GOVERNMENT OF THE USA v.

PURGANAN, 389 SCRA 623, September 24, 2002

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Facts:
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government, through diplomatic channels,
sent to the Philippine Government Notes accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the
extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents,
the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action,
pursuant to the Extradition Law. Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted
a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO prohibited the Department of
Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition.
The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before the Supreme Court. Initially, the
Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish Jimenez copies of the extradition
request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and
supporting evidence.
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, the Supreme Court issued its Resolution. By an identical
vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held
that Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
This Resolution has become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine
DOJ, filed with the RTC, the appropriate Petition for Extradition. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was
the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on 15
April 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Conspiracy to defraud the United States;

Tax evasion;
Wire fraud;
False statements; and
Illegal campaign contributions.

In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate
arrest". Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte
Motion," which prayed that Jimenezs application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.
The RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing. In that hearing, Jimenez manifested its
reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard
prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should
issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for
hearing.
Thereafter, the court issued its Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his
temporary liberty at P1 million in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond,
Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.
The DOJ filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
WON Jimenez is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending.
Held:
Extradition is different from ordinary criminal proceedings. There is no provision in the Philippine Constitution
granting the right to bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant. As suggested
by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws.
It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favour of every accused
who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt
be proved beyond reasonable doubt." It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case
like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available
only in criminal proceedings. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion." Hence, the
second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings
for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition
proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument
to grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for
the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against
him, not before the extradition court.
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to Article 14 of the
Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut
short their detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall
into place with the emphasis of the Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for
their speedy disposition.
The rule is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty
to curb grave abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce
constitutional rights. Furthermore, the right to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness
to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the "life, liberty or property" of every person. It is
"dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application." Accordingly and to best serve the
ends of justice, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be
applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the
applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting
state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein. Since this exception has no express or specific
statutory basis,and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears
the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.

LEVISTE vs. CA, 615 SCRA 619, March 17, 2010

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Facts: Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was

convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He appealed his

conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming
the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The CA denied his application on the ground that the discretion to extend bail during the
course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. That bail
is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the
prison facility.
On this matter, Leviste questioned the ruling of the CA and averred that the CA committed
grave abuse of discretion in the denial of his application for bail considering that none of the
conditions justifying denial of bail under the Sec. 5 (3) Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was

present. That when the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more
than 20 years and the circumstances in the above-mentioned provision are absent, bail must be
granted to an appellant pending appeal.

Issue: WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the application for bail of
Leviste.

Held: No, under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction by the RTC of an

offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Under par. 3 of the
same rule if the penalty impose is more than 6 years the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail
be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or
other circumstances:

1. That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the

crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
2. That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without a valid justification;

3. That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
4. That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

5. That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.
That bail is expressly declared to be discretionary pending appeal and it cannot be said that
CA committed grave abuse of discretion. After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of

innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends, from then on the
grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion.
BONGGAC v. SANDIGANBAYAN, 588 SCRA 64, May 21, 2009
On the cancellation of petitioners cash bailbond as ordered in the Resolution of 10 January 2003 of the
Sandiganbayan, the cancellation of the bailbond was due to the execution of the final judgment of
conviction. Section 22 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides: SEC.
22. Cancellation of bail.Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail
may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death. The bail shall be deemed
automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment
of conviction. In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail. From
this provision, it is clear that the cancellation of bail is automatic upon execution of the judgment of
conviction. The Sandiganbayan did not err in cancelling petitioners cash bailbond after the judgment of
conviction became final and executory and its execution became ministerial.

NARCISO v. RAMONA CRUZ, March 17, 2010

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Facts: After a preliminary investigation, Narciso Cruz was charged with the crime of parricide for allegedly killing his wife. He was thereby
detained. He then filed a motion for reinvestigation and to lift warrant of arrest. Also, Cruz filed an ex-parte motion for bail. The prosecutor
made no objection. The motion was granted on the same day, allowing the accused to post bail at P150,000. Flor Cruz, sister of the deceased
wife, filed a Motion to lift order allowing accused to post bail.
Issue: Whether the grant of bail valid.
Held: No. Cruz was charged with parricide which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. When the penalty prescribed by law is reclusion
perpetua, a hearing must be conducted by the trial judge before the bail can be granted. Without such hearing, the order granting bail is void
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. In this case, there was no basis for the granting of the bail. No hearing was conducted
on the application for bail summary or otherwise. The CA even found that only 10 minutes had elapsed between the filing of the Motion
and the granting of bail. Such lapse of time could not be deemed sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate any evidence. Even if the
prosecutor did not object to the motion, the judge still had no basis to grant the bail. The judge had no reason to presume that that
prosecutor knew what he was doing. It is the judges duty first to determine if evidence of guilt is strong before bail is granted.

GRAGEDA v. TRESVALLES, 421 SCRA 500, February 2, 2004

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Ignorance of the Law and Abuse of Authority.

The Rules require the Judge to hear the parties and then make an intelligent assessment of their
evidence.The importance of the Rule lies on the fact that on the result of the bail hearing depends the right of an
accused to provisional liberty vis--vis the duty of the State to protect the people against dangerous elements. The
resolution of the issue affects important norms in our society: liberty on one hand, and order on the other. To
minimize, if not eliminate, error and arbitrariness in a judges decision, the Rules require the judge to hear the
parties and then make an intelligent assessment of their evidence.
Admission to bail presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided by the applicable
legal principles.Admission to bail presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided by the
applicable legal principles. The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by
the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is
weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other words, discretion must be
exercised regularly, legally, and within the confines of due process, that is, after the evaluation of the evidence
submitted by the prosecution.
When a judge grants bail to a person charged with a capital offense or by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment without conducting the required bail hearing, he is considered guilty of ignorance or
incompetence.It is already settled that when a judge grants bail to a person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment without conducting the required [bail] hearing, he is
considered guilty of ignorance or incompetence the gravity of which cannot be excused by a claim of good faith or
excusable negligence.
Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice.When a judge displays an utter
unfamiliarity with the law and the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. A judge owes the
public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws and the prevailing
jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice.

GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SAR v. OLALIA, Jr., 521 SCRA 470, April 19, 2007
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
This case discusses whether the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extradite in an extradition
proceeding.
Facts:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the
Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997. The Petitioner is the Government of Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice. The Respondents are Judge Felix Olalia and Juan
Antonio Muoz.
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of accepting an advantage
as agent," in violation of Bribery Ordinance of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized
by the common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14)
years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private
respondent. The RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and
detained him. Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order
denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high
"flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail and this was granted by respondent judge.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge.
Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:
Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no
provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
Held:
No.
Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary
detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential lextraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice.
Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted
bail.
Ratio:
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as
well as value the worth and dignity of every person. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be
viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of
human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty
of every individual is not impaired. Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a fullblown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its objective is to prevent the escape of a person accused or
convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. It does not necessarily
mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due
process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the
Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
satisfactorily met.
In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice Puno proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and
convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof
beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extradite must prove by "clear and convincing
evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. In this case, there is no
showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to
the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private respondent is
entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his
immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.
RUIZ v. BELDIA, Jr., 451 SCRA 402, February 16, 2005
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Ignorance of the Law and Abuse of Authority.
BAIL
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

The authority of a judge merely designated as assisting judge in a particular court is limited and he could
only act on an application for bail filed therewith in the absence or unavailability of the regular judge.
A person lawfully arrested and detained but who has not yet been formally charged in court can seek his
provisional release through the filing of an application for bail.
The failure of a judge to grant bail in accordance with established rules and procedure subjects him to
administrative liability.
Where a person has not yet been charged in court, the application for bail should be filed before the
proper court where he is held.
In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, reasonable notice of hearing must be given
to the prosecutor, or at least his recommendation on the matter must be sought.
A judge disregards basic procedural rules when he grants bail sans hearing and notice and without the
person detained filing a formal petition for bail.

OKABE v. GUTIERREZ, 429 SCRA 685, May 27, 2004

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
Maruyama sued Okabe for estafa. It was alleged in the complaint that Maruyama entrusted to Okabe a
sum of money for the latter, who was engaged in the business of door to door delivery, to remit to the Philippines.
Okabe failed to remit such amount.
nd

The complaint for estafa was files with the 2 assistant city prosecutor for preliminary investigation.
During the preliminary investigation, both Okabe and Marumaya were given the chance to adduce
nd
evidence/affidavits on their behalf. The 2 assistant city prosecutor found probable cause and issued a resolution
and the corresponding information. Appended thereto was the Marumayas complaint affidavit. These documents
were forwarded to the city prosecutor for approval.
Then the information was filed with the RTC of Pasay. A WoA was issued but Okabe was able to post bail
in the amount of PhP 40,000 thereby allowing her to freely leave the Philippines for Japan. Upon the instance of
the prosecution, a hold-departure order was issued by the court.
Okabe filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause. She claims that the documents
attached to the resolution of the investigating prosecutor were insufficient to warrant a finding of probable cause.
She contends that it behooved the investigating prosecutor to submit the following to the trial court to enable it to
determine the presence or absence of probable cause: (a) copies of the affidavits of the witnesses of the
complainant; (b) the counter-affidavit of Okabe and those of her witnesses; (c) the transcripts of stenographic notes
taken during the preliminary investigation; and, (d) other documents presented during the said investigation.
Issue:
Whether the trial court judge should have required the production of the affidavits of Maruyamas
witnesses, their documentary evidences, stenographic notes of the preliminary investigation and Okabes counteraffidavit for the purposes of determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest YES.
Whether posting of bail bars the accused from questioning the legality of the arrest or the conduct
of preliminary investigation NO.
Held:
The case of Webb v De Leon and Ho v People say that for the purposes of determining the existence or
non-existence of probable cause for the purpose of issuing a WoA, the judge should not rely solely on the said
report. The judge should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the
affidavit/affidavits and the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter affidavit of the accused and his
witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any,
submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information. This rule is now
embodied section 8(a) of Rule 112 (but which is section 7 (a) in ourcodal) which mandates that an information
filed in court shall be supported by affidavits and counter affidavits of the parties and their witnesses, other
supporting documents and the resolution of the case. The reason for this rule is because the law aims not only to
acquit the innocent but to like insulate the clearly innocent from false charges and from the strong arm of the law.
Section 26 of the Rule 114 says that an application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefore, or from assailing the regularity
or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them
before entering his plea. This is a curative rule because modified the previous rulings of the SC saying that posting
of bail is a bar to challenging the validity of the arrest. Being curative and procedural in nature, it applies
retroactively. It must favor Okabe. Besides, every waiver of a right to question the validity of an arrest must be
unequivocally established by the conduct of the accused. In this case, the series of acts by Okabe point to the
conclusion that she was insistent about the fact that the arrest was ordered with insufficient finding of probable
cause. In fact, she immediately filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause.

BORLONGAN, Jr. v. PENA, 620 SCRA 106, May 5, 2010

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Facts: Respondent Magdaleno Pea instituted a civil case for recovery of agents compensation and expenses,
damages, and attorneys fees, against Urban Bank and the petitioners, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Negros Occidental, Bago City. Respondent anchored his claim for compensation on the contract of agency,
allegedly entered into with the petitioners wherein the former undertook to perform such acts necessary to

prevent any intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Banks property located along Roxas
Boulevard, Pasay City.
Petitioners filed a MD accompanied with documents as proof that they never appointed the respondent as agent
or counsel by the Urban Bank or by the petitioners, but he was appointed by the ISCI.
Respondent Pea filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bago City. He claimed that
said documents were falsified because the alleged signatories did not actually affix their signatures, and the
signatories were neither stockholders nor officers and employees of ISCI. Worse, petitioners introduced said
documents as evidence before the RTC knowing that they were falsified.
The City Prosecutor concluded that the documents were falsified because the alleged signatories untruthfully
stated that ISCI was the principal of the respondent; that petitioners knew that the documents were falsified
considering that the signatories were mere dummies; and that the documents formed part of the record of Civil
Case where they were used by petitioners as evidence in support of their motion to dismiss, adopted in their
answer and later, in their Pre- Trial Brief.
Subsequently, the corresponding Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC). Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants for the arrest of the petitioners.
Petitioners filed an Omnibus MQ. They insist that they were denied due process because of the non-observance
of a proper procedure on preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court; since no such counter-affidavit
and supporting documents were submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely relied on the complaintaffidavit and attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in contravention of the Rules.
Moreover they claim that the respondents affidavit was not based on the latters personal knowledge and
therefore should not have been used by the court in determining probable cause. On the same day that the
Omnibus MQ was filed, the petitioners posted bail. Their bail bonds expressly provided that they do not intend to
waive their right to question the validity of their arrest.
Upon arraignment, the petitioners refused to enter their plea, for the obvious reason that the legality of their
information and their arrest was yet to be settled by the court.
MTCC upheld the validity of the warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in accordance with the Rules. Besides,
(according to the MTCC) petitioners could no longer question the validity of the warrant since they already posted
bail.
Issue: Whether the petitioners posting a bail constitutes a waiver of their right to question the validity of their arrest.
Held: The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the
issuance of a warrant of arrest that has already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rule of
Criminal Procedure. The principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the legality of the arrest after
arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without previously invoking
his objections thereto.
As held in Okabe v. Hon. Gutierrez:
It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is a new one, intended to
modify previous rulings of this Court that an application for bail or the admission to bail by the accused shall be
considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities or irregularities
thereon. The new rule has reverted to the ruling of this Court in People v. Red. The new rule is curative in nature
because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing
curative statutes are applicable. Curative statutes are by their essence retroactive in application. Besides,
procedural rules as a general rule operate retroactively, even without express provisions to that effect, to cases
pending at the time of their effectivity, in other words to actions yet undetermined at the time of their effectivity.
Before the appellate court rendered its decision on January 31, 2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was
already in effect. It behoved the appellate court to have applied the same in resolving the petitioners petition for
certiorari and her motion for partial reconsideration.
Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be argued that
she waived her right to question the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of arrest issued against her
by the respondent judge. There must be clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual intention to
relinquish her right to question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what a
party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, intent to voluntarily and
unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible. x x x.
Herein petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation on the
same day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise expressly contained a stipulation that they were not
waiving their right to question the validity of their arrest.24 On the date of their arraignment, petitioners refused
to enter their plea due to the fact that the issue on the legality of their arrest is still pending with the Court. Thus,
when the court a quo entered a plea of not guilty for them, there was no valid waiver of their right to preclude

them from raising the same with the Court of Appeals or this Court. The posting of bail bond was a matter of
imperative necessity to avert their incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of their right to assail their
arrest.
Petition granted; MTCC is ordered to dismiss criminal cases against petitioners.

QUI v. PEOPLE, 682 SCRA 94, September 26, 2012

Under the present rule, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; The allowance of bail pending appeal should be
exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been
in fact convicted by the trial court.Under the present rule, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion upon
conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as here. The
Court held: Indeed, pursuant to the tough on bail pending appeal policy, the presence of bail-negating conditions
mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave
as conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where
bail is prohibited. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental
principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and
only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court.

G.R. No. 170618, November 20, 2013

FAR EASTERN SURETY AND INSURANCE CO., INC., Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
A personal bail bond was issued for the release of Celo Tuazon with the RTC which was later
then approved. Tuazon however failed to appear in the schedule hearing prompting the RTC to
issue an order requiring the petitioner to produce the body of the accused and to explain why
no judgment shall be rendered against the bond. Samuel Baui, who was the petitioners
representative filed a motion for extension of time and sought petitioners assistance. But
petitioner filed with the RTC a very urgent motion to cancel fake/falsified bail bond and prayed
to be relieved from any liability alleging that the signatures are forged and unauthorized.
The RTC denied the motion on the ground that petitioner had indirectly acknowledge the
bonds validity when it filed a motion for extension of time. A judgment of forfeiture was issued
against petitioner and thereafter a writ of execution. Hence this petition for certiorari under
Rule 45 of the ROC.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC erred in holding the petitioner liable under the alleged falsified bond.
HELD:
In the absence of factual circumstances relating to the RTCs approval of the bail bond, a finding
on whether it erred is a matter that the SC cannot touch. This ruling, by its clear terms, did not
pass upon the falsity or forgery of the bail bonds signatures. Nothing in the order resolved the
question of whether Teodoricos signature had been forged. Neither was there any finding on
the validity of the bail bond, nor any definitive ruling on the effects of the unauthorized
signature of Paul. Missing as well was any mention of the circumstances that led to the RTCs
approval of the bond. We need all these factual bases to make a ruling on what and how the
law should be applied.
A bail bond is required to be in a public document, i.e., a duly notarized document. As a
notarized document, it has the presumption of regularity in its favor, which presumption can
only be contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant;
otherwise, the regularity of the document should be upheld. Likewise notable is the settled rule
that forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing
evidence. The burden of proof lies in the party alleging forgery.

All these legal realities tell us that we can rule only on the issue of liability, even assuming this
to be a purely legal issue, if the matter of forgery and falsification has already been settled. In
other words, a finding of forgery (or absence of forgery) is necessary. At the moment, the
questions of whether the petitioners evidence is sufficient and convincing to prove the forgery
of the signature and whether the evidence is more than merely preponderant to overcome the
presumption of validity and the regularity of the notarized bail bond are unsettled factual
matters that the assailed ruling did not squarely rule upon, and which this Court cannot now
resolve via a Rule 45 petition. Simply put, the resolution of these matters is outside this Courts
authority to act upon.

PANTILO III VS. CANOY (2011)

It is settled that an accused in a criminal case has the constitutional right to bail, more
so in this case when the charge against Melgazo, Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide, is a non-capital offense. However, the letter-complaint focuses on
the manner of Melgazos release from detention.
FACTS:
After learning that the accused in a criminal case was released, even though no
information had been filed in Court that would serve as the basis for the approval of the
bail, and that no written, but a verbal order, was issued directing the city police station
to release the accused from his detention cell, petitioner, brother of the victim in a
homicide, filed an administrative complaint against herein respondent judge of the RTC
of Surigao City charging the latter gross ignorance of the law and/procedures, grave
abuse of authority and appearance of impropriety with a prayer of the latters
disbarment.
ISSUE:
WON the application and reduction of bail is valid.
HELD:
NO. Sec. 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure allows that any person
in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in the
province, city or municipality where he is held. In the case at bar, Melgazo did not file
any application or petition for the grant of bail with the Surigao City RTC, Branch
29. Despite the absence of any written application, respondent judge verbally granted
bail to Melgazo. This is a clear deviation from the procedure laid down in Sec. 17 of
Rule 114.
In addition to a written application for bail, Rule 114 of the Rules prescribes other
requirements for the release of the accused:
SEC. 14. Deposit of cash as baill The accused or any person acting in
his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal
revenue or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed
by the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed
the case. Upon submission of a proper certificate of deposit and a written
undertaking showing compliance with the requirements of section 2 of
this Rule, the accused shall be discharged from custody. The money

deposited shall be considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine

and costs while the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to
whoever made the deposit.
SEC. 2. Conditions of the bail; requirements All kinds of bail are
subject to the following conditions:
(a)
The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless
cancelled, shall remain in form at all stages of the case until promulgation
of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the
case was originally filed in or appealed to it;
(b)
The accused shall appear before the proper court whenever
required by the court or these Rules;
(c)
The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification
and despite due notice shall be deemed a waiver of his right to be present
thereat. In such case, the trial may proceed in absentia; and
(d)
The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for
execution of the final execution.
The original papers shall state the full name and address of the
accused, the amount of the undertaking and the conditions required by
this section. Photographs (passport size) taken within the last six (6)
months showing the face, left and right profiles of the accused must be
attached to the bail.
In the case at bar, Melgazo or any person acting in his behalf did not deposit the
amount of bail recommended by the Prosecutor with the nearest collector of internal
revenue or provincial, city or municipal treasurer. In clear departure from Sec. 14 of Rule
114, Judge Canoy instead verbally ordered Clerk IV Suriaga of the Surigao City RTC,
Office of the Clerk of Court, to accept the cash deposit as bail, to earmark an official
receipt for the cash deposit, and to date it the following day. Worse, respondent judge
did not require Melgazo to sign a written undertaking containing the conditions of the
bail under Sec. 2, Rule 114 to be complied with by Melgazo. Immediately upon receipt
by Suriaga of the cash deposit of PhP 30,000 from Melgazo, Judge Canoy ordered the
police escorts to release Melgazo without any written order of release. In sum, there
was no written application for bail, no certificate of deposit from the BIR collector or
provincial, city or municipal treasurer, no written undertaking signed by Melgazo, and
no written release order.
As regards the insistence of Judge Canoy that such may be considered as constructive
bail, there is no such species of bail under the Rules. Despite the noblest of reasons, the
Rules of Court may not be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the rights of
another.

LEVISTE VS. ALAMDEDA (2010)

FACTS: Petitioner after having been charged with Homicide posted bail, a 40,000
cash bond, which was approved by the RTC of Makati. Private complainants, heirs
of the deceased, filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for the public prosecutor

to re-examine the evidence or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper

offense. The RTC amended the information for murder and directed the issuance of
warrant of arrest. Prior to the arraignment, where petitioner refused to plead
drawing the RTC to enter a not guilty plea for him, petitioner filed an Urgent
application for Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela finding the evidence of
murder is not strong and allowing him to post bail for 300,000.
The RTC went to try the petitioner under the amended information and find
petitioner herein guilty of homicide. Petitioner filed an appeal during the pendency
of which he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal. The
CA denied the application. The OSG argued that the present petition had been
rendered moot since the presentation of evidence had been concluded.
ISSUE: WON petitioner waived his right to challenge the regularity of the
investigation of the charge against him, the validity of the admission of the
amended information, and the legality of his arrest under the amended information,
by applying for bail.
HELD: NO. Because he raised them prior to the arraignment. The principle that
the accused is precluded after arraignment from questioning the illegal arrest or the
lack of or irregular preliminary investigation applies only if he voluntarily enters
his plea and participates during trial, without previously invoking his objections
thereto. There must be clear and convincing proof that petitioner had an actual
intention to relinquish his right to question the existence of probable cause. When
the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so
manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and
unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his
conduct is possible.
From the given circumstances, the Court cannot reasonably infer a valid waiver on
the part of petitioner to preclude him from obtaining a definite resolution of the
objections he so timely invoked. Other than its allegation of active participation,
the OSG offered no clear and convincing proof that petitioners participation in the
trial was unconditional with the intent to voluntarily and unequivocally abandon
his petition. In fact, on January 26, 2010, petitioner still moved for the early
resolution of the present petition.
Whatever delay arising from petitioners availment of remedies against the trial
courts Orders cannot be imputed to petitioner to operate as a valid waiver on his
part. Neither can the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction be deemed
as a voluntary relinquishment of petitioners principal prayer. The non-issuance of
such injunctive relief only means that the appellate court did not preliminarily find
any exception to the long-standing doctrine that injunction will not lie to enjoin a
criminal prosecution.

PEOPLE VS. PLAZA (2009) GR 176933

FACTS:

Plaza after being charged with the crime of Homicide filed a motion to fix the
amount of his bail bond and since the prosecutions evidence can sufficiently
prove homicide, he prayed for his release on bail and that the bail bond for his
temporary liberty be fixed at 40,000, the usual bond for homicide in the RTC
of Surigao.
The opposition contends that the case is non-bailable, being for murder; that
it is the public prosecutor who has exclusive jurisdiction to determine what
crime the accused should be charged with; that the accused should have filed
a motion and/or application to bail; that the accused had already waived his
right to apply for bail at the stage of the proceedings; and that under the
Rules, the prosecution could still prove the existence of treachery after the
defense has rested its case.
Respondent was subsequently released after the grant and posting of his bail
bond. The victims brother, Roberto, impleading the people as co-petitioner,
assailed the order via petition for certiorari with the CA. The OSG adopted
Robertos argument that the grant of bail without any separate hearing is
contrary to prevailing jurisprudence.
The CA dismissed Robertos petition on the ground that a motion to fix the
amount of bail bond constitutes an application for bail.
ISSUE:
WON holding a summary hearing, to determine whether respondent was
entitled to bail, is necessary under Rule 114 Section 5 of the RRCP.
HELD:
NO. The said section speaks for an application for bail AFTER a judgment of
conviction has been handed down by the RTC. And since the discretionary
power of the trial court to grant bail depends on whether the evidence of guilt
is strong pursuant to Article 3 Section 13 of the Constitution, Judge Tan
concurred with the assessment of Judge Buyer, holding that the evidence was
sufficient to convict respondent of homicide, holding a summary hearing
would be unnecessary as the evidence in chief was already presented by the
prosecution.
Hence, bail becomes a matter of right towards the accused because the
motion to fix bail was filed prior to his conviction for the crime of Homicide.

CERVANTES VS. PANGILINAN A.M. No. MTJ-08-1709 (2009)

FACTS:
Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant of arrest for slander against Cervantes who
subsequently posted bail for 2,000. The latter pleaded not guilty during her
arraignment. She later filed a motion to admit counter-affidavit of which
Carmenchita refused to accept because Cervantes has already been arraigned.

Cervantes, in a letter-complaint against Judge Pangilinan and the clerk of court,

Carmenchita, charged for a prejudicial conduct to the best interest of the service
and ignorance of the law.
ISSUE:
WON the issuance of a warrant of arrest and fixing bail at 2,000 for Cervantes is
valid.
HELD:
NO. Warrant of Arrest should not have been issued against Lanie Cervantes
which fact during the cross-examination was admitted by respondent judge to
be lapses of judgment. He could have ordered Lanie Cervantes to file her
Counter-Affidavit within ten (10) days as provided by [t]he Rules before
arraignment. What the respondent judge did in this case was that the accused
was caused to be arraigned without ordering her to file her Counter-Affidavit
which later when Lanie Cervantes had known that she could not put up her
defense without a Counter-Affidavit in Summary Procedure, she filed that
Counter-Affidavit with the motion to admit the same.
Judge Pangilinan immediately issued a warrant of arrest and fixed
complainants bail at 2,000. There being no showing that complainant failed to
appear in court when required by Judge Pangilinan, the warrant of arrest he
issued had no legal basis.
As Section 16 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure reiterates: Arrest of
accused. The court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure
to appear whenever required. Release of the person arrested shall either be on
bail or on recognizance by a responsible citizen acceptable to the court.

A.C. No. 7815 (July 23, 2009)

DOLORES C. BELLEZA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ALAN S. MACASA, Respondent.
FACTS:
The complainant seek respondents legal services in
connection with the case of her son. The latter however,
upon receiving the amount that complainant gave for the
purpose of posting a bond to secure the provisional
liberty of her son. When the former learned that
respondent did not remit the amount to the court, she
demanded the return of the said amount on several
occasions but was ignored by the latter.

Complainant filed a disbarment case against herein

respondent for unprofessional and unethical conduct in
connection with the handling of a criminal case involving
complainants son.
ISSUE:
WON respondent unduly impeded the complainant sons
constitutional right to bail.
HELD:
YES. Respondent failed to use the amount entrusted to
him for posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of
his client. In this case, after accepting the criminal case
against complainants son and receiving his attorneys
fees, respondent did nothing that could be considered as
effective and efficient legal assistance. For all intents and
purposes, respondent abandoned the cause of his client.
Indeed, on account of respondents continued inaction,
complainant was compelled to seek the services of the
Public Attorneys Office. Respondents lackadaisical
attitude towards the case of complainants son was
reprehensible. Not only did it prejudice complainants
son, it also deprived him of his constitutional right to
counsel.

CONQUILLA VS. BERNARDO A.M. No. MTJ-09-1737

(2011)
FACTS:
A criminal complaint was filed against Conquilla before the
MTC of Bocaue, Bulacan. The respondent judge conducted
a preliminary investigation and found probable cause to
hold the complainant for trial for the crime of direct
assault. A warrant of arrest with a fixed bail amount of
12,000 was issued by the respondent judge. Upon motion,
the bail was reduced to 6,000.
Conquilla filed an administrative complaint against Judge
Bernardo, for usurpation of authority, grave misconduct,
and gross negligence of the law on the grounds that: first

level court judges no longer have the authority to conduct

preliminary investigations; the hasty issuance of the
warrant of arrest was without legal basis and unjustly
prejudiced complainant and deprived her of her liberty;
respondent judge usurped the power of the prosecutor,
who was not even given the chance to comment on
complainants Motion to Reduce Bail.
ISSUE:
WON the issuance of the warrant of arrest and the
reduction of the amount of bail is void for want of
jurisdiction.
HELD:
YES. While Rule 114 of the Rules of Court allows a judge to
grant bail in bailable offenses and to increase or decrease
bail, it assumes that the judge has jurisdiction over the
case. In this case, respondent judge conducted the
preliminary investigation without authority and issued the
warrant of arrest. Thus, these acts are void for want of
jurisdiction. The reduction of bail is also void because in
the first place, respondent judge had no jurisdiction over
the case itself.
GO, Sr. VS. RAMOS 598 SCRA 266
FACTS:
These three consolidated cases stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation
initiated by Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation against Go, alleging
that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien.
Go, maintaining that he is indeed a natural born Filipino citizen, refuted the allegations
averring that the complaint is merely a harassment designed to oust him of his rightful
share in their business dealings.
The commission dismissed the complaint relying the NBI findings but days after the same
was reversed. The former issued a warrant of deportation. Go commenced a petition for
habeas corpus but was dismissed by reason of his provisional release on bail.
Go again filed the same petition before the RTC of Pasay assailing his apprehension and
detention despite the pendency of his appeal and his release on recognizance. The trial
court dismissed the said petition ruling that the remedy of habeas corpus cannot be
availed of to obtain an order of release once a deportation order has already been issued
by the Bureau.

The Court of Appeals granted the petition and enjoined the deportation of Jimmy until the
issue of his citizenship is settled with finality by the court. The CA held that the issuance
of a warrant to arrest and deport the petitioner without any proof whatsoever of his
violation of the bail conditions, that he was previously granted, is arbitrary, inequitable and
unjust, for the policies governing the grant of his bail should likewise apply in the
cancellation of the said bail.
ISSUE:
WON the bail granted was valid.
HELD:
NO. Petitioners argue that the Go cannot rely on the bail on recognizance he was
previously granted to question his subsequent apprehension and detention. Pursuant to PIA
of 1940, the power to grant bail can only be exercised while the alien is still under
investigation, not when the order of deportation had already been issued by the Board.
The Habeas Corpus case is rendered moot and academic as Go is no longer detained.
The SC ruled that once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer
question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His
remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The
writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had
been charged before any court. The term court in this context includes quasi-judicial
bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the persons confinement, like the
Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.
Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas
corpus. When an alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant
to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no
power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no
law authorizing it.

RE: ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT AGAINST HON. MARILOU RUNES- TAMANG, PRESIDING

JUDGE, MeTC PATEROS, METRO MANILA AND PRESIDING JUDGE, MeTC SAN JUAN, METRO
MANILA, A.M. MTJ-04-1558
FACTS:
A letter which the court treated as an administrative complaint, was sent to
then Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. requesting the investigation of herein
petitioner, as well as her husband, for the existing connivance of the
arresting officer and court employees in approving fake bonds for a fee.
A discreet investigation revealedthe anomalous transactions on bail bonds
committed in the petitioners sala. The RTC of Pasig furnished a copy
revoking the unethical orders of release issued by herein petitioner in
various criminal cases assigned to that branch. The order stated that
petitioner had approved bail bonds issued by a black listed company without
showing any unavailability of all RTC Judges in Pasig considering that the
accused persons posting bail bonds were charge criminal cases pending before
the RTC in Pasig and detained in the Pasig City Jail.
ISSUE:

WON the petitioners approval of the bail bonds is valid pursuant to Section
17 (a) Rule 114 of the ROC.
HELD:
NO. Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court governs the approval of bail
bonds for criminal cases pending outside the judges territorial
jurisdiction, viz:
Section 17. Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may
be filed with the court where the case is pending, or in the
absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional
trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or
municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or
municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or
municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also
be filed with any Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no
judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
Petitioner herein approved the bail bonds of three criminal cases
notwithstanding the presence and availability of the RTC in Mandaluyong before
whose courts the cases are pending. Such approval is in contravention of
Section 17 (a) Rule 114 of the ROC.

ATTY. GACAL VS. JUDGE INFANTE (2011)

FACTS:
The MCTC of Sarangani issued a warrant of arrest in connection with a murder
case without bail. The office of the provincial prosecutor affirmed the findings
and accordingly filed with the RTC an information for murder but with a
recommendation for bail in the amount of 400,000. The case was raffled to
Judge Infantes branch. The latter issued twin orders granting bail and the
release of the accused from custody.
Atty. Gacal filed a very-urgent motion but was denied by the judge on the
ground of pro forma for not bearing the conformity of the public prosecutor.
The latter, in his comment, recommended bail as a matter of course and the
recommendation and release of the accused were proper; such recommendation
was in effect a waiver of the public prosecutors right to a bail hearing.
Atty. Gacal charges Judge Infante with gross ignorance of the law, gross
incompetence and evident partiality for the latters failure to set a hearing
before granting bail to the accused and for releasing him immediately after
allowing bail.
ISSUE:

WON bail hearing is unnecessary when the accused did not file an application
for bail; and because the public prosecutor had recommended bail.
HELD:
NO. A hearing, separate and distinct from the initial hearing to determine the
existence of probable cause, should still be held. This will give the Prosecution
a chance to show the strength of its evidence; otherwise, a violation of due
process occurs.
The fact that the public prosecutor recommended bail for Ancheta did not
warrant dispensing with the hearing. The public prosecutors recommendation
of bail was not material in deciding whether to conduct the mandatory hearing
or not. For one, the public prosecutors recommendation, albeit persuasive, did
not necessarily bind the trial judge, in whom alone the discretion to determine
whether to grant bail or not was vested.
Whatever the public prosecutor recommended, including the amount of bail, was
non-binding. Nor did such recommendation constitute a showing that the
evidence of guilt was not strong. If it was otherwise, the trial judge could
become unavoidably controlled by the Prosecution.

PEOPLE VS. CAWALING GR 157147 (2003)

FACTS:
Cawaling was found guilty as an accomplice in the crime of homicide in the RTC of Romblon, but on appeal to the CA,
he was charged with the crime of murder. The CA further ordered the elevation of the entire records of the case to the
SC pursuant to Section 13 Rule 124. The SC directed the presiding judge of the RTC to order the bondsmen/sureties
of Cawaling to surrender him. If he fail to surrender, his bond shall be forfeited and an order of his arrest shall be issued
and his appeal shall be dismissed.
Cawaling filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the CA disregarded the findings and assessment of the RTC
on the matter of credibility of the witnesses and testimonies. He argues that there is now a conflict between RTC and the
CAs findings on his alleged participation in the commission of the crime. He further avers that "no prejudice can also be
had on the people if bail is maintained, since the accused can immediately be arrested, if conviction is sustained" by this
Court. He argues that the records will show that he had faced his accuser and never went into hiding and in fact, he was
jailed for more than 4 years while the case was heard below. He therefore prays that he be allowed to maintain his bail
bond while the case is being deliberated by this Court.
The OSG prayed for the denial of the motion for reconsideration because Cawaling, having been convicted by the CA, of
a capital offense can no longer post bail.
ISSUE:

WON Cawalings motion for reconsideration be granted.

HELD:
NO. Section 7, Rule 114 is explicit. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution. Stated otherwise, when the accused is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and evidence of guilt is strong, bail shall be denied, as it is neither a matter of
right nor of discretion.
Appellant was charged with the crime of murder which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Although the court a
quo found him guilty of a lesser offense, appellant appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals, which
found him guilty of the crime of murder. An appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case wide open for review and the
appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment. This includes the
penalty which may be increased. The entire case is submitted for review and even factual questions may again be weighed
and evaluated. There is the possibility that appellant may be convicted upon the original charge.
The clear implication, therefore, is that if an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is
convicted and sentenced to suffer such penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of
discretion on the part of the court. The court would not have only determined that the evidence of guilt is strong, it would
have likewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, bail must not be granted
during the pendency of the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
People v Dumlao
This is complaint for gross ignorance of the law against Dumlao.
Facts: A criminal case filed by Barbero aginst her man Medina was raffled to Judge Anghad.
Medina was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by Judge Anghad. However, Judge
Dumlao approved Medina's bail. Barbero charged Judge Dumlao with gross ignorance of the
law. Several directives of the court were issued which Judge Dumlao ignored. He was considered
to have waived his right to comment on the affidavit-complaint.
Issue: Whether or not a Judge may issue bail for an accused whose case is pending on another
court.
Held: In the present case, there is no showing that Judge Anghad was absent or unavailable or
that the accused was arrested outside Santiago City. Judge Dumlao failed to act in accordance
to the rules of court regarding bail.
Under Sec 3 Rule 114 of the rules of court, no person under detention by legal process shall be
released except when his admitted to bail. Sec 17 provieds that bail maybe filed with the court
where the case is pending, unless the Judge is absent or unavailable or if the accused is arrested
in the province, the bail should be filed with any RTC of the place.

Trillanes V. Pimentel
Special civil action in the supreme court.
Facts: Petitioner Trillanes was charged along with others with coup d'etat. Petitioner who remained in
detention won a seat in the senate. He then filed emotion for him to perform his duty in the senate.
All of his request were denied by the court.
Issue: Whether the court erred in denying his application for bail.
Held: No. The constitution provides that no person charged with a capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua shall be admitted to bail when the evidence of guilt was strong. coup
d'etat is punishable by reclusion perpetua, there is no distinction as to political complexion or moral
turpitude involve in the crime charged. Also, all prisoners whether under preventive detention or

serving final sentence cannot practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation or
hold office, elective or appointive.

MENDOZA VS. ALARMA

Facts: Spouses Alarma are the owners of a parcel of land posted as a property bond for the provisional liberty
of Joselito Mayo. The latter was charged with illegal possession of fire arms. When the accused failed to
appear in court, the trial court ordered this arrest and the confiscation offica bail bond in favor of the
government and directed the bondsmen to show cause why judgement should not be entered against the bail
bond. However, a writ of execution was issued and the land was sold at the public auction.

Issue: Whether the bond forfeiture was valid

Held: No. Sec 21 Rule 114 provides for the two requisites forfeiture of bail. As held in reliance surety vs
amante, two ocassions upon which the Trial Court may rule adversely against the bondman in cases where the
accused fails to appear in court. first, the non-appearance by the accused is a cause for the judge to summarily
declare the bond as forfeited. second, the bondsmen, after forfeiture, are given 30 days within which to
produce the principal or to show cause why judgment shall not be rendered against the bond.
however, in this case, two years had passed from the time the court ordered the forfeiture and no judgment
had been rendered. Instead, a writ of execution was issued. This shows that there was a failure of due process
of law. An order of forfeiture is interlocutory, it leaves something to be done.

San Miguel v Maceda

Facts: Complainant filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging Judge Maceda with gross ignorance of the law,
among others. Complainant was arrested for illegal sale of prohibited drugs punishable by Prision
Correctional. he jumped bail. His Bail Bond was increased from 60,000 to 120,000. He was then arrested
on September 12, 2001. Complainant alleged that his right to procedural due process was violated as
the offense charged is neither a capital offense nor punishable by Reclusion Perpetua. His right to bail,
as he alleged is a constitutional right, not only a mere privilege.
OCA recommends that the order increasing the bail shall be cancelled and tyhat the accused enjoys the
right to bail since he has not yet been convited and he is charged with an offense not punishable by
death or Life imprisonment.

Issue: Whether the accused is entitled to bail as a matter of right.

Held: Yes. the court agrees with the findings and recommendation of OCA. Section 13, Article III of the
1987 Constitution provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance
as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Also, though the accused jumped bail, where bail is a matter of right and prior absconding and forfeiture
is not exceoted form such right, bail must be allowed.
Chua v Court of Appeals
Facts:
An Information of estafa was filed against Wilfred Chiok caused by the petitioner. After trial,
respondent was convicted of estafa sentencing him of 12 years of prision mayor to 20 years of
Reclusion Temporal. He was not appear on the promulgation of judgment. On the same day,
Petitioner filed a motion for cancellation of bail for the respodent might flee. An Omnibus order
was issued cancelling bail of the respondent. Petitioner argued thathe should not be deprived of
his liberty pending the resolution of his appeal as he was convicted of a non-capital offense.
Issue:
Whether or not the cancellation of bail is proper.
Held:
Yes. the petition for certiorari and preliminary injunction is not the proper remedy in assailing the
Trial Court's order cancelling his bail. Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure3 provides:
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary.Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the
filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate
court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of
the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and
resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional
liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the
bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b)That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated
the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d)That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail;
or
(e)That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.

The proper recourse is by filing a motion to review with the appellate court.

Savella v Ines

Facts:
This case stemmed from a criminal complaint filed in MTCC vigan for falsification of public document. A warrant of
arrest was not immediately issued as the respondent was residing in USA. Upon where return, NBI operatives tried to
secure an alias warrant. Her daughter produce a copy of an order directing the provisional release of the accused issued by
the responded judge from MTC sinait. Complainant claims that the bailbond papers were not forwarded to the court
where the case is pending.

Issue:
Whether a bailbond may be issued by the judge of a equal court other than that where the case is pending.

Held:
In this case the court agreed with the findings of OCA, that the judge failed to properly applied the rule
regarding bailbond application. Section 17, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that (b)ail in the amount
fixed may be filed with the court where the case is pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with
any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge of the province or
city or municipality. The instant falsification case against accused was filed before the MTCC-Vigan, presided by Judge
Ante. There was no showing of the unavailability of Judge Ante at that time. Following the said rule, respondent judge
clearly erred in entertaining the bail application despite knowledge of the pendency of the falsification case before the
MTCC of Vigan.

Assuming arguendo that respondent judge rightfully granted bail to accused, her failure to transmit the order of release
and other supporting papers to the court where the case is pending constitutes another violation of the rules, particularly
Section 19 of Rule 114. Respondent judge should have forwarded the records pertaining to the bail bond immediately
after she received the same.

People vs Sandigan Bayan

Facts: At the offshoot of the impeachment trial of Joseph Estrada, criminal complaints
against the members of his family, friends, and conspirators were filed with the office of the
ombudsman. Among them wasa Jinggoy Estrada who's charged with plunder. A warrant of
arrest was issued for Jinggoy. He filed an omnibus motion for bail arguing that no probable
cause exist to put him on trial and he is entitled to bail as a matter of right. petitioner
argues that respondent is flight risk. The motion was denied. On the third time he applied
for bail due to medical reasons. Sandiganbayan pursued with it's bail hearing granting the
respondent a provisional liberty. Petitioner questions the decision.

Issue: Whether or not the grant of bail was proper

Held: Yes. To begin with, Section 13 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution
mandates:

Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. xxx.

Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness of the evidence of guilt, the right to
bail may justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is great.14 Here, ever since the
promulgation of the assailed Resolutions a little more than four (4) years ago, Jinggoy does not, as
determined by Sandiganbayan, seem to be a flight risk.

People v Valerio

Facts:
Jun Valerio was shot and killed in Quezon City. An information for
murder was then filed against several respondents and uninformation for
parricide was filed against the victims wife Milasgros. She filed an
application for bail claiming that the evidence of guilt against her was not
strong. The bail was granted. The sister of the deceased, Laarni Vallerio
questioned the decision of RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not Milagros is entitled to bail

Held:
No. Bail is not a matter of right in cases where the person is charged
with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Article 114, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, states, No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to
bail when the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal action.
In this case, the trial court had disregarded the glaring fact that the
killer himself has confessed to the crime and has implicated Milagros as the
mastermind. When taken in conjunction with the other evidence on record,
these facts show very strongly that Milagros may have participated as
principal by inducement in the murder of Jun Valerio. It was thus a grave
error or a grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court to grant
her application for bail. The appellate court clearly committed a reversible
error in affirming the trial courts decision granting bail to Milagros
Valerio.

Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4,
Dolores, Eastern Samar

Facts:
This administrative case arose from a memorandum1 an audit team of the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted. The audit team reported on the judicial
audit conducted in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar
(trial court) on 7 October 2004. The audit team found that Judge Bugtas accepted
the bail bonds in Criminal Case Nos. 393 and 358, both of which were pending before
Judge Alvarez. In Criminal Case No. 358, Judge Bugtas accepted the bail bond on 9
December 1999 and, on the same day, then officerin-charge Ernesto C. Quitorio
(Quitorio), now legal researcher, RTC, Branch 2, Borongan, Eastern Samar signed the
order of release. Judge Bugtas and Quitorio did not forward the bail, order of release,
and other supporting papers to Judge Alvarez until after a subpoena duces tecum was
issued on 29 January 2002.

Issue:
WON the granting of bail made by Judge bugtas were proper.

Held:
Since (1) Criminal Case Nos. 393 and 358 were pending before Judge Alvarez, (2) there
was no showing that Judge Alvarez was unavailable, and (3) the accused were not
arrested in Borongan, Judge Bugtas had no authority to accept the bail bonds in these
cases. In Espaol v. Mupas, 442 SCRA 13 (2004), the Court held that judges who
approve applications for bail of accused whose cases are pending in other courts are
guilty of gross ignorance of the law. In Lim v. Dumlao, 454 SCRA 196 (2005), the Court
held that: The requirements of Section 17(a), Rule 114 x x x must be complied with
before a judge may grant bail. The Court recognizes that not every judicial error
bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant
administrative sanction, but only in cases within the parameters of tolerable
misjudgment. Where, however, the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, not
to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge undeniably erred in approving the bail and issuing the order of
release. He is expected to know that certain requirements ought to be complied with
before he can approve [the accuseds] bail and issue an order for his release. The law
involved is rudimentary that it leaves little room for error.
Section 19 is very clear: When bail is filed with a court other than where the case is
pending, the judge who accepted the bail shall forward it, together with the order of
release and other supporting papers, to the court where the case is pending. Section
11, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court states that failure of the accused to cause the
annotation of the lien on the propertys certificate of title within 10 days after the
approval of the property bond shall be sufficient cause for the cancellation of the
bond and re-arrest and detention of the accused. Judge Alvarez could have cancelled
the property bond and issued the warrant of arrest much sooner had Judge Bugtas
followed Section 19.