The Military Revolution, 156o-166o

MICHAEL

ROBERTS

Ir rs,q. nrsronrcer commonplace that malor revolutions in military techniques

have usually been attended with widely ramifting consequences. The coming of
the mounted warrior, and of the sword, in the middle ofthe second millennium
oc; the triumph of the heary cavalryman, consolidated by the adoption of the
stifiup, in the sixth century ofthe Christian era; the scientific revolution rn warfare in our own day these are all recognized as major turning-points in the history ofmankind. The period in the history ofthe art ofwar with which I shall try
to deal in this lecture may seem from this point ofview to be of inferior irnportance. But it brought changes which may not improperly be called a military revolutionj and that revolution, when it was accomplished, exercised a profound influence upon the future course of European history. It stands like a great divide
separating mediaeval society from the modern world, Yet it is a revolution which
has been curiously neglected by historians. The experts in military history have
mostly been content to describe what happened, without being overmuch concerned to trace out broader effects; while social historians have not been very apt
to believe that the new fashions in tactics, or improvements in weapon-design,
were likely to prove of much significance for their purposes. Some few sociologists, indeed, have realized the importance ofthe problem; but historians tend to
find their expositions a trifle opaque, and their conclusions sometimes insecurely
grounded, Yet it remains true that purely military developments, ofa strictly technical kind, did exert a lasting influence upon society at large. They were the agents
and auxiliaries ofconstitutional and social change; and they bore a main share of
responsibility for the coming ofthat new world whichwas to be so very unlike the

old.t
The military revolution which fills the century between 156o and 1660 was in
essence the result ofiust one more attempt to solve the perennial problem oftactics-the problem of how to combine missile weapons with close action; how to
unite hitting power, rrobility, and defensive strength. And the solution offered by
the reforms of Mauricc ofOrlngc and Gustav Adolfwas a return, under thc inspil.t

The

Michael Roberts

linear formations'2 In place of

ration ofVegetius, Aelian, and Leo the Isaurian' to
or the still larger but
itr. -ur.iu.ia..p, unwieldy squares of the spanish tercio'
a multiplicity of
upon
relied
they
iwiss column'
-.*'itr"g"r"t fir""ks of tire
as to permrt
armed
and
disposed
so
and
,-"fi ".i l t"t*"a ln two or three lines,
r." of all types of weapon Maurice used these new formations
,i," i"rr
apply
""pi.iii
but it was the great achievement o[ Guslav AdolI to

rllf,"ff"

f.i

defencel

too' Moreover' he restored to cav

"ctions
he mao',1:li:*^".1:-'*ttn
cara.coler
bv rorbiclding-the
"#;il
the impac t of the weight
upon
effect
its
ft" lnsistei that it rely"for
iil.l,,,o'ra,
in gunfounding' he
".a
exPeriments
his
of
of man and horse. And lastly, as a result
designed to
;;;1. i; urm his units with a light and transportable field-piece

b,til;;;:,].*,,

in offtn'i""

;;t,;;';;J;;.ii,on,

alike'
sufply clore artill".y support.for infantrv and cavalry

essentially tactical.in nature'

These were fundamental changesi and they were

S",ih.t.;rca
i"*l"ita"tJit

They entailed' for instance' a

-hers of much larger imptication
The soldier of
art. training and diiipline ofthe ordinary soldier'

he-(and his horse)

eg", r,"d been, in the whole, an individualist; and
first of firearms'
period
"liiai.t igilty truined over a prolonged
h"JU".n

iir"

Jh-t-

:"*]lc'

The mercenary in the

then
*lli" ofthe Swiss column, put an end to" thii state ofaffairs'
if he rnclined his pike
skill:
le..s
and
ining
tra
ti plf.. tquare needed little
of him' he had^do^ne
i;;;;;i ";fs;dt and leaned heavilv on tht -un in. front
a certarn
musketeer:
the
with
too
So
him'3
Af thlt could be required of
to
command
of
words
"f*"ti
asninety-eight
i",<J,yit r""a-g-it.ouid tukt u' -""y
counterto execute the
nr" u rn.,rt .t-u .lrtain steadiness in the ranks' sufliced
that.it should be
musket
of
a
demand
trtur.t, ,in.. no one could reasonably
be a dead shot at a
;i;;;;th ""."t".y. The training of a bowman' schooled toas-an
arquebus or a
ai""..", *..fa fr" wasted on so imperfect an instrument individual weapon at
the pike, unlike the lance' was not an
i,fr".'f'--l'ocf. pit,"ft
"ndfirearms drove out the bow and the lance was precisely this'
o"" r""i"t -rty
of horse
"ii.
on training'n Mo'eover' deep formations' whether
ilffi;;;;;i;.J
required
of officers' and
;f"* G;;t;J;ith the need ior a large trained corpsfifteen
ranks behind vou'
with
awav
iun
to
difficult
it
is
,ince
;i;;shiil;'o',all'
- -in"
in these
of Maurice inaugurated a real' and a lasting' revolution

,".tora,

-"tt.,,.-rntu",l""tsmallunitshadtobehighlytrainedinmanoeuvre;they
NCos to tead them' The tactics of Gustav Adolf

;;;;;;;;"."

officers and
long practice in the combination
o.ti"f""J"'""r,fy fmproved fire-discipline' and well content if he mastered the
li"r"*irt. *t*Lntimajor of the ter;io had been
of Maurice s army must
Uy the squareroot';s the sergeant-major
oi
evolutions'
parade-ground
"-U"ttfini
"rt
be capable of executing a great number of intricate
strictlv
more
of
;;i;; il;; ;odei"," iesides u number of battle movements
to
primarily
designed
*ft.. For LondoRo drill and exercises had been
"r".,iJ or,ltti."r ntnessr for Lipsius they were a method of inculcating Stoic virit.-li"
fundamental postulates of tactics'
tues in the soldier; for Maunce they weie the
tlle whole vocabuhry of rnilitary cot'ttttt:tltrl'

lrront Aclian Mlurice borrowed

Military Revolution,

$6o-1660

15

transmitting it almost unaltered to our own day.7 Contemporaries found in the

new drill which he introduced a strange and powerful fascination: it was an 'invention', a'science',8 indeed, a revelation; and a large literature appeared, designed
to explain to the aspiring soldier, in two pages of close print, the precise significance ofthe order'right turn'-a service the more necessary, since it sometimes
meant, in fact, turn left.e And so officers became not merely leaders, but trainers,
of men; diligent practice in peacetime, and in winter, became essential; and drill,
for the first time in modern history, became the precondition of military success.
The decline in the size of the basic infantry unit from about three thousand to
about thirty meant that individual initiative was now expected at a far lower level
of command than before, The slowly-increasing technical complexity offirearms
was already beginning the process offorcing the soldier to be a primitive technician. If the revolution in drill implied a more absolute subordination of the soldier's will to the command ofa superior, it implied also an intelligent subordination. Henceforth it might not be the soldier's business to think, but he would at
least be expected to possess a certain minimal capacity for thinking. The army
was no longer to be a brute mass, in the Swiss style, nor a collection of bellicose
individuals, in the feudal style; it was to be an articulated organism ofwhich each
part responded to impulses from above. The demand for unanimity and precision of movement led naturally to the innovation of marching in step, which appears at some date impossible to establish about the middle of the seventeenth
century.r0 And the principle of mass-subordination, of the solution of the indi-

vidual will in the will of the commander, received a last reinforcement with the
slow adoption of uniforms: 'without uniforms', said Frederick the Great, 'there
can be no discipline.'The process was already observable in the r62os; but rt was
scarcely complete by the end ofthe century. The long delay is easily explained. As
long as body-armour remained general, uniforms were scarcely practical; and
even when armour was abandoned, the common use ofthe sword-resisting buffcoat prevented for a time a general change.rr Moreover, the habit of using mercenary armies, and the notorious readiness ofmercenaries to change sides, induced
men to prefer the 'token'-a kerchief round the arm, a green branch in the hatwhich could be discarded easily as the occasion for it passed. Nevertheless, by the
time Louvois was well in the saddle it was sufficiently plain that the general adoption of uniforms would not long be delayed.t'? Their mass-psychological effect
will be readily appreciated by anyone who has ever worn one. The way was clear
for the armies of the nineteenth century: it remained only for the twentieth to
complete the process by replacing dolmans, busbies, eagle's wings, and all the
itunting panache of Cossack and Hussar, by the flat uniformity offield-grey and
khaki.
The new emphasis on training and drill seemed to contemporaries to reinforce
their already established convictions about the best way to recruit an army. The
irr.nries which carricd through thc military revolution or upon which that revolrrtion inrpingerl wcrc nclrly all nrcrccnary armics. It has indccd bccn argued,

16

The

Michael Roberts

history
with some plausibility, that the Sreat military innovations .throughouthas been
it
and
metcenaries;r3
of
t
*"r,".aif" .oit.t"idecl with the predominance
in a
"u.
;;" specilically, that the reforms of Maurice were possible only skill
;;;
ofprolessional
degree
high
and
tr-l"r."nnru fot.., rince the prolonged drilling
miliwou'ld havJ been impossible to obtain from a citizen

wiiiilil

;;;;ed

be sus-

cannot
,i".li uriin."gft rnis last contention (as we shall see in a moment)
with
attended
was
'ertain
tained, there ii no doubt that the use of mercenaries
to

was indifferent
obvious advantages. The mercenary had no local attachments'
suppressron ol
the
in
agent
,lutlonut ,.ntl-Jnt; and this matle him an invaluable
war were proif
the
all
at
not
cared
oopular disturbattces A mercenary army
and
manpower'
own
state's
the
i""J. ;;;;;il;". fro- hont"; it economized
governthe
relieved
caPtains
fr."?.l r *""f,ftt the system of recruiting through

mentofagooddealofadministrativewotk.Therewere,ofcoulse'lnanycounter-

unreliable' and averse to

vailing dis"advantages: the mercenary was undisciplined'
often bad;r5 the emand
buttl"ihi. n.-, und equipment were unstandardized
system was ruinwhole
the
and
oilu", -o, itt'ouriuUly swi.tdled by the captains;
states were
poorer
and
smaller
the
iuJly .*p"nriu". So expensive, indeed, that
the lesser
of
many
century
of
the
forced to look for alternatlves. Around the turn
and
Brandenburg
saxony'
as
such
ones
even some quite big
C;;;;;"t-"td
as
such
writers
Military
militias16
Bavaria-began to experiment with local
citizen
of
the
superiority
the
urged
Ma.hia.,relli ind Lararus von schwendi had
rT
of republican Route
n.rany a backward glance at the militiry virtues
-irft
teachings formed
"r*".
il;ii ;;; f.t#,"n that th""classicul authors whose military
Roman forces
the
when
times
from
th. Uuri, of tn"" ft'lnurician reforms all dated
militias
half-trained
the
that
event
Proved
*".. .lii^"-"t-i"t no longer. The
was
in
Germany
failure
Their
ofwar'
art
*"r. in.upofrt. ot-asteringlhe modern
who
right
were
those
that
it
seemed
ancl
ani complete;
effective'
""ir*r"i,';s;"-ttrous
in the new condiiions only mercenary armies could be

..ti""J"Jirt",

warning against too hasty-a conclusion: for

national Euroa conscript national militia-the first truly
,fr" i*.Jtf,
"t-ylv"s
much more
techniques
military
mastering
of
o"nn u.-u-uni i, oroved capable
stage ofthe
i"-0i." i'n"" i"Ju'een see,t b"fore' The second and more important
was in fact launched'
militarv reuolution' which Gustav Adolf carried through'
and experienced
,,o;;;'hi;ht"k li;d profes"ionals, but bv conscriPt peasants;again
to learn the
Monro had to go to school
-..."".i tJfal"^.uch as Robert
any
S*"itft methods.rs And not only were the Swedish armies better than by
no.peculation
".1v
*.....t0ri"", they were also incompaiably cheaper' There was
taxcould be made in land-grants' revenue-assrgnments'
captains; and

The Swedish victories' however, were

Payment
remissions, or in kind.

ButconditionsinSwedenweleexceptional.andotherEuroPeanc.ountriesfelt

unabletofollowtheSwedishexample.TheSpanisharmyunderPhiliplldidin

n-retcenaries and Spanish

dccd contain some conscripts, as well as international
William l was rt ttrtxctl
u",rtl"nt"n-rn,tk"rs', an<i ll'tc Plussian arnly of Freclerick

Military Revolutiotr, 1560

1660

17

army too;re but on the whole the rulers found no feasible alternative to a mercenary force, drawn, often enough, from the more impoverished and mountainous
regions ofEurope such as Scotland, Albania, or Switzerland,20
Few monarchs of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries werc prepared to establish national armies; for most of them agreed with Christian IV of Denmark
and John George of Saxony in being unwilling to put arms into the hands of the
lower orders:2r only where the peasantry had been reduced to a real serfdom was
it esteemed safe to proceed upon the basis of conscription. This stage was not
reached in Prussia before the end ofthe century; nor even in Russia before the reforms of Peter the Great. Except in Sweden, therefore, and to some extenL in
Spain, the armies continued to be mercenary armies throughout the century. The
difference was that they became standing armies too. And this change arose
mainly from the obvious need to n.rake them less burdensome to the state. Al,
ready before the end of the sixteenth century it was realized that the practice of
disbanding and paying-off regiments at the end ofeach campaigning season, and
re-enlisting them in the following spring, was an expensive way ofdoing business.
Large sums were payable on enlistment and mustering, and (in theory at least) all
arrears were paid up on disbandment. But between mustering and disbandment
pay was irregular and never full, despite the so-called 'full-pays which occurred
from time to time.22 Ifthen a mercenary force were not disbanded in the auturrtn,
but continued from year to year, the calls upon the exchequer were likely to be
considerably lessened, and the general nuisance of mutinous soldiery would be
abated. Moreover, if the army remained embodied throughout the winter, the
close season could be used for drilling and exercising, of which since the tactical
revolution there was much more need than ever before. There were, rlroreover,
special areas where winter was the best season for campaigning: it was so in the
marshy regions of Poland and north-west Russia; and it was so in Hungary, for
the Turkish camels could not stand the cold ofthe Hungarian plain, and their annual retirement provided the Habsburgs with the chance to recoup the losses of
the preceding summer.2r Considerations such as these led one prince after another to retain his mercenaries on the strength throughout the winter months:
lludolfll was perhaps the earliest to do so; but Maurice ofOrange was not far behind. From this practice arose the modern standing army; and it is worth while
crnphasizing the fact that it was the result of considerations of a military and financial, and not ofa political or constitutional nature. Writers such as de la Noue,
l)uplessis-Mornay, Wallhausen and Montecuccoli all advocated standing armies
on purely military grounds.'?a There seems little basis for the suggestion that
slirnding armies were called into being by artful princes in order to provide employment for their turbulent nobility;'zs or that they were a sign of the inherent
l)rang naclt Machtentfaltung of the monarchs;26 or that they were designed to en.iblc the rulers to cstablish a sovereignty unrestrained by law and custom and free
lionr constitutionirl lirnitalions-though thcy did, no doubt, prove very servicerl)lc inslrur)rcnls ol <lcspolisrn. Wltclc rrbsolrrtisrn triuntphc<l in this century, it

r
18

The

Michael Roberts

needl and though an army

did so because it provided the response to a Senuine

it was but an accessory factor in
might be useful for curbing arrstocratic licence'
*t'i"l' produced the eclipse of the Estates' Essn;:;;;;;i;;lili.ltr'"tio"
military logic rather than ofpolitithe standing ar-,", *"" tnt p'oduct of
tially

car design.

And tie same

:,liT

",f*:i::H:uilfi#iffi-:::::li:fiJ:

the way of commerce-Protectlon, lr

constantly at call, economy of administhe demand for traineJ crews and ofEcers
and it
some of the factors that produced permanent.navies;
;;;;;-;;;*"t"

direction-the
fleets of
oftheir
minds
in
the
acqulred a sinister significance

attempts in this
u .onr,it,-r,A accident that the first two
*],
';;;;;;""-;;;
iou,ronti, of Frederick Henrv' and the shipmonev
Charles

l-should both have

it was also
that arnies were tending to become permanent;
result of a
the
be
to
I
take
this
becomrng much larger'1nd
that they
necesmade
tactics'-and
in
r"""d made pos'sibl" bv the revolution
;;;il;;;
alhad
century
sixreenth
The
War'
,iarv hv the circumstances of the Thjrty Years'
between
duel
long
in
the
r".iy i*" . ".i;ui. tro"d"nlng of strategic horizons: more fronts had been
on two or
Valois and Habsburg' slmuttaneous opt'uiio"'
to decide which was the
irr"-."i", -a it w;ld have been diffrcult at times
on a vaster scale' of the
true'
was
which the encircled' The same
Persian assaults upon
""J
Eritrea'
"".ftJ.i
the Turks: Portuguese attacks on
,iruggf"
and England At the
France
"g"-"
with
e.i-u. 4ino"t, *".. Ualanced by Turkish alliances
qf the East Indies'
penetration
the
,u"-" ti-" tf.r. air-uery of the New World' and
ofthe globe'
most
it
covered
until
."""i.lii" p"ttrule area ofEuropean conflict
were
developments
these
But
warfare'
age of amphibious

"oBlirt"i,t"tJt.,

""ly
were rapidly

" "e*
""J'it""g*"i.a
;;;i;;;il;:.-"':::lif

*f #ff i*"Tffi "11::X;f;:i1fi :"ji-;::

the dav had not Yet arrlved wnen

.p..;..,".lqu"ui

lt',i" .-tai""-"

of effori over distances so-formidable The

Maurice' is the accurate measterilitv ofwarfare in Europe' in the time of Prince

sure oi the strategic thinking ofthe age'

rnto tavour' perih" thiray v"Itr'War brought a change' Batde came-agarn
strategv aiming at
h-;;i;; iilttfl"ence of coifessional ferocity' a'd with it aand
along the borranged back and forth over Germany'
;ii;;",i;tillil
Lorraineand the Netheri"r, Jr",'i--, fr.m polaid and Transylvania to Itah of
central Eu-rope as one
Lra.,-"o--u"a"tt were driven to look at the whole'all the wars of Europe are
that
**"i',f.""a* of war' When Gustav Adolf wrote of politics; but the remark was
in
terms
thinking
was
he
i".
:;;l;;;;
"ne',28 strategy wallen-stein sends Arnim to fight on tie vistulai
io
;;;;;;..g"rd
Giiteto the relilei of Maestricht; olivares dreams of seizing
;;;;il;;"d"t
caKiel
a
bv
to be made accessible

bu" ut wismar'
'',uul
march from Flanders to Bohemia;3o Savoy'
tamous
a
nal:2e Piccolomini makes
elements in everu"tt*, ir-.yk-ia and even the Tatars of the Crimea become Adolf's strittcgic
Gustav
all'
rl,i,i", ..a rlorc unilied plans of operations Above

;:;, il ;;;;;;;i,i

Military Retolution, $60 t66o

l9

thinking seems a whole dimension bigger than any that had preceded it. He successfully combines two types of strategy: on the one hand a resolute offensive
strategy designed to annihilate the enemy in battle-the product ofconfidence in
the superiority of the new Swedish tactics; on the other a wholly new gradualist
strategy, designed to conquer Germany by the occupation and methodical consolidation ofsuccessive base-areas. The two blend in his plan for the desrrucuon
ofthe Austrian Habsburgs by the simultaneous arrd effectively co-ordinated operations offive or seven armies moving under the king's direction on an enormous
curving front extending from the middle Oder to the Alpine passes.3r It was a
strategic concept more complex, vaster, than any one commander had ever previously attempted. His death prevented its being carried out; but the closing years
of the war saw other developments ofinterst. The strategy of devastation began
to be employed with a new thoroughness and logic; and, as its consequence, the
war became pre-eminently a war of movement, best exemplified in the campaigns
ofBaner, Torstensson and Gallas.12 Not all ofthese developments were to be pursued in the years that followed: an age ofreason and mathematical logic would try
to bring war itselfwithin the scope ofits calculations, to the detriment ofthat offensive spirit without which wars cannot be won; but the effects of the srraregrc
levolution ofwhich Gustav Adolf was the most illustrious exponent were nor ro
be effaced.

The most important ofthem was the great increase in the scope ofwarfare, reflected in a corresponding increase in the normal size ofthe armies of the major
powers. Philip II had dominated Europe in his day with the aid ofan army which

probably did not exceed 4o,ooo men: a century latet 4oo,ooo were esteemed necessary to maintain the ascendancy of Louis XIV.3] In 1627, under the Elector
George William, Brandenburg possessed a defence force totalling 9oo:34 under
Frederick William I, the normal establishment was about 8o,ooo. The prevrous
millennium could show nothing to compare with this sudden rise in the size of
western European armies. Great agglomerations of troops for a particular occasion had indeed occurred in the past, and the Turks had brought vast hosts to
bear upon their enemies; but in the West, at least, the seventeenth century saw the
permanent establishment of some armies at levels which earlier ages had rarely, if
ever, known. With Louvois, indeed, the passion for mere numbers had something
ofa megalomaniac quality: an aspect, perhaps, ofthat'pursuit ofthe quantitative,
which has been considered as an essential characteristic of the new industrialism.3s It may perhaps be legitimately objected that the instances I have chosen to
illustrate the growth of armies are hand-picked: the Spanish armies of 169o were
certainly no bigger than those ofr59o; and the army with which Charles XII won
the battle of Narva was slightly smaller than that with which Charles IX lost the
battle of Kirkholm:36 that Gustav Adolfhad r75,ooo men under arms in 163z was
lirr Swcdcn a quitc exceptional circumstance, never repeated. But this does not allcr thc l-ict thirt thc scirlc of lluropean warf'arc was throughout the century prodigiously incrcasing: lhe grcll iurnics ofi.ouis XIV htd lo bc rnct byarntics ol.coln-

The

Michael Roberts
manage it' there must,O:
parabl size; and if one statecould not

i9:Tj,ott"*"
^Mo,"ou",,intheseventeentlrcentulynumbershadacquiredapreclsemeanlng:
men to repel the

an army ofrzo,ooo
cilrr", u r, .redit"d *ith assembling"decline
to take the figure too literallv;
;uikiJ-;;.t.J' *" are perhaps entitled to
it is safe to assume that there

*rr"r1

fr"i*i"" i."t"ft

ttates the Fre"ch urmy at 3oo'ooo'

them may have
on the muster-roils' "ven though not all of
just
number
that
was
men'
ob"served)
(as
Montecuccoli
that
t""ks. And so it happened
;;;;;Jl;;i;
ofwar:r7 hence
;:1".';;; ;;;;;;i".u.t in tt" '*t"teenth centurv theto sinews
sure,that popumake
invstigations
iir.'.""1..t "f,ft. "arliest demographical
mercantilists' with their eyes
f",i* -", ".ta*fining; hence tire insistence of thepoPulation
is among the chief
of war, that a copious

*", "p.t ii. -*inge"ncy

of the state.
riches
';;"i;;;;;",ion
in the scale of war led inevitablv
,h.;;;;.;;-ihe

days when war

to an inctease in the au-

partook of the nature of feud were now for

evergone,andthechangeisrettectedin(amongotherthins),thedevelopmentof
could
;i*hi'h r 't'ull 'ptuk in a m-oment onlv the state' now
largeresources required for
r"p# ir*'la-r"rttrative' technic;l and financial
its military monopoly absomake
to
And the state was concerned

ffit"'J;;il;,
scale

hostilities.

lute.

It

private armies' to ambiguous and

declared its hostility to lrregular and
the ex
ventures Backiard countries such as Scotland-were

,.-l
High"tt",f*i""td the rule: the failure of scottish parliaments to disarm
.";il;;;;;
navies'
state
#;il;"i;t;;r' ";;t.d oi*tJn"tt i" 't.te bodv politic Navies become
disuse; the
into
falls
merchantman
armed
of the
-y"r ""tlt,ift" "flicompromise
Effective control ofthe armed forces
Dutch West lndia Company goes oankrupt'

the
sign of modernity: it is no accidnt that
by a centralized authority becomes a
quarter
a
and
il,"r*ii"" "r,rt. ,treksi by Peter the Creat Preceded by a century
II'
Mahmud
by
the destruction ofthe Janissaries
warfare itself' catled for new adminisThis development, and the new style of
was from the beginstandards; and the new administration
,."ti"" -.,ft"i,
""a
for war are born; war offices prolifning centralized and royal' Secretaries ofstate
the midifr. e"rrrl"n tiubsburgs had possessed a Hoftriegsrat since

rising military power^s-Sweden'

,Ji""natt ."n,ury, but in the '"u"nt"""th the
manusia-atl equipped themselves wjth new and better
il;;;*il;;il,g,
of
deal
good
a
spent
irri"* ir. in. .."d-uct of war. lneviiably these new oflicialsarms ardarmaments'
ii.t,1-. i. *t"ppringwith problems of supply-supplyof
showed that it was
g".ar, .f.thin-g, transport ana ttt" i"tt Experience
,"ppfy
to equip

"."it".

"f
to Permit the mercenary armies
bad for discipline, as well as rnefiicient'
weapons' a limited number of
themselves:3s it was better to nuve stunduidited
ofwindage' i consistently-compounded
recoqnised calibres' an agreed maximum
ttothing' and boots in three standard sizes'
ti"-i.'a,
'''nlrotofsupply; in many cases' to
i{ence the state was driven to attempt the supervision
n-tonopoly' the Spanish NetherDroduction on lts own accou"t; sometime'' to
gunpowder' thc Swetlish lirrcl
c
of
iL';,].t hil; ;;';;,.'',,'pt'ty nt- ttt" tnntfactut

;ffiffi;;'j;

Militaty Revolutioll,

156o,1660

2l

ing Company was created to facilitate control of a strategic material-copper,

Military needs drove the monarchs into ever-increasing interference in the lives of
their subjects: in Sweden, as in England, there were bitter complaints at the grisly
perquisitions ofthe saltpetre-collector The developments in the science offortification, of which Vauban was to be the most eminent exponent, meant new
fortresses for the p# carrd, and this in turn meant heavier con les, the subversion
of municipal liberties, and the increased power of the sovereign: 'fortresses,, says
Montecuccoli, 'are the buttresses ofthe crown'; and he added that the fact that'licentious' nations such as the English disliked them merely proved thefu utility,3e
The stricter discipline, the elaborately mechanical drilling, required by the new
linear tactics, matched the tendency ofthe age towards absolute government, and
may well have reinforced it: it was tempting to think that the discipline which had
succeeded so well in the field might yield equally satisfactory results if applied to
civil society. The ruler was increasingly identified with the commander-in-chief,
and from the new discipline and drill would be born not merely the autocrat, but
that particular type ofautocrat which delighted in the name of Kriegsierr. It was
not the least of England's good luck, that for the whole of the critical century
ftom 1547 to 1649 she was ruled by monarchs with neither interest nor capacity
for military affairs. It was certainly no accident that Louis XIII should have been
'passionately fond' ofdrill;4o nor was it a mere personal quirk that led Louis XIV
to cause a medal to be struck, ofwhich the reverse displays him in the act of taking a parade, and correcting, with a sharp poke ofhis cane, the imperfect dressing
ofa feckless private in the rear rank.ar The newly,acquired symmetry and order of
lhe parade-ground provided, for Louis XlVand his contemporaries, the model to
wlrich life and art must alike conform; and the pas cadenci of Martinet-whose
name is in itself a prograrnme-echoed again in the majestic monotony of interrninable alexandrines.a': By the close of the century there was already a tendency
itt monarchs ofan absolutist cast to consider military uniform as their normal attire-as Charles XII did, for instance, and Frederick William I. It was not a fashion that would have commended itselfto Henry VIII, or Gustav Vasa, or philip IL
One very important effect of all these developments was in the sphere of finance. The ever-increasing cost of war-the result of larger armies and navies,
rnore expensive armaments, longer periods of training, bigger administrative
stirffs, in an age when prices were still rising-en.rbarrassed the finances of every
state in Europe. Kings were presented with new problems ofpaying large and disllnt armies, which posed new difficulties of remittance; and the solutions they
krund to these difliculties contributed a good deal to the development offinancial
instrurnents and a structure ofcredit: Wallenstein's ties with the sreat German fi
nanciers were an essential elernent in his success.a' Everpvhere kings found that
though they might still-with care-live of their own in peacetime, they plunged
r)1o clebt in wartime. And in this period it was irlnrost always wartime. They fell
lrrcl< on rl?iilrc-s cxttoonlinoircs, on nd ltoc 6nancial dcvices, some of them suflir.ictttly rcnlrl<ublc: tltis is thc irgc ol l)clcr. llrc (ircirt's prilryllliki, ot- titx-l.tven-

The

Mirhael Roberts

22

le Pelletier
employed after Colbert's death by
tors, .Ind of the analogous officials
sale of mo';':;;;;;r;)"';"r"ri.
debasement'
to
" tl't), ho't '"*u'se
'u'e"cv
sale of ofthe
to
all
above
inflatlo" of honours' and

:*"t;;;;;ffJ;;;1a"ds,

i.i,,*r,i.r,.nthiscenturypj"lT j'"ili1i"::"ff
lromenon.4s But sooner or later nl

,l?n1lirt:i:i:lli;,

in constitutional crise":1he monarclrs found.rhemselves

irt"tt"a in" "",n.tities

i.,..J. p",r"v.*rrt,To u,ililii:ll.i"J:",'::"'lt
ties. Behind all the great insurrectro

;;;
1av.

ffi,";'j;THTff$ li"T

the Sparish^realms-there
;;;;iiJ6ellion, the Fronde' the.revoltsofincourse
not the only one) the
(though
as one major element ln the srtu;tion
militarv commttproducedbv
was usuallv

:lffiil;

i;;"*t;

and that need

on the
part the result oi the military rev.olution
ments whose dil.rensions were in
was
armres
standing
maintaining
prevailed; the income for
fi;;,;il;;;s
in
Branfinance-as
militarY
."ntrol of the Estates; sometimes

,"i"t

""i.iaft.
;ffi;;-;;;;;itv1"po'ut'a

from the ordinarv revenues And in Germanv

thisissueoftheconflictlesulted,rnpart,fromthefactthatinthe,lastresoltthe
principle'"and retain the-security afEstates had rathr su.rifi." u .onrtit,ltional
sufferings and crushing finanf..a.J Uy .,"tafttg army, than risk the appalling
Years' War had shown'
fhitty
"
tn"
cial exactions which, as the experience oi
ot' Nevertheless' though the
old-fashioned
awaited the militarily impotent ot-

evils' it was a grrevous

came to be uctepted as the lesser oftwo
discarded the alterThey,had
weaker states.
burden to the smaller and nnancraliy
them could
many.of
but
leemed inescapable;
native of a militia; a sta,tding atmf
presented
which
situation
this
was
i"'ottrces lt
scarcely finance it fro- tn"o
upon which the aggressive policies

.r""ilt*lt-t in*

ot"

t.i;'

to that subsidv-diplomacv
;ilil;;;t
tnrtve'
to
were
of
"' Louis XIV,n"t' *ere thus to be sacrificed to the army' it ought at least to be an
if fLu..iy,
oiitt" tting' and not a mere iig:lt^t"t"t ttt"army that was really tt'" ptopt'ty
recruiting captain and employ.rtiii"g .p.."r"4,,. rne f'ee ba'guining be'tween of the nature ofar industrial
fu"took mo-re
ins prince, the Articf"' ot wut

'"iitn
;;:"H;;;;;;..**:1ll1'J"ffi
il:
*ff ;,il::i:,'lli::#iiJ:1ff
to the orderliness and ethcrency o
the
over
take
must
gt"."t ift. t."i f"t disciplining

it from

above'a8 The

monarch

businessofrecruitingandPaylngmen,ashewasalreadybeginningtotakeover
war-industries And the mon,ft""'Ut-ri*rl; .f r"pplying niot"'iu-l o"d 'upervising
*"i clf cust"av Adolf set a. new standard of
archs, in fact, did so Tl.re e'ttr"' "i
predomrititot"tl even in countries which emploved a
of
-*i;;;;;i: ;;t'"
independence
a start in curbing the

Wuttt"'t"in -ade
Elector
o g".'"ution ti"'.t:*"o. ill9,l1"-Great
had
monarchs
the
",'a
By the encl of the century
were to prolit fron-r his example'i
development;
signilicant
.-*ft Ot""a effective control of their armies ltwas a
fcrlclnccthcarlliesbecameroyal(astbenaviesalreadywere)thewaywasopen
rli tt'rl'
lr,r' llr, it . r. trtrr.llly l'ei'rtltitrF tt

nantlY mercenary a'n.ty

il:':J.il;;;t;"i"1"'

Military Revolution,

i56o-r66o

23

The social consequences ofthe military revolution were scarcely less important
than the constitutional. In the Middle Ages war had been almost the privilege ofa
class: by the seventeenth century it had become almost the livelihood of the
masses. The Military Participation Ratio (to borrow the language of the sociologists)s] rose sharply. Men flocked to the swollen mercenary armies. In part they
did so, no doubt, because in the Germany ofthe r63os and r64os the army was the
safest place to be;s'zbut also, and more generally, because the new warfare offered
fresh prospects ofa career. Never before had commanders required so many subalterns and NCOs. It was no wonder that impoverished Scots and Irish made all
haste to the wars ofLow Germanie: 'He who is down on his luck', ran the contem
porary Gaelic proverb, 'can always earn a dollar of Mackay'.s3 Even the cavalry,
which had once been the close preserve of the nobility, was now open to all who
could sit a horse and fire a pistol; for with the abolition ofthe lance the European
nobility tended to abandon heal7 cavalry to the professionals, while light cavalry
had long appeared to them almost as socially subversive, since it eliminated the
difference, in mount, arms and equipment, between the noble and his esquire.
The decline of expensive hear,7 armour, which was a consequence ofthe growing
realization that no armour could stop a musket ball, and that in any case few musket balls hit their mark, had obvious social implications too. The obliteration of
the old distinction between cavalry and foot, gentlemen and others, is a matter of
common remark in the seventeenth century: as Sir James Turner put it,'the ancient distinction between the Cavalry and Infantry, as to their birth and breeding,
is wholly taken away, men's qualities and extractions being little or rather just
nothing either regarded or enquired after; the most ofthe Horsemen, as well as of
the Foot, being composed of the Scum of the Commons'.54 The new armies, in
llct, served as the social escalators ofthe age; the eternal wars favoured interstratic
rnobility; and for a young man with son.re capital behind him a regiment could be
.r brilliant investment: Wallhausen lamented that war was ceasing to be an honourable profession, and was becoming a mere traffic.5s But even for the youth
rvho had no other assets than a native pugnacity and the habit of survival, advrnceme[t was now probable, and the impecunious commoner whose wits were
sharp might certainly hope for a commission. He could not, indeed, feel that he
r.rrried a baton in his knapsack. Very few ofthe leading commanders on the Continent were ofhumble origin: Aldringen had been a lackey, Derfflinger was a tailor's apprentice, Jean de Werth rose from absolute obscurity; but the great names
rr le still noble names: even Catinat came from the noblesse de robe.56 Nevertheless
lhough the highest positions might in practice remain unattainable, the army had
bccome an attractive career, and in France three generations of military service
wotrld enable a family to claim reception into the ,oblei5 de race.51 As the old
. rrstom of conferring knighthood on the battlefield declined, the new custom of
.nnoblement came to take its place. Nor were the possibilities ofadvancement re\tficted to the army in tlrc ficlcl. A host ofclerks and secretaries was now required
to hcep lhc muslcr- Nnd pay-rolls, irnd con<lLrcl thc cor'fcspondcncc ofscnri liter-

The

MiLhael Roberts

24

makes
ate commanders:5s Grimmelshausen

Herzbruder's father

muster-clerk in

son' oliver' becomes secretarv to.a swedish

;" ,;;;;;;
-"'"r'""t''
".Jih"
for the new war officesj5e business
;;;;i. ;J;i;itrt"tors were in brisk demand problems
of logistics: such careers
ever-wid.ening

f""irl.*

,o solve the

"".a"a
ifr"* .fo.li.fta Le Tellier, iohan Adler Salvius'

and Louis de Geer' tell their own

in brining order
of the civilian' bourgeois' administrators
often been rehas
fighting services
and method into the management of the
ofthis de-

",
;".

il;;;t"*e

the most famous representatives

are
--f..i, ".J CaU.rt and Loivois
-ttt'""
pointed out.that it w":
been
often
;i;il;;;ii;asless
:y.nl']:lu

centuries that opened to the

chanees of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth
social ad-

and tempting. prosPects of

be maybest be seen trom a glance ar
Uo* good those Prospects
persons of this sort'
"un..-.n,.
#;'iu|, ;;fild by ,.'tt""i"t s*"dish monarchs upon
ntw style of army
the
by
It is true that the enhanced oPportunities provided
decay of hear'y
The
be somewhat restricted'
tended, before the century was our, to
the gradual
by
of individualist warfare' was accompanied
;;dto ;;ilt*
service as
military
of
obligation
withering away of such remnant of the old noble
Brandenburg'
in,
'f-Sweden'
the middle ages ln France' in
n"i- r".t-i""a
of the
for all-practical purposes by.the third,quarter
ffi-il;;;;J
"anishedutta intrntient' disorderlv and unreliable' and subver.ffitjt i;;;"i-oa.a
power under the ab-solute con,iu. oi',tt. ,t.* p.irlciple ofconcentrating military
armres' an open,t"i.iin" -**ig". But the nobilitv found' in thelossnewof standing
special militarv
own
their
i;;;h.iJ;t;"tf,"; compensated them for the that it should be'so The more
took care
organization; and the monarchs, lndeed'
knapar-were-delighted to be re-

ffi;il;tt;;;i,"

n"* n"ta

or

"tiiuitv'
could

r-"t.t"t"i"i ti,rt"--'he hoberaux' Junkers' equipment of the heaq cavahyii"JJ.iii." l"ra* of supplying the expensive in the king's service lt was not
uUt. to nna,u futt-tlme career
;;,
share of
""d;il;"
to clalm' as a privilege ofbirth' an excessive
attemPted
they
lonq before
th" totl-ou*h
cell"ll
eighteenth
ti"?'"*.oo"tiit.r,res. Bv the beginning oithe

was a widespread tendency to label it

cial escalator was still on the move, thlre
by the Practrce
'ni.LrJo"fyl and this tendency was not wholly counteracted
might attain
who
officers
non-.oble
; t.;. .ountries) of ennobling
;;.;;

to a certain grade.
aspiring soldier with the fewest social
Meanwhile, the arm which presented the
in method' generously approx
Empiiical
the artillery'6r
U"rr'i.^ t",
'mystery" and was on
""i."Utedly
tt urtillery was neveitheless ceasing to be a
i-ut" lr, .r""t,
"
with a normal military organiifr.-*"y ,t U*"-itg a regular arm ofthe s"tuites'
established by
purely artillery regiment seems to have been that
zation:
"C.r,"r the lirst
artillery lay a fringe of scientific laymen
ei.rf r"'tuts.i' A,td bthi;d th"
,n.rathematical practitioners' whose part rn
-"rrr.-aticians_those
of the age has norar been made
"-JJ'_ir".
educating the seamen' gunners and survey-ors
was the harnessing'
.[lrj;itia*a' one maii elen.rent in the military lorevolution
war: the invention o[ ctlrncd
li)r thc 6rst linrc :rnd tlt-t a large scale' of science

Military Rewlutiotl,

1560-1660

25

powder towards the end ofthe sixteenth century gave to firearms a new effectiveness, and would have been still more important if the techniques of metallurgy
had been able to take full advantage of this advance.6a A century ofnotable technical progress, nevertheless, lay behind the Swedish light artillery. Very soon after
the invention of a satisfactory portable telescope it was being used in the field by
Maurice and Gustav Adoll The importance for military purposes ofadvances in
cartography seems first to have been recognized by Stefan Batory, who caused
military maps to be drawn for him in the r58os.65 Technicians and theoreticians
vied with each other in devising new and more terrible weapons: multiple-barrelled guns were invented upon all hands; Napier, the father of logarithms, was
more favourably klown to his contemporaries as the man who built a submarrne,
suggested the use ofgas-shells, and designed an armoured fighting vehicle; Gilius
Packet invented the first hand-grenade for Erik XIV in \67;66 lan Bouvy in his
Pyrotechnie militaire (159t) described the first practicable torpedo.6T Maurice of
Orange dallied with saucisses de guerre, with saws fitted with silencer attachment
(for nocturnal attacks upon fortresses), and with other contrivances more curious than effective.6s ln 165o the Venetians resorted to biological warfare in the def-ence of Crete, despatching Dr Michael Angelo Salomon thither to infect the
'Iurkish armies with 'the quintessence ofthe pest'.6e It comes as no surprise that
when Colbert founded his Acndbmie royale des Sciences, one of its main objects
.hould have been the application of science to war.
These developments brought to an end the period in which the art ofwar could
still be learned by mere experience or the efflux of time. The commander of the
rrew age must be something ofa mathematician; he must be capable of using the
tools with which the scientists were supplying him. Gustav Adolf consistently
preached the importance of mathematics; Monro and Turner spoke slightingly of
illiterate old soldiers.T0 And since war must be learned-even by nobles-institulions must be created to teach it: the first military academy of modern times was
lirunded by |ohan ofNassau at Siegen in 1617. The need for military education was
especially felt by the nobility, whose former supremacy in arms was beginning to
bc challenged; and the century saw the foundation of noble academies or cadetschools, which sought to combine the now gentlemanly acquirement of fortification with the ltalian tradition ofcourtly education: such were Christian IV's Soro,
l.ouvois' short-lived cadet-school, and the similar Austrian establishment,
lirunded in 1648 by the ominously-named Baron de Chaos.ir
Side by side with the older stratification ofsociety based upon birth or tenure,
tlrere now appeared a parallel and to some extent a rival stratification based on

rnilitary and civil rank. The first half of the seventeenth century sees the real
ofthe concept ofrank. In the armies ofthe Lardsknechts, for instance,
thc distinction between officers and men had been faint, and their bands had at
tirrres something of the aspect of a self-governing democracy.T'? All that was now
r lrangecl. Aftcr captains came colonels; then (in the Thirty Years' War) majors;
, rrrcrgence

tlrcn a rcgtrlar hiclurchy ol gcncrrls urrd lickl nrarshals. Soon after 1660 Louvois

26

The

Michoel Roberts

t' And rhi' hierarchizalion was the more

resulated precedence in the French army
. it"'v ranks were drawn into that general sale of of;:lJ;il;;r"""
parallel hii.". *tri.tt *u, or.r" of the characteristics of the age On the whole'.the
nonevade
to
contrived
.r"Ji'", "rr".r. ""d birth avoided conflict; the nobility
guards)
XIfs
(such
Charles
as
ir--irri.""a *ttice, xcept in sPecial regiments

and a
to b" no derogatin; and.the locution'an officer
counin
some
But
U".u--" a pleonasm rather than a nice distinction
it expedient to
and Sweden' in particular) the state found

;;;;;l;;;;;;s'i'"a

g"r.tti.-""
i.Jr-"i f""t, fzu*la

to adjust delicate que.stions of-precedence as

or"l"f*l . t"ii"t tf Rank, in order
protessor' oi an ent.tr".n (fo. instance) a second lieutenant and a university
had been
officer-corps
li.ri.g";istrar. By the close ofthe century' the
r,g"
international
own
its
""i
ethos'
born: a European, supranatlonal entity' with its own

codeofhonour,rtsowncorporarespirit.TheduellumofadyingchivahyiStrans-is
revolution

i*.r-.i'lr*,i" "n"ir of honour of a military caste . And the-military

to modern
r.""'i" n"t ttv"" Uirth, not only to modern warfare' but also

milita-

rism.

TheeffectofwarupontheeconomicdevelopmentofEuropeinthisperiodis
ground'whereon
U"ttiefields of historians-a 'dark and bloody
on. of ifr.
much as
sombart'
"furri.
valiantlv with the shade ofwerner

;;il;N;i;;tlis;apples
lu-U *r.rtt.a *iti the Angel-and it would

be rash for one who rs not an ecothis at least-may be said: that

nomic historian to intrude uPon ttlis argument But
thought' and by many
war was a fundamental presuppositioi of mercantilist
state-and im*.l".t,lir" ** consideied to te n"cessary to the health of the,Ta The mercantilpir.L J"fiii"ft ,ft.ories was the new concept of war-potential
must be so directed as to ensure
ists held that the economtc actrvtdes of the state
,ft. mercy of a foreign power for those commodities-whether

,"fr"iii'i"

;;;;;;";,.;"., ", g."ds-withoutrryhi"ch *u" tu""ot

Thomas Mun' for

when mercantilAnd
irrriu".., ltrg"a itt. ,tockPiling of strategic raw materials'75
Sweden-boasted
in
even
ist writers in France and Engtand and"Austria-and
in fertility of soiland mineral
that their respectlve countrres excelled all others
for war' and warning off
preparedness
.r".d,'i,th"y..i"* i" fact proclaiming their
there arose' more clearly
autarkic'
tiuly
an aggressor. But since tew states cou'ld be
so' since the needs of armore
the
;t#ilt b.f*";;" ii"u orttono-it *arfare;
course' been conscrous
of
had'
There
more varied'
-ia, *ar" no* gtaater andrepeated
to cut off the Turks
made
been
had
attempts
economic warfare before:
th 156os to deny
in
made
were
i."r" ttppir"t *"r-materials; similar aitempts
"i s.eden had been hard hit in the Seven Years'War ofthe North
il"-i"'rit*""y'
seventeenth century ecoir rf-l. O"t".'""ppage ofher imports ofsalt But in the
in range' sharper' and more effective than before'

b"

'nged:

*"tf"r. U.i"rie wider

"'o-i.
This increased efficacy is a corrseq,,erice

(but also a cause) oflarger navies, and of

It was a sign of the new scope
tfr. fr"ifai"g of tnips with a greater sea-endurance'

ofecononicwarfarethattheDutchinl5ggnotonlydeclaredatotalblockadeof
ir scriotls iltbut also proceeded lo
thc clrtifc c(usts of Itdly' Portugtrl and Spain'

Military Revolution,56o

t66o

27

tempt to make that blockade effective.T6 At the same time, the notion of contra,
band ofwar underwent a considerable extension: by the mid-century it could be
made to cover even such commodities as corn, specie, cloth and horses.77 It was to
meet this situation that the legists of Europe began the attempt to formulate an
international law of contraband and blockade. Before the middle of the century
the Dutch had already induced at least three nations to recognize the principle
'free ships make free goods';78 and it was partlybecause ofthe serious military implications that there had arisen the classic controversy between the advocates of
mare liberum and mqre clausum.'lhe nilitary revolution, indeed, had important
effects upon international relations and international law There can be no doubt
that the strengthening of the state's control of military matters did something to
regularize international relations. The mediaeval concept of war as an extension
of feud grows faint; military activities by irresponsible individuals are frowned
on; the states embark on the suppression of piracy; the heyday of the Algerines
and the Uscocchi is drawing to a close. The century witnessed a steady advance
towards restriction ofthe old rights oflooting and booty, and before the end ofit
cartels governing the exchange ofprisoners had become usual. This was a necessary consequence ofthe decline of individual warfare; for looting and booty had
been juridically based on the idea of feud, and the apportionment of booty had
been generally linked to the amount ofcapital investd by the soldier in his arms
and equipment, so that the cavalryman received more than the footsoldier: hence
when the state provided the capital it reasonably claimed the disposition of the
loot.Te Nevertheless, before this stage had been arrived at, Europe had endured a
period-the period of the Thirty Years' War-when war making seems to have
been only intermittently under the state's col.ltrol, and when ordinary conduct
was ofexceptional savagery. The explanation ofthis state ofaffairs lies, it seems to
me, in the technical changes which I have been considering. The increased size of
lrmies, the new complexity oftheir needs, at first confronted the states with problems of supply which they were incapable of solving-hence the bland indiffercnce of most generals during the Thirty Years' War to any threat to their line of
communications. Armies must live offthe country; looting and booty were necessary ifthe soldier were to survive.s0 The occupation ofterritory thus became a Jegitimate strategic object in itself; and conversely, the commander who could not
(leny to the enemy the territory he desired must take care so to devastate it that it
became useless to him. Thus, as Piero Pieri observes, frightfulness became a logistical necessity,3r a move in a struggle for supply which was itselfthe result of the
increased size of armies and the low level of administrative techniques. Already,
however, there were signs of better things. Gustav Adolf, despite his dictum that
ltcllum se ipsum alet,82 was not content to plunder Germany haphazard; and
irmonS other innovations he iDtroduced a system ofmagazines, by which supplies
irnd war material were concentrated at strategic points such as Erfurt, Nurembcrg, Ulnr, and Mritrz:3r it wrs a developnrent that lool<ed forward to the eighlccnlh ccDtuIy. Ncvc|thclcss, thc ntcnlcc 0l lhc scll'-supPor ting irr.n'ry, wlndering

The

Michael Robetts

at rarse over

:"*'"l

ri::l:::::""i,:{ffi:*T,::::J:

ffi:##J.-j;

lt

il; ilil;;;o.t

at6' of the Rtunions' is not far ahead'34

virrU",l,
";;;;;i of,n" pt; t *as
had been one
reached' the administrative nihilism which
J"g"
to draw up
urgent
it
made
;;;;;rt ;;;q"ences of the rnilitarv revolutionthe situation in which Hugo
"f
;r;:i ,;;. code for the conduct of wai' This was
GrotiuswrotehisDeJureBelliacPacis.Itbearsoneverypagetheimpressionof
of maintaining the old stanttr" -itlt"ry ,"uotlttion; for it was the hopelessness
in the condofar

]"ri. i|'*l f"* ,f ,he new situation that iorced Grotius to go so conventional
restraints-moral'
. It seemed to Grotius that the old
man in his war-making had
""ii"
"i""
that
and
effective'
to
be
ceased
il;;;tl;
had perished in the
.""#;;; r"r.i"i,n. beasts. The last vestige of chivalry
of Catholic and Protestant had made reliFrench civil wars; and the antaSonism
ro these factors were
ferocitv., rither than a check upon it
;;;;;;"i";i";
of missile weapons' which w^e.re dehumannow added the growrng predomlnance

and also the

of undiscriminating slaughter at-a distance'35
t *t"tt
"1" "ff"ir
the soldiert
n.-*"rtrnt"gy ofd".'astation' It was an aBe when
"11::^"1:
civilian population;36 and the
ing a prescriptive right to massacre a r"ecalcitrant

irl"t ** i"a

armiesoftheThirtyYeals'Walhadlattellytocontend,notonlywiththeirofficial

*i

guerillas: Simplicissimus
f, ifte bloodthirsty vengeance ofpeasant

there. ever is O:'Y::l:^o'u*tt "nu

lo
seI timits to what was legitimale rn
In this situation, Grotius;ought
^1i.."t.*
t""tpt his obscured the fact thar.the limils he did
[ffi;, it;
and Gentili; and far
';;;;""."'"in't
wide: wider, for instance' than in Sud'rez
,"i *.t"
prisoners of war;
to
"On"U*gft
it is lawful
wider than in Vitoria.ss Grotius taught that
^kill that unrestricted
perfidy;
by
is legitimate, if noi accompanied
irr",
if they have
"r.lrri"",l""
l""lri"iJ "f,fr" fanis and cities of the enemy is permissible,.even
that 'the
and
consideration;
,"rr"tJ"r"a, ,ft", ,f,e civilian has no right to special
comprehended
as
and children is alli*ed to ha"e impunitv'
il;il;;;;;;;"t
according to his habit' with
in the right of war'-a Posrtron which he buttressed'
that taketh thy
from the :l7th Psalm: 'Blessed shall he be
*"L,ton
proceeded to
he
"on.ii,"
".
th" stones''se It is true that
and dasheth them
children
use of
"gu'n't
which must detr the good man from making
-.J."*ia*ations
lothe
reflects
"r*.
remain rights none the less' Grotius' in fact'
;L';;;;;t,;;;G
same
to
the
oithe Thirty Years' warf. though it was
*1r,r."ii"""r,"r"'' "fthe age
-had
disciplinary
given Maurice the insPiration for his
which
ir"rrl."i
ilbsolutc'
Thc
instances
""ift"tltr"t
convenient
of
,"f',"ttr, ,ft"t hc lttrnctl I'ol his lepcrtory

"""-i.r,Ut,
might well comment

on 'the enmiry;hich

156o-1660

29

feral warfare ofthe epoch, with which Grotius thus felt obliged to come to terms,
gave a peculiar incisiveness to the logic ofLeviathan.
The continued use ofmercenary armies, with their professional codes and traditions, and the rise of an international officer,class, did indeed provide mitigations before many decades had passed: new military conventions grew up, to reg-

il*:,:l-T:Tfii;

neishbours a sharpened conscrousn

in his ?esra;;;ril. nl.h.lit' put tt'" point clearlv when he wrote the
;;"ffi;
raids ofa
to
necessary
was
Prevent
d"nt nnlitiaue lhat awell-fortitied trontier
as one or more lines of
i"""'"ii"" r""t tr'" idea of a frontier
the rather new no;;;;ifr";;i** *;t *;l developed, and from it there followed
't"ttin"a' to meet strategic requirements' The age of

Military Revolution,

ulate the relations of armies

to one another. But it was lons before

these

restrictions were applied to civilians: not until the most civilized siate in Europe,
impelled by military logic, had twice devastated the Palatinate, did public opinion
begin to turn against the type ofwarfare which Grotius had been compelled to legitimize. Grotius, indeed, represents a transitional stage at which the military revolution had not yet worked out its full effects. A completer control by the state of
its armies, better administrative devices-and the fear of reprisals-were required
befbre there could be any real alleviation. Ifthe military revolution must be given
the responsibility for the peculiar horrors of the Thirty years' War, it did at last
cvolve the antidote to them. The eighteenth century would bring to Europe a long
period in which a limitation ofthe scope ofwar was successfully maintained, But
it is a long way still, in 1660, to the humane rationalism ofVattel.
Such were some of the effects of the military revolution: I have no doubt that
others could be distinguished. I hope, at least, to have persuaded you that these
taclical innovations were indeed the efficient causes ofchanges which were really
fcvolutionary. Between 1560 and 1660 a great and permanent transformation
came over the European world. The armies of Maximilian II, in tactics, strategy,
constitution and spirit, belong to a world ofidcas which would have seen.red quite
lirreign to Benedek and Radetzky. The armies of the Great Elector are linked inliangibly with those of Moltke and Schlieffen. By 166o the modern art ofwar had
.ome to birth. Mass armies, strict discipline, the control ofthe state, the submergence ofthe individual, had already arrived; the conjoint ascendancy offinancial
power and applied science was already established in all its malignity; the use of
propaganda, psychological warfare, and terrorism as military weapons was alrcady familiar to theorists, as well as to commanders in the field. The last remaining qualms as to the religious and ethical legitimacy of war seemed to have been
rtilled. The road lay open, broad and straight, to the abyss of the twentieth cenr

Llry.

Notes
r. For a general treatment of the period Hans l)elbriick, Geschichte tler Ktiegskunst im
lithnen tler politischen Geschichte, tserlin, .9zo. iv, is the best authority, though this volume
i\ oD a slighter scale than its predecessors. Paul Schmitthenner, Krieg und Kriegf hrung im
\\\rtulel der Wehgeschichte, Potsdam, 1930, is a stimulating and suggestive survey. Sir
t llrarles Oman's A Flistory of the Art of War in the Sixteenlh Centuly (1937) necessarily ends
rvith Mauricc of Orangc. l'he best discussions
English are the chapter in Sir Ceorge
i lirrk, 7 ftc S.r'./r/aarllr (,ivrtraH Oxford, r9:9, nrd thc same author's llar ancl Society in the
\t ttttI '.ttIIt () itIttty, ( )irrtrbr'irlgc, ri.75tt.

il

The

Michael Roberts
z. For

'""

tltupt"t

iof

-Non Dlsoglra
credere che l'addestra-"1:"
::"'.;;;iJ*""
tt::TY::l::
rudimenlale istruTione
\ia pur :i::]"i:"t"f;tilJ:::
d'armi nel senso mo(lerno Lna pi"ri'
esercizi
tIt Rinascimento
crict
non ci sono
^r
pi'ro
- - ^ e" ta" crisi
iiijilii J ffi'" a"i i""iiuitici "':
:ffit:';i
militare italiano,Tvin, 19tz' P 46'
ii' o*''" "r *: li:::r":'li:i'
illi'J#'lll; lliiii ;1115.
p. s: ard cf. l. 1:
'n' Mc'fioie5' SlratbourE' 1735, :^',::':::";T
Monle(uc(oli'
frrla.nao
r.",t
"'4,
i chelal' Frankfurt' fif
Arr
w"lllln.tr"n,
is a de: .

-- --

'l1iltloire
the art of drawing up

,ii" 1"il " 0".r".,

Siven n

rr..

a'mata {ro8J)' pP 160-8'

lorier' Pallas
r"'o;rle or
O;;;,ut" ot squut'' th" w"ag' rt"
Globe': Turner, oP. alt' PP lr2 14'

*ri"ii."i"
*';i;.;.'il

sit

,Ouare. There

Tongs' the saw' and the

;:il#:ft;';:;l;i"i,,""o'1'*auo*"":li!^1t:.:::tl?,::::1ji"-];3i;,']"';':
a

rgog,l,

a'

::"Jfi

"..,:"'ro
l^l,' ns' Hondbuch

l"'l,"a',il'l::;:;'""iii""'

i -, .L^ ^rr "+-r- ,,^,,1.1 h.ve

-::'-'i:.:11"i,":-H::iH:
einer Geschichte des Ktiegswesens

internationale d'histoire militairc, x, (r95r), p. 94: 'le esigenze della nuova tattica esigono
insomma degli eserciti mercenari permanentil
15. See on this Eugen Heischmann, Die,4firinge rles stehenden Heeres i1 Ostefteich, Yienna, 1925, pp, 199-2oo.
16. For these attempts see E. von Frauenholz, Die Landes.lefeflsiou in der Zeit des
dreissigjahrigen Ktieges, Munich, 1939; H. Werthelm, Der toller Halbelstddter, i, 68 75;Max
Lenz, Landgtuf Moritz yon Hessefi, in Keine historische Schriften, Mnnich and Berlin, r9:o,
ii, 128-3r; C. lany, Geschichte der Ki;niglich Preusskchen Armee, Berlin, 1928, i, 26-9, 6L]'
Otton Laskowski, 'Uwagi na marginesie nowego wydania Zarysu Historii Wojskowoice w
Polsce Generata Mariana Kukiela', Teki Historyczne,v (r95r-z), p. j9; Rockstroh, i,4-38, 65;

rl

:.,::I:'ili?..*lJil;';;
t',.

*",!i',1{;:;il;*v:,y;i:';,f
:;:,:';:;:i::"r;lrffi

p"nr'ei-,'e,s,pas

discussion appears to
in ,t"p n""'f investisatio' rhe onlv
und.Uniformktnde
de. Gtei.trsih, irn:, ZiitutrrtT.lur,U"eresbe E. Sandet,Zur Geschi.hte

?;]11il.li;,iil;i']lllhing

!t',:'il,tuTJ;,*:i#,";".*,*,m"l1T'"T#l'43"ixl'6'i";'"i"y;ii
ygg.:!ii'1ii:fii'i'*'-'1i1'ffi':::
;#f ::;:t[1}'; :'I"Jtr ;*:*it{"1':l
ffi .';,;;;' ;il;.'ndence'in san&r's viewsiil*TiilJfi:;:: x1::r:Tff tT: :ilj
'*"u:o:1111t"

H. Kretzschmar, Sacfisische Geschichte, Dresden, 1935, ii, 39.

17. For Lazarus von Schwendi, see E. von Frauenholz, Lazarus von Schwendi. Det erste
tleutsche Uerkiindet der allgemeinen WebpJlicht.
18. As Gustav Adolfput it to AdolfFrederick of Mecklenburg; 'Es miichtte E. L. imandt
cinbilden wollen, als wen das lands volck nicht zum krige tauget, lasen sich solches ja von

marching in steP.was.tl"
prussiar army (w. sombart' Der
,, ,ne rule in the
that it was Leopold ofDessau who macl(

;;i:
(:(",'fl.$jj,if; *: ),*;lmr,"'t'"1;.".'*:iiil :'Tj"l'::"T'J""ii':
armies
the
that
sugsest
I h"u"

ilil;il,i'J

u'

;;;toau"t*

'icuri'i''"t'hing'
tt"p titfter' Willh.ausen
ofthe Thirty Years' Wa' aia not ft""p

'""nnothing ofit

saYs

in his chap-

i*",,\:"*i,t^:

l"t:::;:fi11,_i{1:.ili'l,i,l;1i," f}ffiiff:"HT:
"" -",ii,i*
ff::;:'i::'"f,xlfJ.!*ffiiu.ilJ#";;;fJthe"orrvs*e''te"ntl'i.::1tllr.v.^:eetsteeror
i.,n ir,.* *"rrm*n writes (op.rir,, p.,73)i,;:"r,r:;#jnl1f,if"tiffi".,",'Ji'1T\

i..

reculant le pied droict'; and E D Davii

comma nds' Fibi to the tight
is evef more exPlicit:'The captatne

h::a?:::::**"'^"o

*rit**x*iil"$*It*.?ui,;;u:ltxru*u;:.'l;':':l'"1#!'1*
with
tttp on the march: 'Let him march then
so)diers alreaay
Davies

OJpt

thrt !'nglish

;;l.i -;;:", l";i.ii',*

vp his hcacl

g"l""liv'

i'i.. pacc ftrll of s.atritics and st.tc

"

18, 52-3.

r3. Paul Schmitthennet, Europiiische Geschichte un.l SbLdnertum, Betlin, .933.

r4. Ibid., p. 26; Pierc Pieri, 'La formazione dottrinale di Raimondo Montecuccoli', Rerre

'

Leen forced

31

rr.'ll n'y a pas un Cavalier dans les trouppes de France, qui n'ait un habillement de
Bufle, depuis que l'on s'est deffait de ceux de fet': Gaya, Traitt des Armeg Paris, 1678, p. 56.
12. R. Kn6tel, H. Kniitel, J. Sieg: Handbuch der Llnifutmkunde. Die militLrische Tracht in
ihrer Entwicklung bis zur Gegenwart, Hamburg, 1932, is a standard history. The authors
consider that there were no true uniforms before about the middle ofthe centuryj but it is
possible to dispute this view: see, e.g., Wettheim, op. cit,, l, 94i E. von Frauenholz, Das
Sijldnertum in .ler Zeit des dreissigjahrigen Krieges, Munich, 1938, i, 41-2; K. C. Rockstroh,
Udtiklingen af den natioxale haer i Danmark i det ry. og 18. Aarhuwirede, Copenhagen,

a,^'advanPrlnsMa::it:.:.u::".:'::'::.';io":,:tl;
";;;;;
,,"t-'l;:il:fi::;:;i,ii',,),,-i,
,
u-oi ui u n - s,:!'
ilIi^fi
il
"
,i".,1"i
:i.:,: :,.:!.',:;:#: Y;: \:i"
'"gs.''"a iTl Y;Ii;l"l,ijlJil"lil,!lli
Krlege' r>ct'tr' t:rLt) " "" i'r*'
'
Pfiilzlschen .lllJl,l'lilli''i',,""',.
li,l,il;"i
"
protracted hostilities in
during
.ii*i.'""a *rdiers
the great wastage
on him by ";:;
t'',.

1660

Ioc. cit.

<. 1.e..

1560

which most imports, is that they haue alwaies their eies vpon their companions which are
in ranke with them, and before them going iust one with the other, and keeping perfit distance without committing error in the least pace or step lmy italics] ' (p. 76). This may be to
attach too much importance to a mere flower of Davies' exuberant style; but it seems very
likely that pikemen, at least, could not afford to be out ofstep when marching in close order, for the position ofthe pike when held at the ttail, and its extreme length, would other
wise have been liable to imperil the haulches ofthe man in front: see Davies' description,

the art of wlr in Europe' and'the reforms

fuller consideration ofthe changes in
(MittM Roberts' Essa)'s I n Swedish Hi:toty

of Matrrice and Gtrstav Aaotf,

neapolis,1967).

Military Rel,olution,

den grossprecheren nicht einbilden, glauben n,ihr (der ich tegelich die probe da von
nehmen muss) das wen sihe wol gefiirret vnd gecommendiret werden, mit ihnen mehr,
clan mit der irregularen soldatesce, auss zu richtten': C. G. Styffe, Konung Gustaf II Adolt's
slir{ier, Stockholm, rs6r, p.4r4. Sweden did indeed employ mercenaries in time ofwar to
supplement her standing army of conscripts; but the permarent force, as provided for in
the Form ofGovernment of1634, was a militia.
19. R. Altamira y Crevea, Historia .le Espana y de la Civilizaciin espaiola, Barcelona,
1927, iii, 289 93; P Schmitthenner, Krieg und Kriegfahrung im Wandel der Weltgeschichte, p,
20. V K. Kiernan, 'Foreign Mercenaries and Absolute Monarchy', Crisis
/660, ed. T. Aston (1965), pp. rzz-3.

rrn(l thitt

in E rope $60-

2f. IlockslK)h, i,4, 6, -1t,65; C. lrnrcr, /)ic Vcrhnnllungcn Schv,edens tnal seiler Ver,
lut tDit Wtlhttsttin ttttl rhttt K]ris( rolt (j.t bis r(,.t./, LciIzig, r899, i, 259: in Auglrst

ltii,trh

The

Michael Roberts

land unter sich. iiber sich gehen

Fra.reiholz' Das sd ldnertuln in der zeit

"iiirtl,
is now the best authority

,r.

t.

i".

*n

armv
i'; *ji"llTi"T;ii 'll1tithe point that a standingusually
which
excesses
the
oooutation, since
'iii it avoided

#iffi;,
;ffi;ilft;,

;u.ou

.f n-""""a
*i.i"
'"
ri. ,t. t"gg*"a

to form a standing armv for the

*u' a'i*n #"tt"'pt

'qaolr

Cermany, in the interest

Uy A.Vagts' A History of

of discipline

Militatisn (r%8)'.p

46'

. odeme Kap.ialimus,
26. As susqested by w.n", so-ou.,Jdr,
:o'" wlFr*i*r,'tieL mag dabei mitgesprochen haben' .
,ai,
-*l'r.].'t.
u, otspelTan den eetsten hrgelschen

tra.'

""t

the civil

,of
accompanied disbandment:

Montecuc1ti3,11-]' th" hs

pou' I'Int'anierie' pP re-2o;

*;uo""

des dreissiglahriSek Krleges

eased the-burdens

i, :+1, though he did

oorlog's Grawnhage' 1920'

1'

15o-

of lhe two case''

r, for a suggestive comparison
28.

Axi!

ir. il. i"i .""", *".

;;;t;;the

;;

brefvexlins Stockholm' 1888 ll' i'J96'

the biggest canal enterwalenst.in,. idea. t-t is notewofthy thar
with the MediterraBordeaux
canal des Deu* Mers' linking

Oxensriernos skriftet

och

nean-was essentially a strategic work'

great military feats ofthe war:
30. In 1639: one ofthe

see

Birger Steckzbn' lohan Banet'

Stockholm, 1919, P. 33o.

i
Adolfsbasering och operationsplaner
rr. Lars Tingsten, 'Ni8ra dara angiiende Gustafll
1632"'I'262-4'

xlviii (rs:8); Srerises,ktis1611

t'itl*i 'i ":":r; uiilo,*kt;dsri;fi,ts"ries'
'"ii'
of Gustav Adolf's strategv' see Robaiscussion
i"[*
il';'"lil; t;;' History'
^
^' 71-3'
"'' pp'
etts,

Essays

in Swedish

di

'La formazione dottrinale

jz. B. Sfeckren' Baner pp 2o8' JJ2'.J4zl Piero Pieri,
uo: La gucrra :":" P,"1.':llT:lt::"::':;""i,*,:l:
pp.

-"

R"il;;;;;;,;;"iii

:Uili.;H;:'i".oi"i'u ""1"'" "'ry1**1::

(tgto)'
senare skede' scandia'iii
krigets:i1-'1"i1:T"H:);,:il'i,:1;;:
;:*::ft:::'J:t'#:.#;;;";;;;'t"*iga
fi

Ddsslm-

et nat'ale (=Histoite de la
Colin and J Rebo d' Histoirc nilitaie
i'
433; General Weygand'
432'
4:,:8'
noion francaise,ed. G. Hanotaux' tu'' to'i'""t'

'"::.'l,tro-iru, lii,tgs;l

Tfienne, Patis, \934, P. 98.

i' sl'
J4. C. lany. oP .ir..

,i. r. u. N"r,io ,v,", **^tu

16. The Swedes had ro,8oo

o".k;;:;;t;"tiets

tttrt'
rt:,ii,!,'j#Ji,,l'.ii'f:'f

,:ffi1?'$l',ijl ..

u.

Fihraeus' Karl
hisroria' Stockholm' re38-e' ii' 537; Rudolf

.,*.,
x/

ocft

(ariXlI,

Stockholm, r9l2' P JJ8

p u4'
'Formazione dottrinale di - - Montecuccoll'
Pieri,
37.
is' to the flattening
discipline-that
of
relaxation
the
to
conducrve
18. 'Self-equipment is
to' -

i:;

il;'.",i"i,
il'-'Til v:y.r:""1*

"t
ety (te5'av p. e2

s"'i'r"-

nid lleboul, P

drz')ewskt'

Military,as4"-|1i1o!

^n

"*1":Jllj:;:i:"15::lTil:,1"#["j#; ;::"::i,ff

sion of Jthe rulers'] desire to assert tnel

ibid., P.88.
uo-u'
39. Montecuccoli' PP
40. Colin

a"

368'

46o-i66o

33

4r.Weygand, Histoire de I'Armte ftangaise, p. r44, reproduces this medal.

42. For a discussion of related problems, see fames E. King, Science and Rationalism in
the Gowrwheht of Louis XIV Baltimor, 1949.
43. A. Ernstberger, Hans de Witte, Filtafiznafin Walletsteins,Wiesbaden, 1954
44. J. Saint-Germain, Les fnanciers sous Louis XIV Paris, 1950, p. 17. V Klutchevski,
Pietre Ie Cranal et sorl oe rrc, P^ris, rg53, pp. 162-6.
45, K. R. Swart, The Sale of Offces in the Seventeenth Century, The Hague, 1949, passirn.

auch
lch witl die bauren nicht lrewehren' solte
r6j2 lohn George told Larr Nilsson lirngel
tlas
""

Military Revolution,

46. The point is well made

in M. futter, 'Das Kontributionssystem

Wallensteins',

Hktorische Zeitschrift, qo IN.F. r+l (r93o), pp. 248-9.

47. G. Droysen, Beitrage zut Geschichte des Militarwesens in Deutschlafid wdhrend der
Epoche des dreissigjhhrigen Krieges,Hanoven 1875, pp. 28-31, for the resemblances betweel
a mercenary company and a gild.
48. Andrzeiewski, op. .it, p. 96.
49. V l-oewe, Die Oryanisation unrl Verwahung der Wallensteinischen Heere, Freibwg
i.8., 1895, pp. 22-4.
50. L. An&6, Michel Le Tellier et Louyois, Paris, r94u, pp. jz7 4o; Gordon A. Craig, Tfte
Politics of the Prussian Army 640-1945, Oxford, rgs5, pp. 5-6.
5r. The term is Andrzejewskit.
52. Especially for those who lived on a main traffic artery: one major cause ofthe decline
in the population ofCoburg during the periodwas enlistment. G. Franz, Der dreissigjilhrige
Krieg und das deutsche VoIk lena, ry$, p. 4t.
5j. T. A. Fischer, The Scots itr Germany: being a contibution towards the History of the
Scots abroad, Edinburgh, r9o2, p. 74, gives the proverb in the original. Cf the Scots ballad:
"First they took my brethren twain, Then wiled my love from me, O, woe unto the cruel
wars In Low Gennanie!" See B. Hoenig, Memoiren Englischer Oftciere im Heere Gustaf
Adolfs und ihr Fottleben in der Litentur, in Beitr, z. neueren Philologie J. Schippet
dorgefuocht, Leipzig, rgo2, pp. 324-0.
54. Turner, Pallas Armafa, p. 166. Or as Wallhausen put it, when lamenting the decline of
the lance,'on est contraint de se servir de gens basses et vils':4/f militaire A cheva\ p. J; ane
cf similar remarks in Richeliev, Testameri politique, p, 476.
55. Wallhausen, lArr militaire pour I'lnfdhterie, pp, 9-ro.
56. There is a good discussion of the question in H. J. C. von Grimmelshausen,
Simplicissimus the Vaga&ord [trans. A. T, S. Goodrick] (r9rz), in chapters xvi-xvii: 'Who
was the Imperialist |ohlr de Werthi Who was the Swede Stalhans [i.e. Stilhandske]? Who
were the Hessians, Little Jakob and St Andr? Of their kind there were many yet well
l<nown, whom ... I forbear to mention'. I{e argues that this is no new state of affairs; but
when he cones to give a list ofearlier examples he can think of no instance between Hugh
(lapet and Pizzaro except Tamerlane. Simplicissimus was mistaken about Stilhandske,
nroreover: his father hadbeen kammariunkar"e to Erik XIV
57. Roland Mousnier, La Vlnalitt des ffices sous Henri IV et Louis XIII Rouen, n.d., p.
506; 4 Frauenholz, Sijldnertum, i, z7: 'vom Rjtterschlag hdrt man nichts mehr, an denen
Stclle tritt die Nobilitierung: For conditions in Sweden, E. Ingers, B onden i svenskhistoria,
Stockbolm, 1943, i, 234 B. Steckz6D, ,loh Bane6 p. 57: 'Their Isc Swedish infantry officers']
coats of arrns are often of recent origin, and many of them are not easily distinguishable
lrom the young peasaDt lads that serve as NCOS, or frll the ranks as privatesl
58. It was said ol- thc flclds.hrciher th^t'er lnuss fast des Hauptmanns Mejster sein, der
sclbcl olinmls nicht scltrcibcn und rcchncn kunn': l,ocwc, or. .i/., D. 20.

Mthacl

The

Roberts

lhe beginGenemlktiegs.kommissaliatl
ts. As for instance in the Great Elector's
verv indtpendentlv of the

J;;i;;;fr.*t,

i"t"'r"'"a *;tr' *itltaiy

a a.Catsten'The origins of

affairs and acted

Prussia' oxford.',t95,0'P'

"From
'u?'-

- "- Sweden'
ns ban and arriite-ban; andsee' for
^r.it..--""a;,
60. Richelieu' Terfame'r, pp' :q:-+' condem
tidskrift'
4z lrgzz)'
Historisk
organisation"
'M;i"; .u.tt1:lnst lch adelsfa"ans
* ;";;,
cit" \' ro-72'

oD
r4i-5o, zzr-3; and for Brandenburg' Ianv'
and the
instance, 'the officers of th artillery
er. ln the armies ofthe Great Elctor,

f;

*"r. ul-o.t exclusively

"ngin"".,
sreriges krig
62.

1611-1632,

commoners': Carstn' op ctl' p

s$pPlement,'ry'tol'

re. E. G. R. Taylor, The Mathelnatlcl

o"liTtilif"iffi,

lt*?i

of

271'

'The standard
possible'
gunnery
insufficient to make scientif,c
ofenginering technology was not meref
oran appried
16:

i i.i.iJl""n'.,i.,.'J::f::::*l*li"fil:;115'il:,T;i,,iistatus

'1;.

r-.'i;ilr,i

r(

nt',1t'1,f,*;-T::.hi'*?,!l,lli"1i,ii"-i;J;,,1X;,rur?'::;
f(
pp

Adolf's interest in cartograPhy' see

';;;;;t;;';i;iir",utoia
-eo.

L. Hammarskiold,

-iiii'0,"i,'"

u)

re4&
undet treniotrriga ktisets 'kt.a tkede' srockholm'
r94r-4'
Artillerr'-TrdskriJt'
'Ur svenska artillerietr h?ivder"

o"""0

"T:":fl i'ff

68. Stlucisses ile

"- guetre are descrlDeo

l"lfl"T?

41-2'

93

i; {;.YJl;';#l"ngerrich
illiu*:':

und
and as

: ;tt-"i'"'nd" "h'oti" kugel oder.

:'"t:11, "-lYet"
rustliicher lof a fortress] so viel man dun
"J;;;;i
Lurste welche voll pulvers gefullet und in die
g"'ptJ;'*;rden' They aie saidro have been sacks an ell
kan, sesteckt, und die -uu"t nr'o

Nassau'pp 50'

e feetlong: itilgskui)ige Aontekening-tan 1ohan 'an

described in a note
to be distiniuished from the,sarcissors
";k";;;;;;;"i'
iliiniJ;. il;;" possibiy
eDdroits"
trois
en
li6es
(Mlmoires, p r37' note) as:grosses fascines
to
(rs66), p
'" Montecuccoli
profession',
Histoty'X,
dical
,The
Me
of the MJical

,r.

iird *. Ct*,

History

Il' v5' 196; and in gen"t)o. rrrrr",

odolfs sktifier' pp 65'67;Monrc Hk FxPeditior'
w Sjastraid' Grunddragen av den militara nilerrisningens
"uuol
f*'-ifia"r,
"it.o,ion

".Jf
tDDkomst-ochutt/ecklingshistoriatsvetigetillfrrvgz-',lJPPsala'D+r'Theconcludingsectwo,persons on
; rinilitaire iL che'i! 1pp 97-rl4) is 'a discourse.of
i#"

"i*;"rit-."i;

the excellence ofthe Military

;;is-ii;',.c.i.e-n;.;.*ell

Art' mai;;nri;g that

liberal

as

all the other

1e*cepr Theology)-it.excels

Art ought to
mechanicai" and insisting that'the Military

ouui"' *tit"i 1Th" A't ol Wo' o*1 Englands

be taught in Academies, as Letters u'"i 'ttta
'beirg
then more perfect andaboue all other
i. "rl ,l'"'he military profession
gr"ut"' Stt'die' and more continuall
itt th"
Arts, consequently it i' n"t""u"" '"" ut"
'""-"
Artl
exercise then is to be vsed in any other
Heischmann' pp' z11-r3'
pp
Wijn'
74-80;
zr. Siostrand' pp. 177-83;

i)iiirrr'
-

72. Loewe' PP. 16-25'

Andrb, LeTellier et Loul'ols'

7.

pp

377-2t; and (on the emergence

ofrank) Wiin' pp 62-

r, 28-9; s)ostranuolrr'i'
z:;'i.au"nholr, st;l in ertuttl-,
arono^inu" au XyIe au XVIIIe sidcre,
Silberner' La Guerre
ra. Edmond

Paris,

r'

1939

Iltirl '

tt gtl'

156o-1660

35

76, I. E. Elias, Het Uoorspel van ileh eersten Engelschen oorlog,

i, r4r z.
77. Bulstrode Whitelocke, Memoriak ofthe English Afairs (q3z), pp. @j ff,
78. Elias, op. cit., i, r:'4 r77, especially pp. r57, 167-8; Charles E. Hill, The Danish Sound
Dues axd the Command ofthe Babic, Chapel Hill, 1926, p. r55.
79. For all this see F. Redich, De praeda militari. Looting afld Booty
den, r956.
8(). See, e.9.,

rsoo ]sts,Wjesba-

M. Ritter,'Das Kontributionssystem Wallensteins', pa$irfl.

8r. Pieri, 'Formazione dottrinale', p. loo.

S|yffe, Gustal II Adolfs skrifier, p. 5z.o.

Axel Oxenstiernas skrifter och brefvexling l, vti, rz6.
84. For Vauban and the notlon ol the prb carrt, see Makets of Modern Strategy,
Earle, Princeton, r94,t, pp. 40-6.
82.

rua. ora stuart E glafld, cam

p'
sicsin the sewnteenth centutv'cantbi-dge'1e52'

science, since thete was no technrque

Military Revolution,

83.

ed,.

E.

85. The best early example ofthis is perhaps the close-action broadside; but the new
ear tactics were not far behind.

M.
lin-

86.'Les maisons n'6toient que de bois, comme dans la pluspart de l'Allemagne, et en

moins de six heures tout ftlt reduit en cendre: exemple terrible mais n6cessaire contre des
bourgeois insolents qui ne sachent ce que c'est que de faire la guerre, osent insulter de
braves gens et les dfier d'entrer dans leurs murs, Iors-qu'ils n'ont ni l'adresse ni le courage
de s'y dfendre': G. Gualdo Priorato, L'Historie des demiires campagnes et negociations d.e
Gustave Atlolphe en Allemagne. Avec des notes .. . pat M. I'AbbA de Frcncheville, tseririn, y7z,
p. r85. It is difficult to agree with Professor Nef (War antl Human Progress [r95o], pp. r3a)
that Spinola's courteous treatment ofthe enemy at the surrender ofBreda (1625), as against
the horrors ofMagdeburg (163r), marks the beginning of a new chivalrousness and the age
of limited warfare, though Oestrich (op. cir., p. 31) endorses Nef's comment. Breda capitulated; Magdeburg was stormed: the two cases are not comparable.
87. Grimmelshausen, Simplicissimu5 p. 32.
88. Francisco Suarez, De Triplici virtute theologica, fde, spe, et chatitaf (162r) (new edn,
Oxford, 1944), especially vii, p. 13-16; Alberico Gentili, De /rre jelli Libri Tres (tltz) (new
cdn, Oxford, 1933), II, iv, viii, xxi, xxiii; fames Brown Scott, The Spanish Origin of Interflational Law: Francisco ile Vitoria and his Law ofNatlons, Oxford, 1934, especially p. 285.
89. Hugonis Gtotii De lure Belli ac Pacis Librl ?eq ed. W Whewell, Cambridge, 1853, III,
iv, 9 $ r, for this passage; and see ibid, IIl, iv, 8 ro, 15, 16; IIl, n r; Itl, viii, r-4.
90. Blnkershoek is said to have remarked 'dat de Groot zich steeds aan de bestaande
Sewoontei en gebruiken houdt, zoodat hij bij gebreke daarvan nauwelijks eenigen regel
van jus gentium durft te stellen': J. Kosters, 'Het Jus gentium van Hugo de Groot n diens
voorgangers', Mededeelingen der Koninklijke Akademie ran Wetenschappen, Afd. Lettet
kunde, 58 (1924). Series B., p. 13.