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Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia David Sedney briefed
Pentagon reporters March 3. Sedney had just returned from Defense
Policy Coordination talks with his Chinese military counterparts in
Shanghai.
Sedney added, "We don't want anybody to see -- we don't want ourselves
or the Chinese to see Africa as a forum for conflict or competition between
the United States and China, but rather an area where we can work
together to address the many needs in Africa, including in the security
field. We had again, as I said, a very successful set of discussions on that
in that way."
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DoD News Briefing with David Sedney from the Pentagon Briefing Room,
Arlington, Va.
MODERATOR: Well, welcome, and thank you for joining us this afternoon.
It's my pleasure to introduce to you the deputy assistant secretary of
Defense for East Asia, David Sedney, who is here to present as well as
answer some of your questions about the 2008 DOD Report to Congress
on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China. He does have
some of his subject matter experts along with him, and he may call on
them if we get into some of the details.
But with that, let me turn it over to David for a brief overview and then take
your questions. David?
Thank you.
MR. SEDNEY: Thank you. Thanks very much. I think I see some familiar
faces out there. Some people traveled along with Secretary Gates out to
China, Japan and Korea back in November, I think it was. Happy to see
you again.
I'm here to brief you, really to answer your questions on the China Military
Power Report. We've already released the report. I hope all of you had a
chance to read it over. If you haven't read the entire report, I think the
executive summary really gives you a lot of the real key issues there.
One is that this is the first year we've been able to basically release the
report on time, and that goes to -- that's due to a great deal of effort by my
staff here and a lot of other people in the U.S. government who've worked
very hard over the past year to do that. The Congress has asked that the
report be delivered every year on March 1st, and this year -- well, March
1st was a Saturday, so we were able to do it today. We were able to go up
and brief the staff of the Senate and House Armed Services Committee,
and they were very appreciative that we had done it this year.
The second thing I want to stress is that while, as mandated by Congress,
this is a military power report that's, of course naturally enough, drafted by
the Department of Defense, it's the U.S. government's unified view on
Chinese military power. So this report has been vetted and cleared across
our entire interagency -- the White House, the NSC, State Department, the
intelligence community, other agencies involved as well. So it really is a
collective view. It's not specific to -- just to the Department of Defense.
That said, the China Military Power Report, I think, as it states directly,
portrays a China that not only is a rising economic power, but it's a rising
military power. It shows that China's -- the new capabilities that China's
acquiring have implications for not just the region but globally. And it
discusses a lot of areas where we don't have full knowledge of what we're
talking about.
But this report is a very, very serious attempt, again, by the entire U.S.
government, to present in a fair and factual way what we see as the facts
of China's military power. We will always look to do better. We think this
year's report is better than last year's, and I'm sure that next year's will be
better than this year's. But, in -- it's designed, really, to speak for itself. So
I'm not going to get into all the details, but if you have questions, we'll be
prepared to answer them, including on details. And I have with me here
David Helvey, who's our senior China director, who is a key lead on this
effort.
I also wanted to mention to you that I've actually only been back a little
over 12 hours from China, where on Thursday and Friday in Shanghai we
had the fourth session of our Defense Policy Consultative (sic
Coordination) talks with the Chinese. You may have seen some of the
earlier press reporting. We signed an agreement on the Defense
telephone link that will enable us to go ahead and put the equipment into
place in the next couple of weeks. That was a culmination of a very long
effort, and I know those of you who were with us when you traveled with
the secretary, we had some discussions about that. But that's done now,
and that's really, I think, very good, very important news.
We also signed an agreement with the Chinese on access to Korean War-
era archives. My colleague Deputy Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of
War and Missing in Action Affairs Charles Ray signed that agreement. It
had actually been 17 years in the making. I -- when I was posted in the
embassy in Beijing back in 1991, I started talking to the Chinese about
that. But the Korean War's a very sensitive subject for the Chinese and
between us.
But at the same time, our families of those who are still missing in action
from the Korean War deserve much more information than they've had,
and we think this is an important step forward.
Beyond those two formal agreements in these talks that I had with the
Chinese, which I would say were surprisingly successful, we also agreed
to move forward on our dialogue on nuclear strategy and policy. Again,
those of you who are with us -- with the secretary traveling, you will recall
that he mentioned that. We're going to go ahead and start. We have a
process. The Chinese have agreed to that process, and we're very happy
about that. We think it's an area that really needs a lot more discussion
between the U.S. and China, and one where we don't expect this to solve
all the problems, and there are certainly a number of areas in the nuclear
field that we address in this report as areas where we'd like to have more
information. This dialogue won't address them all from the beginning, but
it'll be a forum where we can deepen and expand our knowledge, and the
Chinese, of course, will have a chance to discuss with us.
Beyond that, the Chinese, who always object to the military power report,
generally protest very strongly against it, that also have agreed to begin a
dialogue where our drafters of the Chinese military power report and their
-- the Chinese drafters of their regular white paper, which they put out
about every two years, is that right, David?
MR. SEDNEY: Every two years -- their drafters and our drafters will get
together. In fact, we'll be sending Mr. Helvey there to lead that delegation
in the next few months.
So we'll be able to sit down and discuss the -- that they'll be able to sit
down and discuss their objections to the report. We, of course, are not
going to be the position of having them edit it, but we're also -- that will
also give us a forum for asking them a lot of the questions that are raised
by the report.
Additionally, we had discussions about Africa. We had a presentation on
the formation of AFRICOM, and the Chinese gave us a presentation on
their role in Africa. And we agreed to continue discussions on Africa in the
military field, and I think that's a very positive thing.
But I've said I would give a brief introduction. I've maybe gone past that
already. So let me go ahead and turn it over to all of you for questions.
Q: Sir, just very briefly, your mentioning of the meeting of drafters, is that
-- will that be the first time --
MR. SEDNEY: Well, certainly in both those areas, there's reason for
concern.
We continue to ask the Chinese to sit down and talk to us about that test,
and they haven't. Their reaction, as Secretary Gates said in his press
conference back in November in Beijing, we really just haven't had a
response on that. And so we continue to ask for that and press for that,
and we hope we will get that.
And in the cyber area that you mentioned, there continue to be around the
world, not just in the United States but around the world, many, many
computer intrusions that are sourced back to the PRC.
While we're not able to definitively label them as the work of the PLA or
the Chinese government, the techniques that are used, the way these
intrusions are conducted are certainly very consistent with what you would
need if you were going to actually carry out cyberwarfare, and the kinds of
activities that are carried out are consistent with a lot of writings we see
from Chinese military and Chinese military theorists.
So it's an area that I would say, yes, definitely is of growing concern, but
again, one where we don't have very much clarity at all and where we
really need to have a much better understanding of the Chinese. And it
would be best, of course, if that understanding came from the Chinese
themselves, if they were to come forward and tell us what's going on.
MR. SEDNEY: I think, as I said, this report is very careful -- it's not the
China military policy report. It's the China Military Power Report. And so
it's a description of China military power. It's not -- in terms of drawing the
kinds of conclusions -- that's your discussion -- that's really, I think, in
many ways for readers and policymakers to be --to make. But I certainly
wouldn't say that it's one where we would say that people should be
alarmed. This process of the Chinese military modernization, the process
of the growth and the rise of China, including in the military area, has been
a phenomenon that has been under way for some years, and one that
we've been tracking very closely. The mandate from the Congress in 1999
to begin this report was part of that process.
I think the biggest thing for people to be concerned about, really, is the
fact that we don't have that kind of strategic understanding of these
Chinese intentions, and that leads to uncertainty, that leads to a readiness
to hedge against the possibility that China's development will go in ways
that the Chinese right now say it won't.
The Chinese tell us today that their rise is peaceful. They tell us that their
intentions are very much to be part of the international system. But when
we have all these capabilities that are -- very clearly have regional and
global reach, going to your point, so their capabilities are increasing and
growing beyond just the area immediately around China, where it was,
say, 20, 30 years ago, then questions develop.
MR. SEDNEY: I think those intentions are unclear. I mean, if I knew all the
answers, then you have all the answers here. But China's a growing
country. China's undergoing a lot of change.
And the problem that we have -- and this is not just in the military area, I
would say, but there's a lot of areas where a lack of understanding of
China -- opacity about China's processes, from a lot of areas I don't deal
with now but I dealt with in the past -- for example, health and safety
issues. You've seen all the stories over the last several years. So it's not
just a military issue, this lack of transparency. And it's not just a military
issue that it -- if -- that these issues are important now for China, because
as China continues to grow and expand and influence the course of world
events, it's important for us to have a clear understanding.
Q: I wonder if you could talk a little bit about what the report says about
the development of China's missile technology over the last year and the
expansion both of regional missiles challenging Taiwan and more global
intercontinental technology. And how much is that being -- what is that
being driven by? Is it purely a Taiwan situation? Is it developing of a
supply of Patriot missile defenses to Taiwan or other missile defense
technology?
MR. SEDNEY: Again, what's driving it is a question that I have to urge you
to ask the Chinese, because we can make a certain amount of guesses or
assumptions, and sometimes they can be pretty good guesses or
assumptions, but the real answer to that has to come from the Chinese.
But they also are developing a wider range of missiles, and they've had
missiles for a long time. The Chinese have had a missile capability for a
long time, and they certainly continue to have missiles that are capable of
carrying their -- their nuclear weapons. And they continue to have what
they are, I think, clearly designing as a nuclear deterrent and keeping in
place a nuclear deterrent, and that missile capability is very strong.
Q: Well, then, what would you say is the biggest change from the last
report? What are the developments -- because we've seen this
incremental increase in military spending for some time now, what's the
biggest change?
MR. SEDNEY: I have to say there's no one biggest change. If you look
through this year's report and compare it with last year's report, you'll see
a number of areas where there are changes and there are things that are
new. But there's no one big dramatic change. I can't -- (chuckles) -- I can't
write your headline for you here, and I don't think there is a headline out of
that.
And then, also, you said last year the Chinese protested very strongly
against the report.
Can you tell us some of the specific things they protested against? If there
haven't been any major changes in the report this year, are they
presumably going to protest the same specifics, or --
And our response to those or to that will be that this is the report that's
done the very best we can, based on the information we have, and we
would love to hear more from you about what those strategic intentions
are behind your developments.
(Off mike.)
And that has clearly happened. Large amounts of data have been taken
out in these intrusions. That doesn't mean that that data has been
destroyed, but it could have been.
It doesn't mean it's been altered, but it could have been. So there are all
these possibilities there.
That, I guess, is -- it's a very careful answer to your question, and I think I
have to be careful when I answer your questions.
Q: Isn't that an attack if you went into my house and took things out of my
house? Isn't that more than an intrusion?
MR. SEDNEY: We're getting into philosophy here, but if I -- I think it's,
perhaps, more like if someone went into your house and took a picture
and left what was there, but then they went off -- but they went off with the
image of it.
But I think the whole area of cyber presents new challenges to us, both in
the defense world, the intelligence world and the legal world. The whole
world of the Internet presents these kind of challenges that we're
struggling with, but it is important for countries to behave responsibly. And
I think you'll notice in the report that we point out statements by other
governments directly through the Chinese about their concerns, because
it's not just the United States that has been subject to these intrusions --
(word inaudible) -- in China. It's been countries all over the world.
MODERATOR: (Inaudible) -- first row, and then we'll go to the second row.
Q: Is it fair to say that this report paints a picture of China accelerating its
capability to attack U.S. carriers through anti-ship cruise missiles and this
whole area- denial theory strategy. That seems to be a message here,
that they're accelerating their development of missiles like that.
MR. SEDNEY: I would say they're continuing to develop it. I'm not sure I'm
comfortable with the term "accelerating the development," but they're
certainly developing it. They're certainly putting a lot of resources into it,
and they certainly are, as I said before, very technical and very capable.
And I think we make that point here.
Q: I have one follow-up. They bought from the Russians the SS-N-27B
SIZZLER. The U.S.-China commission says that's its most advanced anti-
ship missile in the world because of its supersonic capabilities. What
capability does, in fact, China now have, because these missiles are on
eight of their 12 KILOs?
MR. SEDNEY: Getting into some -- into a little technical area, but why
don't I go ahead and ask my colleague, David Helvey, to go ahead and
answer that.
But one of the things that it's important to point out is that the missile itself
is -- (off mike) -- technology in terms of having the operational capability,
it's a function of the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance network,
the training and the integration of all those.
So this is still a new weapons system for China, and we're going to be
watching carefully how they integrate that anti-ship cruise missile into their
submarine force with the ISR architecture that they need to have.
Q: Does it give them a major boost, though, that they didn't have a year or
two ago?
MR. HELVEY (?): It terms of having that particular weapons system, yes.
That weapons system is significantly more sophisticated than the previous
anti-ship cruise missiles that they've had. As you may know, they had the
Sunburn --
Q: Right.
Q: Thank you.
MR. SEDNEY: They gain an awful lot. There's a lot that is unclassified
knowledge, that it -- by, in some cases, the sheer volume, other cases by
the indications, and other cases by the fact that we're an extraordinarily
open society that people -- not just the Chinese, perhaps, but all kinds of
people around the world can get. And there's always that struggle in our
society and in our way of doing business between openness and utilities,
using the Internet and that kind of thing and the need to keep secrets. I
think it's something that we are constantly reviewing here, working very
hard to make sure that things that are classified remain classified.
But at the same time, there's -- there really is a whole lot of things that are
in the unclassified world that, taken together -- and I would include in this
a lot of proprietary business material that is not classified because it might
not have even been something that is developed by, paid for by,
associated with the Department of Defense.
MR. SEDNEY: Well, again we're very careful here to say that we don't
know that there's a direct link between the PRC government, the PLA, the
organizations and these intrusions. That's -- we don't have that. But the
kinds of things that are done are certainly the kinds of things that
espionage agencies would do. But I don't have -- there isn't that direct link.
And so I can't answer that question that way.
Q: Two questions.
First, do you have any better knowledge now, than a year ago or two
years ago, as to how the decision-making process works within the
Chinese senior leadership and the military. Specifically the ASAT test and
more recently the Kitty Hawk -- who was responsible?
And second of all, if you look at the balance of forces across the Taiwan
Strait, ground forces are down. And while airpower is up, the number of
bombers and fighters, within range of Taiwan, is quite a bit down. What
does that say about what China's doing vis-a-vis Taiwan and their posture
there?:
MR. SEDNEY: Well, first of all, on any particular numbers of planes and
also capabilities deployed across the Taiwan Strait, those are things that
can change very rapidly. The Chinese can deploy. The Chinese have a lot
of resources, throughout the country, which they can deploy in the Taiwan
Strait area and which they practice deploying on a regular basis.
So if you're looking at the Taiwan Strait, we wouldn't look just at any one
point in time. You know, we do look at what's based there. But it's
important to remember there's even a larger number of assets there.
MR. HELVEY: I would also point out that as China's military forces
improve, in terms of the quality of their equipment, you'll also see the
retirement of older platforms and airframes. So in some cases, you may
see a decrement in total numbers, but you have a higher percentage of
much more capable platforms and systems.
So, I mean, I would factor that in mind, that this is a military that is
undergoing a comprehensive transformation. And so a lot of things are
changing on a year-to-year --
MR. SEDNEY: On the leadership question, I would say no. We don't have
any better understanding than we did a year ago of Chinese leadership
decision-making processes and what goes into those -- what goes into
that. That continues to be an area where we really don't have a very good
picture.
Q: But when you met them last week, did you ask them who took the
decision on the Kitty Hawk and did they have an explanation?
MR. SEDNEY: We don't have a timetable for the actual visit of General
Jing. As you know, that invitation was issued, I think, a little over a year
and half ago, two years ago. David?
Q: Just one question: that for a few years we saw from this report the
number of the missiles deployed of Taiwan is increasing continually. But
on the other hand, we don't really see the discussion about, you know,
how U.S. or Taiwan is going to deal with this problem. In the past we have
suggested on the Chinese side to freeze the numbers or even, you know,
withdraw some of the missiles. But in the report, we don't see this kind of
discussion anymore. I wonder: is there a reason you can't, you know, tell
us?
And the second question is that the report also indicated the balance has
shifted to China's favor, you know, steadily, for a few years. And you have
discussed this with Taiwan authority in the past. I wonder: have you
achieved any, you know, solid accomplishments after your talks with, you
know, Taiwanese counterparts? This year has -- any progress has really
been made to address this -- (off mike)?
MR. SEDNEY: Well, first, on the issue of the policy that comes out of the
military power that's described here, you're correct; it's not addressed in
the report. But that's because we're keeping the report focused on the
facts. What are the -- what is the extent of China's military power? And
yes, in the case of the missiles, they're deploying across from Taiwan, this
is clearly an issue that we're very concerned about and which we have
raised very strongly and consistently at high levels over the years with the
Chinese. There have been various proposals at the policy level about that.
And so far, of course, we haven't seen that happen. The missiles continue
to be deployed, and as you said, they continue -- the numbers continue to
increase.
In terms of the response of Taiwan to this shift, we were very pleased this
year to -- that Taiwan passed in July a 2007 budget, in December a 2008
budget, which increased rather substantially the amount of money and the
percentage of its resources that Taiwan will be spending on its own
defense. And we think that's very important.
And separately, can you tell us what percentage or what's the estimate for
how many of the cyberintrusions in the U.S. target DOD or defense
industries?
In terms of the specific thing you mentioned, I know that there were a lot of
reports about that, but I don't think that I have enough information to
comment on that for you.
We mentioned one more -- maybe I'll take one more because you had up
-- you your hand up from the very beginning, and I --
Q: Throughout these military power reports, the lack of transparency has
been a great concern. And here in this report, we see that for defense
expenditure figures, 2007, the DOD low estimate is almost twice of that of
China's announced budget. So what are you doing specifically to try to get
more transparency on the part of the People's Republic of China?
MR. SEDNEY: For one thing, we make it a point -- and it's not just
because we want to know the numbers; it's because of the impact of the
numbers on policy -- we make it a point in all of our discussions, whether
they're at the working level or the very highest levels -- the secretary made
it a point when he met with the top Chinese leaders last fall to continue to
make this point.
The response of the Chinese has been, I would say, very slow. There's
been a little bit of progress over the years, but so little that it's really hard
to measure against the scope of the problem.
The Chinese will be announcing, in the next couple of days, their budget
for the coming year, including their military budget. I would very much
appreciate it. I would call on them to be more transparent and forthcoming
in describing that military budget when they announce it in the next couple
of days.
Q: (Off mike.)
MR. SEDNEY: (Off mike) -- because, of course, they knew it was coming.
It comes every year.
We didn't brief them on the content of it. But since it's a congressional
report, we do that to Congress first. We will be actually, David and I will
be, going and talking with them in a few minutes actually. And they've had
the chance to read it already.
Q: The Chinese?
MR. SEDNEY: The Chinese, yeah. We'll have the Chinese defense
attache coming in, and giving him an opportunity, to both give his reaction
but also to talk to him about it.
Yes, and we do it very broadly. David and his colleagues will be meeting a
very broad range of defense attaches and others and doing -- there's a lot
of interest, and we're responsive.
Thank you.
Source: DefenseLink
On 3/8/2008 1:07:22 AM, Andrew P. in Nigeria GK, Germany said:
Yet another mislead individual this Ezekiel...Anonymous, thanks for setting
Ezekiel from London straight.
You only want to come and cause war in our Land, in our Nation. Chaos,
conflicts, confusion, maiming, destruction is all you stand for and want
when you want to get the resources of other Nations and countries. Its so
bad, a shame to the destiny and generation of Kufour of Ghana, who's
entertained an evil US agains the will of other stakeholders in Africa.
Why did Bush not consult the African Union and obtain the votes and
consent of all the leaders.
Bush please go away. Take all your millitary and evil devices away. WE
DON'T NEED YOU AND IT'LL NEVER BE WELL WITH YOU AND YOUR
EVIL IDEAS.
The chinese community may have their own interests in Africa but not
dominance, control, steal, maim and destroy our Nation.