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Today'sPaperOPINION

Theentrepreneursofviolence
VasundharaSirnate

OnDecember16,2014,145people,including132children,wereexecutedbytheTehrikeTalibanPakistan(TTP)ina
terroristattackonanArmyPublicSchoolinPeshawar.[Thetollisnow150.]Whencornered,thesevenmilitantsblew
themselvesupfiveinsidetheschoolandtwooutside.LateraTTPspokesperson,Mohd.OmarKhorasani,saidthatthe
attackwasretributionforthePakistanigovernmentscounterinsurgencyoperationsinNorthWaziristan,whichhad
targetedour[Talibans]familiesandfemales.
OperationZarbeAzbisamassivecounterinsurgencyoperationthatwaslaunchedbythePakistaniArmyinJune2014
towipeouttheTalibanfromNorthWaziristanaweekaftertheTTPsattackonJinnahInternationalAirportin
Karachi,whichkilledover36peopleincludingtheattackers.Itinvolves30,000men,armouredbattalions,airsupport
anddrones.TheoperationcameinthewakeofrepeatedfailureoftalksbetweentheTalibanandthePakistan
government.WiththePakistangovernmentfeelingasiftheTalibanwasdodgingthetalksbysendingTTP
sympathisersandnotactualTTPranks,theairportattackwasthelaststraw.BetweenJuneandDecember,
approximately1,200reportedinsurgentshavebeenkilledintheregionandapproximatelyamillioncivilianshavebeen
displaced.
Fightingforspace
TounderstandtheTTPattackinPeshawar,weneedtofirstunderstandthestructureoftheTTP.Itisanumbrella
organisationofatleast13groupsstartedin2007byBaitullahMehsud.Lastyear,theleadershipoftheTTPcameto
MaulanaFazlullah,alsocalledtheFM[radio]Mullah,amanwhohasviolentlyopposededucationforchildren,most
clearlyevincedinhisinstructionsfortheshootingofMalalaYousafzai.WhenFazlullahassumedtheTTPsleadership,
foursplintergroupsemerged(alongsidethepreexistingTTPPunjab)theAhrarulHind(February2014),theTTP
SouthWaziristan(May2014),theTTPJamaatulAhrar(August2014),andtheTTPSajna(May2014).Thegroups
emergedbecauseofsharpdifferencesoninsurgentstrategybetweenFazlullahandothercompetinginsurgentchiefs
withintheTTP,includingtheremainingmembersoftheMehsudclan.
Whentherearecompetinginsurgentgroups,withveryfewideologicalandoperationaldifferencesoperatinginthe
samepieceofterritory,thingsbecomecomplicated.Essentiallythesegroupslooklikesimilarproducts.Often,proving
yourmettleasaninsurgentgroupandestablishingdominancemeansundertakingthemostdaring,riskyattacksand
gettingahigherdeathcount.Itmeansbeingasentrepreneurialatviolenceaspossible.So,tounderstandthePeshawar
attackweneedtofocusonthefollowingfactors.
Counterinsurgency
First,asIhavealreadydescribed,competitionbetweeninsurgentgroupsfordominanceinonepieceofterritory,leads
tohigherlevelsofviolence.Memorable(notinagoodway)violenceofthetypeundertakenbytheTTPservesthe
purposeofhelpingthegroupdevelopabrandidentity,i.e.,itiseasilydistinguishablefromothersimilarlooking
groups.HavinganeasilydistinguishableidentityfromapoolofsimilargroupsallowstheTTPtohaveanupperhand
whileamassingrecruits.So,insurgentstrategyandideologyhelpsinbrandingandbandingforaninsurgentgroup.
Second,wecannotlookattheTTPsactionsinisolation.Counterinsurgency,bydefinition,isbasedonforceasadefault
strategy.However,whendealswithinsurgentsfail,thestatestendencytouseforcebecomesmorepronouncedandin
someways,isseenasmorelegitimatebystateactors.However,counterinsurgencyalsodislocatesentirepopulations,
who,ifnotadequatelyresettledandpoliced,serveasnewrecruitinggroundsforinsurgentgroups.The
counterinsurgencyoperationsinNorthWaziristanhavebeenswift,sustainedandbrutal.WithranksoftheTTPwiped
outandtheoutfitsplintering,thePeshawarattacksneedtobeseenastheTTPswayofreassertingmilitarydominance
andterritorialcontrolonly,theyshiftedthetarget.Insteadofahardmilitarytarget,asofttargetwaspicked.Further,
inastrategycalculatedtoincitethePakistanimilitaryandhitwhereithurtsthemmost,familiesofArmymenwere
targeted.
Third,whatistellingisthat,overall,thecounterinsurgencyoperationshavebeeneffectiveintermsofputtingtheTTP
outofcommissiontotheextentthattheycurrentlyfinditdifficulttoattackahardmilitarytarget.
Fourth,typicallywhencounterinsurgencyoperationsareonthevergeofdestroyinganinsurgentgroupandareheavily
coercive,theinsurgentgroupasksfortalksoraceasefire.Acessationofhostilitiesallowsforbothsidestoregroup,
rearm,recruit,andmovemen,moneyandmaterialsaround.Thisismoreimportantforinsurgentgroupsthanthestate
becausethestatedoesnotimmediatelyneedthebreathingroomasmuchastheinsurgentgroupsdo.Thereisno
indicationthattheTTPaskedforthisbreathingroomorevenifithadasked,thereisnothingtosuggestthePakistani
Armywouldobligeit.
Roleofideology
Whenagroupbecomesintricatelyboundtoitsownideologythereisverylittlewiggleroomleftforthatgroup
strategically.Thisisbecauseforaninsurgentgrouptohaveanylocalcredibility,thegroupsstrategyneedstobe
commensuratewithitsideology.TheTTPsideologybindsittoaregressiveideal,forsure,butitalsodoesnotlend
itselfwelltonegotiationandpactingasastrategy.Tonegotiateistoloseface.WithpreviousTTPleaderssometalks

werepossible.However,withFazlullah,givenhistrackrecord,thisseemsunlikely.Fazlullah,whowastheleaderofthe
SwatTTPandanimmenselysuccessfulmilitant(bystandardsofmilitancy),hadusedaceasefireperiodin2009to
establishlegalandcoercivecontrolover59villagesinSwatvalley.
Hisstrategyhasbeensimple.WhateverpolicythePakistangovernmentattempts,decryit,stopit,attackit.So,hehas,
forinstance,opposedeverythingfromwomenseducationtopoliovaccinesbycallingthesewesternimplantsthat
donotbelonginPakistanisociety,whichmustbegovernedbyfullsharia.Inmanyways,ifFazlullahistheonewho
pickedtheArmyPublicSchoolinPeshawarasthetarget,itfallsinlinewithhisthinking.InbothIndiaandPakistan,
theArmyisoneofthefewmoderninstitutionswheremilitaryranksmattermorethanentrenchedfeudalhierarchies.
TheArmyalsohangsontocolonialtraditionsbecausemanyregimentsweresetupduringtheBritishRaj.These
colonialtraditionshaveincasesbecomeregimentaltraditions.Finally,theArmyrunsschoolstofacilitatepersonnel
transferswithoutcosttothefamily.Manycivilianschoolsrefusetotakeadmissionsinmidsession.Foraserving
soldierwhoistransferredinmidsession,theeasiestsolutionistoshifthischildfromoneArmyschooltoanother.
ArmyschoolstypicallyimparteducationinEnglishandinsistonmoderncodesofdressforstudents.Betweenthefact
thattheschoolwasrunbytheArmyandthatfamiliesofArmypersonnelwereinthere,and,thefactthattheschoolby
itsmereexistencewasasymbolofatypeofeducation,whichisatoddswithwhattheTalibanteaches,theschoolsfate
wassealed.
Theonlyoutcomethatcanbeguaranteedatthispointisthatcounterinsurgencyoperationswillnotceaseagainstthe
TTP,neitherwillthefocusbedeflectedtoothermatters.ThishasbeenmadeclearbythePakistaniArmychief,General
RaheelSharif,andbymostofthepoliticalestablishment.IfthePakistangovernmentweretothinkcarefullyaboutthis
process,alongsidecoercivecounterinsurgencytheywouldalsoopendialogueswiththemoreapproachableand
perhapsmoderateTalibansplintergroupsthosethatdonotacceptFazlullahastheiramirorchiefandhave
deviatedsufficientlyfromconventionalTalibanideologytonotbeconstrainedifitcomestomeaningfuldialogue.
(VasundharaSirnateistheChiefCoordinatorofResearchatTheHinduCentreforPoliticsandPublicPolicy.)
TheTTPsideologybindsittoaregressiveideal,butitalsodoesnotlenditselfwelltonegotiation
andpactingasastrategy.Tonegotiateistoloseface.
UnderstandingtheTTPattackinPeshawarwouldinvolvelookingatthegroupsstructure,therole
ofideologyandtheimpactofPakistanscounterinsurgencyoperations

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