NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW WITH LAND TITLE AND DEED

MIDTERMS REVIEWER
ZAZZA SIMBULAN || SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW

REGALIAN DOCTRINE declares that all lands and all other natural
resources are owned by the State.

All lands of whatever classification and other natural

resources not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership belong to the State.

The State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of

land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.

Public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released

as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person
by the State remain part of the alienable public domain. To
overcome this presumption, it is indispensable that there be
a showing of a title from the State or any other modes of
acquisition recognized by law.

Reflected in the Constitution: principle of state ownership of

lands and other natural resources in:
o Section 2, Article 12 on National Economy and Patrimony,
1987

All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,

petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake
such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint
venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least 60 per centum
of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements
may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under
such terms and conditions as may provided by law. In cases of
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of waterpower, beneficial use
may be the measure and limit of the grant.

Sec 1, Art. 13 on Conservation and Utilization of Natural

Resources, 1935 Constitution
Sec 8, Art. 14 on National Patrimony and the Patrimony
of the Nation, 1973 Constitution

Jura Regalia

Private title to land must be traced to some grant, express or

implied, from the Spanish Crown or its successors, the
American Colonial Government and/or Republic of the
Philippines.

Spanish Crown is the origin of all land titles in the Philippines

because title to land must emanate from some source for it
cannot be issue forth from nowhere.

In its broad sense, jura regalia refers to royal rights, or those

rights which the King has by virtue of is prerogatives.

In Spanish Law, it refers to a right which the sovereign has

over anything in which a subject has a right of property.

Feudal System- this theory was that title to all lands was
originally held by the King and while the use of lands was
granted out to others who were permitted to hold them
under certain conditions, the King theoretically retained the
title. The King was regarded as the original proprietor of all
lands and true and only source of title, and from him all lands
were held.

Jura regalia was nothing more than a natural fruit of

conquest.

States power of dominium- capacity of the State to own or

acquire property.

Regalian Doctrine or Jura regalia is a Western legal concept that was

first introduced by the Spaniards into the country through the Laws of
the Indies and the Royal Cedulas.

The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of discovery and

conquest and all lands became the exclusive patrimony and
dominion of the Spanish Crown.

The Spanish government took charge of distributing the

lands by issuing royal grants and concessions to Spaniards,
both military and civilian.

Private land could only be acquired from the government

either by purchase or grant from the crown.
-Laws of Indies followed by Ley Hipotecaria or Mortgage Law
of 1893

Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic

registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.
It also sought to register and tax lands pursuant to the Royal
Decree of 1880.
-The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law

It was partly an amendment of the Mortgage Law as well as

the Law of Indies, as already amended by previous orders
and decrees.

Last Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines

Required the adjustment or registration of all agricultural

lands, otherwise the lands shall revert to the State.
-Treaty of Paris- December 10, 1898

Spain ceded to US government all rights, interests and claims

over the national territory of the Philippine Islands.
CRUZ VS. SEC. OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
GR No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for
prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A.
8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules)
on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other
natural resources therein, by recognizing the rights of the ICCs and the IPs
to their ancestral lands and domains on the basis of native title which was
in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article 12 of
the Constitution as well as violation of the rights of private land owners.
ISSUE: Is RA 8371 unconstitutional because it violates the Regalian
Doctrine?
HELD: 7 justices voted to dismiss while 7 voted to grant the petition and
the necessary majority was not obtained so the case was redeliberated
upon. However, after such, voting remained the same and pursuant to sec
7, Rule 56 of Rules of Court, the petition was dismissed and the validity of
the law deemed upheld.
Justice Kapunan: Regalian doctrine does not negate the native title to
lands held in private ownership since time immemorial.
As an exception to jura regalia: ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of
possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and
independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown/native title.

Justice Puno: IPRA grants recognizes the existence of the ICCs and IPs as
a distinct sector of the Philippines and it grants these people the
ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands,
an indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which traces its
origin to native title.
SEC. OF DENR VS YAP
GR 167707, Oct 8, 2008
FACTS: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No.
1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas
in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the
administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA).
Respondents, Mayor Yap Jr. and others filed a petition for declaratory
relief with RTC Kalibo, Aklan claiming that Proc No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes even
if they had been in OCEN possession and occupation of the land in Boracay
since June 12, 1945 or earlier since time immemorial under CA 141, Se
48(b), and they pay taxes regularly.
OSG opposed saying that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the
public domain formed part of the mass of lands classified as public
forest, which was not available for disposition. Since Boracay Island had
not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they
had cannot ripen into ownership.
ISSUE: W/N private claimants have a right to secure titles over their
occupied portions in Boracay
HELD: CA decision was reversed. Except for for lands already covered by
existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior
to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public
forest under PD No. 705. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands,
including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests.
PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
Classification of lands of public domain under the Constitution are:
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, national parks. only
agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of
May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and
administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay
was an unclassified land of the public domain.
In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time
and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government,
declaring land as alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative
action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The
records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of
Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.

TORRENS SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION

Made by Sir Robert Torrens, a layman in South Australia in

1857

Title by registration takes the place of title by deed of the

system under the general law.

Object of the Torrens system is to do away with delay,

uncertainty and expense of the old conveyancing system

By Torrens systems generally are meant those systems of

registration of transactions with interest in land whose
declared object is, under governmental authority, to establish
and certify to the ownership of an absolute and indefeasible
title to realty and simplify its transfer.

Torrens System requires that the government issue an

official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person
named is the owner of the property described therein,
subject to such liens and encumbrances as noted or as law
warrants.

Certificate title is INDEFEASIBLE and IMPRESCRIPTIBLE and

all claims to the land is quited by the issuance of the
certificate.
Does not furnish a shield for fraud, nor permit one to enrich
himself at the expense of others. INDEFEASIBILITY does not
attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation.
Act No. 496 or Land Registration Act of 1903.
o Grants of public land were brought under the
operation of Torrens system under this act
o Placed all public and private lands in the
Philippines under Torrens System
o Was said to be almost a verbatim copy of the
Massachusetts Land Registration Act of 1898, which
in turn, followed the principles and procedure of
the Torrens System of registration who patterned it
after the MERCHANT SHIPPING ACTS in SOUTH
AUSTRALIA
Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is
merely a procedure to establish evidence of title over realty.
It is a mode of confirming the fact of its existence with notice
to the world at large.
TITLE: constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession, or
which is the foundation of ownership property.
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE: mere evidence of ownership; not
the title to the land itself.

PURPOSES OFTORRENS SYSTEM (QR-PIPS-FF)

To quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of

the legality of the title, EXCEPT claims which were noted at
the time of the registration, in the certificate, or which may
arise subsequent thereto.

To relieve the land of unknown liens or claims, just or unjust,

against it EXCEPT statutory liens under sec. 44 of PD 1529.

To establish priority in right

To create indefeasible and imprescriptible title binding to the

whole whole

To provide means of publication or notice to third persons

To provide stability to land titles

To facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public

the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate of
title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further
EXCEPT when the party concerned has actual knowledge of
facts and circumstances that should imply a reasonable
cautious man to make such further inquiry.

To prevent fraudulent claims

ADVANTAGES OF TORRENS SYSTEM (SRESAR)

Substituted security for insecurity;

Reduced the cost of conveyances from pounds to shillings

and the time occupied from months to days;

Exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and verbiage;

Simplified ordinary dealings that he who has mastered the

three Rs can transact his own conveyancing;

Affords protection against fraud;

Restored to their just value many estates, held under good
titles, but depreciated in consequence of some blur or

technical defect and has barred the reocurrence of

similar faults.

PAST&PRESENTLEGISLATIONONLANDREGISTRATION TIMELTABLE
1902
Nov. 6
but took
effect on
Jan. 1,
1903

Act No. 496

Land Registration
Act

-established the Torrens system of

Registration in the country.

-applied to lands of public domain

except timber and mineral

-created Court of Land Registration for

applications for registration with power
to hear and determine all questions
arising from applications. (before in CFI)

-Fil and US Citizens may apply to CFI for

the confirmation of their claims

-the purpose of the law is to bring land

titles in the Philippines under one
comprehensive and harmonious system.
-provided for an Assurance Fund to pay
for the loss or damage sustained by a
person who without negligence on his
part, is wrongfully deprived of any land
or interest therein on account of
bringing the same under Torrens
system.

1903
Oct. 7

Act No. 926

First Public Land Act

countries which gave Filipinos same

privileges.

1936
Nov. 7
but took
effect on
Dec. 1,
1936

-applies to lands of the public domain

which have been declared open to
disposition or concession and finally
delimited and classified.

Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,

occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected
or completed, may apply to the Regional Trial Court of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act , to wit:

-provided for the issuance of patents to

certain native settlers upon public lands
for the establishment of townsites and
sale of lots therein for the completion of
imperfect titles and for the cancellation
or confirmation of the Spanish
concessions.
-PLA OPERATED ON THE ASSUMPTION
THAT TITLE TO PUBLIC LANDS IN THE
PHIL. ISLANDS REMAINED IN THE
GOVERNMENT AND THAT THE
GOVERNMENTS TITLE TO PUBLIC
LAND SPRUNG FROM THE TREATY OF
PARIS AND OTHER TREATIES
BETWEEN SPAIN AND US.

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in

interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
since June 12, 1945, except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

-When in the opinion of the President,

the public interest requires that title to
any lands be settled and adjudicated, he
shall order the Dir. Of Lands to make a
survey thereof, with notice to all persons
claiming interest therein. Dir. Of Lands,
represented by Sol.Gen. shall institute
registration proceedings by filing a
petition in the proper court against
holders, claimants, possessors or
occupants of such lands, stating that
public interest requires that titles to
such lands be settled and adjudicated.
-provisions of this Acts have been
substantially incorporated in the
Property Registration Decree (PD 1529)
particularly in Sec 35 to 38
-Sec 53 of the Public Land Act, deemed
integrated in the Property Registration
decree.

Act No. 2874

Second Public Land
Act

-Main difference between the two:

transitory provisions on the rights of
American Citizens and corporations
during the Commonwealth period at par
with Filipino citizens and corporations.

(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the
United States have applied for the purchase, composition or other
form of grant of lands of the public domain under the laws and royal
decrees then in force and have instituted and prosecuted the
proceedings in connection therewith, but have with or without
default upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title
therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied
and cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of their
applications.

-cadastral proccedings are in rem too

1919
Nov. 29

-After the passage of 1935 Constitution,

this amended Act 2874 which are
essentially the same.

-contains provisions on the different

modes of govt grants and reservations
for public and semi-public purpose.

-prescribed rules and regulations for the

homesteading, selling and leasing
portions of the public domain of the PI
and prescribed the terms and conditions
to enable persons to perfect their titles
to public land.

Act No. 2259

The Cadastral Act

-existing general law

governing
classification and
disposition of lands
of public domain

-US government through the Philippine

Commission, passed in pursuance of the
provisions of Philippine Bill of 1902.
-governed the disposition of lands of the
public domain

1913
Feb 11

CA 141
The third and
present Public Land
Act

-This was passed under the Jones Law

-It was more comprehensive in scope
but limited the exploitation of
agricultural lands to Filipinos and
Americans and citizens of other

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or

through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the
public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not,
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.

1978
June 11

PD 1529
Property
Registration Decree

-issued to update the Land Registration

Act
-to codify the various laws relative to
registration of property and to facilitate
effective implementation of said laws
-supersedes all other laws relative to the
registration of property
-RTC and in proper cases, the lower
courts exercise jurisdiction over
applications for registration and all
subsequent proceedings relative thereto
subject to judicial review.
-Section 48(b) of CA 141 and Section 14
of PD 1529 are virtually the same, with
the latter law operationalizing the
registration of lands of the public
domain and codifying the various laws
relative to registration of property.
-incorporated the substantive and
procedural requirement of its precursor,

Land Registration Act of 1902 but

included judicial confirmation of
imperfect and incomplete titles in Sec 14
(1), cadastral registration proceedins in
Sec 35 to 38, voluntary proceedings in
Sec 51 to 68, involuntary proceedings in
Sec 69 to 77, certificates of land transfer
and emancipation patents issued
pursuant to PD No. 27 in Sections 104 to
106 and reconstitution of lost or
destroyed original Torrens titles in Sec
110.
-in rem judicial proceedings
-jurisdiction is acquired by giving public
notice through publication, mailing and
notice.
-created the Land Registration
Commission, now Land Registration
Authority as the central repository of
records relative to the original
registration, including subdivision and
consolidation plans of titled lands.
Section 14. Who may apply.
The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or
abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under the
existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner
provided for by law.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION

OVER LAND REGISTRATION CASES

Section 2 of 1529: RTCs shall have exclusive jurisdiction over

all applications for original registration of titles to lands,
including improvements and interest therein and over all
petitions filed after original registration of title, with power
to hear and determine all questions arising upon such
applications or petitions.

Section 108 of PD 1529: jurisdiction over petitions for

amendments of certificates of title.

Before 1529, summary reliefs can only filed before RTC

acting as a land registration court, if there is unanimity
among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious
objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise, the
case becomes contentious and controversial and should be
threshed out in an ordinary action or in the case where the
incident property belonged.
EXCEPTIONS:

First level courts: Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial

Courts in Cities, Mun. Trial Courts, and Mun. Circuit Trial
Courts have delegated jurisdiction to hear and determine
cadastral or land registration cases in the ff. instances (Section
34 of BP Blg. 129: Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 as amended by RA
7691 on March 25, 1994):

Where the lot sought to be registered is not the

subject of controversy or opposition; or

Where the land is contested but the value does not

exceed P100,000, such value to be ascertained by
the affidavit of the claimant or by the agreement of
the respective claimants, if there be more than one,
or from the corresponding tax declaration of the
real property.

Note: Decisions of first level courts are appealable to CA; jurisdiction is

limited to what is expressly mentioned in the delegation hence, matters
subsequent to orig. registration determined by second level courts,
including petitions for reconstitution of lost titles, may not be unloaded
to first level courts.

SC Administrative Circular No. 6-93-A (Nov. 15, 1995)

o Cadastral or land registration cases filed before the
effectivity of this Circular but where the hearing has not
yet commenced shall be transferred by the Exec. Judge
of RTC to the Exec. Judge of MTC for the required raffle
among the branches od the court under his
administrative supervision.
o Cadastral or land registration cases pending in RTC
where trial had already been commenced as of circular
shall remain with courts. However, by agreement of the
parties, these cases may be transferred to the
appropriate MTCs.
JURISDICTION IN CIVIL CASES INVOLVING TITLE TO PROPERTY

Pursuant to Section 19 (2) of BP Blg. 129, RTC shall exercise

exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein:
o where the assessed value of the property exceeds
P20,000 outside Metro Manila;
o for civil actions in Metropolitan Manila, where the
assessed value exceeds P50,000;

EXCEPT actions for forcible entry into, unlawful detainer of

lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon the MTCs.
What determines jurisdiction are the allegations in the complaint and the
reliefs prayed for.
o
Where the objective is to OBTAIN TITLE to property, it should be
filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value
of the property
o
An action for reconveyance, the complaint should allege the assessed
value of the property to determine which court has jurisdictions.
o
If the complaint simply alleges market value of property, it is the
inferior court and not the RTC which ahs jurisdiction over the case.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN COURTS GENERAL & LIMITED

JURISDICTION ELIMINATED

Sec. 2 has eliminated the distinction between general

jurisdiction vested in RTC and the limited jurisdiction
conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a
land registration or cadastral court

To avoid multiplicity of suits, simplied registration

proceedings by conferring upon RTC the authority to act not
only on applications for original registration but also over all
petitions filed after orig. registration of title, with power to
hear and determine all questions arising upon such
applications or petitions.

Now authorized to hear and decide not only noncontroversial cases but even the contentious and substantial
issues which were before beyond its competence.
JUNIO VS. DE LOS SANTOS
GR No. L-35744, Sept 28, 1984
Although the grounds relied upon by petitioner for cancellation of the adverse
claim were unmeritorious, it behooved the lower Court to have conducted a
speedy hearing upon the question of validity of the adverse claim pursuant to
the second paragraph of Section 110 of the Land Registration.

In fact, the lower Court, instead of confining itself to the propriety of the
registration of the adverse claim should already have decided the controversy
between the parties on the merits thereof. Doctrinal jurisprudence holds that
the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), as a Land
Registration Court, can hear cases otherwise litigable only in ordinary civil
actions, since the Courts of First Instance are at the same time, Courts of
general jurisdiction and could entertain and dispose of the validity or invalidity
of respondent's adverse claim, with a view to determining whether petitioner is
entitled or not to the relief that he seeks.
ARCEO VS. CA
GR No. 81401, May 18, 1990
The petitioners argue that the cadastral court was bereft of the power to
determine conflicting claims of ownership, and that its authority was solely to
confirm an existing title, and that anyway, all the lots should have been
awarded to them by virtue of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession since 1941 (1942, when Jose took possession of the parcels) or
otherwise, by acquisitive prescription.
We have held that under Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree, the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a land registration court, is no
longer as circumscribed as it was under Act No. 496, the former land
registration law. The SC said that the Decree "has eliminated the distinction
between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the
limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as
a cadastral court." The amendment was "aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits,
the change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the
required trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for 'original
registration' 'but also 'over all petitions filed after original registration of title,
with power to hear and determine all questions arising from such applications
or petitions.
LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION= LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY

June 17, 1954- RA 1151 created LRC to provide more

efficient execution of the existing laws relative to the
registration of lands.
LRC exercises supervision and control over all Register of
Deeds, as well as clerical and archival system of the CFIs
throughout the Philippines with the reference to the
registration of lands.
Headed by a Commissioner and an Assistant Commissioner,
both appointed by the President with the consent
Commission of Audit
Commissioner of Land Registration took over all the powers
and functions of the Chief of the General Land Registration
Office, which position was abolished, as well as the powers
and functions of the Judge of the Fourth Branch of the CFI
Manila, in all matters submitted to it for resolution under
All functions, records, personnel, equipment, and other
properties of the General Land Registration Office were
transferred to LRC.
LRC renamed to LRA pursuant to Section 28, Chapter 9, Title
3 of EO 292 (Administrative Code of 1987)
Headed by an Administrator, assisted by 2 Deputy
Administrators, all of whom are appointed by President upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
All other officials of the LRA, except Register of Deeds, are
appointed by the Secretary of Justice upon the
recommendation of the Administrator.
LRA or Pangasiwaan sa Patalaan ng Lupain is the central
repository of records relative to the original registration of
lands titled under the Torrens System, including subdivision
and consolidation plans of titled lands.
Responsible for the issuance of decrees of registration and
certificated of title (original and duplicate) where the land is
brought for the first time under the Torrens System

FUNCTIONS OF THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY (S-A-C)

Extend SPEEDY and effective assistance to the Department of

Agrarian Reform, the Land Bank, and other agencies in the
implementation of the land reform program of the
government;

Extend ASSISTANCE to courts in ordinary and cadastral land

registration proceedings;

Be the CENTRAL REPOSITORY of records relative to original

registration of lands titled under the Torrens System,
including subdivision and consolidation plans of titled lands.
FUNCTIONS OF THE LRA ADMINISTRATOR (DR. VISE)

Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final judgments of

the courts in land registration proceedings and cause the
issuance by the ROD of the corresponding certificates of title;

Resolve cases elevated en consulta by, or on appeal from the

ROD;

Verify and approve subdivision, consolidation, and

consolidation-subdivision survey plans of properties titled
under Act No. 496 except those covered by PD 957.

Implement all orders, decisions, and decrees promulgated

relative to the registration of lands and issue, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Justice, all needful rules and
regulations therefor;

Exercise supervision and control over all ROD and other

personnel of the Commission

Exercise executive supervision over all clerks of court and

personnel of the CFI throughout the Philippines with respect
to the discharge of their duties and functions in relation to
the registration of lands;
-------------------------------------------------------------------------o LRA Administrators functions are plainly executive and
subject to the Presidents power of supervision and control.
o He can be investigated and removed only by the President
and not by SC.
o Duty of the LRA officials to issue decree of registration is
purely ministerial, in the sense that they act under the orders
of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the
decision of the court and with the data found in the record.
o EXCEPT when they are doubt upon any point in relation to
the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to
refer the matter to the court acting as officials of the court.
o The issuance by LRA officials of a decree of registration is not
purely ministerial duty in cases where they find that such
would result to the double titling of the same land. ROD
cannot be compelled by mandamus where there is existing
title and there are reasons to question those requesting.
o The issuance of the decree of registration is part of judicial
function of the courts and is not compellable by mandamus
because it involves the exercise of discretion.
REGISTRATION: the entry of instruments or deeds in a book or public
registry; to record formally and distinctly. Any entry made in the
books of the Registry, including both registration in its ordinary and
strict sense, and cancellation, annotation and even marginal notes. It is
the entry made in the registry which records solemnly and permanently
the right of ownership and other real rights.
EFFECT: Notice to the whole world
Between two buyers of the same immovable property registered under
the Torrens system, the law gives ownership priority to:

1) the first registrant in good faith;

2) the first possessor in good faith;
3) the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title.
But this does not apply if the property is not registered under Torrens

OFFICE OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS

Constitutes a public repository of records of instruments

affecting registered or unregistered lands and chattel
mortgages in the province or city wherein such office is
situated.

The existence of a certificate of title in ROD supports and

strengthens the authenticity of the title.

There should be at least one ROD for each province and one
for each city.

Sec of Justice shall define the station and territorial

jurisdiction of each Registry upon the recommendation of the
LRA Administrator, making every ROD accessible to the
people of neighboring municipalities.

ROD shall be appointed by the President upon the

recommendation of Sec of Justice

Deputy ROD and all other subordinate personnel of the ROD

shall be appointed by Sec of Justice upon the
recommendation of LRA Administrator.

Both ROD and Deputy ROD must be members of the Bar

ROD perform both functions of an administrative in

character and quasi-judicial in nature
MINISTERIAL DUTIES OF ROD

Function of ROD with referece to the registration of deeds,

encumberances and instruments is ministerial in nature.
Whether a document is valid or not is not for ROD to
determine, this function belongs to a court of competent
jurisdiction; and may not validly refuse to register a deed
presented to him for registration.

The purpose of registration is to give notice, the validity or

invalidity of the instruments are expected to be decided after
and not before registration. It must follow as a necessary
consequence that registration must first be allowed, and the
validity or effect thereof litigated afterwards.

The law does not require that only valid instruments shall be
registered.
INSTANCES WHERE ROD MAY DENY REGISTRATION (instances
where he may be justified in denying registration) (SC-PR)

Where there are several copies of the title but only one is
presented with the instrument to be registered;

Where the property is presumed to be conjugal but the

instrument of conveyance bears the signature of only one
spouse.

Where there is pending case in court where the character of

the land and validity of the conveyance are in issue (rights of
parties waiting for the outcome could be protected by filing
the proper notice of lis pendens)

Where required documents or certificated are not submitted

DOUBTFUL QUESTIONS SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO LRA
ADMINISTRATOR FOR RESOLUTION
Sec. 10 of PD 1529 states that: It shall be the duty of the register of deeds to immediately
register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property
which complies with all the requisites for registration. If the instrument is not registrable,
he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor or such denial in
writing, stating the ground and reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal
by consulta in accordance with Sec 117 of this decree.
ROD is precluded from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted
with the problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is
invalid. For under the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken
with respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for registration, all that he
is supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land
Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be
taken on the doubtful question.

BARANDA VS GUSTILO
GR No. 81153, Sept 26, 1988
FACTS: A parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta.Barbara,
Iloilo covered by original certificate of title no. 6406 is the land subject of the dispute
between petitioner (Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia) and respondents (Gregorio
Perez, Maria Gotera and Susan Silao). Both parties claimed ownership and possession over
the said land. However during the trial, it was found that the transfer certificate of title
held by respondents was fraudulently acquired. So the transfer certificate of title was
ordered to be put in the name of petitioners. In compliance with the order or the RTC, the
Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the order declaring TCT T-25772 null
and void, cancelled the same and issued new certificate of titles in the name of petitioners.
However, by reason of a separate case pending in the Court of Appeals, a notice of lis
pendens was annotated in the new certificate of title. This prompted the petitioners to
move for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in the new certificates. Judge Tito
Gustilo then ordered the Acting Register of Deeds for the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens but the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion for reconsideration invoking Sec
77 of PD 1529.
ISSUE: What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or annul anotice
of lis pendens in a Torrens certificate of title?
HELD: Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of Deeds stand
that the notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of the case in
the Court of Appeals. The function of the Register of Deeds with reference to the
registration of deeds, encumbrances, instrument and the like is ministerial in nature. The
acting register of deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration
of the Judges Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens. Sec. 10 of PD 1529
states that: It shall be the duty of the register of deeds to immediately register an
instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which
complies with all the requisites for registration. If the instrument is not registrable,
he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor or such denial
in writing, stating the ground and reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to
appeal by consulta in accordance with Sec 117 of this decree. On the other hand, Sec
117 states that: When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to
be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other
instrument presented to him for registration or where any party in interest does not agree
with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the
question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the Register of
Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of Deeds.

ALMIROL VS REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN

GR No. L-22486, March 20 1968
FACTS: On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land
situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered by original
certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo."
Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in
Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a transfer certificate of
title. Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds due to the property being conjugal
by legal presumption, and that in the sale of such, both spouses should sign the document.
Due to the fact that this was impossible because Nicolasa already died when the sale was
made, it is necessary that the property be first liquidated and transferred in the name of
the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased wife by means of extrajudicial
settlement or partition and that the consent of such other heir or heirs must be procured
by means of another document ratifying this sale executed by their father to effect the
registration of the absolute deed of sale.
In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on a petition
for mandamus (sp. civ. case 151), to compel the Register of Deeds to register the deed of
sale and to issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate of title. He asserted that it is
but a ministerial duty of the respondent to perform the acts required of him, and that he
(Almirol) has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Herein respondent filed a counterclaim and reiterated the grounds stated in his letter of
May 21, 1962, averred that the petitioner has "other legal, plain, speedy and adequate
remedy at law by appealing the decision of the respondent to the Honorable Commissioner
of Land Registration," and prayed for dismissal of the petition. In its resolution of October
16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that "mandamus does not lie, dismissed the petition,
with costs against the petitioner.
ISSUE: whether mandamus will lie to compel the respondent to register the deed of sale in
question?
HELD: Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to determine;
this function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction. Indeed, a register of
deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal
judgment and discretion when confronted with the problem of whether to register a deed
or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the said section, when he is in
doubt as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any deed or other instrument
presented to him for registration, all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the
question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing,
enter an order prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question which shall be
"conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds." This administrative remedy must be
resorted to by the petitioner before he can have recourse to the courts.

CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT

the Civil Code.

KRIVENKO DOCTRINE: aliens are disqualified from acquiring

public and private lands.

The trial court dismissed the complaint on Mar 10 1992. It ruled that Helen
Guzmans waiver of her inheritance in favor of her son was not contrary to the
constitutional prohibition against the sale of land to an alien, since the purpose
of the waiver was simply to authorize David Rey Guzman to dispose of their
properties in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the Philippines,
and not to subvert them. On the second issue, it held that the subject land was
urban; hence, petitioners had no reason to invoke their right of redemption
under Art. 1621 of the Civil Code.

Non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands

of the public domain, except only by way of hereditary succession.
KRIVENKO VS. REGISTER OF DEEDS
GR No. L-630, November 15, 1957
FACTS: Alenxander A. Kriventor is an alien (foreigner) who bought a residential
lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of 1941. The registration of
which was interrupted by the war.
In May 1945, he registered the lot but was denied by the register of deeds of
Manila on the ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this
jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch of the Court of
First Instance of Manila by means of a consulta, and that court rendered
judgment sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko
appealed to this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential
land?
HELD: This case has settled the issue as to who are qualified and disqualified to
own public as well as private lands in the Philippines. It was held through
Justice Moran that aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands,
thus:
Under Section 1 of Art.13 of the 1935 Constitution which is now in Sec 2, Art. 12
of 1987 Constitution, natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural lands, shall not be alienated, and with respect to public
agricultural lands, their alienation is limited only to Filipino citizens. But this
constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of
Filipino may easily be defeated by Filipinos who may alienate their agricultural
lands in favor of aliens. To prevent such, Sec 5 is included in Art. 13:

ISSUE: Is the Sale to Cataniag Valid?

HELD: Yes. The court did not find any reversible error in the appellate courts
holding that the sale of the subject land to Private Respondent Cataniag renders
moot any question on the constitutionality of the prior transfer made by Helen
Guzman to her son David Rey. Helens deed of quitclaim collided with the
Constitution, Article XII, Section 7. However, the landmark case of Krivenko vs.
Register of Deeds settled the issue as to who are qualified (and disqualified) to
own public as well as private lands in the Philippines. Section 2, Art XII of the
constitution intended to insure the policy of nationalization. Both sections
must, therefore, be read together for they have the same purpose and the same
subject matter.
Jurisprudence is consistent that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who
subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the
original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is
rendered valid.
Since the disputed land is now owned by Private Respondent Cataniag, a
Filipino citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed. The
objective of the constitutional provision -- to keep our land in Filipino hands -has been served.

A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN WHO HAS LOST HIS

CITIZENSHIP MAY BE A TRANSFEREE OF A PRIVATE LAND

Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be

transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.

This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which
agricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to
prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may
be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the
hands of Filipino citizens.

Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private

lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain.

Section 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this

Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost
his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private
lands, subject to limitations provided by law.

Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is intended to insure the policy of

nationalization contained in section 1. Both sections must, therefore, be read
together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It must
be noticed that the persons against whom the prohibition is directed in section
5 are the very same persons who under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines."
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.= Filipinos, corporations at least
60% of capital of which is owned by Filipinos.
HALILI VS. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 113539, Mar 12, 1998
Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real
properties in the Philippines to his heirs: widow, defendant appellee Helen
Meyers Guzman, and his son, David Rey Guzman, both of whom are also
American citizens. On August 9, 1989, Helen executed a deed of quitclaim
assigning and transferring and conveying to David Rey all her rights, titles and
interests in and over six parcels of land which the two of them inherited from
Simeon. On February 5, 1991, David Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land to
defendant-appellee Emiliano Cataniag, and lands were issued in the latters
name.
Petitioners, who are owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, questioning the constitutionality and
validity of the two conveyances -- between Helen Guzman and David Rey
Guzman, and between the latter and Emiliano Cataniag -- and claiming
ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption under Art. 1621 of

Pursuant to Sec. 10 of RA 7042 (An Act to Promote Foreign

Investment), as amended by RA 8179 dated March 28, 1996,
provides that any natural-born citizen who has the legal capacity
to enter into a contract may be a transferee of a PRIVATE land up
to a maximum area: 5000 sqm in the case of urban land, or 3
hectares in rural land.
In case of married couple, one of them may avail of the same, the
total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum fixed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural land, he shall
still be entitled to be a transferee of additional urban or rural land
which when added to those already owned shall not exceed the
max area.
A transferee who has already acquired urban land shall be
disqualified from acquiring rural land area and vice versa.
Under RA 9225, Aug 29, 2003: natural born citizens of the Phils
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of foreign country are deemed to have reacquired Philippine Citizenship upon taking oath of allegiance to
the Republic.
o

He shall then enjoy full civil and political rights and be

subject to all liabilities and responsibilities under existing
laws of the Philippines. Area limitation does not apply
since 9225 grants him right to enjoy full civil and political
right upon reacquisition of Filipino citizenship.

The time to determine whether a person acquiring the

land is qualified is the time the right to own it is acquired
not the time to register its ownership.
o

Capacity to own land is determined as of the time of

the acquisition and not registration.
REPUBLIC VS CA AND LAPIA
Even if the spouses were already Canadian Citizens at
the time they applied for registration, the lots were
already private lands and no longer formed part of the
public domain. They were already private in character
at the time of the purchase since respondents
predecessors-in-interest had been in OCEN possession
and occupation prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937,
which is the prescribed period for the acquisition of
title under the Public Land Act, Sec 48b thus acquiring
an imperfect title thereto.
Moreover, the law provides that a natural-born citizen
of the Phils. who has lost his Phil. citizenship may be a
transferee of a private land under the terms
prescribed by law. Therefore, for the purpose of
transfer of the residential land, it is not significant
whether they are no longer Filipino citizens at the
time they purchased or registered the land. What is
important is that they were formally natural-born
citizens and as transferees of a private land, they could
apply for registration in accordance with Section 8,
Art. 12 of the Constitution. (IMPERFECT TITLE OVER
PROPERTY BEFORE THEY LOST PHIL. CITIZENSHIP)

ALIENS MAY LEASE PRIVATE LANDS

Aliens are disqualified from acquiring lands of public domain, but
they may lease private lands.
A lease for a reasonable period is valid
Giving the alien the right to buy real property on the condition
that he is granted Phil. Citizenship.
Aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the
use of lands for residential purposes since their residence in the
country is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights
such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the
Constitution.
Should they remain here forever and share our fortune and
misfortune, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
If alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy a
piece of land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or
dispose his property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes
clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership
whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right
to enjoy the land and the sum of which make up ownership.
GREGORIO LLANTINO and BELINDA LLANTINO
vs. CO LIONG CHONG alias JUAN MOLINA
FACTS: Plaintiffs aver that they are the owners of a commercial-residential land
situated in the municipality of Virac, Catanduanes, which sometime in 1954
they leased to the defendant who was then a Chinese national and went by the
name of Co Liong Chong for a period of thirteen (13) years for the sum of
P6,150.00 for the whole period. The defendant was placed in possession of the
property but knowing that the period of the least would end with the year
1967, petitioners requested private respondent for a conference but the latter
did not honor the request and instead he informed the petitioners that he had
already constructed a commercial building on the land worth P50,000.00; that
the lease contract was for a period of sixty (60) years, counted from 1954; and
that he is already a Filipino citizen. The claim of Chong came as a surprise to the
Llantinos because they did not remember having agreed to a sixty-year lease
agreement as that would virtually make Chong the owner of the realty which, as
a Chinese national, he had no right to own and neither could he have acquired
such ownership after naturalization subsequent to 1954. On December 16,
1967, in order to avoid a court litigation the Llantinos once more invited Chong
to a conference about the matter but again Chong ignored the invitation.
Hence, on January 10, 1968, the Llantinos filed their complaint to quiet title
with damages before the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes, the Court finds

the contract of lease valid and in accordance with law and the complaint is
dismissed with costs against the plaintiffs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contract of lease entered into by and between the
petitioners and private respondent on October 5, 1954 for a period of sixty (60)
years is valid.
HELD: The lower court correctly ruled that the defendant-appellee Chong had
at the time of the execution of the contract, the right to hold by lease the
property involved in the case although at the time of the execution of the
contract, he was still a Chinese national.
In the present case, it has been established that there is only one contract and
there is no option to buy the leased property in favor of Chong. There is nothing
in the record, either in the lease contract or in the complaint itself, to indicate
any scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition. Chong had merely
asked them for a lease of the premises to which they agreed. Admittedly under
the terms of the contract there is nothing to prevent the Llantinos from
disposing of their title to the land to any qualified party.
Under the circumstances, a lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So
is an option giving an alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is
granted Philippine citizenship. Aliens are not completely excluded by the
Constitution from use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in
the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a
lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to
remain here forever and share our fortune and misfortune, Filipino citizenship
is not impossible to acquire. The only instance where a contract of lease may be
considered invalid is, if there are circumstances attendant to its execution,
which are used as a scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition.
If an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land,
by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his
property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is
a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not
only of the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi, and jus
abutendi) rights, the sum of which make up ownership. It is just as if today
the possession is transferred, tomorrow the use, the next day the disposition,
and so on, until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up are
consolidated in an alien.
Coming back to the case at bar, even assuming, arguendo, that the subject
contract is prohibited, the same can no longer be questioned presently upon the
acquisition by the private respondent of Filipino citizenship. It was held that
sale of a residential land to an alien which is now in the hands of a naturalized
Filipino citizen is valid.

FOREIGNERS ALLOWED TO PURCHASE CONDO UNITS

RA 4726, Sec 5: foreign nationals can own Philippine real

estate through purchase of condo units or townhouses.

Foreigners are allowed to acquire condo units and shares in

condo corporations up to no more than 40% of the total and
outstanding capital stock of a Filipino-owned or controlled
corporation. 60% of the members of the condo corporation
should be Filipinos.

A unit owner is simply a member of the condominium

corporation and the land remained owned by condominium
corporation, then the constitutional proscription against
aliens owning real property does not apply.
DONATION IN FAVOR OF A RELIGIOUS CORPORATION
CONTROLLED BY NON-FILIPINOS NOT REGISTRABLE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL VS UNG SIU SI TEMPLE
GR No. L-6776, 21 May 1955
The Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal refused to accept for record a deed of
donation executed in due form on January 22, 1953, by Jesus Dy, a Filipino citizen,
conveying a parcel of residential land, in Caloocan, Rizal, in favor of the unregistered
religious organization "Ung Siu Si Temple", operating through three trustees all of Chinese
nationality. The donation was duly accepted by Yu Juan, of Chinese nationality, founder and
deaconess of the Temple, acting in representation and in behalf of the latter and its

trustees.
The refusal of the Registrar was elevated to the Court of First Instance of Manila. On March
14, 1953, the Court upheld the action of the Rizal Register of Deeds.
UNG SIU SI TEMPLE is a religious organization whose deaconess, founder, trustees and
administrator are all Chinese citizens, this Court is of the opinion and so hold that in view of
the provisions of the sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the Philippines
limiting the acquisition of land in the Philippines to its citizens, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital stock of which is owned by such citizens
adopted after the enactment of said Act No. 271, and the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of Krivenko vs. the Register of Deeds of Manila, the deed of donation in question should
not be admitted for registration.
Uy Siu Si Temple has appealed to this Court, claiming: (1) that the acquisition of the land in
question, for religious purposes, is authorized and permitted by Act No. 271 of the old
Philippine Commission and (2) that the refusal of the Register of Deeds violates the
freedom of religion clause of our Constitution.
HELD:
We are of the opinion that the Court below has correctly held that in view of the absolute
terms of section 5, Title 13, of the Constitution, the provisions of Act No. 271 of the old
Philippine Commission must be deemed repealed since the Constitution was enacted, in so
far as incompatible therewith. In providing that,
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines,
The Constitution makes no exception in favor of religious associations.
The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock does not suffice to
escape the Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its members are of foreign
nationality. The purpose of the sixty per centum requirement is obviously to ensure that
corporations or associations allowed to acquire agricultural land or to exploit natural
resources shall be controlled by Filipinos; and the spirit of the Constitution demands that
in the absence of capital stock, the controlling membership should be composed of Filipino
citizens.
As to the complaint that the disqualification under article XIII is violative of the freedom of
religion guaranteed by Article III of the Constitution, we are by no means convinced (nor
has it been shown) that land tenure is indispensable to the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession or worship; or that one may not worship the Deity according to the
dictates of his own conscience unless upon land held in fee simple.

Land acquired by an American citizen in 1945 can be

registered under the ordinance appended to the 1935 Consti.
The ordinance appended thereto on November 10, 1939
provided that until the final withdrawal of the US sovereignty
over the Phils, citizens and corporations of the US could
enjoy the same civil rights as Phil citizens. (as directed by
Tydings-McDuffie Law)
Upon the proclamation of Phil Independence on July 4, 1946,
all property rights of citizens or corporations of US shall be
acknowledged, respected and safeguarded to the same extent
as property rights of citizens of Phils.

A CORPORATION SOLE MAY ACQUIRE AND REGISTER PRIVATE

AGRICULTURAL LAND
ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF DAVAO INC.
VS LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION
On October 4, 1954, Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of the City of
Davao, executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land located in the same city
covered by Transfer Certificate No. 2263, in favor of the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc., a corporation sole organized and existing
in accordance with Philippine Laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a Canadian
citizen, as actual incumbent.
As the Register of Deeds entertained some doubts as to the registerability if the
document, the matter was referred to the Land Registration Commissioner en
consulta for resolution in accordance with section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151.
Proper hearing on the matter was conducted by the Commissioner and after the
petitioner corporation had filed its memorandum, a resolution was rendered on
September 21, 1954, holding that in view of the provisions of Section 1 and 5 of
Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution, the vendee was not qualified to
acquire private lands in the Philippines in the absence of proof that at least 60
per centum of the capital, property, or assets of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Administrator of Davao, Inc., was actually owned or controlled by Filipino
citizens, there being no question that the present incumbent of the corporation
sole was a Canadian citizen.

Petitioner consistently maintained that a corporation sole, irrespective of the

citizenship of its incumbent, is not prohibited or disqualified to acquire and
hold real properties. The Corporation Law and the Canon Law are explicit in
their provisions that a corporation sole or "ordinary" is not the owner of the of
the properties that he may acquire but merely the administrator thereof.
HELD: A corporation sole, which consists of one person only, is vested with the
right to purchase and hold real estate and to register the same in trust for the
faithful members of the religious society or church for which the corporation
was organized.
It is not treated as an ordinary private corporation because whether or not it be
so treated, the constitutional proscription against private corporations will not
apply because a corporation sole has no nationality and the framers of the
Consti did not have in mind the religious corporation sole when they provided
that 60 per centum of the capital should be owned by Filipinos.
A corporation sole is not the owner of the properties that he may acquire but
mere the administrator thereof. Upon his death, properties are passed not to
his personal heirs but to his successor in office.

LANDS SOLD TO AN ALIEN WHICH IS NOW IN THE HANDS OF A

FILIPINO MAY NO LONGER BE ANNULLED
DE CASTRO VS TAN
GR NO. L-31956, 30 APRIL 1984
In 1938, petitioner Filomena Gerona de Castro sold a 1,258 sq. m. residential lot
in Bulan, Sorsogon to Tan Tai, a Chinese. In 1956, Tan Tai died leaving herein
respondents his widow, To O. Hiap, and children Joaquin Teng Queen Tan,
Tan Teng Bio, Dolores Tan and Rosario Tan Hua Ing.
Before the death of Tan Tai or on August 11, 1956, one of his sons, Joaquin,
became a naturalized Filipino. Six years after Tan Tai's death, or on November
18, 1962, his heirs executed an extra-judicial settlement of estate with sale,
whereby the disputed lot in its entirety was alloted to Joaquin.
On July 15, 1968, petitioner commenced suit against the heirs of Tan Tai for
annulment of the sale for alleged violation of the 1935 Constitution prohibiting
the sale of land to aliens.
Issue:
Will the action filed by the petitioner prosper?
Held:
No. Independently of the doctrine of pari delicto, the petitioner cannot have the
sale annulled and recover the lot she herself has sold. While the vendee was an
alien at the time of the sale, the land has since become the property of
respondent Joaquin Teng, a naturalized Philippine citizen, who is
constitutionally qualified to own land. There would be no more public policy to
be served in allowing petitioner to recover the land as it is already in the hands
of a qualified person.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. IAC and GONZALVES

The case involved three (3) parcels of land. Lots 1 and 2 were sold by the
owners, the Maosca Spouses, to Gregorio Reyes Uy Un on Dec. 30, 1934. Lot
549 was also sold by the Marquez Spouses to Gregorio Reyes Uy Un on
December 27, 1934.
Subsequently, Gregorio Reyes Uy Un died, and his adopted son, Chua Kim @ Uy
Teng, took possession of the property.
The three (3) parcels of land above mentioned, together with several others,
later became subject of a compromise agreement in a litigation in the Court of
First Instance of Quezon Province.
Chua Kim then filed a petition for issuance of decree of confirmation and
registration in Land Registration Case No. 405 of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon Province.
Court of First Instance of Quezon promulgated on January 14, 1982 that herein
petitioner Chua Kim alias Uy Teng Be has duly established his registerable title
over the properties in question in this land registration case and adjudicated

the said properties to Chua Kim alias Uy Teng Be.

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, challenged the
correctness of the Order and appealed it to the Court of Appeals. That Court,
however, affirmed the Order "in all respects," in a decision promulgated by CFI.
Republic has come to this Court on appeal by certiorari arguing: that the
conveyances to Chua Kim were made while he was still an alien, i.e., prior to his
taking oath as a naturalized Philippine citizen on January 7, 1977, at a time
when he was disqualified to acquire ownership of land in the Philippines hence,
his asserted titles are null and void.
It is a fact that the lands in dispute were properly and formally adjudicated by a
competent Court to the Spouses Gaspar and to the Spouses Marquez in fee
simple, and that the latter had afterwards conveyed said lands to Gregorio
Reyes Uy Un, Chua Kim's adopting parent, by deeds executed in due form on
December 27, 1934 and December 30, 1934, respectively. the conveyances
were made before the 1935 Constitution went into effect, at a time when there
was no prohibition against acquisition of private agricultural lands by
aliens. Gregorio Reyes Uy Un therefore acquired good title to the lands thus
purchased by him
It is a fact, furthermore, that since the death of Gregorio Reyes Uy Un, Chua Kim
@ Uy Teng Be had been in continuous possession of the lands in concept of
owner, as the putative heir of his adoptive father, said Gregorio Reyes. Also, the
acquisition by Chua Kim of Philippine citizenship should foreclose any further
debate regarding the title to the property in controversy, the litigated property
is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a
disqualified vendee. As a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to
own the subject property. There would be no more public policy to be served.

Two ways or remedies:

1) an action for reversion
2) escheat to the state
They differ in procedure but are essentially the same in effects, imputes to the
sovereign or to the government the ownership of all lands and makes them the
original source of private titles. Reversion of property to state which takes
place when title fails.
PHIL. BANKING CORPORATION VS LUI SHE
The Court declared that the pari delicto rule may not be applied in said case
since:
1) the original parties who were guilty of the violation of the
fundamental character have died and have since been substituted by
their administrators to whom it would be unjust to impute their guilt
2) As an EXCEPTION to the rule on pari delicto, when the agreement is
not illegal per se but is merely prohibited and the prohibition by law
is designed to protect the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby
enhanced, recover what he has paid or delivered.
But when the buyer has acquired Phil citizenship OR where the land has
come to the hands of a qualified transferee in good faith.
If land is transferred invalidly to an alien who subsequently becomes a Fil
citizen or transfers is to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title is rendered valid. The objective of the
constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been
achieved.
PUBLIC LANDS
PRIVATE LANDS
FILIPINO CITIZENS
FILIPINO CORPORATIONS AND
ASSOCIATIONS

RECOVERY OF LAND SOLD TO ALIEN

RELLOSA VS. GAW CHEE HUN
GR No. L-1411, Sept. 29, 1953
On February 2, 1944, Dionisio Rellosa sold to Gaw Chee Hun a parcel of land,
together with the house erected thereon, situated in the City of Manila,
Philippines, for the sum of P25,000. The vendor remained in possession of the
property under a contract of lease entered into on the same date between the
same parties. Alleging that the sale was executed subject to the condition that
the vendee, being a Chinese citizen, would obtain the approval of the Japanese
Military Administration in accordance with (seirei) No. 6 issued on April 2,
1943, by the Japanese authorities, and said approval has not been obtained, and
that, even if said requirement were met, the sale would at all events be void
under article XIII, section 5, of our Constitution.
The vendor instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Manila
seeking the annulment of the sale as well as the lease covering the land and the
house above mentioned, and praying that, once the sale and the lease are
declared null and void, the vendee be ordered to return to vendor the duplicate
of the title covering the property, and be restrained from in any way
dispossessing the latter of said property.

YES
Sec. 2, Art. 12
Yes =1935 Consti as
long as not exceeding
1,024 hectares
No=1973 Consti
Except by LEASE
No=1987 Consti, Sec
3, Art. 12 Except by
LEASE period: not to
exceed 25 yrs,
renewable for not
more than 25yrs
Area: not to exceed
1000 hectares

YES
-at the time of the
corporation acquired the
land, its predecessor in
interest had been in
possession and occupation
in manner and for period
described by law as to
entitle him to registration
in his name, then
proscription agains
corporation acquire public
land does not apply since
the land was no longer
public but PRIVATE land.
- At least 60% of capital is
owned by Filipinos

FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
ALIENS

NO
NO

NO
NO except by HEREDITARY
SUCCESSION, Sec 7 Art 12
-allowed to buy condo units
and shares; as long as no
more than 40% of total
stocks of condo corpo
because he is a member of
condo corpo only, but lands
belong to the condo corpo
still

The court declared both the sale and the lease valid and binding and dismissed
the complaint.
HELD: The sale in question having been entered into in violation of the
Constitution, the next question to be determined is, can petitioner have the sale
declared null and void and recover the property considering the effect of the
law governing rescission of contracts? Our answer must of necessity be in the:
"We can, therefore, say that even if the plaintiffs can still invoke the
Constitution, or the doctrine in the Krivenko Case, to set aside the sale in
question, they are now prevented from doing so if their purpose is to recover
the lands that they have voluntarily parted with, because of their guilty
knowledge that what they were doing was in violation of the Constitution. They
cannot escape this conclusion because they are presumed to know the law. As
this court well said: 'A party to an illegal contract cannot come into a court of
law and ask to have his illegal objects carried out. The law will not aid either
party to an illegal agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.' As
expressed in the maxim in pari delicto.

YES

NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF
THE PHILIPPINES WHO LOST
CITIZENSHIP

RELIGIOUS
CORPORATIONS
CONTROLLED
BY NON-FILIPINOS
CORPORATION SOLE

YES
Upon taking oath of
allegiance to Republic
pursuant to RA 9225
which grants him full
civil and political
rights
NO

NO

LEASE YES, and may

acquire the land upon grant
of Phil. Citizenship
YES, by transferee of lands,
Sec 8.
5000 sqm urban
3 hectares in rural

NO

YES

10

CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC LAND Governed by CA 141

1935: Agricultural, Forest, Timber
1973: Agricultural, Industrial or Commercial, residential,
resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands and others as
may provided by law.
1987: Agricultural, Forest, Timber, National Parks
ONLY AGRICULTURAL LANDS MAY BE ALIENATED.
CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC LANDS IS AN EXECUTIVE
PREROGATIVE of the executive department of the government
and not of courts.

In the absence of such classification, the land remains

unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered
open to disposition. REGALIAN DOCTRINE
SYSTEM OF CLASSIFICATION (governed by CA 141 since Nov 7,
1936: the classification and disposition of lands of public domain)
President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the
lands of public domain into: (Sec 6)
o ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE

Agricultural

Residential, Commercial, Industrial or for

similar productive purposes

Educational, Charitable or other similar

CHAVEZ VS. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY

GR No. 133250, July 9, 2002
FACTS:
The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to
undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling
functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore
lands are concerned. PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to
have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be
transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the
constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands
comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the
name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the
public domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private
corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer
is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land
of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to
transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of
Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other
than agricultural lands of the public domain.

purposes

Reservations for town sites and for public

or quasi-public uses (Sec 9)
TIMBER OR FOREST,
MINERAL LANDS

o
o

Under Sec. 6 of CA 141, the President through a PP or EO

can classify or reclassify land to be included or excluded
from the public domain
The Sec of DENR is the only other public official
empowered by law to approve a land classification and
declare such land as A & D.
REQUIREMENTS TO ESTABLISH CLASSIFICATION:
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO) or Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer (CENRO) certification that land is A&D.
Applicant must prove that DENR Sec has approved the land
classification and released the land of Public Domain as
A&D or PP classifying the land as A&D.
Land falls within the land classification map as verified
through survey by PENRO or CENRO
ONLY A & D LANDS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN MAY BE THE SUBJECTS OF
DISPOSITION

Public Land Act, Sec. 2, Sec. 6, Sec. 9, Sec. 10

BEFORE THE GOVERNMENT COULD ALIENATE OR DISPOSE
OF LANDS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN:
o The president must first officially classify the lands
as A&D
o Declare them open to disposition or concession
(there must be no law reserving these lands for
public or quasi-public uses)
o Positive act of the government such as an official
proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land
into disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes
o A and D= those land which have been delimited and
classified

Notes: The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas
is rooted in the Regalian doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and
waters of the public domain.
After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and
marshy disposable lands of the public domain continued to be only leased and
not sold to private parties.56 These lands remained sui generis, as the only
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain the government could not
sell to private parties.
Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private
parties government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public
domain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale. CA No. 141
does not authorize the President to reclassify government reclaimed and
marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 59 (d). Lands
classified under Section 59 (d) are the only alienable or disposable lands for
non-agricultural purposes that the government could sell to private parties.
In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands
of the public domain, there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to
sell these lands.
Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its
reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain.
Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain would be subject to the constitutional ban
on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain.
Hence, such legislative authority could only benefit private individuals.
As such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be alienated," unless they
are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain. The mere
reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural
resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or
concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or
disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special
patent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation
classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquino's issuance of a land patent also
constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer needed for
public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties.

11

There is no legislative or Presidential act classifying these submerged

areas as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to
disposition. These submerged areas are not covered by any patent or
certificate of title. There can be no dispute that these submerged areas form
part of the public domain, and in their present state are inalienable and
outside the commerce of man.
The mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas
does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the
National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the
lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial
lands of PEA.
Absent two official acts a classification that these lands are alienable or
disposable and open to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not
needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of
the public domain. Only such an official classification and formal declaration
can convert reclaimed lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, open to disposition under the Constitution, Title I and Title III 83of CA
No. 141 and other applicable laws
There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands,
whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may sell
to private parties itspatrimonial properties in accordance with the PEA
charter free from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not
apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.
PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to
private individuals since, with the legislative authority, there is no longer any
statutory prohibition against such sales and the constitutional ban does not
apply to individuals. PEA, however, cannot sell any of its alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain to private corporations since Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits such sales. The legislative authority
benefits only individuals. Private corporations remain barred from acquiring
any kind of alienable land of the public domain, including government
reclaimed lands.
Historically, lands reclaimed by the government are sui generis, not available
for sale to private parties unlike other alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands
retain their inherent potential as areas for public use or public service.
Alienable lands of the public domain, increasingly becoming scarce natural
resources, are to be distributed equitably among our ever-growing population.
To insure such equitable distribution, the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions have
barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. Those who attempt to dispose of inalienable natural resources
of the State, or seek to circumvent the constitutional ban on alienation of lands
of the public domain to private corporations, do so at their own risk.
BUREAU OF FORESTRY VS CA AND GALLO
GR No. L-37995, 31 Aug. 1987
On July 11, 1961, four (4) parcels of land situated in Buenavista, Iloilo w/ an
approximate area of 30.5943 hectares were the subject of an application for
registration by Mercedes Diago who alleged among others that she herself
occupied said parcels of land having bought them from the testate estate of the
late Jose Ma. Nava who, in his lifetime, had bought the lands in turn from
Canuto Gustilo on June 21, 1934. The Director of Lands opposed said
application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-ininterest have sufficient title over the lands applied for, which could be
registered under the Torrens systems, and that they have never been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession of the said lands for at least 30 years prior
to the filing of the application. The Director of Forestry on the other hand
anchored his opposition principally on the ground that certain specific portions
of the lands subject matter of the application, with an area of approximately
194,080 square meters .
On June 30, 1965, respondent Filomeno Gallo, having purchased the subject
parcels of land from Mercedes Diago on April 27, 1965, moved to be substituted
in place of the latter, attaching to his motion an Amended Application for
Registration of Title substantially reproducing the allegations in the application
of Mercedes Diago. Petitioner Philippine Fisheries Commission also moved on
August 30, 1965 to be substituted in place of petitioner Bureau of Forestry as
oppositor over a portion of the land sought to be registered, supervision and
control of said portion having been transferred from the Bureau of Forestry to
the Philippine Fisheries Commission.

of the four (4) parcels of land in the name of respondent Filomeno Gallo after
excluding a portion Identified as Lot "1-A" which is the site of the municipal hall
of Buenavista town, and subjecting Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to the road-of-way of 15
meters width.
Out of the 30.5943 hectares applied for registration under the Torrens System,
11.1863 hectares are coconut lands and admittedly within the disposable
portion of the public domain. The rest, consisting of 19.4080 hectares is now
the center of controversy of the present appeal.
Admittedly the controversial area is within a timberland block as classification
of the municipality and certified to by the Director of Forestry on February 18,
1956 as lands needed for forest purposes and hence they are portions of the
public domain which cannot be the subject of registration proceedings. Clearly
therefore the land is public land and there is no need for the Director of
Forestry to submit to the court convincing proofs that the land in dispute is not
more valuable for agriculture than for forest purposes, as there was no
question of whether the land is forest land or not. Be it remembered that said
forest land had been declared and certified as such by the Director of the
Bureau of Forestry on February 18, 1956, several years before the original
applicant of the lands for registration Mercedes Diago, filed it on July 11, 1961.
As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which was lifted
from Act No. 2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the
Executive Department of the government and not of the courts. With these
rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which
determines the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the Government, through the
Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of discretion for
the respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed
area is within a timberland block and (2) as certified to by the then Director of
Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes.
Furthermore, private respondents Cannot claim to have obtained their title by
prescription inasmuch as the application filed by them necessarily implied an
admission that the portions applied for are part of the public domain which
cannot be acquired by prescription, unless the law expressly permits it. It is a
rule of law that possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership (Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, 23 SCRA 1184).

DIR. OF LANDS VS. CA & BISNAR

In their joint application for registration of title to two (2) parcels of land filed
on July 20,1976, the applicants Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar claimed to be the
owners in fee simple of Lots 866 and 870 of the Pilar Cadastre Plan AP-06000869, respectively containing an area of 28 hectares (284,424 sq. m.) and 34
hectares (345,385 sq. m.) situated in barrio Gen. Hizon, Municipality of
President Roxas, Province of Capiz. The applicants alleged that they inherited
those parcels of land and they had been paying the taxes thereon.
On December 16,1976, the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of
Forest Development, opposed the application.
On February 24,1977, the applicants filed an amended application, which was
approved on March 14, 1977, and included the following allegation: Should the
Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable to the case, they hereby apply
for the benefits of Chapter 8, Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, as they and
their predecessors-ininterest have been in possession of the land as owners for
more than fifty (50) years.
After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the title of the lots in
the names of the applicants, herein private respondents.
Held: As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was
lifted from Act 2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the
Executive Department of the government and not the courts.
Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an pfficial
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title
do not apply. Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership. The application for registration in LRC Cad. Rec. 1256 of the
former Court of First Instance, is hereby dismissed without costs

On April 6, 1966, the trial court rendered its decision ordering the registration

12

PUBLIC LANDS AND GOVERNMENTAL LAND DISTINGUISHED

MONTANO VS. INSULAR GOVERNMENT
Facts:
Isabelo Montano presented a petition to the Court of Land Registration for the
inscription of a piece of land in the barrio of Libis, municipality of Caloocan,
used as a fishery having a superficial area of 10,805 square meters, and
bounded as set out in the petition; its value according to the last assessment
being $505.05, United States currency. This petition was opposed by the
Solicitor-General in behalf of the Director of Lands, and by the entity known as
Obras Pias de la Sagrada Mitra, the former on the ground that the land in
question belonged to the Government of the United States, and the latter, that it
was the absolute owner of all the dry land along the eastern boundary of the
said fishery. The Court of Land Registration in its decision of December 1, 1906,
dismissed the said oppositions without costs and decreed, after a general entry
by default, the adjudication and registration of the property described in the
petition, in favor of Isabelo Montano y Marcial. From this decision only counsel
for the Director of Public Lands appealed to this court. and precisely Isabelo
Montano sought title thereon on the strength of 10 years' occupation pursuant
to paragraph 6, section 5 of Act 926 of the Philippine Commission
Issue:
Whether or not the land in question can be acquired by Montano
Held:
Public lands is equivalent to public domain and does not by any mean include
all lands of government ownership, but only so much of said lands as are
thrown open to private appropriation and settlement.
Accordingly, "government land" and "public domain" are not synonymous
items. The first includes not only the second, but also other lands of the
Government already reserved or devoted to public use or subject to private
right. In other words, the Government owns real estate which is part of the
"public lands" and other real estate which is not part thereof.
Government property was of two kinds first, that of public use or service,
said to be of public ownership, and second, that of having a private character or
use. (Civil Code, arts. 339 and 340.) Lands of the first class, while they retain
their public character are inalienable. Those of the second are not. Therefore,
there is much real property belonging to the Government which is not affected
by statutes for the settlement, prescription or sale of public lands. Examples in
point are properties occupied by public buildings or devoted to municipal or
other governmental uses.
It is settled that the general legislation of Congress in respect to public lands
does not extend to tide lands. It provided that the scrip might be located on the
unoccupied and unappropriated public lands. As said in Newhall vs. Sanger (92
U.S. 761, 763.) A marshland which is inundated by the rise of tides belong to the
State and is not susceptible to appropriation by occupation, has no application
in the present case inasmuch as in said case the land subject matter of the
litigation was not yet titled.

NON-REGISTRABLE PROPERTIES
Property of Public Dominion
Art. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and
others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.

Parts of the public domain and intended for pub use and pub service,
and are outside the commerce of men and therefore not subject to
private appropriation.

Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in
the preceding article, is patrimonial property.

Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use
or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.
(341a)

Public domain lands become patrimonial property:

o
A declaration that such is A & D
o
Express government manifestation that the property is
already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service
or the development of national wealth

Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to
run.

Patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by private persons

through prescription (Art 1113)
Art. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into
property for public use and patrimonial property. (343)
Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities,
consist of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares,
fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid
for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be
governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
(344a)
Art. 425. Property of private ownership, besides the patrimonial property of
the State, provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of all property belonging
to private persons, either individually or collectively.
LAUREL VS GARCIA
The executive department attempted to sell the Roppongi property in Japan
which was acquired by the Phil. Government for use as embassy. Although the
Chancery transferred to another location thirteen years earlier, the court ruled
that under Art. 422 of NCC, property of public dominion retains such character
until formally declared otherwise.
The fact that the Roponggi site has not been used for a long time for actual
Embassy does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such
conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use. A
property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from such.
REPUBLIC VS. ALAGAD
On 11 October 1951, Melitona, Carmen (with spouse Espiridion Kolimlim), Justo, Carlos,

Librada (with spouse Emerson Abano), Demetrio, and Antonio Alagad filed an
application for registration of their title over a parcel of land situated at Linga, Pila,
Laguna, with an area of 8.1263 hectares (survey plan Psu-116971), which was
amended after the land was divided into two parcels, namely, Lot 1 with an area of
5.2476 hectares and Lot 2 with an area of 2.8421 hectares (survey plan Psu-226971,
amendment 2). The Republic opposed the application on the stereo-typed ground
that applicants and their predecessors have not been in possession of the land
openly, continuously, publicly and adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership
since 26 July 1894 and the land has not ceased to be a part of the public domain. It
appears that barrio folk also opposed the application. On 16 January 1956, by virtue
of a final judgment in said case, supplemented by orders issued on 21 March 1956
and 13 August 1956, the Alagads were declared owners of Lot 1 and the remaining
portion, or Lot 2, was declared public land. Decree N-51479 was entered and OCT 0401, dated 18 October 1956, was issued in the names of the Alagads.
In August 1966, the Alagads filed before the Municipal Court of Pila, Laguna (Civil
Case 52) an action to evict the barrio folk occupying portions of Lot 1. On 8 August
1968, judgment was rendered in the eviction case ordering the barrio folk therein to
return possession of the premises to the Alagads. The barrio folk did not appeal.
Property, according to the Civil Code, is either of public dominion or of private
ownership. Property is of public dominion if it is (1) intended for public use, such as
roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks,
shores, roadsteads and others of similar character;or if it (2) belongs to the State,
without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.
All other property of the State which is not of the character mentioned in article
[420], is patrimonial property, meaning to say, property open to disposition by the
Government, or otherwise, property pertaining to the national domain, or public
lands. Property of the public dominion, on the other hand, refers to things held by
the State by regalian right. They are things res publicae in nature and hence,
incapable of private appropriation. Thus, under the present Constitution, [w]ith the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.

13

ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LANDS HELD BY GOVERNMENT

ENTITIES UNDER SEC. 60 of CA 141 CANT BE ALIENATED
WITHOUT APPROVAL BY CONGRESS (reclaimed, foreshore,
marshy lands)

Registration of land of public domain under the Torrens

system cannot convert public lands into private lands.

Upon the grant of patent or issuance of certificate of title the

alienable land of public domain automatically becomes
private and cannot apply to govt units and entities.

Sale of inalienable lands of public domain that are

transferred to government units or entities are prohibited by
Sec 60 of CA 141 except when authorized by Congress.

Alienable lands of public domain held by government entities

under Sec 60 of CA 141 remain public lands because they
cannot be alienated or encumbered unless Congress passes a
law authorizing their disposition.

Congress cannot authorize the sale to private corporations of

reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain because
constitutional ban. Only individuals can benefit from such
law.

The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in

accordance with Sec 60 does not automatically convert
alienable lands of public domain into private or patrimonial
lands.

The alienable lands of public domain must be transferred to

qualified private parties or to government entities not tasked
to dispose of public lands before they can become private or
patrimonial lands.

Lands of public domain may be registered under the Torrens

System, lands titled in the name of govt entities form part of
the public domain.

If private lands are donated or purchased to the government,

units and agencies, It may titled under the name of the
agency or unit or head of the agency, all these properties
become properties of public domain, although if registered in
1529 or 496, they remain resgisted land.

Lands registere under 496 or 1529 are not exclusively

private or patrimonial lands. Lands of the public domain may
also be registered pursuant to existing laws.
FOREST LANDS

Forest: a large tract of land covered with natural growth of

trees and underbush; a large wood. Every definition that can
be framed for legal purposes will be found to either exclude
some cases which ought to apply or to include some with
which the law ought not to interfere.

REPUBLIC VS CA and LASTIMADO

o If the land forms part of the public forest,
possession thereof, however long, cannot convert it
into private property as it is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development
and beyond the power and jurisdiction of
registration courts. Forest land cannot be alienated
in favor of private persons or entities.
o Until timber or forest are released as A&D neither
the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has
authority to grant, lease, sell or dispose the lands.

When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the

government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the
government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality
a forest, the Dir. Of Forestry should submit to the court
convincing proof that the land is no more than valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes.

Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the

principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. They are merely privilege
granted by the State to qualified entities and do not vest a

permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession

area and the forest products. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced, rescinded by the Chief Executive when
national interests so require. They are not deemed contracts
with in the purview of due process of law clause.
Logging companies are required to preserve and maintain
forest areas, reforestation is one of prices must be paid for
the explotation.

CLASSIFICATION OF LAND IS DESCRIPTIVE OF ITS LEGAL

NATURE AND NOT WHAT IT ACTUALLY LOOKS LIKE

Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to

agricultural land
o The land must first be released from
classification as forest land
o Reclassified as agricultural land
o In accordance with certification issued by Dir.
Of Forestry as provided in Revised Admin Code

The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or

status and does not have to be descriptive of what the
land actually looks like

Mere fact that the land has trees upon it or minerals is

not sufficient to declare that one land is forest or mineral
land; there must be some proof of the extent and present
or future value of the forestry and other minerals

Sec. 48(b) of CA 141 applies only to A and D lands of

public domain, excluding forest lands.
WATERSHEDS

Watershed- an area drained by a river and its tributaries and

enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates it from
adjacent watersheds

Adequate supply of water for future generations and control

of flashfloods that not only damage property but also cause
loss of lives, protection of watersheds is an intergenerational
responsibility

TAN VS DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY:

SC reiterated the basic policy of conserving the national
patrimony, as exemplified by the governments withdrawal
from entry, sale, settlement of forest reserves for watershed,
soil protection and timber production.
MANGROVE SWAMPS

DIR. OF FORESTRY VS. VILLAREAL:

Mangrove swamps or manglares are forestal and not
alienable agricultural land.

Mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of this

country, not subject to disposition until and unless they are
first released as forest land and classified as alienable
agricultural land.
MINERAL LANDS

Mineral land means any area where mineral resources are

founds and mineral resources means any concentration of
mineral or rocks with potential economic value.

Meant to benefit not merely a select group of people living in

the areas locally affected by mining activities but the entire
nation.

Possession of mineral land, no matter how long, does not

confer possessory rights. Certificate of title is void when it
covers property of public domain classified as mineral lands.

Any title issued over non-disposable lots, even in the hands

of alleged innocent purchaser, shall be cancelled.

RA 7942/ Philippine Mining Act of 1995:

o Mineral resources are owned by State and the
exploration, development, and processing thereof
shall be under its full control and supervision

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State may undertake such activities or it may enter

into mineral agreements with contractors
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING CO. VS CA:
o Perfection of mining claim before 1935 Constitution
(prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public
domain except agricultural land) had the effect of
removing land from public domain.
o The location and perfection of a mining claim before
Nov 15, 1935 segregated the land from the public
domain.
Regalian doctrine reserves the State to all natural wealth that
may be found in the bowels of the earth even when the land
where the discovery is made be private or public.
Once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use of
land at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to
enable it to extract the minerals therein in exercise of its
sovereign prerogative.
Land cannot be partly mineral and partly agricultural since
the rights over the land are indivisible. Must be categorical:
either completely mineral or completely agricultural.
o

Private parties could lease lands reclaimed by government

only if these lands were no longer needed for public purpose.
Act No. 1654: mandated public bidding in the lease of
government reclaimed lands
It made reclaimed land sui generis in that unlike other public
lands which the government could sell to private parties,
these reclaimed lands were available only for lease to private
parties.
But it did not repeal prohibit private parties from reclaiming
parts of sea with government permit-remained as private
lands.

NATIONAL PARKS

Land reserved for a national park cannot be registered either

in CA 141 or PD 1529.

PALOMO VS CA:
o It has been held that where a certificate of title
covers a portion of land within the area reserved
for park purposes, the title should be annulled with
respect to said portion.
MILITARY OR NAVAL RESERVATION

REPUBLIC VS MARCOS
o Land inside a military or naval reservation cannot
be the object of registration
o A military camp or reservation could not have been
the object od cadastral proceedings
o A military reservation can not be the subject to
occupation, entry or settlement. It is inalienable.
o To segregate portions of the public domain as a
military reservation, all that is needed is a
Presidential Proclamtion
FORESHORE LANDS AND RECLAIMED LANDS

Foreshore land: that strip of land that lies between the high
and low watermarks and that is alternately wet and dry
according to the flow of tide.

Foreshore lands and submerged lands which may be the

subject of reclamation are inalienable and disposable
portions of the public domain.

Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 was first statutory law

governing the ownership and disposition of reclaimed land in
Phils.

May 18, 1907- Act No. 1654 which provided for the lease, but
not sale of reclaimed lands of government to corporations
and individuals

Nov. 29, 1919- Act No. 2874- authorizing the lease but not
sale of reclaimed lands of government to corporations and
individuals

Nov 7, 1936- CA 141

Land reclaimed from the sea belonged to the party

undertaking the reclamation, provided that government
issued necessary permit and did not reserve ownership of
the reclaimed land to the State.

May 8, 1907- Act No. 1654 which regulated the lease of

reclaimed and foreshore lands. Mandated that government
should retain title to all lands reclaimed by the government.
It vested government the control and disposition of
foreshore lands.

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