Cultural Relativism and Subjectivism

Different cultures have different

moral codes

 Among the Etoro people of New Guinea, penis feeding

is considered not only morally acceptable, but medically
and socially necessary for adolescent males.
According to Herodotus, the Callatians ate their dead
fathers. The ancient Greeks cremated dead bodies;
Christians mainly bury them.
Some Eskimo (i.e., Inuit, Yupik, Kalaallit) groups
traditionally practiced open marriage and wife
wife loaning
loaning
Supposedly, some of these same groups also practiced
infanticide and eldercide (though this is disputed)

How do we know these things?

Partly on the basis of empirical evidence; partly on the
basis of testimony.
Though in some cases, we should bear in mind, such
claims might be the result of prejudice or fantasy or
projection.
Nonetheless, its
it s surely true that, at least when it comes
to specific practices, there is a substantial degree of
diversity among cultural norms

Descriptive Moral Relativism

So, from the perspective of the social sciences, history,
globalized world)) even everyday
y y experience,
p
it
and ((in a g
is perhaps just obvious that the claim is generally true:
Different cultures have different moral codes
But what, if anything, follows from the descriptive fact of
cultural relativism?
Well, for one thing, if we think that truth is intrinsically
valuable, then knowing the truth about the variety of
human norms and practices is valuable for that reason
alone

Consequences of Descriptive Relativism

Beyond that, coming to know the descriptive truth about
cultural differences can be morally valuable to us. It
can:
1. Alert us to the danger of assuming that all of our
preferences must be based on some absolute moral
standard.
Eating the dead, e.g., may seem horrific to us, yet it may
be that, despite our strong feelings, funerary practices are
more like matters of etiquette than matters of morals.
morals
They may be things about which there could be
reasonable disagreement

2. Similarly, confronting the fact of cultural relativism may

p us to keep
p an open
p mindit can p
provide an
help
antidote to dogmatism (30)
We may have been socialized to find repugnant, e.g.,
public nudity or homosexuality. To the degree that our
socialization has been successful, we are then likely to
have strong negative feelings about nudity or
homosexuality.
But feelings arent reasons. Our socialization may have
been morally mistaken. The fact of diversity forces us to
consider the reasons (if any) underlying that socialization.

Normative Implications?
But many people have sought to draw further, stronger
conclusions from the descriptive fact of cultural
relativism.
In particular, some people attempt to draw normative
inferences from this fact, possibly using an argument of
the form:
1. Different cultures have different moral codes.
2. Therefore, there is no objective truth in morality. Right
and wrong are only matters of opinion, and opinions vary
from culture to culture.

1. Different cultures have different moral codes.

2. Therefore, there is no objective truth in morality. Right
and
d wrong are only
l matters
tt
off opinion,
i i
and
d opinions
i i
vary
from culture to culture.
Logically, the argument as stated is unsound. Its premise is
true, but its inference is invalid (i.e., not truth-preserving).
Nothing necessarily follows from the fact of disagreement
about
b t anything.
thi
Compare: Some people think the world is flat. Does it follow
that the shape of the Earth is merely a matter of opinion?

Normative Relativism:
Unacceptable Consequences
Moreover, if we accepted normative cultural relativism
(the when
when in Rome
Rome view):
A. We could never criticize the customs of other societies.
They would instead merely be different. (But what
about, e.g., oppressive regimes?)
B. We could determine right and wrong in moral matters
simply by consulting the existing standards of our
society or culture. (But what if our society is evil, e.g., a
slave-owing society?)

C. Similarly, there could be no criteria for judging moral

progress; no non-arbitrary
non arbitrary grounds for undertaking
reform of social norms.
(If there is no moral fact of the matter about how we
ought to treat people, then why not continue to oppress
gay people or ethnic minorities, provided that majority
culture concurs?)

Moral Criticism of Other Cultures

Confronting the descriptive fact of cultural relativism can
teach us the virtues of tolerance ((of other p
peoples
p
norms) and humility (about the warrants of our own).
As the preceding arguments suggest, however, all
cultures, all societies are in the same boat: We may
have objectively good reasons for some of our beliefs;
others may be founded on prejudice and/or uncritical
acceptance of tradition
tradition.
None of this, however, implies that we need a perfectly
objective, neutral perspective from which to criticize the
norms of other people

Is moral criticism of
other cultures possible?
The Argument from Relativity
For moral skeptics like J. L. Mackie (1917-81),
such criticism must always be arbitrary (i.e., irrational).
Consider our earlier argument: When we disagree with
others about whether or not the Earth is flat,, there is an
objective fact (namely the sphericality of the Earth), and
plenty of observational evidence for that fact, to which
we can appeal

Mackies Metaethics I
but when it comes to moral disagreement, Mackie
asks, where in the world is there anyy objective
j
moral
fact to which we could point? (39)
Moral claims do not seem to be objective facts (at least
to Mackie). Instead, they seem simply to be intuitions or
assertions of ideals.
If there was anything like an objective
objective moral fact,
fact it
would be a metaphysically queer sort of thing
something utterly different from anything else in the
universe (40)

The Range of Intercultural Disagreement

While specific cultural norms are obviously diverse, there
pp
to be a significant
g
core of moral norms
also appears
shared amongst all sustainable cultures and societies.
E.g., prohibitions against lying; at least some prohibitions
against indiscriminate killing.
The general theoretical point: There are some rules that
all societies must have in common
common. Because those rules
are necessary for society to exist. (23)
The causal mechanism: Selection? Game theory?

Moral Subjectivism

Moral Subjectivism: The Basic idea

At its normative core, moral subjectivism is really just a
generalization (to individuals) of the sort of skepticism
that can be engendered by normative cultural relativism.
People have different moral opinions. But there is no
moral fact of the matter. So, really, people just feel
differently about moral issues. And thats really all there
is to it.
So, at its core, moral subjectivism can be addressed with
the same objections that weve offered for normative
cultural relativism. But some theorists have linked
subjectivism to more fundamental claims in metaethics..

Simple Subjectivism
David Hume (1711-76) raised the possibility
that p
purportedly
reports
about
p
y objective
j
p
moral beliefs are fundamentally reports
about feelings:
Take any action allowed to be vicious. Wilful murder, for
instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find
that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call
viceYou can never find it. Till yyou turn yyour reflection
to your own breast, and find a sentiment of
disapprobation, which arises in you toward this action.
Here is a matter of fact, but tis the object of feeling, not
reason. (Treatise of Human Nature, 1740)

Simple Subjectivism: Objections

Simple subjectivism:
X
X is immoral
immoral = II disapprove of X
X
X is the morally right thing to do = I approve of X
This seems clear enough, but it is open to some serious
objections:
1. It cannot make sense of disagreement
2. It implies that we are infallible

Emotivism
Charles Leslie Stevenson (1908-79)
developed a somewhat more sophisticated
version of the subjectivist idea: Emotivism.
Moral claims are not propositions, but imperatives
which express emotional attitudes. (Non-cognitivism)
As a metaethical theory, this has some initial
plausibility: When we use moral language we arent just
uttering propositions, we are normally also expressing
attitudes and trying to influence other people

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Emotivism and the Objections

Imperatives, unlike propositions, are neither true nor
false (e.g., shut
shut the door!;
door! ; fuck
fuck off!
off!),
), so the problem of
disagreement is avoided. Famously, people can have
different, contrary attitudes.
But just because emotivism holds that moral claims are
non-cognitive, it (arguably) only partly avoids the
infallibility problem: We may enjoy privileged access to
our attitudes and preferences (I am in pain; I prefer
vanilla to chocolate), but we can (surely) at least
occasionally be mistaken in our feelings

Moral Facts
Subjectivism can admit that there are such things, yet
they become facts about our feelings. This may leave
room for
f being
b i mistaken
i t k about
b t our ffeelings
li
and
d attitudes,
ttit d
but it doesnt provide any non-arbitrary way of evaluating
or revising our feelings.
Stevenson:
Any statement about any fact which any speaker
considers likely to alter attitudes may be adduced as a
reason for or against a moral judgment. (40)
If (or to the extent that) this really is our moral condition,
it seems to imply or support moral skepticism

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Mackie Redux
The Argument from Queerness
Mackie, as weve seen, embraces this possibility: Appeal
to moral facts is really an appeal to ways of life and/or
intuition.
If there really were any moral facts, of the sort that
actually justified moral claims (as opposed to explaining
the effects of moral sentences)
sentences), then we
e sho
should
ld be able
find empirical evidence for them. But there is none, says
Mackie. So, if they exist, they must be some queer sort
of thing. (Philosophical naturalism)

But thats just stupid presumptuous

But why should we assume that morality is like empirical
science? Compare
p
science, in this respect,
p
to the rules
of chess, or proofs in mathematics.
Rachels: when proof is demanded (in morals), people
often have in mind an inappropriate standard. (43)
Korsgaard (1996): It's true that [moral concepts] are
queer sorts
t off entities
titi and
d th
thatt kknowing
i th
them iisn't't lik
like
anything else. But that doesn't mean that they don't
exist... For it is the most familiar fact of human life that
the world contains entities that can tell us what to do and
make us do it. They are people, and the other animals.

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