
o Tamani, together with Vice-Mayor Villamor Tamani and others, planned to
kill Mayor Domingo so the latter could act as mayor; the former was given a
carbine to kill
o Cadawan went to the poblacion in the morning to know the whereabouts of
Mayor Domingo
o Cadawan informed Tamani that said mayor was at Puas store
o Cadawan stumbled at the yard of Mrs. Ibarra, making a noise, thus leading to
Tamani being recognized by Mrs. Ibarra
o Two gunfire were heard, Jose Siyang standing beside Mayor Domingo, was
killed
- Tamani was declared guilty of murder:
o Alibi was insufficient and uncorroborated
o Inconsistency regarding his claim of not understanding Tagalog but he
repeated verbatim in Tagalog what his supposed tormentor wanted him to say;
he also knew English being a former policeman
o Francisco Siyang, Tamanis lone witness and the father of the deceased could
not identify positively the killers so he claimed that his son was killed not by
Tamani, a second-cousin, but by policemen Ibarra and Tumaneng
o The act of shooting at a distance which renders Jose unexpected of being shot
and defenceless is a form of treachery, hence, a qualifying circumstance to
murder
o On the part of the mayor, because he was able to avoid the second shot by
taking refuge to Puas store is an attempted murder, because he did not perform
all acts of execution

Topic: Construction of Statute as a Whole

JMM PRODUCTIONS & MANAGEMENT INC v. NLRC
Facts:
1.

Topic: Redeendo Singular Singulis

PEOPLE v. TAMANI
FACTS:
- Tamani was sentenced a life imprisonment for the murder of Jose Siyang
- February 14, 1963- the decision was promulgated ; a copy was sent to his
counsel on February 25, 1963
- March 1, 1963- he filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied; the
notice of denial was mailed on July 13, 1963 on defendants counsel through his
wife
- Sept. 10, 1963- forty-eight days from Jul 24, 1963 (15 days reglementary
period for appeal if computed from the promulgation of its decision64), he file
for a motion for recommendation
- The counsel of Tamani filed a sworn statement saying that the letter was not
brought into his attention by his wife, although she acknowledged its receipt on
July 13, 1963. He came to know about this order only on Sept. 7, 1963, when he
verified the expediente of the case and discovered his motion was denied; his
wife should have lost his envelope containing the letter
- The court said that he should include an affidavit of his wife and file for a
motion praying that the tardy appeal may be granted
- Sept. 10, 1963- a notice of appeal was filed by the respondent

Following Secs. 4 and 17, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules, the
petitioner made the following:
a.
Paid the license fee (Sec. 4)
b. Posted a cash bond and surety bond (Sec. 4)
c.
Placed money in escrow (Sec. 17)
2. The petitioner wanted to appeal a decision of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to the respondent
NLRC, but the latter dismissed the appeal because of failure of the
petitioner to post an appeal bond required by Sec. 6, Rule V, Book
VII of the POEA Rules. The decision being appealed involved a
monetary award.
3. The petitioner contended that its payment of a license fee, posting of
cash bond and surety bond, and placement of money in escrow are
enough; posting an appeal bond is unnecessary. According to Sec.
4, the bonds are posted to answer for all valid and legal claims
arising from violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the
license, and/or accreditation and contracts of employment. On the
other hand, according to Sec. 17, the escrow shall answer for valid
and legal claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment
violations or money claims.
4. Sec. 6 reads:
In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond
The bonds required here are different from the bonds required in Sec. 4.

ISSUE: What does Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court mean?
DECISION: (appeal dismissed)
- The word must in the phrase An appeal must be taken within... in Sec. 6
means connotation, compulsion or mandatoriness to be effected fifteen days
after the promulgation
- Reddenda singular singulis65: The word promulgation should be construed
as referring to judgment, while the word notice should be construed as
referring to order, hence, an appeal must be taken within 15 years from
promulgation of judgment or notice of order

Issue: Was the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond despite the fact
that it has posted bonds and placed money in escrow before?
Held:
Yes. The Court found that Sec. 6 complements Sec. 4 and Sec. 17.
The bonds required in Sec. 4 and the escrow required in Sec. 17 have different
purposes from the appeal bond required in Sec. 6.
The bonds in Sec. 4 are made to answer for all claims against the employer,
which is not limited to monetary awards to employees whose contracts of
employment have been violated.

The escrow agreement in Sec. 17 is used only as a last resort in claiming against
the employer.
On the other hand, Sec. 6 requires an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to
the monetary award. Indeed, this appeal bond is intended to further insure the
payment of the monetary award. Also, it is possible that the monetary award
may exceed the bonds posted previously and the money placed in escrow. If
such a case happens, where will the excess be sourced? To solve such a
dilemma, an appeal bond equivalent to the amount of the monetary award is
required by Sec. 6.
Construction:
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of
rules as in this case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given
effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a
hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. That
the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed.
The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should
be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled
whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.

The law, taken together, simply means that the cancellation of the adverse claim
is still necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain
annotated and shall continue as lien upon the property. In other words, the
adverse claim is not automatically cancelled by the lapse of the 30-day period.
If this was the intention of the law, then the procedures set out in the succeeding
sentence will no longer be necessary and should not have been included.
2.

Yes. The presumption is that the buyers are in good faith. The party
alleging bad faith must establish the same by competent proof. In
this case, no proof established the buyers bad faith. Hence, they are
presumed to be buyers in good faith.

Judgment reversed and set aside, that of the court a quo reinstated.

Topic: Construction in Relation to Other Statutes

AKBAYAN YOUTH v. COMELEC
Facts:

SAJONAS v. CA
Facts:
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Issues:
1.

2.

Petitioners Sajonases had an agreement with the Uychocdes in 1983

for the latter to sell their land to the former. In August 27, 1984,
petitioners caused the annotation of an adverse claim based on their
Contract to Sell on the title of the subject land. On September 4,
1984, the petitioners were able to fully pay for the land, and the deed
of absolute sale was registered on August 28, 1985.
Respondent Pilares was a creditor of Ernesto Uychocde. Uychocde
failed to fulfill his monetary obligation to respondent. A notice of
levy on execution was granted to the respondent by a competent
court, and this was annotated by the Register of Deeds on the title of
the subject land on February 12, 1985.
When a new title was issued to the petitioners pursuant to the deed
of absolute sale, the annotation of notice of levy on execution was
carried over to it.
The petitioners filed a complaint before the RTC, asking to cancel
the annotation of levy on execution. The court a quo decided in
favor of the petitioners.
Upon appeal by the respondent, however, the CA reversed the lower
courts order and upheld the annotation of the levy of execution on
the title. The CA accepted respondents claim that the annotation of
adverse claim by the petitioner already lapsed after a period of 30
days, following Sec. 70 of PD. No. 1529.

Was the annotation of adverse claim still in force despite the lapse of
the 30-day period provided in Sec. 70 of PD No. 1529 when the
annotation of the notice of levy on execution was made on February
12, 1985?
Were petitioners buyers of land in good faith?

Held:
1. Yes. The CA and private respondent erred in interpreting Sec. 70.
In construing the law aforesaid, care should be taken that every part thereof be
given effect and a construction that could render a provision inoperative should
be avoided, and inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible
as parts of a harmonious whole.
A statutes clauses and phrases must not be taken separately, but in its relation
to the statutes totality. Each statute must, in fact, be construed as to harmonize
it with the pre-existing body of laws. Unless clearly repugnant, provisions of
statutes must be reconciled.

Petitioners, representing the youth sector are asking COMELEC to

conduct a special registration of new voters from 18-21.
January 25, 2001: Acting on the clamor of students and civic
leaders, Sen. Roco, Chairman of the Committee on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage
and Peoples Participation invited COMELEC to a public hearing for the
purpose of discussing the extension of registration of voters to accommodate
those who are not able to register before the COMELEC Deadline.
January 29, 2001: Submission of Memo No. 2001-027 on the Report
on the Request for a Two-Day Additional Registration of New Voters Only.
February 8, 2001: Request to Conduct a two-day additional
registration of new voters on Feb. 17 and 18, 2001 was denied.
Petitioner:
GR No. 147066: Seeks to nullify COMELECs Resolution and/or to declare
Sec. 8 of RA 8189 (Voters Registration Act) unconstitutional insofar as said
provision causes disenfranchisement of petitioners and other similarly situated.
GR No. 147179: Praying that the court direct COMELEC to provide for another
registration day under the continuing registration provision under the Election
Code.
Sol Gen: recommended an additional continuing registration of voters.
Issues:
1.
2.

WoN respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in

issuing COMELEC Resolution
WoN court can compel COMELEC to conduct a special registration
of new voters during the period bet. COMELECs deadline Dec. 27,
2001 and May 14, 2001 general elections

Held:
No. Right of suffrage is not absolute and subject to existing
substantive and procedural requirements. No. Registration is a necessary
requisite to the right to vote. State has power to safeguard and regulate voters
registration. Every new statute should be construed in connection with those
already existing in relation to the same subject and all should be made to
harmonize and stand together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable
interpretation. Interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi:
best method of interpretation is that which makes laws consistent with other
laws.
Sec. 28 is anchored on the sound premise that these certain preelection acts are still capable of being reasonably performed vis--vis the
remaining period before the date of the election and the conduct of other related
pre-election activities required under the law.
No showing that petitioners have filed an application and was denied
nor filed a complained before COMELEC that s/he was barred from applying
from Dec. 28 to Jan. 13

Sec. 70 of PD 1529 added a lapsing period not found in Sec. 110 of Act 496 or
the Land Registration Act. The relevant lines of the former reads:
The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of
registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may
be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest.
Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on
the same ground shall be registered by the same claimant.
The first sentence must not be taken separately, but must be read in relation to
the succeeding sentences.

Impossibilium nulla obligation est. No obligation to do an

impossible thing.
A statute may not be so construed as to require compliance with it
prescribes cannot, at the time, be legally accomplished.
Petitioners are not without fault. They were not totally denied the
opportunity to avail of the continuing registration. Impuris minibus nemo
accedat curiam Let no one come to court with unclean hands.
1. No.

Determination of whether or not the conduct of a special registration

of voters is feasible within the remaining period involves the exercise of
discretion and thus, cannot be controlled by mandamus.

(2)
(3)
(4)

Concurring Opinion: Kapunan, J.

(5)

Sec. 28, RA 8436 must be understood in the context of the

inadequacy of the registration period under the law then prevailing, i.e. the
period provided in Sec. 126 of BP 881. Said provision was made in recognition
of the insufficiency of the two-day registration period. Also, Sec. 28 has been
impliedly repealed by RA 8189 providing a prolonged period of registration.

(6)

Section 21 of the HRET Revised Rules of Procedure states that

petitioner has to specify the precincts.
Petitioner did not have any support for the allegation.
Rather than a failure to follow procedure, the petition has a more
serious inadequacy, because the contested precincts werent alleged.
Substantial amendments to the protest must be made within ten days
after winners proclamation. (Rule 16)
Rule that in an election protest, the petitioner must stand or fall upon
the issues he had raised in his original or amended pleading prior to
the lapse of the statutory period for filing of the protest, still stands.

CIR v. B.F. GOODRICH PHILIPPINES INC.

Sec. 29 of RA 6646/ Sec. 28 of RA 8436 cannot prevail over RA
8189 since the latter deals specifically with registration of voters (a special
law). Where a conflict between a general law and a special law exists, the latter
should prevail because it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the
general law.
Provision that no registration shall be conducted within 120 days
prior to regular elections is clear and unequivocal.
Granting arguendo that COMELEC has standby power, we cannot
compel the COMELEC since it is already operationally impossible.
Dissenting Opinion: Pardo, J.
Non-registration will render nugatory the constitutional right of
suffrage granted to every qualified Filipino citizen.
Laws are to be harmonized rather than consider one repealed in
favor of the other. The presumption is against inconsistency or repugnancy and,
accordingly, implied repeal. Thus, standby power is retained by Sec. 28 of
RA 8436.
Sec. 8, RA 8189: Directory and not mandatory
COMELEC has misled the public due to an erroneous resolution on
fixing the deadline for registration.
Matters can be resolved by proper planning, coordination and
cooperation. Extraordinary effort may be needed, but the work can still be done.

Topic: Strict and Liberal Construction

PENA v. HRET
Facts:
Pena assails the HRET decision dismissing his petition against private
respondent Abueg, which alleged that the latter committed fraud in the 2nd
district of Palawans congressional elections.
Petition to HRET stated the number of votes only, not number of
precincts. Abueg to HRET: HRET does not have jurisdiction because petitioner
didnt allege the number of precincts. Petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss,
and named the 700 out of 743 precincts wherein the alleged fraud happened.
HRET: dismissed.
a.
Petitioner did not allege the municipalities where fraud happened.
b. No specification of the 700 precincts
c.
The precincts were only referenced to in the Prayer
d. It is clear in HRET rules that the precincts where the irregularities
occurred need to be stated in the allegations
e.
Defects in original protest is not cured by summary
f.
Petitioner did not appeal from the resolution which decided the
dismissal, thus it is final (Rule 18)
g. Petitioner did no steps to amend and cure defects when petition ad
cautelam (for caution) was changed to non ad cautelam.
Issues
(1)
(2)

WON there is a cause of action, and if the petition is sufficient.

WON petitions defect was cured by the summary

Held: NO and NO.

(1) Abuegs answer is in line with procedure; HRET was not ruling on
the substantive merits of the case.

Facts
1.

TMX Sales paid its quarterly income tax of P247,010 for the first
quarter of 1981 on May 15, 1981.
2. On April 15, 1982, its Annual Income Tax return for 1981 declared a
net loss of more than 6M (thus zero annual tax).
3. On July 1982, TMX Sales, Inc. filed with the Appellate Division of
BIR a claim for refund of the P247,010 paid on May 15. Claim was
not acted upon.
4. March 14, 1984, respondent filed a petition for review before the
CTA. Herein petitioner said that the respondent is already barred
from claiming the refund because more than 2 years had already
elapsed between the payment (May 15, 1981) and the filing of claim
in CTA. Section 292 (now Section 230) of the National Internal
Revenue Code states that no suit or proceeding shall be begun after
the expiration of two years from the date of payment of the tax.
5. CTA decided in favor of herein respondent, ordering petitioner to
refund the claimed amount, and saying that in contemplation of tax
laws, there is no payment until the whole or entire tax liability is
completely paid.
6. Thus this petition.
Petitioner: Pacific Procon Ltd. V. Commissioner of Internal Revenue: case
involving similar set of facts; denial of claim for refund.
Issue: WON the two-year prescription period in Section 292 starts from the date
the quarterly income tax was paid (May 15, 1981, in favor of petitioner).
Held: NO. Period starts from the date of filing of the Final Adjustment
Return/final payment (April 15, 1982, in favor of respondent).
(1) CTA reversed its decision of Pacific Procon Ltd. V. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue through this case.
(2) Section 229 should be interpreted in relation to the other provisions
of the Tax Code to avoid an inconvenient and absurd application of
the law. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the
whole text of the law, and every part of the act is to be taken into
view. A literal application of Section 292 would pose no problem if
the exact quarter that the income tax was paid can be easily
determined. (See pages 190-191) If payments were made during the
first and third quarters of the year, it would be difficult to determine
when the two-year prescriptive period would commence. It would be
more logical for the prescriptive period to start at the time of filing
of Final Adjustment Return or the Annual Income Tax Return.
(3) Section 321 requires the YEARLY auditing of the books. Payments
of quarterly income tax returns are considered mere installments of
the annual tax due.
Doctrine:
(1) A provision should be interpreted in relation to other provisions of
that code. (in its totality)
Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper frienda est, ut evitatur inconveniens et
absurdum where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid
inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted.

PHILEX MINING CORPORATION v. CIR

Facts:
Petitioner is a domestic mining corporation.
Petitioner purchased from several oil companies, refined and
manufactured mineral oils, motor fuels, and diesel fuel oils.
Specific taxes passed on to petitioner amounted to around 2 million.
Pursuant to RA 1435, petitioner filed a claim for refund with the
commissioner of internal revenue (CIR) for 623k, representing 25% of
the specific taxes paid.
Pending CIR action, petitioner filed a case for tax refund with the court
of tax appeals (CTA).
CTA granted the claim, but only to the extent of 16k.
CA affirmed the decision of CTA, hence this petition.

CTA based the refund on Sections 1 and 2 of RA 1435, instead of

petitioners claim that it be based on the increase rates imposed by
Sections 142 and 145 (which became 153 and 156) of the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) as amended.

Issues:
W/N the respondent court erred in basing the tax refund under Sections 1
and 2 of RA 1435, instead of the increased rates imposed by Sections
142 and 145 (which became Sections 153 and 156) of the NIRC, as
amended.
W/N the respondent court erred in relying on the SCs decision in CIR vs
Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Corp. which allegedly runs counter to the
Courts decision in Insular Lumber Co. Vs. CTA.
Held:
No.
No.
Reasoning:
RA 1435, grants 25% partial refund of specific taxes paid on purchases
of manufactured diesel and fuel oils of mining and lumber companies.
1977 PD 1158 codified all laws. Sections 142 and 145 were
renumbered to sections 153 and 156.
Later, this sections were amended by PD 1672 and subsequently by EO
672 increasing the tax rates for certain oil and fuel products.
In a string of decisions, SC repeatedly held that the tax refund under RA
1435 is computed on the basis of the specific tax deemed paid under
Sections 1 and 2, and not on the increased rates actually paid under the
1977 NIRC.
Since the partial refund is in the nature of a tax exemption, it must be
construed strictly against the grantee. No expression of a legislative will
authorizing a refund based on the higher rates claimed by petitioner. Law
did not specifically provide for a refund based on the increased rates.
In the case of insular lumber co., increased rates were not yet in effect.
Issue now does not exist at the time. In Rio Tuba case, refund granted
was computed on the basis of sections 1 and 2 of RA 1435.
There is no tax exemption based solely on the ground of equity.

The NTC can function and has functioned without additional rules aside
from the Public Service Law and other rules issued by the predecessors
of NTC. What is MANDATORY is the immediate implementation of the
policies declared. The formulation of rules and regulations is purely
discretionary on the part of the delegate.
That both words are used in Section 2 demonstrates the distinction
between may and shall and preserves their ordinary sense.
Section 16 of the Public Service Law was not modified nor repealed by
P.D. 217 section 2 only reiterates and clarifies ambiguity of repealing
clause of PD 217.
The existing substantive and procedural laws are more than adequate to
determine the reasonability of the amounts of investment of telephone
subscribers, the viability of the company and other factors involved.
For several years NTC has applied the procedure prescribed by the
Public Service Law and recognizes that PLDT has earned a yearly
average profit of Php 100 Million and subscribers have been consistently
receiving their quarterly dividends on their investments. Plus the
installment option for payment will lighten the burden of subscribers.

Dissenting Opinions:
*Teehankee: departure from Rules of Court and practice of setting the case for
rehearing or hearing oral arguments when a new majority is inclined to overturn
original majority.
*Gutierrez: Concurs with views on the power of NTC but there is No
justification for the continued inefficient services rendered by PLDT.
Consumers would not mind paying reasonable increases if they get satisfactory
services.
* Abad Santos: deny second motion for reconsideration of PLDT as the
decision very recent was overturned especially as there was no dissenting
opinion to dilute the acceptability of the November 25 decision. Words ought to
be more subservient to the intent and not the intent to the words.. the rule of
ordinary meaning is not absolute, especially when it concerns public interest or
rights. If the public has an interest in matters, the grant of authority is therefore
equivalent to imposition of duty.

Topic: Mandatory and Directory Statutes

DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. CA

PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION INC v. NATIONAL

TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Facts:
NTC approved the revised Subscriber Investments Plan schedule which
was proposed by PLDT on March 20, 1980. Oppositions were filed
against said proposal after which hearings were conducted and the said
decision being challenged was promulgated on November 22, 1982. The
SIP was approved on the ground that the rates are within 50% of cost
limit as provided in P.D. No. 217, and that they are just and reasonable
and in consonance with public policies and public interest.
March 2, 1983 petitioner filed instant petition seeking to annul and set
aside the decision of NTC. Respondents filed their respective comments
and memoranda and on November 25, 1983 the decision sought to be
reconsidered was set aside.
January 1984, the court granted respondent PLDT motion for extension
to file motion for reconsideration and subsequently filed a motion to
admit attached supplemental motion for reconsideration which was
allowed by the court upon requiring petitioners to file comments. The
Solicitor general in behalf of NTC filed a manifestation and motion that
it is joining PLDT in its motion for reconsideration. The motion for
reconsideration was denied in a resolution promulgated April, 1984.
PLDT filed a second motion for reconsideration and required petitioner
to comment after which the court required respondents to file a reply on
the comments of the petitioner. NTC again filed a manifestation adopting
the motion of PLDT.
The motion of petitioner to declare the November 25 decision as final
was not acted upon by the Supreme Court.
Issues:
WoN the National Telecommunications Commission must first
promulgate the rules and regulations mentioned in P.D 217 before it can
approve the Subscriber investment Plan of PLDT
Held:
The November 25 decision interpreted Section 2 of P.D 217 as
mandatory which is NOT supported by the actual words of the law. The
word used in the law must be given its ordinary meaning thus may be
promulgated should NOT be construed as shall or must.

Facts:

The petition is a question whether a newspaper publication of the

notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case
mandatory or directory.
December 8, 1986 Private respondent, Teodoro Abistado, filed a
petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of
land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 [Property Registration
Decree].
During the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Therefore he
was substituted with his heirs represented by their Aunt Josefa
Abistado who was their guardian ad litem.
June 13, 1989 The Land Registration Court dismissed the petition
for want of jurisdiction.
o
Due to the applicants failure to comply with the
provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD1529 requiring the
applicants to publish the Notice of Initial Hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines and in
the Official Gazette.
o
The applicant was only able to publish such in the
Official Gazette.
o
The Land Registration Court also cited Ministry of
Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982 stating that the
publishing in the OG is for jurisdiction of the court and
the publishing in a newspaper of general circulation is
procedural. Neither one nor the other is dispensable.
o
Hence, the Land Registration Court concluded that it did
not acquire jurisdiction over the application.
Private Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
o
July 3, 1991 The CA set aside the decision of the lower
court and ordered the registration of the title to the
Private Respondent.
o
November 19, 1991 The CA also denied the motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.

Issue and Reasoning:

WoN the publication in the OG is sufficient to confer jurisdiction?

Yes.
o
Sec23 of PD1529 provided that:
x x x the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a Notice of Initial
Hearing to be published once in the OG and once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines. Provided, however, that the publication in the OG
shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. x x x

WoN the failure to comply with the requirement of publication in a

newspaper of general circulation is a mere procedural defect and
can be skipped? No.
o
In the absence of any publication in a newspaper of
general circulation, the Land Registration Court cannot
validly confirm and register the title of private
respondents.
o
Statutory Construction The law used the term shall
in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner
of Land Registration upon receipt of the court order
setting the time for initial hearing. The word shall
denotes an imperative and indicates a mandatory
character of a statute.
o
Statutory Construction The inclusion of the law of a
requirement in its detailed provision is imperative.
(Republic vs Marasigan 198 SCRA 219, June 6, 1991)
o
Due Process A land registration is a proceeding in rem
(in a thing). Therefore, such proceeding requires
constructive seizure of the land as against all persons,
including the State who has rights to or interests in the
property. The publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing
in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines,
therefore, must be strictly be complied with so that all
persons who may have interest in the same property will
be notified and given opportunity to oppose. Not doing so
will deprive other persons of due process.

Decision:
Petition is granted.
Assailed decision and resolution are reversed and set aside.
Application of Private Respondent for land registration is dismissed.

PHILIPPINE REGISTERED ELECTRICAL PRACTITIONERS INC v.

FRANCIA, JR
Facts:

February 10, 1986 The PRC (then headed by the Respondent,

Francia, Jr.) approved the resolution of the Board of Electrical
Engineering, BEE Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986.
o
In the said resolution, the Board adopted guidelines for
the implementation of the Continuing Professional
Education (CPE) Program for electrical engineers.
o
BEE Resolution1 stated that beginning January 1, 1988,
every electrical engineer must earn credit units of CPE
before his license can be renewed.
o
To earn credits, an electrical engineer must first apply for
accreditation with the Institute of integrated Electrical
Engineers of the Philippines (IIEE).
July 6, 1988 Petitioner filed before the RTC an action for
declaratory relief and/or prohibition, assailing the constitutional
validity of BEE Resolution1.
o
Petitioner claims that BEE Resolution1 violates: (1) due
process clause, (2) equal protection clause, (3)
prohibition against bills of attainder, (4) prohibition
against ex post facto laws, and (5) mandate for the
protection of the rights of workers.
RTC dismissed the Petitioners action.
o
Petitioner failed to establish a clear and unequivocal
violation of the Constitution or statute. All reasonable
doubts should be resolved in favor of the validity of a
statute.
o
BEE Resolution1 is a valid implementation of Sec3,
RA184 [An Act to Regulate the Practice of Electrical
Engineering in the Philippines, to Provide for the
Licensing and Registration of Electrical Engineers and

Electricians and for Other Purposes], and Sec6 of PD233

[Creating the Professional Regulation Commission and
Prescribing its Powers and Functions].
Hence, this direct appeal to the Supreme Court on pure questions of
law.

Issue and Reasoning:

WoN the Board of Electrical Engineers had the authority to issue the
question resolution under the provisions of RA184? Yes.
o
Petitioner PRC and the Board did not have the
requisite authority to issue the question resolution. Citing
Sec6(a) of PD223, Petitioners claims that the Board only
has visitation powers, to see [to it] that proper
compliments of professionals are employed and given
proper responsibilities and remunerations. Petitioner
claims that the Board may only conduct inspections of
sites where electrical engineering jobs are conducted,
primarily to safeguard the welfare of electrical engineers.
o
Supreme Court Sec3, RA184 mandates the Board to
recommend to the PRC the adoption of:
x x x measures as may be deemed proper for the maintenance of good ethics
and standards in the practice of electrical engineering in the Philippines. x x x
Moreover, Sec6(a) of PD223 gives various professional boards the power:
x x x (t)o look from time to time into the conditions affecting the practice of
the profession or occupation under their respective jurisdictions and whenever
necessary, adopt such measures as may be deemed proper for the enhancement
of the profession or occupation and/or the maintenance of high professional,
ethical and technical standards x x x
For said purposes,
x x x the members of a Board may personally or through subordinate
employees of the Commission conduct ocular inspection or visit industrial,
mechanical, electrical or chemical plants or works, hospitals, clinics, and other
engineering works x x x
>> The Petitioners claim that the authority of the Board is limited to conduct
ocular inspections is false. Nothing in the provision imposes such interpretation.
The Board may even do away with ocular inspections as seen with the use of
the word may, implying that the conduct of ocular inspections is merely
directory and not mandatory. Conducting such ocular inspections is only one
way of ensuring compliance with laws and rules relative to the professional
practice of electrical engineering but it is not the only way.
>> The Board has the power to issue the assailed resolution, in pursuance of its
mandates under RA184 and PD223.

WoN BEE Resolution1 is constitutionally valid? Moot.

o
July 25, 1995 President Fidel V. Ramos issued EO266,
entitled Institutionalization of the Continuing
Professional Education (CPE) Programs of the Various
Professional Regulatory Boards (PRBs) under the
Supervision of the Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC).

>> It is now imperative to impose upon registered professionals the completions

of the CPE as a pre-requisite for the renewal of their licenses.
>> Therefore, the assailed BEE Resolution1, Series of 1986, is no longer in
effect.
Decision:
Petition is denied for being moot and academic.

Topic: Retroactive and Prospective Statutes

SUBIDO, JR v. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: On June 25, 1992, Bayani Subido Jr., then a Commissioner of the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation (BID) and Rene Parina, a BID special agent,
while in the performance of their officialfunctions, issued and implemented a
warrant of arrest against James J. Maksimuk, knowing fullywell that the BID
decision requiring Maksimuks deportation was not yet final and executory.

This resulted to the detention of Maksimuk for a period of 43 days, causing him
undue injury.
Subido and Parina were charged with Arbitrary Detention defined
and punished by Article 124 ofthe Revised Penal Code. For their part, the
petitioners filed a Motion to Quash, contending thatthe Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over the case since when it was filed, Subido was nolonger part of
the service and Parina was not occupying a position corresponding to salary
grade 27
.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the case
Held: Yes. The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the case by virtue of
Section 2 of R.A. 7975, which amended Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606:
Section 2: Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
Section 4: Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction
in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
theAnti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter
II,Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in
thegovernment, whether in permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
thecommission of the offense;
1)Officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regionaldirector and
higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher,of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989(R.A. 6758), specificially including:
xxx
5)All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 andhigher under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to the office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with the
Executive Order Nos. 1,2, 14, and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying
positionscorresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in said R.A.
6758, orPNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their
equivalent,exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested n the proper Regional
Trial Court,Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court,as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction
as provided in BatasBlg. 129.
Contrary to the claims of the petitioners, R.A. 7975 applies since
what is considered is the time ofthe commission of the crime, during which
Subido was still Commissioner of BID. Similarly,although Parina was holding a
position with a classification lower than salary grade 27, it stillapplies to him
since he is prosecuted as a co-conspirator of Subido, the principal
accused.Jurisdiction is only vested on the other courts if none of the principal
accused where occupyingpositions corresponding to salary grade 27.

ZULUETA v. ASIA BREWERY

Doctrine on Retroactivity of laws
General rule: Laws have no retroactive effect.
Exception: remedial, procedural, curative laws, laws that do not affect vested
rights
Thus, procedural laws may operate retroactively as to pending proceedings even
without express provision to that effect.
Facts:
1. Petitioner Zulueta is a dealer and operator of Asia Brewery beer products in
Iloilo.
2. Petitioner filed a complaint for breach of contract.
3. Respondent filed a complaint for the collection of the a sum of money
representing the value of beer products which respondent had delivered to
petitioner.
4. Jan. 1997: Petitioner moved for the consolidation of the two cases. Makati
RTC granted the motion.
5. Respondent appealed to CA. CA reversed the RTC decision.
Issues:
(1) WON CA still had jurisdiction over the case when respondent filed the
appeal
Held: NO
1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which took effect on July
1997, covers the case. Thus, petition for certiorari should have been
filed within the 60-day reglementary period, which respondent had
failed to do.

Ninety-day limit within which to file an appeal that respondent avers

is not a vested right, merely a discretionary prerogative of the courts.
Respondent was not entitled, as a matter of right, to the 90-day
period for filing a petition for certiorari, neither can it imperiously
demand that the same period be extended to it. (108)
The sworn certification against forum-shopping was also signed by
respondents counsel only, thus weakening the certifications
validity.
The respondent did not send a written explanation why the petition
with CA was served on her counsel by registered mail. This written
explanation is indispensable and the failure to execute such must
have compelled CA to consider the petition as not having been filed.

(2) WON the Makati and Iloilo cases can be consolidated

Held: Yes
The non-payment of the sum of money alleged in the Makati case is
an incident of the Iloilo case.
Both cases are concerned with common questions of law and facts.
Disposition:
Petition GRANTED

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CA

Facts:
Republic of the Philippines, represented by National Centennial
Commission, filed a complaint for expropriation against Fe Manuel and
Metrobank because Metrobank foreclosed the mortgaged property of Manuel.
Said property will be utilized by the State to construct the Tejeros Convention
Center and the founding site of the Philippine Army as part of the
commemorative Centennial Trail.
Trial Court ruled that the case has no cause of action because
complainant NCC lacked the authority to institute expropriation cases in behalf
of the State. On June 17, 1998, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but
was denied in the courts order. On October 12, 1998, petitioner received the
copy of the said order. On December 11, 1998, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals, but was denied for being filed out of
time pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 65 of 1995 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended
by Bar Matter 803, which states that the filing of a petition is given a period of
60 days. This begins from the receipt of the assailed order and is interrupted
only by a filing of a motion for reconsideration. Upon the receipt of the order
for the motion for reconsideration, the petitioner can file a petition for certiorari
within the remaining time from the original 60.
As applied in the case:
June 3
Petitioner received assailed order from Trial Court
(Start of the 60 days)
June 17 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration (46 days left from
original 60)
October 12
Petitioner received the order for the motion for
reconsideration (Start of 46)
December 11
Petitioner filed the petition for certitiorari to the Court
of Appeals
From October 12 December 11, 60 days passed. Since only 46 days were left
to file for a petition for certitiorari, the petition was late for 14 days. Therefore,
petition was filed out of time.
Issue: Was the petition filed out of time?
Held:
Corona, J. held that the petition was filed on time. An amendment
(AM. No. 00-2-03-SC) to the amended Rule (Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the 1995 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended by Bar Matter 803) on the filing of petition
provides that the 60 day period shall now be reckoned from the receipt of the
said order denying the motion for reconsideration, which in the instant case was
on October 8, 1998. Hence, petition for certiorari filed on December 11, 1998,
which is the 60th day from the receipt, was filed on time.
However, it should be noted that this amendment had only become
effective on September 1, 2000 (after the filing of the case). As a general rule,
amendments of procedural character such as this which only furthers the
remedy of already existing rights do not have a retroactive effect. But, they may
be given retroactive effect to actions pending at the time of their passage
without violating the rights of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, in this case Metrobank, because there are no vested rights in rules of
procedure.
Petition Granted. Case Remanded to Court of Appeals.

Topic: Amendment, Revision, Codification, Repeal

MECANO v. COA
FACTS
- Antonio Mecano was a Director II of the NBI, and was hospitalized. He
subsequently requested reimbursement for his hospital expenses under the
Revised Administrative Code (RAC), Sec. 699.
- Although recommended by then NBI Director Alfredo S. Lim for favorable
action, the Commission on Audit (COA) denied the request, saying that the
RAC was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.
- Mecano resubmitted his request, with the opinion written by then Justice
Secretary Frankin Drilon attachedThe opinion of Sec. Drilon had stated that the
issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its
entirety the RAC, including Sec. 699.
- The COA again denied the request, solely for the reason that Sec. 699 of the
RAC was not restated nor re-enacted in the 1987 Administrative Code. The
COA recommended, however, that Mecano file a claim with the Employees
Compensation Commission as provided by P.D. 626.
ISSUE
Does the Administrative Code of 1987 repeal or abrogate Sec. 699 of the RAC?
Petitioner:
- Sec. 699 of RAC
- opinion of Sec. Drilon
- Even if he does file a claim with the Employees Compensation Commission,
he is still not barred from filing a claim under Sec. 699 of the RAC.
Respondent:
- Admin Code of 1987 repealed the RAC
- legislative intent to repeal RAC gleaned from the whereas clauses
- questioned applicability of opinion of Sec. Drilon
- Since employee-related death is already covered by the Employees
Compensation Commission under P.D. 626, allowing someone to claim benefits
under both laws would be unjust and unfair to the government
HELD: Sec. 699 of the RAC was NOT abrogated/repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1987.
- The Administrative Code of 1987 contained a general repealing clause. This
means that the intent of the law is to not repeal any existing law unless
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists between the two laws. It is
an implied repeal.
- The COA failed to demonstrate that the two Codes are in conflict; in fact there
can be no conflict since the new Code does not contain provisions on sickness
benefits as the old Code does.
- The COAs contention that the phrase unified document in the whereas
clause in the Admin Code of 1987 contemplates only the Admin Code of 1987
is untenable. Just because the Admin Code of 1987, a later enactment, deals
with the same subject matter as the RAC does not in itself mean that the old
enactment is impliedly repealed. The new law may be cumulative or a
continuation of the older law.
- The Admin Code of 1987 is also not a law codifying former laws on the whole
subject matter. As stated in Sec. Drilons opinion, the intent of the Admin Code
of 1987 is only to cover those aspects of government that may have changed
since the RAC was first enacted.
- On the materiality of Sec. Drilons opinion vis--vis the determination of the
COA, the Court held that the opinion of the Secretary or Undersecretary of
Justice is material to the construction of statutes in pari materia (upon the same
subject matter).
DISPOSITION

LAMBINO v. COMELEC
FACTS: The Lambino Group commenced gathering signatures for
an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution and then filed a petition
with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for ratification under Sec. 5(b) and (c) and
Sec. 7 of RA 6735. The proposed changes under the petition will shift the
present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form
of government. COMELEC did not give it due course for lack of an enabling
law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant to
Santiago v. Comelec ruling
.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the proposed changes constitute an amendment or

revision
Whether or not the initiative petition is sufficient compliance with
the constitutional requirement on direct proposal by the people

RULING:
Initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art. XVII on direct proposal by
people
Sec. 2, Art. XVII...is the governing provision that allows a peoples initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. While this provision does not
expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed
amendments, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show
that: (a) the framers intended to adopt relevant American jurisprudence on
peoples initiative; and (b) in particular, the people must first see the full text of
the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a
petition containing such full text.
The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a
petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present.
2 elements of initiative
1. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No
agent or representative can sign on their behalf.
2. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing
such complete proposal in a petition. The full text of the proposed
amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it.
If so attached, the petition must stated the fact of such attachment. This is an
assurance that everyone of the several millions of signatories to the petition had
seen the full textof the proposed amendments before not after signing.
Moreover, an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the
nature and effect of that which is proposed and failure to do so is deceptive
and misleading which renders the initiative void.
In the case of the Lambino Groups petition, theres not a single word, phrase,
or sentence of text of the proposedchanges in the signature sheet. Neither
does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to
it. The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a
shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral- Parliamentary system
of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the
proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. This
omission is fatal.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the
people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and
can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. Thats why the
Constitutionrequires that an initiative must be directly proposed by the people
x x x in a petition - meaning that the people must sign on a petition that
contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as
amending the nations fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed
amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special power
of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.
The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution disallowing
revision through initiatives
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the
Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all
its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third
mode is through a peoples initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to
any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution. In contrast, Section 2 of
Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to amendments to this
Constitution. This distinction was intentional as shown by the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission. A peoplesinitiative to change the
Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its
revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both

amendments and revisions to the Constitution.

Does the Lambino Groups initiative constitute a revision of the Constitution?
Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a BicameralPresidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of
the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is
beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment.
Amendment vs. Revision
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a
revision of a constitution. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic
principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers
or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters
the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects
substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment
broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the
basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the
constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision
being amended.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the
Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the change may
generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a
change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years is an amendment and
not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media
companies from 100% to 60% is an amendment and not a revision. Also, a
change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to
the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision.
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or
articles of the Constitution other than the specific provision being amended.
These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system of
checks-and-balances among or within the three branches.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a
revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be
a revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word
republican with monarchic or theocratic in Section 1, Article II of the
Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the
fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change
will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other
provisions, as well as how it affects the structure ofgovernment, the carefully
crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of
the existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions
of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to
undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several
provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered.
Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent
assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other
hand, constitutions allow peoples initiatives, which do not have fixed and
identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only
amendments and not revisions.
Tests to determine whether amendment or revision
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to
the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part
test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks
whether the proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to change
directly the substantial entirety of the constitution by the deletion or alteration
of numerous existing provisions. The court examines only the number of
provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change
in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will accomplish
such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to
amount to a revision. Whether there is an alteration in the structure of
government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, a change in the nature of [the]
basic governmental plan includes change in its fundamental framework or the
fundamental powers of its Branches. A change in the nature of the basic
governmental plan also includes changes that jeopardize the traditional form of
government and the system of check and balances.
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Groups initiative

is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino

Groups proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature
and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the
entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the
basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as
when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present
Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the
Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the
legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of
government. The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of
Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision
of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress
alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a
revision of the Constitution.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between amendment and
revision is only one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits
that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution,
substantive changes are called revisions because members of the deliberative
body work full-time on the changes. The same substantive changes, when
proposed through an initiative, are called amendments because the changes are
made by ordinary people who do not make an occupation, profession, or
vocation out of such endeavor. The SC, however, ruled that the express intent of
the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino
Groups theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the
Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such
categorical intent and language.