Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP

Committee
on
Bar
Discipline or CBD) of committing the following violations of the provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

CONRADO QUE,

A.C. No. 7054

Complainant,

versus

PUNO, C J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR.

Respondent.

Promulgated:
December 4, 2009

x ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ x

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In a complaint for disbarment,[1] Conrado Que (complainant) accused Atty.
Anastacio Revilla, Jr. (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the

(1) The respondents abuse of court remedies and processes by

filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
(CA), two petitions for annulment of title before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for annulment of
judgment before the RTC and lastly, a petition for
declaratory relief before the RTC (collectively, subject
cases) to assail and overturn the final judgments of the
Metropolitan Trial Court[2] (MeTC) and RTC[3] in the
unlawful detainer case rendered against the respondents
clients. The respondent in this regard, repeatedly raised the
issue of lack of jurisdiction by the MeTC and RTC knowing
fully-well that these courts have jurisdiction over the
unlawful detainer case. The respondent also repeatedly
attacked the complainants and his siblings titles over the
property subject of the unlawful detainer case;
(2) The respondents commission of forum-shopping by filing the
subject cases in order to impede, obstruct, and frustrate the
efficient administration of justice for his own personal gain
and to defeat the right of the complainant and his siblings to
execute the MeTC and RTC judgments in the unlawful
detainer case;
(3) The respondents lack of candor and respect towards his
adversary and the courts by resorting to falsehood and
deception to misguide, obstruct and impede the due
administration of justice. The respondent asserted falsehood
in the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the
petition for annulment of judgment by fabricating an
imaginary order issued by the presiding judge in open court
which allegedly denied the motion to dismiss filed by the
respondents in the said case. The complainant alleged that
the respondent did this to cover up his lack of preparation;
the respondent also deceived his clients (who were all
squatters) in supporting the above falsehood.[4]
(4) The respondents willful and revolting falsehood that unjustly
maligned and defamed the good name and reputation of the
late Atty. Alfredo Catolico (Atty. Catolico), the previous
counsel of the respondents clients.

(5) The respondents deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized

appearances in court in the petition for annulment of
judgment for 15 litigants, three of whom are already
deceased;
(6) The respondents willful and fraudulent appearance in the
second petition for annulment of title as counsel for the
Republic of the Philippines without being authorized to do
so.

Additionally, the complaint accused the respondent of representing fiftytwo (52) litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 when no such authority was ever
given to him.
The CBD required the respondent to answer the complaint.
In his Answer,[5] the respondent declared that he is a member of the
Kalayaan Development Cooperative (KDC) that handles pro bono cases for the
underprivileged, the less fortunate, the homeless and those in the marginalized
sector in Metro Manila. He agreed to take over the cases formerly handled by other
KDC members. One of these cases was the unlawful detainer case handled by the
late Atty. Catolico where the complainant and his siblings were the plaintiffs
and the respondents present clients were the defendants.
With respect to paragraph 1 of the disbarment complaint, the respondent
professed his sincerity, honesty and good faith in filing the petitions complained of;
he filed these petitions to protect the interests of his clients in their property. The
respondent asserted that these petitions were all based on valid grounds the lack
of jurisdiction of the MeTC and the RTC over the underlying unlawful detainer
case, the extrinsic fraud committed by the late Atty. Catolico, and the extrinsic
fraud committed by the complainant and his family against his clients; he
discovered that the allegedly detained property did not really belong to the
complainant and his family but is a forest land. The respondent also asserted that his
resort to a petition for annulment of judgment and a petition for declaratory relief to
contest the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC were all parts of his legal strategy
to protect the interests of his clients.
On the allegations of falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment (covered by paragraph
3 of the disbarment complaint), the respondent maintained that his allegations were
based on his observations and the notes he had taken during the proceedings on what
the presiding judge dictated in open court.

The respondent denied that he had made any unauthorized appearance in court
(with respect to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the disbarment complaint). He claimed that
the 52 litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 were impleaded by inadvertence; he
immediately rectified his error by dropping them from the case. On the petition for
annulment of judgment, the respondent claimed that a majority (31 out of 49) of the
litigants who signed the certification constituted sufficient compliance with the rules
on forum-shopping. The respondent likewise denied having represented the
Republic of the Philippines in the second petition for annulment of title. The
respondent pointed out that there was no allegation whatsoever that he was the sole
representative of both the complainants (his clients) and the Republic of
the Philippines. The respondent pointed out that the petition embodied a request to
the Office of the Solicitor General to represent his clients in the case. [6]
The respondent submitted that he did not commit any illegal, unlawful,
unjust, wrongful or immoral acts towards the complainant and his siblings. He
stressed that he acted in good faith in his dealings with them and his conduct was
consistent with his sworn duty as a lawyer to uphold justice and the law and to
defend the interests of his clients. The respondent additionally claimed that the
disbarment case was filed because the complainants counsel, Atty. Cesar P. Uy
(Atty. Uy), had an axe to grind against him.
Lastly, the respondent posited in his pleadings[7] before the IBP that the
present complaint violated the rule on forum shopping considering that the subject
cases were also the ones on which a complaint was filed against him in CBD Case
No. 03-1099 filed by Atty. Uy before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. The
respondent also posited that the present complaint was filed to harass, ridicule and
defame his good name and reputation and, indirectly, to harass his clients who are
marginalized members of the KDC.
The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner
Except for the last charge of unauthorized appearance on behalf of 52
litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762, Investigating Commissioner Renato G.
Cunanan[8] (Investigating Commissioner Cunanan) found all the charges against the
respondent meritorious. In his Report and Recommendation, he stated:
While an attorney admittedly has the solemn duty to
defend and protect the cause and rights of his client with all the
fervor and energy within his command, yet, it is equally true that
it is the primary duty of the lawyer to defend the dignity,
authority and majesty of the law and the courts which enforce it.
A lawyer is not at liberty to maintain and defend the cause of his
clients thru means, inconsistent with truth and honor. He may
not and must not encourage multiplicity of suits or brazenly
engage in forum-shopping.[9]

On the first charge on abuse of court processes, Investigating

Commissioner Cunanan noted the unnecessary use by the respondent of legal
remedies to forestall the execution of the final decisions of the MTC and the RTC in
the unlawful detainer case against his clients.[10]
On the second charge, the Investigating Commissioner ruled that the act of
the respondent in filing two petitions for annulment of title, a petition for annulment
of judgment and later on a petition for declaratory relief were all done to prevent the
execution of the final judgment in the unlawful detainer case and constituted
prohibited forum-shopping.[11]
On the third and fourth charges, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan
found ample evidence showing that the respondent was dishonest in dealing with the
court as shown in his petition for annulment of judgment; he resorted to falsities and
attributed acts to Atty. Catolico and to the presiding judge, all of which were
untrue. [12]
On the fifth and sixth charges, the Investigating Commissioner disregarded
the respondents explanation that he had no intention to represent without authority
15 of the litigants (three of whom were already deceased) in the petition for
annulment of judgment (Civil Case No. Q-01-45556). To the Investigating
Commissioner, the respondent merely glossed over the representation issue by
claiming that the authority given by a majority of the litigants complied with the
certification of non-forum shopping requirement. The Investigating Commissioner
likewise brushed aside the respondents argument regarding his misrepresentation in
the second complaint for annulment of title since he knew very well that only the
Solicitor General can institute an action for reversion on behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines. Despite this knowledge, the respondent solely signed the amended
complaint for and on behalf of his clients and of the Republic.
The Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, through
its Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 on CBD Case No. 03-1100, adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Cunanan
and recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two
(2) years.[13] On reconsideration, the Board of Governors reduced the respondents
suspension from the practice of law to one (1) year.[14]
The Issue
The case poses to us the core issues of whether the respondent can be held
liable for the imputed unethical infractions and professional misconduct, and the
penalty these transgressions should carry.
The Courts Ruling

Except for the penalty, we agree with the Report and

Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and the Board of
Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline.
We take judicial notice that this disbarment complaint is not the only one
so far filed involving the respondent; another complaint invoking similar grounds
has previously been filed. In Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia v. Atty.
Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.,[15] we suspended the respondent from the practice of law
for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court
procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating
with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We initially imposed a suspension of
two (2) years, but in an act of leniency subsequently reduced the suspension to six
(6) months.[16]
Abuse of court procedures and processes

The following undisputed facts fully support the conclusion that the
respondent is guilty of serious misconduct for abusing court procedures and
processes to shield his clients from the execution of the final judgments of the
MeTC and RTC in the unlawful detainer case against these clients:
First, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari (docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 53892) with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order to question the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC for lack of
jurisdiction. In dismissing the respondents petition, the CA held:
Even for the sake of argument considering that the
petition case be the proper remedy, still it must be rejected for
failure of petitioners to satisfactorily demonstrate lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City over the ejectment case.[17]
Second, notwithstanding the CAs dismissal of the petition for certiorari,
the respondent again questioned the MeTCs and the RTCs lack of jurisdiction over
the unlawful detainer case in a petition for annulment of judgment (docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-01-45556) before the RTC with an ancillary prayer for the grant
of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The RTC dismissed this
petition on the basis of the motion to dismiss filed.[18]
Third, the respondent successively filed two petitions (docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-99-38780 and Civil Case No. Q-02-46885) for annulment of the
complainants title to the property involved in the unlawful detainer case. The
records show that these petitions were both dismissed for lack of legal personality
on the part of the plaintiffs to file the petition.[19]

Fourth, after the dismissals of the petition for annulment of judgment and the
petitions for annulment of title, the respondent this time filed a petition for
declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
complainant and his siblings from exercising their rights over the same property
subject of the unlawful detainer case. The respondent based the petition on the
alleged nullity of the complainants title because the property is a part of forest land.
Fifth, the persistent applications by the respondent for injunctive relief in the
four petitions he had filed in several courts the petition for certiorari, the petition
for annulment of judgment, the second petition for annulment of complainants title
and the petition for declaratory relief reveal the respondents persistence in
preventing and avoiding the execution of the final decisions of the MeTC and RTC
against his clients in the unlawful detainer case.
Under the circumstances, the respondents repeated attempts go beyond
the legitimate means allowed by professional ethical rules in defending the interests
of his client. These are already uncalled for measures to avoid the enforcement of
final judgments of the MeTC and RTC. In these attempts, the respondent violated
Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which makes it
obligatory for a lawyer to observe the rules of procedure and. . . not [to] misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice. By his actions, the respondent used procedural
rules to thwart and obstruct the speedy and efficient administration of justice,
resulting in prejudice to the winning parties in that case.[20]

Filing of multiple actions and forum shopping

The respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility,[21] as well as the rule against forum
shopping, both of which are directed against the filing of multiple actions to attain
the same objective. Both violations constitute abuse of court processes; they tend to
degrade the administration of justice; wreak havoc on orderly judicial
procedure;[22] and add to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the
courts.[23]
While the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the lower courts
jurisdiction may be a procedurally legitimate (but substantively erroneous) move,
the respondents subsequent petitions involving the same property and the same
parties not only demonstrate his attempts to secure favorable ruling using different
fora, but his obvious objective as well of preventing the execution of the MeTC and
RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case against his clients. This intent is most
obvious with respect to the petitions for annulment of judgment and declaratory
relief, both geared towards preventing the execution of the unlawful detainer
decision, long after this decision had become final.

Willful, intentional and deliberate

falsehood before the courts
The records also reveal that the respondent committed willful, intentional
and deliberate falsehood in the pleadings he filed with the lower courts.
First, in the petition for annulment of judgment filed before the RTC,
Branch 101, Quezon City, the respondent cited extrinsic fraud as one of the grounds
for the annulment sought. The extrinsic fraud was alleged in the last paragraph of
the petition, as follows:
In here, counsel for the petitioners (defendants therein),
deliberately neglected to file the proper remedy then available
after receipt of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration
thus corruptly
sold
out
the
interest
of
the
petitioners(defendants therein) by keeping them away to the
Court and in complete ignorance of the suit by a false pretense
of compromise and fraudulent acts of alleging representing them
when in truth and in fact, have connived with the attorney of
the prevailing party at his defeat to the prejudice of the
petitioner (defendants therein) [24]
Yet, in paragraph 35 of the same petition, the respondent alleged that no second
motion for reconsideration or for new trial, or no other petition with the CA had
been filed, as he believed that the decisions rendered both by the MeTC and the
RTC are null and void.[25] These conflicting claims, no doubt, involve a fabrication
made for the purpose of supporting the petition for annulment. Worse, it involved a
direct and unsubstantiated attack on the reputation of a law office colleague, another
violation we shall separately discuss below.
Second, the respondent employed another obvious subterfuge when he filed
his second petition for annulment of title, which was an unsuccessful attempt to
circumvent the rule that only the Solicitor General may commence reversion
proceedings of public lands[26] on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. This
second petition, filed by a private party and not by the Republic, showed that: (a) the
respondent and his clients requested that they be represented by the Solicitor
General in the proceedings; (b) the Republic of the Philippines was simply
impleaded in the amended petition without its consent as a plaintiff; and (c) the
respondent signed the amended petition where he alone stood as counsel for the
plaintiffs. In this underhanded manner, the respondent sought to compel the
Republic to litigate and waste its resources on an unauthorized and unwanted suit.
Third, the respondent also committed falsehood in his motion for
reconsideration of the order dismissing his petition for annulment of judgment

where he misrepresented to the court and his clients what actually transpired in the
hearing of June 28, 2002 in this wise:
Likewise, the proceedings on said date of hearing (June
28, 2002) show, that after both counsel have argued on the
aforesaid pending incident, the Honorable Presiding Judge, in
open court, and in the presence and within the hearing distance
of all the plaintiffs and their counsel as well as the counsel of the
defendants resolved: TO DENY THE MOTION TO DISMISS
FILED AND DIRECTED DEFENDANTS COUNSEL TO
FILE AN ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN THE
REMAINING PERIOD.[27][Underscoring and emphasis theirs]

The records, however, disclose that the scheduled hearing for June 28,
2002 was actually for the respondents application for temporary restraining order
and was not a hearing on the adverse partys motion to dismiss.[28] The records also
show that RTC-Branch 101 held in abeyance the respondents application for
injunctive relief pending the resolution of the motion to dismiss filed by the adverse
party.[29] As stated in the order of the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 101:
Browsing over the records of this case specifically the
transcripts of stenographic notes as transcribed by the
Stenographer, the same will indicate that the allegations in the
Motion for Reconsideration are not true.
how can this Court make a ruling on the matter even without
stating the factual and legal bases as required/mandated by the
Rules. Moreover, there are no indications or iota of irregularity
in the preparation by Stenographer of the transcripts, and by the
Court interpreter of the Minutes of the open Court
session.[Underscoring theirs]
The records further disclose that despite knowledge of the falsity of his
allegations, the respondent took advantage of his position and the trust reposed in
him by his clients (who are all squatters) to convince them to support, through their
affidavits, his false claims on what allegedly transpired in the June 28, 2002
hearing. [30]
For these acts, we find the respondent liable under Rule 10.01 of Canon
10 the Code of Professional Responsibility for violating the lawyers duty to observe
candor and fairness in his dealings with the court. This provision states:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT

Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to

the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the
Court to be mislead by an artifice.
Likewise, the respondent violated his duty as an attorney and his oath as a
lawyer never to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false
statement of fact or law.[31] The respondent failed to remember that his duty as an
officer of the court makes him an indispensable participant in the administration of
justice,[32] and that he is expected to act candidly, fairly and truthfully in his
work.[33] His duty as a lawyer obligates him not to conceal the truth from the court,
or to mislead the court in any manner, no matter how demanding his duties to his
clients may be.[34] In case of conflict, his duties to his client yield to his duty to deal
candidly with the court.[35]
In defending his clients interest, the respondent also failed to observe
Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which reads:
CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS
CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF LAW
Rule 19.01 A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means
to attain the lawful objectives of his clients x x x

This Canon obligates a lawyer, in defending his client, to employ only

such means as are consistent with truth and honor.[36] He should not prosecute
patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless
actions.[37] The recital of what the respondent did to prevent the execution of the
judgment against his clients shows that he actually committed what the above rule
expressly prohibits.
Maligning the name of his fellow lawyers

To support the charge of extrinsic fraud in his petition for annulment of

judgment, the respondent attacked (as quoted above) the name and reputation of the
late Atty. Catolico and accused him of deliberate neglect, corrupt motives and
connivance with the counsel for the adverse party.
We find it significant that the respondent failed to demonstrate how he
came upon his accusation against Atty. Catolico. The respondent, by his own
admission, only participated in the cases previously assigned to Atty. Catolico after
the latter died. At the same time, the respondents petition for annulment of
judgment also represented that no second motion for reconsideration or appeal was

filed to contest the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case for the
reason that the respondent believed the said decisions were null and void ab initio.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the respondent has been less
than fair in his professional relationship with Atty. Catolico and is thus liable for
violating Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which obligates a
lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his
professional colleagues. He was unfair because he imputed wrongdoing to Atty.
Catolico without showing any factual basis therefor; he effectively maligned Atty.
Catolico, who is now dead and unable to defend himself.
Unauthorized appearances
We support Investigating Commissioner Cunanans finding that the
respondent twice represented parties without proper authorization: first, in the
petition for annulment of judgment; and second, in the second petition for
annulment of title.[38]
In the first instance, the records show that the respondent filed the petition
for annulment of judgment on behalf of 49 individuals, 31 of whom gave their
consent while the other 15 individuals did not. We cannot agree with the
respondents off-hand explanation that he truly believed that a majority of the
litigants who signed the certification of non-forum shopping in the petition already
gave him the necessary authority to sign for the others. We find it highly improbable
that this kind of lapse could have been committed by a seasoned lawyer like the
respondent, who has been engaged in the practice of law for more than 30 years and
who receivedrigid and strict training as he so proudly declares, from the University
of the Philippines College of Law and in the two law firms with which he was
previously associated.[39] As Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found, the
respondents explanation of compliance with the rule on the certification of nonforum shopping glossed over the real charge of appearing in court without the
proper authorization of the parties he allegedly represented.
In the second instance, which occurred in the second complaint for
annulment of title, the respondent knew that only the Solicitor General can legally
represent the Republic of the Philippines in actions for reversion of land.
Nevertheless, he filed an amended petition where he impleaded the Republic of
the Philippines as plaintiff without its authority and consent, as a surreptitious way
of forcing the Republic to litigate. Notably, he signed the amended complaint on
behalf of all the plaintiffs his clients and the Republic.
In both instances, the respondent violated Sections 21 and 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court when he undertook the unauthorized appearances. The settled rule is
that a lawyer may not represent a litigant without authority from the latter or from

the latters representative or, in the absence thereof, without leave of court. [40] The
willful unauthorized appearance by a lawyer for a party in a given case constitutes
contumacious conduct and also warrants disciplinary measures against the erring
lawyer for professional misconduct.[41]
The Respondents Defenses
We find no merit in the respondents defenses.
Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking
unconscientious advantage of another. Accordingly, in University of the East v.
Jader we said that "[g]ood faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking
undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of law,
together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the
transaction unconscientious."[42] Bad faith, on the other hand, is a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest, ill
will or for an ulterior purpose.[43] As both concepts are states of mind, they may be
deduced from the attendant circumstances and, more particularly, from the acts and
statements of the person whose state of mind is the subject of inquiry.
In this case, we find that the respondent acted in bad faith in defending the
interests of his clients. We draw this conclusion from the misrepresentations and the
dubious recourses he made, all obviously geared towards forestalling the execution
of the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC. That he took advantage of his legal
knowledge and experience and misread the Rules immeasurably strengthen the
presence of bad faith.
We find neither sincerity nor honest belief on the part of the respondent in
pleading the soundness and merit of the cases that he filed in court to prevent the
execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions, considering his own conduct of
presenting conflicting theories in his petitions. The succession of cases he filed
shows a desperation that negates the sincere and honest belief he claims; these are
simply scattershot means to achieve his objective of avoiding the execution of the
unlawful detainer judgment against his clients.
On the respondents allegations regarding his discretion to determine legal
strategy, it is not amiss to note that this was the same defense he raised in the first
disbarment case.[44] As we explained in Plus Builders,the exercise of a lawyers
discretion in acting for his client can never be at the expense of truth and justice. In
the words of this cited case:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of
his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion
of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the

bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on

the merits and probable results of his clients case with the end
in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes,
and counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as
appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to
be honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind
himself of the oath he took upon admission to the Bar that he
will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; and
that he will conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best
of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well
to the courts as to [his] clients. Needless to state, the lawyers
fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth
and the administration of justice, and it must be done within the
bounds of reason and common sense. A lawyers responsibility
to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant
a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious
intentions against the other party.[45]
We cannot give credence to the respondents claim that the disbarment
case was filed because the counsel of the complainant, Atty. Uy, had an axe to grind
against him. We reject this argument, considering that it was not Atty. Uy who filed
the present disbarment case against him; Atty. Uy is only the counsel in this case. In
fact, Atty. Uy has filed his own separate disbarment case against the respondent.
The sui generis nature of a disbarment case renders the underlying
motives of the complainants unimportant and with very little relevance. The purpose
of a disbarment proceeding is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue
acting as an officer of the court and a participant in the dispensation of justice an
issue where the complainants personal motives have little relevance. For this
reason, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by the Court motu proprio upon
information of an alleged wrongdoing. As we also explained in the case In re:
Almacen:
. . .disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve - a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather
an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no
sense a criminal prosecution.
x

It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public

interest is its primary objective, and the real question for

determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to

be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of
the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of-the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct
have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak
of a complainant or a prosecutor.[46]
Hence, we give little or no weight to the alleged personal motivation that drove the
complainant Que and his counsel to file the present disbarment case.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various
acts of professional misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical
standards imposed on members of the Bar. We cannot agree, however, that only a
penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law should be imposed. Neither
should we limit ourselves to the originally recommended penalty of suspension for
two (2) years.
Given the respondents multiple violations, his past record as previously
discussed, and the nature of these violations which shows the readiness to disregard
court rules and to gloss over concerns for the orderly administration of justice, we
believe and so hold that the appropriate action of this Court is to disbar the
respondent to keep him away from the law profession and from any significant role
in the administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too,
to the public that the legal profession serves. Not even his ardor and overzealousness
in defending the interests of his client can save him. Such traits at the expense of
everything else, particularly the integrity of the profession and the orderly
administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.
Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondents
first ethical infraction of the same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc.
and Edgardo Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla forhis willful and intentional
falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the
execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal
practice of law. We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to suspension for
six (6) months. We cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it is clear that he
did not learn any lesson from his past experience and since then has exhibited traits
of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the respondents professional legal
career for the sake of the public, the profession and the interest of justice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No.

XVII-2005-164 dated December 17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated
December 11, 2008 of the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable
for professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyers Oath; Canon 8; Rules
10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19
of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the IBP imposed, and
hold that the respondent should be DISBARRED from the practice of law.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACH

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

[1]

Rollo, pp. 2-18.

Civil Case No. 38-20262.
[3]
Appealed Case No. 99-38199.
[4]
See rollo, p.14, on the observation of the presiding judge which denied the lack of
truthfulness of the above assertions of the respondent.
[2]

[5]

Id. at 24-32.
Id. at 31.
[7]
Supplemental Position Paper; id. at 131-134.
[6]

[8]

Id. at 148-156.
Id. at 156.
[10]
Id. at 150-151.
[11]
Id. at 151.
[12]
Id. at 152-153.
[13]
Id. at 147.
[14]
Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008; Folder III of the rollo.
[15]
A.C. No. 7056 dated September 13, 2006, 501 SCRA 615.
[16]
A.C. No. 7056 dated February 11, 2009.
[17]
Rollo, p. 6.
[18]
Id. at 12.
[19]
Id. at 7-8.
[20]
See: Agpalo, Comments on the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code
of Judicial Conduct, p. 104 (2004 edition).
[21]
Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions.
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of
judgment or misuse court processes.
[22]
Supra note 20 at 104.
[23]
Pena v. Aparicio, A.C. No. 7298, June 25, 2007, 525 SCRA 444, 454; see:
Agpalo. supra note 20 at 121, citing Chempil Export & Export Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, 321 Phil 619 (1995); and Ligon v. Court of Appeals, 355 Phil 503 (1998).
[24]
Petition for Annulment of Judgment, p. 25; rollo, p. 11.
[25]
Ibid.
[26]
Id., pp. 30-31; PUBLIC LAND ACT, Section 101.
[27]
Id. at 13.
[28]
Id. at 13-14.
[29]
Id. at 12.
[30]
Id. at 155.
[31]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Section 20 (d).
[32]
Agpalo, supra note 20 at 99.
[33]
Id. at 100.
[34]
Id. at102.
[35]
Ibid.
[36]
Id. at 226.
[37]
Ibid.
[38]
Rollo, pp. 155-156.
[39]
Id. at 26.
[40]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Section 21.
[41]
Id., Sections 21 and 27.
[42]
Philippine National Bank v. Heirs of Estanislao Militar and Deogracias Militar,
G.R. Nos. 164801 & 165165, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 308, 318; citing University
of the East v. Jader, 382 Phil. 697, 705 (2000).
[43]
Santiago v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127440, January 27, 2007, 513 SCRA
69, 83.
[9]

[44]

Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla,

Jr., supra note 15.
[45]
Ibid., citing Choa v. Chiongson, 329 Phil 270, 275-276 (1996).
[46]
G.R. No. L-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562, 600-601.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 4103 September 7, 1995
VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR. SOCORRO
F. MANAS, and TRINIDAD NORDISTA, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS, respondent.
DAVIDE JR., J.:
In their letter of 8 September 1993, the complainants, former clients of the
respondent, pray that the latter be disbarred for "malpractice, neglect and
other offenses which may be discovered during the actual investigation of
this complaint." They attached thereto an Affidavit of Merit wherein they
specifically allege:
1. That we are Defendants-Appellates [sic] in the Court of
Appeals Case No. CA-G.N. CV No. 38153 of which to our
surprise lost unnecessarily the aforesaid Petition [sic]. A
close perusal of the case reveals the serious misconduct
of our attorney on record, Atty. Amado Fojas tantamount
to malpractice and negligence in the performance of his
duty obligation to us, to defend us in the aforesaid case.
That the said attorney without informing us the reason why
and riding high on the trust and confidence we repose on
him either abandoned, failed to act accordingly, or
seriously neglected to answer the civil complaint against
us in the sala of Judge Teresita Capulong Case No. 3526V-91 Val. Metro Manila so that we were deduced [sic] in
default.
2. That under false pretenses Atty. Fojas assured us that
everything was in order. That he had already answered
the complaint so that in spite of the incessant demand for
him to give us a copy he continued to deny same to us.
Only to disclose later that he never answered it after all
because according to him he was a very busy man.
Please refer to Court of Appeals decision dated August
17, 1993.
3. That because of Atty. Amado Foja's neglect and
malpractice of law we lost the Judge Capulong case and
our appeal to the Court of Appeals. So that it is only
proper that Atty. Fojas be disciplined and disbarred in the
practice of his profession.

In his Comment, the respondent admits his "mistake" in failing to file the
complainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91, but he alleges that it was
cured by his filing of a motion for reconsideration, which was unfortunately
denied by the court. He asserts that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was a "losing
cause" for the complainants because it was based on the expulsion of the
plaintiff therein from the Far Eastern University Faculty Association (FEUFA)
which was declared unlawful in the final decision in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050.
Thus, "[t]he unfavorable judgment in the Regional Trial Court is not
imputable to [his] mistake but rather imputable to the merits of the
case, i.e., the decision in the Expulsion case wherein defendants
(complainants herein) illegally removed from the union (FEUFA)
membership Mr. Paulino Salvador. . . ." He further claims that the
complainants filed this case to harass him because he refused to share his
attorney's fees in the main labor case he had handled for them. The
respondent then prays for the dismissal of this complaint for utter lack of
merit, since his failure to file the answer was cured and, even granting for
the sake of argument that such failure amounted to negligence, it cannot
warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of the law
profession.
The complainants filed a Reply to the respondent's Comment.
Issues having been joined, we required the parties to inform us whether they
were willing to submit this case for decision on the basis of the pleadings
they have filed. In their separate compliance, both manifested in the
affirmative.
The facts in this case are not disputed.
Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro Manas,
and Trinidad Nordista were the President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and
Auditor, respectively, of the FEUFA. They allegedly expelled from the union
Paulino Salvador. The latter then commenced with the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) a complaint (NCR-OD-M-90-10-050) to declare
illegal his expulsion from the union.
In his resolution of 22 November 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin
declared illegal Salvador's expulsion and directed the union and all its
officers to reinstate Salvador's name in the roll of union members with all the
rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. This resolution was affirmed in
toto by the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, a complaint against the complainants
herein for actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees, under
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 3526-V-91.
As the complainants' counsel, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the
said case on grounds of (1) res judicata by virtue of the final decision of the
Med-Arbiter in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050 and (2) lack of jurisdiction, since what

was involved was an intra-union issue cognizable by the DOLE. Later, he

filed a supplemental motion to dismiss.
The trial court, per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, granted the motion and
ordered the dismissal of the case. Upon Salvador's motion for
reconsideration, however, it reconsidered the order of dismissal, reinstated
the case, and required the complainants herein to file their answer within a
nonextendible period of fifteen days from notice.
Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
and dismissal of the case. This motion having been denied, the respondent
filed with this Court a petition for certiorari, which was later referred to the
Court of Appeals and docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 25834.
Although that petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration were
both denied, the respondent still did not file the complainants' answer in Civil
Case No. 3526-V-91. Hence, upon plaintiff Salvador's motion, the
complainants were declared in default, and Salvador was authorized to
present his evidence ex-parte.
The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to
stop the ex-parte reception of evidence before the Clerk of Court, but to no
avail.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the complainants
herein to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff Salvador the amounts of
P200,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages or
corrective damages; and P65,000.00 as attorney's fees; plus cost of suit.
The complainants, still assisted by the respondent, elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals, which, however, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court.
The respondent asserts that he was about to appeal the said decision to this
Court, but his services as counsel for the complainants and for the union
were illegally and unilaterally terminated by complainant Veronica Santiago.
The core issue that presents itself is whether the respondent committed
culpable negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for
the complainants an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 for which reason
the latter were declared in default and judgment was rendered against them
on the basis of the plaintiff's evidence, which was received ex-parte.
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate
for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to
1
decline employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client,
the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the
2
trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with
3
competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with
4
wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire
devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by

the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled
to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the
law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
6
defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the
client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who
performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of
his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and
7
helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.
The respondent admits that it was his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No.
3526-V-91. He justifies his failure to do so in this wise:
[I]n his overzealousness to question the Denial Order of
8
the trial court, [he] instead, thru honest mistake and
excusable neglect, filed a PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI with the Honorable Court, docketed as
G.R. No. 100983. . . .
And, when the Court of Appeals, to which G.R. No. 100983 was
referred, dismissed the petition, he again "inadvertently" failed to
file an answer "[d]ue to honest mistake and because of his
overzealousness as stated earlier. . . . "
In their Reply, the complainants allege that his failure to file an answer was
not an honest mistake but was "deliberate, malicious and calculated to place
them on the legal disadvantage, to their damage and prejudice" for, as
admitted by him in his motion to set aside the order of default, his failure to
9
do so was "due to volume and pressure of legal work." In short, the
complainants want to impress upon this Court that the respondent has given
inconsistent reasons to justify his failure to file an answer.
We agree with the complainants. In his motion for reconsideration of the
default order, the respondent explained his non-filing of the required answer
by impliedly invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume and
pressure of legal work, while in his Comment in this case he attributes it to
honest mistake and excusable neglect due to his overzealousness to
question the denial order of the trial court.
Certainly, "overzealousness" on the one hand and "volume and pressure of
legal work" on the other are two distinct and separate causes or grounds.
The first presupposes the respondent's full and continuing awareness of his
duty to file an answer which, nevertheless, he subordinated to his conviction
that the trial court had committed a reversible error or grave abuse of
discretion in issuing an order reconsidering its previous order of dismissal of
Salvador's complaint and in denying the motion to reconsider the said order.
The second ground is purely based on forgetfulness because of his other
commitments.
Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that the
respondent did not comply with his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No.
3526-V-91. His lack of diligence was compounded by his erroneous belief

that the trial court committed such error or grave abuse of discretion and by
his continued refusal to file an answer even after he received the Court of
Appeals' decision in the certiorari case. There is no showing whatsoever that
he further assailed the said decision before this Court in a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to prove his claim of overzealousness to
challenge the trial court's order. Neither was it shown that he alleged in his
motion to lift the order of default that the complainants had a meritorious
10
defense. And, in his appeal from the judgment by default, he did not even
raise as one of the errors of the trial court either the impropriety of the order
of default or the court's grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to lift
that order.
Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the
respondent's inability to exercise due diligence in the performance of his
duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full
attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its importance and
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
All told, the respondent committed a breach of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which requires him to serve his clients, the
complainants herein, with diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03
thereof which provides: "A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."
The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No.
3526-V-91 was in fact a "losing cause" for the complainants since the claims
therein for damages were based on the final decision of the Med-Arbiter
declaring the complainants' act of expelling Salvador from the union to be
illegal. This claim is a mere afterthought which hardly persuades us. If
indeed the respondent was so convinced of the futility of any defense
therein, he should have seasonably informed the complainants thereof. Rule
15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly
provides:
A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and
honest opinion on the merits and probable results of the
client's case, neither overstating nor understanding the
prospects of the case.
Then too, if he were unconvinced of any defense, we are unable to
understand why he took all the trouble of filing a motion to dismiss
on the grounds of res judicata and lack of jurisdiction and of
questioning the adverse ruling thereon initially with this Court and
then with the Court of Appeals, unless, of course, he meant all of
these to simply delay the disposition of the civil case. Finally, the
complainants were not entirely without any valid or justifiable
defense. They could prove that the plaintiff was not entitled to all
the damages sought by him or that if he were so, they could ask for
a reduction of the amounts thereof.

We do not therefore hesitate to rule that the respondent is not free from any
blame for the sad fate of the complainants. He is liable for inexcusable
negligence.
WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED and
ADMONISHED to be, henceforth, more careful in the performance of his
duty to his clients.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Hermosisima Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Canon 31, Canons of Professional Ethics.
2 Canon 17, Code of Professional Responsibility.
3 Canon 18, Code of Professional Responsibility.
4 Vda. de Alisbo vs. Jalandoon, 199 SCRA 321
[1991].
5 Canon 15, Canons of Professional Ethics.
6 Id.
7 Francisco vs. Bosa, 205 SCRA 722 [1992].
8 Order denying the motion to reconsider the
order which set aside the previous order
dismissing the case, reinstated the complaint,
and required the complainants to answer the
complaint.
9 Appellant's Brief (CA-G.R. No. CV-38153), 3;
Annex "12" of the Respondent's Comment.
10 Section 3, Rule 18, Rules of Court. See Circle
Financial Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA
166 [1991]; Golden Country Farms, Inc. vs.
Sanwar Development Corp. 214 SCRA 295
[1992].
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 6084. September 3, 2003]
FELICITAS
BERBANO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY.
WENCESLAO
BARCELONA, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require
in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his
profession, the courts and the public. The bar should maintain a high
standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair
dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession
by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to
his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal
fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the
[1]
public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.
In a sworn Affidavit-Complaint dated March 11, 1999 filed before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), complainant Felicitas Berbano seeks
the disbarment of Atty. Wenceslao Barcelona for Malpractice and Gross
Misconduct Unbecoming a Lawyer, Dereliction of Duty and Unjust
[2]
Enrichment. Complainant alleges:
1. I am one of the heirs of Rufino Esteban Hilapo, owner of a 244hectare lot situated at Alabang, Muntinlupa, which property is
being claimed by Filinvest Dev. Corp. in a case pending with
the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP), Quezon City. The heirs of REH has appointed Mr.
PORFIRIO DAEN as their attorney-in-fact giving him authority
to prosecute the case for and in their behalf.
2. On January 26, 1999, Mr. Porfirio Daen was arrested by a
Muntinlupa police on the strength of an expired warrant of
arrest-it was issued on February 1990-and subsequently
detained at the Muntinlupa City Jail, Tunasan, Muntinlupa
City, until his release on February 18, 1999.
3. Since Mr. Daen needed the assistance of a lawyer for his
release from incarceration, we tried to look for one. We told
our friend Naty Sibuya, about the predicament of Mr. Daen,
who recommended Atty. Wenceslao Barcelona to us, his wife
being Natys cousin/relative.
4. So on January 26, 1999, at about 10:30 in the evening, Atty.
Wenceslao Barcelona arrived at the Muntinlupa City Jail and
conferred with Mr. Daen. We learned later that Mr. Daen has
engaged the services of Atty. Barcelona for the latter to
secure the release of the former from prison. After their
conversation, Atty. Barcelona told us that if you could produce
the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) Pesos he will

cause the release of Mr. Daen from prison the following day. I
told him that it was already late in the evening and I cannot
any more produce the amount. But he insisted that I must
produce even just a small amount. So, what I did was ask my
relatives who were with me at the time to contribute and we
were able to raise FIFTEEN THOUSAND SEVEN-HUNDRED
(P15,700.00) Pesos. In the meantime, Atty. Barcelona
proceeded to Chowking Restaurant which is just located
across the city jail where he waited for us there.
5. At the aforesaid restaurant, I handed to Atty. Barcelona the
amount who accepted the same. He reiterated his promise to
secure the release of Mr. Daen the following day. Before he
left, he asked us to meet him at Max Restaurant at around
12:00 noon at EDSA Crossing. He thereafter left because
according to him, he would go and see somebody, (a justice)
from the Supreme Court who could help the release of Mr.
Daen. It was already about 12:30 in the early morning of
January 27, 1999.
6. As agreed upon, I, together with Romana Soriano, proceeded
to Max Restaurant. We arrived at around 12:00 noon. Atty.
Barcelona came at around 1:00 P.M. He even told us that he
just came from the Supreme Court where he fixed the case
of Mr. Daen. It surprised me though, that he did not have with
him any single document at the time. Then, I handed him a
pay-to-cash check for TWENTY-FOUR THOUSAND
(P24,000.00) Pesos, dated January 29, 1999. We told him
that the check may be encashed on the said date. Although,
he said that the Justices of the Supreme Court do not accept
check he nonetheless, accepted it saying that he will have the
same rediscounted. We thereafter left.
7. The following morning, January 28, 1999, at around 7:00
oclock Atty. Barcelona called me up by phone to say that
since he was unable to have the check rediscounted, I must
produce the amount of P5,000.00 and give the amount to him
at Max Restaurant at EDSA Crossing at around 12:00
noon. We were unable to meet him because we arrived at
about 1:00 oclock already. Nonetheless, we waited for him
until 3:00 in the afternoon. Thereafter, I called him through his
pager saying that we were waiting for him at Max. I also
called up our house and inquire (sic) if a lawyer has called
up. I was able to talk to my husband who informed me that a
certain Atty. Barcelona called up. That Atty. Barcelona
wanted to meet us at McDonalds at Barangka Drive,
Mandaluyong. So we rushed to the place but he was not
there. I again paged him informing him that we were already

at McDonalds and to return my call through my cell

phone. After a while, his wife called up to inform us to
proceed to their house which was just five houses away from
McDonalds. When we reached their house, we were met by
his daughter who called her mother. We were ushered inside
the house and after introducing ourselves, we gave not only
P5,000.00, but TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) Pesos in cash
to his wife in the presence of his daughter. Then we went to
Putatan, Muntinlupa, hoping that he might be there.
8. We arrived at Putatan, Muntinlupa at around 4:30 in the
afternoon and there we saw Atty. Barcelona. We informed
him that we left the P10,000.00 with his wife at their
house. Since Atty. Barcelona informed us that he could not
secure the release of Mr. Daen because the check had not
been encashed, Mr. Gil Daen, a nephew of Porfirio Daen,
gave him FIFTEEN THOUSAND (P15,000.00) Pesos in
cash. I also gave him an additional P1,000.00 for his gasoline
expenses.
9. The next time that we saw Atty. Barcelona was on February 3,
1999, Wednesday at around 6:00 in the evening at Putatan,
Muntinlupa. He informed us that he just came from the city
jail where he had a conversation with Mr. Daen. He told us
that he is going to release Mr. Daen from prison tomorrow,
February 4, 1999. However, in the morning of February 4, we
learned from the wife of Atty. Barcelona when she returned
my call that her husband had left for Mindanao early that
morning on board a private plane owned by Chiongbian
allegedly to attend a peace talk with the Muslims.
10. After more than a week, I went to Putatan, Muntinlupa,
because I was informed by the son of Mr. Daen that he saw
Atty. Barcelona there. When I saw him, I confronted him
about his undertaking to release Mr. Daen from prison, but he
only advised us not to worry and promised (again) that he will
return the entire amount of P64,000.00 more or less, on
Thursday, February 18, 1999. But I never saw him again
since then. I have repeatedly paged him to return my call but
[3]
he never returned any of my calls.
In an Order dated April 15, 1999, Investigating Commissioner J. Virgilio
A. Bautista of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, required
respondent to submit his answer to the complaint, with a warning that he will
be considered in default and the case will be heard ex parte, if he fails to do
[4]
[5]
so. Despite due notice, respondent failed to file his answer. Thus,
[6]
complainant filed a motion to declare respondent in default, resolution of
which was held in abeyance by the Investigating Commissioner who
required the parties to appear for hearing before the Commission on August

[7]

13, 1999. On said date, respondent again failed to appear despite due
[8]
receipt of notice. Commissioner Bautista was thus constrained to consider
respondent in default and complainant was allowed to present her
evidence ex parte. Complainant testified and affirmed under oath the
[9]
truthfulness and veracity of her Affidavit-Complaint. Complainant also
[10]
manifested that she will present the check in the amount of P24,000.00 at
the next date of hearing.
Further hearings were set by the Commissioner, on October 1, 1999,
November 19, 1999, October 12, 2001, December 14, 2001 and June 28,
[11]
2002, but both parties failed to appear on said dates despite due notice.
Commissioner
Bautista
submitted
his
Final
Report
and
Recommendation on December 23, 2002 finding respondent guilty of
malpractice and serious breach of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and recommending that respondent be disbarred and ordered to return to
complainant the amount of P64,000.00. The IBP Board of Governors
adopted Commissioner Bautistas findings but reduced the penalty to
suspension from the practice of law for six years.
The Court disagrees with the IBP Board of Governors in reducing the
penalty and upholds the findings and recommendation of Commissioner
Bautista. Under the facts established by complainant, respondent should
not only be suspended, but disbarred from practice.
The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the
individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the administration of justice by
protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the
court, and to remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for
their oath of office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust
[12]
reposed in them as members of the bar.
In In re Almacen, the Court expounded on the nature of disbarment
proceedings, viz.:
. . . Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis . Neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu propio. Public interest is [their]
primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar
to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. . . . [13]
[14]
As in the Ricafort case, herein respondent chose to forget that by
swearing the lawyers oath, he became a guardian of truth and the rule of

law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration

of justice a vital function of democracy a failure of which is disastrous to
[15]
society. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case
against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and
[16]
satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has
consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
[17]
imposition of the administrative penalty.
Complainants evidence consists solely of her Affidavit-Complaint and
testimony before the Commission attesting to the truth of the allegations laid
down in her affidavit. Commissioner Bautista and the IBP Board of
Governors found her testimony together with her affidavit sufficient to
support the finding that respondent committed the acts complained of . The
matter of assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is best done by the
investigating body (which in this case is the Investigating Commissioner)
because unlike appellate courts, it can weigh such testimony in light of the
[18]
demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the trial. Witnesses
are weighed not numbered, and the testimony of a single witness may
[19]
suffice if trustworthy and reliable.
The non-presentation of the check given to respondent does not affect
complainants case as it will merely serve to corroborate her testimony and
there is no law which requires that the testimony of a single witness needs
corroboration except where the law expressly mandates such
[20]
corroboration which is not so required in administrative cases.
The act of respondent in not filing his answer and ignoring the hearings
set by the Investigating Commission, despite due notice, emphasized his
contempt for legal proceedings. Thus, the Court finds no compelling reason
to overturn the Investigating Commissioners judgment.
Respondent is guilty of culpable violations of several Canons of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal processes.
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times upholds the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the integrated bar.
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and
to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
CANON 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that
may come into his possession.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from the client.
The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal
processes and the courts but also mandates the utmost degree of fidelity
and good faith in dealing with clients and the moneys entrusted to them
pursuant to their fiduciary relationship. Instead of promoting respect for law

and the legal processes, respondent callously demeaned the legal

profession by taking money from a client under the pretext of having
connections with a Member of this Court.
The Court has taken into consideration the penalties imposed in other
administrative cases involving similar offenses, e. g.:
[21]
In Judge Angeles vs. Atty. Uy, Jr., the respondent was suspended
from the practice of law for one month for failing to promptly report and remit
the amount of P16,500.00 he received on behalf of his client.
[22]
In Gonato vs. Atty. Adaza, the respondent was suspended from the
practice of law for six months for charging his clients the amount of
P15,980.00 as filing fees when in fact no such fees were due.
[23]
In Dumadag vs. Lumaya, the Court ordered the indefinite
suspension of a lawyer for not remitting to his client the amount of P4,344.00
that he had received pursuant to an execution.
[24]
In Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., vs. Atty. Naldoza, the
respondent was disbarred for obtaining from his client the amount of
US$2,555.00 allegedly as cash bond in an appealed case before this Court,
when in fact no such amount has been paid or that the Court required such
payment.
In the present case, respondent collected money from the complainant
and the nephew of the detained person in the total amount of P64,000.00 for
the immediate release of the detainee through his alleged connection with a
Justice of the Supreme Court. He deserves to be disbarred from the
practice of law.
This is not the first time that respondent has been charged with and
found guilty of conduct unbecoming a lawyer. In Gil T. Aquino vs. Atty.
[25]
Wenceslao C. Barcelona, respondent misrepresented to the complainant
that he could secure the restructuring of the complainants loan with the PNB
through his connection with a certain Gonzalo Mericullo, legal assistant in
the PNB. Based on such misrepresentation, respondent asked and received
the amount of P60,000.00 from the complainant allegedly to be paid to the
PNB. It turned out that there was no such employee in the PNB by the
name Gonzalo Mericullo and the complainants property was eventually
foreclosed. As in the present case, respondent did not appear before the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline despite receipt of the notices sent and
duly received by him. After due proceedings, the IBP Board of Governors
found respondent guilty of professional misconduct, and recommended that
he be suspended from the practice of law for six months and ordered to
render the accounting and restitute whatever remained of the P60,000.00 to
the complainant. The Court adopted such finding and recommendation and
respondent was ordered suspended from the practice of law for six months,
effective immediately.
Respondent has demonstrated a penchant for misrepresenting to
clients that he has the proper connections to secure the relief they seek, and
thereafter, ask for money, which will allegedly be given to such

connections. In this case, respondent misrepresented to complainant that

he could get the release of Mr. Porfirio Daen through his connection with a
Supreme Court Justice. Not only that, respondent even had the audacity to
tell complainant that the Justices of the Supreme Court do not accept
checks.
In so doing, respondent placed the Court in dishonor and public
[26]
contempt. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, the Court
expounded on a lawyers duty to the courts, viz.:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court itself, and instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice. [People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R.
851, 855]. His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he
owes fidelity, not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. [In re Sotto,
82 Phil. 595, 602]. Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to
undermine the judicial edifice is a disastrous to the continuity of the government
and to the attainment of the liberties of the people. [Malcolm Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1949 ed., p. 160]. Thus has it been said a lawyer that [a]s an officer of the
court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that
high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration
of justice.
The Judiciary has been besieged enough with accusations of
corruption and malpractice. For a member of the legal profession to further
stoke the embers of mistrust on the judicial system with such irresponsible
representations is reprehensible and cannot be tolerated. Respondent
made a mockery of the Judiciary and further eroded public confidence in
courts and lawyers when he ignored the proceedings in the Aquino case and
in the present case. More so, when he misrepresented to complainant that
he has connections with a Member of the Court to accommodate his client
and that Justices of the Court accept money. Indubitably, he does not
deserve to remain a member of the Bar any minute longer.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence
to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of
morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the
conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and
for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian
of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This
authority to discipline its members is not only a right but a bounden duty as
well . . . That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its
[27]
members.
WHEREFORE, for gross misconduct, respondent Wenceslao C.
Barcelona is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name is ordered
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is further directed to return to
complainant Felicitas Berbano the amount of Sixty Four Thousand Pesos
(P64,000.00) within thirty (30) days from notice of this Decision.
This Decision shall take effect immediately.

Let copies hereof be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be

appended to respondents personal record; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; the Office of the President; the Department of Justice; the
Philippines Judges Association; and all courts of the land for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga,
JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., on official leave.
Vitug, J., I concur except for the civil award which, in my view, should
be taken apart from this administrative case.

[1]

Busios vs. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407, 414 (1997), citing Marcelo vs. Javier,
214 SCRA 1, 12-13 (1992).
[2]
Rollo, p. 4.
[3]
Exhibit A, Affidavit-Complaint, Rollo, pp. 2-4.
[4]
Id., p. 6.
[5]
Per Registry Return Receipt showing that the order was received on April
20, 1999, Rollo, back of p. 6.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 7-8.
[7]
Per Order dated July 9, 1999, Rollo, p. 10.
[8]
Per Registry Return Receipt showing that the order was received on July
22, 1999, back of p. 10.
[9]
Rollo, p. 12, Order dated August 13, 1999.
[10]
Rollo, p. 13.
[11]
Id., pp. 14, 16, 18, 21 and 27; Rollo, see back of pp. 18-26.
[12]
Deles vs. Aragona, Jr., Adm. Case NO. 598, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA
633, 644.
[13]
Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., vs. Atty. Naldoza, A.C. NO.
4017, September 29, 1999, 374 Phil. 1, 10.
[14]
See Note 1.
[15]
Ibid.
[16]
Concepcion vs. Fandio, Jr., 334 SCRA 136, 142 (200).
[17]
Id.
[18]
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Sumilang, A.M. NO. MTJ-94-989,
April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 316, 325.
[19]
Naval vs. Panday, A.M. No. RTJ-95-1283, December 21, 1999, 321
SCRA 290, 301; citing People vs. Nimo, 227 SCRA 69 (1993).
[20]
Ibid.
[21]
A.C. No. 5019, April 6, 2000, 386 Phil. 221.
[22]
A.C. No. 4083, March 27, 2000, 328 SCRA 694.
[23]
A.C. No. 2614, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 513.

[24]

Gatchalian case, supra., Note 18.

A.C. No. 5668, April 19, 2002.
[26]
31 SCRA 1, 16-17 (1970).
[27]
Dumadag case, supra., Note 23.

R e p u bl i c of t h e P hi l i p p i n e s
S u p r e me C o u r t
B ag ui o C i t y

[25]

THIRD DIVISION

FERDINAND A. CRUZ,
Petitioner,

G . R . N o. 1 5 4 2 0 7

Present:
- versus -

YNARESS AN T I A G O , J . ,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIAM AR TI N E Z ,
C A L LE J O , S R . ,
CHICON AZ A R I O , a n d
N AC H U R A, J J .

ALBERTO MINA,

HON. ELEUTERIO F
GUERRERO and HON.
P r o mu l ga t e d :
ZENAIDA LAGUILLES,
Respondents.
Ap r i l 2 7 , 2 0 0 7
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

A U S T R I A - M A R TI N E Z , J . :
B e fo r e t h e C o u r t i s a P e t i t i o n fo r C e r t i o r a r i u n d e r R u l e 6 5
o f t h e R u l e s o f C o u r t , gr o u n d e d o n p u r e q u e s t i o n s o f l a w, w i t h
P r a ye r fo r P r e l i m i n a r y I n j u n c t i o n a s s a i l i n g t h e R e s o l u t i o n d a t e d
M a y 3 , 2 0 0 2 p r o mu l g a t e d b y t h e R e gi o n a l Tr i a l C o u r t ( R T C ) ,
B r a n c h 1 1 6 , P a s a y C i t y, i n C i vi l C a s e N o . 0 2 - 0 1 3 7 , wh i c h d e n i e d
t h e i s s u a n c e o f a w r i t o f p r e l i mi n a r y i n j u n c t i o n a ga i n s t t h e
M e t r o p o l i t a n T r i a l C o u r t ( M e TC ) , B r a n c h 4 5 , P a s a y C i t y, i n
Criminal Case No. 00 -1705;[1] and the RTCs Order dated June 5,
2 0 0 2 d e n yi n g t h e M o t i o n fo r R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n . N o wr i t o f
preliminary injunction was issued by this Court .

Th e a n t e c e d e n t s :
O n S e p t e m b e r 2 5 , 2 0 0 0 , F e r d i n a n d A. C r u z ( p e t i t i o n e r ) fi l e d
b e fo r e t h e M e TC a fo r m a l E n t r y o f Ap p e a r a n c e , a s p r i va t e
p r o s e c u t o r , i n C r i m i n a l C a s e N o . 0 0 - 1 7 0 5 fo r G r a ve Th r e a t s ,
wh e r e h i s f a t h e r , M a r i a n o C r u z , i s t h e c o m p l a i n i n g w i t n e s s .
Th e p e t i t i o n e r , d e s c r i b i n g h i m s e l f a s a t h i r d ye a r l a w
student, justifies his appearance as private prosecuto r on the bases
of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of
the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.[2] that a
n o n - l a w ye r m a y a p p e a r b e fo r e t h e i n f e r i o r c o u r t s a s a n a ge n t o r
f r i e n d o f a p a r t y l i t i g a n t . Th e p e t i t i o n e r fu r t h e r m o r e a v e r s t h a t
h i s a p p e a r a n c e w a s wi t h t h e p r i o r c o n fo r mi t y o f t h e p u b l i c
prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing
him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
However,
in
an
Order
dated
February
1,
2002,
t h e M e T C d e n i e d p e r m i s s i o n fo r p e t i t i o n e r t o a p p e a r a s p r i va t e
p r o s e c u t o r o n t h e gr o u n d t h a t C i r c u l a r N o . 1 9 go v e r n i n g l i m i t e d
l a w s t u d e n t p r a c t i c e i n c o n j u n c t i o n wi t h R u l e 1 3 8 - A o f t h e R u l e s
o f C o u r t ( L a w S t u d e n t P r a c t i c e R u l e ) s h o u l d t a k e p r e c e d e n c e o ve r
t h e r u l i n g o f t h e C o u r t l a i d d o wn i n C a n t i m b u h a n ; a n d s e t t h e c a s e
fo r c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t r i a l . [ 3 ]
O n F e b r u a r y 1 3 , 2 0 0 2 , p e t i t i o n e r fi l e d b e fo r e t h e M e TC a
M o t i o n fo r R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s e e ki n g t o r e v e r s e t h e F e b r u a r y 1 ,
2 0 0 2 O r d e r a l l e gi n g t h a t R u l e 1 3 8 - A , o r t h e La w S t u d e n t P r a c t i c e
Rule, does not have the effect of su perseding Section 34 of Rule
1 3 8 , fo r t h e a u t h o r i t y t o i n t e r p r e t t h e r u l e i s t h e s o u r c e i t s e l f o f
t h e r u l e , wh i c h i s t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t a l o n e .
In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the
M o t i o n fo r R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n .

i s s u a n c e o f a n i n j u n c t i ve wr i t o n t h e gr o u n d t h a t t h e c r i m e o f
G r a v e Th r e a t s , t h e s u b j e c t o f C r i m i n a l C a s e N o . 0 0 - 1 7 0 5 , i s o n e
t h a t c a n b e p r o s e c u t e d d e o f i c i o , t h e r e b e i n g n o c l a i m fo r c i vi l
i n d e mn i t y, a n d t h a t t h e r e fo r e , t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n o f a p r i v a t e
prosecutor is not legally tenable.
O n M a y 9 , 2 0 0 2 , t h e p e t i t i o n e r fi l e d b e f o r e t h e R T C a
M o t i o n fo r R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Th e p e t i t i o n e r a r gu e s t h a t n o wh e r e
d o e s t h e l a w p r o vi d e t h a t t h e c r i m e o f G r a ve Th r e a t s h a s n o c i vi l
a s p e c t . An d l a s t , p e t i t i o n e r c i t e s B a r M a t t e r N o . 7 3 0 d a t e d J u n e
1 0 , 1 9 9 7 wh i c h e xp r e s s l y p r o vi d e s fo r t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f a n o n l a w ye r b e fo r e t h e i n f e r i o r c o u r t s , a s a n a ge n t o r fr i e n d o f a p a r t y
l i t i ga n t , e ve n w i t h o u t t h e s u p e r vi s i o n o f a m e mb e r o f t h e b a r .
P e n d i n g t h e r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e fo r e go i n g M o t i o n fo r
R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n b e fo r e t h e R T C , t h e p e t i t i o n e r f i l e d a S e c o n d
Motion
fo r
Reconsideration
dated
June
7,
2002
wi t h
the MeTCseeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order
o f t h e s a i d c o u r t , o n t h e s t r e n gt h o f B a r M a t t e r N o . 7 3 0 , a n d a
M o t i o n t o H o l d I n Ab e ya n c e t h e Tr i a l d a t e d J u n e 1 0 , 2 0 0 2 o f
Criminal
Case
No.
00-1705
pending
the
o u t c o me
of
t h e c e r t i o r a r i p r o c e e d i n g s b e fo r e t h e R TC .
O n J u n e 5 , 2 0 0 2 , t h e R T C i s s u e d i t s O r d e r d e n yi n g t h e
p e t i t i o n e r s M o t i o n fo r R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
Li ke w i s e , i n a n O r d e r d a t e d J u n e 1 3 , 2 0 0 2 , t h e M e TC d e n i e d
t h e p e t i t i o n e r s S e c o n d M o t i o n fo r R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n a n d h i s
M o t i o n t o H o l d i n Ab e ya n c e t h e Tr i a l o n t h e gr o u n d t h a t t h e R TC
h a d a l r e a d y d e n i e d t h e E n t r y o f A p p e a r a n c e o f p e t i t i o n e r b e fo r e
the MeTC.
O n J u l y 3 0 , 2 0 0 2 , t h e p e t i t i o n e r d i r e c t l y f i l e d wi t h t h i s
C o u r t , t h e i n s t a n t P e t i t i o n a n d a s s i gn s t h e fo l l o wi n g e r r o r s :
I.

O n Ap r i l 2 , 2 0 0 2 , t h e p e t i t i o n e r fi l e d b e fo r e t h e R T C a
P e t i t i o n fo r C e r t i o r a r i a n d Ma n d a m u s w i t h P r a ye r f o r P r e l i m i n a r y
I n j u n c t i o n a n d T e m p o r a r y R e s t r a i n i n g O r d e r a g a i n s t t h e p r i va t e
respondent and the public respondent MeTC.
A f t e r h e a r i n g t h e p r a ye r fo r p r e l i m i n a r y i n j u n c t i o n t o
r e s t r a i n p u b l i c r e s p o n d e n t M e TC J u d g e f r o m p r o c e e d i n g wi t h
C r i m i n a l C a s e N o . 0 0 - 1 7 0 5 p e n d i n g t h e C e r t i o r a r i p r o c e e d i n gs ,
t h e R TC , i n a R e s o l u t i o n d a t e d M a y 3 , 2 0 0 2 , r e s o l v e d t o d e n y t h e

THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

ABUSED
I TS
D I S C R E TI O N
WHEN
IT
R E S O LV E D T O D E N Y T H E P R A Y E R F O R T H E
WR I T O F I N J U N C T I O N O F T H E H E R E I N
P E TI TI O N E R D E S P I TE P E TI TI O N E R H AV I N G
E S T A B L I S H E D T H E N E C E S S I TY O F G R A N T I N G
T H E WR I T;

II.
T H E R E S P O N D E N T TR I A L C O U R T A B U S E D I TS
D I S C R E TI O N , T A N T AM O U N T T O I G N O R A N C E
O F TH E L A W , W H E N I T R E S O LV E D TO D E N Y
THE
P R AY E R
FOR
TH E
WRIT
OF
P R E LI M I N A R Y
I N J U N C TI O N
AND
THE
SUBSEQUENT
M O TI O N
FOR
RECONSIDERATION
OF
THE
HEREIN
P E TI TI O N E R O N T H E B A S I S T H A T [ GR AV E ]
T H R E A T S H AS N O C I V I L AS P E C T, F O R T H E
S AI D B A S I S O F D E N I A L I S N O T I N A C C O R D
WI T H T H E L A W ;

C o n s i d e r i n g t h a t t h i s c a s e i n vo l v e s t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,
c l a r i fi c a t i o n , a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f S e c t i o n 3 4 , R u l e 1 3 8 o f t h e
R u l e s o f C o u r t , B a r M a t t e r N o . 7 3 0 , C i r c u l a r N o . 1 9 go ve r n i n g
law student practice and Rule 138 -A of the Rules of Court, and
t h e r u l i n g o f t h e C o u r t i n C a n t i m b u h a n , t h e C o u r t t a ke s
c o gn i z a n c e o f h e r e i n p e t i t i o n .
Th e b a s i c q u e s t i o n i s wh e t h e r t h e p e t i t i o n e r , a l a w s t u d e n t ,
m a y a p p e a r b e fo r e a n i n f e r i o r c o u r t a s a n a ge n t o r fr i e n d o f a
party litigant.
Th e c o u r t s a q u o h e l d t h a t t h e L a w S t u d e n t P r a c t i c e R u l e a s
encapsulated in Rule 138 -A of the Rules of Court, prohibits the
p e t i t i o n e r , a s a l a w s t u d e n t , fr o m e n t e r i n g h i s a p p e a r a n c e i n
b e h a l f o f h i s f a t h e r , t h e p r i v a t e c o mp l a i n a n t i n t h e c r i m i n a l c a s e
w i t h o u t t h e s u p e r vi s i o n o f a n a t t o r n e y d u l y a c c r e d i t e d b y t h e l a w
school.

III.
R u l e 1 3 8 - A o r t h e L a w S t u d e n t P r a c t i c e R u l e , p r o vi d e s :
T H E R E S P O N D E N T M E T R O P O LI T A N T R I A L
C O U R T A B U S E D I TS D I S C R E T I O N W H E N I T
D E N I E D TH E M O T I O N T O H O L D I N AB E Y A N C E
T R I A L , WH E N W H A T W A S D E N I E D B Y T H E
R E S P O N D E N T R E G I O N A L TR I A L C O U R T I S
THE
ISSUANCE
OF
THE
WR I T
OF
P R E LI M I N A R Y I N J U N C TI O N A N D W H E N T H E
R E S P O N D E N T R E G I O N A L TR I A L C O U R T I S
Y E T TO D E C I D E O N T H E M E R I TS O F T H E
P E TI TI O N F O R C E R T I O R A R I ;
IV.
T H E R E S P O N D E N T C O U R T[ S ] AR E C L E AR L Y
I GN O R I N G TH E L A W W H E N T H E Y P A TE N T L Y
R E F U S E D TO H E E D T O [ s i c ] T H E C LE A R
M AN D A TE O F T H E L AP U T , C A N TI M B U H A N
A N D B U L A C A N C A S E S , A S WE L L A S B AR
M A T TE R N O . 7 3 0 , P R O V I D I N G F O R TH E
AP P E A R A N C E O F N O N - L A W Y E R S B E F O R E T H E
L O WE R C O U R TS ( M TC S ) . [ 4 ]
Th i s C o u r t , i n e x c e p t i o n a l c a s e s , a n d fo r c o m p e l l i n g
r e a s o n s , o r i f w a r r a n t e d b y t h e n a t u r e o f t h e i s s u e s r e vi e w e d , m a y
t a ke c o gn i z a n c e o f p e t i t i o n s fi l e d d i r e c t l y b e fo r e i t . [ 5 ]

R U LE 1 3 8 - A
L A W S T U D E N T P R AC T I C E R U L E
Section
1.
Conditions
for
Student
P r a c t i c e . A l a w s t u d e n t wh o h a s s u c c e s s fu l l y
c o mp l e t e d h i s 3 r d ye a r o f t h e r e gu l a r fo u r - ye a r
prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a
r e c o gn i z e d l a w s c h o o l ' s c l i n i c a l l e ga l e d u c a t i o n
p r o gr a m a p p r o ve d b y t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t , m a y
a p p e a r w i t h o u t c o m p e n s a t i o n i n a n y c i vi l , c r i m i n a l
o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c a s e b e fo r e a n y t r i a l c o u r t ,
t r i b u n a l , b o a r d o r o f f i c e r , t o r e p r e s e n t i n d i ge n t
c l i e n t s a c c e p t e d b y t h e l e ga l c l i n i c o f t h e l a w
school.
S e c . 2 . A p p e a r a n c e . Th e a p p e a r a n c e o f
the law student authorized by this rule, shall be
under the direct supervision and control of a
member
of
the
I n t e gr a t e d
Bar
of
the Philippines duly accredited by the law school.
An y a n d a l l p l e a d i n gs , mo t i o n s , b r i e f s , m e m o r a n d a
o r o t h e r p a p e r s t o b e f i l e d , mu s t b e s i gn e d b y t h e
s u p e r vi s i n g a t t o r n e y f o r a n d i n b e h a l f o f t h e l e g a l
clinic.

However, in Resolution [6] dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter

N o . 7 3 0 , t h e C o u r t E n B a n c c l a r i fi e d :
T h e r u l e , h ow e v e r , i s di f f e r e n t i f t h e l aw
s t u d e nt a p p e a r s b e f or e a n i nf e r i or c o u r t , w he r e
the
issues
and
p r o c e d ur e
ar e
r e l at i v e l y
s i mp l e . I n i nf e r i or c o u r t s , a l aw s t u d e nt ma y
a p p e a r i n hi s p e r s o n al c a p ac i t y w i t h o u t t h e
s u pe r vi s i o n of a l aw y e r . S e c t i o n 3 4 , R u l e 1 3 8
p r o vi d e s :
Sec.
34. By
whom
l i t i g a t i o n i s c o n d u c t e d . - I n t he
c o u r t o f a j u s t i c e of t h e p e ac e , a
p a r t y m a y c o n d u c t h i s l i t i ga t i o n i n
person, with the aid of an agent or
f r i e n d a p p o i n t e d b y h i m fo r t h a t
p u r p o s e , o r wi t h t h e a i d o f a n
a t t o r n e y. I n a n y o t h e r c o u r t , a
p a r t y m a y c o n d u c t h i s l i t i ga t i o n
personally or by aid of an
a t t o r n e y, a n d h i s a p p e a r a n c e m u s t
be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.
T h u s , a l aw s t u d e nt ma y ap p e a r b e f o r e
a n i nf e r i o r c o u r t a s a n ag e nt o r f r i e n d of a
p a r t y w i t h o ut t h e s u pe r vi s i o n of a me mb e r of
t h e b a r . [ 7 ] ( E mp h a s i s s u p p l i e d )
Th e p h r a s e I n t h e c o u r t o f a j u s t i c e o f t h e p e a c e i n B a r
Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to In the court of a
m u n i c i p a l i t y a s i t n o w a p p e a r s i n S e c t i o n 3 4 o f R u l e 1 3 8 , t h u s : [ 8 ]
SEC.
34.
By
whom
litigation
is
c o n d u c t e d . I n t he C o u r t o f a mu n i c i p al i t y a
p a r t y m a y c o n d u c t h i s l i t i g a t i o n i n p e r s o n , wi t h
t h e a i d o f a n a g e n t o r f r i e n d a p p o i n t e d b y h i m fo r
t h a t p u r p o s e , o r w i t h t h e a i d o f a n a t t o r n e y. I n a n y
other court, a party may conduct his litigatio n
personally or by aid of an attorney and his
a p p e a r a n c e mu s t b e e i t h e r p e r s o n a l o r b y a d u l y
authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)

wh i c h i s t h e p r e v a i l i n g r u l e a t t h e t i m e t h e p e t i t i o n e r fi l e d h i s
E n t r y o f A p p e a r a n c e w i t h t h e M e TC o n S e p t e m b e r 2 5 , 2 0 0 0 . N o
r e a l d i s t i n c t i o n e xi s t s f o r u n d e r S e c t i o n 6 , R u l e 5 o f t h e R u l e s o f
C o u r t , t h e t e r m "M u n i c i p a l Tr i a l C o u r t s " a s u s e d i n t h e s e R u l e s
s h a l l i n c l u d e M e t r o p o l i t a n Tr i a l C o u r t s , M u n i c i p a l T r i a l C o u r t s i n
C i t i e s , M u n i c i p a l Tr i a l C o u r t s , a n d M u n i c i p a l C i r c u i t Tr i a l
Courts.
Th e r e i s r e a l l y n o p r o b l e m a s t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f S e c t i o n
3 4 o f R u l e 1 3 8 a n d R u l e 1 3 8 - A. I n t h e fo r m e r , t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f
a n o n - l a w ye r , a s a n a ge n t o r fr i e n d o f a p a r t y l i t i ga n t , i s e xp r e s s l y
a l l o w e d , w h i l e t h e l a t t e r r u l e p r o vi d e s f o r c o n d i t i o n s wh e n a l a w
student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear
b e fo r e t h e c o u r t s .
P e t i t i o n e r e xp r e s s l y a n c h o r e d h i s a p p e a r a n c e o n S e c t i o n 3 4
o f R u l e 1 3 8 . Th e c o u r t a q u o mu s t h a v e b e e n c o n fu s e d b y t h e f a c t
t h a t p e t i t i o n e r r e f e r r e d t o h i ms e l f a s a l a w s t u d e n t i n h i s e n t r y o f
a p p e a r a n c e . R u l e 1 3 8 - A s h o u l d n o t h a ve b e e n u s e d b y t h e
c o u r t s a q u o i n d e n yi n g p e r m i s s i o n t o a c t a s p r i v a t e p r o s e c u t o r
a g a i n s t p e t i t i o n e r fo r t h e s i mp l e r e a s o n t h a t R u l e 1 3 8 - A i s n o t t h e
b a s i s fo r t h e p e t i t i o n e r s a p p e a r a n c e .
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the
i n f e r i o r c o u r t s b y a n o n - l a w ye r i s a l l o w e d , i r r e s p e c t i ve o f wh e t h e r
o r n o t h e i s a l a w s t u d e n t . As s u c c i n c t l y c l a r i f i e d i n B a r M a t t e r
N o . 7 3 0 , b y vi r t u e o f S e c t i o n 3 4 , R u l e 1 3 8 , a l a w s t u d e n t m a y
a p p e a r , a s a n a g e n t o r a fr i e n d o f a p a r t y l i t i g a n t , wi t h o u t t h e
s u p e r vi s i o n o f a l a w ye r b e fo r e i n f e r i o r c o u r t s .
P e t i t i o n e r fu r t h e r a r gu e s t h a t t h e R TC e r r o n e o u s l y h e l d
t h a t , b y i t s v e r y n a t u r e , n o c i vi l l i a b i l i t y m a y f l o w f r o m t h e c r i m e
o f G r a v e Th r e a t s , a n d , fo r t h i s r e a s o n , t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n o f a
private prosecutor is not possible.
I t i s c l e a r fr o m t h e R T C D e c i s i o n t h a t n o s u c h c o n c l u s i o n
h a d b e e n i n t e n d e d b y t h e R TC . I n d e n yi n g t h e i s s u a n c e o f t h e
i n j u n c t i ve c o u r t , t h e R T C s t a t e d i n i t s D e c i s i o n t h a t t h e r e w a s n o
c l a i m fo r c i vi l l i a b i l i t y b y t h e p r i v a t e c o mp l a i n a n t fo r d a m a g e s ,
a n d t h a t t h e r e c o r d s o f t h e c a s e d o n o t p r o vi d e f o r a c l a i m fo r
i n d e mn i t y; a n d t h a t t h e r e fo r e , p e t i t i o n e r s a p p e a r a n c e a s p r i v a t e
prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.
U n d e r A r t i c l e 1 0 0 o f t h e R e vi s e d P e n a l C o d e , e v e r y p e r s o n
c r i m i n a l l y l i a b l e fo r a f e l o n y i s a l s o c i vi l l y l i a b l e e x c e p t i n

i n s t a n c e s w h e n n o a c t u a l d a m a ge r e s u l t s f r o m a n o f f e n s e , s u c h a s
e s p i o n a g e , vi o l a t i o n o f n e u t r a l i t y, fl i gh t t o a n e n e m y c o u n t r y, a n d
c r i m e a g a i n s t p o p u l a r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . [ 9 ] Th e b a s i c r u l e a p p l i e s i n
t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , s u c h t h a t wh e n a c r i m i n a l a c t i o n i s i n s t i t u t e d , t h e
c i vi l a c t i o n fo r t h e r e c o ve r y o f c i vi l l i a b i l i t y a r i s i n g fr o m t h e
o f f e n s e c h a r ge d s h a l l b e d e e m e d i n s t i t u t e d wi t h c r i mi n a l a c t i o n ,
u n l e s s t h e o f f e n d e d p a r t y w a i ve s t h e c i vi l a c t i o n , r e s e r v e s t h e
r i gh t t o i n s t i t u t e i t s e p a r a t e l y o r i n s t i t u t e s t h e c i vi l a c t i o n p r i o r t o
the criminal action.[10]
Th e p e t i t i o n e r i s c o r r e c t i n s t a t i n g t h a t t h e r e b e i n g n o
r e s e r v a t i o n , w a i v e r , n o r p r i o r i n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e c i vi l a s p e c t i n
C r i m i n a l C a s e N o . 0 0 - 1 7 0 5 , i t fo l l o w s t h a t t h e c i vi l a s p e c t a r i s i n g
f r o m G r a ve Th r e a t s i s d e e m e d i n s t i t u t e d w i t h t h e c r i mi n a l a c t i o n ,
a n d , h e n c e , t h e p r i va t e p r o s e c u t o r m a y r i gh t fu l l y i n t e r v e n e t o
p r o s e c u t e t h e c i vi l a s p e c t .
W H E R E F O R E , t h e P e t i t i o n i s G R A N T E D . Th e a s s a i l e d
R e s o l u t i o n a n d O r d e r o f t h e R e gi o n a l T r i a l C o u r t , B r a n c h
1 1 6 , P a s a y C i t y a r e R E VE R S E D a n d S E T
A S I D E . Th e
Metropolitan
Tr i a l
Court,
Branch
45, Pasay City
i s D I R E C T E D t o A D M I T t h e E n t r y o f Ap p e a r a n c e o f p e t i t i o n e r i n
C r i m i n a l C a s e N o . 0 0 - 1 7 0 5 a s a p r i va t e p r o s e c u t o r u n d e r t h e
d i r e c t c o n t r o l a n d s u p e r vi s i o n o f t h e p u b l i c p r o s e c u t o r .

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

M I N I T A V. C H I C O - N A
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

r e a c h e d i n c o n s u l t a t i o n b e fo r e t h e c a s e w a s a s s i gn e d t o t h e wr i t e r
o f t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t s D i vi s i o n .

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
C h a i r p e r s o n , Th i r d D i v i s i o n
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice

WE C O N C U R :

C E R T I F I C A T I O N
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,

a n d t h e D i vi s i o n C h a i r p e r s o n s At t e s t a t i o n , i t i s h e r e b y c e r t i f i e d
t h a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n s i n t h e a b o ve D e c i s i o n h a d b e e n r e a c h e d i n

c o n s u l t a t i o n b e fo r e t h e c a s e w a s a s s i gn e d t o t h e w r i t e r o f t h e
opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]

[6]
[7]
[8]

[9]

[10]

Entitled, People of the Philippines v. Alberto Mina.

211 Phil. 373, 378 (1983).
Rollo, p. 26.
Rollo, pp. 7-9.
U n i t e d L a b o r a t o r i e s , I n c . v . I s i p , G. R . N o . 1 6 3 8 5 8 , J u n e
28, 2005, 461 SCRA 574, 593; Ark Travel Express, Inc.
v . A b r o g a r , G . R . N o . 1 3 7 0 1 0 , Au gu s t 2 9 , 2 0 0 3 , 4 1 0 S C R A
148, 157.
2 7 3 S C R A xi .
I d . a t xi i i - xi v.
S e e B u l a c a n v . T o r c i n o , G. R . N o . L - 4 4 3 8 8 , J a n u a r y 3 0 ,
1985, 134 SCRA 252, 257 -258
S a n c h e z v . F a r E a s t B a n k a n d T r u s t C o . , G. R . N o .
1 5 5 3 0 9 , N o ve m b e r 1 5 , 2 0 0 5 , 4 7 5 S C R A 9 7 , 1 1 1 .
Chua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150793, November
19, 2004, 443 SCRA 259, 267 -268.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

Atty. Alfredo Villamor, Jr., et al., which was filed by petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City on January 13, 2005.

THIRD DIVISION

LEONARDO S. UMALE, substituted by CLARISSA

VICTORIA UMALE,[1]
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 171634

Present:

Petitioner stated that within the business district of Pasig City lies several
hectares of land, referred to as the Payanig Property, which belongs to Mid-Pasig
Land Development Corporation (Mid-Pasig). Mid-Pasig is a corporation
surrendered by the Campos family to the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG). Since obtaining control of the Payanig property, the PCGG,
through Mid-Pasig, has leased, and granted options to lease parcels of the said
property. The Pasig Printing Corporation (PPC) was awarded a lease contract over a
5,000-square-meter property located along Meralco Avenue.

versus -

ATTY. ALFREDO VILLAMOR, JR.,

Respondent.

CARPIO, J.,
Petitioner alleged that sometime in 2003, PPC officers approached him
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
with a proposal for a business venture for the development of property.
**
BRION,
Petitioner expressed interest to develop not only the 5,000-square-meter property,
PERALTA, and
but also other parcels of land within the Payanig property, some of which were
***
SERENO, JJ.
under litigation. PPC agreed to negotiate with Mid-Pasig for the right over these
other parcels of land. In exchange for petitioners commitment to develop the 5,000Promulgated:
square-meter property, now known as Metrowalk, PPC allegedly committed to
deliver to petitioner the proceeds obtained from some of these litigated parcels of
August 17, 2011 land.

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Resolution of the Board of Governors
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in CBD Case No. 05-417 dismissing the
Complaint for Disbarment filed by petitioner against respondent.
On April 22, 2005, petitioner filed a Complaint for Disbarment[2] before
the Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against
respondent for committing acts violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The factual background of the Complaint was culled from the facts stated
in petitioners Complaint in Civil Case No. 70251, entitled Leonardo S. Umale v.

Moreover, petitioner alleged that during the development of the property

occupied by Metrowalk, petitioner and PPC worked to obtain rights to the other
litigated parcels of the Payanig Property, including the land occupied by MC Home
Depot, located at the corner of Meralco Avenue and Ortigas Avenue. The rights to
MC Home Depot was being litigated with a former lease holder, Rockland
Construction Company. In consideration of petitioners efforts, work and
investment, PPC allegedly agreed that in the event that it obtained any rights or
interests, concessions, option, contract and/or proceeds in relation to the parcel of
land occupied by MC Home Depot, the said rights or interest would belong to
petitioner, and that any proceeds and/or checks obtained would be remitted
immediately to petitioner as the beneficial owner.
Subsequently, after negotiations with Mid-Pasig for an option to lease the
property occupied by MC Home Depot, petitioner stated that he used his personal
funds to pay to Mid-Pasig, on May 1, 2004, the option money for the lease of the
said property.
To protect his interest in the MC Home Depot property, petitioner
allegedly requested respondent Atty. Alfredo Villamor, Jr. -- a lawyer he personally
knew and who was acceptable to all investors whom he transacted with -- to
negotiate and act in his behalf and PPC in relation to the MC Home Depot property.
Respondent allegedly knew about the agreement between petitioner and PPC.

To safeguard his interest in the proceeds, petitioner allegedly required

respondent to insist that any agreement with MC Home Depot, Inc. must contain
two conditions: (1) that in the event of default in payments, petitioners personal
lawyer, Atty. E. Hans S. Santos, would have the right and authority to recover actual
possession over the property, and that this authority could not be rescinded or
revoked without the consent of Atty. E. Hans S. Santos; and (2) that all check
payments be issued payable to "Cash" and not payable to PPC, so that these checks
could be immediately turned over and delivered to petitioner who could encash,
negotiate them or rediscount them as he saw fit. Petitioner stated that the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated November 22, 2004, executed between
PPC and MC Home Depot, Inc., included these two conditions.
Moreover, under the terms of the MOA, MC Home Depot, Inc. agreed to
pay PPC P4.5 million per month for the next four years for the use and occupation
of the property, and P18 million as goodwill. Pursuant to the agreement, the officers
of MC Home Depot, Inc. issued a total of 20 pay-to-cash checks in payment for the
agreed monthly rate and for goodwill. Respondent allegedly received these checks
from MC Home Depot, Inc. in behalf of petitioner as the beneficial owner.
Petitioner alleged that three of the 20 checks totaling P9.5 million, and all
dated November 2004, were promptly turned over to him, and also all proceeds in
relation to the MC Home Depot property. However, respondent continued to hold
on to the other 17 checks dated December 2004 to October 2005, which were not
turned over by respondent despite repeated demands. Subsequently, respondent
delivered only two checks totaling four million pesos (P4 million) and cash in the
amount of P1.5 million on January 7, 2005 and January 10, 2005.
According to petitioner, the crux of the dispute in Civil Case No. 70251 was
respondents refusal to deliver to him checks and proceeds from MC Home Depot,
Inc. issued and given pursuant to the MOA dated November 22, 2004. Petitioner
claimed that respondent received those checks and proceeds in trust for him
(petitioner), as respondent was fully aware of the arrangement between him
(petitioner) and PPC.
Petitioner contends that in regard to his application for preliminary
mandatory injunction/temporary restraining order in Civil Case No. 70251,
respondent filed an Opposition thereto justifying his refusal to deliver the amounts
demanded on the grounds that:
1. Respondent received the checks for and in behalf of
PPC as its attorney-in-fact.
2. PPC has an ostensible right to the checks under the
provisions of the contract.[3]
3. The contract was between the issuer of the checks,
MC Home Depot, Inc., and PPC, represented therein by

respondent, and petitioner was not a party to the agreement

between MC Home Depot, Inc. and PPC.[4]

Petitioner further contended that the rights and interests of PPC over the
proceeds from MC Home Depot Inc. was waived, assigned and transferred to the
Defensor Briones Villamor and Tolentino Law Offices without any consideration
per the Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Board of Directors of PPC dated
November 11, 2004.[5]
Petitioner learned that respondent never delivered or turned over to PPC
any amount received by him from MC Home Depot, Inc. On April 13, 2005,
petitioner sent a demand letter to respondent requiring an explanation for the
waiver, as well as the misrepresentation in the pleadings, but respondent failed and
refused to explain why they failed to remit the proceeds to him or to PPC.
Petitioner claimed that respondent lied in his pleadings in Civil Case No.
70251, stating that he was an attorney-in-fact of PPC, when respondent allegedly
knew that he was not, which was violative of the duty of respondent as a lawyer to
be truthful to the courts, and truthful in his pleadings.[6]
Petitioner also contended that whether he or PPC is the client, the fact
remains that respondent kept the proceeds from MC Home Depot, Inc, which he
admittedly received, and respondent did not turn over the checks to him or to PPC,
his alleged principal, in violation of his duty and responsibility as a lawyer. [7]
In addition, petitioner stated that it appears from the Minutes of the
Special Meeting of the Board of Directors of PPC dated November 11, 2004 that the
fees due to the Defensor Briones Villamor and Tolentino Law Offices for legal
services performed for PPC amounts to over P200 million. Petitioner contends that
the amount received and pocketed by respondent and/or the Defensor Briones
Villamor and Tolentino Law Offices is staggering, shocking and unconscionable,
and violative of Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states,
A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.
In his Answer, respondent denied that the complaint was instituted for a
valid cause, and stated that it was another harassment suit filed against him by
petitioner. He stated that in Civil Case No. 70251 before the RTC of Pasig City,
petitioner failed to obtain a temporary restraining order and he has not been granted
any provisional remedy with respect to the checks being claimed by him.
Respondent categorically denied the charge of deliberate
misrepresentation made in the pleadings. He asserted that the pleadings clearly
showed that the legal arguments advanced therein were to oppose petitioners
application for injunctive writ and temporary restraining order.

Respondent stated that whatever rights PPC had under the Option to
Lease that portion of the property commonly known as the MC Home Depot were
subject of waiver, assignment and transfer in his favor, acting as counsel for an
undisclosed client. He stated that PPCs rights were then subject of pending
litigation between claimants and there was nothing certain and definite as to whether
PPC would be able to obtain possession of the MC Home Depot property without it
incurring more expenses due to the pending litigation involving the right to
possession of the said property; thus, PPC did not see any practical and beneficial
outcome from the said option. Respondent alleged that the option money PPC paid
for the lease of the MC Home Depot property was used to pay for another option to
lease covering the Rockland area. Hence, insofar as the MC Home Depot property
was concerned, PPC did not pay anything therefor nor lost anything by the waiver in
favor of respondent.
Respondent alleged that in consideration of the waiver by PPC, he strove
to obtain legal possession of the MC Home Depot property and was successful in
defeating other claimants thereto. To protect the rights of PPC regarding the MC
Home Depot property, respondent dealt with the owner of MC Home Depot
property, Mid-Pasig, for the purpose of formalizing a lease contract over the MC
Home Depot property and the acceptance by Mid-Pasig of respondents offer of
reasonable compensation for the use of the MC Home Depot property. In addition,
respondent undertook to free PPC from any liability for any tax incidents which may
arise out of the MOA over the MC Home Depot property.
Respondent stated that whatever is due to petitioner has already been
received by him, and petitioner admitted in his Complaint that he already
received P15 million.[8]
Respondent contended that he has not committed any violation of any
provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and any of his sworn
responsibilities and duties encompassed in his oath as a lawyer.
Petitioner filed a Request for Admission dated July 7, 2005.
In his Reply,[9] respondent admitted the existence and genuineness of the
Opposition (To Application for Preliminary/Mandatory Injunction/ Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO)/Temporary Mandatory Injunction) and the Memorandum
(Opposition to Application for TRO) filed in Civil Case No. 70251. Respondent
also admitted the demand letter dated January 10, 2005 and respondent's Reply
thereto dated January 11, 2005.
Respondent averred that he had no duty to remit, either to petitioner or to
PPC any premiums or rentals from the MC Home Depot property. Respondent
stated that with respect to the premiums and rentals and/or checks due from the MC
Home Depot property for the period from December 2004 up to October

2005, he acted as lawyer for a client with regard to the premiums and rentals or
checks due from the MC Home Depot property, and he is barred and prevented by
his confidential relations with his said client to disclose, without permission from
the client, any communications which he and his client may have made regarding
the subject of the lawyer-client relationship.
On September 9, 2005, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP submitted a Report and Recommendation
on the disbarment case. He stated that the two issues to be settled in this case are:
(1) the alleged non-remittance by respondent to petitioner of the rental proceeds
from the MC Home Depot, Inc.; and (2) the alleged misrepresentation by respondent
as to his relation with PPC.
In regard to the first issue, petitioner claimed that the checks received by
respondent should have been remitted to him as the "beneficial owner." However,
Commissioner Funa stated that petitioner did not adduce any documentary or
testimonial evidence showing that he is the real or intended beneficiary of the MOA
dated November 22, 2004. He found it strange that a commercial and business
transaction worth more or less P200 million would have no signed documentation to
show petitioners beneficial ownership or other financial interest. He averred that
PPC could have validated petitioner's undocumented claim that he is the "beneficial
owner" of the subject checks, but it did not do so.
The second issue of misrepresentation by respondent referred to the
statement in the pleadings filed in Civil Case No. 70251 that respondent was the
attorney-in-fact of PPC, when PPC had previously waived, assigned and transferred
its rights over the MC Home Depot property in favor of respondents law firm. In
defense, respondent contended that he never stated that he was an attorney-in-fact of
PPC, but rather such claim was made in a pleading signed by another lawyer, Atty.
Raul Ibay Tolentino, and not by him.
Commissioner Funa observed that a reading of the said
pleadings[10] showed that they were not signed by respondent. Moreover, assuming
that respondent did claim and act as attorney-in-fact of PPC, it could not be readily
said that this position would conflict with the waiver, assignment and transfer of
PPC's interests to respondent's law firm and, therefore, constitute misrepresentation.
Commissioner Funa stated that respondent's receipt of the checks had not been
repudiated or challenged by PPC or by respondent's law firm; thus, it could be
concluded that respondent's receipt of the checks was with the consent and
agreement of both PPC and respondent's law firm. Any irregularity in
respondent's behavior should have been challenged by either PPC or respondent's
law firm, as they were the parties that would be directly affected by any
misrepresentation on the part of respondent.

Commissioner Funa averred that whether respondent received the checks

on behalf of PPC or on behalf of respondents law firm was immaterial to petitioner,
who was not party in the said agreement. He stated that it was possible that
respondent received the checks to be turned over to his law firm with the consent
and agreement of PPC. The assignee and transferee is respondents law firm and not
respondent himself. Commissioner Funa held that the charge of misrepresentation,
so as to impute deceit, malice or evil intent, has not been satisfactorily established.
There is no sufficient factual basis to hold respondent liable.
Commissioner Funa submitted that respondent did not commit any act for
which he should be disciplined or administratively sanctioned, and recommended
the dismissal of the case for lack of merit.
On December 17, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP
passed Resolution No. XVII-2005-192, dismissing the case for lack of merit, thus:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2005-192
CBD Case No. 05-1471
Leonardo S. Umale vs. Atty. Alfredo Villamor, Jr.
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that the case
lacks merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED.[11]

any in Court, nor shall he mislead, or allow

the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall
account for all money or property collected
or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall
deliver the funds and property of his client
when due or upon demand. x x x
II
WHETHER
OR
NOT
ATTY.
ALFREDO
VILLAMOR, JR. SHOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR
HIS CLAIM OF HAVING ACQUIRED THE INTEREST OF
HIS SUPPOSED CLIENT OVER THE PROPERTY THAT IS
A SUBJECT OF LITIGATIONS.
III
WHETHER
OR
NOT
ATTY.
ALFREDO
VILLAMOR, JR. SHOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR
MAKING CONFLICTING CLAIMS ON HIS PLEADINGS
BEFORE DIFFERENT FORA DEPENDING ON HIS NEED
AT A PARTICULAR FORA.[13]

Petitioner contends that as a lawyer, respondent violated the following

ethical standards provided for in the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Petitioner filed a petition[12] for review within the reglementary period,

raising the following issues:

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor

consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

I
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTY.
ALFREDO VILLAMOR, JR. COMMITTED VIOLATIONS
OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
SPECIFICALLY THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS, TO WIT:

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or

property collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not

engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do
any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of

Canon 20A lawyer shall charge only fair and

reasonable fees.

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and

property of his client when due or upon demand.

Petitioner states that in Civil Case No. 70251, he claimed that he owns all
the proceeds from the MC Home Depot property and that respondent had the

obligation to deliver the proceeds to him, while respondent alleged that PPC owns
the proceeds, and that he received the checks and proceeds for and on behalf of PPC.
Petitioner contends that respondent knowingly lied in his pleadings[14] in
Civil Case No. 70251, which pleadings were prepared by his law firm with his
knowledge and consent, by claiming that he was the attorney-in-fact of PPC.
Respondent never submitted any board resolution appointing him as such attorneyin-fact, the reason being, according to petitioner, was that respondent was in
possession of the PPC Board Resolution dated November 11, 2004, which board
resolution supposedly transferred to respondents law firm all rights, interests and
proceeds in the MC Home Depot property. Petitioner stated that instead of
disclosing the said transfer of right to the court, respondent lied, saying that he was
the attorney-in-fact of PPC when he knew that he was not, which is violative of his
duty as a lawyer to be truthful to the courts, and truthful in his pleadings.
Petitioner stressed that respondent argued that he received the subject
checks and proceeds for and on behalf of PPC in order to defeat his (petitioners)
application for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction in Civil
Case No. 70251, and respondent succeeded.
Moreover, petitioner contends that respondent just kept the proceeds,
which he admitted he received, and did not remit or deliver any check or proceeds to
him (petitioner) or to PPC, his alleged principal, which is violative of his duty as a
lawyer.
The arguments of petitioner do not persuade.
The pleadings in Civil Case No. 70251 referred to by petitioner are
respondents Opposition (To Application for Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order/Temporary Mandatory Injunction) and his
Memorandum (Opposition to Application for Temporary Restraining Order). The
pertinent contextual portion of respondents Opposition [15] reads:

By his complaint, plaintiff has not shown any present,

clear, and unmistakable right to be protected. On the contrary, it
is defendant Villamor who appears to have a clear and present
right under the provisions of the Memorandum of Agreement
dated November 22, 2004 attached as Annex C to plaintiffs
complaint.
Anent the checks subject matter of the present case,
plaintiff seeks that defendant Villamor be enjoined, by a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, in relation to the MC Home property, from
negotiating, transacting, encashing or in any manner performing

any act in relation to the checks identified and enumerated in

par. 2.27 of this complaint, without the written consent of
Umale, or unless directed to do so by a court order. Also
regarding said checks, plaintiff seeks that defendant Villamor be
ordered, by a temporary mandatory injunction and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, to immediately deliver and turn over
the same to Umale, and to immediately account for, deliver
and turn over to Umale the cash proceeds for subject checks
encashed without his consent.
However, it is defendant Villamor, as attorney-infact of the Pasig Printing Corporation (PPC), or, more
properly, it is Pasig Printing Corporation (PPC) itself who
has an ostensible right to the checks under the provisions of
the contract attached to the complaint. Even plaintiff himself
acknowledges that (u)nder the terms of said agreement, MC
Home Depot, Inc. agreed to pay PPC the amount of Four
Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (PHP4,500,000.00) per
month, for the next four years, for the use and occupation of the
MC Home property, and the payment of Eighteen Million Pesos
(PHP 18,000,000.00) as goodwill, and that pursuant to said
Agreement, MC Home Depot, Inc. and its officers issued a total
of twenty (20) pay to cash checks in payment for the agreed
monthly rate, and for the goodwill, all of which checks were
received by defendant Villamor from MC Home Depot, Inc. (see
pars. 2.18 and 2.19, Complaint).[16]
The last paragraph above was reiterated in respondents Memorandum
(Opposition to Application for Temporary Restraining Order). [17]
In an Order dated January 21, 2005, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 155, in
Civil Case No. 70251, denied petitioners application for temporary restraining
order, thus:
xxxx
After a careful evaluation of the arguments advanced
by both parties, the Court resolves to DENY the instant
application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
on the following grounds:
1.
The applicant has not clearly shown that
he is entitled to the relief demanded, not having as yet
substantiated his claimed right to the subject checks as the

alleged beneficial owner thereof. Plaintiffs claimed right

proceeds from an alleged side agreement between him and Pasig
Printing Corporation (PPC), which agreement, however, has not
as yet been convincingly shown. The fact that previous checks
and/or proceeds of checks were delivered to the plaintiff does
not
necessarily
establish
the
existence
of
that
agreement. Notably, plaintiff is not a party to the
agreement/transaction for which or by reason of which, the
checks were issued.[18]

The dispositive portion of the RTC decision above shows that one of the
grounds for the denial of petitioners application for a temporary restraining order in
Civil Case No. 70251 was because petitioner was not able to substantiate his right to
the subject checks as the beneficial owner thereof.
The Court finds that the statement, it is defendant Villamor, as attorneyin-fact of the Pasig Printing Corporation (PPC), or, more properly, it is Pasig
Printing Corporation (PPC) itself who has an ostensible right to the checks under
the provisions of the contract attached to the complaint, is not cause for
administrative sanction by the Court as it did not appear to mislead the RTC of
Pasig City, Branch 155 in rendering its decision on petitioners application for a
temporary restraining order in Civil Case No. 70251. In fact, respondent stated
therein that PPC had the right to the checks under the provisions of the contract,
which was correct under the MOA. It was within the discretion of respondents
counsel to determine whether or not to mention in the said Opposition the supposed
waiver of rights of PPC over the MC Home Depot Property in favor of his law
office. In fact, mentioning the said waiver would bolster the claim of respondent that
petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
Under the MOA[19] dated November 22, 2004, wherein PPC was
represented by respondent, PPC has the right to payment by MC Home Depot, Inc.
for the use and occupation of the property sub-leased. It appears that PPC allowed
respondent to collect the checks and proceeds from MC Home Depot, Inc., which
may have led to the statement in the aforementioned Opposition that it is defendant
Villamor, as attorney-in-fact of the Pasig Printing Corporation (PPC), or, more
properly, it is Pasig Printing Corporation (PPC) itself who has an ostensible right
to the checks under the provisions of the contract (MOA) attached to the
complaint.
On the other hand, it is alleged that under the PPC Board
Resolution[20] dated November 11, 2004, PPC waived its rights over the MC Home
Depot property in favor of respondents law office, the Defensor Briones Villamor
and Tolentino Law Offices. Thus, respondent finds support in the said waiver to
assert that petitioner is not entitled to the checks and proceeds from MC Home

Depot, Inc. and that whatever rights PPC had under the Option to Lease the MC
Home Depot property were subject of waiver, assignment and transfer in his
favor, acting as counsel for an undisclosed client. However, it should be pointed out
that the validity of the waiver is still the subject of a pending intra-corporate case
entitled Balmores v. Ignacio, et al.,[21] wherein petitioner therein prayed, among
others, for the annulment of the Board Resolution dated November 11, 2004, which
waived PPCs rights over the MC Home Depot property in favor of defendant
Villamors law firm.
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with the IBP Board of
Governors and the Commission on Bar Discipline that there was no
misrepresentation on the part of respondent.
Petitioner also contends that respondent did not turn over the subject
checks to him or to PPC in violation of respondents duty as a lawyer.
Petitioners contention is unmeritorious.
Petitioner failed to present evidence showing that he was entitled to the
checks from MC Home Depot, Inc., pursuant to the MOA[22] dated November 22,
2004 between MC Home Depot, Inc. and PPC. The MOA did not state that
petitioner was the beneficial owner of the checks, and petitioner was not a party to
the agreement.
In regard to the acknowledgment receipts of payments to petitioner, which
were submitted as proof of his beneficial ownership of the subject checks,
Investigating Commissioner Funa correctly found, thus:

With respect to the Acknowledgment of receipt of 2

checks and cash from Respondent (see Annex D of Complaint
in Civil Case) wherein Atty. Hans Santos stated that he received
such payments For and On Behalf of Mr. Leonardo Umale,
the document clearly does not state the nature of the transaction
giving rise to such remittances. It would be speculative to
conclude that the document proves that Complainant is the
beneficial owner of the MC Home Depot Contract.
As to the Acknowledgment Receipt dated January 10,
2005, signed by E. Hans S. Santos and Agnes H. Maranan,
which states: Received from Atty. Alfredo Villamor, Jr. the
additional amount of Php1,000,000.00 in cash as partial
payment to Mr. Leonardo Umale of proceeds on the MC Home
Depot property rentals/goodwill, the following can be
observed:

1.
The
Acknowledgment Receipt was not signed by
respondent, but rather by Complainants
legal counsel in this case. Although it bears
a stamp marking showing receipt by
Respondents law firm, it does not indicate
concurrence by Respondent as to its content.
2.
The
Acknowledgment Receipt can hardly be
considered as proof of beneficial ownership
over the MC Home Depot project as it does
not indicate any concurrence on the part of
the other parties to the MOA, namely the
MC Home Depot, Inc. and PPC.
Herein Complainant has not shown any documentary
or testimonial evidence to show that the real or intended
beneficiary of the November 22, [2004] MOA is herein
Complainant. x x x[23]

As regards the issue on the non-delivery of the subject checks to PPC, the
same is still the subject of a pending intra-corporate case seeking, among others, the
annulment of the Board Resolution dated November 11, 2004, which board
resolution waived the rights of PPC over the MC Home Depot property in favor of
respondents law office.
Petitioner also contends that from the November 11, 2004 Minutes, the
fees due to the Defensor Briones Villamor and Tolentino Law Offices for legal
service performed for PPC amounts to P200 million, which is violative of Canon 20
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states, A lawyer shall charge only
fair and reasonable fees.

2.
MATTERS TAKEN UP The President
of the Corporation informed the Board of the necessity of
passing a Board Resolution on the assignment and waiver of the
Corporations option to lease on the MC HOME DEPOT only.
After discussion, the following Board Resolution was adopted,
to wit:

BOARD RESOLUTION
RESOLVED, as it is hereby
resolved, that the Corporation waives,
assigns and transfers all its rights, interest,
and participation in par. 2 (d) of the
OPTION TO LEASE CONTRACT dated
March 1, 2004, of Notary Public Atty. Noel
J. Salvanera, under Doc. No. 369, page No.
76, Book No. III, Series of 2004, in favor of
Defensor Briones Villamor and Tolentino
Law Offices, who can perform such acts that
will lead to the recovery of a portion of the
Payanig sa Pasig property otherwise
known as the MC HOME DEPOT property,
registered in the name of Mid-Pasig Land
Development Corporation, a corporation
under the direct control and supervision of
the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), as well as to exercise
such rights as assignee, transferee of the MC
HOME DEPOT property, including the right
to lease and/or sublease the same, as it may
deem necessary;

The contention is unmeritorious.

The allegation of petitioner has not been substantiated. The Minutes[24] of
the Special Meeting of the Board of Directors of PPC dated November 11, 2004
reads:
xxxx
1.

CALL TO ORDER- x x x x

RESOLVED further that the

waiver, assignment and transfer referred to
above shall be limited only to the Option to
Lease that portion of the property commonly
known as the MC HOME DEPOT, located
at No. 168 Ortigas Avenue, corner Miracle
Avenue, Pasig City, and shall not include
the 18,000 square meters also subject of the
Option to Lease in favor of Pasig Printing
Corporation, which 18,000 square meters

exclusively belong to Pasig Printing

Corporation, who is already in possession
thereof;
3.

ADJOURNMENT x x x[25]

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Nowhere in the Minutes cited above is the payment of such legal fees
expressed. Moreover, the proper party to make such a complaint is PPC, but it has
not done so.
Petitioner further contends that the IBP Board of Governors and the
Commission on Bar Discipline erred in not holding respondent accountable for
acquiring the interest of his supposed client over the property that is subject of
litigation. In support of his argument, petitioner cited Ordonio v.
Eduarte[26] and Bautista v.Gonzales,[27] which held that under Article 1491 of the
Civil Code,[28] lawyers are prohibited from acquiring by assignment property and
rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by
virtue of their profession.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

The contention lacks merit.

The cases cited by petitioner involved the prohibited acquisition by a
lawyer of his clients property that was the object of the litigation in which the
lawyer represented his client. However, in this case, the property occupied by MC
Home Depot is registered under Mid-Pasig, and the records show that the litigation
over the property was between Rockland Construction Company, Inc. and MidPasig.[29] Petitioner failed to prove that respondents case is within the ambit or is
violative of Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated
December 17, 2005 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines in CBD Case No. 05-1471 dismissing the case for disbarment is
hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate
Justice
Third Division,
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had

been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]

Leonardo S. Umale, who died on March 16, 2006, was substituted by his
wife Clarissa Victoria Umale.
*
Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto
A. Abad, per Special Order No. 1059 dated August 1, 2011.
**
Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose
Catral Mendoza, per Special Order No. 1056 dated July 27, 2011.
***
Designated as an additional member, per Special Order No. 1028 dated
June 21, 2011.
[2]
Records, p. 1; rollo, p. 47.
[3]
Opposition
(To
Application
for
Preliminary
Mandatory
Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order/Temporary Mandatory Injunction) dated
January 18, 2004) dated January 18, 2004, rollo, p. 181.
[4]
Memorandum (Opposition to Application for Temporary Restraining
Order), id. at 194.
[5]
RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, that the Corporation waives,
assigns, and transfers all its rights, interests, and participation in par. 2 (d) of the
Option to Lease contract dated March 1, 2004 of the Notary Public Atty. Noel J.
Salvanera under Doc. No. 369 Page No. 76 Book No. III Series of 2004 in favor
of Defensor Briones Villamor and Tolentino Law Offices, who can perform such
acts that will lead to the recovery of a portion of the Payanig sa Pasig property
otherwise known as the MC Home Depot property registered in the name of MidPasig Land Development Corp., a Corporation under the direct control and
supervision of the Presidential Commission of Good Government (PCGG), as well
as to exercise such rights as assignee, transferee of the MC Home Depot property
including the right to lease and/or sublease the same as it may deem necessary.
[6]
Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 10.01.A lawyer shall not do
any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
[7]
Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 16.01.A lawyer shall
account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
[8]
Complaint, paragraph 6.02.
[9]
Records, p. 166.

[10]

Annexes B and C of the Complaint, records pp. 43, 55.

Rollo, p. 31.
[12]
Rule 139-B, Sec. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. -xxxx
(c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary
sanction imposed by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition,
reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such
sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the
complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the Boards resolution, the Court orders otherwise.
[13]
Rollo, p. 7.
[14]
Opposition
(To
Application
for
Preliminary
mandatory
Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order/Temporary Mandatory Injunction) and his
Memorandum (Opposition to Application for Temporary Restraining Order).
[15]
Rollo, p. 178.
[16]
Id. at 180-181.
[17]
Id. at 190.
[18]
Memorandum (Respondent), rollo, p. 27.
[19]
Rollo, p. 170.
[20]
Id. at 316.
[21]
Records, p. 63.
[22]
Rollo, p. 170.
[23]
Id. at 42-43.
[24]
Id. at 199.
[25]
Id. at 199-200.
[26]
A.M. No. 3216, March 16, 1992, 207 SCRA 229.
[27]
A.M. No. 1625, February 12, 1990, 182 SCRA 151.
[28]
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a
public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another;
xxxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior
courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of
justice, the property and right in litigation or levied upon an execution before the
court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective
functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall
apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the
object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession. (Emphasis supplied.)
[29]
Rollo, p. 255.
[11]

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
B.M. No. 2012
February 10, 2009
PROPOSED RULE ON MANDATORY LEGAL AID SERVICE FOR
PRACTICING LAWYERS
RESOLUTION
Acting on the Memorandum dated January 27, 2009 of Justice Renato C.
Corona re: Comment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on our
Suggested Revisions to the Proposed Rule of Mandatory Legal Aid Service
for Practicing Lawyers, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.
This Resolution shall take effect on July 1, 2009 following publication of the
said Rule and its implementing regulations in at least two (2) newpapers of
general circulation.
February 10, 2009

RULE ON MANDATORY LEGAL AID SERVICE

SECTION 1. Title. - This Rule shall be known as "The Rule on Mandatory
Legal Aid Service."
SECTION 2. Purpose. - This Rule seeks to enhance the duty of lawyers to
society as agents of social change and to the courts as officers thereof by
helping improve access to justice by the less privileged members of society
and expedite the resolution of cases involving them. Mandatory free legal
service by members of the bar and their active support thereof will aid the
efficient and effective administration of justice especially in cases involving
indigent and pauper litigants.
SECTION 3. Scope. - This Rule shall govern the mandatory requirement for
practicing lawyers to render free legal aid services in all cases (whether,
civil, criminal or administrative) involving indigent and pauper litigants where
the assistance of a lawyer is needed. It shall also govern the duty of other
members of the legal profession to support the legal aid program of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SECTION 4. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Rule:
(a) Practicing lawyers are members of the Philippine Bar who
appear for and in behalf of parties in courts of law and quasi-judicial
agencies, including but not limited to the National Labor Relations
Commission, National Conciliation and Mediation Board,
Department of Labor and Employment Regional Offices,
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board and National
Commission for Indigenous Peoples. The term "practicing lawyers"
shall exclude:
(i) Government employees and incumbent elective officials
not allowed by law to practice;

(ii) Lawyers who by law are not allowed to appear in court;

(iii) Supervising lawyers of students enrolled in law student
practice in duly accredited legal clinics of law schools and
lawyers of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
peoples organizations (POs) like the Free Legal
Assistance Group who by the nature of their work already
render free legal aid to indigent and pauper litigants and
(iv) Lawyers not covered under subparagraphs (i) to (iii)
including those who are employed in the private sector but
do not appear for and in behalf of parties in courts of law
and quasi-judicial agencies.
(b) Indigent and pauper litigants are those defined under Rule 141,
Section 19 of the Rules of Court andAlgura v. The Local
Government Unit of the City of Naga (G.R. No.150135, 30 October
2006, 506 SCRA 81);
(c) Legal aid cases are those actions, disputes, and controversies
that are criminal, civil and administrative in nature in whatever
stage wherein indigent and pauper litigants need legal
representation;
(d) Free legal aid services refer to appearance in court or quasijudicial body for and in behalf of an indigent or pauper litigant and
the preparation of pleadings or motions. It shall also cover
assistance by a practicing lawyer to indigent or poor litigants in
court-annexed mediation and in other modes of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR). Services rendered when a practicing lawyer is
appointed counsel de oficio shall also be considered as free legal
aid services and credited as compliance under this Rule;
(e) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is the official national
organization of lawyers in the country;
(f) National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) is the committee of the
IBP which is specifically tasked with handling legal aid cases;
(g) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) is the committee of the IBP
which is specifically tasked with disciplining members of the Bar;
(h) IBP Chapters are those chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines located in the different geographical areas of the
country as defined in Rule 139-A and
(i) Clerk of Court is the Clerk of Court of the court where the
practicing lawyer rendered free legal aid services. In the case of
quasi-judicial bodies, it refers to an officer holding an equivalent or
similar position.
The term shall also include an officer holding a similar position in
agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, or a responsible officer
of an accredited PO or NGO, or an accredited mediator who
conducted the court-annexed mediation proceeding.
SECTION 5. Requirements. -

(a) Every practicing lawyer is required to render a minimum of sixty

(60) hours of free legal aid services to indigent litigants in a year.
Said 60 hours shall be spread within a period of twelve (12)
months, with a minimum of five (5) hours of free legal aid services
each month. However, where it is necessary for the practicing
lawyer to render legal aid service for more than five (5) hours in one
month, the excess hours may be credited to the said lawyer for the
succeeding periods.
For this purpose, a practicing lawyer shall coordinate with the Clerk
of Court for cases where he may render free legal aid service. He
may also coordinate with the IBP Legal Aid Chairperson of the IBP
Chapter to inquire about cases where he may render free legal aid
service. In this connection, the IBP Legal Aid Chairperson of the
IBP Chapter shall regularly and actively coordinate with the Clerk of
Court.
The practicing lawyer shall report compliance with the requirement
within ten (10) days of the last month of each quarter of the year.
(b) A practicing lawyer shall be required to secure and obtain a
certificate from the Clerk of Court attesting to the number of hours
spent rendering free legal aid services in a case.
The certificate shall contain the following information:
(i) The case or cases where the legal aid service was
rendered, the party or parties in the said case(s) for whom
the service was rendered, the docket number of the said
case(s) and the date(s) the service was rendered.
(ii) The number of hours actually spent attending a hearing
or conducting trial on a particular case in the court or
quasi-judicial body.
(iii) The number of hours actually spent attending
mediation, conciliation or any other mode of ADR on a
particular case.
(iv) A motion (except a motion for extension of time to file
a pleading or for postponement of hearing or conference)
or pleading filed on a particular case shall be considered
as one (1) hour of service.
The Clerk of Court shall issue the certificate in triplicate,
one (1) copy to be retained by the practicing lawyer, one
(1) copy to be retained by the Clerk of Court and one (1)
copy to be attached to the lawyer's compliance report.
(c) Said compliance report shall be submitted to the Legal Aid
Chairperson of the IBP Chapter within the courts jurisdiction. The
Legal Aid Chairperson shall then be tasked with immediately
verifying the contents of the certificate with the issuing Clerk of
Court by comparing the copy of the certificate attached to the
compliance report with the copy retained by the Clerk of Court.

(d) The IBP Chapter shall, after verification, issue a compliance

certificate to the concerned lawyer. The IBP Chapter shall also
submit the compliance reports to the IBPs NCLA for recording and
documentation. The submission shall be made within forty-five (45)
days after the mandatory submission of compliance reports by the
practicing lawyers.
(e) Practicing lawyers shall indicate in all pleadings filed before the
courts or quasi-judicial bodies the number and date of issue of their
certificate of compliance for the immediately preceding compliance
period. Failure to disclose the required information would cause the
dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the
records.
(f) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the
category under Section 4(a)(i) and (ii), shall fill up a form prepared
by the NCLA which states that, during that year, they are employed
with the government or incumbent elective officials not allowed by
law to practice or lawyers who by law are not allowed to appear in
court.
The form shall be sworn to and submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP
National Office together with the payment of an annual contribution
of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000). Said contribution shall accrue to
a special fund of the IBP for the support of its legal aid program.
(g) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the
category under Section 4(a)(iii) shall secure a certification from the
director of the legal clinic or of the concerned NGO or PO to the
effect that, during that year, they have served as supervising
lawyers in a legal clinic or actively participated in the NGOs or
POs free legal aid activities. The certification shall be submitted to
the IBP Chapter or IBP National Office.
(h) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the
category under Section 4(a)(iv) shall fill up a form prepared by the
NCLA which states that, during that year, they are neither practicing
lawyers nor covered by Section (4)(a)(i) to (iii). The form shall be
sworn to and submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National Office
together with the payment of an annual contribution of Four
Thousand Pesos (P4,000) by way of support for the efforts of
practicing lawyers who render mandatory free legal aid services.
Said contribution shall accrue to a special fund of the IBP for the
support of its legal aid program.
(i) Failure to pay the annual contribution shall subject the lawyer to
a penalty of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000) for that year which
amount shall also accrue to the special fund for the legal aid
program of the IBP.
SECTION 6. NCLA. -

(a) The NCLA shall coordinate with the various legal aid
committees of the IBP local chapters for the proper handling and
accounting of legal aid cases which practicing lawyers can
represent.
(b) The NCLA shall monitor the activities of the Chapter of the
Legal Aid Office with respect to the coordination with Clerks of
Court on legal aid cases and the collation of certificates submitted
by practicing lawyers.
(c) The NCLA shall act as the national repository of records in
compliance with this Rule.
(d) The NCLA shall prepare the following forms: certificate to be
issued by the Clerk of Court and forms mentioned in Section 5(e)
and (g).
(e) The NCLA shall hold in trust, manage and utilize the
contributions and penalties that will be paid by lawyers pursuant to
this Rule to effectively carry out the provisions of this Rule. For this
purpose, it shall annually submit an accounting to the IBP Board of
Governors.
The accounting shall be included by the IBP in its report to the
Supreme Court in connection with its request for the release of the
subsidy for its legal aid program.
SECTION 7. Penalties. (a) At the end of every calendar year, any practicing lawyer who
fails to meet the minimum prescribed 60 hours of legal aid service
each year shall be required by the IBP, through the NCLA, to
explain why he was unable to render the minimum prescribed
number of hours. If no explanation has been given or if the NCLA
finds the explanation unsatisfactory, the NCLA shall make a report
and recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors that the erring
lawyer be declared a member of the IBP who is not in good
standing. Upon approval of the NCLAs recommendation, the IBP
Board of Governors shall declare the erring lawyer as a member
not in good standing. Notice thereof shall be furnished the erring
lawyer and the IBP Chapter which submitted the lawyers
compliance report or the IBP Chapter where the lawyer is
registered, in case he did not submit a compliance report. The
notice to the lawyer shall include a directive to pay Four Thousand
Pesos (P4,000) penalty which shall accrue to the special fund for
the legal aid program of the IBP.
(b) The "not in good standing" declaration shall be effective for a
period of three (3) months from the receipt of the erring lawyer of
the notice from the IBP Board of Governors. During the said period,
the lawyer cannot appear in court or any quasi-judicial body as
counsel. Provided, however, that the "not in good standing" status

shall subsist even after the lapse of the three-month period until
and unless the penalty shall have been paid.
(c) Any lawyer who fails to comply with his duties under this Rule
for at least three (3) consecutive years shall be the subject of
disciplinary proceedings to be instituted motu proprio by the CBD.
The said proceedings shall afford the erring lawyer due process in
accordance with the rules of the CBD and Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court. If found administratively liable, the penalty of suspension
in the practice of law for one (1) year shall be imposed upon him.
(d) Any lawyer who falsifies a certificate or any form required to be
submitted under this Rule or any contents thereof shall be
administratively charged with falsification and dishonesty and shall
be subject to disciplinary action by the CBD. This is without
prejudice to the filing of criminal charges against the lawyer.
(e) The falsification of a certificate or any contents thereof by any
Clerk of Court or by any Chairperson of the Legal Aid Committee of
the IBP local chapter where the case is pending or by the Director
of a legal clinic or responsible officer of an NGO or PO shall be a
ground for an administrative case against the said Clerk of Court or
Chairperson. This is without prejudice to the filing of the criminal
and administrative charges against the malfeasor.
SECTION 8. Credit for Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE). A lawyer who renders mandatory legal aid service for the required number of
hours in a year for the three year-period covered by a compliance period
under the Rules on MCLE shall be credited the following: two (2) credit units
for legal ethics, two (2) credit units for trial and pretrial skills, two (2) credit
units for alternative dispute resolution, four (4) credit units for legal writing
and oral advocacy, four (4) credit units for substantive and procedural laws
and jurisprudence and six (6) credit units for such subjects as may be
prescribed by the MCLE Committee under Section 2(9), Rule 2 of the Rules
on MCLE.
A lawyer who renders mandatory legal aid service for the required number of
hours in a year for at least two consecutive years within the three yearperiod covered by a compliance period under the Rules on MCLE shall be
credited the following: one (1) credit unit for legal ethics, one (1) credit unit
for trial and pretrial skills, one (1) credit unit for alternative dispute resolution,
two (2) credit units for legal writing and oral advocacy, two (2) credit units for
substantive and procedural laws and jurisprudence and three (3) credit units
for such subjects as may be prescribed by the MCLE Committee under
Section 2(g), Rule 2 of the Rules on MCLE.
SECTION 9. Implementing Rules. - The IBP, through the NCLA, is hereby
given authority to recommend implementing regulations in determining who
are "practicing lawyers," what constitute "legal aid cases" and what
administrative procedures and financial safeguards which may be necessary
and proper in the implementation of this rule may be prescribed. It shall

coordinate with the various legal chapters in the crafting of the proposed
implementing regulations and, upon approval by the IBP Board of
Governors, the said implementing regulations shall be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final approval.
SECTION 10. Effectivity. - This Rule and its implementing rules shall take
effect on July 1,2009 after they have been published in two (2) newspapers
of general circulation.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

BAR MATTER NO. 730 June 13, 1997
BAR MATTER NO. 730 June 13, 1997
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc
dated June 10, 1997.
IN RE: NEED THAT LAW STUDENT PRACTICING UNDER RULE 138-A
BE ACTUALLY SUPERVISED DURING TRIAL (BAR MATTER NO. 730).
The issue in this Consulta is whether a law student who appears before the
court under the Law Student Practice Rule (Rule 138-A) should be
accompanied by a member of the bar during the trial. This issue was raised
by retired Supreme Court Justice Antonio P. Barredo, counsel for the
defendant in Civil Case No. BCV-92-11 entitled Irene A. Caliwara v. Roger
T. Catbagan filed before the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite.
The records show that the plaintiff in civil Case No. BCV-92-11 was
represented by Mr. Cornelio Carmona, Jr., an intern at the Office of Legal
Aid, UP-College of Law (UP-OLA). Mr. Carmona conducted hearings and
completed the presentation of the plaintiff's evidence-in-chief without the
presence of a supervising lawyer. Justice Barredo questioned the
appearance of Mr. Carmona during the hearing because the latter was not
accompanied by a duly accredited lawyer. On December 15, 1994, Presiding
Judge Edelwina Pastoral issued an Order requiring Mr. Carmona to be
accompanied by a supervising lawyer on the next hearing. In compliance
with said Order, UP-OLA and the Secretary of Justice executed a
Memorandum of Agreement directing Atty. Catubao and Atty. Legayada of
the Public Attorney's Office to supervise Mr. Carmona during the subsequent
hearings.
Justice Barredo asserts that a law student appearing before the trial court
under Rule 138-A should be accompanied by a supervising lawyer. 1 On the
other hand, UP-OLA, through its Director, Atty. Alfredo F. Tadiar, submits
that "the matter of allowing a law intern to appear unaccompanied by a duly
accredited supervising lawyer should be . . . left to the sound discretion of
the court after having made at least one supervised appearance." 2
For the guidance of the bench and bar, we hold that a law student appearing
before the Regional Trial Court under Rule 138-A should at all times be
accompanied by a supervising lawyer. Section 2 of Rule 138-A provides.
Section 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized by
this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and
all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must
be signed the by supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
The phrase "direct supervision and control" requires no less than the
physical presence of the supervising lawyer during the hearing. This is in

accordance with the threefold rationale behind the Law Student Practice
Rule, to wit: 3
1. to ensure that there will be no miscarriage of
justice as a result of incompetence or
inexperience of law students, who, not having as
yet passed the test of professional competence,
are presumably not fully equipped to act a
counsels on their own;
2. to provide a mechanism by which the
accredited law school clinic may be able to
protect itself from any potential vicarious liability
arising from some culpable action by their law
students; and
3. to ensure consistency with the fundamental
principle that no person is allowed to practice a
particular profession without possessing the
qualifications, particularly a license, as required
by law.
The matter of allowing a law student to appear before the court
unaccompanied by a supervising lawyer cannot be left to the discretion of
the presiding judge. The rule clearly states that the appearance of the law
student shall be under the direct control and supervision of a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by law schools. The rule
must be strictly construed because public policy demands that legal work
should be entrusted only to those who possess tested qualifications, are
sworn to observe the rules and ethics of the legal profession and subject to
judicial disciplinary control. 4 We said in Bulacan v. Torcino: 5
Court procedures are often technical and may prove like snares to
the ignorant or the unwary. In the past, our law has allowed nonlawyers to appear for party litigants in places where duly authorized
members of the bar are not available (U.S. vs. Bacansas, 6 Phil.
539). For relatively simple litigation before municipal courts, the
Rules still allow a more educated or capable person in behalf of a
litigant who cannot get a lawyer. But for the protection of the parties
and in the interest of justice, the requirement for appearances in
regional trial courts and higher courts is more stringent.
The Law Student Practice Rule is only an exception to the rule. Hence, the
presiding judge should see to it that the law student appearing before the
court is properly guided and supervised by a member of the bar.
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior
court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior
courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the
supervision of a lawyer. Section 34 Rule 138 provides;
Section 34. By whom litigation is conducted. In the court of a
justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person,

with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose,
or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized
member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or
friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that a law student appearing before the
Regional Trial Court under the authority of Rule 138-A must be under the
direct control and supervision of a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines duly accredited by the law school and that said law student must
be accompanied by a supervising lawyer in all his appearance.
Padilla and Francisco, J.J., on leave.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of court
Footnotes
1 Consulta, p. 2.
2 Comment, p. 9.
3 Comment, p. 5.
4 Agpalo, Legal Ethics (Fourth Edition, 1989), pp. 39-40.
5 134 SCRA 252 (1985).
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6116
August 1, 2012
ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by
complainant Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon against respondent Atty. Mariano R.
Pefianco for grave dishonesty, gross misconduct constituting deceit and
grossly immoral conduct.
1
In his Complaint, complainant narrated that respondent undertook to give
him 20% commission, later reduced to 10%, of the attorney's fees the latter
would receive in representing Spouses Amable and Rosalinda Yap (Sps.
Yap), whom he referred, in an action for partition of the estate of the late
Benjamin Yap (Civil Case No. 4986 before the Regional Trial Court of
2
Aklan). Their agreement was reflected in a letter dated August 11, 1995.
However, respondent failed to pay him the agreed commission
notwithstanding receipt of attorney's fees amounting to 17% of the total
estate or about P 40 million. Instead, he was informed through a
3
letter dated July 16, 1997 that Sps. Yap assumed to pay the same after
respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney's fees from 25% to 17%. He
4
then demanded the payment of his commission which respondent ignored.
Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived up to the high
moral standards required of his profession for having abandoned his legal
wife, Milagros Hilado, with whom he has two children, and cohabited with
Mae FlorGalido, with whom he has four children. He also accused
5
respondent of engaging in money-lending business without the required
authorization from the BangkoSentralngPilipinas.
In his defense, respondent explained that he accepted Sps. Yap's case on a
25% contingent fee basis, and advanced all the expenses. He disputed the
August 11, 1995 letter for being a forgery and claimed that Sps. Yap
assumed to pay complainant's commission which he clarified in his July 16,
1997 letter. He, thus, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for the
corresponding sanction against complainant's counsel, Atty. Florencio B.
6
Gonzales, for filing a baseless complaint.
7
In the Resolution dated February 16, 2004, the Court resolved to refer this
administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and
8
Recommendation dated October 10, 2008, the Investigating IBP
Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended for one (1) year
from the active practice of law, for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01,

Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code). The IBP Board of Governors adopted
9
and approved the same in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-453 dated August
10
28, 2010. Respondent moved for reconsideration which was denied in
Resolution No. XIX-2011-141 dated October 28, 2011.
After due consideration, We adopt the findings and recommendation of the
IBP Board of Governors.
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those
who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications
for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a
high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession,
the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms
11
embodied in the Code. Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct
that is wanting of the above standards whether in their professional or in
their private capacity.
In the present case, respondent's defense that forgery had attended the
execution of the August 11, 1995 letter was belied by his July 16, 1997 letter
admitting to have undertaken the payment of complainant's commission but
passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap. Clearly, respondent has violated
12
Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or
stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to
practice law, except in certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar.
Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned his
legal family to cohabit with his mistress with whom he begot four children
notwithstanding that his moral character as well as his moral fitness to be
retained in the Roll of Attorneys has been assailed. The settled rule is that
betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage is
considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of
the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution
13
and affirmed by our laws. Consequently, We find no reason to disturb the
14
IBP's finding that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
However, We find the charge of engaging in illegal money lending not to
have been sufficiently established.1wphi1 A "business" requires some form
of investment and a sufficient number of customers to whom its output can
15
be sold at profit on a consistent basis. The lending of money to a single
person without showing that such service is made available to other persons
on a consistent basis cannot be construed asindicia that respondent is
engaged in the business of lending.
Nonetheless, while We rule that respondent should be sanctioned for his
actions, We are minded that the power to disbar should be exercised with
great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and as

16

member of the bar, or the misconduct borders on the criminal, or

17
committed under scandalous circumstance, which do not obtain here.
Considering the circumstances of the case, We deem it appropriate that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year as recommended.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO is
found GUILTY of violation of the Lawyers Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the same
Code andSUSPENDED from the active practice of law ONE (1)
YEAR effective upon notice hereof.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent
as a member of the Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate justice

Footnotes
*
Designated member in lieu of Justice Jose C. Mendoza, per
Special Order No. 1282 dated August 1, 2012.
1
Rollo, pp. 23-27.
2
Id. at 8.
3
Id. at 14.
4
Letter dated October 25, 2002, id. at 38.
5
Evidenced by the Affidavit of Jose E. Autajay dated April 19,
2003, id. at 41.
6
Comment, id.at 44-51.
7
Id. at 90.
8
IBP rollo, vol. IV, pp. 2-10.
9
Id. at 1.
10
Id. at 11-12.
11
Molina v. Magat,A.C. No. 1900, June 13, 2012.

12

Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

reads in full:
"Rule 9.02 - A lawyer shall not divide orstipulate to divide a
fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice
law, except:
a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner
or associate that, upon the latter's death, money shall be
paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to
the persons specified in the agreement; or
b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished
legal business of a deceased lawyer; or
c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer
employees in a retirement plan, even if the plan is based
in whole or in part, on a profit-sharing arrangement."
13
Guevarra v. Eala, A.C. No. 7136, August 1, 2007, 529 SCRA 1,
16.
14
I ______ having been permitted to continue in the practice of law
in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme
authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid
nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice,
and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the
courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So
help me God.
15
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/business.html.
16
Tan v. Gumba, A.C. No. 9000, October 5, 2011;Conlu v.
Aredonia, Jr., A.C. No. 4955, September 12, 2011, 657 SCRA 367;
Garrido vs. Garrido, A.C. No. 6593, February 4, 2010, 611 SCRA
508.
17
Nevada v. Casuga, A.C. No. 7591, March 20, 2012.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

[3]

THIRD DIVISION
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, 332 Edang St.,Pasay City,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 154464

Court that a non-lawyer may appear before any court and conduct his litigation
personally.

During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to

secure a written permission from the Court Administrator before he could be
- versus allowed to appear as counsel for himself, a party-litigant. Atty. Stanley Cabrera,
*
TINGA, J.,
counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief
CHICO-NAZARIO,
JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
to which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is
Acting Chairperson,not allowed after the Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares then remarked, Hay
Branch 108, Pasay City, Metro Manila,
*
VELASCO, JR.,
Public Respondent.
naku, masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok? and proceeded to hear the
NACHURA, and
pending Motion to Dismiss and calendared the next hearing on May 2, 2002.
REYES, JJ.
BENJAMIN MINA, JR., 332 Edang St.,Pasay City,
Private Respondent.
On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to
[4]
Promulgated:
Inhibit, praying for the voluntary inhibition of Judge Mijares. The Motion alleged
that expected partiality on the part of the respondent judge in the conduct of the
September 11, 2008trial could be inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the
pre-trial. It asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that justice will not be
[5]
served.
Present:

[6]

DECISION

In an Order dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion for
inhibition stating that throwing tenuous allegations of partiality based on the said
remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary inhibition, considering that it was
said even prior to the start of pre-trial. Petitioner filed a motion for
[7]
reconsideration of the said order.

This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer

for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. It was directly filed with this Court assailing the Resolutions dated May 10,
[1]
[2]
2002 and July 31, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 108, Pasay City,
which denied the appearance of the plaintiff Ferdinand A. Cruz, herein petitioner,
as party litigant, and the refusal of the public respondent, Judge Priscilla Mijares, to
voluntarily inhibit herself from trying the case. No writ of preliminary injunction
was issued by this Court.

On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality. In the
same Order, the trial court held that for the failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the
promised document and jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the
requirements or conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance
was denied.

NACHURA, J.:

The antecedents:
On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter
his appearance for and on his behalf, before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, as the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-0410, for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth
year law student, anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of

[8]

[9]

In a motion for reconsideration, petitioner reiterated that the basis of

his appearance was not Rule 138-A, but Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that
the two Rules were distinct and are applicable to different circumstances, but the
[10]
respondent judge denied the same, still invoking Rule 138-A, in an Order dated
July 31, 2002.
On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the
instant petition and assigns the following errors:

I.
THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED
AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE
APPEARANCE OF THE PETITIONER, FOR AND IN THE LATTERS
BEHALF, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-0401 [sic] CONTRARY TO RULE
138, SECTION 34 OF THE RULES OF COURT, PROVIDING FOR
THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS AS A PARTY LITIGANT;

will not tolerate litigants who make a mockery of the judicial hierarchy as it
necessarily delays more important concerns before us.
In resolving the second issue, a comparative reading of Rule 138, Section 34
and Rule 138-A is necessary.
Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A

II.
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT DESPITE
THE ADVENT OF JURISPRUDENCE [sic] THAT SUCH AN
INHIBITION IS PROPER TO PRESERVE THE PEOPLES FAITH AND
CONFIDENCE TO THE COURTS.

The core issues raised before the Court are: (1) whether the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Court may issue; and (2) whether the respondent court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied
the appearance of the petitioner as party litigant and when the judge refused to
inhibit herself from trying the case.
This Courts jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and injunction is not exclusive; it has concurrent jurisdiction with the
RTCs and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to
be taken as an absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the court where the
[11]
application therefor will be directed. A becoming regard of the judicial hierarchy
most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs
[12]
against the RTCs should be filed with the Court of Appeals. The hierarchy of
courts is determinative of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs; and only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by
the nature of the issues reviewed, may this Court take cognizance of petitions filed
[13]
directly before it.
Considering, however, that this case involves the interpretation of
Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, the Court takes
cognizance of herein petition. Nonetheless, the petitioner is cautioned not to
continue his practice of filing directly before this Court petitions under Rule 65
when the issue raised can be resolved with dispatch by the Court of Appeals. We

Section 1.
Conditions for Student Practice. A law
student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the
regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a
recognized
law
school's
clinical
legal
education
programapproved by the Supreme Court, may appear without
compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case
before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent
indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student
authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision
and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all
pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be
filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in
behalf of the legal clinic.

The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for
himself and on his behalf because of his failure to comply with Rule 138-A. In
denying petitioners appearance, the court a quo tersely finds refuge in the fact
that, on December 18, 1986, this Court issued Circular No. 19, which eventually
became Rule 138-A, and the failure of Cruz to prove on record that he is enrolled in
a recognized schools clinical legal education program and is under supervision of
an attorney duly accredited by the law school.
However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance was Section
34 of Rule 138, which provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court

of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for
that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of
an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by
a duly authorized member of the bar.

and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.

From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have to be
conceded that the contention of the petitioner has merit. It recognizes the right of
an individual to represent himself in any case to which he is a party. The Rules state
that a party may conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney,
and that his appearance must either be personal or by a duly authorized member
of the Bar. The individual litigant may personally do everything in the course of
proceedings
from
commencement
to
the
termination
of
the
[14]
litigation. Considering that a party personally conducting his litigation is
restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to
[15]
practice law, petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs the risk of falling into
the snares and hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his
own instance, can personally conduct the litigation of Civil Case No. 01-0410. He
would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his right
to represent himself.
The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a
law student and must, therefore, be subject to the conditions of the Law Student
Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the basis of the petitioners
claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The former rule provides for conditions when a law
student may appear in courts, while the latter rule allows the appearance of a nonlawyer as a party representing himself.
The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by
virtue of Circular No. 19 is misplaced. The Court never intended to repeal Rule 138
when it released the guidelines for limited law student practice. In fact, it was
intended as an addendum to the instances when a non-lawyer may appear in
courts and was incorporated to the Rules of Court through Rule 138-A.
It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of
[16]
an accused to be heard by himself and counsel, this Court has held that during
[17]
the trial, the right to counsel cannot be waived.
The rationale for this ruling was

[18]

articulated in People v. Holgado, where we declared that even the most

intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in
the rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is
guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff
therein. The solicitous concern that the Constitution accords the accused in a
criminal prosecution obviously does not obtain in a civil case. Thus, a party litigant
in a civil case, who insists that he can, without a lawyers assistance, effectively
undertake the successful pursuit of his claim, may be given the chance to do so. In
this case, petitioner alleges that he is a law student and impliedly asserts that he
has the competence to litigate the case himself. Evidently, he is aware of the perils
incident to this decision.
In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue
of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear as an agent or a friend of a party
litigant, without need of the supervision of a lawyer, before inferior courts. Here,
we have a law student who, as party litigant, wishes to represent himself in
court. We should grant his wish.
Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge
committed manifest bias and partiality by ruling that there is no valid ground for
her voluntary inhibition despite her alleged negative demeanor during the pre-trial
when she said: Hay naku, masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok? Petitioner
avers that by denying his motion, the respondent judge already manifested
conduct indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice, causing petitioners and his coplaintiffs loss of faith and confidence in the respondents impartiality.
We do not agree.
It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed an
[19]
administrative case against the respondent for violation of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics, which we dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 2002. We now adopt
the Courts findings of fact in the administrative case and rule that there was no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Mijares when she did not inhibit
herself from the trial of the case.
In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias
and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from
[20]
participating in a particular trial, as voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of
conscience and addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. The decision on
whether she should inhibit herself must be based on her rational and logical

[21]

assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case before her. Absent clear
and convincing proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, this
Court will rule in favor of the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed.

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed

Resolution
and
Order
of
the
Regional
Trial
Court,
Branch
108, Pasay City are MODIFIED. Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City
is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Civil Case No. 010410 as a party litigant.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION

No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
*

Designated additional members in lieu of Associate Justices Consuelo

Ynares-Santiago and Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez per Special Order No. 517
dated August 27, 2008.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 34-35.
[2]
Id. at 43-45.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

[3]

Section 31-Rule 138. By whom litigation conducted. In the court of

justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an
agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In
any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized
member of the bar.
[4]
Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit, rollo, pp. 29-30.
[5]
[6]

ATTESTATION

[7]
[8]
[9]

Rollo, p. 30.
Id. at 31.
Annex D of the Petition, id. at 32-33.
Rollo, pp. 34-35.
Annex F of the Petition, id. at 36-42.

[10]
[11]

Annex G of the Petition, id. at 43-45.

People v. Cuaresma, G.R. No. 67787, April 18, 1989, 172 SCRA 415,

423-424.
[12]

Liga ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor of Manila, 465 Phil. 529,
543 (2004).
[13]
Cruz v. Mina, G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 382,
386; United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, G.R. No. 163858, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA
574, 593; Ark Travel Express, Inc. v. Abrogar, 457 Phil. 189, 202 (2003).
[14]
Santos v. Lacurom, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1823, August 28, 2006, 499 SCRA
639, 648-649.
[15]
Maderada v. Mediodea, 459 Phil. 701, 716-717 (2003).
[16]
CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 14(2).
[17]
Flores v. Ruiz, 179 Phil. 351, 355 (1979).
[18]
86 Phil. 752 (1950).
[19]
Ferdinand Cruz v. Judge Priscilla Mijares, OCA IPI No. 02-1452-RTJ,
[20]
People v. Ong, G.R. Nos. 162130-39, May 5, 2006, 489 SCRA 679, 688.
[21]
Abrajano v. Heirs of Augusto F. Salas, Jr., G.R. No. 158895, February
16, 2006, 482 SCRA 476, 487.