Rule of Law in Indian Constitution

RULE OF LAW IN INDIAN CONSTITUTION
Guided By: Dr. Asad Malik
SUBMITTED BY:
MD. ABID HUSSAIN ANSARI
B.A. LL.B. (HONS.) 6TH SEMESTER
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Acknowledgement
Firstly, I would like to express my profound sense of gratitude towards the almighty ALLAH
for providing me with the authentic circumstances which were mandatory for the completion of
my project.
Secondly, I am highly indebted to Prof. Dr. Asad Malik at Faculty of Law, Jamia Millia Islamia
University, New Delhi for providing me with constant encouragement and guidance throughout
the preparation of this project.
Thirdly, I thank the Law library staff who liaised with us in searching material relating to the
project.
My cardinal thanks are also for my parents, friends and all teachers of law department in our
college who have always been the source of my inspiration and motivation without which I
would have never been able to unabridged my project.
My father, a lawyer with large access to books of value has been of great help to me.
Without the contribution of the above said people I could have never completed this project.
Mohd. Abid Hussain Ansari

B.A.LL.B (Hons) 6th Semester
3rd Year
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction7
2. Rule of Law under the Indian Constitution..12
3. Rule of Law part of the Basic Structure....28
4. Put Checks on Governmental Powers..32
5. Equality Guarantee and the Protection of Human Rights33
6. Judicial Review by an Independent Judiciary......36
7. Conclusion38
8. Bibliography.41
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List of Cases
1. SP Gupta v Union of India
2. Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain
3. State of M.P. v. Bharat Singh
4. Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab
5. Som Raj v. State of Haryana
6. Union of India v. President, Madras Bar Association
7. Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State of U.P.
8. Maganlal Chhaganlals case,
9. Northern India Caterers case
10. Union of India v. Raghubir Singh
11. Chief settlement Commissioner Punjab v. Om Prakash
12. Binani Zinc Limited v. Kerala State Electricity Board and Ors
13. Gadakh Yashwantrao Kankarrao v. Balasaheb Vikhe Patil
14. Sukhdev v. Bhagatram
15. Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Umadevi and Ors
16. Amlan Jyoti Borooah v. State of Assam and Ors
17. Bachan Singh v. state of Punjab
18. P. sambamurthy v. state of Andhra Pradesh
19. Yusuf Khan v. Manohar Joshi
20. Frank Anthony Employees Union v. Union of India
21. Nakara v. Union of India.
22. Zee Telifilms v. Union of India
23. C. Ravichandran Iyer v. J.A.M. Bhattacharya
24. In re Vinay Chandra Mishras case
25. DTC v. Mazdoor Congress
26. A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India
27. C.B. Muthumma v. Union of India
28. Air India v. Nargesh Meerza
29. Govt. of A.P. v. P.B. Vijayakumar
30. Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar
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31. Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan

32. Gaurav Jain v. Union of India
33. I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu
34. Satwant Singh
35. Jaisinghanis case
36. Olmstead v. United States:
37. Mohamed v. President of the Republic of South Africa.
38. Glanrock Estate (P) Ltd v. The State Of Tamil Nadu
39. Smt. Shakti Kumari Gupta v. State Of U.P. And Ors.
40. National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh and Anr.
41. Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal and Anr
42. A.K. Chaudhary And Ors. v. The State Of Gujarat And 2 Ors.,
43. A.P.Abbu Gounder v. D.K.Goel
44. Maninderjit Singh Bitta v. Union of India and others
45. Association of Registration of Plates v. Union of India
46. Manohar Lal Sharma v. The Principle Secretary & Others,
47. Madhu Limaye v. Supdt. Tihar Jail Delhi
48. Sanaboina Satyanarayan v. Govt. of A.P
49. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. R. Veeraswamy
50. Shankari Prasad v. Union of India
51. Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan
52. Golaknath v. State of Punjab
53. Keshavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala
54. Raman Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India
55. In re: Arundhati Roy
56. Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra
57. Veena Sethi v. State of Bihar
58. Medical and Educational Charitable Trust v. State of Tamil Nadu
59. Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala
60. Express Newspapers v. Union of India and in Bennett Coleman v. Union of India
61. K Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala
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62. Rajendram v. State of Madras

63. State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar
64. Northern India Caterers Ltd. v. State of Punjab
65. Ameernnisa Begum v. Mehboob Begum
66. Ram Prasad v. State of Bihar
67. E P Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu
68. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India
69. Mithu v. State of Punjab
70. Central Inland Water Corporation v. B N Ganguly
71. DTC v. DTC Mazdoor Congress
72. Common Cause v. Union of India
73. Shivsagar Tiwari v. Union of India
74. Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi
75. Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India
76. In re, Presidential Reference
77. T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad case
78. ; R D Shetty v. International Airport Authority
79. Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib
80. A L Kalra v. Project &Equipment Corporation
81. Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration
82. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation
83. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India
84. onsumer Education & Research Centre v. Union of India
85. Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty
86. Munn v. Illinois
87. Parmanand Kataria v. Union of India
88. Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of West Bengal
89. Unni Krishnan v. State of
90. Indian Council for Enviro Legal Action v. Union of India
91. M C Mehta v. Union of India
92. Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India
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93. Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India

94. Gauri Shankar v. Union of India
95. A P Pollution Control Board II v. M V Nayudu
96. Govind v. State of MP
97. R Raj Gopal v. State of Tamil Nadu
98. PUCL v. Union of India
99. X v. Hospital Z
100.
M H Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra
101.
Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar
102.
Khatri v. State of Bihar
103.
Suk Das v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh
104.
Hussainara Khatoon (I) to (VI) v Home Secretary, Bihar
105.
Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar
106.
Common Cause v. Union of India
107.
Rajdeo Sharma v. State of Bihar
108.
Prem Shankar v. Delhi Administration
109.
Munna v. State of UP
110.
Kirloskar Brothers Ltd. v. ESIC
111.
Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar
112.
Bhim Singh v. State of J & K
113.
Nilabati Behra v. State of Orissa
114.
Mithu v. State Punjab
115.
Naz Foundation v. Government of Delhi
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Introduction
Where the law is subject to some other authority and has none of its own, the collapse of the
state, in my view, is not far off; but if law is the master of the government and the government is
its slave, then the situation is full of promise and men enjoy all the blessings that the gods
shower on a state.
-
Plato
Dicey said1:
It means, in the first place, the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as
opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, and excludes the existence of arbitrariness,
of prerogative, or even of wide discretionary authority on the part of the government.
Englishmen are ruled by the law, and by the law alone; a man may with us be punished
for a breach of law, but he can be punished for nothing else. It means, again, equality
before the law, or the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law courts; the rule
of law in this sense excludes the idea of any exemption of officials or others from the
duty of obedience to the law which governs other citizens or from the jurisdiction of the
ordinary tribunals; there can be with us nothing really corresponding to the
administrative law (droit administratif) or the administrative tribunals (tribunaux
administratifs) of France. The notion which lies at the bottom of the administrative law
known to foreign countries is, that affairs or disputes in which the Government or its
servants are concerned are beyond the sphere of the civil courts and must be dealt with
by special and more or less official bodies. This idea is utterly unknown to the law of
England, and indeed is fundamentally inconsistent with our traditions and customs.
According to Dicey, the Rule of Law, as he formulated it, was a principle of the English
Constitution. The preface to the first edition says that the book deals with only two or three
guiding principles which pervade the modern Constitution of England, and the book shows that
the Rule of Law is one such principle. This is important, for the modern version of that rule does
A.V. Dicey, Law of the Constitution (1885)
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not assert that it is a principle of the English Constitution, but that the rule is an ideal by
reference to which that Constitution must be judged.
Rule of Law is the basic necessity for maintaining peace in the country. Constitution is supreme
law of the nation and it is all about politics and as we know politics is all about unpredictability.
So in this assignment, I am concerned on the problems which cause threat to the Rule of Law in
the society. And what can be done to maintain this Rule in the society for proper functioning of
the legislature
India is the largest democratic country in the world. It attained freedom 67 years ago, has a
thriving institutions like Parliament, State Assemblies and Panchayat. Our constitution is written
in such a manner that everyone would get equal opportunity. Our nation has three organs,
namely, executive, judiciary and legislative. All the three are been bestowed with independent
and autonomous powers to make and implement the rules depending on the changing society so
that the nation can run smoothly.
By exercising the power of adult franchise the common people choose their leaders. The leaders
have vision, shape our future and implement peoples programmes. But this is not the truth.
We see stark reality of destitution, malnutrition, illiteracy, joblessness in the independent India.
Roughly, 15% of people are well off, economically. They are industrial tycoons, financial
conglomerates, politicians, and their touts, media and intelligentsia are in the rich layer and
ruthlessly exploiting the rest of us. The majority are living without proper housing, education and
healthcare.
Politicians, criminals and police have forged an unholy nexus. As the scams keep multiplying,
we, the common people feel shame. The exploitation by leaders who have been mandated to
conserve, develop and protect the citizen at large is disgusting. Coffingate was bribe taken by the
defence ministry to bury the martyrs of the Kargil war. Bofors gun backpay scandal was alleged
in premiership of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. Tehelka exposed bribes taken by Mr. Bangaru laxman,
BJP National President. The involvement of Army in the Adarsh Housing Society episode is
damage to our most revered institution. Even the air force and navy personals are deeply
involved. Another skeleton has popped of the cupboard, in the form of 2G spectrum, causing a
loss of Rs. 1, 80,000 crore to the national exchequer. The undervaluation of Public Sector Unit
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disinvestment also has been under investigation. A failed public distribution system (PDS) and
the Union Food & Agriculture Minister Mr. Sharad Pawar got reprimanded by the Honorable
Supreme Court when food grains went rotting instead of reaching the starving millions. The
politicians of Uttar Pradesh were siphoning food grains to offshore countries to mint money for
themselves, instead of feeding their countrymen and women. The bribes for- loan scam has
exposed leading Banks and LIC Housing Fund.
Economic inequality has to be fought on the political plane. The Bihar Assembly election of
2010 has given a new dimension to the nation. The landslide victory for the agenda of
development put forth by Mr. Nitish is phenomenal, and has dealt a big blow the caste ridden,
divisive, feudalistic and parochial policies of the other leaders.
The concept of Rule of law2 is of old origin and is an ancient ideal. It was discussed by ancient
Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle around 350 BC. Plato wrote: Where the law is
subject to some other authority and has none of its own, the collapse of the state, in my view, is
not far off; but if law is the master of the government and the government is its slave, then the
situation is full of promise and men enjoy all the blessings that the gods shower on a state.
Likewise, Aristotle also endorsed the concept of Rule of law by writing that "law should govern
and those in powers should be servants of the laws.
The phrase Rule of Law is derived from the French phrase la principe de legalite (the
principle of legality) which refers to a government based on principles of law and not of men.
Rule of law is one of the basic principles of the English Constitution and the doctrine is accepted
in the Constitution of U.S.A and India as well. The entire basis of Administrative Law is the
doctrine of the rule of law.
The Rule of Law, in its most basic form, is the principle that no one is above the law. The rule
follows logically from the idea that truth, and therefore law, is based upon fundamental
principles which can be discovered, but which cannot be created through an act of will.
H.M. Seervai, The Supreme Court of India and the Shadow of Dicey in The Position of the Judiciary under the
Constitution of India, pp. 83-96 (1970)
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In fact, the Supreme Court has declared the rule of law to be one of the 'basic features' of the
Constitution.3
Sir Edward Coke, the Chief Justice of King James Is reign was the originator of this concept.
He maintained that the King should be under God and the Law and he established the supremacy
of the law against the executive and that there is nothing higher than law.
Later, Albert Venn Dicey4 developed the concept in his book The Law of the Constitution5.
His writing on the British Constitution (which is unwritten) included three distinct though
kindered ideas on Rule of law:
1. Absence of discretionary powers and supremacy of Law: viz. no man is above law. No
man is punishable except for a distinct breach of law established in an ordinary legal
manner before ordinary courts. The government cannot punish any one merely by its own
fiat. Persons in authority do not enjoy wide, arbitrary or discretionary powers. Dicey
asserted that wherever there is discretion there is room for arbitrariness.
2. Equality before law: Every man, whatever his rank or condition, is subject to the
ordinary law and jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. No person should be made to suffer
in body or deprived of his property except for a breach of law established in the ordinary
legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land.
3. Predominance of legal spirit: The general principles of the British Constitution,
especially the liberties and the rights of the people must come from traditions and
customs of the people and be recognized by the courts in administration of justice from
time to time.
The expression rule of law is one which, over the years, has been used to convey a wide variety
of ideas and has a number of meanings and corollaries including their criticisms. In common
parlance it is often used simply to describe the state of affairs in a country where, in the main, the
law is observed and order is kept i.e., as an expression synonymous with law and order. To
public lawyers, however, the phrase conveys something a little more precise. For them, the
phrase is inextricably linked with the writings of Dicey.
3
Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2295; SP Gupta v Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149
A British jurist and constitutional theorist
5
(1885)
4
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The term rule of law is not used in the Indian Constitution anywhere, but there is no doubt that
the rule of law pervades the Constitution as an underlying principle. In fact, the Supreme Court
has declared the rule of law to be one of the basic features of the Constitution, so this principle
cannot be taken away even by a constitutional amendment. In this assignment I will try to focus
on the Indian conception of the rule of law is both formal and substantive. It is also seen as an
integral part of good governance.
The State of M.P. v. Bharat Singh6 also did not raise any question about Diceys Rule of Law,
though it did raise a question about the Rule of Law in the strict legal sense. In Bharat Singh
case, it was contended that as the executive power of the State was co-extensive with its
legislative power, an executive order restricting the movements of a citizen could be passed
without the authority of any law, and the Supreme Courts decision in Ram Jawaya Kapur v.
State of Punjab7 was relied upon to support the contention. The Supreme Court could have
pointed out, but did not, that the principle of Kapur case directly negatived the contention when
that case held that though the authority of law was not necessary for Government to carry on
trade, such authority was necessary when it became necessary to encroach upon private rights in
order to carry on trade. The Supreme Court distinguished Kapur case on the ground that it
involved no action prejudicial to the rights of others. Even so, Bharat Singh case is really
disposed of by the courts observation that every act done by the Government or by its officers
must, if it is to operate to the prejudice of any person be supported by some legislative
authority, for that is the strict legal meaning of the Rule of Law. For reasons which I have
already given, it was wholly unnecessary to refer to the first meaning which Dicey gave to the
Rule of Law, or to Diceys contrast between the English and the Continental systems.
The Supreme Court observed in Som Raj v. State of Haryana that the absence of arbitrary
power is the primary postulate of Rule of Law upon which the whole constitutional edifice is
dependent. Discretion being exercised without any rule is a concept which is antithesis of the
concept.
6
7
[AIR 1967 SC 1170]

(1955) 2 SCR 225
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Rule of Law under the Indian Constitution

In India, the concept of Rule of law can be traced back to the Upanishads. In modern day as well,
the scheme of the Indian Constitution is based upon the concept of rule of law. The framers of
the Constitution were well familiar with the postulates of rule of law as propounded by Dicey
and as modified in its application to British India. It was therefore, in the fitness of things that the
founding fathers of the Constitution gave due recognition to the concept of rule of law.
The doctrine of Rule of Law as enunciated by Dicey has been adopted and very succinctly
incorporated in the Indian Constitution. The ideals of the Constitution viz; justice, liberty and
equality are enshrined in the Preamble itself (which is part of the Constitution).
The Constitution of India has been made the supreme law of the country and other laws are
required to be in conformity with it. Any law which is found in violation of any provision of the
Constitution, particularly, the fundamental rights, is declared void. The Indian Constitution also
incorporates the principle of equality before law and equal protection of laws enumerated by
Dicey under Article 14.
Constitution of India: Article 14:- Equality before law The State shall not deny to any
person equality before law or equal protection of laws within the territory of India.
The very basic human right to life and personal liberty has also been enshrined under Article 21.
Article 19(1) (a) of the Indian Constitution guarantees the third principle of the Rule of law
(freedom of speech and Expression). No person can be convicted of any offence except for
violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence is also
very well recognized in the Indian Constitution. The principles of double jeopardy and selfincrimination also found its rightful place in the Constitution. Articles 14, 19 and 21 are so basic
that they are also called the golden triangle Articles of the Indian Constitution.
The Constitution also ensures an independent an impartial Judiciary to settle disputes and
grievances for violation of fundamental rights by virtue of Articles 32 and 226. In Union of
India v. President, Madras Bar Association8, the Supreme Court held that Rule of Law has
several facets, one of which is that disputes of citizens will be decided by Judges who are
8
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3067 OF 2004
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independent and impartial; and that disputes as to legality of acts of the Government will be
decided by Judges who are independent of the Executive.
Justice R.S. Pathak of the Honble Supreme Court has observed that It must be remembered
that our entire constitutional system is founded on the rule of law, and in any system so designed
it is impossible to conceive of legitimate power which is arbitrary in character and travels
beyond the bounds of reason.
In Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State of U.P., the District Magistrate had cancelled the
license granted under the U.P. Sugar Dealers Licensing Order, 1962 without giving any reason
and the State Government had dismissed the appeal against the said order of the District
Magistrate without recording the reasons. This Court has held: The practice of the executive
authority dismissing statutory appeals against orders which prima facie seriously prejudice the
rights of the aggrieved party without giving reasons is a negation of the rule of law.
Recording of reasons in support of a decision on a disputed claim by a quasi- judicial
authority ensures that the decision is reached according to law and is not the result of
caprice, whim or fancy or reached on grounds of policy or expediency. A party to the
dispute is ordinarily entitled to know the grounds on which the authority has rejected his
claim. If the order is subject to appeal, the necessity to record reasons is greater, for
without recorded reasons the appellate authority has no material on which it may
determine whether the facts were properly ascertained, the relevant law was correctly
applied and the decision was just.
In S.P. Gupta case, the petitioners had raised the question of alleged misuse of power of
appointing and transferring the Judges of the High Court by the Government. In order to make
sure that the power of appointment of Judges was not used with political motives thereby
undermining the independence of the judiciary, the petitioners sought information as to whether
the procedures laid down under Articles 124(2) and 217(1) had been scrupulously followed. Here
the right to information was a condition precedent to the rule of law. Most of the issues, which
the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan of Rajasthan had raised in their mass struggle for the right
to information, were mundane matters regarding wages and employment of workers, such
information was necessary for ensuring that no discrimination had been made between workers
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and that everything had been done according to law. The right to information is thus embedded
in Articles 14, 19(1) (a) and 21 of the Constitution.
In Maganlal Chhaganlals case, a Bench of seven learned Judges of this Court considered, inter
alia, the question: whether a judgment of the Supreme Court in Northern India Caterers case
was required to be overruled. Khanna, J. observed:
At the same time, it has to be borne in mind that certainty and continuity are essential
ingredients of rule of law. Certainty in law would be considerably eroded and suffer a serious
setback if the highest court of the land readily overrules the view expressed by it in earlier cases,
even though that view has held the field for a number of years. In quite a number of cases which
come up before this Court, two views are possible, and simply because the Court considers that
the view not taken by the Court in the earlier case was a better view of the matter would not
justify the overruling of the view. The law laid down by this Court is binding upon all courts in
the country under Article 141 of the Constitution, and numerous cases all over the country are
decided in accordance with the view taken by this Court. Many people arrange their affairs and
large number of transactions also take place on the faith of the correctness of the view taken by
this Court. It would create uncertainty, instability and confusion if the law propounded by this
Court on the basis of which numerous cases have been decided and many transactions have taken
place is held to be not the correct law.
The rule of law highlights the independence of the judiciary and the supremacy of courts. It is
rightly reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case Union of India v. Raghubir Singh that it is
not a matter of doubt that a considerable degree that governs the lives of the people and regulates
the State functions flows from the decision of the superior courts.
In Chief settlement Commissioner Punjab v. Om Prakash , it was observed by the supreme
court that, In our constitutional system, the central and most characteristic feature is the
concept of rule of law which means, in the present context, the authority of law courts to test all
administrative action by the standard of legality. The administrative or executive action that
does not meet the standard will be set aside if the aggrieved person brings the matter into
notice.
In India, the meaning of rule of law has been much expanded. It is regarded as a part of the basic
structure of the Constitution and, therefore, it cannot be abrogated or destroyed even by
14 | P a g e
Parliament. The ideals of constitution; liberty, equality and fraternity have been enshrined in the
preamble. Constitution makes the supreme law of the land and every law enacted should be in
conformity to it. Any violation makes the law ultra vires.
In the case of Binani Zinc Limited v. Kerala State Electricity Board and Ors9., Justice S B
sinha declare that It is now a well settled principle of law that the rule of law inter alia
postulates that all laws would be prospective subject of course to enactment an express provision
or intendment to the contrary. In the case of Gadakh Yashwantrao Kankarrao v. Balasaheb
Vikhe Patil the ratio laid down was If the rule of law has to be preserved as the essence of the
democracy of which purity of elections is a necessary concomitant, it is the duty of the courts to
appreciate the evidence and construe the law in a manner which would subserve this higher
purpose and not even imperceptibly facilitate acceptance, much less affirmance, of the falling
electoral standards. For democracy to survive, rule of law must prevail, and it is necessary that
the best available men should be chosen as people's representatives for proper governance of the
country. This can be best achieved through men of high moral and ethical values who win the
elections on a positive vote obtained on their own merit and not by the negative vote of process
of elimination based on comparative demerits of the candidates.
In the case of Sukhdev v. Bhagatram, Mathew J. declared that Whatever be the concept of the
rule of law, whether it be the meaning given by Dicey in his "The Law of the Constitution" or
the definition given by Hayek in his "Road to Serfdom" and "Constitution of liberty" or the
exposition set-forth by Harry Jones in his "The Rule of Law and the Welfare State", there is,
as pointed out by Mathew, J., in his article on "The Welfare State, Rule of Law and Natural
Justice" in "Democracy, Equality and Freedom," "substantial agreement is in juristic thought
that the great purpose of the rule of law notion is the protection of the individual against
arbitrary exercise of power, wherever it is found". It is indeed unthinkable that in a democracy
governed by the rule of law the executive Government or any of its officers should possess
arbitrary power over the interests of the individual. Every action of the executive Government
must be informed with reason and should be free from arbitrariness. That is the very essence of
the rule of law and its bare minimal requirement. And to the application of this principle it
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15 | P a g e
makes no difference whether the exercise of the power involves affection of some right or denial
of some privilege."
In Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Umadevi and Ors, a Constitution Bench of this
Court has laid down the law in the following terms:
Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of
our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a court would certainly
be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the
overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the
Constitution.
In the case of Amlan Jyoti Borooah v. State of Assam and Ors. It was held by S B Sinha that:
Equity must not be equated with compassion. Equitable principles must emanate from facts
which by themselves are unusual and peculiar. A balance has to be struck and the Court must be
cautious to ensure that its endeavour to do equity does not amount to judicial benevolence or
acquiescence of established violation of fundamental rights and the principles of Rule of law.
Moreover, In the case of Bachan Singh v. state of Punjab, Justice Bhagwati has emphasized
that rule of law excludes arbitrariness and unreasonableness. To ensure this, he has suggested
that it is necessary to have a democratic legislature to make laws, but its power should not be
unfettered, and that there should be an independent judiciary to protect the citizens against the
excesses of executive and legislative power. In addition to this in P. sambamurthy v. state of
Andhra Pradesh, the SC has declared a provision authorizing the executive to interfere with
tribunal justice as unconstitutional characterizing it as violative of the rule of law which is
clearly a basic and essential feature of the constitution
Yet another case is of Yusuf Khan v. Manohar Joshi in which the SC laid down the proposition
that it is the duty of the state to preserve and protect the law and the constitution and that it
cannot permit any violent act which may negate the rule of law.
Hence, it is quite evident that the concept of rule of law is gaining importance and attention and
judicial efforts are made to make it stronger.
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The opposite of rule of law is rule of person. The rule of law is necessarily rule by men, for the
law is inert. Men are necessary to enforce the law, but all men are prone to interpret the law
through their own knowledge, interpretation, and ethical sense. At best a set of laws are a wellintended guidebook for the application of justice by the rule of men. In spite of an apparently
enviable position of the subjects in almost all the fields of industry, commerce, education,
transport, banking, insurance etc. there is interference by the administrative authorities with the
actions of the individuals, companies and other corporate and non-corporate bodies, observes
Justice Ramaswamy. There is a large amount of discretion involved in the administrative work.
For e.g.: for the purpose of national planning the executive is armed with vast powers in respect
of land ceiling, control of basic industries, taxation, mobilization of labour etc. Even Parliament
passes acts which are opposed to personal liberty such as preventive detention act or
maintenance of Internal Security act 1971, national security act 1980. Even the simplest thing
like discriminate payment of employees can be termed as inequality, as opposed to rule of law.
The case Frank Anthony Employees Union v. Union of India is concerned with discrimination
in payment to employees, which was held to violate the persons right to equality and
unreasonable classification of pensioners was held to be arbitrary in the case Nakara v. Union of
India.
In the present scenario where disinvestment of the public sector is in full swing and the private
enterprises are stepping into the zone of public sector, there is a responsibility upon the private
enterprise to maintain the rule of law in their conduct. Reference may be made to the dissenting
view of S.B.Sinha J. in Zee Telifilms v. Union of India, where he points that in the new market
economy we need to change the definition of State under article 12 of the Constitution. The
private bodies have assumed quasi-public dimension and the state intervention is decreasing
every day.
Criminal process and rule of law: it would amount to rule of law:
When there is certainty of rule of law. The rule of law means that decisions should be made by
the application of known principles and rules in general, such decisions should be predictable
17 | P a g e
and the citizens should know where he is. A decision without any principle or rule is un
predictable and is the antithesis of a decision in accordance with the rule of law10
In C. Ravichandran Iyer v. J.A.M. Bhattacharya,11 the court observed that that the rule of law
and judicial review are the basic features of the constitution as its integral constitutional
structure. Independence of judiciary is an essential attribute of rule of law. If there is one
principle which runs through the entire fabric of the constitution, it is the principle of rule of law
and under the constitution it is the judiciary which is entrusted with the task of keeping every
organ of the state within the limits of law, thereby making rule of law more meaningful and
effective.
The Supreme Court, in In re Vinay Chandra Mishras case12 stated that the rule of law is the
foundation of a democratic society. The judiciary is the guardian of rule of law. In a democracy
like ours where there is written constitution which is above all individuals and institutions and
where the power of judicial review is vested in the superior court, the judiciary has a special and
additional duty to perform i.e. to see that all the individual and institutions including the
executive and legislative act within the framework of not only law but also the fundamental law
of the land.
In DTC v. Mazdoor Congress13, the Supreme Court held that uncannalised discretion vested in
the administrative authority is not permissible.
In A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India14, the court held that the concept of rule of law would lose its
validity if the instrumentalities of the state are not charged with the duty of discharging their
functions in a fair and just manner. The court further stated that the aim of natural justice is to
secure justice or to put it negatively, prevent miscarriage of justice. They do not supplant the law
of the land but supplement it. The horizon of natural justice is constantly expanding ant it covers
not only quasi-judicial but also administrative powers.
10
(AIR 1967 SC 1427)

(1995) 5 SCC 457
12
(1996) 2 SCC 584
13
AIR 1991 SC 101
14
AIR 1970 SC 150
11
18 | P a g e
In case of C.B. Muthumma v. Union of India15, a writ petition was filed by Ms Muthamma, a
senior member of the Indian Foreign Service, complaining that she had been denied promotion to
Grade I illegally and unconstitutionally. She pointed out that several rules of the civil service
were discriminatory against women. At the very threshold she was advised by the Chairman of
the UPSC against joining the Foreign Service. At the time of joining she was required to give an
undertaking that if she married she would resign from service. Under Rule 18 of the Indian
Foreign Service (Recruitment, Cadre, Seniority and Promotion) Rules, 1961, it was provided that
no married woman shall be entitled as of right to be appointed to the service. Under Rule 8(2) of
the Indian Foreign Service (Conduct and Discipline) Rules, 1961, a woman member of the
service was required to obtain permission of the Government in writing before her marriage was
solemnised. At any time after the marriage she could be required to resign if the Government
was confirmed that her family and domestic commitments were likely to come in the way of the
due and efficient discharge of her duties as a member of the service. On numerous occasions the
petitioner had to face the consequences of being a woman and thus suffered discrimination,
though the Constitution specifically under Article 15 prohibits discrimination on grounds of
religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth and Article 4 provides the principle of equality before
law.
In case of Air India v. Nargesh Meerza16, Nargesh Meerza filed a writ petition, In this case, the
air-hostesses of the Air-India International Corporation had approached the Supreme Court
against, again, discriminatory service conditions in the Regulations' of Air-India. The
Regulations provided that an air-hostess could not get married before completing four-years of
service. Usually an air-hostess was recruited at the age of 19 years and the four-year bar against
marriage meant that an air-hostess could not get married until she reached the age of 23 years. If
she married earlier, she had to resign and if after 23 years she got married, she could continue as
a married woman but had to resign on becoming pregnant. If an air hostess survived both these
filters, she 'continued to serve until she reached the age of 35 years. It was alleged on behalf of
the air-hostesses that those provisions were discriminatory on the ground of sex, as similar
provisions did not apply to male employees doing similar work.
15
16
(1979) 4 SCC 260)

((1981) 4 SCC 335)
19 | P a g e
The Supreme Court upheld the first requirement that an air-hostess should not marry before the
completion of four years of service. The court held that:
"It was a sound and salutary provision. Apart from improving the health of the employee it helps
a great deal in the promotion and boosting up of our family planning programme."
However, this argument given by the Court came in for criticism that as the requirements of age
and family planning were warranted by the population policy of the State and once the State had
fixed the age of marriage, i.e. 18 years, the reasoning advanced for upholding the rule was a
camouflage for the real concern.
The Supreme Court struck down the Air-India Regulations relating to retirement and the
pregnancy bar on the services of Air-hostesses as unconstitutional on the ground that the
conditions laid down therein were entirely unreasonable and arbitrary. The impugned Regulation
46 provided that an air hostess would retire from the service of the corporation upon attaining the
age of 35 years or on marriage, if it took place within 4 years of service, or on first pregnancy,
whichever occurred earlier. Under Regulation 7, the Managing Director was vested with absolute
discretion to extend the age of retirement prescribed at 45 years. Both these regulations were
struck down as violative of Article 14, which prohibits unreasonableness and arbitrariness.
Reservations of seats for women in local bodies or in educational institutions have been upheld.
The Supreme Court in Govt. of A.P. v. P.B. Vijayakumar17, held that reservation to the extent of
30% made in the State Services by the Andhra Pradesh Government for women candidates was
valid. The Division Bench of the Supreme Court emphatically declared that the power conferred
upon the State by Article 15(3) is wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity
including employment under the State. The power conferred by Article 15(3) is not whittled
down in any manner by Article 16.
In Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar18, the Supreme Court dealt with the validity of the
Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 of Bihar which denied the right of succession to Scheduled
Tribe women as violative of the right to livelihood. The majority judgment however upheld the
validity of legislation on the ground of custom of inheritance/succession of Scheduled Tribes.
17
18
(1995 (4) SCC 520)

{ (1996) 5 SCC 145}
20 | P a g e
Dissenting with the majority, Justice K. Ramaswamy felt that the law made a gender-based
discrimination and that it violated Articles 15, 16 and 21 of the Constitution. In his dissenting
judgment he said:
"Legislative and executive actions must be conformable to and for effectuation of the
fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III, Directive Principles enshrined in Part IV and the
Preamble of the Constitution which constitute the conscience of the Constitution. Covenants of
the United Nations add impetus and urgency to .eliminate gender-based obstacles and
discrimination. Legislative action should be devised suitably to constitute economic
empowerment of women in socio-economic restructure for establishing egalitarian social order."
In Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan19, the Supreme Court, in the absence of legislation in the field
of sexual harassment of working women at their place of work, formulated guidelines for their
protection. The Court said:
"Gender equality includes protection from sexual harassment and right to work with dignity
which is a universally recognised basic human right. The common minimum requirement of this
right has received global acceptance. In the absence of domestic law occupying the field, to
formulate effective measures to check the evil of sexual harassment of working women at all
workplaces, the contents of international conventions and norms are significant for the purpose
of interpretation of the guarantee of gender equality, right to work with human dignity in articles
14, 15, 19(1}(g) and 21 of the Constitution and the safeguards against sexual harassment
implicit therein and for the formulation of guidelines to achieve this purpose."
In Gaurav Jain v. Union of India20, the condition of prostitutes in general and the plight of their
children in particular were highlighted. The Court issued directions for a multi-pronged approach
and mixing the children of prostitutes with other children instead of making separate provisions
for them. The Supreme Court issued directions for the prevention of induction of women in
various forms of prostitution. It said that women should be viewed more as victims of adverse
socio-economic circumstances than offenders in our society.
19
20
(AIR 1997 SC 3011)

(1997 (8) SCC 114)
21 | P a g e
In a Nine bench decision in January 2007 in the case of I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu,
Rule of Law is regarded as part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Consequently Rule of
Law cannot be abolished even by a constitutional amendment. This manifests the high status
accorded to the Rule of Law in Indian constitutional jurisprudence. And, mind you, that is not
merely in theory. In practice the Indian Supreme Court has vigorously enforced the Rule of Law.
In the case of Satwant Singh which was argued in 1967 before the Supreme Court and
successfully persuaded the Supreme Court to hold that in a matter concerning the fundamental
right of a person to travel abroad total absence of any law would result inevitably on arbitrariness
and that was itself violative of the Rule of Law. After the judgment the Passport Act 1967 was
enacted to regulate grant, refusal, revocation and impounding of the passports.
The Indian Supreme Court in its decision in Jaisinghanis case in 1967 ruled that the first
essential of the rule of law upon which our whole constitutional system is based is that
discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities, must be confined within clearly defined
limits. The Court reaffirmed this position and held in 1975 that in a government under law,
there can be no such thing as unfettered unreviewable discretion. The Court referred to the
famous statement of Justice Douglas of the US Supreme Court that Law has reached its
finest moments when it has freed man from the unlimited discretion of some ruler Absolute
discretion is a ruthless master. Where discretion is absolute, man has always suffered.
Justice Brandies has rightly said in his judgment in Olmstead v. United States: Crime is
contagious. If the government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites
anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means to
declare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private
criminal would bring terrible retribution. These words had a special resonance in the
Constitutional Court of South Africa in the case of Mohamed v. President of the Republic of
South Africa.
In Glanrock Estate (P) Ltd v. The State Of Tamil Nadu21, it was held that Right to Equality
before law, Right to Equality of Opportunity in matters of public employment, Right to
Protection of life and personal liberty, Right against Exploitation, Right to Freedom of Religion
21
On 9 September, 2010; WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 242 OF 1988
22 | P a g e
etc. are all fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution and a common thread
running through all the Articles in Part III of the Constitution have a common identity committed
to an overarching principle which is the basic structure of the Constitution. Rule of law is often
said as closely inter-related principle and when interpreted as a principle of law, it envisages
separation of powers, judicial review, restriction on the absolute and arbitrary powers, equality,
liberty etc. Separation of powers is integral part of rule of law which guarantee independence of
judiciary which is a fundamental principle viewed as a safeguard against arbitrary exercise of
powers, legislative and constitutional. Doctrine of absolute or unqualified parliamentary
sovereignty is antithesis to rule of law. Doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty may, at times,
make rule of law and separation of powers subservient to the wish of the majority in parliament.
Parliamentary supremacy cannot be held unqualified so as to undo the basic structure. Basic
structure doctrine is, in effect, a constitutional limitation against parliamentary autocracy. Let us,
however, be clear that the principles of equality inherent in the rule of law does not averse to the
imposition of special burdens, grant special benefits and privileges to secure to all citizens
justice, social and economic and for implementing the directive principles of state policy for
establishing an egalitarian society.
In Smt. Shakti Kumari Gupta v. State Of U.P. And Ors.,22 it was held that In the instant case,
the said hopes have been belied blatantly and without any justified excuse. The police in spite of
having full information did not rise to the occasion and sacrificed promptness in favour of laxity,
presumably to leniently deal with the matter and unduly protect the respondent No, 5. Delay in
justice is denial of the same and is a negation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article
21 of the Constitution. That, which was supposed to be jealously guarded, was left open for
wanton violation and destruction. The constitutional rights of the petitioner under Article 300A
have been violated on account of absence of timely intervention by the police. To put it
precisely, the police failed to take action and waited till this Court wielded its authority by
issuing orders. The Court has been compelled to issue prerogative Writs on account of a total
failure on the part of the authorities particularly the police who failed to restore the rule of law.
The failure was both ways, firstly by not taking immediate action against the respondent No. 5
by launching appropriate criminal proceedings and allowing him to forcefully occupy the
22
on 1 December, 2005: 2006 (2) AWC 1525
23 | P a g e
premises and secondly by not timely setting its own house in order. This sort of a situation
destroys the faith of the public in the system which brings the rule of law under threat of
extinction.
In the decision of National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh and
Anr.23 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down as under:
We are a country governed by the Rule of Law; our Constitution confers certain rights on
citizens. Every person is entitled to equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. So
also, no person can be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure
established by law. Thus, the State is bound to protect the life and liberty of every human-being,
be he a citizen or otherwise, and it cannot permit anybody or group of persons e.g. the AAPSU to
threaten the Chakmas to leave the State failing which they would be forced to do so. No State
Government worth the name can tolerate such threats by one group of persons to another group
of persons, it is duty bound to protect the threatened group from such assaults and if it fails to do
so, it will fail to perform its constitutional as well as statutory obligations. Those giving such
threats would be liable to be dealt with in accordance with law. The State Government must act
impartially and carry out its legal obligations to safeguard the life, health and well-being of
Chakmas residing in the State without being inhibited by local politics.
In Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal and Anr.24, the Supreme
Court observed that where a Government activity involves public element, the "citizen has a
right to claim equal treatment", and when "the State acts to the prejudice of a person, it has to be
supported by legality." Functioning of a "democratic form of Government demands equality and
absence of arbitrariness and discrimination.
In A.K. Chaudhary And Ors. v. The State Of Gujarat And 2 Ors.,25 the question before the
court is Life is dear to everybody and death is painful to one and all. Should sentiments prevail
or discipline for the administration of any institution? Can sentiments be allowed to be enforced
over rule of law? The Court held that There cannot be a dispute to the proposition that no one is
above law, but at the same time if the Court on merits finds that no case is made out for
23
1996 AIR 1234, 1996 SCC (1) 742

1975 AIR 266, 1975 SCR (2) 674
25
on 9 September, 2005: 2006 CriLJ 726
24
24 | P a g e
commission of offence as per law, it would be improper either to decline the relief merely on the
ground that any party to the proceeding is holding high position in the organization or to grant
relief merely on the ground that either party to the proceeding is lower in rank. In the system of
administration of justice as per Constitution of India and law, such aspects have no legs to stand.
Suffice it to say that this Court has to uphold the rule of law irrespective of the position of either
of the parties to the proceedings before it. Therefore, the said attempt of Mr. Jani cannot be
entertained and deserves to be rejected at the outset only.
In A.P.Abbu Gounder v. D.K.Goel26, This court can take judicial note that in a number of cases;
the orders passed by this Court are not complied with by the Central and State Governments. It
only shows that there is no mechanism available with the Central and State Governments to
implement Court orders properly and in time. Even if mechanism is available, it is not effective.
Hence this court feels that such practice should be prevented/stopped. Otherwise there cannot be
effective functioning of judiciary as it would denote end of rule of law.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as this court has declared that disobedience of orders of the
courts strikes at the very root of rule of law on which the judicial system rests. The Hon'ble Apex
Court in Maninderjit Singh Bitta v. Union of India and others27, considered the nonimplementation of orders passed by the Apex Court in Association of Registration of Plates v.
Union of India28 which was reiterated in Maninderjit Singh v. Union of India29. The issue in
the above matter was regarding introduction of a scheme regulating issuance and fixation of high
security number plats. The Supreme Court fixed time limit for implementation. However, the
judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was not implemented by many of the states. In the
contempt petition, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Maninderjit Singh Bitta v. Union of
India and another30 held as follows:
"26. it is also of some relevance to note that disobedience of court orders by positive or active
contribution or non-obedience by a passive and dormant conduct leads to the same result.
Disobedience of orders of the court strikes at the very root of the rule of law on which the
26
on 20 February, 2013; Cont.Petn.No.1858 of 2012

reported in 2012 (1) SCC 273
28
29
30
reported in (2012) 1 SCC 273, at paragraphs 26,27 and 29 of 2012 (1) SCC 273
27
25 | P a g e
judicial system rests. The rule of law is the foundation of a democratic society. Judiciary is the
guardian of the rule of law. If the judiciary is to perform its duties and functions effectively and
remain true to the spirit with which they are sacredly entrusted, the dignity and authority of the
courts have to be respected and protected at all costs.31 The proceedings before the highest court
of the land in public interest litigation attain even more significance. These are the cases which
come up for hearing before the court on a grievance raised by the public at large or publicspirited persons. The State itself places matters before the Court for determination which would
fall, statutorily or otherwise, in the domain of the executive authority.
In Manohar Lal Sharma v. The Principle Secretary & Others,32 writ petitions under Article 32
of the Constitution of India brought in public interest, to begin with, did not appear to have the
potential of escalating to the dimensions they reached or to give rise to several issues of
considerable significance to the implementation of rule of law, which they have, during their
progress.
The popular habeas corpus case, ADM Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla33, is one of the most
important cases when it comes to rule of law. In this case, the question before the court was
whether there was any rule of law in India apart from Article 21. This was in context of
suspension of enforcement of Articles 14, 21 and 22 during the proclamation of an emergency.
The answer of the majority of the bench was in negative for the question of law. However
Justice H.R. Khanna dissented from the majority opinion and observed that Even in absence of
Article 21 in the Constitution, the state has got no power to deprive a person of his life and
liberty without the authority of law. Without such sanctity of life and liberty, the distinction
between a lawless society and one governed by laws would cease to have any meaning
In Madhu Limaye v. Supdt. Tihar Jail Delhi34, There were Indian and European Prisoners. Both
were treated differently. European gets better diet. Court held that difference between Indian and
European prisoners in the matter of treatment and diet violates right to equality under Article 14
of Indian prisoners. They all are prisoners they must treat equally.
31
(refer T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad case9, SCC p. 6, para 5)

on 17 December, 2013 WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.120 OF 2012
33
AIR 1976 SC 1207
34
1971 AIR 2486
32
26 | P a g e
In Sanaboina Satyanarayan v. Govt. of A.P35, In Andra Pradesh. They formulate a scheme for
prevention of crime against women. In prisons also prisoners were classify in to two categories
first Prisoners guilty of crime against women and second prisoners who are not guilty of crime
against women. Prisoners who are guilty of crime against women challenge the court saying that
there right to equality are deprived. Court held that there is reasonable classification to achieve
some objective.
Also in case of Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. R. Veeraswamy36, The employee was governed
by the contributory provident fund scheme. With effect from 1-7-1986 a scheme was introduced.
The question was whether the pension scheme ought to be applied to those who had already
retired before the introduction of the pension scheme the Supreme Court rejected the claim. As
per the rules prevalent at the time the retirees had received all their retiral benefits. If the pension
scheme was made applicable to all past retirees, the resulting financial burden would be Rs. 200
crore which would be beyond the capacity of employer. The reason given for introducing the
scheme was financial constraint- a valid ground. The court held that retired employees and those
who were in employment on 1-7-1986 cant be treated alike as they do not belong to one class.
The workmen who had retired and received all the benefits under the contributory provident fund
scheme cease to be employees of the appellant board w.e.f. the date of their retirement. They
form a separate class. Thus there was no illegality in introducing the pension scheme and not
making it applicable retrospectively to those who had retired before the date.
35
AIR 2003 SC 3074

AIR 1999 SC 1768
36
27 | P a g e
Rule of Law part of the Basic Structure

The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, shocked the status of Rule of law in India. The
question which came up for consideration in Shankari Prasad v. Union of India37 was whether
the fundamental rights can be amended under Article 368. The Supreme Court held that
Parliament has the power to amend Part III of the Constitution under Article 368 as under Article
13 - law means any legislative action and not a constitutional amendment. Therefore, a
constitutional amendment would be valid if abridges any of the fundamental rights.
The question again came up for consideration in Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan38 in which
the Supreme Court approved the majority judgment in Shankari Prasad case and held that
amendment of the Constitution means amendment of all provisions of the Constitution. Honble
Chief Justice Gajendragadkar held that if the framers of the constitution intended to exclude
fundamental rights from the scope of the amending power they would have made a clear
provision in that behalf.
However, both these cases were overruled by the Apex Court in Golaknath v. State of Punjab39
and it held that Parliament has no power to amend the Part III of the Constitution so as to take
away or abridges the fundamental rights and thus, at the end the Rule of law was sub-served by
the Judiciary from abridging away. However, the Rule of law was crumpled down with the
Constitution (Twenty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1971. Parliament by the way of this Amendment
inserted a new clause (4) in Article 13 which provided that nothing in this Article shall apply to
any amendment of this constitution made under Art 368. It substituted the heading of Article
368 from Procedure for amendment of Constitution to Power of Parliament to amend
Constitution and Procedure thereof. The Amendment not only restored the amending power of
the Parliament but also extended its scope by adding the words to amend by way of the
addition or variation or repeal any provision of this constitution in accordance with the
procedure laid down in the Article.
37
AIR 1951
AIR 1965
39
AIR 1971
38
28 | P a g e
This was challenged in the case of Keshavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala40. The Supreme
Court by majority overruled the decision given in Golaknaths case and held that Parliament has
wide powers of amending the Constitution and it extends to all the Articles, but the amending
power is not unlimited and does not include the power to destroy or abrogate the basic feature or
framework of the Constitution. There are implied limitations on the power of amendment under
Article 368. Within these limits Parliament can amend every Article of the Constitution. Thus,
Rule of law prevailed and Supreme Court stated in the same case that Our Constitution
postulates Rule of Law in the sense of supremacy of the Constitution and the laws as opposed to
arbitrariness. The 13 judge Bench also laid down that the Rule of law is an aspect of the basic
structure of the Constitution, which even the plenary power of Parliament cannot reach to
amend.
Since Keshavananda case, Rule of law has been much expanded and applied differently in
different cases. In Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain41, the Supreme Court invalidated Clause
(4) of Article 329- A inserted by the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1975 to
immunise the election dispute to the office of the Prime Minister from any kind of judicial
review. The Court said that this violated the concept of Rule of law which cannot be abrogated or
destroyed even by the Parliament.
The Habeas Corpus case42 according to many scholars is a black mark on the rule of law. The
case entails Diceys third principle of rule of law. The legal question in this case was whether
there is any rule of law over and above the Constitutional rule of law and whether there was any
rule of law in India apart from Article 21 of the Constitution regarding right to life and personal
liberty. A five judge Bench with a majority of 4:1 (going by strict interpretation) held in the
negative.
The majority judges held that the Constitution is the mandate and the rule of law. They held that
there cannot be any rule of law other than the constitutional rule of law. Excluding moral
conscience, they held that there cannot be any pre-Constitution or post-Constitution rule of law
40
AIR 1973
AIR 1975 SC 2299, 1975 Supp SCC 1, 1976 2 SCR 347
42
1976 AIR 1207, 1976 SCR 172
41
29 | P a g e
which can run counter to the rule of law embodied in the Constitution, nor there any rule of law
to nullify the constitutional provisions during the time of Emergency.
The majority judges held that Article 21 is our rule of law regarding life and liberty. No other
rule of law can have separate existence as a distinct right. The rule of law is not merely a
catchword or incantation. It is not a law of nature consistent and invariable at all times and in
all circumstances. There cannot be a brooding and omnipotent rule of law drowning in its
effervescence the emergency provisions of the Constitution. Thus they held that Article 21 is the
sole repository of right to life and liberty and during an emergency, the emergency provisions
themself constitute the rule of law.
In a powerful dissent, Justice H.R. Khanna observed that Rule of law is the antithesis of
arbitrariness...Rule of law is now the accepted form of all civilized societies...Everywhere it is
identified with the liberty of the individual. It seeks to maintain a balance between the opposing
notions of individual liberty and public order. In every state the problem arises of reconciling
human rights with the requirements of public interest. Such harmonizing can only be attained by
the existence of independent courts which can hold the balance between citizen and the state and
compel governments to conform to the law.
With the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 it has been laid down that even
during emergency, Articles 20 and 21 will not be suspended. According to me, Justice Khanna
(with due respect to his high moral conscience) has not given a judgment in consonance with the
rule of law. His Lordship has on the other hand tried to place the judiciary over and above the
rule of law. During emergency, that was the rule of law that Article 21 is suspended. Creating
rule of law above the Constitution will create huge implications. Whatever is the case, the
Austinian sense of jurisprudence does apply in the present case and the majority judges have not
decided wrongly. Though now it remains only an academic question but if a law does not seem
to be morally rich then it is the job of the Legislature to amend it and not the Judiciary to come
up with its own new law which is non-existent and against the existing law.
In Raman Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India43, the Supreme Court
held that the great purpose of rule of law is the protection of individual against arbitrary exercise
43
1979 AIR 1628, 1979 SCR (3)1014
30 | P a g e
of power, wherever it is found. In re: Arundhati Roy44, Justice Sethi observed that for achieving
the establishment of the rule of law, the Constitution has assigned the special task to the
judiciary.
When Article 371-D (5) (Proviso) authorized the A.P Government to nullify any decision of the
Administrative Services Tribunal, it was held violative of the rule of law. Holding the provision
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court said that it is a basic principle of the rule of law that the
exercise of power by the Executive must not only be governed by the Constitution but also is in
accordance with law. The Court also held that the power of judicial review should be used to
ensure that rule of law is maintained.
Over the years, the Courts have used judicial activism to expand the concept of rule of law. For
example, in Courts are trying to establish a rule of law society in India by insisting on fairness.
In Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra45, the Supreme Court insisted on fairness to women in
police lock-up and also drafted a code of guidelines for the protection of prisoners in police
custody, especially female prisoners. In Veena Sethi v. State of Bihar46, also the Supreme Court
extended the reach of rule of law to the poor who constitute the bulk of India by ruling that rule
of law does not merely for those who have the means to fight for their rights and expanded the
locus standi principle to help the poor.
44
Contempt Petition (crl.) 10 of 2001

JT 1988 (3)
46
AIR 1983 SC 339, 1983 CriLJ 675, 1982 (1) SCALE 793
45
31 | P a g e
Put Checks on Governmental Powers

The Indian Constitution establishes a limited government. Bring a federal country; both the
central and state legislatures have the power to make laws, but only subject to express and
implicit constitutional limitations.
1. First of all, the constitution specifies and demarcates the matters on which the central
legislature and state legislatures could make law.47 In Medical and Educational
Charitable Trust v. State of Tamil Nadu48, it was held that any law that breaches these
limitations (e.g., a state law made on a matter within the exclusive competence of the
central legislature) could be declared unconstitutional by courts.
2. Second, the power of executive to make laws by issuing Ordinances is limited both in
terms of duration and situations triggering the exercise of such power.49 The executive, of
course, cannot make a law on a matter on which the corresponding legislature lacks the
competence to legislate.50
3. Third, although the Indian Constitution having established a parliamentary form of
government does not follow any strict separation of powers,51 a system of checks and
balances has been put in place. For instance, all the Bills passed by the Parliament require
the Presidents assent to become law.52 The Parliament, on the other hand, has the power
to impeach the President for violating the Constitution.53
4. Fourth, in case of Kharak Singh v. State of UP54 and in Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of
Kerala55, the courts have held that any executive action without the support of a valid law
will be void, more so if it violated fundamental rights. Similar to the position in many
other jurisdictions, laws cannot generally be retroactive, especially if they seek to impose
47
Constitution of India, 1950, articles 246, 248-254 read with Schedule IX

(1996) 3 SCC 15
49
Articles 123 and 213 of the Constitution
50
Articles 123(3) provides: If and so far as an Ordinance under this article makes any provision which Parliament
would not under this Constitution be competent to enact, it shall be void.
51
Article 50 though mandates to separate the judiciary from the executive
52
Article 111 of the Constitution
53
Article 61 of the Constitution
54
AIR 1963 SC 1295
55
AIR 1987 SC 748
48
32 | P a g e
any penalty or punishment.56 The judiciary also does not treat vague laws or
administrative guidelines favourably.
5. Fifth, in a multi-party democracy, the presence of a free press and the requirement of
periodic elections can be one of mechanisms against the abuse of governmental power.
The Constitution expressly limits the term of legislatures,57 and the freedom of speech
and expression under Article 19(1) (a) has been interpreted to include the freedom of
press in case of Express Newspapers v. Union of India58 and in Bennett Coleman v.
Union of India59.
In addition to these checks, the fundamental rights provisions and the power judicial review
provide effective means of checking the power of the legislature and executive. These two
aspects are discussed below.
Equality Guarantee and the Protection of Human Rights

For establishing an egalitarian society was/is one of the main goals of the India Constitution. The
fundamental rights and the directive principles of state policy were the primary tools adopted to
achieve this goal. Part III of the Constitution entitled Fundamental Rights comprises Articles
12 to 35 which lay down various rights, their limitations and remedies for their enforcement. The
rights range from the equality before the law to the freedom of speech and expression, the
protection against double jeopardy, the right to life and personal liberty, the freedom of religion,
prohibition of discrimination, and the protection against arrest and unlawful detention.
It will be useful analyse to a few rights in some detail in order to appreciate the rule of law in
operation. Article 14 prohibits the state from denying to any person equality before the law or
the equal protection of the laws. The guiding principle of equality being that like should be
treated alike and that unlike should be treated differently, Article 14 permits reasonable
classification. In case of K Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala60, The court has invalidated several
laws under Article 14 because the classification was without a difference, and in case of P
56
Article 20(1); Mahendra P Singh, Shuklas Constitution of India, 11th edn., (Lucknow: Eastern Book Co., 2008),
177-81
57
Artilces 83 and 172
58
AIR 1958 SC 58
59
AIR 1973 SC 106
60
AIR 1962 SC 723
33 | P a g e
Rajendram v. State of Madras61, it was decided by the court that the basis of classification had
no nexus to the object of the law, and in case of State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar62 and
also in Northern India Caterers Ltd. v. State of Punjab63, the courts said that the law
established special courts for trial of certain cases or types of cases without any reasonable
classification or guidelines, and in case of Ameernnisa Begum v. Mehboob Begum64 and also in
Ram Prasad v. State of Bihar65, it was held that the law singled out a person for giving a special
or discriminatory treatment.
More importantly, it however, has been the judicial employment of Article 14 to develop a broad
principle of reasonableness. In E P Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu66, the Court said that
Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be cribbed,
cabined and confined within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of
view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. Later on, the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v.
Union of India67 observed that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in state action and ensures
fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of reasonableness, which logically as well as
philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness, pervades Article 14 like
a brooding omnipresence. Therefore, allegation of discrimination vis-a-vis others is no longer
sine qua non for attracting Article 1468 and in bunch of cases Mithu v. State of Punjab69,
Central Inland Water Corporation v. B N Ganguly70, DTC v. DTC Mazdoor Congress71,
Common Cause v. Union of India72, Shivsagar Tiwari v. Union of India73, it was held by the
courts that it would strike down any arbitrary executive or legislative action unconstitutional as
ipso facto violating Article 14. Another interesting fundamental right has been Article 21, which
lays down that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the
61
AIR 1968 SC 1012

AIR 1952 SC 75
63
AIR 1967 SC 1581
64
AIR 1952 SC 91
65
AIR 1953 SC 215
66
(1974) 4 SCC 3, 38
67
(1978) 1 SCC 248, 284; R D Shetty v. International Airport Authority AIR 1979 SC 1628; Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib
AIR 1981 SC 487
68
A L Kalra v. Project &Equipment Corporation (1984) 3 SCC 316, 328
69
AIR 1983 SC 473
70
(1986) 3 SCC 156
71
AIR 1991 SC 101
72
(1996) 6 SCC 530
73
(1996) 6 SCC 558
62
34 | P a g e
procedure established by law. This provision has proved to be a residuary repository of many
fundamental rights. Life in this article has been interpreted by the courts to mean more than
mere physical existence;74 and in Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi75, it includes
right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it. Ever-widening horizon of
Article 21 is illustrated by the fact that the Court has, inter alia, read into it the right to health76,
livelihood,77 free and compulsory education up to the age of 14 years,78 unpolluted
environment,79 shelter,80 clean drinking water,81 privacy,82 legal aid,83 speedy trial,84 and various
rights of under trials, convicts and prisoners.85 Another innovative use of this provision has been
in reaching violation of right to life and personal liberty by even private persons, 86 and to grant
compensation for violation of fundamental rights.87
74
For the evolution of such an interpretation, Kharak Singh v. State of UP AIR 1963 SC 1295; Sunil Batra v. Delhi
Administration (1978) 4 SCC 494; Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1986 SC 180; Francis Coralie v.
Union Territory of Delhi AIR 1981 SC 746; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India AIR 1984 SC 802; Consumer
Education & Research Centre v. Union of India (1995) 3 SCC 42; Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty (1996)
1 SCC 490; Visakha v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1997 SC 3011. In some of these cases the Court has relied upon the
observation of Justice Field in Munn v. Illinois 94 US 113
75
AIR 1981 SC 746, 753 (per Justice Bhagwati)
76
Parmanand Kataria v. Union of India AIR 1989 SC 2039; Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of West
Bengal (1996) 4 SCC 37
77
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1986 SC 180; DTC Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Congress AIR
1991 SC 101
78
Unni Krishnan v. State of AP (1993) 1 SCC 645
79
Indian Council for Enviro Legal Action v. Union of India (1996) 3 SCC 212; M C Mehta v. Union of India (1996) 6
SCC 750; Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1996) 5 SCC 647; Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of
India (2000) 10 SCC 664
80
Gauri Shankar v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 349
81
A P Pollution Control Board II v. M V Nayudu (2001) 2 SCC 62
82
Kharak Singh v. State of UP AIR 1963 SC 1295; Govind v. State of MP AIR 1975 SC 1378; R Raj Gopal v. State of
Tamil Nadu (1994) 6 SCC 632; PUCL v. Union of India AIR 1997 SC 568; X v. Hospital Z (1998) 8 SCC 296
83
M H Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1978 SC 1548; Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar AIR 1979 SC 1369;
Khatri v. State of Bihar AIR 1981 SC 928; Suk Das v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh AIR 1986 SC 991
84
Hussainara Khatoon (I) to (VI) v Home Secretary, Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81, 91, 93, 98, 108 and 115; Kadra Pahadiya
v. State of Bihar AIR 1982 SC 1167; Common Cause v. Union of India(1996) 4 SCC 33 and (1996) 6 SCC 775; Rajdeo
Sharma v. State of Bihar (1998) 7 SCC 507and (1999) 7 SCC 604
85
Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration AIR 1978 SC 1675; Prem Shankar v. Delhi Administration AIR 1980 SC 1535;
Munna v. State of UP AIR 1982 SC 806; Sheela Barse v. Union of India AIR 1986 SC 1773
86
M C Mehta v. Union of India (1987) 1 SCC 395; Consumer Education & Research Centre v. Union of India (1995) 3
SCC 42; Kirloskar Brothers Ltd. v. ESIC (1996) 2 SCC 682; Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subra Chakraborty AIR 1996 SC
922; Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1997 SC 3011; X v. Hospital Z (1998) 8 SCC 296; M C Mehta v. Kamal Nath
AIR 2000 SC 1997
87
Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 141; Bhim Singh v. State of J & K (1985) 4 SCC 677; Nilabati Behra v.
State of Orissa (1993) 2 SCC 746
35 | P a g e
It should also be noted that although the constitution framers had expressly rejected the due
process requirement in Article 21, the Supreme Court introduced this guarantee by judicial
interpretation.88 Furthermore, by a joint reading of Articles 14 and 21, the courts have basically
developed a substantive model of rule of law any law or executive action which is not just,
fair and reasonable could be declared unconstitutional. 89 The Courts, for example, invalidated a
penal provision prescribing the mandatory death sentence for murder committed by a life
convict.90 More recently, the Delhi High Court ruled that Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code
insofar it criminalises consensual sexual acts of adults in private, is violative of Articles 21, 14
and 15 of the Constitution.91
Judicial Review by an Independent Judiciary

The power of an independent judiciary to review the decisions of the other two organs of the
government is considered an integral aspect of the rule of law and the Indian Constitution does
everything possible to put in place this mechanism. Judges of the Supreme Court and the High
Courts are appointed by the President in consultation with relevant judges of these courts.92
Subsequent to the decision in Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of
India93 and also in In re, Presidential Reference 94, judges of the higher judiciary are in essence
appointed by the judiciary itself.95 Detailed provisions have also been made to provide judges
security of tenure,96 and protect their salaries, allowances and privileges.97 Legislative bodies are
barred from debating the conduct of judges unless dealing with impeachment motions.98 In fact,
on a closer look, it seems that the Indian judiciary has become over-independent in that there are
not many checks on its powers and the functioning/conduct of judges. The judiciary, for
instance, resists any attempt to introduce accountability measures and impeaching judges so far
88
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 97

Singh, Shuklas Constitution of India, above n 11, 201-04
90
Mithu v. State Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 473
91
Naz Foundation v. Government of Delhi, WP(C) No.7455/2001 (2 July 2009), para 132
92
Articles 124(2) and 217
93
(1993) 4 SCC 441
94
AIR 1999 SC 1
95
Mahendra P Singh & Surya Deva, The Constitution of India: Symbol of Unity in Diversity (2005) 53 Jahrbuch des
Offentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart 649, 673-74
96
Articles 124 and 218
97
98
89
36 | P a g e
has proved to be an almost impossible even in suitable cases. Although the power of judicial
review does not require an express recognition in a constitutional text, Article 13(2) of the Indian
Constitution provides such recognition by laying down that the state shall not make any law
which takes away or abridges the fundamental rights.
The remedy to approach the Supreme Court for violation of fundamental rights under Article 32
is in itself a fundamental right.99 The Court has widened the scope of this power over the years
by
1. implying many new rights within the ambit of Article 21;
2. chartering the course of public interest litigation as a tool of deepening justice to the
masses;
3. declaring judicial review a basic feature of the Constitution and thus putting this
beyond the Parliaments amendment power; and
4. Conferring on itself the power to review the validity of even constitutional amendments.
99
A similar power is vested with the High Courts under Article 226
37 | P a g e
Conclusion
What article 14 forbids is discrimination by law that is treating persons similarly circumstanced
differently and treating those not similarly circumstanced in the same way or as has been pithily
put treating equals as unequals and unequals as equals. Article 14 prohibits hostile
classification by law and is directed against discriminatory class legislation.
A legislature for the purpose of dealing with the complex problem that arise out of an infinite
variety of human relations cannot but proceed on some sort of selection or classification of
persons upon whom the legislation is to operate.
It is well settled that Article 14 frobid classification for the purpose of legislation. It is equally
well settled that in order to meet the test of Article 14
1. classification must be based on intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or
things that are grouped together from those that are left out of group and
2. The differentia must have a rational nexus to the objects sought to be achieved by the
executive or legislative action under challenge. Article 14 contains a guarantee of
equality before law to all persons and protection to them against discrimination by law. It
forbids class legislation.
On a brief overview of the constitutional provisions and judicial decisions, it can be safely
concluded that the Indian Constitution enshrines the rule of law as a fundamental governance
principle, though the term is not mentioned expressly in the text of the Constitution. Having said
this, there are several challenges that pose threat to building a society based on robust rule of law
framework. Continued socio-economic inequalities (despite affirmative active provisions and
programmes), large population, pervasive corruption (including in judiciary), judicial delays, law
and order problems in view of regionalism and Naxalism, and the general apathy of people
towards the rule of law are matters of serious concern. Despite these challenges, there is no doubt
about the constitutional mandate or governments commitment to establishing a rule of law
society. We must straightaway point out that A.K. Kaipak case is a landmark in the development
of administrative law and it has contributed in a large measure to the strengthening of the rule of
law in this country. We would not like to whittle down in the slightest measure the vital principle
laid down in this decision which has nourished the roots of the rule of law and injected justice
38 | P a g e
and fair play into legality. There can be no doubt that if a Selection Committee is constituted for
the purpose of selecting candidates on merits and one of the members of the Selection
Committee is closely related to a candidate appearing for the selection, it would not be enough
for such member merely to withdraw from participation in the interview of the candidate related
to him but he must withdraw altogether from the entire selection process and ask the authorities
to nominate another person in his place on the Selection Committee, because otherwise all the
selections made would be vitiated on account of reasonable likelihood of bias affecting the
process of selection. But the situation here is a little different because the selection of candidates
to the Haryana Civil Service (Executive) and Allied Services is being made not by any Selection
Committee constituted for that purpose but it is being done by the Haryana Public Service
Commission which is a Commission set up under Article 316 of the Constitution. It is a
Commission which consists of a Chairman and a specified number of members and is a
constitutional authority. We do not think that the principle which requires that a member of a
Selection Committee whose close relative is appearing for selection should decline to become a
member of the Selection Committee or withdraw from it leaving it to the appointing authority to
nominate another person in his place, need be applied in case of a constitutional authority like
the Public Service Commission, whether Central or State. If a member of a Public Service
Commission were to withdraw altogether from the selection process on the ground that a close
relative of his is appearing for selection, no other person save a member can be substituted in his
place. And it may sometimes happen that no other member is available to take the place of such
member and the functioning of the Public Service Commission may be affected. When two or
more members of a Public Service Commission are holding a viva voce examination, they are
functioning not as individuals but as the Public Service Commission. Of course, we must make it
clear that when a close relative of a member of a Public Service Commission is appearing for
interview, such member must withdraw from participation in the interview of that candidate and
must not take part in any discussion in regard to the merits of that candidate and even the marks
or credits given to that candidate should not be disclosed to him. Here in the present case it was
common ground between the parties that Shri Raghubar Dayal Gaur did not participate at all in
interviewing Trilok Nath Sharma and likewise Shri R.C. Marya did not participate at all when
Shakuntala Rani and Balbir Singh came to be interviewed and in fact, both of them retired from
the room when the interviews of their respective relatives were held. Moreover, neither of them
39 | P a g e
took any part in any discussion in regard to the merits of his relatives nor is there anything to
show that the marks or credits obtained by their respective relatives at the interviews were
disclosed to them. We are therefore of the view that there was no infirmity attaching to the
selections made by the Haryana Public Service Commission on the ground that, though their
close relatives were appearing for the interview, Shri Raghubar Dayal Gaur and Shri R.C. Marya
did not withdraw completely from the entire selection process. This ground urged on behalf of
the petitioners must therefore be rejected.
40 | P a g e
Bibliography
1. Upendra Baxi, 'The Rule of Law in India', (2007) 6 Sur - Revista Internacional de
Derechos Humanos 7, <socialsciences.scielo.org/pdf/s_sur/v3nse/scs_a01.pdf>.
2. Mahendra P Singh & Surya Deva, 'The Constitution of India: Symbol of Unity in
Diversity' (2005) 53 Jahrbuch des Offentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart [Yearbook of
Public Law, Germany] 649.
3. S K Verma and Kusum (eds.), Fifty Years of the Supreme Court of India - Its Grasp and
Reach(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000).
4. Victor V Ramraj & Arun K Thiruvengadam (ed.), Emergency Powers in Asia: Exploring
the Limits of Legality *(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).*
5. S P Sathe, Judicial Activism in India - Transgressing Borders and Enforcing Limits (New
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002).
6. http://www.lawyersclubindia.com/articles/Adoption-Of-Rule-Of-Law-In-India-AndSupreme-Court-Judgments-2901.asp
7.
41 | P a g e

Rule of Law in Indian Constitution

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RULE OF LAW IN INDIAN CONSTITUTION

Guided By: Dr. Asad Malik

Mohd. Abid Hussain Ansari

31. Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan

62. Rajendram v. State of Madras

93. Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India

M H Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra

Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar

Khatri v. State of Bihar

Suk Das v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh

Hussainara Khatoon (I) to (VI) v Home Secretary, Bihar

Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar

Common Cause v. Union of India

Rajdeo Sharma v. State of Bihar

Prem Shankar v. Delhi Administration

Kirloskar Brothers Ltd. v. ESIC

Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar

Bhim Singh v. State of J & K

Nilabati Behra v. State of Orissa

Mithu v. State Punjab

Naz Foundation v. Government of Delhi

A.V. Dicey, Law of the Constitution (1885)

[AIR 1967 SC 1170]

Rule of Law under the Indian Constitution

CIVIL APPEAL NO.3067 OF 2004

(AIR 1967 SC 1427)

(1979) 4 SCC 260)

(1995 (4) SCC 520)

(AIR 1997 SC 3011)

On 9 September, 2010; WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 242 OF 1988

on 1 December, 2005: 2006 (2) AWC 1525

1996 AIR 1234, 1996 SCC (1) 742

on 20 February, 2013; Cont.Petn.No.1858 of 2012

(refer T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad case9, SCC p. 6, para 5)

AIR 2003 SC 3074

Rule of Law part of the Basic Structure

1979 AIR 1628, 1979 SCR (3)1014

Contempt Petition (crl.) 10 of 2001

Put Checks on Governmental Powers

Constitution of India, 1950, articles 246, 248-254 read with Schedule IX

Equality Guarantee and the Protection of Human Rights

AIR 1968 SC 1012

Judicial Review by an Independent Judiciary

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 97

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