Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Signed 1 July 1968

Location New York, United States

Effective 5 March 1970

Condition Ratification by the Soviet Union,

the United Kingdom, the United
States, and 40 other signatory states.

Parties 189 (Complete List)

Participation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Signed and ratified
Withdrawn
Acceded or succeeded
(North Korea)
State abiding by treaty though Non-signatory
outside
(India, Israel, Pakistan)
(Taiwan)

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT or NNPT)
is a treaty to limit the spread (proliferation) of nuclear weapons. The treaty came into force on 5 March 1970, and
currently there are 189 states party to the treaty, five of which are recognized as nuclear weapon states: the United
States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China (also the fivepermanent members of the United Nations
Security Council).
Four non-parties to the treaty are known or believed to possess nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan and North
Korea have openly tested and declared that they possess nuclear weapons, while Israel has had a policy
of opacity regarding its own nuclear weapons program. North Koreaacceded to the treaty, violated it, and in 2003
withdrew from it.

The NPT consists of a preamble and eleven articles. Although the concept of "pillars" is not expressed anywhere in
the NPT, the treaty is nevertheless sometimes interpreted as a three-pillar system, with an implicit balance among
them:

1. non-proliferation,
2. disarmament, and
3. the right to peacefully use nuclear technology.

[1]

The treaty is reviewed every five years in meetings called Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty of NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In addition, Sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference
take place on the intermediate years. Simultaneously, many events organized by independent institutions, groups of
experts, think tanks and NGOs take place worldwide in order to provide reports and recommendations that
complement the Preparatory Committees.

[2]

Even though the treaty was originally conceived with a limited duration of 25 years, the signing parties decided, by
consensus, to extend the treaty indefinitely and without conditions during the Review Conference in New York City on
May 11, 1995.
[3]

The most recent Review Conference was held in May, 2010.

Contents

1 Treaty "pillars"

1.1 First pillar: non-proliferation

1.2 Second pillar: disarmament

1.3 Third pillar: peaceful use of nuclear energy

2 Key articles

3 History

3.1 United States-NATO nuclear weapons sharing

3.2 India, Israel, and Pakistan

3.3 North Korea

3.4 Iran

3.5 South Africa

3.6 Libya

4 Leaving the treaty

5 Recent and coming events

6 Criticism and responses

7 See also

8 References

9 External links

[edit]Treaty

"pillars"

The NPT is commonly described as having three main "pillars": non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful
use.

[4]

This "pillars" concept has been questioned by some who believe that the NPT is, as its name suggests,

principally about nonproliferation, and who worry that "three pillars" language misleadingly implies that the three
elements have equivalent importance.
[edit]First

[5][dead link]

pillar: non-proliferation

Five states are recognized by the Non-Proliferation Treaty as nuclear weapon states (NWS): China (signed
1992), France (1992), the Soviet Union (1968; obligations and rights now assumed by the Russian Federation),
the United Kingdom (1968), and the United States (1968) (The United States, UK, and the Soviet Union were the only
states openly possessing such weapons among the original ratifiers of the treaty, which entered into force in 1970).
These five nations are also the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. These five NWS
agree not to transfer "nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" and "not in any way to assist, encourage,
or induce" a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) to acquire nuclear weapons (Article I). NNWS parties to the NPT
agree not to "receive," "manufacture" or "acquire" nuclear weapons or to "seek or receive any assistance in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons" (Article II). NNWS parties also agree to accept safeguards by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify that they are not diverting nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Article III).
The five NWS parties have made undertakings not to use their nuclear weapons against a non-NWS party except in
response to a nuclear attack, or a conventional attack in alliance with a Nuclear Weapons State. However, these
undertakings have not been incorporated formally into the treaty, and the exact details have varied over time. The
U.S. also had nuclear warheads targeted at North Korea, a non-NWS state, from 1959 until 1991. The previous
United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, has also explicitly invoked the possibility of the use of
[6]

the country's nuclear weapons in response to a non-conventional attack by "rogue states".

In January 2006,

President Jacques Chirac of France indicated that an incident of state-sponsored terrorism on France could trigger a
small-scale nuclear retaliation aimed at destroying the "rogue state's" power centers.
[edit]Second

[7][8]

pillar: disarmament

The NPT's preamble contains language affirming the desire of treaty signatories to ease international tension and
strengthen international trust so as to create someday the conditions for a halt to the production of nuclear weapons,
and treaty on general and complete disarmament that liquidates, in particular, nuclear weapons and their delivery
vehicles from national arsenals.

The wording of the NPT's Article VI arguably imposes only a vague obligation on all NPT signatories to move in the
general direction of nuclear and total disarmament, saying, "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament."

[9]

Under this interpretation, Article VI

does not strictly require all signatories to actually conclude a disarmament treaty. Rather, it only requires them "to
negotiate in good faith."

[10]

The International Court of Justice, in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or

Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued 8 July 1996, went beyond the text of Article VI in its unanimous conclusion that
"There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear
disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control."

[11]

Some governments, especially non-nuclear-weapon states belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement, have interpreted
Article VI's language as being anything but vague. In their view, Article VI constitutes a formal and specific obligation
on the NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states to disarm themselves of nuclear weapons, and argue that these states
have failed to meet their obligation. Some government delegations to the Conference on Disarmament have put forth
proposals for a complete and universal disarmament, but no disarmament treaty has emerged from these
proposals.

[citation needed]

Critics of the NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states sometimes argue that what they view as

the failure of the NPT-recognized nuclear weapon states to disarm themselves of nuclear weapons, especially in the
postCold War era, has angered some non-nuclear-weapon NPT signatories of the NPT. Such failure, these critics
add, provides justification for the non-nuclear-weapon signatories to quit the NPT and develop their own nuclear
arsenals.
Other observers have suggested that the linkage between proliferation and disarmament may also work the other
way, i.e., that the failure to resolve proliferation threats in Iran and North Korea, for instance, will cripple the prospects
for disarmament.

[citation needed]

No current nuclear weapons state, the argument goes, would seriously consider

eliminating its last nuclear weapons without high confidence that other countries would not acquire them. Some
observers have even suggested that the very progress of disarmament by the superpowerswhich has led to the
elimination of thousands of weapons and delivery systems

[12]

could eventually make the possession of nuclear

weapons more attractive by increasing the perceived strategic value of a small arsenal. As one U.S. official and NPT
expert warned in 2007, "logic suggests that as the number of nuclear weapons decreases, the 'marginal utility' of a
nuclear weapon as an instrument of military power increases. At the extreme, which it is precisely disarmaments
hope to create, the strategic utility of even one or two nuclear weapons would be huge."
[edit]Third

[13]

pillar: peaceful use of nuclear energy

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Please help improve this article by adding reliable references. Unsourced material may
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The third pillar allows for and agrees upon the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to NPT signatory
countries for the development of civilian nuclear energy programs in those countries, as long as they can
demonstrate that their nuclear programs are not being used for the development of nuclear weapons.
Since very few of the states with nuclear energy programs are willing to abandon the use of nuclear energy, the third
pillar of the NPT under Article IV provides other states with the possibility to do the same, but under conditions
intended to make it difficult to develop nuclear weapons.
The treaty recognizes the inalienable right of sovereign states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but
restricts this right for NPT parties to be exercised "in conformity with Articles I and II" (the basic nonproliferation
obligations that constitute the "first pillar" of the Treaty). As the commercially popular light water reactor nuclear
power station uses enriched uranium fuel, it follows that states must be able either to enrich uranium or purchase it
on an international market. Mohamed ElBaradei, then Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
has called the spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities the "Achilles' heel" of the nuclear nonproliferation
regime. As of 2007 13 states have an enrichment capability.

[14]

Because the availability of fissile material has long

been considered the principal obstacle to, and "pacing element" for, a country's nuclear weapons development effort,
it was declared a major emphasis of U.S. policy in 2004 to prevent the further spread of uranium enrichment and
plutonium reprocessing (a.k.a. "ENR") technology.

[15]

Countries possessing ENR capabilities, it is feared, have what

is in effect the option of using this capability to produce fissile material for weapons use on demand, thus giving them
what has been termed a "virtual" nuclear weapons program. The degree to which NPT members have a "right" to
ENR technology notwithstanding its potentially grave proliferation implications, therefore, is at the cutting edge of
policy and legal debates surrounding the meaning of Article IV and its relation to Articles I, II, and III of the Treaty.
Countries that have signed the treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapons States and maintained that status have an unbroken
record of not building nuclear weapons. However, Iraq was cited by the IAEA with punitive sanctions enacted against
it by the UN Security Council for violating its NPT safeguards obligations; North Korea never came into compliance
with its NPT safeguards agreement and was cited repeatedly for these violations,

[16]

and later withdrew from the NPT

and tested multiple nuclear devices; Iran was found in non-compliance with its NPT safeguards obligations in an
unusual non-consensus decision because it "failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time" to
report aspects of its enrichment program;

[17][18]

and Libya pursued a clandestine nuclear weapons program before

abandoning it in December 2003. In 1991 Romania reported previously undeclared nuclear activities by the former
regime and the IAEA reported this non-compliance to the Security Council for information only. In some regions, the
fact that all neighbors are verifiably free of nuclear weapons reduces any pressure individual states might feel to build
those weapons themselves, even if neighbors are known to have peaceful nuclear energy programs that might
otherwise be suspicious. In this, the treaty works as designed.
In 2004, Mohamed ElBaradei, the then Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said that
by some estimates thirty-five to forty states could have the knowledge to develop nuclear weapons.

[19]

[edit]Key
Article I:

[20]

articles
Each nuclear-weapons state (NWS) undertakes not to transfer, to any recipient, nuclear weapons, or

other nuclear explosive devices, and not to assist any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or acquire such
weapons or devices.
Article II: Each non-NWS party undertakes not to receive, from any source, nuclear weapons, or other nuclear
explosive devices; not to manufacture or acquire such weapons or devices; and not to receive any assistance in their
manufacture.
Article III: Each non-NWS party undertakes to conclude an agreement with the IAEA for the application of its
safeguards to all nuclear material in all of the state's peaceful nuclear activities and to prevent diversion of such
material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Article IV: 1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty
to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in
conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange
of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties
to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or
international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,
especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of
the developing areas of the world.
Article VI. The states undertake to pursue "negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of
the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament", and towards a "Treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control".
Article X. Establishes the right to withdraw from the Treaty giving 3 months' notice. It also establishes the duration of
the Treaty (25 years before 1995 Extension Initiative).
[edit]History
See also: Nuclear proliferation
The impetus behind the NPT was concern for the safety of a world with many nuclear weapon states. It was
recognized that the cold war deterrent relationship between just the United States and Soviet Union was fragile.
Having more nuclear nuclear-weapon states would reduce security for all, multiplying the risks of miscalculation,
accidents, unauthorized use of weapons, or from escalation in tensions, nuclear conflict.

The NPT process was launched by Frank Aiken, Irish Minister for External Affairs, in 1958. It was opened for
signature in 1968, with Finland the first State to sign. By 1992 all five then-declared nuclear powers had signed the
treaty, and the treaty was renewed in 1995 (and followed by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996, which has
not entered into force). Several NPT signatories have given up nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons
programs. South Africa undertook a nuclear weapons program, allegedly with the assistance of Israel in the 1970s,
and may have conducted a nuclear test in the Indian Ocean in 1979, but has since renounced its nuclear program
and signed the treaty in 1991 after destroying its small nucleararsenal. Several former Soviet Republics destroyed or
transferred to Russia the nuclear weapons inherited from the Soviet Union.
[edit]United

States-NATO nuclear weapons sharing

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
Nuclear weapons states
Nuclear sharing
Neither, but NPT

Main article: Nuclear sharing

At the time the treaty was being negotiated, NATO had in place secret nuclear weapons sharing agreements whereby
the United Statesprovided nuclear weapons to be deployed by, and stored in, other NATO states. Some argue this is
an act of proliferation violating Articles I and II of the treaty. A counter-argument is that the U.S. controlled the
weapons in storage within the NATO states, and that no transfer of the weapons or control over them was intended
"unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which the treaty would no longer be controlling", so there is no
breach of the NPT. These agreements were disclosed to a few of the states, including the Soviet Union, negotiating
the treaty, but most of the states that signed the NPT in 1968 would not have known about these agreements and
interpretations at that time.

[21]

As of 2005, it is estimated that the United States still provides about 180 tactical B61 nuclear bombs for use
by Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey under these NATO agreements.

[22]

Many states, and

the Non-Aligned Movement, now argue this violates Articles I and II of the treaty, and are applying diplomatic
pressure to terminate these agreements. They point out that the pilots and other staff of the "non-nuclear" NATO
states practice handling and delivering the U.S. nuclear bombs, and non-U.S. warplanes have been adapted to
deliver U.S. nuclear bombs which must have involved the transfer of some technical nuclear weapons information.

NATO believes its "nuclear forces continue to play an essential role in war prevention, but their role is now more
fundamentally political".

[23]

NATO officials also point out that no nuclear weapons have ever been given over to non-

U.S. control by the United States, so therefore there cannot have been a violation of Article I (which prohibits
transferring "nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices")
or Article II (which bars "receiv[ing] the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices").
U.S. nuclear sharing policies were originally designed to help prevent the proliferation of nuclear weaponsnot least
by persuading the then West Germany not to develop an independent nuclear capability by assuring it that West
Germany would be able, in the event of war with the Warsaw Pact, to wield (U.S.) nuclear weapons in self-defense.
(Until that point of all-out war, however, the weapons themselves would remain in U.S. hands.) The point was to limit
the spread of countries having their own nuclear weapons programs, helping ensure that NATO allies would not
choose to go down the proliferation route.

[24]

(West Germany was discussed in U.S. intelligence estimates for a

number of years as being a country with the potential to develop nuclear weapons capabilities of its own if officials in
Bonn were not convinced that their defense against the Soviet Union and its allies could otherwise be met.
[edit]India,

[25]

Israel, and Pakistan

See also: India and weapons of mass destruction, Israel and weapons of mass destruction, and Pakistan and
weapons of mass destruction
Three statesIndia, Israel, and Pakistanhave declined to sign the treaty. India and Pakistan are confirmed nuclear
powers, and Israel has a long-standing policy of deliberate ambiguity(see List of countries with nuclear weapons).
These countries argue that the NPT creates a club of "nuclear haves" and a larger group of "nuclear have-nots" by
restricting the legal possession of nuclear weapons to those states that tested them before 1967, but the treaty never
explains on what ethical grounds such a distinction is valid.
India and Pakistan have publicly announced possession of nuclear weapons and have detonated nuclear devices in
tests, India having first done so in 1974 and Pakistan following suit in 1998 in response to another Indian test.

[26]

India

is estimated to have enough fissile material for more than 150 warheads.

[27]

Pakistan reportedly has between 80 and

120 warheads according to the former head of its strategic arms division.

[28]

India is one of the few countries to have

a no first use policy, a pledge not to use nuclear weapons unless first attacked by an adversary using nuclear
weapons.

[29]

India's External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee said during a visit to Tokyo in 2007: "If India did not

sign the NPT, it is not because of its lack of commitment for non-proliferation, but because we consider NPT as a
flawed treaty and it did not recognise the need for universal, non-discriminatory verification and treatment."

[30]

According to leaked intelligence, Israel has been developing nuclear weapons at its Dimona site in the Negev since
1958, and many nonproliferation analysts like David Albright estimate that Israel may have stockpiled between 100 to
200 warheads using the plutonium reprocessed from Dimona. The Israeli government refuses to confirm or deny
possession of nuclear weapons, although this is now regarded as an open secret after Israeli low level nuclear

technician Mordechai Vanunusubsequently arrested and sentenced for treason by Israelpublished evidence
about the program to the British

North Korea and weapons of mass destruction

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

North Korea

First nuclear weapon test

October 9, 2006

Last nuclear test

May 25, 2009[1]

Total tests

Current stockpile

68 nuclear weapons (estimated)[2]

Maximum missile range

4,000 km (BM25 Musudan)

NPT signatory

Yes, but withdrew in 2003

Weapons of
mass destruction

By type

Biological, Chemical, Nuclear, Radiological

By country

Albania
Algeria
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Brazil
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Canada
PR China
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Libya
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Netherlands
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Pakistan
Poland
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Russia
Saudi Arabia
South Africa
Sweden
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Taiwan (ROC)
Ukraine
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Proliferation

Biological, Chemical, Nuclear, Missiles

Treaties

List of treaties

Book

Category

vde

Nuclear weapons

History
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This box: view talk edit

North Korea and weapons

of mass destruction

Events

North Korean missile tests:

1993

1998

2006

2009

2006 nuclear test

2009 nuclear test

Weapons

Taepodong-1

Taepodong-2

See also

Musudan-ri

Ryanggang explosion

Yongbyon

Korean People's Army

Songun
vde

North Korea (officially the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or DPRK) has declared that it
has nuclear weapons and is believed by many to have nuclear weapons. The CIA assesses that
North Korea also has a substantial arsenal of chemical weapons. North Korea was a party to
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but withdrew in 2003, citing the failure of the United States to
fulfill its end of theAgreed Framework, a 1994 agreement between the states to limit North Korea's
nuclear ambitions, begin normalization of relations, and help North Korea supply some energy needs
through nuclear reactors.
On October 9, 2006, the North Korean government issued an announcement that it had successfully
conducted a nuclear test for the first time. Both the United States Geological Survey and Japanese
seismological authorities detected an earthquake with a preliminary estimated magnitude of 4.3 in
North Korea, corroborating some aspects of the North Korean claims.[3]
In April 2009, reports surfaced that North Korea has become a "fully fledged nuclear power", an
opinion shared by IAEA Director GeneralMohamed ElBaradei.[4] On May 25, 2009, North Korea

conducted another nuclear test, which is believed to have been the cause of a magnitude 4.7
seismic event.[1] Although there is no official information about the test's location, it is believed that it
happened in the north-eastern region near Kilju, the site of North Korea's first nuclear test.[5]
Contents

1 Nuclear weapons

1.1 Background

1.2 Chronology of events

1.3 Plutonium

1.4 Enriched uranium and foreign assistance

1.5 North Korea United States relations

1.6 Nuclear deterrence

1.7 Reactivation

1.8 Nuclear fusion claims

2 Biological and chemical weapons

3 Delivery systems

3.1 History

3.2 Testing

3.2.1 Early 2000s

3.2.2 2009

3.2.3 Aims

3.3 Delivery Systems

3.3.1 Successfully tested

3.3.2 Not tested / failed tests

3.4 Exports

3.4.1 Export partners

4 See also

5 References

6 External links

[edit]Nuclear

weapons
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[edit]Background

Korea has been a divided country since 1945, when it was liberated from the defeated Japan after
World War II. The Korean War was fought from June 25, 1950, until an Armistice Agreement was
signed on July 27, 1953. As part of the Armistice, both sides, including U.S. forces, conduct military
patrols within the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).[citation needed]
Tensions between North and South have run high on numerous occasions since 1953. The
deployment of the U.S. Army's Second Infantry Division on the Korean peninsula and the American
military presence at the DMZ are publicly regarded by North Korea as an occupying army. In several
areas, North Korean and American/South Korean forces operate in extreme proximity to the border,
adding to tension. This tension has led to numerous clashes, including the Axe Murder Incident of
1976.
According to newly declassified documents from the archives of former communist allies of North
Korea, Pyongyang first began to pursue nuclear technology as early as 1956.[citation needed] In the early
1960s security concerns in the region and an apparent Soviet dismissal of these concerns hastened
the DPRK's efforts to acquire the technology to produce nuclear weapons. In the wake of the
student-led April 19 movement in 1960 that overthrew the South Korean president Rhee
Syngman and the May 16, 1961, military coup d'tat that brought General Park Chung-hee to power
in the south, North Korea sought a mutual defense treaty with the Soviet Union and China.
Soviet leaders reportedly did not even consider such a pact necessary, despite the military posture
of the anti-communist Park regime, as long as the Soviets improved relations with the United
States.[6]
Perhaps the two most important factors in North Korea's attempts to obtain nuclear weapons and
become militarily self-reliant were the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 and the prospect of a
USJapanROK alliance following the 1965 establishment of diplomatic relations between the ROK
and Japan. Kim Il-sung reportedly did not trust that the Soviets would live up to the conditions of the
mutual defense pact and guarantee North Korea's security since they betrayed Castro by
withdrawing nuclear missiles in an effort to improve relations with the United States. As a North
Korean official explained to Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin in 1965, "the Korean leaders were
distrustful of the CPSU and the Soviet government, they could not count on that the Soviet
government would keep the obligations related to the defense of Korea it assumed in the Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, Kim Il-sung said, and therefore they were
compelled to keep an army of 700,000 and a police force of 200,000." In explaining the cause of
such mistrust, the official claimed that "the Soviet Union had betrayed Cuba at the time of the
Caribbean crisis."[7] However, as recently declassified Russian, Hungarian, and East

German materials confirm, no communist governments were willing to share the technology with the
North Koreans, out of fear that they would share the technology with China.[8]
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korean leaders recognized the need for a new security
relationship with a major power since Pyongyang could not afford to maintain its military posture.
North Korean leaders therefore sought to forge a new relationship with the United States, the only
power strong enough to step into the vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union. From the early
1990s, throughout the first nuclear crisis, North Korea sought a non-aggression pact with the United
States.
The U.S. rejected North Korean calls for bilateral talks concerning a non-aggression pact, and stated
that only six-party talks that also include the People's Republic of China, Russia, Japan, and South
Korea are acceptable. The American stance was that North Korea had violated prior bilateral
agreements, thus such forums lacked accountability. Conversely, North Korea refused to speak in
the context of six-party talks, stating that it would only accept bilateral talks with the United States.
This led to a diplomatic stalemate.
On October 9, 2006, the North Korean government issued an announcement that it had successfully
conducted a nuclear test for the first time. Both theUnited States Geological Survey and Japanese
seismological authorities detected an earthquake with a preliminary estimated magnitude of 4.3 in
North Korea, corroborating some aspects of the North Korean claims.[3]
On November 19, 2006, North Korea's Minju Joson newspaper accused South Korea of building up
arms in order to attack the country, claiming that "the South Korean military is openly clamoring that
the development and introduction of new weapons are to target the North." Pyongyang accused
South Korea of conspiring with the United States to attack the isolated and impoverished state, an
accusation made frequently by the North and routinely denied by the U.S.[9] The United Nations
Security Council condemned the test in Resolution 1874.
On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted a second test of a nuclear weapon at the same location
as the original test (not confirmed). The test weapon was of the same magnitude as the atomic
bombs dropped on Japan in the 2nd World War, (confirmed S. Korea and Russia). At the same time
of the test N. Korea tested 2 short range missiles (reported a S. Korean News Network YTN not
officially confirmed).
[edit]Chronology

of events

Main article: North Korea Nuclear Program Chronology

[edit]Plutonium

This section needs additional citations for verification.

Please help improve this article by adding reliable references. Unsourced material may
be challenged and removed. (October 2009)

5 MWe experimental reactor atYongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center

North Korea has had two operating reactors, both located at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific
Research Center. The older reactor is a Russian supplied IRT-2000 research reactor completed in
1967.[10] Uranium irradiated in this reactor was used in North Korea's first plutonium separation
experiments in 1975.[11] Nevertheless, the primary purpose of the reactor is not to produce plutonium
and North Korea has had trouble acquiring enough fuel for constant operation. The U.S. Department
of Energy estimated that this reactor could have been used to produce up to 12 kg of plutonium,
though the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee said that the amount was no more than a
few hundred grams.[12]
North Korea's main reactor, where practically all of its plutonium has been produced, is a 5MWe gasgraphite moderated Magnox type reactor. A full core consists of 8,000 fuel rods and can yield a
maximum of 2729 kg of plutonium if left in the reactor for optimal burnup.[13] Often, North Korea has
unloaded the reactor before reaching the maximum burnup level. There are three known cores
which were unloaded in 1994 (under IAEA supervision in accordance with the Agreed Framework),
2005, and 2007. A secret core, Core 0, may have been unloaded between 1989 and 1990 and
verification is needed to confirm North Korean claims that such an unloading or partial unloading did
not take place.[citation needed] Under normal operation, the reactor can produce about 6 kg of plutonium
per year although the reactor would need to be shut down and the fuel rods extracted to begin the
plutonium separation process. Hence, plutonium separation takes place in campaigns. Reprocessing
(also known as separation) is known to have taken place in 2003 for the first core and 2005 for the
second core. The reprocessing of the third core was halted by the six party talks and resumption will
be delayed due to the disablement efforts.[citation needed]

North Korea also had two additional graphite moderated reactors being built, but that have since
become unsalvageable since maintenance of their construction sites was not allowed under the
Agreed Framework. The first of these two partially constructed reactors was also in the Yongbyon
Nuclear Scientific Research Center. It was to be 50MWe and able to produce 60 kg of plutonium per
year, enough for approximately 10 weapons. The second partially constructed reactor was in nearby
Taechon. It was to be 200MWe and able to produce roughly 220 kg of plutonium annually, enough
for approximately 40 weapons.[14]
On March 12, 1993, North Korea said that it planned to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) and refused to allow inspectors access to its nuclear sites. By 1994, the United States
believed that North Korea had enough reprocessed plutonium to produce about 10 bombs with the
amount of plutonium increasing.[15] Faced with diplomatic pressure afterUN Security Council
Resolution 825 and the threat of American military air strikes against the reactor, North Korea
agreed to dismantle its plutonium program as part of the Agreed Framework in which South Korea
and the United States would provide North Korea with light water reactors and fuel oil until those
reactors could be completed. Because the light water reactors would require enriched uranium to be
imported from outside North Korea, the amount of reactor fuel and waste could be more easily
tracked, making it more difficult to divert nuclear waste to be reprocessed into plutonium. However,
with bureaucratic red tape and political obstacles from the North Korea, the Korean Peninsula
Energy Development Organization (KEDO), established to advance the implementation of the
Agreed Framework, had failed to build the promised light water reactors because the United States
failed to uphold their end of the agreement by providing energy aid, and in late 2002, North Korea
returned to using its old reactors.
In 2006, there were eight sites identified as potential test explosion sites for current (and future) tests
according to a statement by the South Korean Parliament. These sites are distinguished from a
number of other nuclear materials production facilities in that they are thought to be most closely
identified with a military, or potentially military purpose [16]:
1. Hamgyong Bukdo (North Hamgyong) Province 2 Sites:

Chungjinsi Nuclear fuel storage site, military base & unidentified underground facility

Kiljugun Extensive military buildup with motorized troop formations and construction of new
advanced underground facility Site of May 25, 2009 Nuclear Test.

Phunggyere Site of October 9, 2006 Nuclear Test

2. Chagangdo Province 1 Site: Kanggyesi Production center of North Korea's advanced

equipment & munitions since 1956. Also, extensive intelligence of highly advanced underground
facility.
3. Pyongan Bukdo (North Pyongan) Province 4 Sites:

Yongbyonsi 2 Sites Location of Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center, and the facility's
Experimental Test Explosion facility and two unidentified underground facilities. In addition, there
is a gas-graphic reactor, HE test site, nuclear fuel fabrication site, nuclear waste storage site

Kusungsi Between 1997 and September 2002, approximately 70 text explosions of North
Korean munitions took place. Also, existence of underground facility

Taechongun 200MWe Nuclear Energy Plant construction site. Location of unidentified

underground facility and nuclear arms/energy related facilities known to exist

4. Pyongan Namdo (South Pyongan) Province 1 Site: Pyongsungsi Location of National Science
Academy and extensive underground facility whose purpose is not known.
[edit]Enriched

uranium and foreign assistance

With the abandonment of its plutonium program, U.S. officials claimed North Korea began an
enriched uranium program. Pakistan, through Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan,
supplied key technology and information to North Korea in exchange for missile technology around
1997, according to U.S. intelligence officials. Pakistani president General Pervez
Musharraf acknowledged in 2005 that Khan had provided centrifuges and their designs to North
Korea.[17] On May 30, 2008, ABC News reported that Khan, who previously confessed to his
involvement with Iran and North Korea, now denies involvement with the spread of nuclear arms to
those countries. He claimed in an interview with ABC News that thePakistani government and
President Pervez Musharraf forced him to be a "scapegoat" for the "national interest". He also
denied ever traveling to Iran or Libya, and claimed that North Korea's nuclear program was well
advanced before his visit.[18]
This program was publicized in October 2002 when the United States asked North Korean officials
about the program.[19] Under the Agreed Framework, North Korea explicitly agreed to freeze
plutonium programs (specifically, its "graphite moderated reactors and related facilities"). The
agreement also committed North Korea to implement the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula, in which both Koreas committed not to have enrichment or reprocessing
facilities. The United States argued North Korea violated its commitment not to have enrichment
facilities.

In December 2002, the United States persuaded the KEDO Board to suspend fuel oil shipments,
which led to the end of the Agreed Framework. North Korea responded by announcing plans to
reactivate a dormant nuclear fuel processing program and power plant north of Pyongyang. North
Korea soon thereafter expelled United Nations inspectors and withdrew from the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
In 2007 reports emanating from Washington suggested that the 2002 CIA reports that North Korea
was developing uranium enrichment technology had overstated or misread the intelligence. U.S.
officials were no longer making this a major issue in the six-party talks.[20][21][22]
WikiLeaks has dropped a bombshell cache of U.S. diplomatic cables, ripping the cloak off scores of
secret deals, including clandestine North Korean support for Iran and the North Korea, now
embroiled in a knifes edge confrontation with South Korea and the United States, was able to
smuggle 19 advanced, Russian-designed missiles, capable of delivering nuclear payloads, to Iran,
according to a February 24, 2010 cable detailing a meeting between Russian officials and a State
Department nonproliferation expert. The shipment of some R-27 components was widely known in
intelligence circles, but the WikiLeaks disclosures represent the first confirmation that Iran now
possesses complete missile systems.
[edit]North

Korea United States relations

Main article: North Korea United States relations

Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, the U.S. government agreed to facilitate the supply of two light
water reactors to North Korea.[23][24] Such reactors are considered "more proliferation-resistant than
North Korea's graphite-moderated reactors,"[25] but not "proliferation proof." [26]
Even though U.S. President George W. Bush had named North Korea as part of an "Axis of Evil"
following the September 11, 2001 attacks, U.S. officials stated that the United States was not
planning any immediate military action.
According to John Feffer, co-director of the Foreign Policy in Focus, in 2006
The primary problem is that the current U.S. administration fundamentally doesnt want an
agreement with North Korea. The Bush administration considers the 1994 Agreed Framework to
have been a flawed agreement. It doesnt want be saddled with a similar agreement, for if it did sign
one, it would iithen be open to charges of "appeasing" Pyongyang. The Vice President has summed
up the approach as: "We dont negotiate with evil, we defeat evil."[27]
American ire at North Korea was further inflamed by allegations of state-sponsored drug smuggling,
money-laundering, and wide-scale counterfeiting.[citation needed]

Diplomatic efforts at resolving the North Korean situation are complicated by the different goals and
interests of the nations of the region. While none of the parties desire a North Korea with nuclear
weapons[citation needed], Japan and South Korea are especially concerned about North Korean counterstrikes following possible military action against North Korea. The People's Republic of China and
South Korea are also very worried about the economic and social consequences should this
situation cause the North Korean government to collapse.
[edit]Nuclear

deterrence
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section if you can. The talk pagemay contain suggestions. (June 2009)

Former South Korean Government sources[who?], as well as some scholars and analysts, have
argued that North Korea is using nuclear weapons primarily as a political tool to begin reestablishing normal relations with the U.S., Japan and South Korea, and to end the long-standing
economic embargo against North Korea.[citation needed] They point out that the threat of nuclear
weapons is the only thing that has brought the U.S., Japan and South Korea into serious
negotiations. In a lecture in 1993, Bruce Cumings asserted that based on information gathered by
the CIA, the activity around the Yongbyon facility may have been done expressly to draw the
attention of U.S. satellites. He also pointed out that the CIA had not claimed North Korea had
nuclear weapons, but that they had enough material to create such weapons should they choose to
do so. Others argue that North Korea is developing nuclear weapons for the same reason most
other countries develop themnamely to give their nation a sense of power in the world, enabling
them to further their goals without fear of reprisal.
Further to this argument is the observation that many parties have a vested interest in the claim that
North Korea has nuclear weapons. For North Korea, it has been a bargaining tool for opening
diplomatic discussions. The nuclear development programme can be manipulated in exchange for
foreign aid. Nuclear posturing has also been seen as a threat that could force the re-unification of
the Korean peninsula. The Grand National Party, currently the ruling party in South Korea, have
stated that they will not return to the Sunshine policy before North Korea gives up their nuclear
weapons. South Korean newspapers have warned that North Korea's nuclear arsenal could destroy
South Korea's conventional forces, and that the strategic military balance has irrevocably shifted in
the aftermath of North Korea's nuclear test. Finally, the threat of a nuclear-armed North Korea has
fed South Korea's perceived need for a larger standing army and defence force.
Some LDP politicians in Japan have openly expressed a desire to change Article 9 of the Japanese
Constitution, which prohibits the use of force as a tool for resolving international disputes. This
desire has become increasingly relevant given the ability of North Korea's Rodong-1 missile to strike

Tokyo, and it has gained increasing support as a result. Some estimates have claimed that as many
as 3 of the 200 Rodong-1 missiles currently deployed may be fitted with nuclear
warheads.[28] Further fears about North Korea's ability to generate weapons-grade fissile materials in
its projected civilian nuclear reactors have led to the consideration of the threat posed by the entire
Rodong-1 missile fleet being armed with nuclear warheads and targeted on the Japanese home
islands. (The missiles are able to cover 90% of Japanese territory. Moreover, their accuracy is so
poor that they are only valid delivery systems when targeted on very large military installations or
cities.)
Because it is impossible to be certain of shooting down every ballistic missile, it is preferable to
ensure that the weapons cannot be manufactured in the first place. An attack on a plutonium
production reactor, such as that carried out by the Israelis on the Iraqi reactor complex at Osirak
(Operation Opera), may prevent or delay later nuclear attacks, though such an act could be seen as
an act of war and subject to retaliation (albeit with conventional weaponry). Perhaps because of this
both the Clinton and Bush administrations did not attempt an attack on North Korean nuclear
facilities. Other avenues leading to the same result have failed: during the 2006 negotiations, North
Korea rejected the suggestion that it demolish its two larger reactors. American interest in the region
has waned, since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Bush administration in the United States has
made "terrorism" the focus of its foreign policy.[citation needed] Although the United States maintains a
force of 28,500 troops in South Korea (the second largest U.S. troop deployment in East Asia[29]), it
is likely that that deployment would be considerably decreased if the political situation changed
significantly in Korea, something expected to reduce U.S. influence in the region.
On March 17, 2007, North Korea told delegates at international nuclear talks that it is preparing to
shut down its main nuclear facility. The agreement was reached following a series ofsix-party talks,
involving North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, Japan and the U.S begun in 2003. According to
the agreement, a list of its nuclear programs will be submitted and the nuclear facility will be disabled
in exchange for fuel aid and normalization talks with the U.S. and Japan.[30] This had been delayed
from April due to a dispute with the United States overBanco Delta Asia, but on July 14, International
Atomic Energy Agency inspectors confirm the shutdown of North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear
reactor.[31]
North Korea's ability to fulfil its energy needs has been deteriorating since the 1990s. Although North
Korea's indigenous nuclear power-generating capacity is insignificant, the two light-water moderated
plants would be an important source of electricity in a nation with scant resources. Donald Rumsfeld
demonstrated the severe lack of electricity for the entire nation in a photograph released in October
2006.[32]

[edit]Reactivation

USGS image of the earthquake caused by the nuclear test.

During 2008 tensions resurfaced between North Korea and the U.S. due to disagreements over
the six-party talks disarmament process. According to one account, the talks began to break down
after the United States insisted on more intrusive verification measures than North Korea was
prepared to accept.[33] On October 8, 2008, IAEA inspectors were forbidden by the North Korean
government to conduct further inspections of the site. But two days later, the U.S. removed North
Korea from the U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism list and the Yongbyon deactivation process was
expected to resume.[34]
On April 25, 2009, however, the North Korean government announced that the country's nuclear
facilities have been reactivated,[35] and that spent fuel reprocessing for arms-grade plutonium has
been restored.[36]
On May 25, 2009, North Korea confirmed to have performed a "successful" underground nuclear
test. It was the second such test and it was said to be much more powerful than the first. The same
day a successful short range missile test was also conducted. The confirmation came little more
than an hour after the U.S. Geological Survey reported a magnitude 4.7 seismic disturbance on the
proximity of the site of North Korea's first nuclear test conducted in October 2006, other agencies
such as the International Data Center of the CTBTO, and the Japanese Meteorological Center, also
registered the seismic variations. North Korea's Korean Central News Agency said the test was
conducted as part of the measures to bolster up its nuclear deterrent for self-defense in every
way.[37]
[edit]Nuclear

fusion claims

In May 2010, the Rodong Sinmun announced in an article that North Korea had successfully carried
out a nuclear fusion reaction. The aforementioned article, referring to the alleged test as "a great
event that demonstrated the rapidly developing cutting-edge science and technology of the DPRK",
also makes mention of efforts by North Korean scientists to develop "safe and environment-friendly
new energy", and made no mention of plans to use fusion technology in its nuclear weapons
program.[38]
[edit]Biological

and chemical weapons

North Korea acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987, and the Geneva Protocol on
January 4, 1989, but has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. The country is believed to
possess a substantial arsenal of chemical weapons. It reportedly acquired the technology necessary
to produce tabun and mustard gas as early as the 1950s.[39]
[edit]Delivery

systems

See also: North Korean missile tests

[edit]History

The DPRK first received shipments of short-range ballistic missiles from its main ally, the Soviet
Union. The first weapons of this kind to be delivered were the tactical FROG-series, capable of
carrying either a conventional or WMD warhead for battlefield usage. Later the DPRK received
shipments of longer range Scud-B missiles from Egypt (which in turn received those missiles from
the USSR, Bulgaria and Poland). A local production basis was established, and the first modified
copy was named Hwasong-5. With time, more advanced types of missiles were developed.
Eventually North Korea equipped itself with ballistic missiles, capable of reaching Japan.
[edit]Testing
[edit]Early 2000s

North Korea's ability to deliver weapons of mass destruction to a hypothetical target is somewhat
limited by its missile technology. As of 2005, North Korea's total range with its No Dongmissiles is
1,400 km, enough to reach South Korea, Japan, and parts of Russia, and China, although they could
potentially reach islands in the Pacific Ocean such as the Northern Mariana Islands and possibly
even the state of Hawaii.
It is not known if this missile is actually capable of carrying the nuclear weapons North Korea has so
far developed. The BM-25 is a North Korean designed long-range ballistic missile with range
capabilities of up to 1,550 miles (2,490 km), and could carry a nuclear warhead.[40] North Korea has
also developed the Taepodong-1 missile, which has a range of 2,500 km, but it is not yet in full

deployment. With the development of the Taepodong-2 missile, with an expected range of 5,000
6,000 km,[41] North Korea could hypothetically deliver a warhead to almost all countries in Southeast
Asia, as well as the western side of North America.
The Taepodong-2 missile was unsuccessfully tested on July 4, 2006. U.S. intelligence estimates that
the weapon will not be operational for another 11 years. The Taepodong-2 could theoretically hit the
western United States and other US interests in the Western hemisphere. The current model of the
Taepodong-2 could not carry nuclear warheads to the United States. Former CIA director George
Tenet has claimed that, with a light payload, Taepodong-2 could reach western parts of Continental
United States, though with low accuracy.[citation needed]
In 2007 North Korea's Taepodong-X/Nodong-B Mobile Ballistic Missile (now named "Musdan
Missile") was deployed. This missile's design is based on the USSR's submarine launchedR-27 and
extended the fuel tank to the 20 ton loading limit of the MAZ-543 transporter erector launcher,[42] and
the estimated range is 30004000 km, which can strike Guam.[43][44]
[edit]2009

On April 5, 2009, North Korea launched the Unha-2 space booster (allegedly based on the longrange Taepodong-2). Although the launch was more successful than the 2006 test, the third stage
still failed to separate properly. A missile test or a satellite attempt, the launch still violates the UN
Security Council's decision. Because the Unha-2's first stage engine is the Musudan (Nodong-B /
Taepodong-X),[45] North Korea claims they have demonstrated the 4000 km range and reliability of
its new Musudan missile.
This means North Korea may be able to develop/deploy mobile ICBMs, which can survive a US first
strike, within 710 years.[46]
On July 2, 2009, North Korea test fired a series of at least four surface-to-ship cruise missiles into
the Sea of Japan (East Sea). Two days later, on July 4, they proceeded to test fire a further
seven Scud-type ballistic missiles into the same sea.[47] The tests are seen by world powers as a
symbol of defiance to the United Nations set over North Korea after their nuclear test on May 25,
2009.[48] These launches come only a week after US President Barack Obama extended US
economic sanctions against North Korea.[49] This is also a response to the UN's sanctions that were
imposed in June 2009, after Pyongyang's atomic test in May 2009, as well as the new UN resolution
that any nation can inspect a North Korean vessel that the investigating nation believes is carrying
weaponry.[49] It has been suggested that the test firing of missiles is an act of defiance against the
United States national holiday, Independence Day.[47]

Japan Ministry of Defense's analyst Takesada points out that North Korea's desire of unification is
similar to North Vietnam, and warns of the possibility of North Korea's compulsory merger with South
Korea by threats of nuclear weapons, taking advantage of any possible decrease in the US military
presence in South Korea, after North Korea deploys several hundred mobile ICBMs aimed at the
US.[50]
[edit]Aims
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adding references. Statements consisting only of original research may be removed. More details
may be available on the talk page. (May 2010)

These increases of missiles and nuclear tests may have dual purposes:

Internal: A source of prestige and legitimacy for the party and the leadership, affirming its power
before the coming succession, thus strengthening internal security. A successful missile, nuclear
and space program would also increase internal national pride and the international prestige of
the regime.

International: USA, Japan, and South Korea are possibly the main diplomatic targets for these
tests, but scholars[who?] also note that a resurgent China may be the ultimate diplomatic target.
North Korea's aim might also be to eventually get more assistance from all these countries, in
exchange for the reduction of missile and nuclear programs. This also secures a long term
security need: preventing undue Chinese influence.

However, the true aims of North Korea remain officially unstated, and therefore open to speculation.
[edit]Delivery

Systems

[edit]Successfully tested

KN-1 a short-range anti-ship cruise missile. Its range is estimated to be around 160 kilometers,
and most probably it's an improved version of the Soviet Termit missile (NATO codename
"Styx").

KN-2 Toksa a short-range, solid-fueled, highly accurate mobile missile, modified copy of the
Soviet OTR-21. Unknown number in service, apparently deployed either in the late 1990s or
early 2000s.

Hwasong-5 initial Scud modification. Road-mobile, liquid-fueled missile, with an estimated

range of 330 km. It has been tested successfully. It is believed that North Korea has deployed
some 150200 such missiles on mobile launchers.

Hwasong-6 later Scud modification. Similar to the Hwasong-5, yet with an increased range
(550700 km) and a smaller warhead (600750 kg). Apparently this is the most widely deployed
North Korean missile, with at least 400 missiles in use.

Nodong-1 larger and more advanced Scud modification. Liquid-fueled, road-mobile missile
with a 650 kg warhead. First production variants had inertial guidance, later variants
featured GPS guidance, which improves CEP accuracy to 190250 m.[51] Range is estimated to
be between 1,300 and 1,600 km.

Nodong-2 further improved variant of the Nodong-1, successfully tested in 2006. Range is
estimated at about 2,000 km.

Taepodong-1 two-stage Scud-derived missile. Has been tested with a satellite payload in
1998. The satellite failed, but the missile apparently flew without significant problems, therefore it
is North Korea's longest-ranged operational missile with its 2,500 km maximum range. According
to some analysts, the Taepodong-1 could have an intercontinental range of nearly 6,000 km with
a third stage and a payload of less than 100 kg.[52][53]

[edit]Not tested / failed tests

Musudan-1 a modified copy of the Soviet R-27 Zyb SLBM. No tests of this missile have ever
been made, but it is known to be operationally deployed. Most probably it is used as a first stage
to the Taepodong-2. The missile, also known under the names Nodong-B, Taepodong-X and
BM25, has a range of 4,000 kilometers.

Taepodong-2 North Korea's domestic ICBM attempt. First test occurred in 2006, when the
missile failed 40 seconds after launch. On April 5, 2009, a space booster variant was
launched with a satellite on board. As with in 1998, the satellite itself failed to reach orbit, but the
missile flew several thousand kilometers before falling in the Pacific Ocean. Estimates of the
range vary widely from 4,500 to 10,000 kilometers (most estimates put the range at about
6,700 km).

[edit]Exports

In April 2009 the United Nations named the Korea Mining and Development Trading Corporation
(aka KOMID) as North Korea's primary arms dealer and main exporter of equipment related to
ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. The UN lists KOMID as based in Central District
Pyongyang.[54] However it also has offices in Beijing and sales offices worldwide which facilitate
weapons sales and seek new customers for North Korean weapons.[55]
KOMID has sold missile technology to Iran[56] and has done deals for missile related technology with
the Taiwanese.[57] KOMID representatives were also involved in a North Korean deal to mass
produce Kornet anti-tank guided missiles for Syria[58] and KOMID has also been responsible for the

sale of equipment, including missile technologies, gunboats, and multiple rocket artilleries, worth a
total of over $100 million, to Africa, South America and the Middle East.[59]
North Korea's military has also used the company Hap Heng to sell weapons overseas. Hap Heng
was based in Macau in the 1990s to handle sales of weapons and missile and nuclear technology to
nations such as Pakistan and Iran. Pakistan's medium-range ballistic missile, the Ghauri, is
considered to be a copy of North Korea's Rodong 1. Even in 1999, intelligence sources said North
Korea had sold missile components to Iran.[60] Listed directors of Hap Heng include Kim Song In and
Ko Myong Hun.[61] Ko Myong Hun is now a listed diplomat in Beijing[62] and may be involved in the
work of KOMID.[63]
A UN sanctions committee report stated that North Korea operates an international smuggling
network for nuclear and ballistic missile technology, including to Burma, Syria, and Iran.[64]
[edit]Export partners

These are countries which allegedly operate North Korean ballistic missiles, allegedly bought such
or received assistance for establishing local production.
Pakistan
North Korean entities continued to provide assistance to Pakistan's ballistic missile program
during the first half of 1999. Such assistance is critical for Islamabad's efforts to produce
ballistic missiles. In April 1998, Pakistan flight-tested the Ghauri MRBM, which is based on
North Korea's Nodong missile. Also in April 1998, the US imposed sanctions against
Pakistani and North Korean entities for their role in transferring Missile Technology Control
Regime Category I ballistic missile-related technology.[65]
Cuba
No confirmed information for North Korea shipping Hwasong-6 missiles to Cuba.[66]
Egypt
Egypt has received technologies and assistance for making both the Hwasong-5 and
Hwasong-6, and may have as well provided guidance systems or information on longerrange missiles to North Korea from its Condor program.
Ethiopia
Unconfirmed information for possessing Hwasong-5 missiles.[67]
Iran
One of the first buyers of North Korean missiles. Iran has established local production for the
Hwasong-5 (Shahab-1), Hwasong-6 (Shahab-2) and the Rodong-1 (Shahab-3). Also

possesses some 18 land-based BM25 missiles.[68] North Korean weapons sales to Iran are
estimated to total $2 billion annually.[69]
Libya
Libya has been known to receive technological assistance, blueprints and missile parts from
North Korea.[70]
Nigeria
In January 2004, the Nigerian government announced that North Korea agreed to sell it
missile technology, but a month later Nigeria rejected the agreement under US pressure.[71]
Republic of the Congo
There is some (although unconfirmed) information, that the Republic of the Congo has
acquired Hwasong-5 missiles.[67]
Sudan
There is some information that Syria shipped some of its North Korean designed Scud
missiles to Sudan in 2004.[72]
Syria
Uses two types of North Korean missiles the Hwasong-6 and Rodong-1.[72]
United Arab Emirates
25 Hwasong-5s purchased from North Korea in 1989. The Military of the United Arab
Emirates were not satisfied with the quality of the missiles, and they were kept in storage.[73]
Vietnam
Acquired Hwasong-5/6 missiles in 1998.
Yemen
Known to have bought Hwasong-5 missiles from the DPRK in the 1990s a total of 15
missiles, 15 TELs with 15 HE warheads.[74]
[edit]See

also

Nuclear power in North

Korea

Foreign relations of North

Korea

North Korea United States

relations

[edit]

List of Korea-related topics