First, is the links.

The ideology of capitalism maintains relevancy through a promise of making life whole, by removing that
which stole our enjoyment. It shields us from the trauma of the Real with a promise of completeness, but
maintains desire through a continual denial of exactly what it promises. The 1AC only perpetuates
capitalist ideology by removing the Cuban embargo for a greater fulfillment in lifethe fact that more
people will be alive gives closure to them. Perpetuating this ideology allows for outside movements to be
subsumed by the capitalist machine and used as justifications for its perpetuation.

Daly 2k4 [Glin, Risking the Impossible, http://www.lacan.com/zizek-primer.htm]

Zizek has been concerned crucially to demonstrate the way in which ideology serves to support reality as a concrete fully integrated totality - reality cannot be reproduced without initial ideological mystification. Ideology does not

ideology attempts to do is provide a certain positive

consistency against the distorting and traumatizing effects of the Real[;] (Zizek, 1989: 45).All ideology presents reality
conceal or distort an underlying positivity (the way things really are), but quite the opposite. What

as a full ontological totality, and in this way tries to repress the traumatic fact that the latter is ultimately a delusion; it tries to eliminate all traces of (Real) impossibility (Zizek, 1989: 49). The exemplary figure here is that of the cynic.
The typical cynic is someone who is "pragmatic", who distances themselves from sincerely held beliefs, dismisses alternative visions of social existence as so much juvenile nonsense...and who, for all that, relies even more deeply on
some absolutist conception of an independent fully-formed reality.The cynic is the very model of an ideological subjectivity insofar as s/he is radically dependent on the idea of an externally ratified reality ("human nature", "the
way it is" etc.). What the cynic fears most is that they might lose the support of this independent (Other) reality and consequently their sense of "place" in the world. The cynic gets involved in a certain short-circuiting procedure that
is, in fact, generic to all ideological functioning: s/he is cynical towards every kind of ideological belief except his/her own fundamentalist belief in objectivist reality.The cynical attitude is more widely reflected in today's
predominant inclination towards "postmodern ironizing". The key philosopher is arguably R. Rorty. Rorty wants a world where individuals are free "to pursue private perfection in idiosyncratic ways" (Rorty, 1991: 19) and where the
public realm is restricted to minimal functions and is essentially aesthetic in orientation (Rorty, 1989: 125). For Rorty the central obligation is to be sceptical towards any projects of substantial social engagement for fear that it might
curtail individual pursuits of happiness and lead towards despotic forms of cruelty in the name of a higher (collective) Truth (see Daly, 1994). The basic inconsistency in Rorty's position is that "we" should exercise an ironic
distancing towards every socio-political project except the liberal one: the one true reality whose (private/public) structuring of social relations represents "the last conceptual revolution" (Rorty, 1989: 63) and effectively suspends
history.This is why so much of what passes for contemporary postmodern thought should be understood as strictly ideological in character. With all its ironic distancing, disavowals of the authentic gesture and so on, it relies even

a kind of preservation of the ontological dream through

of "we know very well that there is
no such thing as Reality[, as contentment,] but nonetheless we believe in it.So how does ideology deal with its
more heavily on the functioning of the existing order as if it were a naturalistic, or immaculate, Other -

symbolic mortification. In other words, it tends to involve the very form of ideological identification which is formulated along the lines

ideology attempts to reify [transforms the] impossibility [of

contentment] into some kind of external obstacle; to fantasmatically translate the impossibility of Society into the theft, or sabotage, of Society (see Daly, 1999). Transcendental
impossibility is projected into some contingent historicised Other (e.g. the figure of "the Jew" in Nazi ideology) in such a way that the lost/stolen
object (social harmony/purity) appears retrievable; an object which, of course, "we" have never possessed.
immanent impossibility, with the fact that it cannot deliver a fully integrated social order? Zizek's answer is that

By synonymizing the impossible-Real with a particular Other (Jews, Palestinians, Gypsies, immimgrants...), the fantasy of holistic fulfilment through the (imagined or otherwise) elimination/suppression of the Other is thereby
sustained.Zizek has recently given this perspective a further more radical twist. Thus ideology not only presents a certain ideal of holistic fulfilment (Plato's Republic of Reason, Habermas' transparent modernity, Rorty's liberal

ideology is that it advances a particular [the]fantasy of being

of total fulfilment) but with the built-in proviso that we do not come too close to it.

utopia, multiculturalist harmony and so on), it also serves crucially to regulate a certain distance from it. The paradox of

reconciled with the Thing (

The
psychoanalytic reason for this is clear: if you come too close to the Thing it either fragments irretrievably (like a digitally produced image) or, as in the Kantian sublime, produces unbearable anxiety and psychical disintegration.The
point is that ideology is always already engaged reflexively with its own impossibility. Impossibility is articulated through ideology and in such a way that it both structures reality and establishes the very sense of what is considered
possible. Here we have a double inscription. First there is the basic operation of translating impossibility into an external obstacle (an Other). But second, there is a further deeper stage whereby the ideological objective itself is
elevated to the status of impossibility precisely as a way of avoiding any direct encounter with it (see Zizek & Daly, 2003).Ideology seeks to maintain a critical distance by keeping the Thing in focus but without coming so close
that it begins to distort and fragment (see Daly, 1999: 235). The paradigmatic example is of someone who fantasises about an ideal object (a sexual scenario, a promotion, a public performance etc.) and when they actually
encounter the object they are typically confronted with a de-idealisation of the object; a return of the Real . By keeping the object at a certain distance, however, ideology sustains the satisfaction derived from the fantasy of holistic
fulfilment: "if only I had x I could achieve my dream". Ideology is the impossible dream not simply in terms of overcoming impossibility but of constructing the latter in an acceptable way; in a way that itself yields a certain

Ideology
regulates this fantasmatic distance as a way of avoiding the Real in the impossible - the trauma
involved in any real change.
satisfaction of both having and eating the cake. The idea of overcoming impossibility is subsists as a deferred moment of realisation but without having to go through the pain of overcoming as such.

AND
The shallow green capitalism of the aff in organic farming used to help profits, not the environment
Smith, Rutgers University professor, 11 Richard Smith has taught history at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, and has written on the
social and environmental impact of the transition to capitalism in China for the New Left Review, the Ecologist, and other
publications. (Green capitalism: the god that failed 2011 http://paecon.net/PAEReview/issue56/Smith56.pdf)

green capitalism

In rejecting the antigrowth approach of the first wave of environmentalists in the 1970s, pro-growth
theorists of the 1980s-90s like Paul Hawken, Lester
Brown, and Francis Cairncross argued that green technology, green taxes, eco-conscious shopping and the like could align profit-seeking with environmental goals, even invert many

has clearly failed. I claim

first, that the project of sustainable capitalism was misconceived and doomed from the start because
maximizing profit and saving the planet are inherently in conflict and cannot be systematically aligned even if,
here and there, they might coincide for a moment. Thats because under capitalism, CEOs and corporate boards are not responsible
to society, theyre responsible to private shareholders. CEOs can embrace environmentalism so long as
this increases profits. But saving the world requires that the pursuit of profits be systematically
fundamentals of business practice such that restoring the environment and making money become one and the same process. This strategy

subordinated to ecological concerns: For example, the science says that to save the

humans, we have to drastically cut fossil fuel consumption, even close

profitmaximization is an iron rule of capitalism, a rule that trumps all else, and this sets the limits to
ecological reform -- and not the other way around as green capitalism theorists supposed. Secondly, I claim that contrary to green capitalism proponents, across the spectrum
down industries like coal. But no corporate board can sacrifice earnings to save the humans because to do so would be to risk shareholder flight or worse. I claim that

from resource extraction to manufacturing, the practical possibilities for greening and dematerializing production are severely limited. This means, I contend, that the only way to
prevent overshoot and collapse is to enforce a massive economic contraction in the industrialized economies, retrenching production across a broad range of unnecessary, resource-hogging,
wasteful and polluting industries, even virtually shutting down the worst. Yet this option is foreclosed under capitalism because this is not socialism: no one is promising new jobs to
unemployed coal miners, oil-drillers, automakers, airline pilots, chemists, plastic junk makers, and others whose jobs would be lost because their industries would have to be retrenched -and unemployed workers dont pay taxes. So CEOs, workers, and governments find that they all need to maximize growth, overconsumption, even pollution, to destroy their childrens
tomorrows to hang onto their jobs today because, if they dont, the system falls into crisis, or worse. So were all onboard the TGV of ravenous and ever-growing plunder and pollution. And
as our locomotive races toward the cliff of ecological collapse, the only thoughts on the minds of our CEOS, capitalist economists, politicians and labor leaders is how to stoke the locomotive
to get us there faster. Corporations arent necessarily evil. They just cant help themselves. Theyre doing what theyre supposed to do for the benefit of their owners. But this means that

so long as the global economy is based on capitalist

doomed to collective social suicide and

private/corporate property and competitive

production

no amount of tinkering with the market can brake the drive to global

for market

, were

ecological collapse . We cant shop

our way to sustainability because the problems we face cannot be solved by individual choices in the marketplace. They require collective democratic control over the economy to prioritize
the needs of society and the environment. And they require national and international economic planning to re-organize the economy and redeploy labor and resources to these ends. I
conclude, therefore, that if humanity is to save itself, we have no choice but to overthrow capitalism and replace it with a democratically-planned socialist economy.

AND
Their appeal to Human rights subordinate everyone to the only people who count as human, a
determination made by global capital.
Moufawad-Paul, PhD in Philosophy,13,
(Josh, 4/10/13, M-L-M Mayhem!: Marxist-Leninist-Maoist reflections, Bourgeois Moralism, http://moufawad-paul.blogspot.com/2013/04/bourgeoismoralism.html, [Accessed 7/4/13], JB).
Of course, it is worth recognizing that Marx did tend to philosophically ground the necessity of socialism/communism upon the concept of a specific notion of human commonality. In the introduction to the Grundrisse, for
example, he distinguishes his approach from bourgeois political economy by declaring solidarity with the concept of the social rather than individual animal. Elsewhere, both Marx and Engels were wont to speak of socialism as

Marx understood this final

"humanization" as something that was only possible outside of a bourgeois humanism that
understands the bourgeois concept of "Man" (and here I am intentionally using the gendered concept because it really does speak to the ideology of bourgeois humanism
and was not a concept, in my opinion, accidentally chosen by bourgeois utopians) as being universal. And it is precisely this understanding of
humanity, which is one thoroughly compromised by a class society which can only speak of humanity
according to bourgeois rights, that is behind our "common sense" morality. We are drawn to a vague
humanitarian ethics because we glimpse the contradictions of bourgeois morality, because we see the
rational kernel behind its platitudes, but we are still caught up in its ideology: we see "rights" violated
being a humanization (or more properly "rehumanization") of society. And yet, as much as this is important on an abstract theoretical level, it is clear that

and we are enraged, we must be equally enraged when "the sanctity of life" of reactionaries are mocked by the victims of said reactionaries. We do not think of the necessities that can sling-shot us past this bourgeois humanism of

the current ideology of "common

humanity", where everyone must be murderously subordinated to the only people who count as
human, is actually standing in the way of the re/humanization proclaimed by Marx and Engels. We are troubled
by the notion that the expropriators must be expropriated in order for such a moment of commonality to actually exist; we want to believe that this commonality can already be understood and that,
in order to be truly moral, we have to equivocate between the rights of the oppressed and the rights
of the oppressors But between equal rights, as Marx pointed out in the first volume of Capital, greater force decides.
equal rights. We do not often grasp what it might mean to struggle for a deeper concept of humanization because we cannot recognize that

SECOND ARE THE IMPACTS,

Capitalism anonymizes the very conditions of its victims. The systematic approval of capitalism
allows us to see the politically oppressed body of the impoverished lowest class and the struggles it
faces as a fiction. Theyre trapped but nobody cares.

Zizek 08

- senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology University of Ljubljana (Slavoj, Violence, 2008, p. 44-46, CH)

there is hypocrisy in tolerating the abstractanonymous killing of thousands, while condemning individual cases of the violation of human[s]
Harris violates his own rules when he focuses on September 11, and in his critique of Chomsky. Chomsky's point is precisely that

] rights.

Why should Kissinger, when he ordered the carpet bombing of Cambodia that led to the deaths of tens of thousands, be less of a criminal than those responsible for the Twin Towers collapse? Is it not because

"ethical illusion
the proximity (of the tortured subject)

we are victims of an

"? The horror of September 11 was presented in detail in the media, but al-Jazeera TV was condemned for showing shots of the results of U.S. bombing in Fallujah and condemned for complicity with the terrorist s. There is, however, a much

more disquieting prospect at work here:

which causes sympathy and makes torture unacceptable is not the victim's mere physical proximity but, at its most fundamental, the

proximity of the Neighbour, with all the Judeo-Christian-Freudian weight of this term, the proximity of the thing which, no matter how far away it is physically, is always by definition "too close." What Harris is aiming at with his imagined "truth pill" is nothing less than the abolition of the

[makes the] tortured subject no longer a Neighbour, but an object whose pain is
neutralised, reduced to a property
dealt with in a rational utilitarian calculus
dimension of the Neighbour. The

is

that has to be

(so much pain is tolerable if it prevents a much

greater amount of pain). What disappears here is the abyss of the infinity that pertains to a subject. It is thus significant that the book which argues for torture is also a book entitled The End of Faith-not in the obvious sense of, "You see, it is only our belief in God, the divine injunction to love

[if]the subject
is
, an
object of belief-how can I ever be sure that what I see in front of me is another subject, not a flat
biological machine lacking depth?
your neighbour, that ultimately prevents us from torturing people!," but in a much more radical sense. Another subject (and ultimately

as such)

for Lacan not something directly given, but a "presupposition," something presumed

AND
Capitalism is the root cause of the ontological damnation of the black body; the affs refusal to accept
it supports capitalism
Young, professor of English at the University of Alabama, 6Dr. Robert M was a professor of English in the College of Arts and
Sciences at the University of Alabama. He passed away in 2010. (Putting Materialism back into Race Theory:
Toward a Transformative Theory of Race http://www.redcritique.org/WinterSpring2006/puttingmaterialismbackintoracetheory.htm)
Indeed, the

discourse of the subject operates as an ideological strategy for fetishizing the black
experience and, consequently, it positions black subjectivity beyond the reach of Marxism. For example, in The
Afrocentric Idea, Asante dismisses Marxism because it is Eurocentric; but are the core concepts of Marxism, such as class and mode of production, relevant only for
European social formations? Are African and African American social histories/relations unshaped by class structures? Asante assumes that class hierarchies do not
structure African or the African American social experiences, and this reveals the class politics of Afrocentricity: It makes class invisible. Asantes

assumption, which erases materialism, enables Asante to offer the idealist formulation that the word
creates reality (Afrocentric Idea 70). The political translation of such idealism is, not surprisingly, very conservative. Asante directs us away
from critiquing capitalist institutions, in a manner similar to the ideological protocol of the Million Man March, and calls for
vigilance against symbolic oppression. As Asante tellingly puts it, symbol imperialism, rather than institutional racism, is the major social
problem facing multicultural societies (Afrocentric Idea 56). In the realm of African American philosophy, Howard McGary Jr. also
deploys the discourse of the (black) subject to mark the limits of Marxism. For instance, in a recent interview, McGary
offers this humanist rejection of Marxism: I dont think that the levels of alienation experienced by Black people are rooted primarily in economic relations
(Interview 90). For McGary, black alienation exceeds the logic of Marxist theory and thus McGarys idealist assertion that
the sense of alienation experienced by Black people in the U.S. is also rooted in the whole idea of what it means to be a human being and how that has to be
understood (Interview 90). McGary

confuses causes and effects and then misreads Marxism as a descriptive

modality. Marxism is not as concerned with descriptive accounts, the effects, as it is with explanatory
accounts; that is, it is concerned with the cause of social alienation because such an explanatory account acts as
a guide for praxis.

Social alienation is a historical effect, and its explanation and such and explanation emerges from the transpersonal space of concepts.

In theorizing the specificity of black alienation, McGary reveals his contradictory ideological coordinates. First, he argues that black alienation results from cultural
beliefs. Then, he suggests that these cultural norms and practices develop from slavery and Jim Crow, which are fundamentally economic relations for the
historically specific exploitation of black people. If these cultural norms endogenously emerge from the economic systems of slavery and Jim Crow, as McGary
correctly suggests, then and contrary to McGarys expressed position,

black alienation is very much rooted in economic relations.

McGarys desire to place black subjectivity beyond Marxism creates contradictions in his text. McGary
asserts that the economic structures of slavery and Jim Crow shape cultural norms. Thus, in a postslavery, post-Jim Crow era, there
would still be an economic structure maintaining contemporary oppressive normsfrom McGarys logic this must
be the case. McGary remains silent, however, on the contemporary economic system structuring black alienation:
capitalism. Apparently, it is legitimate to foreground and critique the historical connection between economics and alienation but any inquiry into the
present-day connection between economics and alienation is off limits. This other economic structure
McGarys

discourse, and consequently

McGary

capitalismremains

the

unsaid in

provides ideological support for capitalism the exploitative infrastructure that

produces and maintains alienation for blacks as well as for all working people.

The alternative is to vote negative to symbolize a withdrawl from the logic of capital completely.
Johnston 4, Ph.D. @State University of New York; assistant professor in psychology; fellow of psychoanalysis @ Emory (Arian, The Cynics Fetish: Slavoj
Zizek And The Dynamics Of Belief Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society Vol. 9 Issue 3 2004 Proquest pg. 275
proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdlink?vinst=PROD&fmt=6&startpage=1&vname=PQD&RQT=309&did=750350871&scaling=FULL&vtype=PQD&rqt=309&cfc=1&TS=1340383759&clientId=17822)//JES//jc
In later texts, Zizek faults his earlier work for having fallen into the trap of treating the Real as a kind of Kantian noumenality, namely, as an
inaccessible dimension that invisibly-yet-inexorably disrupts the other registers of human reality. Speaking of The Sublime Object of Ideology (his first book in
English), he claims that its philosophical weakness is that, it basically endorses a quasi-transcendental reading of Lacan, focused

on the notion
of the Real as the impossible Thing-in-itself; in so doing, it opens the way to the celebration of failure:
to the idea that every act ultimately misfires, and that the proper ethical stance is heroically to accept
this failure (Zizek, 2002b, p xii). The word act is crucial here, since it designates that which Zizek relies upon so as to avoid the resigned pessimism
coloring much of Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis one doesnt have to accept the Real as a negative limit cordoning off
an impossible beyond that must simply be observed and respected as such; one doesnt have to
concede that the subject is always and ultimately a dysfunctional slave to the past, the id, the
symbolic order, the drives, the libidinal economy, and so on, given that radical breaks with all these
overdetermining factors are possible. Through a perhaps excessive emphasis on an underdeveloped Lacanian concept, Zizek allows himself
to sustain a sort of cynical distance from the present state of the capitalist situation. According to Zizek, an Act is an intervention that
makes the impossible happen by virtue of rewriting the very rules concerning what is and isnt
possible in a given reality. With this caveat in place, he can, at one and the same time, stress the impoverishment of the ideological imagination
and the bankruptcy of traditional Marxist political programs he can acknowledge that extant scenarios for displacing capitalism are impossibilities while
nonetheless continuing to refuse/disavow this awareness of a stifling contemporary closure (because, as he declares, the impossible happens). This

would go a long way towards explaining what Sarah Kay, in her introductory overview of Zizeks
corpus, highlights as a striking combination of optimism and pessimism in Zizekian political thought,
namely, pessimism about the situation as it is, optimism that it could be transformed (Kay, 2003, p 154)
what Kay fails to note is that this striking combination of optimism and pessimism might very well indicate, in a symptomatic fashion, the effective presence
of something along the lines of an unacknowledged fetishistic split. As long

as one continues to criticize capitalism (properly

using the tried-and-true resources of a purely negative-critical Marxism) during the indefinitely long
period of waiting for the occurrence of the impossible Act-miracle, one is free to be a non-believer in
the capitalist system, leaving belief to, among others, those nave adherents of the third way (perhaps playing the part of Zizeks subjects
supposed to believe). Isnt there a genuine danger that this particular combination of Marx (qua mere critic of capitalism) and Lacan (qua thinker of the Act)
could itself serve as a theoretical fetish-object in Zizeks own precise sense, sustaining a version of the stance of I know full well, but nonethelessy?

Status quo modes of thought only serve to legitimize the system. Policy making taints our ideology so
the perm cant solve.
Zizek and Daly 041
our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive
capitalism and its obscene naturalization / anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it
throughout the world. *+ *Full text available+ In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize[s] capitalism by presenting its
outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgment in a neutral market
place. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the
human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded life-chances cannot be calculated
within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and
nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the developing world). And Zizeks point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalisms profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or
For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that
violence of todays global

misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation.

Slavoj Zizek and Glyn Daly, Conversations with Zizek, 2004 page 14-16

And, policy options that actively negate the capitalist mindset only arise after
we orient ourselves towards an ethic that emphasizes avoiding otherization. Reorientation comes before effective policy making so the K is a prior question.
Herod 4 (James, renowned philosopher, author, and social activist, Getting Free, http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman_g/Strate/GetFre/06.htm)
a strategy for destroying capitalism. At its most basic, this strategy calls
for pulling time, energy, and resources out of capitalist civilization and putting them into building a
new civilization. The image, then, is one of emptying out capitalist structures, hollowing them out, by
draining wealth, power, and meaning from them until there is nothing left but shells. This is definitely an
aggressive strategy. It requires great militancy and constitutes an attack on the existing order. The strategy clearly recognizes that
capitalism is the enemy and must be destroyed, but it is not a frontal attack aimed at overthrowing
the system; it is an inside attack aimed at gutting it, while simultaneously replacing it with something better, something we want.
Thus, capitalist structures (corporations, governments, banks, schools, etc.) are not seized so much as simply abandoned.
Capitalist relations are not fought so much as they are simply rejected. We stop participating in
activities that support (finance, condone) the capitalist world and start participating in activities that build a
new world while simultaneously undermining the old. We create a new pattern of social relations alongside capitalist ones, and
It is time to try to describe, at first abstractly and later concretely,

then continually build and strengthen our new pattern while doing everything we can to weaken capitalist relations. In this way our new democratic,
nonhierarchical, noncommodified relations can eventually overwhelm the capitalist re- lations and force them out of existence. This is how it has to be done. This

is a plausible, realistic strategy. To think that we could create a whole new world of decent social
arrangements overnight, in the midst of a crisis, during a so-called revolution or the collapse of
capitalism, is foolhardy. Our new social world must grow within the old, and in opposition to it, until it
is strong enough to dismantle and abolish capitalist relations. Such a revolution will never happen
automatically, blindly, determinably, because of the inexorable materialist laws of history. It will happen, and only happen, because we want it to, and because we
know what were doing and how we want to live, what obstacles have to be over- come before we can live that way, and how to distinguish between our social
patterns and theirs. But

we must not think that the capitalist world can simply be ignored, in a live-and-let-live attitude,
while we try to build new lives elsewhere. (As mentioned earlier, there is no elsewhere.) There is at least one thing, wage
slavery, that we cant simply stop participating in (but even here there are ways we can chip away at it). Capitalism must be explicitly refused and replaced by
something else. This constitutes war, but it

is not a war in the traditional sense of armies and tanks; it is a war fought
on a daily basis, on the level of everyday life, by millions of people. It is a war nevertheless because the accumulators of
capital will use coercion, brutality, and murder, as they have always done in the past, to try to block
any rejection of the system. They have always had to force compliance; they will not hesitate to
continue to do so. Still, there are many concrete ways that individuals, groups, and neighborhoods can gut capitalism, which I will enumerate shortly. We
must always keep in mind how we became slaves; then we can see more clearly how we can cease being slaves. We were forced into wage slavery because the
ruling class slowly, systematically, and brutally destroyed our ability to live autonomously. By driving us off the land, changing the property laws, dismantling
community rights, destroying our tools, imposing taxes, gutting our local markets, and so forth, we were forced onto the labor market in order to survive, our only
remaining option being to sell our ability to work for a wage. Its quite clear, then, how we can overthrow slavery: we must re- verse this process. We must begin to
reacquire the ability to live with- out working for a wage or buying the products made by wage slaves (that is, we must free ourselves from the labor market and the
way of living based on it), and embed ourselves instead in cooperative labor and cooperatively produced goods. Another clarification is needed. This

strategy does not call for re- forming capitalism, for changing capitalism into something else. It calls
for totally replacing capitalism with a new civilization. This is an important distinction because capitalism has proved impervious to
re- forms as a system. We can sometimes, in some places, win certain concessions from it (usually only temporary ones) and some
(usually short-lived) improvements in our lives as its victims, but we cannot reform it piecemeal. Hence, our strategy of
gutting and eventually destroying capital- ism requires at a minimum a totalizing image, an awareness that we are
attacking an entire way of life and replacing it with another, and not merely reforming one way of life
into something else. Many people may not be accustomed to thinking about entire systems and social orders, but everyone knows what a lifestyle is, or
a way of life, and that is the way we should approach it.

AND
Ignore all their offense its just corporate propaganda in order to crush sustainability Ikerd, Professor
Emeritus of Agricultural & Applied Economics University of Missouri Columbia, 2006
(John Ikerd, Professor Emeritus of Agricultural & Applied Economics University of Missouri Columbia, 2006, University of Missouri, The
Economics of Hunger: Challenges and Opportunities for Future Food Systems , http://web.missouri.edu/ikerdj/papers/Eastern%20Oregon%20Econ%20Hunger.htm, accessed 7-9-13, JF)
Unfortunately, the importance of social and ethical values in sustainability has become lost in the media hype about organic and locally produced foods. The

sustainable food culture is often portrayed as an elitist movement, inaccessible to the poor and a
threat to the hungry. Corporate propaganda suggests that a transition to sustainable or organic
agriculture would result in starvation for half of the worlds population, would increase soil erosion, deplete soil productivity, and require
clearing and cultivation of vast forests and rangelands, which are now home for many of the worlds poor and hungry. Genetically engineered, high-input, highyielding crops and livestock are touted as the new industrial solution to world hunger. However, nothing

in this propaganda actually

challenges the true principles of either sustainable agriculture or industrial agriculture. Research around the world
has shown[s] that organic and low-input sustainable agriculture can be just as high yielding as highinput industrial agriculture.[4],[5] Sustainable agriculture simply requires more thinking people who
understand how to work with nature, rather than try to conquer nature, and who care about their land
and their neighbors. Research has also shown that sustainable agriculture actually reduces erosion,
because of the use of crop rotations, cover crops, and other sustainable practices. In addition, sustainable
agriculture enhances soil quality, because it relies on the natural productivity of the soil rather than commercial fertilizers. Also, sustainable
agriculture is site and location specific, adapting farming systems to natural bioregions, rather than
clearing land and leveling land to facilitate mechanization and thus preserves natural habitats of both
people and wildlife. Sustainable agriculture respects nature, including natural connections between
people and places.

FINALLY IS IMPACT FRAMING

The ks otherization impacts come before theirs and turn the case for 3 reasons
A) destroys the capacity to ground a fixed understanding of the moral subject. Before any ethical theory
creates a maxim that a moral agent ought to do x, it must have a grounding of what the moral agent
consists of. Otherization creates an inconsistency in the way we conceptualize of the moral subject by
arbitrarily conditioning the standard of what constitutes a moral agent. I.e, if you are a means to capital
your concerns are not morally relevant and thus you are not a moral subject. This destroys the basis of
positing any ethical maxim since the moral subject is itself an unfixed concept.
B) Skews the epistemic starting point of any ethical theory. Their knowledge production is reliant on
epistemologies that actively exclude and objectify individuals. The point of ethics is to motivate agents
to act in the right way, the way that respects other individuals as moral agents and does not wrong
them. Pointing out an assumption in their logic that justifies exactly what ethics tries to stop means the
implications drawn from the ethic arent real since their foundation is flawed.

C) Value to life precedes every other ethical consideration. In order for humans to value anything as
good they must first value themselves. Hill writes,2

The second argument is roughly this:

Most valuable things have value

[']

only

because

valued [sic] by human beings. Their value is derivative

from the fact that

they serve our interests and desires. Even pleasure, which we value for its own sake,
value

dependent on the

contingent

fact that human beings want it.

must themselves have value.

create.

In fact, they must have value

independent of

has only derivative value, that

Now if valuers confer derivative value on things by their preferences and choices, those

and superior to,

is,

valuers

the derivative values which they

The guiding analogy is how we treat ends. We value certain means because they serve intermediate ends, which in turn we value because they contribute to our ultimate ends, that is, what we value for its own sake. The value of the means and the

intermediate means is derivative from the value of the ultimate ends; unless we value the ultimate end, the means and intermediate ends would be worthless to us. So, it seems, the source of derivative value must be

valuable for its own sake. Since the ultimate source

of the value of our contingent ends, such as health, wealth, and even pleasure, is their being valued by human beings, human beings, as valuers, must be valued for their own sakes.

2Thomas

Hill, Jr. Self-regarding suicide: A modified Kantian view, in Autonomy and Self-Respect, Cambridge
University Press, 1991, 101-102.