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At the start it seems fair to ask, In what way might Marxist theory
immediate aim was to secure the vote for workers, the Chartists ultimate
objectives were militantly socialist (Cameron, 1993).
In short, Marx took the richness of Hegels analysis of complex sociohistorical relationships-the so-called dialectical laws-but put his theory of historical evolution on a firm materialistic footing, drawing from the
viewpoints of materialist philosophers: Feuerbach in Germany and the
18th-century French writers, Diderot and Holbach. Subsequently, Marx
spent enormous labor on his critique of political economy, concentrating
on the works of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. However, the foundation
of Marxist theory is not in the texts of Hegels dialectics, Feuerbacks materialism, or the English political economists, but in the experience of the
industrial working class, in particular, the British working class of the
1840s. As intellectuals who were part of this working-class movement,
Marx and Engels thus set out to synthesize its world-view and to forward
its economic and political interests (Cameron, 1993, p. 5), and so began
the systematic work on Marxist theory.
158)
but would not be able to demonstrate that only that particular species could
have arisen, Marxist theory can describe how a given society evolved but
would not argue that it could not have been otherwise. Slightly different
initial conditions acting on an organism (society) in a slightly different
order could have selected a somewhat different species (social formation).
To evaluate Marxs scientific contributions, one must examine how
and on what basis he reached his conclusions. To compound the problem
of evaluating Marxist theory, as Marx continued to develop his theory, he
changed his emphases on and interpretations of various aspects of sociohistorical phenomena that constituted his subject matter. The work of subsequent Marxist theorists must also be evaluated, but in a highly selective
manner given the enormous, diverse, and even contradictory body of literature that has come to be called Marxist.
Therefore, the following is an attempt to render an overview of Marxist theory that is commensurate with the natural science of behavior, behaviorology, and the philosophy that guides it, radical behaviorism. My
goal in this chapter, then, is to present an interpretation of Marxist theory
that will be relevant to the practice of behavior therapy.
O n the basis of this statement, Harris (1979) derived what he termed the
principle of infrastructure determinism (p. 56), where infiamrcture is composed of variables responsible for the production and reproduction of a
given human group (e.g., methods of food production and storage, methods
of birth control, etc.).
However, Harris (1979) was not clear about how one is to determine
which infrastructural variable is operative in each instance, and therefore
his principle of infrastructure determinism might more properly be termed
the principle of infrastructure eclecticism. Furthermore, when pressed, Harris
( 1979) conceded that there are occasions in which structural/superstructural variables may play a determining role (e.g., conscious political-ideological struggle is clearly capable of [changing] . . . the direction and pace
of the transformational processes initiated within the infrastructure [p.
731). Perhaps the most revealing difference between cultural materialism
and Marxist theory is found in Harriss book, America Now (subsequently
titled Why Things Dont Work). According to Harris, the problem with the
United States is not, as Marxists would argue, the inherent crises of capitalism, but that the means of production have become too huge, centralized, and bureaucratized.
As Legros (1977) made clear, cultural evolutionism and historical
materialism are two fundamentally divergent theories of evolution (p. 26).
Harriss cultural materialism is a form of cultural evolutionism (see Lett,
1987) and thus differs from historical materialism in a crucial way: It fails
to grasp the centrality of the concept mode of production, which, for Marxists, constitutes a discriminating criterion for a science of history (Legros,
1977, p. 79). Legros (1977) pointed out that this concept allows us to
construct an evolutionary sequence in terms of general evolution (p. 79).
That is, by comprehending a given society not as a single structure of
interrelated levels (as in Harris, 1979) but as a unique synthesis and articulation of various modes of production, historical materialism not only
offers a more scientifically comprehensive view of the human social environment than does cultural evolutionism, it is an opposite view-one that
is closer to the modem conception of biological evolution in which the
concept of chance has become as crucial as the concept of necessity (cf.
Monod, [1970/]1971) (p. 79).
Moreover, Lett (1987), a former student of Harris, observed that cultural materialism is concerned primarily with the general question of cultural causality . , . and not the particular question of dynamic processes
(p. 92). Cultural materialism cannot explain the causes of all sociocultural
phenomena, but instead offers explanations for those phenomena (as its
proponents duly recognize) that either benefit or detract from the productive and reproductive efforts of particular sociocultural systems. In effect, the principle of infrastructural determinism is only capable of account-
ing for those components of sociocultural systems that are affected by infrastructural determinants (Lett, 1987, p. 92).
Harriss ( 1979) cultural materialism thus reduces societal phenomena,
including that of class struggle, to cultural practices, to structural and superstructural events driven by infrastructural determinants. One net result
is that the priority he gave infrastructural determinism obscures the question of political power, which is central to a Marxist analysis (see Isaac,
1987). The point here is not to criticize cultural materialism as much as
it is to emphasize that Marxs theory and Harriss theory are concerned
with different kinds of questions-respectively, of power and of cultural
causality. After all, Harris never claimed to be a Marxist.
In general, behaviorists appear to be attracted by Harriss emphasis
on infrastructural determinism combined with his antimentalism. They
give little or no credence to Marxism, as is typical among North American
academics. The popularity of Harris among radical behaviorists notwithstanding, I argue that there is nothing inherent in the philosophy of radical
behaviorism that would necessarily commit one to cultural evolutionism
as opposed to historical materialism. To the contrary, what is inherent in
radical behaviorism, I think, is a materialistic selectionist viewpoint that,
if it is applied consistently in the interpretation of large-scale social change,
would lead one toward historical materialism (i.e., toward a version of
historical materialism that is conceptualized within the selectionistic explanatory framework and the radical behavioral epistemology).
ence, and even art), the repressive apparatus (the military, police, courts,
prisons, etc.), and all other social institutions within the context of the
mode of production of the society in which they exist. Changes in these
institutions are comprehended in relation to changes in the dominant
mode of production.
tween the rich and the poor; the rampant exploitation of natural resources
with the consequent destruction of the biosphere; the triumph of greed at
any social cost; the international competition for markets, raw materials,
cheap labor, minimal taxes, and unrestricted dumping of industrial waste;
and broadening of class, national, and interimperialist conflicts over world
domination.
WHAT IS A MARXIST?
I next consider these differences in regard to alternative ethical systems. In Western culture, as Engels (1878/1947) noted, there are three
major ethical alternatives: Christian-feudal, bourgeois-modem, and proletarian. In contemporary bourgeois society, one finds various combinations
of ethical systems, but the predominant system can be characterized as
pragmatic, the viewpoint of the political liberal. Perhaps the most advanced form of this mode of thinking is in t
i o ophy of John Dewey
(1859-1952). According to Dewey (1938/1 3), t e worth of any moral
action is to be judged not on the good intentions or motives of the actor
but solely on its consequences. What counts is concrete results.
17 lhf
Leon Trotsky (1877-1940), a central organizer of the Red Army during the 1918-1921 Russian Civil War, discussed moral values from the
revolutionary Marxist perspective. He argued that ends and means are dialectically interdependent:
A means can be justified only by its ends. But the end in its turn needs
to be justified. From the Marxist point of view, which expresses the
historical interest of the proletariat, the end is justified if it leads to
increasing the power of humanity over nature and to the abolition of
the power of one person over another. (Trotsky, 1938/1973, p. 48)
In his debate with Trotsky, Dewey (1938/1973) agreed that the ends justify
the means, but insisted that the means and ends are merely reciprocally
interdependent.
The difference between Trotsky and Dewey on this question reduces
to an essential difference in methods. Dewey believed that Trotskys position was incorrect because he deduced it from a peculiar reading of the
course of social development, class struggle, and that Trotsky was not warranted in entrusting the fundamental tasks of progressive social change to
the proletariat because it is a common concern of all. According to Dewey,
all people of good will, from the topmost level to the lower levels, should
be mobilized for this task. Moreover, selecting one means over another can
be based only on a tentative guess; again, only concrete results matter.
In Trotskys view, on the basis of the materialist study of history (historical materialism), only the working class is capable of carrying through
with the changes required to eliminate the catastrophic problems facing
humanity. Nothing short of worldwide social revolution will do. In achieving this historic task, the choice of means is crucial. One need examine
only the history of successes and failures in revolutionary struggles to comprehend this fact. The point is that politically, ethically, and philosophically, pragmatism and Marxism are absolutely irreconcilable (see Novack,
1975). Practically by default, the overwhelming majority of social scientists
in modern bourgeois society are pragmatists of one shade or another.
Essentially, the implications of Marxist theory for behavior therapy
revolve around the issue of class struggle. In times of social crisis, when
workers and farmers begin to organize their own government and advance
toward the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism-such as occurred in
Russia in 1917 and in Cuba in 1959-the reality of class struggle is not a
theoretical question; rather, it is a stupendously palpable fact. However,
class struggle is not like a light bulb, either on or off. Most of the time its
manifestations are considerably more translucent. Nonetheless, as long as
a class-divided society continues to exist, class struggle will continue to
some degree, ranging from resistance to employer demands on the shop
floor to open class warfare. It is important to understand that whether
workers believe that they are engaging in some form of class struggle is not
the criterion for judging its reality. The criterion Marxists use is class analysis (see Ulman, 1983).
Developing Class Consciousness
cally. In times of social crisis and class polarization, there is no escape from
class conflict. For example, if one works in a unionized plant during a strike,
the choice is clear: One either does or does not cross the picket line.
Understanding that the actions a behavior therapist takes with respect to class struggle are determined largely by his or her class position in
society, I can now address the lead question: What bearing does Marxist
theory have on the practice of behavior therapy? Does Marxist theory have
anything to say about what behavior therapists should do? Not directly, for
exactly the same reason that the science of behavior does not. As materialistic scientists, Marxists and radical behaviorists agree that ought and
should are questions of ethical values and therefore unanswerable within
the sphere of natural science. However, the variables responsible for ethical
conduct can be investigated.
In Beyond Freedom and Dignity, Skinner ( 1971) considered values from
the radical behavioral perspective. For Skinner (1971), to make a value
judgment by calling something good or bad is to classify it in terms of its
reinforcing effects (p. 99). He added, should and ought begin to raise
more difficult questions when we turn to the contingencies under which a
person is induced to behave for the good of others (p. 107). Hence, a
radical behaviorist might describe what a behavior therapist ought to do in
light of Marxist theory as follows: If approval by the verbal community of
vanguard workers is an important source of reinforcement for you, then
you will be reinforced when you engage in revolutionary activities.
E. A. Vargass (1975) radical behavioral analysis of rights provides a
useful way to examine this issue. Ultimately, Vargas argued, it is the ethical
verbal community that effectively asserts an individual5 rights-where
rights are forms of verbal behavior and therefore amenable to Skinners
(1957/1992) analysis. What makes a verbal community an ethical community, according to Vargas, are the contingencies the community shares
in common, or what I referred to earlier as macrocontingencies.
Marxists conversant in operant terminology (rare birds indeed) would
not disagree with Vargas (1975). They would, however, insist that an additional step be taken in this analysis; namely, that the contingencies (macrocontingencies) controlling the practices of the verbal community be
explained by reference to the productive relations in which the ethical
community exists (i.e., in terms of a class analysis combined with a behaviorological analysis). As I have suggested elsewhere,
Vargas (1975) operant analysis of political rights-in particular, the
verbal behavior and antagonistic macrocontingencies responsible for
the competitive struggle between ethical communities [or social
classes] as they seek solutions to their problems ( 189)-points to a
new avenue for developing a synthetic Marxist-behaviorological approach for the investigation of ideological control associated with classstruggle social relations. (Ulman, in press, Footnote 23)
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