Yes, Russias Military Is Getting

More Aggressive
But are Moscow's heavily armed fly-bys through European airspace a
nuisance -- or a warning of things to come in 2015?

BY JAMES T. QUINLIVAN-DECEMBER 30, 2014

On Dec. 12, a Russian military jet came dangerously

close to a Scandinavian Airlines passenger plane in international
airspace near southern Sweden. Reportedly, the Russian aircraft was
flying without its transponder active when the Swedish military
detected it. The Swedes notified civilian air traffic control, which then
diverted the civilian jet. A collision was avoided.
Immediately after the December incident, the Russians denied that their

aircraft was anywhere near the passenger jet. But the near miss in the skies
over Scandinavia was only the latest incident in a consistent pattern of
Russian provocations and who-me? denials. In March 2014, a Russian
reconnaissance aircraft came close enough to an SAS airliner departing
from Copenhagen to require the airliner carrying more than 100
passengers to maneuver to avoid a collision.
For years, Russian aircraft have been doing fly-bys of European neighbors,
largely without much public notice. But as Russias relations with the United
States and Europe has deteriorated in recent months following Moscows
annexation of Crimea and support for the rebels in eastern Ukraine, these
incidents in the skies seem to have taken on a new urgency they may
even herald a revival of Cold War-era tactics.

Moscows aggressive behavior is intended as an intimidating display of the

Kremlins strength, and perhaps even a reminder of Russian nuclear
capability. But overreaction is the wrong response: These are annoying
provocations, not serious dangers to Western Europe. As such, they should
remind the United States and Europe that Russias credible nuclear threats
still spring from relative weakness not strength. A new, military doctrine
issued by the Kremlin last week may look aggressive toward NATO and the
West, but Putin is still more bark than bite.
***
After a hiatus that began in 1991, Russian aircraft returned to long distance

operations in 2007 with venerable Tupolev Tu-95 Bear bombers flying long
distance legs toward the United States coastline, near island bases in the
Pacific, even intercepting American carrier task forces at sea.Over the last
year, tactical aircraft have gradually been integrated into these flights,
progressing in the last few months to short-range provocations of Russias
neighbors with fighter jets and intelligence aircraft.

The recent spate of incidents with Russian aircraft over the Baltic have
made headlines and prompted comments from Western officials. A recent
report by the European Leadership Network documented almost 40
incidents involving Russian aircraft or ships between March and November
2014 and pointed out that they were both more frequent and involved more
risk than in previous years.
These provocations show no sign of abating. In November, Russian Defense
Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that Russia would send bombers to the
Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean. This sounds dramatic, but it merely
extends the practice of sending Bear bombers on long-range flights toward
Canada and the United States. In June, for example, Russian bombers with
tanker and fighter escorts appeared off Alaska, where Canadian and
American fighters intercepted and escorted them. The bombers continued
as far south as northern California and produced a few nuclear-capable
bombers buzz California stories in the media. During the September NATO
summit in Wales, two Bear bombers ostentatiously flew up past Iceland to

Greenland toward points from which Russia would have launched cruise
missiles against American targets if the Cold War ever turned hot.
That some of Russias most provocative flights came during the NATO
summit might not be a coincidence. NATOs own use of airpower
demonstrated its utility as a threat and helped put Moscow on the policy
course it is pursuing today. Now largely forgotten in the West, the Kosovo
War in 1999, when the United States and its NATO allies bombed Serbian
targets to protect ethnic Kosovars, is remembered in Russia for two things,
both of which are directly relevant to understanding why Moscow is
provoking its neighbors.

First, after President Boris Yeltsin warned the West not to push Russia, the
United States and NATO never sought permission from the United Nations
to begin bombing. The NATO campaign humiliated Moscow and contributed
to Yeltsins resignation at the end of 1999. Second, U.S. and NATO airpower
waged what the Russians subsequently described as a contactless war in
which airpower savaged Serbian military, paramilitary, and regime targets
with opposing ground troops never coming into contact.
The ramifications of the Kosovo War are still being felt. When Yeltsin
resigned in December 1999, he turned over power to his prime minister*,
Vladimir Putin.And Putin, who is famous for holding grudges, remembers
both the pain and the possibilities shown in the Kosovo War as he has
attempted to rebuild Russian power and its sphere of influence.

In the wake of the Kosovo War, the Russian military viewed NATO as
aggressive and believed the alliance could intervene in another regional
conflict and wage contactless war against a weakened Russian military.
Under the catchphrase de-escalation of military action, Russian military
theorists developed the concept of using nuclear weapons to bring a stop to
conventional fighting before complete defeat. A series of large exercises
beginning with Zapad-99 in 1999 were designed around scenarios of NATO
intervening with advanced military forces into local conflicts in Russias
near abroad, such as Belarus and Kaliningrad, the Russian enclave
between Lithuania and Poland. In the exercises, the conflicts escalated into
major regional wars with Russian conventional forces losing to mass air
attacks with precision weapons, as had the Serbs in Kosovo.
These exercises involved long-range aircraft including the Tupolev Tu-22
Backfire theater-range system and the Bear simulating attacks at depth
as well as concurrent launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles and
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which flew to the Kamchatka test
range. At the time of the Zapad-99 exercise, then-Defense Minister Igor
Sergeyev stated that the exercise involved nuclear weapons when
conventional weapons had failed. These exercises demonstrated to the
West that de-escalation of military action by nuclear use was more than a
theoretical concept.

***
By 2000, nuclear weapons took a greater prominence in Russias formal
military doctrine, which stated nuclear weapons could be used in situations
critical to the national security of the Russian Federation. New doctrine
also opened the possibility of nuclear first-use. Most outside observers
agreed that the many weaknesses of Russias military, the Wests
conventional ability and U.S. willingness to execute contactless war, and
the Russian regimes fragility all gave credibility to the Kremlins threat of a
nuclear response in the case of a conventional defeat.
Russias 2008 border war with Georgia demonstrated two important new
considerations for Moscow. First, reorganized Russian ground forces built
around contract soldiers rather than conscripts demonstrated greater skills
and overall military capability than the forces that had failed in Chechnya in
the late 1990s. These units are manned at higher levels as permanently
ready forces than the rest of Russias military and do not depend on the
mobilization of reservists or additional conscripts to deploy to operations.
The experience of defeating the Georgians gave the Russian military
greater confidence that they could fight and win a local war. Second, NATO
showed no interest in involving itself in the Georgian war as it had in
Kosovo, which signaled to the Russians that the West is not always itching
for a fight.

Russia issued a new military doctrine in 2010 that seemed to reduce the

role for nuclear weapons. The doctrine retained the possibility of nuclear
first-use but said Russia would consider nuclear use only in situations in
which the very existence of the state is under threat a higher bar than
critical for national security, the language used in the 2000
doctrine. Nuclear deterrence only works when both sides have a clear
understanding of what is being deterred. The formal change in Russias
doctrine communicated that Moscow recognized less need for rapid
recourse to nuclear measures.
The new military doctrine that President Putin signed on Dec. 26 is based
on a four-month effort that began in September to revise the 2010 military
doctrine. The tone of the latest document is much more defensive than the
previous doctrine, with a heightened concern about NATO buildups on
territories contiguous to Russia, as well as evolving forms of warfare such
as information warfare and ballistic missile defenses. At the same time, the
doctrine shows increased Russian interest in improving its own ability to use
precision conventional weapons. But the central question of when Moscow
might feel compelled to use nuclear weapons seems unchanged from the
position laid out in the 2010 doctrine.

***
How should the West think about these provocative flights over the Baltic in
light of understanding Russias nuclear threat? Certainly, the long-range
flights replicate Moscows Cold War behavior, and the sight of a Bear

bomber flying over the Arctic or soon the Gulf of Mexico sends a
message. But it has little to do with how war would be waged or initiated
today. The flights by themselves are not plausible nuclear threats, even
when they simulate bombing runs or cruise missile releases, nor does the
new doctrine show an increased Russian willingness to resort to nuclear
weapons.

But with no U.S. or NATO forces present in Ukraine (and rarely in the Black
Sea), the flights particularly the Baltic fly-bys represent one of the few
situations where NATO and Russian forces could come into direct contact
and potentially conflict. The integrated flights of bombers and fighter
aircraft in the Baltic are visibly more aggressive than the long patrols by
larger aircraft. The flights also intend to embarrass and intimidate. The
Baltic states Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are the primary targets, but
the traditionally neutral and patient Swedes and Finns have also been
imposed upon by Russian intrusions.Indeed, Swedish politicians have been
provoked to such an extent that they are considering joining NATO.

And yet with all of these provocations, the military balance in Europe has
not appreciably changed since the Kosovo War. The Russian flights show
increased confidence in the capabilities of Russias air force and its slowly
modernizing tactical aircraft inventory. The new Sukhoi Su-34 Fullback
only appeared in these flights beginning in late October and represents

Russias latest generation of tactical strike aircraft. But Russia still has
relatively few of these planes and along with the improved accuracies of
other air-delivered munitions that can be carried by the older aircraft
they are only a small down payment on the improved precision capabilities
envisioned in the new Russian military doctrine.

Meanwhile, the United States and its NATO allies have improved their
capabilities to use precision conventional weapons and penetrate defenses
against conventionally organized ground forces. And despite all of Moscows
improvements, including reorganized brigades built around contract rather
than conscript soldiers and explorations of hybrid warfare involving
special forces in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, the core of the Russian
military remains conventionally organized. From 1960 to 2000, the NATO
supreme commander was always an American Army general, reflecting the
centrality of the ground war in a possible NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation.
In the time since the Kosovo War, the supreme command has included
American Air Force generals as well as American admirals reflecting a
change in the way NATO would use military power in a confrontation with
Russia. The current supreme commander, U.S. Air Force Gen. Philip
Breedlove, personifies the important role air power in any new NATORussian conflict.

Still, there are military dangers to the Russian flights and the incursions.

Russian fighters routinely fly armed with air-to-air missiles, as do the

aircraft that intercept them. Its not difficult to imagine pilot with an itchy
trigger finger or an intimidating fly-by that gets too close at which point
many things could go wrong.

Perhaps more concerning is the casual, almost careless, display of power in

Putins Russia. The Russian practice of flying military aircraft in the Baltic
without filing flight plans or using transponders making the aircraft both
unexpected by and invisible to civilian air traffic control shows a reckless
disregard for human life. Indeed, these alarming events, such as the
incidents with civilian airliners in March 2014 and December 2014, are not
simply due to faulty procedures or the actions of rogue or inadequately
trained aviators. These kinds of near-misses will continue as long as
President Putin wants them to.

In a news conference in early November, Gen. Breedlove said of the

provocative Russian flights that they do not add to or contribute to a
secure and stable situation, these kinds of demonstrations, and so they are
problematic. Thats a rhetorical start. But NATO will have to continue to
craft a response to the new Russian aggression.
In the meantime, NATO can only be responsible for its own side. Russian
flights will continue to be intercepted to demonstrate that they are not
likely to achieve much if they were hostile. They will also have to be

intercepted to show that Russias neighbors are not willing to be

intimidated, and to demonstrate that NATO will share the burden of their
defense and air sovereignty. Over the last year, the British, Canadian,
Danish, Dutch, French, German, Polish, Portuguese, and Spanish air forces
have contributed to the Baltic Air Policing mission. As Gen. Breedlove
emphasized in November, the intercepts have been carried out in a
professional manner with professional intercepts by fully capable NATO
defenders to escort the Russians while they were in the airspace.

Perhaps, by increasing communication and cooperation with Finland and

Sweden, NATO can demonstrate to Russia that these air incidents are only
increasing the number of opposing states rather than driving a wedge
between NATO allies.

*Correction, Dec. 30, 2014: Vladimir Putin was prime minister under Boris
Yeltsin. An earlier version of this article mistakenly said he was vice
president.