International Political Science Review (1999), Vol. 20, No.

2, 129149

Sustainable Development: Exploring the

Ethics of Our Common Future
OLUF LANGHELLE

ABSTRACT. The concept of sustainable development was placed on the

international agenda with the release of the report Our Common Future by
the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987.
Although considerable attention has since been devoted to the idea of
sustainable development itself, the broader conceptual framework of the
ideawhereby the Commission tried to integrate environmental policies
and development strategies in order to create the foundation for a global
partnershiphas been neglected in much of the literature. The purpose
of the present article is to offer an interpretation of Our Common Future,
where the concept of sustainable development is linked to the broader
framework of normative preconditions and empirical assumptions. The
structure of the argument is to demonstrate that the relationship between
sustainable development and economic growth has been over-emphasized,
and that other vital aspects of the normative framework have been
neglected. Social justice (both within and between generations), humanistic solidarity, a concern for the worlds poor, and respect for the ecological limits to global development, constitute other aspects of sustainable
development; aspects which are indeed relevant for the growing disparity
between North and South.

Introduction
In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED)
published its report Our Common Future. Since then, the number of different
meanings and interpretations of the concept of sustainable development has
more or less exploded. Numerous treatments have been highly critical of Our
Common Future; the report has been seen as both ambiguous and contradictory
and incapable of specifying the mechanisms and changes necessary to realize
sustainable development.
0192-5121 (1999/04) 20:2, 129149; 006977 1999 International Political Science Association
SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)

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These claims are often related to the view that Our Common Future is biased
toward economic growth. In a straightforward sense this is undoubtedly true. The
report clearly proclaims the possibility for a new era of economic growth (WCED,
1987: 1). But what kind of economic growth does the Commission actually
prescribe? What type of growth is seen as compatible with sustainable development?
The answer to this question is, I believe, equally clear: The world must quickly
design strategies that will allow nations to move from their present, often destructive, processes of growth and development onto sustainable development paths
(WCED: 49). The key question thus emerges: What kind of changespolitical and
societalfollow from the concept of sustainable development?
Interpretation, according to Charles Taylor (1985), is an attempt to make clear,
to make sense of an object of study. Interpretation aims to bring to light an underlying coherence or sense in a text which is in some ways confused, incomplete,
cloudy, or seemingly contradictory (Taylor, 1985). While many have argued that
Our Common Future contains these features, few have actually tried to give an interpretation in the above sense of the document. Instead, the report has been firmly
placed within the limits-to-growth debate which dominated the environmental
discourse prior to the Commissions report.
The domination of the issue of compatibility between sustainable development
and economic growth, however, has led to the neglect of the broader framework of
sustainable development within which the Commission attempted to integrate
environmental policies and developmental strategies. The purpose of the present
article is to argue that much of the vital meaning (and distinctness) of the sustainable development ideas has been glossed over due to a combined overemphasis and
misinterpretation of the growth issue. While the relationship between sustainable
development and economic growth is an important part of the message in Our
Common Future, it is definitely not the entire message. The aim of the present article,
therefore, is to show that Our Common Future is more coherent and potentially more
radical than either adherents or critics seem to be aware of.
The World Commission argued that although interpretations of sustainability will
vary between countries, these interpretations must share certain general features
and must flow from a consensus on the basic concept of sustainable development and
on a broad strategic framework for achieving it (WCED: 43). This article addresses
these general features. How is the basic concept to be understood? What is the
broad strategic framework for achieving sustainable development? These issues will
be treated within the same approach applied by Verburg and Wiegel, that is, there
is much to be gained in terms of clarification by elaborating concepts and their possible connections with respect to the conceptual and normative preconditions and the
implicit interrelations which shape the framework (Verburg and Wiegel, 1997).

Placing the Brundtland Commission Report in Context

One starting point, or frame of reference, for understanding Our Common Future is
to look at the remit for the World Commission on Environment and Development.
The task given the Commission by the United Nations General Assembly was to
formulate A Global Agenda for Change (WCED: ix). This is described in Brundtlands foreword as an urgent call by the General Assembly, the call consisting
of several sub-tasks.
First, to propose long term environmental strategies for achieving sustainable
development by the year 2000 and beyond.

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Second, to recommend ways in which concern for the environment may be translated into greater co-operation among developing countries and between countries
at different stages of economic and social development and lead to the achievement
of common and mutually supportive objectives that take account of the interrelationship between people, resources, environment, and development.
Third, to consider ways and means by which the international community can
deal more effectively with environmental concerns.
Fourth, to help define shared perceptions of long-term environmental issues and
the appropriate efforts needed to deal successfully with the problems of protecting
and enhancing the environment, a long term agenda for action during the coming
decades, and aspirational goals for the world community (WCED: ix).
This frame of reference is important in many ways for an understanding of Our
Common Future. The mandate provides, so to speak, an initial outline. It covers the
questions the Commission is supposed to answer (find strategies, encourage cooperation, define shared perceptions and aspirational goals for the world community); the (initial) understanding or perception of what the problem is (lack of
effective strategies, lack of co-operation, none or too few shared perceptions and
aspirational goals); and finally, a meta-perspective for evaluating the report itself
(does it deliver the goods?).
Moreover, the mandate itself is open to interpretation. Even though the mandate
was formulated in terms of sustainable development, it was, at the time, not in
any way clear what was meant by the term. It had been used only in a few
documents and academic books previously, but no authoritative definition existed
at the time. (For different views on the concepts origin, see Worster, 1993; ORiordan, 1993; McManus, 1996; Jacob, 1996; and Murcott 1997.) This partly explains
the weight the report lays on defining sustainable development. Even more important, however, is the fact that the Commission perceived a degree of semantic
freedom it otherwise would not have had. Even though environmental concerns and
issues figure strongly in the mandate, some clearly wanted environmental issues to
figure even more strongly than they did. Brundtlands response here is important
for both the meaning of sustainable development and for an understanding of how
the Commission interpreted the mandate itself:
When the terms of reference of our Commission were originally being discussed
in 1982, there were those who wanted its considerations to be limited to
environmental issues only. This would have been a grave mistake. The environment does not exist as a sphere separate from human actions, ambitions, and
needs, and attempts to defend it in isolation from human concerns have given
the very word environment a connotation of naivet in some political circles
(WCED: xi).

Brundtland has later explained this aspect of the Commissions work as a way of
catching, and taking seriously, the growing skepticism in developing countries
toward the environmental concerns of the West. Commission member, Sonny
Ramphal, is portrayed as a major advocate of this view, claiming (according to
Brundtland, 1997: 78) that environmentalists are more concerned about panda
bears than human beings, and more concerned about increasing the number of
bicycles in the Third World rather than that we should acquire trucks. This orientation obviously contributed to a more development-oriented approach within the
Commission, leading a number of commentators to portray the report as strongly
anthropocentric (Adams, 1990; Kirkby, OKeefe, and Timberlake, 1995; Lafferty

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and Langhelle, 1995; Reid, 1995). The report states, for example, that our message
is [first and foremost] directed towards people, whose well-being is the ultimate
goal of all environment and development policies (WCED: xiv).
Another way of understanding this orientation is to see it as a reaction to the
criticism raised against the earlier World Conservation Strategy (WCS) from 1980
(IUCN/UNEP/WWF, 1980). This reportone of the first to make use of the words
sustainable developmentwas prepared by the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and published with support from the World Wildlife
Fund (WWF) and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). The WCS report
argued from a dominantly conservationist-environmentalist standpoint (Adams,
1990; Kirkby, OKeefe, and Timberlake, 1995), and was criticized for having an
anti-poverty profile. The conduct of poor people was identified as a principal cause
of environmental damage, without, however, considering poverty itself as an
integral part of the environment-and-development problem (Soussan, 1992). The
fact that the IUCN report (in its Introduction) explicitly called for a strategy to
overcome poverty, was not enough to prevent the impression that the report was
heavily dominated by environmentalist concerns. In this connection, the Brundtland
report represents a specifically different mix and ordering of environment-anddevelopment components. As later described by Brundtland: The term sustainable
development had already been used in certain contexts before the Commission was
established. What the Commission did, was to give this term a new contenta far
more political content (Brundtland, 1997: 79).

Sustainable Development: The Basic Concept

The implications of the change in questionthat is, a broadening of the concept
of sustainable developmentare most easily seen when contrasted with other
usages of the term sustainable. The term itself is derived from the Latin sus tenere,
meaning to uphold (Redclift, 1993), which does not, of course, imply any specific
normative content. Dixon and Fallon (1989) provide a basis for further clarification
by identifying three types of usage: (1) As a purely physical concept for a single resource:
Here the scope of sustainability is limited to particular renewable resources considered in isolation, with sustainability simply implying a usage no greater than the
annual increase in the resource, without reducing the physical stock. Maximum
sustainable yield, maximum sustainable cut, and so forth, are examples of the
underlying logic of this approach. (2) As a physical concept for a group of resources, or an
ecosystem: With this usage, explicit attention is devoted to different aspects of the
ecosystem. For example, forestry managed in accordance with maximum sustainable cut may create problems with increased soil erosion, changes in water yield,
wildlife habitat and species diversity. As a result of system interaction, what may
be considered as a sustainable usage of a single resource may actually be found to
be unsustainable within the context of the entire system. (3) As a socio-economicphysical concept: Here the goal is not a sustained level of a physical stock or the physical production of a given ecosystem, but an unspecified sustained increase in the
level of societal and individual welfare (Dixon and Fallon, 1989: 6), or, more
directly in accord with the language of Our Common Future, a sustained level of need
satisfaction. This third type is the usage developed by Our Common Future.
In this last context, the standard definition of sustainable development from Our
Common Future is that it is development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (WCED:

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43). It is this definition which is nearly universally cited in commentary on the

report, both critical and supportive. What such citations often fail to mention,
however, is that the core definition is immediately qualified by the following:
It [sustainable development] contains within it two key concepts:
the concept of needs, in particular the essential needs of the worlds poor,
to which overriding priority should be given; and
the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environments ability to meet present and future needs (WCED: 43).

We shall address the definition and its key concepts in turn. While the first part
of the definition addresses the importance of meeting present human needs, the
second part, according to Reid (1995), seems to strike two chords. The first touches
on our sense of guilt for what we have done to the planet; while the second
relates to a very deeply-rooted human desire to make sure our childrens futures
are provided for (Reid, 1995: xvi). While one may wish to quibble with the implied
atonement of Reids first claimhave we, in fact, intentionally harmed the
planet?there seems little doubt that the definition rests on the prospect that we
are, in fact, capable of damaging the sustaining capacity of the planet for future
generations. It is the presence of an actual, or at least potential, inter-temporal
conflict of interest here which partly shapes the definition of sustainable development.
Moreover, the satisfaction of human needs is seen as the major objective of development (WCED: 43). This may be called the goal of development (Malnes, 1990: 3). The
qualification that this development also must be sustainable is a constraint placed
on this goal, meaning that each generation is permitted to pursue its interests only
in ways that do not undermine the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs. This may be called the proviso of sustainability (Malnes, 1990: 3). Since the
sustainability constraint is a necessary condition for future need satisfaction, which
is part of what sustainable development is supposed to secure, the proviso of
sustainability becomes a necessary part of the goal of development, thus providing
the inter-dependency of the concept. Or, as Malnes formulates it, the proviso is
entailed by the very goal whose pursuit it constrains (Malnes, 1990:7).

Some Key Implications of the Concept

The above framework and understanding of sustainable development has some farreaching consequences for an understanding of the ideas which are often neglected.
First of all, there are a number of threats, in addition to environmental
problems, which could compromise the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs. In fact, Our Common Future identifies potential political, social, economic,
technological and cultural constraints on future development. The most obvious
example is the threat of a global nuclear war. The sustainability proviso is thus not
only about environmental sustainability, although many prefer to restrict the term
to this usage (Meadowcroft, 1996). One example is the definition given in the report
Caring for the Earth (which was the follow-up to the first World Conservation Strategy).
Here sustainable development is defined as improving the quality of human life
while living within the carrying capacity of supporting ecosystems (IUCN/UNEP/WWF,
1991: 10). In one sense, this implies a more precise definition, but in another, it
represents an unqualified limitation which obviously excludes many other possible
threats to future development.

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But the concern for the environment nonetheless constitutes a central part of the
proviso of sustainability also in Our Common Future. This is formulated as a minimum
requirement for sustainable development, and is also referred to as physical
sustainability: At a minimum, sustainable development must not endanger the
natural systems that support life on Earth: the atmosphere, the waters, the soils,
and the living beings (WCED: 45). In this regard, the definition given in Caring for
the Earth is encompassed by the definition given in Our Common Future.
A second consequence of the above framework, is that it is not, as Meadowcroft
also notes, a particular institution, nor a specific pattern of activity, nor a given
environmental asset which is supposed to be sustained, but rather a process, the
process of development (Meadowcroft, 1996: 3). Or, as Sachs formulates it:
Sustainable development calls for the conservation of development, not for the
conservation of nature (Sachs, 1993: 10). This is a result of the fact that the goal
of development comes logically prior to the proviso of sustainability. This again, has
several important implications.
First, it implies that not every environmental problem is necessarily a sustainable-development issue. This is important because it partly determines how environmental effects are to be judged from a sustainable-development perspective. The
point is concisely put by Malnes: A policy that procures development by dint of
damages to the environment, violates the proviso only insofar as these damages are
detrimental to future development. Policies are not to be judged on account of their
environmental effects as such. This is the World Commissions point of departure
. . . (Malnes, 1990: 7).
It is thus as a prerequisite for development that the injunction to conserve plants
and animals in Our Common Future must initially be understood. It is because the
environment is vulnerable to destruction through development itself that the
constraint of sustainability is placed on the goal of development (WCED: 46; Malnes,
1990: 5). As such, an activity with negative environmental effects is not necessarily contradictory to sustainable development. This is in accordance with Brundtlands own understanding of the idea:
I have often seen it argued that one or another activity cannot be sustainable
because it leads to environmental problems. Unfortunately, it turns out that nearly
all activities lead to one or another form of environmental problem. The question
as to whether something contributes to sustainable development or not, must,
therefore, be answered relatively. We must consider what the condition was prior
to the action undertaken and what the alternative would have been, as well as to
whether the activity could be replaced by other activities. . . . We can be forced to
make difficult, holistic judgments. That is why there have been very mixed feelings
of affection between parts of the environmental movement and the very notion of
sustainable development (Brundtland, 1997: 79, authors translation).

Brundtland seems to be implying here that such a conflict as, for example, that
between Shell Oil and Greenpeace regarding the deep-sea disposal of the Brent
Spar oil platform, could be seen as an activity which is not necessarily contradictory to sustainable development. Although the question of deep-sea disposal is an
important environmental question, the controversy could in this light be portrayed as
peripheral to the broader notion and concerns of sustainable development. (For an
overview of the Brent Spar controversy, see Dickson and McCulloch, 1996.)
A second implication of the above interpretation (whereby it is the process of development which is to be sustained), is that an activity which is not itself sustainable

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could be a part of an ongoing process which is sustainable (Meadowcroft, 1996). This

applies not only to social behavior, but also to activities like the consumption of renewable and non-renewable resources. If this were not so, non-renewable resources could
not be consumed at all. Furthermore, and contrary to the two first usages sustainability identified by Dixon and Fallon (1989), the third usage may have implications
for the use of renewable resources contradictory to the first two. Forestry provides a
good illustration of this point. While the two first usages imply using no more than
the annual increase in the resource, or maintaining different aspects of the ecosystem without reducing the physical stock, the third usage makes it possible to speak
of a sustainable reduction of the physical stock. As stated in Our Common Future:
There is nothing inherently wrong with clearing forests for farming, provided that
the land is the best there is for new farming, can support the numbers encouraged
to settle upon it, and is not already serving a more useful function, such as watershed protection. But often forests are cleared without forethought and planning
(WCED: 127).
In this connection, Beckerman (1994b) would appear to be simply wrong in his
assertion that Our Common Future promotes what he refers to as an absolutist
concept of sustainable development, meaning that the environment we find today
must be preserved in all its forms (Beckerman, 1994b: 194). Once again, the
question of what constitutes a specific instance of sustainable development becomes
a matter of degree. Clearing forests for farming can be part of sustainable development if certain conditions are present. Moreover, it is clear that sustainable
development may have quite different implications for different countries, depending on the level of development, availability of resources, size of population, level
of need satisfaction, and the possibilities of substitution between natural and manmade capital.

Sustainable Development and Economic Growth

It is often argued that the reliance on growth and technology in Our Common Future
makes sustainable development a technological fix. Technology and economic
growth no doubt form an important part of the broad strategic framework for
achieving sustainable development. It is, however, much more fine-tuned and
complicated than the technological fix conclusion indicates. In fact, one can argue
that both the opponents and supporters of growth have exaggerated and overemphasized the bias toward growth in Our Common Future, and thus contributed to
the interpretation that sustainable development first and foremost implies
economic growth. Reid (1995), for example, argues that the comprehensiveness and
detail of Our Common Future is overshadowed by the inadequacy of its treatment of
human need and its bias towards economic growth. . . . Without clear specifications
of a new ecologically sound growth, the emphasis on growth will also in effect
counter the potential of technological change to push back the ecological limits
(Reid, 1995: 65). In the same fashion, Verburg and Wiegel (1997) argue that
sustainable development remains anchored in the very strategies by which current
economic growth was achieved.
More important, however, is the fact that Verburg and Wiegel (1997) also argue
that the compatibility between sustainable development and economic growth
depends on the analytical content of the constituent concepts of needs and limitations, as well as other interrelated concepts. These must be specified if definitions
of sustainable development are to have any content at all (Verburg and Wiegel,

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1997:251). Failing to take conceptual and normative terms of reference into

account, the idea that sustainable development is the solution to the threat to
environmental degradation remains unclear because it lacks precise formulation
(Verburg and Wiegel, 1997: 251).
What the Brundtland report actually stipulates, however, is that, given current
population growth rates, the goal of reducing poverty requires national income growth
of around 5 percent a year in the developing economies of Asia; 5.5 percent in Latin
America; and 6 percent in Africa and West Asia (WCED: 50). For industrial countries,
the medium term growth recommended was 34 percent. This was claimed to be
necessary in order to let industrial countries play a part in the expanding world
economy. This latter argument has correctly been interpreted as a global trickledown thesis, but this is only one part of the puzzle. The prescribed growth rates
are seen as environmentally and socially sustainable only under the following conditions:
(1) if industrialized nations continue the recent shifts in the content of their growth
towards less material- and energy-intensive activities and the improvement of their
efficiency in using materials and energy (WCED: 51); and (2) a change in the content
of growth, to make it more equitable in its impact, that is, to improve the distribution of income (WCED: 52).
These conditions are further elaborated in Our Common Future, and they must be
seen as complementary aspects of a pro-growth position. The question which then
must be asked, is how these conditions differ from conditions imposed by the
opponents of growth. One of the more prominent of the latter, Herman Daly (1977,
1992, 1993), argues, for examplein much the same fashion and at the same level
of abstractionthat the physical volume of through-put must be minimized. The
matter-energy that comes from the environment as low-entropy raw materials, and
is returned again to the environment as high-entropy waste, must, in other words,
be reduced. This problem is referred to as the problem of scale, and the task is to find
an optimal scale which lies within the earths carrying capacity and which can be
judged as ecologically sustainable. The question we can then pose is whether Our
Common Future addresses the problem of scale at all.
As I see it, it does so in two ways, one direct and the other indirect. The indirect
way is by changing the quality of growth. This implies a change in the content of
GNP towards one which, as in Dalys approach, is less material- and energy-intensive.
The difference, as Robert C. Paehlke (1989) points out, is that Daly thinks the necessary reduction in throughput ultimately will lead to a decline also in GNP. Paehlke
disagrees with this, along with Pezzey (1992), Randers (1994), and several others
including the authors of Our Common Future. These sources base their conclusions on
the assumption that economic growth (i.e., growth in the money value of the annual
production of goods and services) can be uncoupled from physical growth (the growth
in population, energy use, resource use and pollution output).
Whether or not this is possible, however, is first and foremost an empirical
question. The essence of the normative-conceptual position is that GNP should be
made less material- and energy-intensive so as to keep within the bounds of the
ecologically possible. Whether GNP rises or falls is not the primary question, albeit
it is an important one (Jacobs, 1991). It is in this light that the growth debate can,
to a certain degree, be said to have been transcended by the World Commission.
This has, according to Jacobs (1995), had the following effect: By bypassing the
unhelpful debate about zero growth which plagued earlier waves of environmental concern, the term [sustainable development] has helped to create an unprecedented level of at least rhetorical political commitment to the environment. . . its

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very universality has generated a debate about environmental economic policy

which shows no sign of abating (Jacobs, 1995: 65).
But Our Common Future also addresses the question of scale in a more direct
sense. Reflecting arguments made by (for example) Fritsch (1995) and Paehlke
(1989), the report takes a very specific stand on the crucial nature of energy in
the sustainable development equation. The ultimate limits to global development
are said to be determined by two things: the availability of energy and the
biospheres capacity to absorb the by-products of energy use. These limits are
assumed to have thresholds much lower than other material resources, mainly
because of the depletion of oil reserves and the build-up of carbon dioxide leading
to global warming (WCED: 5859). The argument is not that there are no other
possible limits to future global development, but that the limits of energy and
the problem of climate change will be met first, and indeed may already be at
hand.
Few, including the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), seem
to be aware of the fact that, more than any other problem, global warming is what
underlies many of the World Commissions recommendations. The problem of
climate change is addressed throughout the report (WCED: 2, 5, 8, 14, 22, 3233,
37, 5859, 172176). Contrary to Beckerman (1994a, 1994b, 1995), who sees the
problem of global warming as more or less non-existent, and thus not a threat to
welfare maximization and sustainable development, the assumption in Our
Common Future is that the problem of climate change is real. Moreover, the problem
is seen as both a problem of scale and of global equity, in much the same manner
as seen by the IPCC. The issue involves distribution both between and within
generations.
The scenario underlying the position is quite straightforward. If the poor nations
were to consume the same amount of fossil fuels as the rich nations, this would
most likely result in an ecological disaster. At the same time, however, the goal of
development demands an increase in energy consumption in developing countries (a
presumption which is also expressed in the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change). The principal developmental challenge is thus to meet the
needs of an expanding developing world population (WCED: 54) within a context of
global ecological interdependence. This is substantiated by the following claim from
the IPCC:
Whatever the past and current responsibilities and priorities, it is not possible
for the rich countries to control climate change through the next century by
their own actions alone, however drastic. It is this fact that necessitates global
participation in controlling climate change, and hence, the question of how
equitable it is to distribute efforts to address climate change on a global basis
(IPCC, 1995: 97).

The most radical changes proposed by the Commission in this context are based
on the above understanding of what the most pressing development constraints are.
Reids (1995) assertion that Our Common Future lacks a description of what would
constitute a new ecologically sound growth is, in this perspective, simply wrong.
Producing More with Less (the title of Chapter 8 in Our Common Future), is a
necessary, but not necessarily sufficient condition for sustainable development. To
avoid an ecological disaster due to the problem of climate change, Our Common
Future recommends a low-energy scenario of a 50 percent reduction in primary
energy consumption per capita in industrial countries, to allow for a 30 percent

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increase in developing countries within the next 50 years (WCED: 173). This will
require profound structural changes in socio-economic and institutional arrangements and it is an important challenge to global society (WCED: 201). Further, the
Commission believes that there is no other realistic option open to the world for
the 21st century (WCED: 174).
It would appear, therefore, that when Reid (1995) argues that Our Common Future
was reluctant to speak plainly about the reduction of levels of consumption in the
North, and claims further that the report reveals a Northern (pro-Western) bias,
he simply ignores the ultimate limits for global development set in Our Common
Future. The report does not view the level of consumption as a general problem. On
the contrary: Different limits hold for the use of energy, materials, water, and
land (WCED: 45). But the report also clearly states that ultimate limits there are,
and sustainability requires that long before these are reached, the world must
ensure equitable access to the constrained resource [base] and reorient technological efforts to relieve the pressure (WCED: 45).
As far as I can determine it is nowhere stated (as claimed by Dobson [1996: 41])
that the only limits which matter are the limitations imposed by the present state
of technology and social organization. Social organization and technology are
instead seen as crucial for progressive change; they can be managed and improved
(WCED: 8) so that the accumulation of knowledge and the development of technology can enhance the carrying capacity of the resource base (WCED: 45). According
to Adams (1990: 59), this involves a subtle but extremely important transformation of the ecologically-based concept of sustainable development, which leads
beyond concepts of physical sustainability to the socioeconomic context of development. It is apparently because Dobson misinterprets Our Common Future, and
because Reid has a different view on the question of limits, that their conclusions
differ from those in the Commissions report. It is not the case that Our Common
Future lacks a prescription of what would constitute a new ecologically sound growth,
as Reid claims, but that Reid disagrees.
Verburg and Wiegels analysis (1997) of Our Common Future is particularly interesting in this regard. While their discussion sometimes seems to reflect the common
interpretation that Our Common Future is biased toward traditional growth, their
conclusions become far less clear when they address the compatibility between
sustainable development and economic growth within a framework of needs and
limitations, also considering the interrelationship between freedom and solidarity.
What they find herethat sustainability and economic growth cannot simply be
assumed to be conceptually and normatively compatibleis in fact the same
position as taken in Our Common Future.

Sustainable DevelopmentTechnology or Ethics?

In a widely discussed article, Wilfred Beckerman has portrayed the concept of
sustainable development as basically flawed because it mixes together the
technical characteristics of a particular development path with a moral injunction to pursue it (Beckerman, 1994b: 193). Alternatively, Beckerman argues
that sustainable development should be understood purely as a technical
concept, where a sustainable development path is defined simply as one that
can be sustained over a specific period of time. Whether or not it ought to be
followed is a very different matter. In Beckermans view, most definitions of
sustainable development incorporate some form of ethical injunction without

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any apparent recognition of the need to demonstrate why this injunction should
be preferred.
The Norwegian philosopher, Jon Wetlesen (1995), argues that this is also the case
for the Brundtland report. The concept of sustainable development is presented
against a background of assumptions as to moral duties and obligations, without
these being directly accounted for.
As an initial reaction to these positions, it can be maintained that, even though
Our Common Future does not elaborate on the philosophical foundation of moral
duties and obligations, this does not, of course, mean that the position is ill-founded.
Granting the proposition that the moral aspects of the report are more implicit
than explicit, it can nonetheless be maintained that the moral content is clearly
communicated in Our Common Future. The Commission itself proclaims that the
issues raised in the report are of far-reaching importance to the quality of life on
earthindeed, to life itself, and that they have tried to show how human survival
and well-being could depend on success in elevating sustainable development to a
global ethic (WCED: 308). This global ethic is constructed on the assumption of
duties and obligations in a specific historic context of growing ecological awareness,
ecological threats and widening NorthSouth disparities and agendas (McManus,
1996). It is in this broader context that the binding between the goal of development and the proviso of sustainability must be understood as a comprehensive
ethical position.
Thus, while Beckerman (1994b) argues for a technical concept of sustainable
development, Our Common Future explicitly rejects such a strategy. This is hardly
surprising given the Commissions mandate to define aspirational goals for the
world community. What is interesting, however, is that the Commission develops its ethic in an indirect and non-proselytizing manner. The argument rests on
the proposition that the normative and technical issues are inseparable (WCED:
43). Even physical sustainability, it is maintained, cannot be secured unless
development policies pay attention to such considerations as changes in access to
resources and in the distribution of costs and benefits (WCED: 43). Whether a
certain development is physically sustainable will thus depend on both of these
considerations. Changes in access to resources and in the distribution of costs and
benefits form an integral part of the process of determining the level of physical
sustainability.
For example, under a situation where resources are scarce, a distribution in which
a small minority of the worlds population controls most of the resources might be
possible to maintain over a longer period of time than one where scarce resources are
distributed equally among the worlds population. Consequently, the question of what
is physically sustainable cannot be answered without taking into consideration the
question of distribution and determining what one actually wishes to maintain and
develop (Lafferty and Langhelle, 1998). Hence, even the more narrow and technical
concept of physical sustainabilitythe minimum requirement for sustainable developmentcannot be separated from considerations of social justic (WCED: 43).
What, then, is the logical structure of the ethical framework of sustainable development? In the present view, the answer lies in the obvious attempt by the
Commission to link environment and development on a global scale. This can be
demonstrated by an elaboration of the text with respect to the relationship
between social justice and need satisfaction; the connection between social justice
and equal opportunity; and the attempt to give needs a precedence over wants or
desires.

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Social Justice as Need Satisfaction

There is a close relationship between need satisfaction and social justice in Our
Common Future. Social justice can be seen as equivalent to the satisfaction of human
needs, which in turn is what constitutes the primary goal of development in
sustainable development (Lafferty and Langhelle, 1995; Lafferty, 1996; Langhelle,
1996). The proviso of sustainability, on the other hand, is a precondition for social
justice between generations, since violating the sustainability constraint would
undermine the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. Moreover,
the concern for social equity between generations must, it is claimed, logically be
extended to equity within each generation (WCED: 43). This provides (as illustrated in Figure 1) two different dimensions of justice in the concept of sustainable development.

Temporal
Dimension

Geographical Dimension
National

Global

Within a
generation

I. Social justice within

a current national
generation

II. Social justice within

a current global
generation

Across
generations

III. Social justice

across national
generations

IV. Social justice

across global
generations

FIGURE 1. Geographical and Temporal Dimensions of Sustainable Development.

Yet it is not self-evident as to why a concern for social justice between generations logically should be extended to justice within each generation. At the outset,
the rationale seems to hinge on the empirical claim that poverty is a major cause
and effect of global environmental problems (WCED: 3), and that a world in which
poverty and inequity are endemic will always be prone to ecological and other crisis
(WCED: 44). These are empirical claims, and by them the Commission argues that
social justice is a precondition also for sustainability. Thus, the reduction of poverty
itself is a precondition for environmentally sound development (WCED: 69). It can
still be argued, however, that the reciprocal relationship between environmental
problems and poverty only partly explains the logic between inter- and intragenerational justice, and that this empirical foundation is, in fact, a weak one. The
nature of the relationship has been challenged by several authors, and it has been
argued that the povertyenvironment thesis is simply wrong (The Ecologist, 1993, and
Angelsen, 1997). But the problematic can be interpreted in different ways.
First, it can be interpreted strictly as an empirical hypothesis. Brundtland (1997)
states that the thesis is empirically true, if not for all environmental problems, at
least for many. The debate on the povertyenvironment relationship seems,
however, to be inflated by an underlying disagreement as to what the most serious
environmental problems consist of. Are they the type of problems created by the
rich, industrialized countries? Or are they, rather, the problems resulting from overpopulation and poverty in the under-developed South? In general, there seems to

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141

be an emerging agreement that there are isolated instances whereby the exigencies of poverty in the South contribute to local problems, but that the problems
created by the wealthier countries of the Northparticularly climate change and
ozone depletionare clearly more serious on a global level.
Second, the povertyenvironment thesis has been viewed as a political necessity for the Commission. To prevent a NorthSouth confrontation, it was necessary for the WCED to link economic development and environmental questions in
a positive way. If poverty is a major cause of environmental problems, and
economic growth contributes to the reduction of poverty, economic growth will
also be good for the environment, and thereby contribute indirectly to the solving
of environmental problems (Angelsen, 1997). Economic growth, in this view,
implies that you actually can have your cake and eat it too, so that sustainable
development becomes consistent with the ambitions of developing countries for
growth and progress.
While this interpretation may have some truth in it, it does not explain the fact
that the G77 countries, at the Special Session of the UN devoted to an assessment
of progress on Agenda 21 in New York in June of 1997, consistently tried to substitute sustainable economic growth for sustainable development in the final
document (Nyborg, 1997). If sustainable development is widely understood to
imply economic growth, why would China and the other under-developed countries
view it as too constraining?
A third perspective on the povertyenvironment thesis is to view the priority
given to the worlds poor as independent of the thesis. That is, even if the thesis is
wrong and there is no clear dependency between poverty and environmental degradation, the underlying framework of Our Common Future would still lead to a prioritization of the essential needs of the worlds poor. As stated in the report, poverty
is an evil in itself (WCED: 8), and sustainable development requires meeting the
basic needs of all, thus extending to all the opportunity to fulfill aspirations for a
better life (WCED: 8). This ethical foundation also explains the logic between
intra-generational and inter-generational justice.
The point can be illustrated in the obverse by looking at definitions of sustainable development which exclude the intra-generational dimension of equity.
Amundsen et al., (1991) argue, for example, that the term sustainable development should be limited to the question of inter-generational justice. Their definition is that: Development is sustainable if it is possible and the living conditions
of the generations are non-diminishing throughout the development (Amundsen
et al., 1991: 21). A similar understanding can be found in the description by the
IPCC of what they refer to as the economic concept of sustainable development,
where the focus is placed solely on inter-temporal equity, capital accumulation and
sustainability (IPCC, 1995: 40).
The exclusion of the intra-generational dimension in these cases not only runs
counter to the overriding priority in Our Common Futureto meet the essential needs
of the worlds poorbut also to sustainable development as an aspirational goal
since sustainable development would then be consistent with massive poverty and
miserable living conditions for the majority of the worlds population. Aside from
offering an extremely bad bargain for the worlds poor, this conceals the fact that
living conditions, to a large extent, determine both individual life-chances and the
very composition of future generations (Lafferty and Langhelle, 1995). Why bother
about inter-generational equity if your own children have very poor chances of
reaching adulthood?

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There is in other words a logical connection between equity within and between
generations in the definition of sustainable development. The priority given to the
worlds poor is a moral constraint on possible alternative developmental paths or
trajectories. More precisely, it can be seen as an attempt to rule out the very
premise underlying Garett Hardins lifeboat ethics:
. . .each rich nation amounts to a lifeboat full of comparatively rich people. The
poor of the world are in other, much more crowded lifeboats. Continuously, so
to speak, the poor fall out of their lifeboats and swim for a while in the water
outside, hoping to be admitted to a rich lifeboat, or in some other way to
benefit from the goodies on board. What should the passengers on a rich
lifeboat do? This is the central problem of the ethics of the lifeboat (Hardin,
1977: 262).

The answer provided by Hardin is that no further swimmers should be

admitted to the boat. If sustainable development were a purely technical
concept, the option favored by Hardingiven the assumption that the developmental path in question was sustainable in a physical sensewould be a valid
option for a sustainable development. If only a purely technical concept, the
policy implications of sustainable development would thus be open-ended in
this sense.
Sustainable development is, however, logically constructed in such a way as to
rule out the above possibility. The basic message is that any attempt to prevent
poor people from damaging nature by trying to keep them poor is not an option
consistent with the basic concept and strategic framework of sustainable development: you cannot sacrifice todays poor in the name of salvation for future generations. Sustainable development requires meeting the basic needs of all and
extending to all the opportunity to satisfy their aspirations for a better life (WCED:
44). In short, as the very title Our Common Future indicates lifeboat ethics is ruled
out. There is only one boat and we either make it seaworthy for everyone or we all
sink.
Finally, we can view the povertyenvironment problematic as part of an ideological discourse. Our Common Future can be (and has been) interpreted as an attempt
to create a global social-democratic ideology, a necessary antidote to global neoliberalism. Adams, for example, takes this position when he refers to the idea as
part of a rather comfortable Keynesian reformism at the global level (Adams,
1990: 65). McManus argues that the seductive notion of sustainable development
formed an effective counter-hegemonic rallying point for recovering the initiative
from both neo-liberalism and existing socialism (McManus, 1996: 51). Need satisfaction, full employment, economic growth, redistribution, and social justice have
also been key concepts in the social-democratic tradition. Gro Harlem Brundtland
provides indirect support for this view when she both stresses the dominant conservative credo dominating much of Western politics at the time when the Commission was appointed, and also refers to previous UN commissions (those named after
Willy Brandt and Oluf Palme) as social-democratic responses to prevailing trends
(Brundtland, 1997: 7576).

Social Justice as Equal Opportunity

Another important aspect of the ethical framework of Our Common Future is the
principle of equal opportunity. While basic needs are the starting point, the

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143

developmental goal of social justice can also be seen as reflecting liberal values
which go beyond the mere satisfaction of human needs. This part of the framework is perhaps the most difficult to detect, but there are several passages which
can be seen as reflecting an equal opportunity principle both within and between
generations. The following can be seen as applying to the relationship between
generations: The loss of plant and animal species can greatly limit the options
of future generations; so sustainable development requires the conservation of
plant and animal species (WCED: 46). This same argument is used concerning
non-renewable resources: Sustainable development requires that the rate of
depletion of non-renewable resources should foreclose as few options as possible
(WCED: 46).
The equal opportunity principle is also expressed as a principle within our own
generation: . . .sustainable development requires that societies meet human needs
both by increasing productive potential and by ensuring equitable opportunities for
all (WCED: 44). And further: What is required is a new approach in which all
nations aim at a type of development that integrates production with resource
conservation and enhancement, and that links both to the provision for all of an
adequate livelihood base and equitable access to resources (WCED: 39). The equal
opportunity principle should thus be seen as an inherent part of the concept of
sustainable development.
Moreover, the principle can be seen as more constraining with respect to possible developmental paths than the basic needs approach. While securing basic needs
for future generations can be linked to the minimum requirement for sustainable
developmentphysical sustainabilitythe equal opportunity principle between
generations (as indicated in the above quotation) also requires the conservation of
plant and animal species. This partly explains the relatively ambitious targets for
conservation indicated in Our Common Future (WCED: 166), to the effect that the total
expanse of protected areas should be at least tripled in order to constitute a representative sample of the worlds ecosystems.

Needs, Desires, and Limits

Finally, the concept of sustainable development seems to indicate that the fulfillment of essential needs (sustenance, basic health, work, energy, housing, water
supply, sanitation) should take precedence over the pursuit of personal desires in
case of conflict. This principle applies to both intra- and inter-generational justice.
Verburg and Wiegel (1997) argue that this, in effect, implies that solidarity is to
be put on an equal footing with liberty. The concept of liberty, they argue, is often
defined in relation to the concepts of needs and limitations; as, for example, in
Berlins (1968) usage of the term, where liberty is identified with the absence of
obstacles to the fulfillment of mans desires. The concept of sustainable development, on the other hand, demands that desires be constrained in order to
safeguard the fulfillment of essential needs. Our Common Future expresses in this
regard what Verburg and Wiegel term humanistic solidarity: a sentiment based
upon feelings of consideration experienced with respect to others as fellow
humans, connected with a provision for essential needs to guarantee an acceptable level of quality of life (Verburg and Wiegel, 1997: 258). As the following
indicates, their reading of Our Common Future places the concept clearly at the
equality end of Sabines (1952) classic libertyequality trade-off within
Western liberalism:

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By giving priority to the essential needs out of consideration of solidarity and
environmental concern, and by the appeal to effectuate a constraining of needs
in the affluent West to bring back the pursuit of desires within the limits
imposed by the carrying capacity of ecosystems, the characteristic interpretations of the concept of liberty and solidarity in the modern frame of reference
are challenged. The overriding importance attached to the fulfillment of essential needs implies that the idea of humanistic solidarity is part and parcel of
sustainable development, not an appendage to the concept of liberty (Verburg
and Wiegel, 1997: 259).

This interpretation is apparently also in line with Gro Harlem Brundtlands own
understanding. The concept of sustainable development signaled, in her view, a
new solidarity both within and between generations (Brundtland, 1997). When
Verburg and Wiegel conclude that this position discredits the justification for
economic growth, however, they argue as if the growth prescribed in Our Common
Future is economic growth in a traditional sense, ignoring that the Commission also
viewed limitations on personal wants as closely tied to the ultimate (ecological)
limits for global development. This is expressed in the following:
Living standards that go beyond the basic minimum are sustainable only if
consumption standards everywhere have regard for long-term sustainability. Yet
many of us live beyond the worlds ecological means, for instance in our patterns
of energy use. Perceived needs are socially and culturally determined, and
sustainable development requires the promotion of values that encourage
consumption standards that are within the bounds of the ecological possible and
to which all can reasonably aspire (WCED: 44, authors emphasis).

The concept of needs is integral to the WCEDs understanding of sustainable development, even though the report (as pointed out by Reid [1995]), devotes little attention to an elaboration of the idea. Beckerman (1994b) argues in this connection
that, since needs are a subjective concept, the definition of sustainable development in Our Common Future is totally useless. It offers no clear guidance as to what
has to be preserved in order to cover the needs of future generations, because
people at different points in time, and in different cultural and national settings,
will differ with respect to the needs they regard as important (Beckerman, 1994b:
194).
I would maintain, however, that criticism of the report on this count is seriously
overdone. One can readily admit that there will be differences in the perception of
needs without judging the concept useless for sustainable development. The needs
identified in Our Common Future are in fact quite specific, and can, as with John
Rawlss (1971) concept of primary goods, be seen as a general means of livelihood
which every individual needs no matter what ones subjective life-project (see
Amundsen et al., 1991). It is hard to see how the need for work, food, energy, and
the linked basic needs of housing, water supply, sanitation, and healthcare, can be
deemed irrelevant for future politics.
Moreover, many of the recommendations found in Our Common Future are based on
the specific assumption that needs, to a large degree, are socially and culturally
constructed. The question of which needs should be changed or curbed depends on
the limits set for global development. Just as Our Common Future refuses to treat
consumption as a general problem (since there are different limits for the use of
energy, materials, water, and land), there is no reason to change needs and interests

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145

which can be pursued without damage to the potential need satisfaction of others,
either now or in the future. There is, for example, no prima facie reason to try to curb
the need for education, social integration or aesthetics.
The discussion of needs can also be related to Malness (1995) differentiation
between stern and lenient interpretations of sustainability. Malnes points
out that, when it is maintained that sustainable development requires the
promotion of values that encourage consumption standards that are within the
bounds of the ecologically possible and to which all can reasonably aspire, this
implies that contemporaries, rather than being held to a stern demand of lowering their ambitions right away, may take the time to foster new values and behavior which reflect the broad principles of sustainability. If the concept of need is
seen within the broader framework of carrying capacity, the urgency of new values
and behavior will depend on the limits and resources involved. The difference
between stern and lenient demands will then depend on how close one comes to
the limits of nature in each case and the risks involved in additional need satisfaction.

Sustainable Development as a Basis for Global Partnership

It is generally accepted that the idea of sustainable development put forth in Our
Common Future was primarily designed to provide a normativeconceptual bridge
for joining environmental concerns with developmental possibilities. The policy
implications which flow from this framework are dependent upon the assumptions made about limitsecological, social, cultural, technological, economic,
and, not least, political: In the final analysis, sustainable development must rest
on political will (WCED: 9). Sustainable development defined a developmental
path, or trajectory, which in the Commissions view, could sustain human
progress, not just in a few places for a few years, but for the entire planet into
the distant future (WCED: 4). It was within this context that the Commission
aspired to overcome the widening disparities and agendas between the North and
the South.
The Commission stressed that the term development was to be used in its
broadest sense. This implied that sustainable development required change in every
country: The word [development] is often taken to refer to the processes of
economic and social change in the third world. But the integration of environment
and development is required in every country, rich and poor. The pursuit of sustainable development requires changes in the domestic and international policies of
every nation (WCED: 40).
While economic growth is seen as necessary to solve the problems of underdevelopment and poverty, the new era of economic growth is seen as neither
problem-free, nor as equal for developing and developed countries. Sustainable
development requires economic growth where essential needs are not being met.
Elsewhere, economic growth is consistent with sustainability only if the content of
growth reflects the broad principles of sustainability (WCED: 44). Furthermore,
rapid economic growth combined with deteriorating income distribution is seen as
worse than slower economic growth combined with redistribution in favor of the
poor (WCED: 52).
Accordingly, the basic concept and the underlying strategic framework for
sustainable development lay the basis for a global partnership in which the demands
and challenges are different for developing and developed countries. The main

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challenge for developing countries is to eradicate poverty and pursue an environmentally sensitive development through economic growth and internal redistribution. The task for developed countries is threefold: (1) to assist in the eradication
of poverty by substantial increases in development aid; (2) to change consumption
and production patterns by reducing energy consumption and CO2 emissions so as
to allow for necessary increases in developing countries; and (3) to develop and
transfer environmentally sound technology so as to smooth the transition to a more
sustainable developmental path or trajectory. In addition, developed and developing countries together, should triple the total expanse of protected areas in order
to conserve a representative sample of the earths ecosystems.
It is important to acknowledge in this connection that the Commission does not
exonerate developing countries from adopting more sustainable patterns of
production and consumption: The simple duplication in the developing world of
industrial countries energy use patterns is neither feasible nor desirable (WCED:
59). It is the changed (or sustainable) consumption and production patterns
primarily with respect to reduced energy consumption and CO2 emissionswhich
should be duplicated. This presupposes, however, that there actually exist alternative consumption and production patterns which can be duplicated. Unfortunately, it appears today that, with both energy consumption and CO2 emissions
increasing in most developed countries, there is as yet little or nothing to duplicate.
The goal and essence of the global partnershipa division of labor between
developing and developed countries and a strategic framework for the realization
of sustainable developmentare nonetheless accessible as a general program in
Our Common Future. The Commission outlined a developmental path, or trajectory,
which, in theory at any rate, would remedy the global environmental and developmental crisisa path which the present analysis has tried to demonstrate as
coherent, integrated, and comprehensive enough to warrant the label of a global
ethic.

Concluding Remarks
Our Common Future addresses, of course, numerous questions and issues which have
not been discussed in this article: the role of technology and the international
economy, population growth, food security, industry, the urban challenge, the fate
of the commons, peace and security, proposals for institutional and legal change,
among others. The purpose of the present exercise however has been to give an
interpretation of Our Common Future in Taylors (1985) sense of the term: to bring
to light what I believe to be an underlying coherence and sense in a text which has
too often been portrayed as confused and contradictory. Without denying that the
Brundtland report is open to different interpretations, I have nonetheless
maintained that there exists a basic concept and broad strategic framework in
the document. By way of conclusion, let me try to draw out at least one major implication of this perspective.
Several recent commentators have viewed the results of the UNCED process as a
reordering of the priorities of Our Common Future, with Agenda 21, in particular,
portrayed as having tipped the environmentdevelopment balance back in an
environmental, more market-oriented direction (Middleton, OKeefe, and Moyo,
1993; Kirkby, OKeefe, and Timberlake, 1995; and McManus, 1996). Agenda 21 was
also, in fact, heavily criticized by the Norwegian government for not being willing

LANGHELLE: Exploring the Ethics of Our Common Future

147

to allocate priorities among the different issues addressed (Ministry of Environment, 199293). The priority to meet the essential needs of the worlds poor (the
initial qualifying key concept) has, it is maintained, more or less disappeared as
an overriding priority. The global partnership prescribed in Our Common Future is
thus yet to be seen.
One might even try to explain this by pointing out that, with respect to climate
change, at least, the reduction of poverty itself does not seem to be a precondition
for an environmentally sound development. The opposite may, in fact, be the case,
and if so, we would have to revert to other, more purely moral and ideological,
reasons for combating global poverty. Southern countries have, however, made it
increasingly clear that they will not accept limits to growth that the countries of
the North have not been willing to impose upon themselves, so we are left with an
increasingly precarious need for the type of integrated environment-and-development logic put forth in Our Common Future.
In this light, it is vital to retain an understanding of the concept of sustainable
development as an overall normativestrategic framework for continuing to work
out in detail the necessary balance between physical sustainability, generational
equity and global solidarity, not as a fixed blueprint for similar developmental
paths for all countries, but as a set of basically integrated concepts and values pointing in a genuinely different alternative direction. At a minimum, the notion offers an
obviously moral, and tauntingly pragmatic, solution to a wealth of increasingly
perilous problems. As an alternative to lifeboat ethics, I have argued that the
normativestrategic message of Our Common Future is more clear, more conceptually
consistent, and more potentially relevant today than its numerous critics are willing
to credit.
The overriding message of Our Common Future is that the global complex of
environment-and-development problems cannot be addressed in an integrated way
without taking simultaneously into account the three core elements of physical
sustainability, generational justice and global solidarity. Sustainable development
provides conceptual tools for the task and stipulates a global partnership in which
the pressing NorthSouth disparities and agendas might be overcome.

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Biographical Note
OLUF LANGHELLE is a Research Associate at ProSus (Program for Research and
Documentation for a Sustainable Society, Research Council of Norway), and a
doctoral student at the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo. He is coeditor of several books and reports on the topic of sustainable development. His
current major research fields are on the relationship between democracy and sustainable development, and on the implementation of sustainable development in Norway.
ADDRESS: ProSus, Sognsveien. 70, 0855 Oslo, Norway. [e-mail: oluf@prosus.nfr.no]